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EASTERN PAPERS.

PART V.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

14

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

(EASTERN QUESTION.)

PART V.

No. 1.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 292.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 5, 1854.

YOUR Lordship will have learnt, by my telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date, that Baron Bourqueney and myself had waited on Count Buol, to learn from him the decision His Majesty the Emperor had taken upon the documents which, by the orders of our Governments, we had submitted to him.

I inclose a copy of that despatch, in which your Lordship will find stated the purport of the answers we received.

The announcement of the intention of the Emperor to direct Colonel Kalich to proceed to the head-quarters of the English and French armies to concert the dates and positions from which they should cooperate with the Austrian armies in the movements which might be decided upon, and the announcement of the intention of His Majesty, at a later period, to appoint a general officer to reside at those head-quarters, and to invite the appointment of officers of a similar rank to be placed at the head-quarters of his own army, was considered by us as perfectly satisfactory.

The acceptation of the text of the notes to be exchanged between the three Governments, but accompanied by the proposal of the two modifications which were required by the Austrian Government, occasioned some discussion; but as these modifications had been transmitted for the approval of our Governments, it was agreed that their consent to them must be waited for.

The text of the Convention, as it was modified in Article III, by the reciprocal engagement of Austria to the offensive and defensive stipulations of the alliance, was agreed to by Count Buol; but he stated that the Emperor considered the modifications proposed, as to the non-acceptance of any overture or proposition for a cessation of hostilities, would interfere with the necessary discretion which belonged to the Commanders-in-chief, and would more naturally form part of those ulterior arrangements which were stipulated for in Article III of the Convention. He therefore proposed that this 1st Article should remain as it had been originally worded. To this proposition we also replied that it would be submitted to our Governments.

Count Buol stated that he had already invited the Prussian Government to adhere to the four points mentioned in the notes to be exchanged between the Representatives of the three Governments, and that upon the acceptation or refusal by Prussia of this invitation, and upon the signature of those notes, the Austrian messenger would immediately be forwarded with them to St. Petersburgh, together with the instructions to Count Esterhazy; and if the Russian Cabinet did not accept the terms suggested, and order the evacuation of the

Principalities within eight days, Count Esterhazy would be directed to demand his passports. As soon as this result was known in Vienna, the Emperor pledged his word to sign the Convention.

Upon this announcement being made by Count Buol to us, Baron Bourqueney and myself strongly represented against this delay in the signature of the Convention. We stated that the substance of that document had been drawn up and proposed by myself, and we could not, therefore, understand why its completion was now to be delayed. We stated that our Governments had already been informed that its stipulations had been approved by the Austrian Government; that they were waiting with impatience the announcement of its adoption by the Emperor; and that they looked forward to it with the greatest anxiety, as the completion of the alliance which had so happily been established between us. We therefore called upon Count Buol most earnestly to reconsider this determination; adding, that it was upon the signature of the Convention that we must make the exchange of notes dependent.

Count Buol stated that the stipulations of this Convention could only become applicable after the refusal of Russia to the terms suggested, and to the evacuation of the Principalities; and he therefore considered that the proper moment for its signature would be when that refusal was made known.

He added, that the Governments of England and France, in the appreciation of their own interests and position, declined to notify their readiness to negotiate upon the guarantees contained in the notes; but the Emperor, who did entertain a hope that these guarantees might lead to the attainment of the objects for which he had engaged himself by the Protocols which had been signed, thought it advisable to see whether such a result was obtained by them, before he became a party to the document in question.

Count Buol did not believe that the present abstention of the Emperor from signing the Convention would have any effect upon the result of the communication he proposed to make to the Russian Government, because he meant it should be clearly understood that if Russia did not evacuate the Principalities, and accept the guarantees, the Convention would at once be signed.

Baron Bourqueney and myself replied, that the Emperor, in becoming a party to the proposed Convention, might feel entire security that his interests would be as zealously upheld as those of the other Governments he was allie with; that the signature of this Convention would be the surest means of obtaining from Russia those objects which it was the common aim to secure; that, since the Convention had been proposed by the Imperial Government, without the reserve at present insisted upon, to defer its signature would be looked upon as a change of policy which indicated a withdrawal of confidence in the Governments to which it had been offered; that we therefore conjured Count Buol to reconsider this decision; to abate at once his intention to conclude the Convention as soon as full-powers for its signature were received; and then to proceed to the exchange of the notes containing the guarantees.

With this appeal to Count Buol we closed our interview.

Since the above was written, Baron Bourqueney and myself have both seen Count Buol; and after our conversation with him, we both have felt that we might entertain a hope that his decision regarding the delay in signing the Convention is not irrevocable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 1.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

August 4, 1854.

(Télégraphié.)

COUNT BUOL, having received the orders of the Emperor, made to Baron Bourqueney and myself the following communication:

The exchange of notes with the two modifications proposed by Austria is accepted. The original text of the Treaty is likewise accepted. Count Buol wishes Article I to remain unaltered, and to consider the stipulation regarding common deliberations before concluding an armistice as part of the arrangement

to be hereafter made for regulating the military cooperation, as indicated in Article III. Article III is accepted, with that clause which renders the offensive and defensive alliance reciprocal. Prussia is already invited to adhere to the four points mentioned in the notes to be exchanged. Upon receipt of her answer, whether negative or affirmative, the Austrian courier will start for St. Petersburgh.

If the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should not accept the terms suggested, and order the evacuation of the Principalities within eight days, Count Esterhazy will demand his passports, and the Emperor of Austria thinks that the moment for signing the Convention will be that in which the refusal of Russia is made known. To the signature at that moment his word is pledged.

To this delay Baron Bourqueney and myself made the strongest objections, and the French Minister refused to sign the notes. Having your Lordship's directions to act with M. de Bourqueney, I did the same.

From my conversation with Count Buol I entertain a hope that his decision is not irrevocable. A communication on the subject has been made by telegraph to Paris.

No. 2.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 12.)

(No. 293.)

Vienna, August 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that having been informed by Baron Bourqueney that he had received similar instructions to mine, to proceed to the exchange of notes, I waited with him this evening upon Count Buol, by appointment, and, in accordance with the directions contained in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch dated the 5th instant, I signed the note (No. 1) and received in exchange the note (No. 2) signed by Count Buol, copies of which I have the honour herewith to transmit to your Lordship. These notes will be immediately forwarded by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

The Earl of Westmorland to Count Buol.

Vienne, ce 8 Août, 1854.

LE Soussigné, &c., a l'honneur d'annoncer au Comte Buol, &c., qu'il a reçu de son Gouvernement l'ordre de constater dans la présente note, qu'il résulte des pourparlers confidentiels échangés entre les Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Londres, conformément au passage du Protocole du 9 Avril dernier, par lequel l'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne, se sont en même temps que la Prusse engagées à rechercher les moyens de rattacher l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre général de l'Europe, que les trois Puissances pensent également que les rapports de la Sublime Porte avec la Cour Impériale de Russie ne pourraient pas être rétablis sur des bases solides et durables:

1. Si le Protectorat exercé jusqu'à présent par la Cour Impériale de Russie, sur les Principautés de Valachie, de Moldavie, et de Servie, ne cesse pas à l'avenir et si les privilèges accordés par les Sultans à ces provinces dépendantes de leur Empire ne sont pas placés sous la garantie collective des Puissances en vertu d'un arrangement à conclure avec la Sublime Porte et dont les dispositions régleraient en même temps toutes les questions de détail.

2. Si la navigation du Danube à ses embouchures n'est point délivrée de toute entrave et soumise à l'application des principes consacrés par les actes du Congrès de Vienne.

3. Si le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, n'est pas revisé de concert par toutes les Hautes Parties Contractantes dans un intérêt d'équilibre Européen.

4. Si la Russie ne cesse de revendiquer le droit d'exercer un Protectorat officiel sur les sujets de la Sublime Porte, à quelque rit qu'ils appartiennent, et si la France, l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne, la Prusse, et la Russie, ne se prêtent leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la conséeration et l'observance des priviléges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes, et mettre à profit, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs coreligionnaires, les généreuses intentions manifestées par Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans qu'il en résulte aucune atteinte pour sa dignité et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

Le Soussigné en outre est autorisé à déclarer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Bretagne, tout en se réservant de faire connaître en temps utile les conditions particulières qu'il pourrait mettre à la conclusion de la paix avec la Russie, et d'apporter à l'ensemble des garanties ci-dessus spécifiées telle modification que la continuation des hostilités rendrait nécessaire, est décidé pour le moment à ne discuter et à ne prendre en considération aucune proposition du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg qui n'impliquerait point de sa part une adhésion pleine et entière aux principes sur lesquels il est déjà tombé d'accord avec les Gouvernements de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche et de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Count Buol to the Earl of Westmorland.

Vienne, le 8 Août, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, &c., de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, s'empresse d'accuser réception à sa Seigneurie le Comte de Westmorland, &c., de la note qu'elle lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du 8 de ce mois, et de constater à son tour qu'il résulte des pourparlers confidentiels échangés entre les Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Londres, conformément au passage du Protocole du 9 Avril dernier, par lequel l'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne se sont en même temps que la Prusse engagées à rechercher les moyens de rattacher l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre général de l'Europe, que les trois Puissances pensent également que les rapports de la Sublime Porte avec la Cour Impériale de Russie ne pourraient pas être rétablis sur des bases solides et durables:

1. Si le Protectorat exercé jusqu'à présent par la Cour Impériale de Russie sur les Principautés de Valachie, de Moldavie, et de Servie, ne cesse pas à l'avenir, et si les priviléges accordés par les Sultans à ces provinces dépendantes de leur Empire ne sont pas placés sous la garantie collective des Puissances en vertu d'un arrangement à conclure avec la Sublime Porte et dont les dispositions réglerient en même temps toutes les questions de détail;

2. Si la navigation du Danube à ses embouchures n'est point délivrée de toute entrave et soumise à l'application des principes consacrés par les actes du Congrès de Vienne;

3. Si le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, n'est pas revisé de concert par toutes les Hautes Parties Contractantes dans un intérêt d'équilibre Européen;

4. Si la Russie ne cesse de revendiquer le droit d'exercer un Protectorat officiel sur les sujets de la Sublime Porte, à quelque rit qu'ils appartiennent, et si l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne, la France, la Prusse, et la Russie ne se prêtent leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la conséeration et l'observance des priviléges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiennes, et mettre à profit, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs coreligionnaires, les généreuses intentions manifestées par Sa Majesté le Sultan, sans qu'il en résulte aucune atteinte pour la dignité et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

Le Soussigné est en outre autorisé à déclarer que son Gouvernement prend acte de la détermination de l'Angleterre et de la France de ne pas entrer pour le moment* avec la Cour Impériale de Russie, dans aucun arrangement qui n'impliquerait point de la part de la dite Cour une adhésion pleine et entière aux

* The words "pour le moment" struck out (see Lord Westmorland's No. 300).

quatre principes ci-dessus énumérés, et qu'il accepte pour lui-même l'engagement de ne traiter que sur ces bases, en se réservant toutefois la libre appréciation des conditions qu'il mettrait au rétablissement de la paix s'il venait lui-même à être forcé de prendre part à la guerre.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) BUOL.

No. 3.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 442. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 9*, 1854.

THE King of Prussia has not sufficiently recovered from the accident His Majesty met with last week, which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 431 of the 4th instant, to receive Count Esterhazy, but His Majesty is improving, though still confined to his couch.

The Austrian Minister is anxiously awaiting his audience, in the hope of impressing on the King the necessity of establishing greater union in the action of the two Governments upon the Eastern question, but he has informed me that he is apprehensive that almost insurmountable objections will be raised to commencing the suggested military preparations in support of the intended advance of the Imperial army into the Principalities.

Baron Manteuffel has been absent several days. On his return yesterday, Count Esterhazy saw his Excellency, and appears to have received assurances which led to a well-grounded hope that although the Prussian Government will not join in the note which has been agreed upon by the English, French and Austrian Governments, and cannot be said to be satisfied with the bases upon which alone it will be advisable to negotiate peace with Russia, they will nevertheless be ready to support the communication which the Austrian Government is about to address to the Court of St. Petersburgh, and press its acceptance on the Imperial Government. This Count Esterhazy thinks an important concession, as it will commit the Prussian Government to an avowed and public approval of the conditions of peace agreed on by the three Powers, and recorded in the notes to be hereafter exchanged.

I understand that Baron Manteuffel has already addressed an instruction to Baron Werther, directing that Minister to call Count Nesselrode's attention to the complications which must ensue from a prolonged occupation of both Principalities by Russian troops, and urging that they should proceed to evacuate them without delay.

At the same time, however, I cannot report that the least improvement seems to have taken place in the disposition of this Government to join the Western alliance, or even to act honestly with Austria. The same vacillating language is held, they will neither declare for nor against us; they pretend to maintain that they had not separated from the Conference at Vienna, but that we no longer desired their cooperation; that they are willing to confer, though differing with us in our view of the question at issue, and that if we exclude them from the Conference, the blame will not rest with Prussia, though she might reasonably declare that if she is not to be consulted during negotiations, and be merely called upon to register the measures on which Austria, England, and France have already agreed, she would but consult her own dignity by retiring altogether, and ceasing to participate in the conferences.

The Prussian Government, however, is desirous not to be left out, and the Austrian Government, I am assured, wishes to prevent Prussia retiring from the Conference, as her doing so might cause serious difficulties in Germany, and raise the hopes of those Governments which are of opinion that their true interest is not to quarrel with Russia, but to remain neutral.

The greatest watchfulness will be required on the part of Austria to prevent the defection of the small States, and the well-known feelings of M. de Bismarck, the Prussian Minister at Frankfort, will no doubt be called into play, in endeavouring to get up a strong anti-Austrian party at the Diet. The

Austrian Government has been apprised of the attitude which the Prussian Government is expected to assume at Frankfort and elsewhere in Germany, and it is to be hoped that it will be able to counteract its object.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 4.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 298.) *Vienna, August 9, 1854.*

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL this day communicated to the Turkish Ambassador the notes containing the guarantees which were signed and exchanged last evening, as stated in my despatch No. 293 of yesterday's date, between the Imperial and Royal Minister and M. de Bourqueney and myself.

The Turkish Ambassador expressed to me his great satisfaction at having received that communication, accompanied as it was by the most friendly assurances on the part of the Imperial Government for the prosperity and security of the Turkish Empire.

Count Buol also communicated to the Ambassador the announcement which he had received from the Russian Minister, Prince Gortchakoff, that the Emperor Nicholas had directed his army immediately to evacuate the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; and as it appeared that a considerable portion of the former of these Principalities was already evacuated, the Austrian Commander-in-chief, Baron Hess, had dispatched an officer of his staff to the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, in order that he might regulate with him the entry into that province of the Austrian troops, according to the terms of the Treaty of the 14th of June of this year, between Austria and the Porte; and with respect to the Principality of Moldavia, Baron Hess was now only waiting for further details as to the date and extent of the movements of the Russian armies in their retreat, to combine also with Omer Pasha the advance of the Austrian forces.

Count Buol also informed the Ambassador that as Prince Gortchakoff, in the announcement he had made, had stated that the evacuation of the Principalities was adopted by the Russian Government as a strategic operation, he conceived that the Austrian Government might look upon it as directed as much against themselves as any of the belligerents; they meant, however, to carry out the movements of their troops, which would take place in consequence of that operation, without unnecessarily pressing upon the Russian army, although Count Buol felt that the advance of the Austrian corps should be made with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 5.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 299.) *Vienna, August 9, 1854.*

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL has this day communicated to Count Alvensleben copies of the notes which he last evening exchanged with Baron Bourqueney and myself; and he at the same time engaged him to invite the Prussian Government to adhere to the substance of those notes, and to recommend it for the Russian Government to accept and adopt. Count Buol also stated, as Baron Bourqueney and myself had done, to Count Alvensleben, that if his Government should so instruct him, we were ready, and were directed by our Governments, to exchange with him notes of the same and identic import.

Count Alvensleben stated in reply, that he would this day, by telegraph, ask of his Government whether it was their intention so to instruct him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 6.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 444.) *Berlin, August 11, 1854.*

My Lord,

I FORWARDED to your Lordship, in my despatch No. 441 of the 9th instant, an analysis of a circular addressed on the 3rd instant by the Prussian Government to its Agents at the German Courts, in consequence of a communication which had been made to the Cabinet of Berlin, of an Austrian circular calling upon the Governments of the Confederation to make certain military preparations needed to carry into effect the Treaty of the 20th of April; and I have now the honour to transmit a translation of this Prussian circular.

Your Lordship will perceive the spirit of antagonism to Austria which pervades this document; its evident tendency is to throw discredit on the Austrian proposals, and to encourage Germany to follow the same inactive course which suits the policy of the King of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Circular addressed to Prussian Representatives in Germany.

(Confidential.) *Berlin, August 3, 1854.*

(Translation.)

A FEW days ago information reached us from the Royal Legations at the German Governments that in consequence of a circular addressed to the Imperial Austrian Legations there, the latter have been called upon to furnish their Representatives at Frankfort with extended powers for the purpose of agreeing, as soon as possible, to a proposal which Austria and Prussia intend to make for the mobilisation of one half of the federal contingent. As we did not possess any more particular knowledge of the intention to bring forward (formulirung) such a proposal, and, moreover, as the question of the military measures of the Confederation hereafter to be adopted had not been alluded to either by us or by the Cabinet of Vienna since the consultations and arrangements at the time of the Treaty of the 20th of April, which certainly refer to it, we had reason to be surprised by the above-mentioned intelligence. Since then the Cabinet of Vienna have communicated to us that the general aspect of politics, and more particularly the strategetical attitude of Russia must be recognised as a necessity for the Federal Governments to make certain military preparations, and expressed the hope that in consequence of the late accession of the Germanic Confederation to the alliance of the 20th of April, they would see them carried into effect, as soon as possible, by the mediation of the Diet.

His Majesty the King, &c., is penetrated with the great importance which the extension of the alliance over the whole Germanic Confederation may also in future acquire in a military point of view. His Majesty considers the military measures which he has adopted up to the present moment, the object of which is the augmentation of the artillery and cavalry, as flowing from his free and independent decision for the maintenance of the power and dignity of Prussia in the present crisis. But His Majesty wishes to devote with his allies the most serious and full consideration to the military questions, so far as they regard the Confederation. The Royal Minister at the Diet has, therefore, been instructed, in accordance with the declaration made in common by Austria and Prussia on the 20th of April, to lay before the Diet and the Committee those documents which must be known in order to be able to judge of the state of affairs. Baron Prokesch has been empowered to make a similar communication of the corresponding Austrian documents. We believe that we cannot better express to our German allies the confidence with which we reckon on the approaching agreement, in accordance with the interests of Germany, than by an immediate and direct communication of the documents which are to be submitted to the Diet, and we express the hope that the views which His Majesty takes of them may be understood, and even shared by the German Government.

You will, therefore, communicate, confidentially, the following inclosures to the Government to which you have the honour of being accredited, laying stress on the points to which your attention has been directed.

1. Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Budberg of the 30th of June, by means of which the answer intended for Vienna was communicated to us in the form of . *(sic in orig.)*

2. The despatch to Prince Gortchakoff dated the day previous.

3. The despatch in reply addressed to the Prussian Minister, Baron Werther, dated the 17th ultimo.

4. The despatch to the Legations at London and Paris of the 24th ultimo, in which we express to those Cabinets our opinions on the preceding documents.

We have not yet received an answer from those Courts.

It would be desirable for us to be informed what instructions will be given to the Representatives of the German Governments at Frankfort, in consequence of this confidential communication.

No. 7.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 445.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 11, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 432 of the 4th instant, and to your Lordship's separate of the 8th instant, I have the honour to inclose a translation of the circular addressed by the Austrian Government to the German Courts on the 28th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Circular addressed to the Austrian Representatives in Germany.

Vienna, July 28, 1854.

BY Article III of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance which is adhered to now by the whole Germanic Confederation, the Contracting Parties have bound themselves, for the purpose of giving due security and force to the conditions of the Treaty, to keep, if necessary, at periods and at points which are to be determined among themselves, a part of their military force in complete readiness for war; and a special decision will be come to as to the time, extent and manner of placing these forces.

The Courts of Austria and Prussia, in the firm hope that their efforts in the cause of unity will include the whole of Germany, have already agreed upon the proposals to be made to the Diet respecting the execution of these conditions of the Treaty, and Baron Prokesch has been accordingly authorized to propose, in conjunction with the Prussian Minister at the Diet, a military arrangement corresponding to said Article III of the Treaty of Alliance; and according to his instructions he will consider it his duty to bring about a decision on this point with the greatest possible dispatch, and a rapid, energetic, and judicious execution of the decisions thus taken.

The most essential point of the proposal intended to be made by the two Courts is that Austria is to place 150,000 to 250,000 men, Prussia 100,000 to 200,000 men, and the rest of the German States one-half of their federal contingent, on a war-footing. Should this proposition be assented to, two federal corps will be formed, the one consisting of the contingents of the 7th and 8th, the other of those of the 9th and 10th army corps, which could be placed in the most eligible positions in conjunction with the forces of Austria and Prussia.

That the case of necessity for such military preparations, foreseen in the Treaty of the 20th of April, has already really occurred, surely requires no more special proofs in the face of the attitude of Russia and the preparations of that Power. Austria has prepared two of her armies for immediate action, and in Prussia the necessary orders have been given for the mobilisation of the military

force which she is bound to raise according to the agreement. An advance of the Austrian troops, and a rencontre between them and the forces of Russia in the Danubian Principalities, will possibly take place in a very short time; and under such circumstances it is surely of great importance for the whole of Germany to prove by its acts that the united power of the Germanic Confederation is opposed to an attack on the frontiers of Austria. Even for the sake of the moral effect alone, we must consider it as most desirable that the military decision of the Diet for the maintenance of the offensive and defensive alliance, should be taken without delay, and be executed with active zeal at the same moment when the Courts of Vienna and Berlin will be called upon to take their last decisive steps in St. Petersburgh.

You will use your best efforts with the Government to which you have the honour of being accredited, that their Representative at Frankfort be provided with the fullest powers to move the Diet to come to a decision on the above-mentioned bases, and to take part in all subsequent resolutions which may become necessary for the well-timed and well-conducted execution of the military measures of the Confederation. All our allies will certainly concur with us in the conviction that the development of an imposing activity from the centre of the Germanic Confederation is proved to be a vital question to the Confederation. But an essential condition of such an activity appears to us to be, that the clearly urgent necessity of alleviating and simplifying, as far as possible, the proceedings of the Diet, should be taken into consideration by all parties, and that for the sake of the great cause the different Governments of the Confederation should give the fullest powers to the members of the Diet.

No. 8.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 446.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 11, 1854.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY has communicated to Baron Manteuffel the desire of his Government, that Prussia should accede to the notes which have been lately exchanged at Vienna, and pressed his Excellency to recommend the subject to the favourable consideration of the King; but up to the present moment his efforts have been fruitless, and all that the Prussian Government will apparently consent to is to express at St. Petersburgh their approbation of the terms of the notes.

Baron Manteuffel says that he is expecting further intelligence from Vienna, and will not say, positively, how far the King may be disposed to go: it is however evident, that there is no disposition on the part of His Majesty to meet the wishes of the three Governments; beyond giving his moral support to the communication which Austria is about to make.

I had, myself, some conversation on this subject with his Excellency to-day. He seemed to hold out little or no expectation that the King would agree to the note; and he laid much stress on the fact of its not having been previously communicated by Her Majesty's and by the French Governments, but coming to them solely from Vienna. I explained to his Excellency that no blame could attach to us for the reserve shown towards Prussia pending this negotiation; that, until lately, we had communicated freely to her in all matters, but that we now find that, instead of assisting us, she impeded our progress towards a satisfactory arrangement with Austria. That if Prussia was disposed to adopt our policy in this matter, she might be assured the adhesion would be welcome not only to Austria, but equally so to England and France; but that we had the experience of losing much valuable time in endeavouring to negotiate with her on matters connected with Russian aggression, and had found that, whilst we were intent on combining active operations against our enemy, Prussia took a different view of the affair, and seemed to be of opinion that our object could be equally attained by negotiation.

Baron Manteuffel did not pretend to say that the least impression had been made on the King's avowed pacific policy; but he said that we might be assured of one thing, that if Austria were attacked by Russia, Prussia would be found ready to come forward in her defence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 9.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 84.)

Frankfort, August 11, 1854.

My Lord,

CONTRARY to general expectation no communication whatever was made to the Diet at yesterday's sitting, either of the Russian reply to the Vienna and Berlin notes, or relating to the mobilisation of a portion of the federal contingents.

From whatever cause this delay has arisen, there can be no question as to the object aimed at by Prussia, viz., putting off any decision to the last moment, being attained; and this has been effected without its being possible to throw the whole blame of the delay upon the Cabinet of Berlin.

When M. de Bismarck accompanied the King of Prussia from Munich to Berlin, it had been agreed between the two Governments that the communication of the Russian answer should be made in the sitting of the Diet held on the 3rd of August.

M. de Bismarck on arriving at Berlin telegraphed to Baron Prokesch to proceed without him. It seems, however, that Baron Prokesch's instructions were to act only in concert with M. de Bismarck, and he consequently abstained from making the communication.

It was then to be expected that as soon as M. de Bismarck came back to his post, the earliest opportunity would be taken of doing what it had been already agreed between the two Governments should be done in this respect, as well as in that of inviting the Diet to put a part of their contingents on a war footing, which had been already done by Austria, through a circular note to her own Ministers at the several Courts, as reported in my despatch No. 83 of yesterday's date.

Such, however, is not the course which events have taken, and the consequence is this;—If on the 3rd instant the Russian answer had been laid before the Diet, it would have been reported upon yesterday by the Commission, and whatever might have been the decision of that body, the vote of the Diet might have been taken in that sitting, if not opposed, or at all events in the sitting of the 17th.

Now the matter will probably not be entertained (if at all) sooner than the 17th, and the vote, or the acceptation of the Commission's report without vote, may be delayed till Thursday the 31st.

I cannot but apprehend that the true reason why M. de Prokesch did not proceed as requested by his Prussian colleague, on the 3rd, is, that he had ascertained that the Commission would take the Prussian, and not the Austrian, view of the Russian answer, and that the same motive is still inducing him to withhold all communication on the subject.

As regards the Austrian circular to its agents, relating to the increase of the federal contingents, it can only be regarded as a useless, if not a mischievous, step, and rather calculated to obstruct than to obtain its ostensible object.

The execution of the measure could be ordered by the Diet alone; nor was it to be supposed that any single Government, with the dispositions they are known to entertain, would in any degree accelerate matters, by instructing its Plenipotentiary at Frankfort before receiving from that Plenipotentiary notice of the invitation having been duly made to the Diet.

Austria has also contrived in this circular to indispose Prussia (or at any rate His Prussian Majesty) even more than was already the case, by assuming without sufficient ground, as it would appear, that the proposed measure was recommended in concert with the Cabinet of Berlin, and has, by addressing herself to the separate Governments instead of to the Diet, afforded that Cabinet an arm against her with the Diet, not very dissimilar to that which brought about the Bamberg coalition—a nucleus of Russian intrigue, be it said by-the-bye, at the head of which Prussia seems about to take a stand.

Your Lordship will, I much fear, be able to form no other judgment from these details than that anything like prompt or energetic action on the part of

the Diet in opposition to Prussian (I might almost say Russian) policy, is not to be expected, but that, on the contrary, everything which affords a pretext for delay will be sedulously taken advantage of.

I greatly apprehend that if ever the Russian answer is laid before the Diet, its decision will be to the effect that they do not see anything in the terms to induce the Diet to reply thereto, by placing any part of their federal contingents on a war footing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 10.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 1000.)

Paris, August 14, 1854.

My Lord,

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch of the 3rd instant received by the French Government from Constantinople, states that both M. de Bruck and Colonel Kalich, who had been sent to Omer Pasha's head-quarters, held language to the effect that the Austrians were to occupy the Principalities exclusively.

On this despatch passing through M. de Bourqueney's hands, he went to Count Buol, and reminding him that this language of the Internuncio and Colonel Kalich was at complete variance with all the assurances which Count Buol had given him, the Austrian Government having even requested the entry of French and English troops into the Principalities, he asked him the reason of this divergence of language. Count Buol replied that no attention was to be paid to the language of M. de Bruck; that if that Minister had expressed himself as reported, he had done so without instructions, and that the Austrian Government was only bound by what he (Count Buol) stated officially on their behalf.

In giving me this information M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that from this and other indications which had reached him, he could not help feeling some anxiety respecting the intentions of Austria in the Principalities, and he had, consequently addressed a telegraphic despatch to M. de Bourqueney on the 12th instant, in which he stated that there were two points on which M. de Bourqueney was to enter into explicit explanations with Count Buol. The first, that Austria could claim no exclusive right to occupy the Principalities; the second, that she could not oppose the march of the allies, if any one of them determined on pursuing the Russians through the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked that a precaution of this kind had become absolutely necessary, because Austria, by placing her troops between the Russian and Turkish armies, gave greater liberty of action to the former, who would thus be enabled to move towards the Crimea. Besides which, in consequence of the dilatory conduct of Austria, Omer Pasha had entered Wallachia before the Austrian troops, and it could not be pretended that the troops of the Sultan were to be forced to retreat from territory of which the Sultan was sovereign.

If Austria was allowed to assume the position claimed by M. de Bruck, there would be nothing to prevent her hereafter from playing the part of an armed mediator. It had became necessary, therefore, to have categorical explanations with the Austrian Government.

In the course of the conversation M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed the opinion that the corps of Omer Pasha should be employed, either by taking up a menacing attitude on the Pruth or by a descent on the coast of Bessarabia, to prevent the concentration of Russian troops for the relief of the Crimea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 11.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 1,005.)

Paris, August 14, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE MOUSTIER reports that he has had two long conversations with M. de Manteuffel on the subject of the answers lately returned by the French Government to the explanations given by the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, respecting the future attitude of Prussia in the Eastern question.

M. de Manteuffel declared that the intention of Prussia was to continue to act with the allies; and that he did not despair of inducing the King to consent to the four points which France, Great Britain, and Austria had declared were necessary to ensure the solution of the Eastern question, but that he did not know how to bring this about unless some written communication was made to him upon the subject. M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered M. de Moustier by telegraph, that the French Government was resolved to make no further communication to the Cabinet of Berlin.

If the Prussian Government desired any information, they would probably obtain it at Vienna; and if they wished to join in such a declaration as that which had been made by the three Governments, it must be done by an exchange of notes with each of the three Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 12.

Mr. Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 191.)

Stockholm, July 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I SENT, on the 24th instant, a telegraphic despatch in cypher to M. Engström, Her Majesty's Consul at Gottenburgh, to be forwarded to Her Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen, in the following words:—

"*Stockholm, July 24, 1854.*

"Major Blanchard had an audience of the King yesterday, and told His Majesty that his conditions were accepted in London and Paris. The King, after considerable hesitation, at length agreed to prepare troops, and also to enter into official negotiations. His Majesty will give a positive answer to-morrow."

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. GREY.

No. 13.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Stockholm, July 29, 1854.

My Lord,

AFTER the more formal part of my audience of this day with the King of Sweden had passed over, and I had presented to His Majesty the Queen's letter, His Majesty invited me to sit down, and conversed with me on the topics which engross at this moment public attention. No one else was present, and the conversation lasted a considerable time.

One of the first subjects touched on by His Majesty, and one on which he appeared to feel strongly, was the delay and reluctance of the Cabinet of Vienna to come to a decision. I said that I had been informed by Lord Bloomfield, on the 24th instant, that he that day had received the intelligence, and had forwarded it by telegraph to London, that the Austrian troops had entered, or were about to enter, the Principalities, which His Majesty doubted; and said, that though reported, it had not been confirmed. I observed, that I believed Her Majesty's Government, a few weeks ago, were satisfied with the attitude of Austria; and although the hesitation and intrigues of Prussia might cause delay, it was improbable that Austria would have gone to the expense of her vast armaments—an expense which she was little able at present to bear—merely to play the part of an armed mediator. Austria must feel, too, that she had made an implacable enemy of Russia; and she was, moreover, perhaps, more directly interested in the solution of the Eastern question than either England or France; and I therefore hoped that, sooner or later, she must declare for us. I added, that, in my opinion, a bolder and more decided line on the part of Austria would have compelled Prussia to follow in her wake, for the latter Power could not, without forfeiting her position and influence in Germany, have abandoned Austria if attacked by Russia in her non-German provinces. I said that we had most reluctantly had recourse to arms to solve the difficulties which Russia had created; and it was not probable that we could lay them down unless we could make a peace which offered the hopes of duration. Russia, until worsted more than she had as yet been, would hardly consent to such a peace, and the moment was rather one for action than for negotiation.

His Majesty admitted that Russia would not relinquish at present the rights which she had consecutively obtained by Treaty since the time of the Empress Catherine, of interfering in Turkey—rights which His Majesty termed "an arsenal of pretexts," and which were abrogated by the war; and he seemed to be of opinion that Austria would ultimately declare against Russia, but he still regretted the delay which probably would prevent our obtaining this year the results which might otherwise have ensued.

His Majesty having informed me of the arrival this morning in Stockholm of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, the conversation turned to the object of the expedition which that officer commands, and to the war in the Baltic. I informed His Majesty, that when I left London, the precise object of this expedition was not known, and that it had been left to the decision of General Baraguay d'Hilliers and the Admirals of the combined fleets. His Majesty replied, that he understood a large portion of the allied squadrons had already assembled at or near Bomarsund; and he consequently concluded that the Aland Islands would be the point selected for attack. His Majesty did not doubt of the success of such an attack; and in reply to my inquiry, stated that he was convinced that we might hold them during the winter against all the efforts which Russia could or would make to retake them. He developed at some length the grounds on which that opinion was formed, such as the difficulty and uncertainty of transporting across the ice, by the shortest winter road of about forty-five miles English, a large force, accompanied by heavy artillery, and the enormous weight of projectiles required for a siege; the shortness of the period—under the most favourable circumstances, about two months from the middle of January—in which such operations could be effected; the impossibility of opening trenches on the sea-side, and the difficulty of doing so on land, from frosts, &c. His Majesty added, that the capture of the Aland Isles would be of great importance, both because it would in some measure satisfy popular impatience in England and France as to the small results obtained by our large fleets in the Baltic, and because those islands would form a good basis for future operations. His Majesty stated, that he thought our success in the Baltic for the present year would be limited to this capture alone.

During the whole of our long conversation the King expressed himself with moderation towards Russia, and I do not believe that the Emperor's name was once introduced. His Majesty made no allusion whatever to a more active cooperation of Sweden with England and France in the present war, nor to the late negotiations for that cooperation with the French Minister, M. Lobstein, and the Commandant Blanchard, as reported by Mr. Grey to your Lordship in his despatches Nos. 189 and 192 of the 24th and 26th of this month; and I thought it advisable on my part to leave that chord untouched.

His Majesty's manner and language during the whole of my interview were most cordial and friendly; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the sentiments he expressed towards England and towards myself personally.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 14.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Bernstorff.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Bernstorff, August 15.*)

Berlin, ce 5 Août, 1854.

M. le Comte,

COMME vous nous l'aviez annoncé, d'après ce que Lord Clarendon vous avait dit, Lord Bloomfield m'a communiqué la dépêche ci-jointe en copie. Le Ministre de France s'est acquitté d'une démarche analogue, en me laissant copie de la dépêche également ci-annexée.

Je ne cacherai pas à votre Excellence que nous avons été surpris du caractère que les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris ont cru devoir donner à ce qu'ils veulent bien appeler notre refus d'assister à la Conférence de Vienne. Nous ne saurions, je l'avoue, retrouver dans les communications des deux Cabinets une appréciation calme et impartiale de la situation et de l'attitude, aussi claire que naturelle, prise par le Cabinet. Peu de mots suffiront pour rétablir les faits dans leur véritable jour.

Les derniers déclarations du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg sont la réponse à une démarche que, de concert avec le Cabinet de Vienne, nous y avions faite conformément à notre Traité avec l'Autriche du 20 Avril. Il était donc non seulement naturel, mais indispensable, qu'avant tout nous tâchions de nous mettre d'accord avec le Cabinet Autrichien sur la portée des ouvertures Russes. Nous n'avons pas tardé un moment à nous prononcer dans ce sens à Vienne et nous nous sommes en même temps déclarés prêts à faire des communications à la Conférence, dès que nous aurions porté à la connaissance des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, le résultat de notre entente avec celui de Vienne. Nous étions d'avis—et nous le sommes encore—que l'appréciation de la réponse Russe était en premier lieu de domaine des Puissances signataires du Traité du 20 Avril. Nous nous croyions d'autant moins en droit de nous départir de cette manière de voir que nous avions l'espoir—réalisé depuis—de voir s'étendre bientôt notre alliance à tous les Etats de la Confédération Germanique. Nous revendiquions pour cette alliance sa place dans les stipulations Européennes, et c'est à cet effet que nous l'avons communiquée à la Conférence de Vienne. Nous admettons avec satisfaction, que les buts que nous avions en vue, en nous alliant avec l'Autriche, s'accordent, en mesure des positions relatives, avec ceux que le concours des quatre Puissances se proposait d'atteindre, et qui ont trouvé leur expression dans les Protocoles de Vienne. Mais nous ne saurions renoncer pour cela à examiner en dehors et indépendamment de la Conférence des documents qui se rattachent à notre Traité spécial. Un pareil échange d'idées avec l'Autriche était évidemment étranger au caractère des Protocoles, dont le but n'est point de renfermer des discussions, mais d'en constater le résultat.

Aussi n'avons nous pas tardé, dès que sous ce point de vue nous croyions trouver étoffe pour un Protocole, à autoriser le Représentant du Roi à assister à la Conférence. Si depuis elle n'a pas eu lieu, ce n'est pas de nous qu'est venu le refus.

Nous ne méconnaissons pas ce que l'accord des quatre Puissances peut offrir de rassurant à l'Europe. Mais nous avons été surpris de l'observation, que par notre désir de remettre la Conférence, nous avions contribué à ébranler la confiance publique. Nous sommes parfaitement étrangers à la publicité inexacte et prématurée qui sous ce rapport a pu donner lieu à des malentendues, et si au sujet de notre attitude l'émoi a été jeté dans l'opinion publique, nous en déclinons la responsabilité.

Nous avons donné, il me semble, aux Cabinets de Londres et de Paris la meilleure preuve de notre désir de nous entendre franchement avec eux, par la dépêche que, d'ordre du Roi, j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence le 24 du mois. Nous regrettons sincèrement que, d'après ce que Lord Clarendon

vous a dit, et d'après le langage que les Ministres d'Angleterre et de France n'ont tenu ici, notre manière d'envisager la situation diffère sur des points bien essentiels de celle des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, mais nous n'attendons qu'une confirmation écrite de ce que ces Cabinets nous ont fait parvenir sur ce qu'ils considèrent comme base préalable d'une entente, pour en faire de notre côté l'objet d'un examen guidé par le sincère désir d'y puiser des éléments propres à cimenter nos rapports de confiance avec les Puissances Occidentales.

Nous serons toujours charmés de pouvoir mettre d'accord l'attitude qui nous est dictée par nos intérêts, avec notre désir de prendre part au concours des autres Puissances de l'Europe, dans les graves complications qui la préoccupent, mais, plus nos intentions à ce sujet sont sincères et loyales, plus nous devons attendre d'être nous-mêmes à l'abri d'une interprétation méfiante de nos procédés les plus naturels.

Je vous invite, M. le Comte, à laisser copie de cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon en réponse à la sienne du 29 Juillet.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 15.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 261.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol dated the 9th instant, stating that Prince Gortchakoff had announced to him that the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities had been ordered by the Emperor of Russia, although as a purely strategical measure, and had then questioned him as to the concentration of troops on the Austrian frontier. That Count Buol had thereupon expressed his satisfaction at this course having been taken by Russia, which, while it rendered more easy the execution by Austria of her engagements, was looked upon by her as the first step towards peace; but that Count Buol had apprized Prince Gortchakoff that, under the Treaty with the Porte, Austrian troops would occupy the Principalities as soon as they were evacuated, although that measure was not looked upon as one of a hostile nature.

In commenting upon what had passed with the Russian Minister, Count Buol observes that this retrograde movement on the part of Russia is, in fact, an act of reparation for the violation of international law, which has called forth the opposition of Europe. Still it does not, in itself, make any alteration in the engagements entered into by Austria under the Protocols of Vienna, and in the views taken by Austria of the guarantees which, in concert with the belligerent Powers, she has considered indispensable to a firm and lasting peace.

Nevertheless, under existing circumstances the Tripartite Treaty, as now drawn up, is no longer applicable, if for no other reason, because it rested on the supposition that Austria must employ force to effect the evacuation of the Principalities; but it would be easy, however, in case of necessity, for the three Courts to come to an understanding as to the manner in which the Treaty should be modified.

Count Buol authorised Count Colloredo to announce that, in a few days from the date of his despatch, two Austrian brigades would enter Wallachia, and that an officer had already been sent to Omer Pasha to make the necessary arrangements respecting that movement, and that in occupying the Principalities by a military force with the consent and concurrence of the Suzerain, Austria became pledged to defend them against any fresh invasion.

Count Buol ends his despatch by stating that he is at present engaged in drawing up the communications to be made to the Court of St. Petersburgh on the subject of the view taken by the British and French Governments of the Russian answer of the 29th of June, and that his despatch would be made known to Her Majesty's Government.

I told Count Colloredo that, as Russia made a distinct and official

announcement that the evacuation of the Principalities was purely a strategical movement. I was at a loss to understand why Count Buol regarded it as a reparation for the offence against international law committed by Russia; the abandonment of the Principalities, because they could be no longer held, was no admission that they had been unjustly seized.

I expressed to Count Colloredo my satisfaction at the renewed assurance of Count Buol, that no change had taken place in the views of the Austrian Government respecting the engagements contracted by the Protocols, or the bases of peace, that were considered indispensable; but I was nevertheless afraid, from the tenor of Count Buol's despatch, that Russia would be allowed to turn her military embarrassments to political advantage.

The occupation of the Principalities by Austrian troops was, I said, a serious question, for circumstances had greatly changed since the signature of the Treaty of June 14, when the Russians were besieging Silistria, and there appeared little prospect of the Turks crossing the Danube; but they had now, without direct foreign aid, entered Wallachia, and were in possession of Bucharest. If the Porte requested or consented to an Austrian occupation it might be unobjectionable, but no interpretation of the Treaty would justify the Austrian Government in demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish forces against the consent of the Porte; nor under such circumstances could Her Majesty's Government recommend the Turkish Government to comply with the requisition.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 16.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 262.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1854.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 292 of the 5th instant, has been received and laid before the Queen. Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, in conjunction with the French Minister, your Lordship held to Count Buol, as reported in that despatch.

The exchange of notes announced by your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 9th instant as having taken place, is regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a satisfactory proof that, notwithstanding the evacuation of the Principalities, the policy of Austria has undergone no change, and that her cooperation may be relied upon for attaining the objects which the three Powers have in view, and with respect to which they are happily agreed. But in fact the retreat of the Russian army from the Moldo-Wallachian province is not calculated to affect the policy of Austria, for it appears to have been caused solely by strategical reasons. It is not in satisfaction of the demands of Austria; it is not in reparation of the insult offered last year to Europe; it affords no security against the return of the invader, no guarantee for the future peace of Europe, and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that if Russia be permitted to derive political advantage from her present bad military position and the difficulties it entail upon her, the just and honourable peace for which England, France, and Turkey are making war, and those solid securities for the future which equally with those three Powers are desired by Austria, will be indefinitely postponed.

Her Majesty's Government, and that of the Emperor of the French, are of opinion that a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, founded upon the notes that have recently been exchanged with Austria, would be eminently useful towards bringing the war to a prompt termination, and your Lordship will, therefore, in conjunction with M. de Bourqueney, use your best efforts to induce Count Buol at once to assent to such a Treaty, and you will inform his Excellency that the Governments of England and France are willing to agree that the conditions contained in the note signed by your Lordship and M. de Bourqueney, shall be regarded as the bases of negotiation with Russia, upon the express understanding, however, that they are not parties to the transmission of these conditions to St. Petersburgh, and that hostilities are not to be suspended until the preliminaries of peace are signed.

Precedents are not wanting, as Count Buol must be well aware, for negotiations being carried on, without an armistice, and if the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of peace, and in a spirit of sincerity to accept the conditions that have become indispensable, the continuation of hostilities will only serve to abridge negotiation; but an armistice would manifestly be for the exclusive advantage of Russia; it would be a premium on delay, and the result of a protracted negotiation could hardly fail to be unsuccessful. In the interest of peace, therefore, England and France would be unable to agree to an armistice, even if they were not convinced that peace can now only be obtained by military success.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 17.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 263.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government approve your having signed and exchanged with Count Buol the notes, copies of which are inclosed in your despatch No. 293 of the 8th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 18.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 264.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government approve your having stated to Count Alvensleben your readiness to exchange with his Excellency identic notes with those already exchanged with Count Buol, as reported in your despatch No. 299 of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 19.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 265.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch* from Lord Cowley, giving an account of a report made to him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys of a conversation between Baron de Bourqueney and Count Buol, respecting the language held by the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople and by Colonel Kalieh at the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, touching the objects of the Austrian occupation of the Principalities.

As Her Majesty's Government had not previously heard of the communication made by the Internuncio to the Porte, they have not hitherto sent to your Lordship any instruction on the subject; but they learn with pleasure that that communication was unauthorized.

Her Majesty's Government consider it indispensable to know on what terms, and with what objects, the Austrian Government propose to occupy the Princi-

* No. 10.

palities; they wish to receive an assurance that no exclusive right to such occupation is claimed by Austria; that it will not be attempted without the request or concurrence of the Porte; and that the march of the allied troops will neither be opposed nor embarrassed, if they determine on pursuing the Russians through the Principalities.

Count Buol will, I am sure, not hesitate to give these assurances, as he must be aware that neither England nor France could consent to Austria assuming the position claimed by the Internuncio, which would enable her hereafter to exercise an armed mediation; and if the Principalities are to be occupied without ulterior objects, or without hostile intentions towards Russia, the Austrian Government, by relieving the Russian forces from all apprehension, and affording them complete liberty of action, may in fact have given a great advantage to Russia by rendering a great disservice to the allies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 20.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 220.)
Foreign Office, August 15, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel, respecting the view taken by the Prussian Government of the exchange of the notes between the three Powers at Vienna, as reported by your Lordship in your despatch No. 446 of the 11th instant.

The communications that have passed between the two Governments during the last twelve months, must have convinced Baron Manteuffel of the friendly feelings of England towards Prussia, and his Excellency therefore cannot doubt that it must have been both with reluctance and with sufficient cause that Her Majesty's Government have found themselves compelled to suspend these communications; but it is not the custom of Her Majesty's Government to exhibit confidence which they do not feel, and it is impossible any longer to confide in Prussia, who, by paralyzing the action of Austria, and exciting the German Powers against her, renders such eminent service to the Power with which England is at war, and who therefore can hardly now be considered as holding a neutral position.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 21.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 221.)
Foreign Office, August 15, 1854.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE the copy of a despatch* from Baron Manteuffel, which Count Bernstorff, after reading it to me, placed in my hands.

I remarked to Count Bernstorff that the Conference had been summoned simply to receive a communication of the Russian despatch, and as no opinion upon it could have been expressed by the English and French Ministers, it appeared unnecessary that a previous understanding should be come to by Austria and Prussia upon the character of that despatch, and even if it had been necessary it might have been effected in much less time than was employed without any result. The object, however, was to create delay, and the publicity of which Baron Manteuffel complained must have been caused by the mission of Colonel Manteuffel, and the notorious fact that the Conference did not assemble because the Prussian Minister was forbidden to attend it, and he had not received contrary instructions until after the Russian despatch had been officially communicated by Austria to the English and French

* No. 14.

Governments, who had given their opinions upon it, and the assembling the Conference in order to communicate to it this despatch would then have been absurd. I could not therefore agree with Baron Manteuffel that Prussia was not to blame, and solely to blame, for the Conference not having met.

I assured Count Bernstorff that Her Majesty's Government regretted as sincerely as Baron Manteuffel, the divergent views of the two Governments upon this great crisis of European affairs. We regretted it, I said, not only on account of those friendly relations which England desired to maintain with Prussia, but in the interests of peace, which depended on the four Powers assuming a firm and united attitude. The course, however, that Prussia was pursuing could have no other result than to protract the war, and to place Prussia in an isolated position; and Baron Manteuffel, I added, cannot feel surprised that England and France should exhibit mistrust towards a Government whose policy it was to assist the Power with which they are at war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 22.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 1,010.)
Paris, August 15, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY has informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys by telegraph, that he lost no time in asking Count Buol the two questions to which reference is made in my despatch No. 1000 of the 14th instant, and that Count Buol had replied that he had no thought of claiming the exclusive occupation of the Principalities by Austrian troops, that it was a matter to be regulated with the Porte; secondly, that he never contemplated interfering with the action of the allied armies, and that he considered that they were at full liberty to enter and retire from the Principalities as they pleased.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to me that although these assurances were satisfactory, the matter was too important not to require all the certainty which could be given to it, and that he had called the attention of the Porte, through M. Benedetti, to the correspondence which he had had upon the subject with the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 23.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, August 17.)

Vienne, le 10 *Août*, 1854.

PAR ma dépêche du 9 Juillet j'ai eu l'honneur de vous faire connaître l'impression qu'avaient produite sur le Cabinet Impérial les communications dont le Prince de Gortchakoff a été chargé par son Gouvernement, ainsi que notre intention d'utiliser auprès des Cours maritimes ce que, à notre sens, ces communications renfermaient d'éléments propres à servir de base à des négociations pour le rétablissement de la paix.

Tout en ne nous dissimulant pas les difficultés de notre tâche, puisque les ouvertures de la Russie ne répondaient qu'incomplétement aux demandes que nous avions été nous-mêmes dans le cas de lui adresser, nous ne nous en sommes pas moins cru appelés à représenter aux Puissances maritimes dans quel esprit l'Empereur, notre auguste maître, désirait voir accueillies les ouvertures, en appuyant sur l'extrême importance des déterminations qu'elles allaient prendre.

Nous avons rappelé aux Cabinets de Paris et de Londres que les efforts communs des Puissances devaient constamment tendre au retour d'une paix

solide et durable. Nous leur avons exprimé notre sentiment qu'aucune Puissance certainement ne voudrait s'exposer au reproche d'avoir négligé un moyen pour mettre un terme aux calamités de la guerre, et nous en avons conclu que les Cours maritimes peseraient mûrement et consciencieusement la question de savoir si les termes de la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne renfermaient pas des germes d'entente de nature à préparer la pacification définitive.

Nous avons constaté auprès des Cours de France et d'Angleterre que la Russie ne faisait aucune difficulté de souscrire aux principes déposés dans le Protocole de Vienne du 9 Avril, en ce sens qu'elle déclarait vouloir respecter l'intégrité de la Turquie, être prête à procéder à l'évacuation des Principautés moyennant les sécurités convenables, et à concourir enfin à la consolidation des droits des Chrétiens en Turquie, par sa participation à la garantie Européenne sous laquelle, dans l'opinion du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, seraient désormais placés ces droits, y compris les privilèges religieux du rit Grec non-uni; que cette triple base pourrait, aux yeux de la Cour de Russie, servir de point de départ à des négociations de paix précédées d'une suspension générale des hostilités; enfin que, si le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'avait pas fait explicitement mention d'un quatrième point que renfermait le Protocole du 9 Avril, et en vertu duquel les Gouvernements signataires se sont engagés à rechercher en commun les garanties les plus propres à rattacher l'existence de la Turquie à l'équilibre général de l'Europe, il nous paraissait indubitable que déjà l'adoption complète et sans réserve des trois premiers points devait faciliter la solution de la question soulevée par le quatrième.

C'est dans ce sens que le Cabinet Impérial a cherché à préparer aux susdites ouvertures de la Cour Impériale de Russie auprès des Gouvernements maritimes un accueil tel à pouvoir en espérer d'heureux résultats.

Nous avons été dans le cas de constater que le premier effet produit sur les Gouvernements Français et Anglais par la communication du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, n'a point répondu à notre attente.

Tant à Paris qu'à Londres la continuation de la présence des troupes Russes sur le sol Ottoman a paru devoir enlever la plus grande partie de sa valeur à l'adhésion du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aux principes posés dans le Protocole du 9 Avril.

Les Cabinets Français et Anglais ont persisté à envisager l'évacuation des Principautés comme la condition préalable de toute entente, et témoigné leur surprise de l'assertion de M. le Comte de Nesselrode comme quoi l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman ne serait pas menacée par la Russie tant qu'elle serait respectée par les Puissances qu'occupaient en ce moment les eaux et le territoire du Sultan. Ces Cabinets ont vivement repoussé l'analogie que la dépêche du Chancelier de l'Empire de Russie semblait vouloir établir entre la présence de troupes alliées, réclamée par la Sublime Porte et autorisée par un acte diplomatique dont les effets devaient cesser d'un commun accord, et le fait de l'entrée de l'armée Russe sur le territoire Ottoman.

Quant à la question religieuse les Cours de Paris et de Londres, croyant devoir admettre que dans l'opinion du Gouvernement de Russie le Protectorat religieux qu'il revendiquait sur les Grecs du rit Oriental devait se fondre dans une garantie Européenne, ne pouvaient guères comprendre comment l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Porte pourraient coexister avec un semblable système. Les Cours de France et d'Angleterre, tout en protestant de leur intérêt pour l'amélioration du sort des Rayas, pensent toutefois que les réformes dont est susceptible le régime auquel ils sont soumis doivent procéder de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman, et que l'action étrangère ne pourrait, dans ce cas, se manifester que par un concours de bons conseils et non par une ingérence fondée sur de Traités qu'aucun Etat ne saurait souscrire sans abdiquer son indépendance.

Enfin, les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres ont surtout relevé avec force que la pièce Russe avait évité de faire allusion à celui des passages du Protocole du 9 Avril qui méritait le plus de fixer son attention, et qui était, selon l'avis de ces Cabinets, d'une importance capitale, en ce qu'il impliquait la nécessité de garanties rassurantes contre le retour de nouvelles atteintes portées à l'équilibre Européen. Les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre trouvent les sacrifices qu'ils ont faits trop considérables, le but qu'ils poursuivent trop important, pour qu'ils s'arrêtent en chemin avant d'avoir la certitude de n'être pas obligés de recommencer la guerre.

Par tous ces motifs, les Puissances maritimes ont cru devoir de prime abord décliner toute proposition tendant à amener dès à présent la cessation des hostilités de leur part, et même hésité à se prononcer sur les conditions qu'elles mettront à la paix, celles-ci dépendant de trop d'éventualités pour qu'elles fassent aujourd'hui à même de les préciser.

Toutefois, pressées par nos représentations, ces Puissances ont enfin consenti à nous faire connaître dès à présent, sauf les modifications et les compléments que pourraient nécessiter les circonstances, les garanties qui leur paraissent indispensables pour asseoir sur des bases solides le rétablissement de la paix et le maintien de l'équilibre en Europe, en nous abandonnant, si nous le jugions à propos, de nous en expliquer, en notre propre nom, vis-à-vis de la Cour de Russie.

Ces garanties se trouvent indiquées dans la note identique, ci-jointe en copie, que les Représentants de France et d'Angleterre viennent d'adresser au Cabinet Impérial; elles découlent des principes posés dans les Protocoles, et nommément dans celui du 9 Avril, et concordent ainsi avec notre propre appréciation. Le Cabinet Impérial, qui verrait, par conséquent, dans leur acceptation de la part de celui de St. Pétersbourg le seul moyen pratique pour entrer dans la voie des négociations, ne peut que les recommander très chaleureusement à une mûre et sérieuse considération.

En donnant lecture et copie de la présente dépêche au Comte de Nesselrode, vous voudrez bien vous appliquer à faire valoir tous les arguments qui militent en faveur d'une acceptation sans réserve des bases sur lesquelles seules nous croyons qu'il soit encore possible de mettre un terme aux calamités d'une guerre qui a déjà fait tant de victimes et qui prendrait indubitablement de vastes proportions. L'Autriche n'entrevoit effectivement que dans la franche acceptation de ces bases, qu'elle reconnait elle-même comme les conditions nécessaires d'une paix solide, la chance d'arriver à une entente générale. En adhérant de la sorte aux quatre garanties en question, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg pourrait compter sur notre empressement d'adresser aux Cours maritimes les plus sérieuses représentations afin de les déterminer à consentir sans délai à l'ouverture de négociations sur ces mêmes bases, et à s'entendre sur une suspension simultanée des opérations militaires.

Nous adjurons encore une fois la Cour Impériale de Russie de se bien pénétrer de la portée immense de la décision qu'elle va prendre, et c'est pourquoi nous n'avons pas besoin de vous recommander, M. le Comte, d'user de tous les moyens en votre pouvoir pour obtenir que cette décision soit conforme aux intérêts de la paix.

La gravité extrême de la situation pouvant vous donner la mesure d'impatience avec laquelle nous attendons la réponse qui nous sera faite par le Cabinet de Russie, je vous engage à nous la faire connaître le plus tôt possible, et saisis cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) BUOL.

No. 24.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 1,022.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 17, 1854.

YESTERDAY morning M. de Hübner communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the instructions which Count Buol addressed, on the 10th instant, to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh with a view of informing the Russian Government of the terms without which no peace could be made between Russia and the Western Powers, and of the adherence of Austria to those terms.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys had been prepared for this communication by a short despatch from M. de Bourqueney dated the 11th instant, in which that Minister states that he had not concealed from Count Buol his disappointment at the form and tenour of his instructions to Count Esterhazy. Count Buol had replied that he could not employ other than courteous language towards the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and that if M. de Bourqueney knew what the

Russian Government had demanded (among other things a joint occupation of the Principalities with Austria), he would be satisfied with the language of the Austrian Government. Most positive orders had been given to Count Esterhazy to enter into no discussion, but to ask for a simple "yes" or "no" to the advice given from Vienna.

To return to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' interview with M. de Hübner, his Excellency at once took objection to the latter part of the instructions to Count Esterhazy, in which Count Buol holds out hopes of a cessation of hostilities, and he requested M. de Hübner to state to his Government that England and France would never permit themselves to be dictated to on this point; that they were as anxious as Austria for peace on proper terms; but that they were the sole judges of when and under what conditions an armistice could be agreed to. If Austria had any pretension to play the part of an armed mediator, it could not be done without France having an enemy more to contend with.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys told me that he should write in the same strain, but calmly and courteously, to M. de Bourqueney.

He then said that he hoped to send to-day for your Lordship's consideration a project of a tripartite Treaty; but that he was of opinion that Austria should not be urged to sign it; but that France and England should wait until she herself proposed to do so. If she had determined to content herself with the occupation of the Principalities, the overtures of the Western Powers in favour of a Treaty would be made in vain; but if, in consequence of supporting our demands at St. Petersburgh, she excited the ire of the Czar, and that hostilities were threatened, or attempts made to alienate her Slavonic population by Russian agents, she would be the first to ask for a Treaty, and the two Powers might then impose their own conditions. He was for signing nothing which was not precise, clear, and positive.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 25.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 1,023. Confidential.)

Paris, August 17, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT HATZFELDT, who has been for some months absent from his post, returned to Paris on the 14th instant. He has not been to Berlin, nor has he seen the King of Prussia or any of his Ministers. He had an interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the day after his return, when he expressed himself as greatly chagrined at the course which events had taken, and at the position in which his Government was placed. He expressed himself in similar language to me, adding that he should not have returned here had he been aware of the real state of affairs.

But while admitting this chagrin to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Count Hatzfeldt attempted to throw the blame of Prussia being insulated on the Western Powers. He said that both France and England had treated his Government with neither friendship nor courtesy in not communicating to them, as they had done to Austria, the observations of the two Governments upon the last Russian propositions.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that Count Hatzfeldt should recollect that the notes which passed at the Bamberg conference had not been communicated by Prussia to France and England, although the contents of them intimately concerned those two Powers, and they had been received from several of the smaller German Courts; that Prussia had refused to assist at the late conferences at Vienna; that she had prejudged the question which it was proposed to decide in conference, by declaring the Russian propositions to be acceptable, whereas the Western Powers, whom they chiefly concerned, had pronounced them detestable. The sympathies of the Prussian Court and Government were known to be with Russia, although their declarations had been against her; transports of arms destined for Russia were allowed to pass through Prussia; finally, news had been just received that the defences of Dantzic were suddenly ordered to be

strengthened—against whom? not against Russia, for she had not a man-of-war in the open waters of the Baltic; but against the maritime Powers, whose cause Prussia pretended in words to espouse. Prussia ought not to be surprised if, under these circumstances, the three Powers had exchanged notes binding them to the future policy which they were to pursue, without reference to the policy of Prussia.

Count Hatzfeldt made no defence to these observations; but he asked what his Government could do to extricate themselves from the unfortunate position in which they found themselves?

M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered that as Minister he could give no advice, nor would he make any further communication to the Prussian Government; but as an individual he would state his opinion of the course which Prussia should follow. There were two ways of awing Russia—by an armed demonstration or by diplomatic pressure. If the Prussian Government considered that they were not justified in entailing upon Prussia such an expense as calling out an army larger, he admitted, than the resources of the country could well maintain, let them act with double energy through their diplomatic agents; let the language of those agents be clear and unequivocal, so that Russia might understand that the whole moral influence of Prussia was against her; let them be the first to demand the signature of notes and Treaties. If Prussia pursued neither of these courses, neither armed nor spoke, she would abdicate her position of a great Power, and she would find the most momentous question of modern times settled without reference to her, who was "par excellence" the largest Power in Germany.

Count Hatzfeldt exclaimed that M. Drouyn de Lhuys must recollect that there was a national feeling and a national pride in Prussia.

"And it is for that very reason," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, "that I speak as I do. You are in danger of becoming like an individual who has allowed himself to be passed over, and quarrels afterwards with everybody in order to retrieve his honour. When you find yourselves insulated you will not be able to bear it, and you will be looking out for whom you may attack, in order to prove that you are somebody. There is nothing in the declarations exchanged at Vienna which is not in unison with your own declaration at Bamberg. The evacuation of the Principalities; the future fate of the Christians in Turkey; the free navigation of the Danube, and the extension of German commerce in the Black Sea, were declared by you to be essential to the welfare of Germany. If you are afraid to repeat as much in conjunction with the other Powers, Germany will have a right to say either that you deceived her by declaring that which was not true, or that you prefer your own interest to hers, if you do not defend the latter."

After giving me this description of his conversation with Count Hatzfeldt, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he was about to call your Lordship's serious attention to the hostile conduct of Prussia evinced in the fortifications of Dantzic, and in the free passage given through the Prussian territories to arms and ammunition for Russia. He was of opinion that a categorical demand should be made to Prussia to put a stop to these inimical proceedings, and that in case of refusal her ports should be at once blockaded. He said that if some measure of this kind were not adopted, we should some day find ourselves in the same position in regard to Prussia, as we were now in regard to Russia, that is, we should find her armed at all points to defy us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 26.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 423.)

Therapia, August 2, 1854.

My Lord,

THE day before yesterday Marshal St. Arnaud arrived here from Varna. On the same day Madame de St. Arnaud paid a visit to the Sultan's harem, where she was received by one of the Sultanas, accompanied by some of the Sultan's children; and on retiring, she received a present in diamonds, reported

to be magnificent, from the Sultan. The Marshal himself was invited during the visit, and had an audience of His Imperial Majesty, no one being present except the first interpreter of the French Embassy.

I am informed, though neither by his Excellency nor by M. Benedetti, that Marshal de St. Arnaud apprised the Sultan of the military operations about to be undertaken by the auxiliary armies: and requested that His Majesty would order his Minister to place at his disposal whatever he wanted for the execution of the enterprise.

If the Marshal's communications extended beyond this point, nothing, to my knowledge, has yet transpired on the subject.

On the following day the Seraskier and the Captain Pasha waited on the French Marshal at the Imperial country-house in this neighbourhood, which the Sultan has allowed Madame de St. Arnaud to occupy. According to my informants, his Excellency stated his wants in artillery and other objects, and assurances were given that they should be supplied without delay.

Reshid Pasha has sent me word that all these arrangements took place without any previous knowledge on his part.

I had some conversation with the Marshal when he called upon me here, and also when I returned his visit.

I extracted enough from him to know that my information respecting his proceedings was generally correct. He spoke with confidence of the intended enterprise, reckoning largely upon the good understanding and spirit of emulation existing between the two armies. He hoped that the remainder of his artillery would arrive in time; and that neither the cholera—though he admitted its ravages—nor the suspension of the Austrian operations, would prevent the accomplishment of the concerted plan. The hope was expressed with animation, but so as to convey an impression of doubt.

His Excellency returns to Varna to-night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 27.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 425.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 4, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith is a report, addressed to me by M. Pisani, for the purpose of conveying through me to your Lordship the Sultan's thanks for the intention of Her Majesty's Government to authorize the payment at their charge of such of the Bashi Bozouks as may take service under the command of Colonel Beatson, Lieutenant-General in the Turkish service.

It is impossible to observe without satisfaction the favourable impression produced by a measure characterized no less by sound policy, under the circumstances, than by a generosity worthy, if I may be allowed to say so, of the British Government and nation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 27.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, August 1, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's instruction, directing me to inform the Porte that Her Majesty's Government have decided upon paying and giving rations and supplying with arms the Bashi Bozouks under General Beatson's command, I have now the honour to state that Reshid Pasha having reported the circumstance to the Sultan, His Imperial Majesty commanded him to express the extreme gratification which this information affords him; and ordered that

he should request your Excellency would be pleased to convey to Her Majesty's Government his satisfaction and thanks for this fresh proof of the interest they are taking in the promotion of affairs in this country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 28.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 427.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 4, 1854.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE BROWN and Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons arrived here from Varna the day before yesterday, for the purpose of obtaining from the Turkish authorities, with the least practicable delay, such articles as are still wanting to complete their preparations for whatever enterprize the Commanders-in-chief of the respective armies and squadrons may eventually feel themselves justified in carrying out against the common enemy.

It cannot be necessary for me to assure your Lordship that I have afforded those distinguished officers every assistance in my power towards the accomplishment of their object.

The Captain Pasha and the Seraskier, accompanied by the President of the Council, attended to-day, at my suggestion, on board Her Majesty's ship "Agamemnon;" and to-morrow Sir Edmund Lyons and General Brown are to have an audience of the Sultan.

Meanwhile a thorough understanding has been established between those officers and the respective Turkish departments for the supply of the required articles; and, judging from the goodwill expressed by the Ministers presiding over them, I have every reason to believe that the wants of Her Majesty's army and fleet will in this instance be supplied to the utmost of their means.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 29.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 429.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 4, 1854.*

I AVAIL myself of the approaching opportunity to forward to your Lordship the latest intelligence which has reached me from Varna and Rustchuk.

My information respecting the health of the armies in Bulgaria is not sufficiently precise to warrant my troubling your Lordship with any statement on that subject. The general impression conveyed to me is, that hopes of early amendment may be fairly entertained, and the weather has lately undergone a change which can hardly fail of proving favourable to the diminution of cholera.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, August 1, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE this moment received a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Ionides, dated the 28th ultimo, in which he states that, on the morning of the previous day, it was perceived from the Turkish camp at Giurgevo that the Russians had withdrawn from their position at Frateste; and on the day he wrote, the 28th ultimo, Mr. Ionides states they were encamped near Bucharest.

On the 27th ultimo, during the day, his Highness Omer Pasha ordered a reconnaissance to the villages which had been occupied by the Russians before Giurgevo. Russian deserters, Mr. Ionides states, were hourly coming into the Turkish camp.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ED. ST. J. NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

Extract from a Private Letter from Slobodzie.

Camp, Slobodzie, July 26, 1854.

YOUR Lordship will have heard from Lord Raglan concerning the passage of the Danube here on the 7th instant. The Turks have since thrown up a small *tête de pont* at Giurgevo, and we are now very busily occupied in entrenching a camp for 30,000 men here. This will be completed in three or four days, and will render our position on this side of the river very secure, as the position is naturally strong and very favourable for fortifications.

The Russians are on the height above Frateste, about five miles from Giurgevo. As far as we can make out they have two complete divisions, or, together, 30,000 men at least, in front of us here, and according to one deserter 45,000. It appears that one division which left Silistria for Bucharest, after resting there for three or four days, came down here. I am inclined to think that Russia is manœuvering to gain time with Austria. In a few weeks she will have the 2nd Corps moved, and her reserves, which will bring up her available army to about 250,000, concentrated in a very strong position between the Sereth and Pruth, quite enough for us all to do to turn her out.

The Turks are much disappointed that the French and English armies have not come up. Without European allies the Turks can do nothing; with them, they do a great deal. At present I suspect Russia is holding us in check with 45,000 men, so that she will have available against the Austrians 200,000, with which I should not be surprised if she gave the Austrians a severe check, if they can fall upon them single-handed.

I was very glad to hear from your Lordship that the Porte had written a handsome letter concerning Captain Butler. I can assure your Lordship that his gallantry, and that of the other British officers at Silistria, and on the 7th here, has raised the name of Englishmen very high with the army, and that in their estimation, as a nation, we are far ahead of and more liked than the French, who, they say, have not taken part in any of their struggles. The appearance of the few Sappers and sailors who have come up, has also had a very good effect. It is a great misfortune, however, that there are a number of do-nothing ignorant Pashas, with whom Omer Pasha is constantly in hot water, as he knows their worthlessness. These men make a party in the army against the Pasha, and hate us.

I am happy, however, to say it is confined to them, as we are exceedingly popular with the soldiers. Butler's bravery and gallant conduct may therefore be considered to have improved our position nationally with the Turks, and his memory certainly merits much approbation, as also does that of the three poor fellows who were killed on the 7th.

The Pasha is now playing a very safe game, I think. There was much risk

in the move on the 7th, and for some days afterwards; but that, I am happy to say, has now passed. The Russians are certainly not an enterprising enemy, or they would have driven the river some days after the action, during which the Turks remained without establishing a firm footing on the left bank. Now we are very secure, and every day become more so; and in about fifteen days shall, I hope, have the bridge in our rear to bring up our supplies and fresh troops, if necessary.

No further operation, than occupation of Giurgevo and Slobodzie, is as yet contemplated.

We know too little of our enemy; and until we know more, it would be rash to extend our operations beyond a reconnaissance.

No. 30.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 430.)

Therapia, August 4, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the day following the arrival of the last Vienna post, the Austrian Internuncio did me the honour to call, and read a despatch addressed to him by Count Buol de Schauenstein, under date of the 24th ultimo. His Excellency observed, that the communication was not invested with a formal character, and was to be viewed as a mere result of the permission which he had received to make known the contents of the despatch officially to his diplomatic colleagues, and also to the Ottoman Secretary of State.

Mention was made in the body of the despatch of a further communication addressed, on the 5th, to the Austrian Representative at St. Petersburgh, and through him to the Russian Government. Mention was also made in it of an instruction transmitted on the 21st to London and Paris, in explanation of the proceedings and views of the Austrian Cabinet respecting Count Nesselrode's answer to its summons.

What I collected as the substance and general purport of these documents, tending to one point, was that the Cabinet of Vienna, though altogether dissatisfied with the Russian reply, did not regard it as wholly destitute of elements of peace; that it intended to convey to St. Petersburgh the remarks, whatever they might be, of the French and English Governments on that reply; and further, that it reserved the right, and intimated the intention, of acting in the sense of its own interests, as united with those of Western Europe, and more particularly of Germany, in case the Russian Government should persist in maintaining its previous position.

As it cannot be doubted that your Lordship has been long in possession of the views of the Austrian Cabinet, I hold it unnecessary to enter into details of what Baron de Bruck read to me. The impression left upon my mind by the whole communication was, that Austria acted with sincerity, and that she would finally, in all likelihood, redeem her pledges, but that her embarrassments on the side of Prussia, and her prolonged *ménagements* towards the Emperor Nicholas, exposed her to chances which might compromise alike the interests of the allies and her own reputation for consistency.

Reshid Pasha has given me to understand, that his reliance on the course pursued by Austria is considerably feebler than mine; and there is no denying that, in point of fact, the suspension of the Austrian advance into Wallachia operates as a cause of encouragement to Russia, and of embarrassing uncertainty to the armies in Bulgaria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 31.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 433.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 5, 1854.

THE representative of Schamyl Bey in Circassia, the Naïb, or Lieutenant, as he is called, arrived in Constantinople a few days ago with a numerous company of Circassians. The Naïb previously visited the commanders of the auxiliary forces in Varna, and was entrusted by Lord Raglan with a letter, copy inclosed herewith, for me.

I lost no time in sending a message of compliment to the Naïb, with a view to acting in the sense desired by Lord Raglan. But three days elapsed without my hearing a word from him or his party. He was sent to live on a remote side of the capital and did not give himself the trouble of opening any communication with me.

It was not till after he and the other Circassians had been received by the Sultan that Reshid Pasha sent a part of them, headed by the Naïb, to this residence. I received them with the customary Eastern attentions, and, notwithstanding the difficulty of carrying on conversation through the complex medium of four languages, succeeded in obtaining some degree of insight into their circumstances and views.

I confined myself to making inquiries, and carefully avoided the expression of my opinions as to their means of usefulness or future prospects.

The substance of what I learnt from them is now to be stated to your Lordship.

They belong to several of the tribes which form the population of Circassia. That population is divided into three principal tribes, which are subdivided into smaller ones, each having a language or dialect of its own, wholly distinct from the Slavonic languages, and intelligible in a certain degree to all.

Their creed, with very few exceptions, is Mahometan. The chief Ministers of their religion are the Cadis. They build places of worship out of their own private funds. There is no State provision for that object, and there is no metropolis in the country.

Their law is, of course, the Mussulman law. They have Mehkemés, or Courts of Justice, whose decisions are enforced by the Naïb's authority.

The families are taxed for objects of general interest, as occasion requires, each family being called upon to give its quota. There is a common Treasury; but it did not appear to whose custody it was consigned.

The land is held in various proportions by the peasantry and their chief, each family having a share of it, however small in most cases. There does not seem to be any class of labourers apart from that of proprietors.

They boast of being able to collect a force of 200,000 fighting men. They have no standing force; no body of officers; no system of discipline. Each man provides his own arms, a rifle, a pistol, a broad sword, and a dagger. They have a few pieces of cannon, probably not very effective, and perhaps not even mounted. They use gunpowder of their own making, and English when they can get it. They have plenty of horses.

The Naïb has been among them about eight years. He is a native of Daghestan, and came originally from Schamyl Bey. He gradually won their confidence, and rules among them without any formal title to their obedience.

The Russians possessed the coast, because, having access from the sea, they were able to construct forts, and to establish themselves there.

The Turks, in former times, had a Pasha at Anapa; but he only commanded the fortress, and had no legal power over the inhabitants.

With respect to the Sultan's temporal authority there was evidently a difference of opinion among them.

All had the appearance of recognizing His Majesty as their Sovereign in a religious sense, and so far at least they had given him token of allegiance at the late audience.

When asked whether they would like to have a French or British General at their head, they replied that they would like to have assistance; but they did not seem prepared to submit to a foreign commander.

One or two of the party showed symptoms of independence, not only in that respect, but as to the future destiny of their country.

They have mountain paths of communications into Daghestan, besides the military road; but the Russians have established their power between the two countries.

On the whole it may be inferred that it would be as difficult for them to expel the Russians without assistance, as it would be for the Russians to subdue them completely; that freed from the Russian yoke they would probably fall into separate communities, capable of being united, though undisciplined in time of danger, having affinities with each other, of which religion is the strongest, and more inclined to accept the protection, than to tolerate the authority of the Sultan.

They expressed a certain confidence of success in the event of their being joined by an auxiliary force, round which they could rally, and concentrate their own means of resistance.

It is by no means improbable that an English auxiliary force would be the object of their preference.

I think it right to observe that the form of statement which I have adopted, tends rather to convey a more positive and definitive impression than the answers of the Circassians might strictly be said to warrant. Some kind of abatement ought, perhaps, to be made on this account.

I have to add, in conclusion, that the Circassians are understood to have been somewhat dissatisfied with the manner in which they have been treated by the Turkish soldiery.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, July* 28, 1854.

THIS letter will be delivered to your Excellency by the Naïb Effendi, Schamyl's Lieutenant, who has come here with numerous Circassian chiefs, to express their earnest desire to cooperate cordially with the allied armies, and to seek their assistance.

They are proceeding with the same objects to Constantinople, and are anxious to be presented to your Excellency.

I have great pleasure in giving them this letter, and in recommending them to your protection; and I hope your Excellency will be their advocate with the Sublime Porte, and ensure them a favourable reception at the hands of the Sultan.

The Naïb appears to be highly esteemed by the officers of the Royal Navy who have had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with him.

He speaks Arabic; the others Circassian.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

No. 32.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 434.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 5, 1854.

MR. LLOYD put into my hands yesterday his despatch No. 8 to your Lordship, and I have only this moment found time to cast a hasty glance over its contents.

What little information I have obtained of the dealings of the Turkish Government with the Circassians who are now here, warrants a suspicion that the Sultan would be glad to establish a permanent influence over them, but it does not warrant an opinion that any decided effect of that kind has been pre-

duced. I am assured, indeed, that Marshal de St. Arnaud touched upon the subject of Circassia when he had his late audience of the Sultan, and that His Majesty disclaimed any idea of wishing to extend his authority over tribes who were habituated to independence, and were happiest in that state.

I have also heard Reshid Pasha intimating an opinion similar to that which is attributed to the Sultan, and if he be sincere his judgment is deserving of the greatest credit, as he generally partakes of that partiality for extent of dominion which is common to the Turks in general, and not less observable in the Sultan than amongst his subjects.

The circumstances which I have stated above did not come to my knowledge till after I had written my despatch relating to the Marshal de St. Arnaud.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 33.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 485.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1854.

WITH reference to my instructions No. 261 and No. 265 to the Earl of Westmorland, respecting the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, and with reference to Lord Cowley's No. 1,010 of August 15 on this subject, of which copies were inclosed in my despatches Nos. 480 and 483 of the 16th and 17th instant, I have to state to your Excellency that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that no portion of the Turkish territory should be occupied by Austrian troops except at the request or with the entire concurrence of the Porte, and it will be for the Sultan's Government to determine how far the proposed occupation will be safe and advantageous.

To Her Majesty's Government it appears that such occupation would be safe, if its objects, civil as well as military, are clearly defined; if all intention of exercising an armed mediation, or interfering between the belligerents be distinctly disclaimed; if the right of the allied forces, as well as of the Turkish troops to enter the Principalities be recognized, and an engagement taken not to permit the Russians to return either to Moldavia or Wallachia. And under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the Austrian occupation would be advantageous, as it would set free a large portion of Omer Pasha's army, and enable him to cooperate elsewhere with the allied forces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 34.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 269.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday read to me, and he afterwards placed in my hands, a despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, the copy of which is herewith inclosed.*

I said that, considering the evasive and unsatisfactory nature of the answer made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to the demands of Austria, I could not but regret the undecided tone of this fresh appeal to a Power which had wantonly brought upon Europe the calamities that Count Buol deplored.

That was a question, however, that concerned the Austrian Government alone; but there was one passage in the despatch against which I felt bound to protest, viz., that in which Count Buol held out an expectation that the belligerent Powers would consent to an armistice, and I must beg leave to say that Count Buol was not entitled to speak in their name, or upon a matter so important, and with respect to which his Excellency did not appear to be correctly informed of their intentions.

* No. 23.

The passage in question was calculated to mislead Russia, and to induce her favourably to consider the proposed bases upon an expectation that would not be realized; for although England and France would be prepared to negotiate when those indispensable bases were accepted frankly and without reserve by Russia, yet they were determined not to consent to a simultaneous cessation of hostilities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 35.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 270.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, dated the 15th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch which he had addressed to the Internuncio on the 31st ultimo, with reference to a question stated to have been raised at Constantinople, as to whether the occupation of the Danubian Principalities, after the retreat of the Russian army, was to be effected by Austrian troops alone, or by those troops in conjunction with the Turkish and allied forces.

In this despatch to the Internuncio, Count Buol, after alluding to the explanations previously given as to the view taken by the Imperial Court of the decision of the Porte in regard to the re-establishment in concert with Austria of a legal order of things in the Principalities, goes on to say that although Austria must necessarily claim, in the settlement of that question, the share to which she is entitled, on account both of the special engagements which she has entered into with the Porte, and of her geographical position, it never entered into her views to give an exclusive character to her proceedings as regards the Powers who are acting in concert with her for the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey. In disclaiming any such notion, even in the case of the evacuation being brought about by her own action alone, Austria must of course be prepared to allow the maritime Powers their full share in the settlement of the matter, if her operations for that object should be supported by their troops.

As regards Prince Stirbey and Ghyka, it was the hope of Austria that the result of the inquiry into their conduct would be favourable, but if that should not be the case, and if either of them should have given cause for suspicion of their fidelity and devotion to his Suzerain, Austria would certainly not feel herself called upon to support his pretensions, but would, on the contrary, have an interest in his being superseded by a person in whom the Divan could place more confidence.

As regards Servia, Austria hoped that her representations, combined with the recent orders of the Porte, would induce the Servian Government to comply with her demands, whereupon there would be nothing to prevent the re-establishment of relations between Austria and Servia on their previous footing.

Count Buol, in his despatch to Count Colloredo, refers to this despatch to the Internuncio as a proof that Austria did not pretend to the exclusive occupation of the Principalities, whether that operation was effected peaceably or by force. It was with reference to the last contingency that Colonel Kalich had been ordered to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the Turkish and allied commanders would be prepared to cooperate with the Imperial troops in the first half of September. In the meanwhile the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had announced the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Principalities, upon which an Austrian officer had been immediately sent to Omer Pasha's headquarters, to concert with him for the entrance of the Imperial troops into Wallachia, and the return of that officer was only waited for in order to that measure being carried out. Count Buol goes on to say that it is evident from this that Austria does not look upon the Convention with the Porte of the 14th of June as authorising her to offer any opposition in principle to the eventual cooperation of the Turkish and allied troops in the occupation of the Principalities.

It is another question whether, in the existing state of things, it is for the interest of the belligerents to insist on this cooperation, and whether, on the contrary, it would not be more to their advantage to dispose of their troops otherwise, inasmuch as the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, once accomplished, would suffice to guarantee the Ottoman Empire against any fresh attempt at invasion from the side of Russia.

The reasons in favour of this view of the question Count Buol says were so evident, that he hoped they would be fully appreciated by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and that accordingly the question of the occupation of the Principalities would no longer be a matter of discussion between the respective military commanders.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, which I said was satisfactory, and particularly as regarded the Hospodars, and it was to be hoped that no misunderstanding, either now or at any future period, would take place respecting the occupation of the Principalities, if the intention announced in Count Buol's despatch were strictly adhered to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 36.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 271.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 18, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, stating that the reception given to the announcement of the evacuation of the Principalities, manifested the hopes entertained with respect to that measure by the Emperor of Austria, whose confidence was proved by the dispositions he had taken.

Prince Gortchakoff was instructed not to represent the movement as a concession, but simply as a strategical measure, and to inquire in return the meaning of the Austrian armaments on the frontier.

Count Buol says that no explanation was asked of the strategical measure, but orders were sent to a portion of the army to halt, and that other arrangements of a similar kind would be made, in the expectation that this course would be appreciated at St. Petersburgh, and that the proposed bases of negotiation would be adopted.

Count Buol further states that the Austrian occupation of the Principalities was not to be subordinate to any political understanding with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and that no condition would be made at variance with the position taken by Austria, and which she was determined to maintain.

That position is one which binds her, in principle, to the three Powers with whom she has hitherto been joined, but leaves her action free. She had separately and for Austrian interests required the evacuation of the Principalities; but as her proceedings with reference to that would be governed by her stipulations with the Porte, all negotiations with Russia on the subject were inadmissible.

Count Buol informs Count Esterhazy that it is of urgent importance that Russia should accept the bases completely and without reserve, as Austria had engaged to adopt them as the only conditions upon which relations could be re-established between the Porte and Russia. Count Esterhazy is instructed to ask for a direct answer, and no latitude is given to him to accept any alteration or condition with respect to the four points, as the efforts of Austria had been exhausted at London and Paris, and any attempt to procure a modification of the bases would be fruitless.

I said that the latter part of the instruction to Count Esterhazy was precise, and would, I hoped, procure the information sought by Count Buol as to the real intentions of Russia; but I expressed my surprise that upon such a communication as that made by Prince Gortchakoff, the march of the Austrian army should have been suspended.

Russia retreated from the country that she had unjustly seized, and could

no longer hold, but that was no reason for pursuing the course that was the most to her advantage. She announced that she made no concession to Austria, and that she was in a bad military position; and instead of the Austrian army halting, there seemed to be a double motive for its advancing. If Austria desired peace it was most unfortunate, I said, that all her measures should tend to protract the war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 37.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 1,026.)
My Lord, *Paris, August* 18, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just read me a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated the 14th instant, in which he gives details of his conversation with M. de Buol after having received M. Drouyn de Lhuys' telegraphic despatch of the 12th instant, desiring him to ask a categorical answer as to the intentions of Austria in occupying the Principalities.

It is impossible to be more explicit than was Count Buol in his reply. Without going into details, I will only say, that he stated that Austria had never meditated any exclusive occupation of the Principalities; and that under no possible contingency would she interfere with the movements of the Turkish troops or their allies.

In the course of the despatch M. de Bourqueney gives it as his opinion that if the answer from St. Petersburgh is a refusal to accept the bases of peace offered by the belligerents, Austria will at once sign the Convention proposed to her some short time back; nor, indeed, would he despair, if France and England urged an immediate signature, of obtaining it before the return of the courier.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether this altered in any way the opinion which he had expressed to me, and which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 1,022 of yesterday's date, that Austria should not be urged at the present moment to sign the Treaty. He replied, that his opinion remained unchanged; but that it might, perhaps, be advisable to instruct the English and French Representatives at Vienna to report by telegraph to their respective Governments whenever they thought the moment favourable for obtaining the concert of Austria.

M. de Bourqueney mentions that the relations between Austria and Servia were on a more cordial footing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 38.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 824.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government concur in the observations which your Excellency states, in your despatch No. 1,022 of the 17th instant, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys made to M. de Hübner in regard to the language used by Count Buol in communicating to Russia the terms on which the allies had decided that peace could alone be negotiated.

I made similar observations to Count Colloredo, and shall write in the same sense to Lord Westmorland.

Her Majesty's Government consider it very desirable that Austria should, as soon as possible, be bound by Treaty engagements to England and France; but they agree with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that, under the circumstances contemplated by his Excellency, a proposal to that effect would probably originate with

Austria; and it might be left to the discretion of the two Ministers at Vienna either to wait a short time for such a proposal, or to press the Treaty on the acceptance of Count Buol, as they thought most expedient.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 39.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 825.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1854.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,026 of the 18th instant, detailing M. de Bourqueney's report of his conversation with Count Buol in regard to the occupation of the Principalities by Austrian troops, and to the prospect of obtaining the early signature of Austria to a Triple-Alliance Treaty; and stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was of opinion that, under these circumstances, the English and French Representatives at Vienna should be instructed to report by telegraph whenever they thought the moment favourable for signing the Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government concur with M. Drouyn de Lhuys in this respect, as your Excellency will perceive by my despatch No. 824 of this day's date, written in reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 1,022 of the 17th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 40.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 304.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 16, 1854.

COUNT BUOL informed me that he has proposed to the Prussian Government to place all the documents relating to the late transactions with Prussia before the Diet, and to call upon that body to pronounce whether they do not feel themselves called upon to support the greater Powers of Germany by making some armed preparation. By the documents laid before them the Diet would see that questions were at issue with Russia which might lead to hostilities; and it was proper that they should consider whether they would remain entirely unprepared to support the Austrian and Prussian Governments, which might have to engage in them. Count Buol stated that the Prussian Government had taken umbrage at the circular despatch which had been addressed to the President of the Diet, Baron Prokesch, and to the Austrian Ministers, because they had not previously been made acquainted with it. This circumstance, Count Buol stated, had been explained by the fact that a copy of that circular, for communication to the Prussian Government, had been entrusted to Count Esterhazy, who had been accidentally detained for a few days at Vienna; and it was in consequence of this delay that the Prussian Government had first become acquainted with the document through an indirect source. The matter had been taken up with some asperity by M. Bismark Schoenhausen; but the explanation above given had since been made, and the fresh communication to the Diet which Count Buol had proposed to the Prussian Government would, he hoped, take place without delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 41.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 305. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 16, 1854.

IN a conversation with Count Buol on the present policy of Austria, his Excellency stated to me that the proposed advance of the Austrian troops, whose movements between the 1st and 10th of September it had been intended to combine with those of the English and French armies, for the purpose of driving the Russians from the Principalities, if they had refused to conform to the Austrian summons to evacuate them, having been rendered unnecessary by the voluntary retreat of the Russian army, the Austrian Government would now proceed to occupy the Principalities, with the engagement that they would not again permit them to be invaded by Russia. Count Buol added that in taking this measure his Government did not for a moment pretend to an exclusive right of occupation, although they were of opinion that in such an operation it was wise to avoid as far as possible the employment of troops of different nations. He said that all details connected with the occupation would be settled in the most friendly manner with the Porte. Looking, therefore, to the carrying out this measure without opposition or delay, some of the Austrian corps which were still on march had been ordered to halt in their different positions, in order not to accumulate a greater number of troops than was necessary on the frontier.

The Russian Government, he said, in ordering the evacuation of the Principalities, had expressly stated that it was a strategical operation, and therefore they had imposed no obligation on the part of Austria in the manner of carrying out the occupation. With regard to what might now arise between Russia and the Austrian Government, it would very much depend upon the nature of the reply from St. Petersburgh to the last communication he had made, but in the meantime his Government were carrying on their armaments, and were completing those which were in progress.

I acquainted Count Buol with the importance your Lordship attached to the judicious execution of the measure of occupying the Principalities, so that no umbrage might be given to the Government of the Porte or to any of the allies, and he assured me that he was fully sensible of the necessity of acting with the caution suggested by your Lordship. The Austrian Government, he said, had no other object in entering the Principalities than to aid the general cause in which the allied Governments were engaged, and as observations had been made as to their not having entered them when they announced their intention of so doing on a previous occasion, he could not help saying that the suspension of the measure had been attributed to very erroneous grounds. They had been reproached, he said, with having required the Turks and allies to undertake that operation, but this statement contrasted singularly with the accusation brought against them that they wished for an exclusive occupation. The proposals which they had sent to the different head-quarters of the allies (immediately before the arrival of the announcement by Prince Gortchakoff of the evacuation) for a general cooperation for the liberation of the Principalities, was a sufficient proof of the inaccuracy of such an insinuation, and the acceptation which had been received from Omer Pasha of the proposed cooperation with his army, and the readiness with which he fixed the dates and positions for combined movements, was the best evidence of the confidence existing between the two armies. The answer to the similar proposals which had been made to Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, have not as yet been received.

The real grounds, however, for the temporary abandonment of the proposed occupation of the Principalities were notorious. Prussia commenced by urging objections to it, and she was followed in that course by other Governments; in the meanwhile it appeared that the Russians were not evacuating the Principalities, and Austria could not order a hostile movement against them while she was in communication with St. Petersburgh for the purpose of settling some basis upon which the terms of peace might be discussed.

In making these replies to the insinuations which had been put forward as to Austrian policy, Count Buol said he hoped it would be offensive to nobody if he declared his opinion that the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians was owing to the attitude and position which had been taken by the Austrian Government and their army, and if this entire liberation of the Turkish territory was a great object to have obtained, he trusted that the credit which he thought was due for such a first result would secure his Government, for a time at least, against the distrust and suspicion which on former occasions had been manifested.

Count Buol informed me that General Hess proceeded yesterday to his head-quarters, and that he had sent an officer (the aide-de-camp of Marshal Nugent), who was well acquainted with Omer Pasha, to regulate with him the occupation by the Austrian troops. He added, that his Government had no predilection for the Hospodar Stirbey, but they had proposed to reinstate him in his Government, because an acknowledged authority would thus be established at once, while an election would both take time and create uncertainty. The Porte, he said, would first send a Commissioner to make the proper inquiries, a measure which he entirely approved, and an Austrian Commissioner would be sent to regulate the general position of the Austrian troops.

Count Buol expressed to me his readiness to sign a Convention such as he had been on the point of concluding with the English and French Governments, when the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians had rendered that document inapplicable. He said that the Convention had been originally his own proposal, but before concluding one now, the Austrian Government must have a *casus belli* on which to found it, which would be in accordance with the engagements they had contracted with England and France, and with their German allies. He saw no objection to your Lordship's proposal to limit the offensive and defensive alliance to the present war; and with regard to the other proposed modification respecting any cessation of hostilities, he said only that it should be so worded as not to interfere with the powers belonging to the Commanders-in-chief of the different armies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 42.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 437.) *Therapia, August* 10, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's screw ship "Agamemnon" returned to Varna last night with Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons and Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown on board.

I was happy to learn from those officers that they had succeeded in obtaining from the naval and military departments of the Porte every object which they had solicited for the service of Her Majesty's forces. They have obtained, in particular, a number of large boats called "mahonas," and a quantity of planking to be used in covering the boats when lashed together alongside in couples for landing troops and artillery.

I can myself bear witness to the goodwill and activity displayed on this occasion by the Captain Pasha and his ministerial colleague, the Seraskier. The zealous support of Her Majesty's Embassy was of course given without reserve.

The French screw line-of-battle ships "Napoleon" and "Charlemagne" appeared here the day before yesterday; and I am informed that the twofold object of their arrival was to secure the remainder of the forty flat-bottomed boats prepared for them at the arsenal, and to embark eight battalions of Turkish infantry, destined, as it would seem, together with fifty-six pieces of artillery, to take part in any expedition which may be directed against the Crimea.

I am informed that the utmost anxiety is expressed by the French commanders to have the whole supply complete and ready for its departure the day after to-morrow.

Some heavy guns are also prepared for Lord Raglan; but I am informed by his Lordship that, judging from the description of them, they are not fit for the intended service.

The reinforcements which have recently arrived from England are detained here for the moment. The Scots Greys are lodged in the cavalry barracks of Koolelee. The Rifles remain on board; and one regiment of the line is encamped on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 43.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 438.) *Therapia, August* 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I FORWARD herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, extract of a letter from a British officer with Omer Pasha, and translations of two official communications transmitted to me from the Porte. They all relate to the movements of the Turkish and Russian armies on the Danube or in Wallachia. Those of the French auxiliaries are reported by General Rose; and I cannot presume to offer any addition to the statements dispatched, no doubt, in regular course to England from the British head-quarters.

It is difficult to determine, on the authority of the Turkish communications, whether Omer Pasha was or was not contemplating a march upon Bucharest. Whatever risk would attach to such an enterprise, it rests on his own responsibility. Reshid Pasha and the Seraskier have both assured me that his Highness was instructed not to advance beyond the Danube without the consent of Lord Raglan and Marshal de St. Arnaud, and I have reason to believe that the two Commanders-in-chief have written to dissuade him from doing so.

What is stated in one of the same communications derives some degree of corroboration from the language of the Austrian Internuncio, founded on his correspondence with Bucharest. His Excellency, whom I saw yesterday, is under an impression that the Russians are concentrating in great numerical strength, and that their movements do not indicate any pacific views at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, August* 7, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that I yesterday evening received information from Silistria that the Russians in front of that place having retired, the Turkish troops at Silistria had crossed the Danube to Karabish, with the intention of marching upon Bucharest, which is also stated to have been evacuated by the Russians. The Turkish army at Giurgevo is reported to be marching simultaneously on Bucharest, which city it was expected it would reach yesterday, the 6th instant. The passage of the troops from Silistria to Karabish took place on the 4th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JNO. NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

Extract from a Letter from Giurgevo.

Giurgevo, August 3, 1854.

ON the 1st we made a reconnaissance about twenty-five miles on the road to Bucharest, to a place called Kalagouren, where we fell in with the Russian outposts, a few Cossacks. The bridge, however, having been burnt, we did not cross the small tributary of Argesh, on which Kalagouren is situated. I believe the main body of the Russians have now left Bucharest, and I should not be surprised if the Turks were in it in a few days. It would be well, I think, if the Government had decided on the steps for governing the country temporarily which they may intend to take. Omer Pasha is most anxious to prevent the Turks from doing mischief, and will, I think, succeed, but he is in very great difficulties from the total absence of money in the military chest. As he ought to pay for the things he takes and requires in the country, it seems to me of the utmost importance that he should receive an immediate supply of funds. Not a moment should be lost in remitting them to him.

So far as I can judge Russia is only manœuvring to gain time to get her reserves organized and up into Moldavia, or near the scene of action.

The 6th Corps, as your Lordship is no doubt aware, has entered Moldavia. The 2nd has moved down from Blund, and is opposite the frontier of Gallicia, or in the Moldavian frontiers, the frontier of the Bukovine and Transylvania. This does not look like peace, and I suspect we are only beginning the war. I should not wonder if they intended to fall upon the Austrians single-handed, and then to turn round upon us. However, we have gained a great step in having obtained a secure base on the left bank of the Danube. Our position at Slobodzie is now very secure. The Pasha is exceedingly cautious, and I have no doubt will play a safe game. If he advances to Bucharest, it will only, I think, be with a light corps.

The troops here are in very good health, notwithstanding the great heat, which is rather trying.

Inclosure 3 in No. 43.

Omer Pasha to the Seraskier.

August 2, 1854.

(Translation.)

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a letter and paper, in French, received to-day from Ferik Halim Pasha, who, as I yesterday reported, had been sent on a reconnaissance. Your Excellency will perceive that the Russian deserters report that the Russians are burning the bridges on the small rivers intersecting the main road, and are retreating on Tokshani, which is likewise deduced from their movements.

At present two livas of Regular Infantry, fully equipped for the field, are retained at Rustchuk. The remainder of the armies of Constantinople and Roumelia, with the reserve, amounting altogether to 40,000 men, have been crossed over to Giurgevo and Slobodzie, with 140 guns of different calibres, everything in complete marching order. The large bridge will be ready in three or four days, at latest.

Inclosure 4 in No. 43.

Omer Pasha to the Seraskier.

August 3, 1854.

(Translation.)

HAVING received authentic intelligence that the Russians had no troops or pickets in the places between Giurgevo and Bucharest, and that they had likewise abandoned Bucharest and retreated, it is my intention to send seven regiments of Regular Cavalry, and two batteries of Artillery, under the command

of Ferik Halim Pasha to make a reconnaissance to-morrow, Friday. Half of these forces will be stationed along the road, and I have given special instructions to Halim Pasha about advancing with the other half to Bucharest and the neighbourhood, and concerning the conduct he is to pursue.

No. 44.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 439.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 10, 1854.

I OBSERVE that Mr. Lloyd, in a despatch No. 9 of this day's date, addressed to your Lordship, and left under flying seal for my perusal, makes mention of an interview, which I have reported to your Lordship as having taken place at my house between me and a number of Circassians, headed by an officer called the Naïb, that he describes himself as having appeared only at the close of the conversation, and that he expresses doubts of the Circassians being chiefs authorized to express the opinions of their several countries.

I have to remark upon Mr. Lloyds' despatch, first, that I know not why he abstained from appearing at an earlier period, as he was near at hand, and I sent for him; and secondly, that the Circassians in question were recommended to me by Lord Raglan, and sent to me by Reshid Pasha, and, moreover, that they were presented to the Sultan.

I shall, however, make inquiry into the matter, and afford your Lordship, by the earliest opportunity, whatever information I may succeed in obtaining.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 45.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 440.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 10, 1854.

I AVAIL myself of the present opportunity to forward herewith, in translation, a memorandum which I have received from Reshid Pasha, respecting the amount of war expenses hitherto incurred by the Porte. It is the substance of a return from the Department of Finance to an inquiry addressed to it on the demand of the French Embassy.

Your Lordship will observe that the surplus of expenditure on that account, beyond what the regular amount of the Turkish revenue can meet, is a deficit of one million of purses, or five hundred millions of piastres, equalling, at the present rate of exchange, about three millions and three quarters sterling.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Return of War Expenses of the Porte.

	Purses.	Piastres
RETURN of the total amount of the expenses incurred during one year for the pay, subsistence, and all other outlays of the regular troops, the Redif, and the paid Irregulars of the armies at Constantinople, Anatolia, Roumelia, and Batoum, and for the treasury of the Arsenal, for Tophané, and for ammunitions of war, as extracted from the registers of the Treasury of the Nizamigé, the Arsenal, and the War Department ..	1,427,030	339
Amount of one year's expenses for the above places (provided for in the Budget), being paid by the Treasury..	623,513	419
Surplus	803,516	420
Monthly surplus ..	66,959	368
(In red Ink.)		
Add the surplus expenses of one year for the aforesaid places, not being provided for in the Budget	803,516	420
And the accumulated debts to be paid by the Treasury on account of ammunitions of war and war expenses ..	196,483	80
	1,000,000	000

No. 46.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 496.)

Foreign Office, August 21, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 427 of the 4th of August, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having rendered every assistance in your power to Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown when they came to Constantinople, on the 2nd instant, to procure articles required by Her Majesty's navy and army.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 47.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 454. Confidential.)

Berlin, August 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE King was sufficiently recovered from his late accident to receive Count Georges Esterhazy on the 16th instant, when he delivered his credentials to His Majesty. Count Esterhazy has informed me that his audience went off much better than he had expected; that the King at first was reserved, but that his manner afterwards improved, and that on the whole he is satisfied with the tone of His Majesty's conversation; he said that he had not thought it advisable to allude to the Convention of the 20th of April, thinking it would be better at first not to push matters too far or to alarm him; but that he had received from His Majesty the most positive assurances that he would strictly adhere to the engagements he had contracted by the Vienna Protocols, and further, that

Austria might count on his support if she were attacked by Russia, for he should always be ready to come forward in the defence of German interests. Count Esterhazy appears to have thought it advisable to call the King's attention to the alliance with the Western Powers, in order to discover how he was disposed on this point, and he says that His Majesty did not seem to have any doubt as to the extent of the obligations into which he had entered. Altogether Count Esterhazy is satisfied with his audience, and I hear from Baron Manteuffel that the King is also well pleased with the Austrian Minister; but we must wait to see whether any solid effects are likely to result from these favourable appearances.

The King's health is nearly restored, and His Majesty leaves to-morrow for Putbus.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 48.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 455.)

Berlin, August 18, 1854.

My Lord,

IN the course of conversation to-day with Baron Manteuffel his Excellency said that he had received intelligence, by the telegraph from Frankfort, that Baron Prokesch and M. de Bismarck had agreed as to the form in which the communication on the Eastern Question should be made to the Diet, but that it had not yet reached him. He hoped, however, that the difficulty which had arisen would be speedily got over, particularly as the new Austrian circular, which had been communicated to him, was calculated to remove the unfavourable impression produced by the first one, and was so drawn up that he thought it would be unnecessary to answer it.

It appears to me that, notwithstanding the efforts making by the Court Party to throw discredit on the intentions of Austria, Baron Manteuffel is doing all in his power to improve the relations of Prussia with the Imperial Government, and is resolved to prevent any serious difference arising between the two Courts, for unlike the generality of his countrymen he desires to see Austria and Prussia acting cordially together.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 49.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 457.)

Berlin, August 18, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 446 of the 11th instant I reported the impression which I had received, that the King of Prussia would not accede to the notes lately exchanged at Vienna, but was disposed to support the communication which the Austrian Government intended to address to the Court of St. Petersburgh on this subject; and I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that the notes continue to be unpalatable to this Government, but that they have dispatched to Baron Werther an instruction to use all his influence to obtain a favourable reception of the Austrian communication of the 10th instant. Baron Manteuffel sent off this despatch to St. Petersburgh some days ago, and I have reason to believe it was also accompanied by a letter from His Prussian Majesty to the Emperor of Russia; but his Excellency has not communicated the former document either to myself or to my French or Austrian colleagues.

Baron Manteuffel, to whom I spoke to-day on the subject, seemed to think that, if Russia really understood her interests, she would accept the conditions now proposed; and he seemed under the impression, if she refused, that the King of Prussia would then join more cordially with Austria than he had hitherto done. His Excellency even went so far as to hold out the expectation that, under these circumstances, he might be brought to agree to the notes, and

to go perhaps even further, giving me to understand that the Emperor of Russia's rejection of the conditions proposed as the basis of a negotiation for peace, would be a proof that he was not disposed to listen to any reasonable proposals whatever.

I availed myself of the opportunity to ask his Excellency why, if the King approved of the conditions stated in the notes, and suggested the propriety of the Russian Government accepting them, His Majesty would not accede to them at once? To this his Excellency replied, that at the present moment it would be useless to propose it to the King, and that we must wait until the answers arrive from St. Petersburgh before urging any further steps.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 50.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 458.)
Berlin, August 18, 1854.

My Lord,

WHEN I went to Baron Manteuffel to-day I took with me your Lordship's despatches Nos. 220 and 221 of the 15th instant, and as I thought the knowledge of their contents might be useful, I read them to his Excellency; and trust that your Lordship will not disapprove of my having done so.

He maintained that there was a positive misapprehension as to the causes which led to the refusal of Count Alvensleben to attend the Conference at Vienna, and that the desire of the Prussian Government to hold some previous communication with that of Austria was the real and sole cause of the occurrence.

His Excellency seemed to feel keenly the observation of your Lordship, that it is impossible any longer to confide in Prussia because she is rendering the Power with which England is at war such eminent services: and still more so the observations which I made from myself, that we consider the position of Prussia to be one of hostile neutrality. Baron Manteuffel said, that for months past he had been struggling to prevent the King making a declaration of neutrality; that the party about His Majesty were continually urging the adoption of a policy which would put an end to the doubts which now existed as to his future intentions; that he had hitherto succeeded in preventing any declaration of his views; and that if Russia refused the conditions proposed as bases of peace, he believed the position of Prussia must change, and that the moment might soon be at hand when joint action with Austria would become inevitable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 51.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 11. Secret and Confidential.)
Stockholm, August 14, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Minister at this Court, M. Lobstein, received on the 10th instant two despatches from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated the 1st and 5th instant. The former was brought by Count de Larochelambert, an Attaché of the French Mission at Berlin; the latter by the Commandant Blanchard, who arrived here by the same steamboat. Upon a comparison of dates—M. Blanchard having reached Paris and seen the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the evening of the 31st ultimo—it appears that both these despatches were written after M. Drouyn de Lhuys had received M. Lobstein's despatches, the substance of which has been brought to your Lordship's knowledge by Mr. Grey, in his despatches No. 189 of the 24th ultimo, and No. 192 of the 26th ultimo.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' second despatch, however, was written after the Emperor Napoleon had been made acquainted with the substance of M. Lobstein's communications.

In the despatch of the 1st, M. Drouyn de Lhuys communicated to M. Lobstein the project of a Treaty offensive and defensive, which had been presented to him by the Austrian Minister at Paris, as well as his own counter-project, agreeing as to the "fond," but differing as to the form by which it was to be effected, and adds that M. de Bourqueney had obtained Count Buol's consent to the proposed alteration of form, subject to the Emperor of Austria's approval, and had asked for his full powers to sign by telegraph on the 31st.

It is unnecessary for me to allude further to these two documents, which are of course in your Lordship's possession. M. Lobstein was instructed to obtain the accession of Sweden to the Treaty about to be signed with Austria in the first instance, and to let it be understood that the Separate Treaty with Sweden might be regarded as a corollary of the former; and he was further directed to reply to the confidence already shown by the King of Sweden to the French Government, by placing before His Majesty in person this despatch and its inclosures.

In the second despatch M. Drouyn de Lhuys informs M. Lobstein that the Emperor "a accueilli avec la plus grande satisfaction les propositions émanées du Roi de Suède et les approuve;" that he was ready to accord to His Majesty the supreme direction of the campaign in Finland, it being of course understood that the immediate command of the French troops was to be vested in General Baraguay d'Hilliers. I remember nothing more of importance in this despatch, which M. Lobstein read to me, which it is necessary to report to your Lordship.

M. Lobstein had an interview, which lasted two hours, with His Majesty at Haga on the 12th instant, and submitted to him these documents, which at His Majesty's request he left in his hands till this morning, when he was promised, with their restitution, His Majesty's final answer.

The King stated frankly that he thought a campaign in Finland was out of the question for this year. He said he had fixed the 20th August or the 1st September as the latest period at which such a campaign should commence, but he would have required some previous time to put his army on war footing; and he thought it impossible for France to bring 50,000 men into the field in sufficient time. His Majesty acknowledged that on the previous occasion he had admitted the possibility of a commencement this year, and taking up winter quarters; but that he no longer thought it advisable. His Majesty then added that though he was opposed to action his opinions as to an alliance remained unchanged; that 15,000 French might winter in the Aland Islands, and might defend themselves against all the efforts of Russia; the casemated barracks there would hold 4,000, and with the abundance of wood on the islands, the remainder might be housed round the forts; that they would have a support in the alliance with Sweden; and that on the 1st of May next year the joint operations might commence.

His Majesty expressed a reluctance to accede to the Project of Treaty between Austria, Great Britain and France, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had drawn up, unless a separate Treaty, such as he had proposed (the substance of which is contained in Mr. Grey's No 192 of the 26th ultimo), was signed simultaneously; he observed that the preamble of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' project contained nearly the first paragraph of his own, but his second paragraph was wanting. I may here state that in Mr. Grey's report of the Treaty, for the word "*restreindre* la Russie dans les limites moins menaçantes pour l'avenir de l'Europe," "replacer" ought to be substituted; and that the second paragraph is textually, "qu'elles (England and France) envisagent comme une garantie nécessaire à cet effet que la Finlande soit détachée de la Russie et unie à la Suède."

His Majesty went on to state that he was a constitutional Sovereign; that to justify the Treaty with England, France, and Austria, to his people and the Chambers, he must show that the present war was looked upon by the belligerents as an European, and not as an Eastern question, in which he had no concern; and that he was not embarking in a war *à la* Charles XII. His Majesty remained positive on this point, but promised to make known to M. Lobstein this day if his opinions were changed on reflection.

M. Lobstein stated that if the alliance with Sweden was not concluded by October, the French troops must evacuate the Aland Islands, and would in that case destroy completely the fortifications, a proceeding which it is supposed would be viewed with great regret here.

During the conversation the King mentioned that I had not touched upon the question of Swedish cooperation to him, and remarked that he could not do so the first, as, by so doing, he would have inverted our "rôles;" "for you know," he added, "it is you who have come to me, and not I who have gone to you." M. Lobstein explained my reserve by saying that when I left London, Her Majesty's Government could have had no knowledge of the communications forwarded from this on the 27th ultimo, the day of my arrival here, but that he had no doubt I should receive instructions to do so by the next messenger, who was probably on the road.

I believe I have stated above the most important points of His Majesty's conversation with the French Minister, but I must crave your Lordship's indulgence should I have omitted anything, as I write in great haste and from recollection merely of what M. Lobstein read to me from his despatch reporting it to his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 52.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 12. Secret and Confidential.)

Stockholm, August 14, 1854.

My Lord,

IN fulfilment of the promise made by His Majesty to M. Lobstein, as reported in my preceding despatch, M. de Manderström called on the French Minister this morning, and brought with him His Majesty's final decision as to the conclusion of a Treaty with Great Britain, France, and Austria. M. Lobstein had requested it might be in writing, and he copied it from M. de Manderström's dictation.

The following, if not an accurate translation of it, is very nearly so, and certainly contains its strict sense. It states:

The King cannot change the conditions which His Majesty has already stated, namely, that His Majesty requires that the guarantees, which are sought for in the North, should have been formally agreed on and adopted by the Contracting Parties (Great Britain, France, and Austria) before the united Kingdoms (Sweden and Norway) take part in the Convention agreed on between them.

This may be effected in two ways, either by their insertion in the Treaty under discussion (the Treaty with Austria), or by additional Articles, acceded to by Austria, which should be presented simultaneously to His Majesty, with the invitation to accede to the above mentioned Convention.

If "une invitation pure et simple" to accede to the Treaty, of which a copy was inclosed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch of the 1st, and which the King has perused, was made to His Majesty, His Majesty would feel himself "dans la nécessité regrettable" of declining such invitation until the moment arrived when the eventualities with regard to the political position of the North were more explicitly defined and agreed on.

The King thinks it is preferable, in consequence, in every respect, that the two arrangements above mentioned should be concluded at the same time.

It is understood that stipulations respecting subsidies, "et frais de la mise en campagne," &c., should be treated in separate Articles between the King and the two maritime Powers.

M. de Manderström, after communicating the above decision of His Majesty, informed M. Lobstein that his Government had sounded the Cabinet of Vienna as long ago as June last, as to the possibility of its being unable to preserve its neutrality in the present war. The similarity of the Austrian and Swedish positions was dwelt on, and the general desire to follow Austria hinted at. M. de Manderström states that this overture was favourably received by Count

Buol; and General Langenau was instructed to thank the Swedish Government for making it.

M. de Manderström further stated, that he had reason to believe, though His Majesty was not yet acquainted with the fact, that the Russian Minister at this Court, M. Daschkoff, had a note ready, calling on them to close, during the winter, their ports of Elfsnabben and Carlshamn to the allied fleets; and that a similar demand would be made to the Danish Government respecting the port of Kiel. He observed, that if this demand was made, they would reject it at once, and the pretext for a rupture with Russia would be thus found.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 53.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 88.)

Frankfort, August 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE imminent hazard of a decided breach between Austria and Prussia is beginning to make itself felt; and it is easy to calculate the effect which even the remote prospect of such an event will be likely to exercise, at this crisis, on the decision of the Emperor of Russia upon the last communications made at St. Petersburgh from the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna.

I am credibly informed that there is a very considerable difference in the manner in which the four points of prospective negotiatory bases, as originally framed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and adopted by Austria, and to a certain extent by Prussia, are endorsed by Count Buol and by M. de Manteuffel.

The former, whose note is, as I learn, dated the 10th instant, gives it clearly to be understood, that if the Emperor of Russia does not accept those bases, Austria will be compelled to act hostilely.

M. de Manteuffel's note to Baron Werther, bearing date the 13th August, is less decided, and does not leave it to be inferred that if persuasion fails, Prussia will proceed to join in measures of coercion.

I beg to subjoin a translation of an article appearing in a supplement of the "Frankfurter Journal," which speaks very decidedly as to some of the mischievous consequences which disunion in Germany is likely to have in the actual posture of affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Extract from the "Frankfurter Post Zeitung" of August 17, 1854.

(Translation.)

IF the unity of action of Austria and Prussia has had the effect upon Russia that she has at length resolved upon the evacuation of the Principalities, this may be a lesson that the wished-for peace cannot be furthered or attained by the division, but only by the union, of Germany. Is Germany to-day in this condition? We know not; but thus much we do know, that if Russia rejects the moderate conditions of the Western Powers, she can only have reckoned on the division of Germany.

No. 54.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 89.)

Frankfort, August 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report, that at the sitting of the Diet held yesterday, the President communicated to that Assembly the diplomatic documents relating to the Eastern question, which have been exchanged between the several Governments, commencing with the Russian replies to the notes known as the Austrian and Prussian summons, and ending with the notes addressed to their Representatives at St. Petersburgh by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, under the respective dates of the 10th and 13th instant, supporting the four points or bases for negotiation, as framed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

These documents were all read to the Assembly, but no motion was made relating to them; and a Committee to consider their import and bearings will only be appointed at the next sitting.

The President further informed the members of the Diet that, under present circumstances, the question of putting any portion of the Federal contingents on a war footing would not be brought forward, but that the result of the last overtures made at St. Petersburgh must first be waited for.

A long report of the military Commission was read, which recommended certain changes in the organization of the Federal contingents consequent upon the augmentation voted in the sitting of March 10, 1853, as reported in my despatch No. 37 of March 12, 1853.

This report will be further considered in the sitting of next Thursday; but I learn that no immediate action will be taken in pursuance of its recommendations, which would go to effect some considerable changes in the distribution of the several army corps, as well as in the armament of the contingents of some of the smaller States.

Finally, a short vacation, probably for three weeks, was announced by the President, to commence after the sitting of next week.

The only point to which I feel it necessary to call your Lordship's attention respecting what passed at this sitting, is, that the vacation commencing at the period it does, will be unfavourable to the views of the Bamberg coalitionists.

The Russian reply to the Vienna and Berlin notes will be received during this recess; and the construction thereof by the Diet, as well as the enunciation of any opinion on the communications made in yesterday's sitting, will thus be delayed for a very considerable time.

I have, &c

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 55.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 70.)

Hanover, August 19, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE writing to your Lordship my despatch No. 61 of the 8th instant, acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 17 of the 4th instant, and mentioning that M. de Lenthe was then absent, I have availed of more than one occasion for speaking with his Excellency at length, according to the tenour of the observations conveyed to me in that despatch, respecting the end which it would become Hanover to take as a member of the German Confederation at the present crisis.

Taking the observations in question as the groundwork of my own, I did not fail to amplify them by enumerating the various proofs which Russia had given of the encroaching spirit which had realised so many spoils at the expense of her neighbours, and of her appetite for more which was sufficiently indicated

by the immense armaments she always maintained, evidently for the purposes of aggression alone, as no one could think of volunteering to attack her. I pointed out how opportune was the moment for restraining this Power with England and France, already cordially united with each other, and with Turkey (which Power is better prepared for war than she has ever been before in modern times), and in the good expectation of being equally so with Austria. I showed him how derogatory it would be to the credit of Germany to follow in the train of a Sovereign who had shown, by the revelations of the secret correspondence of our Blue Books, how little (if assured of England's concurrency as to his plans as to the East) the Emperor Nicholas cares for Central Europe. I excited his *amour propre*, as a Hanoverian, by expressing the opinion that no State in Germany of the second order, by its fine geographical position as to the sea and navigable rivers, and by the close alliance with England (which he had told me he so much cherished), had a better right than Hanover to assume an independent tone, and to make her voice heard and her example followed in the great National Council; and that I should be very sorry to see this country following blindly in the wake of such as Bavaria, or even of any of her confederates.

This last observation had the effect of at once eliciting from his Excellency a positive disclaimer of his being in the least led as to his policy by M. von der Pfordten, and his loudly expressed jealousy and fear of Prussia (in which, in fact, almost all Hanoverians participate) showed that no blind subserviency to the behest of the Cabinet of Berlin need be apprehended from him. Indeed, he freely expatiated upon the grievances which he considered that Germany suffered from the encroaching policy of Prussia, which, to strengthen the false position that, in his opinion, had been assigned to her as one of the five leading Powers of Europe, had, at one time, called the Zollverein into existence as the means of increasing her political importance; at another, had taken advantage of the revolutionary movement of 1848 to grasp at the supremacy in Germany, and was at all times at work for the purpose of weakening the authority of the Diet, if not for overthrowing it altogether.

He said that he could not disguise from himself the probability that the Cabinet of Berlin might, at the present moment, be tampering with the Southern Courts of Germany, and that this made him fear that when the question of neutrality or war against Russia should come to be debated in the Diet, if Austria should have chosen the latter alternative, the majority might be found siding with Prussia for the former; but upon my giving him an opportunity for such a declaration, if he could make it, he repeated, with all appearance of candour and sincerity, what I reported in a former despatch, that Prussia had lately been entirely quiescent as regards Hanover as to this matter, and that no communication whatever in such a sense had passed between the respective Cabinets.

From all this it is impossible to infer otherwise than that, so far as M. de Lenthe is concerned, when matters should come to a crisis as regards the relations between Germany and Russia upon the Eastern question, Hanover will not go with Prussia in opposition to Austria.

I think it right, however, to observe that M. de Lenthe is not supposed to have any particular influence over the King, whose opinions upon this subject it is so difficult to ascertain; but I have no reason to imagine that M. de Lenthe and his colleagues do not take an identical view of it, or that with His Majesty's well-known predilections for England and Austria, and with his deeply rooted mistrust and fear of Prussia, a different direction to Hanoverian policy would be given from the highest quarter.

As regards your Lordship's observation that Russian encroachments should meet with determined resistance, M. de Lenthe expressed his participation in it, up to the points embraced in the Austro-Prussian Treaty of the 20th of April, to which Germany had become a party, because they were points of German as well as European interest. Then, however, old fashioned, but not unintelligible fears and antipathies broke out in the remark, that he questioned much the advisability of humiliating and weakening Russia much, lest her preponderance might be replaced by the still more dangerous one of France. Upon which I begged of him to remember how different were the circumstances of France now, and when some forty years ago she had held dominion over the greater part of the Continent. For now we had her with a Sovereign who had declared the Empire to be one of peace; who when he drew the sword at last so unwillingly,

proclaimed that he did so in defence of the weak against the strong, and for the maintenance of Treaties and the balance of power, adding emphatically, at the risk of alienating the sympathies of his subjects, that the time for conquests and increase of territory was past;—in close alliance with England, which, judging from the experience of all Governments which have lately ruled in France, his great sagacity will have taught him it would be expedient for him not to forego. In this alliance with England, which certainly could have no desire to remodel the map of Europe for the advantage of France, and which, in spite of all the false accusations of revolutionary tendencies brought against her of late years, his Excellency must acknowledge was far more conservative than Russia, when it suited her purpose, had proved herself to be.

In short, I observed to his Excellency that I thought it would be a far wiser policy than that of mistrust to "prendre acte" of the above cited tranquillising declarations of the Emperor Napoleon, and not to provoke France to turn her eyes again to conquest and extension of her limits, as Prussia, and any she may influence at the present crisis, would assuredly do, if they should continue to manifest this mistrust, or long hold off from common action with the Western Powers and with Austria.

I will not longer detain your Lordship by recapitulation of what has passed on this subject between M. de Lenthe and me, and will merely add that as he is of the old school, imbued with deep hatred and fear of France, with apprehensions of increasing democratic tendencies, with but slight predilections for constitutional Government as being the fosterer of those tendencies, and with an overweening impression of power of Russia to keep those bugbears in check, it cannot be supposed that he would at once yield up his opinions, but I can evidently perceive them to be wavering in his Excellency, as well as in his party in general.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 830.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1854.

WITH reference to Prince Gortchakoff's official announcement that both Principalities would be evacuated, your Excellency will ask M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether it would not be advisable to direct the Consular Agents of England and France to return to Bucharest and Jassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 57.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 501.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1854.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 427 of the 10th instant, I have to instruct you to convey to the Sublime Porte the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the alacrity and exertions shown at Constantinople in providing Sir E. Lyons and Sir G. Brown with the articles required by Her Majesty's navy and army in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 58.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 1,039.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 21, 1854.

YESTERDAY M. de Hübner communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a despatch from Count Buol, dated the 15th instant, confirming the assurances already sent through M. de Bourqueney, respecting the intentions of Austria in occupying the Principalities. This despatch inclosed another addressed by Count Buol to the Internuncio, as far back as the 30th ultimo, in which it was clearly laid down that Austria pretended to no exclusive occupation. Another point of importance mentioned in this latter despatch is, that although the Austrian Government had proposed the reinstallation of the Hospodars in the Danubian provinces, yet as an inquiry had been ordered, if that inquiry showed that the Hospodars had been disloyal in their conduct, Austria would be the first to admit that they ought to be changed.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he had received any intelligence either from M. de Bourqueney or from M. de Hübner of the appointment of MM. de Bruck and Gehringer, as civil administrators in the provinces on the part of Austria; I had seen, I said, such a nomination in the newspapers. His Excellency replied in the negative, remarking, however, that he should desire M. de Bourqueney to make inquiries on the subject, as the title of civil administrators implied an interference with the government of the provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 59.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 308.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 20, 1854.

IN conformity with the instruction contained in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 19th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Treaty concluded between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, on the 14th of June last, as published in the official portion of the "Vienna Gazette" of the 14th ultimo. This Treaty was ratified at Vienna on the 30th of June, as I had the honour of reporting to your Lordship in my despatch No. 259 of the 5th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Convention concluded between the Emperor of Austria and the Sultan, on the 14th June, 1854.

[See Eastern Papers, Part XII, presented August 1854.]

No. 60.

Sir John Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Munich, August* 18, 1854.

SINCE my despatch No. 52 of the 15th instant was written, I have acquired a somewhat clearer insight into the impression produced upon the Bavarian Cabinet by the exchange of notes recently effected at Vienna between the British, French, and Austrian Governments, relative to the guarantees for the future security of the peace of the East which are to be required from Russia.

M. von der Pfordten admits, I understand, that the four points specified in those notes are entirely in conformity with the wishes and interests of Germany, but he objects to what he regards in the light of a preparatory step to a closer alliance between Austria and the Western Powers; and he especially blames the policy of the Imperial Cabinet in having taken such precise engagements towards them.

My Austrian colleague, I hear, replied to these observations, by calling M. von der Pfordten's attention to that paragraph in the notes which reserves to all the three Cabinets, a positive liberty of action for certain eventualities to which the progress of hostilities might possibly give rise.

M. von der Pfordten then complained of, or at least adverted in a querulous tone, to the deliberations (pourparlers) which were mentioned as having preceded the step adopted by the Austrian Government, and which he appeared to think had been concealed from the Prussian Cabinet. To this reproach Count Appony, I believe, answered, that although he was not in possession of any documentary evidence to prove the fact, he felt in his own mind perfectly satisfied that no such reserve as that hinted at by M. von der Pfordten had been observed on anything connected with the grave question by his Government towards that of Prussia.

The language of M. von der Pfordten to myself, at a recent interview with his Excellency, indicated an approval of the course pursued at Berlin, as less compromising to the attitude of Germany; but upon my remarking that it went far to establish an absence of unison in the views of the two great German Powers on the Eastern question, he interrupted me to mark that this apparent difference of opinion was one of form alone, for that although Prussia was disinclined to bind herself to any prospective policy, she had not hesitated to give the full weight of her moral support to the principles laid down as the future bases of peace with Russia.

In the course of our conversation I felt, and expressed, some surprise at hearing his Excellency speak of a joint Protectorate to be assumed by all the Powers of Europe over the Christian subjects of the Porte, in the place of that claimed by Russia exclusively; but not being acquainted with the exact tenor of the notes exchanged, I was not in a position to argue the point. Seeing my incredulity, however, M. von der Pfordten produced a copy of the Austrian note, and directed my attention to the fourth point, which, I told him, did not at all convey to my mind the sense which he put upon it; though I was ready, I said, to admit, that the weight of the united representations of all the European Powers in favour of the Christian population of Turkey might be reasonably expected to produce results tantamount to an acknowledged Protectorate.

A subsequent cursory perusal of the three notes exchanged, for which I was indebted to my Austrian colleague, has, I may add, given me no reason to change my original opinion, that the terms made use of do not amount to an official Protectorate. There is even, it seems to me, a species of affectation in putting such an interpretation on them, in the hope, perhaps, of bringing them within the scope of the famous Bamberg Memorandum.

Altogether I am disposed to think, that the small Courts of Germany are but ill-pleased that Austria should have taken a forward step of such importance without consulting the Confederation, and their dissatisfaction will probably be shown in more ways than one, whenever they shall be called upon to furnish

men and money in support of a policy which is diametrically opposed to their convictions from the moment it assumes a character of coercion against their great Conservative Protector.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 61.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 1,050. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 24, 1854.

YOUR Lordship has no doubt been made acquainted through Count Bernstorff, with the despatch by which the Cabinet of Prussia has recommended the Prussian Government to accede to the conditions which the three Powers have recorded as those alone on which they will consent to make peace. Count Hatzfeldt has given the substance of it confidentially, in conversation, to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who observed to me that it was a miserable performance, and that he could not help remarking to Count Hatzfeldt that, in his opinion, the Prussian Government would have done far better to have simply signed the notes which recorded the conditions, than have attempted to recommend them to the Russian Government by reasons which almost bear the stamp of *une mauvaise plaisanterie*.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 62.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 1,052.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 24, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS is of your Lordship's opinion, that the Consuls of France and England should return to their posts at Bucharest and Jassy, and he sends orders, in conformity with this opinion, by the present mail to Constantinople.

The telegraphic despatch which I sent yesterday to your Lordship informing you of this, will hardly have reached you in time to enable you to write upon the subject to Her Majesty's Ambassador by the messenger who left London last night; I propose, therefore, sending his Excellency a copy of your Lordship's despatch to me, and of this answer, for his information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 63.

Colonel Hodges to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 96.)

My Lord, *Hamburgh, August* 24, 1854.

VARIOUS rumours have reached me from time to time, relating to negotiations said to be going on between the Governments of Prussia and Denmark, for agreement as to the position to be assumed by them in common, in regard to the present war; but they were of so vague and conjectural a character that I did not consider myself justified in bringing them to your Lordship's notice.

I have just heard, however, that a M. Neigebauer, a Prussian "Geheimrath," has, within the last few days, gone through here on a secret mission to Denmark.

and it is asserted that his object is to negotiate with the Danish Government for the occupation of the Island of Bornholm by Prussian troops. M. Neigebauer, in a pamphlet lately published by him on marriages in the Catholic Church, has praised the Morganatic union of the King of Denmark with the Countess Danner, and he will probably be an acceptable person at Copenhagen.

Although I attach but little importance to these reports, yet it is certain that the Aristocratic Party in Denmark Proper, and the Ritterschaft of the Duchies, are subduing their natural antipathies, and finding a point for agreement in their sympathy for Russian principles. As these parties, even united, would still be very weak, they must look around for support, and the sentiments of His Prussian Majesty and the Kreuz Zeitung Party, naturally attract them to that quarter. These inclinations, if they have not yet led to any agreement on measures in concert, cannot fail to give currency to reports like those I have above alluded to; and I therefore trust that my noticing them may not be altogether out of place.

Connected with these surmises, I beg to inclose to your Lordship an article from the "Altonaer Zeitung" of yesterday, the 23rd August, to the effect, that the British Government cannot desire Denmark to depart from her neutrality; that no German could desire to see more German unity established than the Danes do; and "in regard to the Prussian Cabinet, the highest acknowledgments of her moderation and prudence are often heard." This "Altonaer Zeitung" received a regular subvention from the Danish Government; but it has, as is said, been lately withdrawn. It is certain that it no longer publishes articles offensive to the English and French Governments.

Whilst addressing your Lordship respecting these rumours, it may not be amiss that I should refer to a conversation which I had lately with Count Reventlow Criminil, the member of the Danish Cabinet and Minister for Holstein. On my way to the Travemünde, on the 16th instant, it so happened that I was placed in a carriage in which there was no one but the Count and myself. He began the conversation by deploring the calamitous effects of the war, especially for Denmark and Sweden, whose true policy, he maintained, was that of rigid neutrality. Upon my alluding to the difficulties that might arise to them therefrom, and remarking that it appeared to me that Denmark especially would be exposed to less danger from an alliance with England and France than from one with Russia, he replied, "As I said before, our policy is that of strict neutrality, and that we must use every effort to adhere to." To this observation I made no reply, and our conversation turned to other subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 64.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 508.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1854.

HAVING learnt from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris that orders have been given to the French Consuls to return to Bucharest and Jassy, I have instructed Lord Westmorland to direct Mr. Gardner to repair to his post at Jassy, as soon as his Lordship shall have learned officially that the Russian troops have evacuated Moldavia; and I have to instruct your Excellency to desire Mr. Colquhoun to return to his post at Bucharest.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 65.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 312.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 23, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that Baron Edward Bach, Statthalter of Upper Austria, and brother to the Minister of the Interior, has been appointed by the Emperor to be Civil Commissioner in the Principalities with the army of General Hess, and will at the same time retain his office of Statthalter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 66.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 314.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 23, 1854.

I CONSIDERED the most satisfactory mode of bringing before Count Buol the views entertained by your Lordship as to the present position of the Austrian Government in relation to the affairs of the East, was to send to him the despatch No. 262 of the 15th instant, which your Lordship had addressed to me.

Count Buol expressed his satisfaction at your Lordship's remarks upon the signature and the exchange of the notes which had taken place between himself, M. de Bourqueney, and myself, and which was an evidence that the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian Government had not affected the policy of Austria, which was to cooperate with England and France for the attainment of the objects the three Governments had in view, and with respect to which they were happily agreed.

Your Lordship is aware that, although the Austrian Government consider the evacuation of the Principalities as an important object to have been attained, yet the terms in which it has been announced to them, as a strategical measure, has imposed no obligation as to the mode in which they have decided (in accordance with their Treaty with the Porte) to carry out the occupation of those Provinces. They do not consider this measure to have been adopted in satisfaction of the demands of Austria; but they look upon their own declaration that they will resist the reoccupation of these Principalities by the Russian armies as a satisfactory security against their return.

I have already informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 305 of the 16th instant, of the feelings of Count Buol as regards the signature of an offensive and defensive Treaty of Alliance with England and France, and of the conditions upon which he considers that it must now be made dependent. He expressed himself as equally convinced with your Lordship of the importance of such a Treaty, and stated his readiness, whenever the occasion for the application of those conditions should arise, to adopt it, in support of the engagements which he had taken with England and France and with his German allies. Count Buol received with great interest your Lordship's declaration that the Governments of England and France were willing to agree that the conditions contained in the note signed by M. de Bourqueney and myself should be regarded as the bases of negotiation with Russia. He considered this assurance as very satisfactory, in as far as it was an acceptation of those conditions of negotiation which hitherto had only in a negative form been assented to by the two Governments. He said he should make no use of this declaration until he had received the same declaration from the French Government; and, with regard to the conditions attached to it by your Lordship, he considered the first, "as to those Governments having been no parties to their transmission to St. Petersburgh," as already fulfilled by the communication with which he had submitted them to the Russian Government; and with regard to the second, "that hostilities

should not be suspended until the preliminaries of peace are signed," he thought, however desirable such an arrangement might be, yet if, by any official act, the Russian Government accepted the proposed basis, it might be considered as tantamount to preliminaries, and would, in such a case, avoid the delays attendant upon the assembly of Plenipotentiaries. Count Buol, however, merely suggested this idea as a means by which a decision might be accelerated; but he was satisfied that it was a question with regard to which a perfect understanding between the allied Governments would be arrived at.

I have communicated your Lordship's despatch, and Count Buol's remarks upon it, to M. de Bourqueney, who has not yet received any instructions from his Government upon this subject, but who (as soon as they reach him) will act upon them as I have done.

I impressed upon Count Buol your Lordship's forcible arguments, lest, by the movement of the Austrian troops, the Russian Government should be able to derive political advantages, from their present bad military position, by being relieved from all apprehension as to the security of their frontier—a result by which, if obtained, they would secure a great advantage, while a great disservice would be rendered to the allies.

Count Buol stated that it was impossible not to admit that the Austrian and Turkish armies concentrated upon the Pruth and in the Bukovine, with the great resources of the Principalities (of which the Russians would have been deprived) in their rear, and with the means of immediately operating, if so required, within the southern provinces of the Russian Empire, were in a much more menacing position than that which they had hitherto occupied in the rear and flank of those Principalities, and with the Turkish army on the banks of the Danube, which army would have become entirely charged with the defence of Bulgaria. From this advanced position on the Pruth, the Austrian Government were requiring from Russia the consent to those conditions of peace which had been agreed to by the three Powers, and which had now been accepted by England and France as the basis of negotiation with that Government; and while awaiting the answers which would be returned to the communication of these conditions, the Austrian army, amounting to upwards of 300,000 men, conjoined with the Turkish army under Omer Pasha, were in so menacing a position, that it would be impossible for the Russians to detach any effective portion of troops from the army with which they had to watch the movements of so formidable a force. He must, therefore, consider the advance of the Austrian army, in connection with that of Turkey, upon the frontiers of Russia, as the most effective operation (short of direct hostilities which might hereafter be determined upon by the Imperial Government) which could at present be adopted in support of the general objects of the allied Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 67.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 316.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 23, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch to your Lordship No. 304 of the 16th instant, in which I stated that Count Buol had proposed to the Prussian Government to place all the documents relating to the late transactions with Russia before the Diet, I have this day learnt from his Excellency that the presentation of these documents took place, in conjunction with Prussia, on Thursday last, when they were referred to the examination of a Commission, and Count Buol added that he was satisfied with the manner in which they had been received.

I merely mention to your Lordship this circumstance, of which you will already have received the details from Her Majesty's Minister at Frankfort.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 68.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 317.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 23, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 265 of the 15th instant, I feel it my duty to state that no such communication as the one said to have been made by the Internuncio and Colonel Kalich, as to the intention of the Austrian Government to occupy exclusively the Principalities upon their evacuation by the Russian troops, was ever made to me by Count Buol. I therefore consider the expression of your Lordship's satisfaction at learning that that communication was unauthorized as entirely justified.

I have stated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 305 of the 16th instant, the positive assurance of Count Buol that his Government has put forward no such pretension as that of an exclusive occupation, that they had no intention of carrying that occupation into execution but with the concurrence of the Porte, and that as the Principality of Wallachia was now in part occupied by the Turkish armies, the Austrian Government had no design of impeding or opposing them from pursuing the Russians through the Principalities if they thought it advisable so to do.

Count Buol has also stated that all the questions relating to the Austrian occupation of those Principalities were at present entrusted to the arrangements of the Austrian military authorities with Omer Pasha, with whose approbation the entry of the Austrian troops into Wallachia had already taken place, and the dislocation of the troops of the respective armies would be settled between those authorities with the view of combining the separate positions in which each army was placed with their mutual convenience.

The Austrian army was about to occupy the Principalities in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty with the Porte of the 15th June, 1854, and it was the firm intention of the Imperial Government to adhere religiously to the engagements therein contracted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 69.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 319.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 23, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 305 of the 16th instant, in which I stated that the answer from Omer Pasha, agreeing to the proposals for military cooperation which had been made to him by the Austrian Government, had been received, and that the replies of the Commanders-in-chief of the English and French armies to the same proposals had not yet arrived, I have now the honour of informing your Lordship that Count Buol has stated to me, that the most courteous communications from Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had been received by General Hess, stating that preparations for the expedition of the allied troops to Sebastopol were in course of completion, and that by reason of the determination to execute that movement, they were deprived of the opportunity of accepting the proposals of the Imperial Government, and of cooperating for the present with their troops in the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 70.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 320.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August 23, 1854.*

IN addition to the information contained in my telegraphic despatch of yesterday, which reported that the three brigades of General Coronini's corps would pass this day into Wallachia, I have the honour of informing your Lordship that while General Coronini himself marches upon Bucharest, which he expects to reach on the 5th of September, he has sent the brigade Jellachich, under General Macchio, direct to Crajova. The three brigades remain in Wallachia, under the special command of General Baron Alleman, while Count Coronini, after the withdrawal of the Russian army from Moldavia, will occupy that province, with three other brigades of his armée corps under General Count Paar, and will then reside by turns in the two capitals of the Principalities.

Information has reached the Government from Odessa of the 14th, stating that the Russian General Wrangel has defeated the Turkish corps under Salim Pasha, near Bajazet; the Russians are said to have taken 4 cannon, 16 standards, and 370 prisoners.

A private despatch states also that they had taken Bajazet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 71.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 464.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 25, 1854.*

I UNDERSTAND that Baron Manteuffel has received intelligence from St. Petersburgh, since the arrival there of the Prussian despatch recommending to the Imperial Government the Austrian communication containing the bases on which the Western Powers are disposed to conclude peace with Russia, stating that Count Nesselrode had been much annoyed at the view which the Cabinet of Berlin took of this communication; and further, that it was not thought improbable that the Imperial Government would accept the terms proposed.

I am assured, also, that the Prussian Government have received intelligence this day from Vienna, which confirms the above opinion.

The King of Prussia, in the meantime, has been making a further attempt at peace-making, and has within the last few days written two letters, one to the Emperor Nicholas, conjuring him to accept the terms proposed, and on no account to risk his relations with Austria; the other to the Emperor Francis Joseph, imploring him to remain at peace.

The rumour of a further concentration of a Russian force on the Austrian frontiers, and also of an advance of troops towards Silesia, has produced alarm on the mind of the King; but the Court party will no doubt endeavour to dispel His Majesty's fears, and will probably do so with success; but still I am assured that the question is again working in the King's mind whether some military demonstration on his part will not become necessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 72.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 465.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 25, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the despatch which has been addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, instructing him to support the terms which Austria has submitted to the Imperial Court as the condition for the negotiation of peace. This document has not been communicated to me officially, but has come into my possession from a private and confidential source.

I feel it unnecessary to offer to your Lordship any remark upon this document. It appears to me weak and timorous in tone. The attempted arguments of persuasion only pourtray a servility and pandering to Russian pride, and, as if fearful of the Emperor's wrath for supporting the Austrian propositions, it terminates with an allusion of a reproachful nature to the Western Powers.

I have been privately informed that in communicating a copy of this despatch to the Austrian Government, Baron Manteuffel took occasion to record the various griefs which Prussia had reason to complain of against the Cabinet of Vienna. It commenced by enumerating the summons which Austria originally addressed to the Imperial Cabinet for the evacuation of the Principalities; 2ndly, the signing of a Treaty with Turkey; 3rdly, the addressing of a circular to the German States, calling upon them to prepare their military contingents; and it cited as the *summum* of their vexations the late exchange of notes with the English and French Governments, stating with some bitterness that all these measures had been taken by Austria without any previous consent, consultation, or communication with Prussia.

The despatch then proceeded to say, that notwithstanding this want of consideration, still Prussia would accede to the Austrian invitation and support the terms of the despatch of the 10th instant, which the Imperial Government had lately addressed to Count Esterhazy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther.

M. le Baron, *Berlin, ce 13 Août, 1854.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de vous transmettre avec ma dépêche du 5 du mois copie de celle que, le 24 du mois passé, j'avais adressée aux Représentants du Roi à Paris et à Londres, pour communiquer à ces Cabinets nos impressions sur les réponses Russes du 29 et 30 Juin, et pour leur exprimer notre espoir qu'ils y verraient avec nous des germes d'entente et des éléments de négociation.

Bien qu'une réponse directe à ces ouvertures ne nous soit parvenue ni de Paris ni de Londres, nous n'avons pourtant point pu, d'après des communications confidentielles et verbales qui nous ont été faites et qui en partie se sont croisées avec nos propres démarches, nous dissimuler que l'appréciation des Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre sur les déclarations Russes différait essentiellement de la nôtre et n'était guère de nature à nous offrir un point de départ commun. C'était surtout la présence prolongée des troupes Russes dans les Principautés, qui aux yeux des Puissances Occidentales devaient les empêcher d'accorder une valeur pratique aux énonciations pacifiques du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. L'adhésion aux principes consignés dans le Protocole du 9 Avril ne leur semblait, en outre, point assez étendue, puisqu'elle ne faisait pas mention des garanties qui selon le même Protocole doivent être recherchées pour rattacher davantage l'existence de la Turquie à l'équilibre général de

l'Europe. Les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres ne nous ont point laissé ignorer que, dans leur pensée, ces garanties devraient renfermer plusieurs points principaux, qui, sauf naturellement toutes les modifications dictés par les événements, formeraient la base indispensable de toute négociation de paix ou d'armistice. Ces points ont été formulés plus tard dans des notes identiques que les Représentants de France et d'Angleterre ont remises au Cabinet de Vienne, et auxquelles celui-ci a adhéré dans sa réponse. En nous en faisant part, il nous annonce en même temps, qu'il les considère comme découlant des principes posés dans le Protocole du 9 Avril, et que par conséquent il ne saurait en recommander assez chaleureusement l'acceptation sans réserve au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

D'ordre du Roi, M. le Baron, je vous invite à appuyer de tous vos efforts cette démarche de la Cour d'Autriche. Notre auguste maître la croit dictée par le sincère désir de préparer la voie des négociations et une suspension d'hostilités de part et d'autre. Mais Sa Majesté la croit aussi propre à faciliter ce résultat. En se pénétrant de l'ensemble des quatre points renfermés dans la note susmentionnée, et en les confrontant avec l'esprit des dernières déclarations Russes, Sa Majesté ne saurait y trouver des bases incompatibles avec ce que son auguste Beau-frère s'est déjà déclaré prêt à admettre comme point de départ d'un arrangement pacifique. L'Empereur lui-même se sera convaincu de la nécessité d'obvier à l'avenir aux inconvénients et aux dangers qui, pour la Russie comme pour le répos de l'Europe, s'attachaient aux institutions qui formaient le droit public des Principautés Danubiennes et de la Servie, et la sollicitude éclairée de Sa Majesté Impériale pour ces pays ne méconnaitra pas les avantages et les bienfaits que pourra leur assurer une garantie collective de leurs privilèges par les Puissances Européennes. La libre navigation du Danube ne saurait que répondre aux véritables intérêts du commerce Russe, et bien que les entraves auxquelles elle est exposée aux embouchures de ce fleuve ne soient point encore entièrement écartées, l'esprit élevé de l'Empereur et les déclarations réitérées de son Cabinet ne laissent point de doutes sur leur ferme intention d'y mettre un prompte fin. Quant aux priviléges des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan, ce n'est pas seulement en adoptant le Protocole du 9 Avril que Sa Majesté Impériale s'est déclarée d'accord avec le principe d'une sollicitude solidaire et collective des Puissances pour le sort de nos coreligionnaires, mais la même pensée avait déjà présidé aux ouvertures que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avait faites, il y a quelque temps, à ce sujet à celui de Berlin; et comme l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Sultan ont été si souvent et si hautement proclamée comme conformes aux vues politiques de l'Empereur, Sa Majesté ne voudra pas refuser son concours aux efforts réunis des Puissances pour concilier l'amélioration du sort des Rayahs Chrétiens avec les intérêts du Gouvernement Ottoman, en assurant à ce dernier l'initiative dont il a besoin pour maintenir son indépendance et sa dignité.

Le Traité enfin du 13 Juillet, 1841, a été le résultat de conjonctures tellement particulières, que sa révision par toutes les Puissances Contractantes ne saurait en principe rencontrer de difficultés, et la Russie comme Puissance limitrophe de la Mer Noire semble même spécialement appelée à se joindre à l'examen des importantes questions qui s'y rattachent.

Voilà, M. le Baron, les considérations générales qui engagent le Roi, notre auguste maître, à appeler de tous ses vœux l'acceptation des points susindiqués, tels que l'Autriche, d'accord avec les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, les a formulés par la Cour de St. Pétersbourg comme bases d'une négociation ultérieure. Veuillez donc vous prévaloir de la haute bienveillance dont l'Empereur aussitôt après votre arrivée à St. Pétersbourg a daigné vous honorer, et de la confiance que M. le Comte Nesselrode a bien voulu vous accorder, pour pénétrer le Cabinet Impérial de l'immense portée qui cette fois encore va s'attacher à ces décisions, de la large perspective de paix qu'elles peuvent ouvrir à l'Europe et de l'effet victorieux qu'elles doivent produire sur les détracteurs de la politique Russe, si elle prouvent à l'évidence à ses adversaires les plus acharnés, de quel côté se trouvent les dispositions véritablement pacifiques.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire, M. le Baron, avec quelle impatience nous attendons vos nouvelles sur l'accueil et l'effet de la présente dépêche, dont vous voudrez bien donner, sans rétard connaissance à M. le Chancelier de l'Empire.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 73.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 445.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 11, 1854.*

THE Servian Agent has called to apprise me, in substance, of what he is charged by his Government to communicate to the Ottoman Secretary of State.

It appears from his statement that Prince Alexander has decided on complying unreservedly with the requisitions of Austria and the counsels of the allied Powers. The Servian militia is to be dissolved; the martial exercises practised of late are to be discontinued; and the attitude of the Principality is to be such as to manifest reliance, not on Russia, but on the Porte and its allies.

M. Nicolayeviteh assured me that, in reality, his Government had never entertained any plans inconsistent with its duty to the Sultan; and that the circumstances, which at one time had encouraged the contrary supposition, were the mere results of anxiety as to future events, and of a desire, natural to every individual existence, not to compromise its safety by acts of unnecessary or premature decision.

It is probable that Reshid Pasha will give me a copy of the Servian despatch, which, in that case, I shall forward to your Lordship by the earliest opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 74.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 446.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 11, 1854.*

IT has come to my knowledge, in a confidential manner, that, after the arrival of the last post from Vienna, the day before yesterday, Baron de Bruck sent to Reshid Pasha a message of the following purport:

"That the Austrian Government, after communicating with those of England and France, intended to summon the Emperor Nicholas to evacuate the Principalities forthwith and unconditionally; that Russia was no longer to exercise a protectorate over those Provinces; that the mouths of the Danube were to be free; that the Treaty of 1841 would be revised; and that Russia was to have no official right to protect the Sultan's Christian subjects."

I deemed it my duty to record this message, as probably authorized by the Austrian Government itself; although the terms which it comprises are already well known to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 75.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 449.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 15, 1854.*

I HAVE received another and more serious complaint from the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's army in Bulgaria, not only on the score of outrageous cruelty practised against the peaceable inhabitants of the province, but also on that of secret endeavours to impede the local purchase of provisions for the army, there being some grounds for suspecting that the difficulties proceeded from authority.

I have performed the painful duty of bringing Lord Raglan's statement, and the reports on which it is founded, under the immediate and serious consideration of the Turkish Government. Your Lordship need not be assured that I have branded with becoming indignation the outrages so pointedly described by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and the perfidious manœuvres brought to light by Colonel Gordon. It shall not be my fault if measures of adequate redress be not adopted and enforced.

For the present, I confine myself to a communication of the correspondence with Lord Raglan, adding a copy, inclosed herewith, of an official note to Reshid Pasha.

My despatches to the former will acquaint your Lordship with the language held to me by the Grand Vizier, in explanation of the occurrences complained of, and also with the course of proceeding which Reshid Pasha proposes to adopt in consequence of my representations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75.

Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, August* 8, 1854.

IN consequence of the accompanying complaint from the Civil Pasha of Varna, in which it is stated that some corn cut by the inhabitants of the village of Soumbey had been forcibly taken by Her Majesty's troops, and paid for at a price infinitely below its value, I directed Lieutenant-General the Duke of Cambride to make inquiry into the subject.

I now do myself the honour to lay before your Excellency a copy of the report that His Royal Highness has forwarded, and to which I beg to solicit your Excellency's special attention.

You will be concerned to see that Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon has discovered that the unwillingness manifested by the Bulgarian peasantry to bring supplies into our camp arises from their having received notice not to sell their grain or forage to either English or French troops, lest there should be none left for the Turkish army. The officer by whom this notice was given could not be ascertained by Colonel Gordon; but I learn from another source that the individual from whom the order is supposed to have emanated is the Civil Pasha of this place.

Your Excellency will observe that the British artillery, and not the Turks, should have been the complainants in the matter of the barley which was reported to have been taken by force for an inadequate price.

If any Turkish authority shall have forbidden the sale of supplies to Her Majesty's troops, I must enter my solemn protest against a proceeding at once so unusual and so contrary to that which a friendly Power has a right to expect from a Government it has come to assist; and I shall feel it my duty to announce to the Porte that the army confided to my care must receive the supplies required for its subsistence, and that I expect the cordial aid of the local authorities in furnishing what the country can afford, payment being made for the same; and I deem the Ottoman Government most fortunate in having to deal with an ally who is willing to pay for that which is provided.

It is now my painful duty to draw your Excellency's notice to the still more grave and serious portion of Colonel Gordon's report, that in which he exhibits, in simple but emphatic terms, the monstrous treatment of the Bulgarian population by the robbers who live in the Turkish villages, and by the Bashi Bozouks.

Your Excellency will see with horror, in the accompanying letter of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, the outrage committed upon the Chief of a village beyond Aladyn. This unfortunate man was not only carried off, but a part merely of the ransom demanded having been paid, his eyes were put out, and he was subsequently found hanging by the feet to a tree, with his body in the Kamtschyk river.

The British troops are, as your Excellency may well believe, horrified at such atrocities, as I, indeed, am in submitting them to you; and they cannot

comprehend how such conduct can be tolerated and allowed to go, not only unpunished, but unnoticed, under the very eye of an army like Her Majesty's, ready upon all occasions to protect the oppressed, and support the due administration of justice and the cause of right.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RAGLAN.

P.S.—I have marked a part of Colonel Gordon's report which should, for obvious reasons, not be communicated to the Turkish Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 75.

The Civil Governor of Varna to Lord Raglan.

(Extrait.) *Le 1 Août*, 1854.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que des troupes Anglais campées aux environs du village de Soumbey veulent acheter de force les grains moissonnés des villageois; comme une pareille chose a été faite au nommé Osman, auquel on a enlévé quatorze arabas de blé tendre coupé et non battu, et on lui a donné six piastres par araba. C'est pourquoi le dit Osman réclame justice.

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner des ordres pour que de tels inconvénients n'aient pas lieu, et que, si la réclamation du précité Osman est vraie, une indemnité légitime lui soit accordée.

Inclosure 3 in No. 75.

The Duke of Cambridge to General Estcourt.

Sir, *Camp, Greselder, August* 6, 1854.

IN returning the inclosed complaint from the Civil Governor of Varna, I have the honour to forward for the information of the Commander of the Forces a report from the officer employed to make the inquiries directed by his Lordship, which I hope will be deemed satisfactory, as showing the necessity for taking peculiar measures in order to obtain the supplies necessary for the subsistence of the division during the present unfortunate condition of the inhabitants of the Bulgarian villages.

I also inclose a copy of the order I issued to prevent the irregularity which is stated to have taken place, but which, as regards the 1st Division, I believe to be unfounded.

I have to add that part of the report which refers to the carrying off of children has this morning been confirmed by two fresh cases. The Teliorbajee, or chief of a village beyond Aladyn, has been carried off; the ransom demanded not being paid, his eyes were put out; this not producing the amount required, although part was paid, he has been found hanging by his feet to a tree, with his body in the Kamtschik river, quite dead. The other case is at the village of Tchapta, not far from this camp, where a negotiation is now going on for the ransom of two boys recently stolen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE,
Lieut.-General.

Inclosure 4 in No. 75.

Colonel Gordon to the Duke of Cambridge.

Sir, *Camp, Gerrekler, August 5, 1854.*

IN compliance with the orders of your Royal Highness, I went yesterday, and on two previous days, through some of the Bulgarian villages in the neighbourhood, accompanied by Mr. Dickson, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of the disinclination of the inhabitants to bring supplies into the camp, and the reason why some of them had refused to sell their crops to the Commissary of the division, but had begged him to take what he wanted by force, and pay them for it afterwards.

Having found some of the leading men amongst the Christians, and gained their confidence by friendly conversation of some duration, we obtained the same information from each, and heard each express the same hopes and wishes, although they were examined separately and without their having had any means of communicating with one another.

They all state that notice has been circulated through the district for the inhabitants not to sell their grain or forage to either English or French troops, for fear there should be none left for the Turkish army. We endeavoured to ascertain the name or rank of the officer who gave the notice, but our informants took fright at such questions, fearing the consequences to themselves from the Turkish authorities being in general the Christian chief of a village, or his deputy; and for the same reason I omit the names of the villages where we obtained our information.

One man stated that an officer had come round with the notice. Another that the Turkish soldiers, who are quartered in the best house, and living at free quarters in every village, had given them the notice. In one village, on the morning of the same day we were there, the Turkish cavalry had threatened to break the vessels in which the inhabitants sold us milk, which they said ought to be made into cheese for them during the winter.

They each asked if we could do nothing to protect them from the Bashi Bozouks and the Turkish robbers, who live in the Turkish villages, and occasionally assemble to plunder the Christian villages. This is their great fear; and they fully expect that next winter, when we have left, they will be forced to give up the money now obtained by the sale of their produce to us. These Turkish soldiers sometimes enter the village in a body, and drive away cattle, &c.; but a more common way is to carry off the child of any man whom they think rich enough to pay a ransom; if the ransom is not paid they put the child to death. Only a fortnight since a Bulgarian boy, about twelve years old, was carried off from a village we visited; the father sold his cattle, &c., and realised 600 piastres to ransom him, but the Turks demanded 3,000, which the father was quite unable to pay—the boy's throat was cut and his limbs cut off. This must have been done almost in sight of the English camp. Against these robbers the Bulgarians have no protection or means of redress, for they are not allowed to carry fire-arms or swords, which every Turk does, and the Turkish soldiers quartered in the villages will never interfere to apprehend a Turk accused of a crime against the Christians; in fact, the condition of a Bulgarian is little better than that of a slave, and those we spoke to all expressed their great desire that the Russians would come and occupy the country permanently, for they could not be worse treated than they are at present, and there would be at any rate community of religion.

With reference to the complaint from the Civil Governor of Varna of what occurred at Soumbey, it appears that the two batteries of the 1st Division encamped near that village (which is a Turkish one) on the 28th ultimo, and no previous arrangement for obtaining forage having been made, the Commissary of the Artillery purchased seven loads of barley, for which he paid on the spot 174 piastres, six loads were taken away to the camp, and on four artillerymen returning with an araba to fetch away the last load, which had been paid for, nine or ten armed Turks came up and forced them to desist, unloaded the araba and drove away the artillerymen, who having no means with them offered no resistance.

On the same day that this occurred the water of the only fountain in the village ceased to run, so that the artillery had to go up the hill nearly two miles for a very small supply of water, rendering it almost impossible for them to remain at that place. On the following morning between 4 and 5 the water was running from the fountain, and Turkish women were seen getting water at that hour; but soon afterwards it ceased to run, and remained dry until the artillery left next day. Two days afterwards I, myself, saw the water running as usual. This does not actually prove anything, but it seems most probable that the Turks cut off the supply of water in order to compel the batteries to change their camping-ground.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEXR. GORDON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, 1st Division.

Inclosure 5 in No. 75.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

Therapia, August 12, 1854.

THE Undersigned is again placed under the painful necessity of calling the Porte's attention to circumstances which form a just ground of complaint on the part of Her Majesty's army in Bulgaria. They are of an extremely serious nature. They not only corroborate the truth of previous reports from the same quarter, but exhibit in strong colours the manner in which the same perversion of authority that leaves unpunished the most outrageous acts of cruelty tends also to exclude the British soldier from local means of subsistence, and exposes the great cause for which he has staked his life to the most perilous chances.

The Ottoman Secretary of State has only to read the accompanying papers in order to satisfy himself that the Undersigned, in thus stating his impressions, gives way to no exaggerated views. Whether his Highness considers the purport of Lord Raglan's despatch accompanying this official note, the facts brought to light in Colonel Gordon's report, or the sentiments expressed by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, he cannot but recognize the gravity of the complaints in question, and the urgent obligation of removing their causes with the least practicable delay.

It is not enough on such an occasion to address particular cases of grievance, and to punish the convicted offenders. The Sultan and his Ministers must feel that after such afflicting disclosures, confidence can only be restored by the enforcement of remedial measures calculated to secure a free command of provisions on purchase to the auxiliary armies, and to protect the peasantry who supply them from hindrance and outrage.

The Undersigned abstains purposely from enlarging on so painful a subject. He is willing to believe that the Porte, instead of seeking to palliate the atrocities complained of, or to cast a doubt on their reality, will be no less anxious than himself to justify the sympathies of Europe, so warmly displayed in its favour, and to wipe out the double stain which lawless subjects and ill-advised functionaries have in their several ways endeavoured to fix upon its administration.

The Undersigned, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 75.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Raglan.

My Lord, *Therapia, August 14, 1854.*

YOUR despatch of the 8th instant, containing an inclosure from Lieutenant-General His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and a report from the Honourable Colonel Gordon, had no sooner reached me than I called upon the Grand Vizier, and after putting him in possession of the painful circumstances related therein appealed to his judgment, experience, and feeling whether such acts of baseness and atrocious cruelty were to be tolerated by any Government

having the slightest pretensions to honour and humanity. I disclaimed all intention of accusing the Turkish Ministers of complicity in the acts complained of, but I also stated my expectation that adequate measures should be forthwith taken to protect the unfortunate peasantry from outrage, and to secure for the British army free access to local means of subsistence on terms of fair purchase. His Highness made no direct objection to my demands, though the explanations which he offered had a tendency to weaken their impression, and to make redress an object of difficult attainment.

With respect to the assertions of the peasantry that they were secretly discouraged from supplying the British army with provisions, he ascribed an unwillingness, which they might have betrayed on that score, to a misapplication of the Porte's restrictions on the sale of provisions for exportation from districts occupied by the allied armies. As to the practice of kidnapping, of extorting money by terror, and of murdering by instalments, he classed them under the common head of brigandage, and stated broadly his conviction that Turk, Greek, Bulgarian, and Cingaree, the four races in Bulgaria, partook in equal share of the criminality.

His Highness admitted that the prevention of such atrocities was a desideratum, and, to excuse the authorities for not finding a remedy, stated that the trustworthy and experienced policemen employed in time of peace had been drafted into the army, and replaced from necessity by others of inferior characters, and for the most part wholly destitute of the required qualifications.

I neither disputed nor admitted the correctness of these statements, but insisted on the urgency of putting in some way or other a check upon the grievances so justly reprobated, of leaving no room for mistakes which could not be repeated without endangering the most important interests.

My remonstrances, invested with a more formal shape, accompany your Lordship's despatch and its distressing disclosures before the Council; and as soon as I succeed in obtaining any satisfactory results, I shall venture to bring them to your Lordship's knowledge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 75.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Raglan.

Therapia, August 15, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE I had the honour of addressing your Lordship yesterday on the subject-matter of your despatch of the 8th instant, I am informed officially by M. Pisani that having read and explained to Reshid Pasha, agreeably to my instructions, the official note by which I communicated to the Porte your Lordship's correspondence, he received from his Highness the assurance that the Pasha of Varna, by whom it is presumable that he means the Civil Governor, shall be removed, and also that it is his Highness' intention to obtain the appointment of a Commissioner having full power to act, and who will be charged to inquire into the cases complained of, and to have condign punishment inflicted upon the offenders. A general firman addressed to the several Governors in Bulgaria, and describing the extent of his powers, will be given to this Imperial Commissioner.

It is the more desirable that the proposed measure should be rendered effective, not only for redress, but for prevention in future, as the retreat of the Russians from Wallachia, and other simultaneous operations, may leave the peaceable, and in particular the Christian, inhabitants of Bulgaria more than ever exposed to the cupidity and violence of their lawless neighbours. On this account I venture to request that your Lordship will favour me with any suggestions which your practised judgment and local observation may supply, and with this advantage I should not despair of inducing the Porte to act on the occasion with that degree of vigour and combination which is necessary to produce a real and lasting result.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 76.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 451.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 15, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two despatches, Nos. 95 and 96, from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, having reference respectively to the position of the Turkish army at Giurgevo, and to the mortality caused by cholera among the French troops which have lately returned from the Dobrutscha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,

Varna, August 9, 1854.

BY a private letter I have received this morning from General Cannon dated Giurgevo the 6th instant, I learn that his Highness Omer Pasha was still encamped near Giurgevo with 50,000 men, but a party of Turkish Cavalry would enter Bucharest on the day on which General Cannon wrote.

The Austrian steamer had commenced running on the Danube between Rustchuk, Orsova, and Vienna. General Prim had left the Turkish camp, and had taken that route on his return to Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JNO. NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,

Varna, August 9, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 94 of the 7th instant, wherein I had the honour to state to your Excellency that I had been informed that the French troops had sustained a loss of 800 men by sickness and privations in the Dobrutscha; I now have to acquaint your Lordship that I am assured, by those who are better informed upon that subject, that the number of deaths among the French troops on the occasion referred to amounted to upwards of 1,600. An equal number have died from cholera at Varna.

The number of deaths by cholera in the British army, according to the best information which is accessible to me up to this date, does not exceed 300.

The number of cases generally has been fewer within the last two or three days, and the disease has assumed a milder form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JNO. NEALE.

No. 77.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 452.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 15, 1854.

THE Sultan's Commissioner to Wallachia is to start to-morrow for Omer Pasha's head-quarters. His departure has been deferred by the temporary suspension of the military operations announced by Austria. The appointment

has been given to Dervish Pasha, who was formerly employed on the Turco-Persian boundary. A better selection might, in some respects, have been made; but those who might have been preferred, were prevented by special circumstances from being named, and Dervish Pasha has at least the merit of being attached to his country, and of having much decision of character.

His instructions are founded upon the communication made to Count Buol through the Turkish Ambassador to Vienna. They were stated by me to your Lordship at the time; and I had the satisfaction of learning that they were approved by Her Majesty's Government. A proclamation, which the Commissioner will be authorized to address to the Wallachians on his arrival among them, is prepared. I have been careful that so important a paper should be in strict accordance with the principles which, under present circumstances, ought to be kept in view. Translations of the instruction and proclamation shall be forwarded to your Lordship by the next messenger.

A Turkish force under Halim Pasha entered Bucharest several days ago. The retreat of the Russians on Busco, in the line to Fokshani, was the immediate cause of that movement. Prince Gortchakoff appears to have expected it, for he wrote to Omer Pasha recommending to his indulgence some Russians, wounded or sick, whom it was necessary to leave there.

The Generalissimo himself remained at Rustchuk or Giurgevo with the principal part of his troops. It is not improbable that he will visit Bucharest in person, before his army advances in force in that direction. Reshid Pasha affirms that he will not put his army in motion without fresh instructions from the Porte, and a thorough understanding with Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud.

Mr. Colquhoun being, on the 7th instant, at Rustchuk, on his way from Bosnia to Constantinople, Omer Pasha prevailed on him to return to Bucharest, attaching apparently much importance to his presence there at so critical a juncture.

I hope that Mr. Colquhoun will be able to render good service by exercising a salutary influence over the local authorities. He enjoys the advantage of knowing the place well, and of having witnessed the conduct of Prince Stirbey, when ordered by the Porte to withdraw from Wallachia.

The Internuncio, who called here just now, has every appearance of expecting an early declaration of war against Russia on the part of his Government. He assures me that, if Austria decides on that course, such part of her army as may be charged with the occupation of Bucharest will be separate from the principal force destined to operate from the Bukovina, and to act against Russia, should that Power determine to make a stand for the continued possession of Moldavia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 78.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 453.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August 15, 1854.*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAMS arrived off Constantinople last night, in the same French steamer which brought the messenger with your Lordship's despatches of the 2nd instant. The despatches, with the Colonel's notice of his arrival, were not put into my hands till this morning. On learning that he had been detained by an accident, which crippled the screw of the packet, I wrote to Admiral Boxer requesting that he would take any step in his power to relieve him without delay. I was anxious, after perusing your Lordship's instructions to him, that he should be able to see Lord Raglan at Varna previous to his Lordship's approaching embarkation for the Crimea. I am not yet acquainted with the effect of my application.

I apprehend no difficulty in making the necessary arrangements respecting Colonel Williams with the Porte.

General Klapka's intended mission is finally dropped. The Porte was willing to send him to the armies at Batoum and Kars with some diminution of attendance and expense. The General himself was still prepared to lend his services, if required. He was, however, of opinion, that the lateness of the season presented serious obstacles to his obtaining any efficient result during this year. The deficiencies of the army at Kars are already known in detail to the Turkish Government. In spite of those deficiencies it appears, from the last reports, that the troops were in condition to take the field, and the Porte has determined on removing the Commanders-in-chief of both its Asiatic armies.

Under these circumstances I could not but acquiesce in the expediency of dropping a mission of inspection which, at an earlier period, offered a fair prospect of advantage, but which had been rendered useless by a series of delays and obstructions more difficult to explain than to lament.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 79.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 848.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1854.*

I APPROVE of the steps taken by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 1,052 of the 24th instant, in forwarding to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople copies of my despatch and of your reply, respecting the return of the British and French Consuls to Bucharest and Jassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 80.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 514.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 24, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 449 of the 15th instant, with its inclosures, relating to the cruelties committed against the peaceable inhabitants of Bulgaria, and the secret attempts to impede the local purchase of provisions for the British troops; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings towards putting an end to the disgraceful outrages complained of by Lord Raglan and the Duke of Cambridge.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 81.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 277.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1854.*

I HAVE received from Mr. Consul Gardner a despatch, stating that he had been in communication with your Lordship respecting the period at which he should return to Jassy, and I have to acquaint you that as soon as you shall have learnt officially that the Russian troops have evacuated Moldavia, you will inform Mr. Gardner of the fact, and direct him to return to his post.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 82.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 278.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, reporting the substance of a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys relative to the appointment by the Austrian Government of Civil Administrators in the Danubian provinces, and I have to instruct your Lordship to make inquiries on this subject and report to me the result.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 83.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 279.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction, from your despatch No. 317 of the 23rd instant, the intentions of the Austrian Government in occupying the Principalities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 84.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 280.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 29, 1854.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 312 of the 23rd instant, reporting that Baron Edward Bach had been appointed to be Civil Commissioner in the Principalities, with the army of General Hess, I have to instruct your Lordship to ascertain, and report to me, what Baron Bach's duties will be.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 58.

No. 85.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 282.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 29, 1854.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 320 of the 23rd instant, reporting the arrangements made for occupying the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia respectively by three brigades of General Coronini's corps, I have to instruct your Lordship to ascertain and report to me what course the Austrian Government propose to pursue in the event of the Russians not evacuating Moldavia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 86.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 458.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 20, 1854.

I HAVE to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a translated copy of the instructions finally given to Dervish Pasha, who has left Constantinople as the Sultan's Commissioner in Wallachia.

I have also the honour to forward herewith in copy the proclamation which Dervish Pasha is to publish in Wallachia, and an instruction which I have addressed to Mr. Colquhoun on the supposition of his having repaired to Bucharest agreeably to his declared intention.

This morning I have received despatches from Mr. Colquhoun to the 13th instant.

Colonel Simmons was then at Bucharest with that part of the Turkish army which Omer Pasha had selected to occupy that city. It appears that some doubt was entertained as the real evacuation of the Principality by Prince Gortchakoff, and some anxiety as to the result of the movements made beyond Bucharest by the Turkish cavalry.

The prospect of Prince Stirbey's return to power appears to have been viewed by the population generally, and even by some of the more influential Boyars, with dislike and apprehension.

A petition numerously signed is on its way to the Sultan through Omer Pasha, for the purpose of objecting to the Prince's restoration.

I have reason to believe that Omer Pasha will give the weight of his opinion to the object of the petition, and that the Embassies of France and England at Constantinople are expected to take the same line.

For my part I conceive that the petitioners are substantially right, and I sincerely regret that the support given to Prince Stirbey by the Cabinet of Vienna should have placed the Porte in a false position respecting him.

I venture still to hope that some better arrangement may be made, and that facilities in that respect may be derived from the retirement of the Russians behind the Pruth, supposing the Austrian army not to enter the Principalities in that case.

The language, however, of the Austrian Internuncio, as stated to me in a message from Reshid Pasha, points to a different contingency. It appears that M. de Bruck, in speaking of the evacuation, said that even if it had extended to both Principalities, the policy of Austria would be unchanged, and her troops would enter Wallachia.

There is, nevertheless, a remainder of doubt which has induced Reshid Pasha to think it better that the Sultan's Commissioner should not enter upon his functions at once, and in this sense he has written to Omer Pasha.

It is probable that in the course of a few days the whole mystery will clear

away; but it must be allowed that while it lasts, whether we look to military operations or to diplomatic proceedings, the embarrassment and risk are by no means inconsiderable and much to be regretted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 86.

Instructions to Dervish Pasha.

(Traduction.)

Il paraît, d'après les dernières nouvelles, que les Russes vont évacuer la Province de Valachie.

Mais, supposé même qu'ils ne se retirent pas tout-à-fait de cette province, et qu'ils voudront en occuper quelques endroits, il a été résolu de les chasser de là par la force des armes, avec l'assistance Divine. Et comme, en vertu du Traité d'Alliance conclu dernièrement entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour d'Autriche, les troupes Autrichiennes aussi doivent tout d'abord entrer en Valachie, il est devenue nécessaire pour la Sublime Porte d'y envoyer le Pacha susmentionné en qualité de Commissaire, afin d'arranger les points suivants.

La première affaire du Pacha sera d'aller d'ici à Varna et de Varna à Shoumla, où, après avoir fait voir ces instructions à son Altesse le Généralissime, comme il aura infailliblement obtenu là d'amples renseignements sur l'état actuel des choses en Valachie, sur les troupes Autrichiennes, surtout sur les endroits où se trouve le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien, et comme il aura à s'entretenir avec M. Kalich, qui a été envoyé par le Gouvernement d'Autriche à Shoumla pour servir d'intermédiaire des communications entre le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien, le Généralissime, et les Commandants-en-chef des Cours alliées, et qu'il s'informera de lui aussi de l'état des choses, il doit commencer par aller à tel endroit de la Valachie et de telle manière que son Altesse le Généralissime aura jugé à propos. Et comme il faudra que le Pacha fasse connaître aux Commandants-en-chef des Cours alliées à Varna aussi la nature de sa mission, il doit rapporter exactement au Généralissime toutes les observations qu'ils lui auront faites, et tout ce qu'ils lui auront dit.

Si, lorsque le Pacha sera arrivé en Valachie, il se trouve que le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien y est entré aussi, il faut qu'il le voie tout de suite; et s'il se trouve que le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien n'y est pas arrivé encore, dans ce cas aussi il faut que le Pacha s'abouche avec le Commandant de la Division expédiée comme une avant-garde; et tout en agissant de la sorte, le Pacha fera une proclamation dans les formes pour faire savoir aux habitants que l'entrée de l'armée Autrichienne en Valachie n'est pas un acte d'hostilité, et qu'elle vient uniquement pour donner des secours à la Sublime Porte en conséquence du Traité d'Alliance conclu entre les deux Gouvernements.

Le Pacha fera savoir à tout le monde que les vivres et les objets nécessaires aux troupes Autrichiennes ne seront pas fournis en guise de corvée, comme c'était le cas avec les troupes Russes; mais que le Gouvernement d'Autriche payera exactement tout ce qu'on leur fournira. Et en même temps, le Pacha prendra des mesures pour rassembler et faire venir toutes les choses nécessaires, des endroits où on les demandera, et il mettra tous ses soins à faire en sorte que les forces auxiliaires n'aient absolument à manquer de rien.

La forme d'administration établie d'après les priviléges données par la Sublime Porte aux deux Principautés, est abolie par suite de l'invasion des Russes; mais pour ne pas laisser le pays dans l'anarchie lors de l'évacuation, il est nécessaire de rétablir dans le moindre délai, l'ancien système administratif. Or comme cela sera fait par le retour des Princes qui se trouvaient alors, et que la Cour d'Autriche a fait une demande dans ce sens, lorsque le Pacha sera entré en Valachie, il s'abouchera avec le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien, ou bien avec qui agira pour lui, et il conférera sur tous les points nécessaires; après quoi, il enverra une lettre à Styr Bey pour l'inviter à retourner à son poste. Partout, où jusqu'à l'évacuation de Bucharest, qui est le chef lieu du Gouvernement, le Commandant-en-chef de la Cour d'Autriche, ou celui qui agit pour lui, se trouvera, le Pacha aussi se trouvera là. Seulement, quand la ville de Bucharest aura été évacuée, comme alors le Prince et les principaux membres de

l'administration devront rester là, le Pacha aussi doit aller là pour mettre tous ses soins au rétablissement des règlements du pays dans leur état naturel, et surveiller lui-même au maintien de la tranquillité, qui est une chose très-désirée. Et avec cela, comme le premier besoin du cœur de Sa Majesté Impériale est d'affermir la sécurité, le repos et la tranquillité de toutes les classes de ses sujets, le Pacha doit aussi faire tout son possible d'empêcher que les Valaques, même pendant que cette guerre dure, n'aient point à souffrir. Il faut aussi que, comme il sera toujours en communication avec le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien, il ne cesse non plus d'informer le Généralissime, ainsi que les Commandants-en-chef Français et Anglais, de tous les événements qui se passent.

Copie du Traité d'Alliance qui a été conclu avec la Cour de Vienne, a été remise au Pacha. Sa mission lui impose les devoirs d'observer les dispositions qu'il renferme, d'agir de concert avec le Commandant-en-chef Autrichien dans toutes les affaires qui surviennent, et d'avoir beaucoup d'égards pour les officiers, aussi bien que pour les soldats Autrichiens.

Bien qu'à l'occasion de la présente guerre tous les Traités avec la Russie se trouvent abolis, la Sublime Porte, malgré cela, confirme les priviléges qu'elle a octroyés, dans le temps, à la Valachie, à la Moldavie, et à la Servie.

Il est nécessaire que le Pacha énonce cette décision dans la proclamation qui concerne sa mission.

Styr Bey n'a pas obtemperé sur le champ aux ordres qui lui avaient été expédiés après l'entrée des Russes en Valachie de sortir de cette province, et d'après l'opinion du Divan réuni extraordinairement il a différé son départ jusqu'à ce qu'il eut reçu de nouveaux ordres. Cette manière de procéder a fait naître des soupçons dans l'esprit de la Sublime Porte. Il y a aussi des rapports d'une grande force sur ses liaisons très intimes avec la Russie. Cela étant, le Pacha doit, afin que la vérité soit bien tirée au clair et que la Sublime Porte, se consultant avec la Cour d'Autriche et avec ses autres alliés, et agissant conformément à ses droits, elle fasse ce que le cas exigera, prendre, pendant son séjour en Valachie, des renseignements au sujet de Styr Bey, c'est-à-dire, sur les points suivants: la réunion du Divan qui a trouvé à propos que le Prince restât malgré les ordres qu'il avait reçus de partir, a-t-elle eu véritablement lieu d'après le désir des Boyars, ou bien était-elle l'effet de la ruse du Prince pour avoir un motif pour rester? Quelles étaient ses liaisons et son intimité avec la Russie? la population était-elle satisfaite de son administration? Le Pacha doit s'enquérir de tout cela de la manière la plus prudente, la plus impartiale, et la plus équitable, et nous en faire connaître le résultat, aussi bien qu'au Commandant-en-chef de la Cour d'Autriche.

Inclosure 2 in No. 86.

Proclamation.

Valaques!

SA Majesté Impériale le Sultan, notre gracieux Souverain, dans sa haute et paternelle sollicitude envers tous ses sujets sans distinction aucune, s'est plu à vous donner un nouveau témoignage de sa bienveillance en daignant me nommer son Commissaire Impérial dans la Principauté de Valachie pour veiller à votre bien-être et rétablir l'ordre qui a été malheureusement troublé par l'injustice et l'arbitraire du Gouvernement Russe.

En vous faisant part de cette gracieuse détermination de Sa Majesté Impériale, je m'empresse de vous faire connaître ce qui suit:

La Sublime Porte ayant conclu une Convention spéciale avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Apostolique, comme elle en avait préalablement conclu avec les Gouvernements de la France et de la Grande Bretagne, je dois vous informer que selon les termes du susdit Acte des forces militaires Autrichiennes entreront provisoirement dans les deux Principautés. La présence de ces troupes en Valachie ne doit nullement vous inquiéter, puisqu'elles y entrent comme appartenant à une des Puissances armées et alliées de la Sublime Porte. Elles ne vous seront aucunement à charge, puisqu'elles payeront exactement en argent comptant tout ce dont elles auront besoin de faire l'achat dans le pays.

Par le fait de la retraite des Russes, la Porte a voulu rétablir l'état précédent du pays, et le Prince a reçu l'ordre d'y revenir et attendre les dispositions ultérieures de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Les anciens priviléges et immunités des Principautés sont et seront toujours maintenus. Vous verrez que le maintien de ces priviléges n'est dû nullement aux Traités, qui sont déjà annullés, mais bien à la sollicitude bienveillante et paternelle de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, notre auguste Souverain, dont l'honneur et la gloire y sont profondément intéressés.

Valaques! votre pays a bien souffert, mais sous l'égide protectrice de notre gracieux Souverain tout va y rentrer dans son état normal. En attendant que les circonstances en permettent un plus heureux développement, vous devez continuer à obéir aux lois qui vous régissent et à conserver pour elles ce sentiment de respect qui est si indispensable au bonheur et à la prospérité d'un pays. A cette condition rien ne sera plus facile et plus doux que de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité publique, auxquels mon auguste Souverain m'a chargé de veiller avec soin.

Je place toute ma confiance dans vos sentiments de dévouement et de fidélité à Sa Majesté Impériale, notre bien aimé Souverain, et dans votre légitime affection au pays qui vous a vu naître.

Inclosure 3 in No. 86.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Sir, *Therapia, August* 16, 1854.

I HAVE learnt with satisfaction from the letters which you addressed to me from Rustchuk, that you had complied, under the circumstances, with the wish expressed to you by Omer Pasha, that you should repair at once to Bucharest. It would have been better had some one duly authorized by the French Government been ready to take part with you in a step of so much importance. But I am not aware that M. Bourné has any authority in such matters; and it has been out of my power to communicate with the French Embassy since the receipt of your advices.

At all events, your own discretion will, no doubt, have suggested the expediency of not resuming your Consular, and still less your diplomatic, functions, until a more regular state of affairs shall have been restored in the Principality.

The Sultan's Commissioner, Dervish Pasha, was to leave Constantinople yesterday, accompanied by an Armenian named Daoud, who was lately the Porte's Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin.

I inclose you herewith, in strict confidence, a copy of his instructions, such as they have been confidentially communicated to me, and also a copy, or translation, of the Proclamation which he is authorised to issue in the Sultan's name.

You will not fail to observe, that while every degree of confidence is placed in the sentiments and proceedings of the Austrian Government and its army, certain principles of a restrictive character are kept in view. The Austrian occupation is qualified as temporary; the restored order of things as provisional; and the Convention of Austria, though separate, as part of the Porte's whole system of agreement with its cooperating allies.

Since writing what precedes, I have communicated, though not in person, with the French Embassy; and M. Benedetti has confirmed the correctness of my impressions respecting M. Bourné. He agrees with me as to the course which I have sanctioned for your prosecution, and appears to expect that M. Poujade will probably be ordered at Paris to return to his post.

I cannot answer for the precise correctness of the instructions to Dervish Pasha, as inclosed herewith. The project may have been slightly amended.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 87.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 461.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 20, 1854.

THE latest advices received here from the Asiatic frontier of Turkey are of more than usual interest.

The town of Bayazid has been occupied by a Russian force. The Turkish troops in position there are stated to have fled on the approach of the enemy.

The great commercial road between Turkey and Persia is thus placed at the mercy of the Russians, threatening a trade in which British manufactures are considerably engaged with serious, if not total, obstruction, impeding our political communications with Teheran, and tending to increase the moral influence of Russia at the Persian Court.

A sanguinary battle has also taken place between the principal armies of Turkey and Russia in that quarter. The loss is stated to have been heavy, and almost equal on both sides. The Russians remained on the field of battle, but in order to bury their dead they were obliged to come to an agreement with the Turkish General.

I beg to refer your Lordship for particulars to the despatch and accompanying notes, inclosed herewith in copy, from Mr. Lloyd, our Acting Vice-Consul at Samsoon.

The army of Kars, if Mr. Lloyd's informant may be relied upon, must have been far better in point of discipline, spirit, and supplies than we had been led to expect. It would not, otherwise, have made so regular and effective a stand against troops of nearly equal number, having to choose their point of attack. It appears, moreover, that the old Turkish General behaved with so much intrepidity and cool judgment, as to maintain the steadiness of the army throughout a close struggle of seven hours' duration, notwithstanding the superiority of the Russians in cavalry and tactics.

The verbal accounts which I have received of these occurrences from the Porte differ in degree, though not in substance, from the particulars transmitted by Mr. Lloyd. I cannot obtain copies of them till after they return from the Palace. I learn, meanwhile, from M. Pisani's report that the result is considered at the Porte as unfavourable to the Sultan's army. Some recrimination appears to have taken place between General Guyon and the Turkish Commander-in-chief. It was known before that the former distinguished officer had so far overcome the reluctance of Zarif Pasha to risk a general engagement, as to persuade him to take up a position which would provoke the Russians to battle, and leave their commander free to attack at his pleasure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

Acting Vice-Consul Lloyd to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Samsoon, August* 15, 1854.

A TURKISH steamer arrived here last night from Trebizond, and proceeding direct to Varna has brought news and letters from which I have been enabled to copy hurriedly the two inclosed extracts, dated Trebizond, 10th and 12th of August; and thinking they may be interesting to your Lordship, I take the liberty of forwarding them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 87.

Extract from Private Correspondence.

Trebizond, August 10, 1854.

BY the Turkish post which reached this afternoon from Erzeroom, we hear of the occupation of Bayazid by the Russians on the 29th July.

There are many stories about at Erzeroom, and all agree that the Turks under Selim Pasha, on the advance of the Russians, left Bayazid without firing a shot, and fled in great disorder over the hills to Kara Klissia, and across the mountain pass to Van where Mahomed Reshid Pasha had taken the command, and having reinforced the army with 12,000 Arabs, was contemplating a march on Bayazid. The Russians found in Bayazid very large supplies of bread, flour, ammunition, hay, tents, and camp furniture, the greater part of which were laid up for winter stock. Some Bashi Bozouks made a stand, and joined by some Rediffs fought nobly, and although many were killed, they committed great havoc amongst the Russians; they did not belong to the Bayazid division but to the Kars army, and merely met the Russians by accident.

The road to Persia is intercepted by the Russians, who have also sent a detachment to occupy the quarantine station at Kissil Dizzel. Many caravans had halted, and the people of the adjoining villages, panic-stricken, had fled in all directions.

Erzeroom was alarmed on the 3rd by news of the approach of the Russians; the bustle and confusion was very great until the report was contradicted.

General Guyon was nigh taken by a party of Russians near Hagee Veli Kivi; he owes his escape to having cut off the top of a Cossack's lance with his sword, and the speed of his horse. The day following, Iskender Bey and Mr. Duncan, the "Chronicle" correspondent, were also near falling into the hands of the Russians; they galloped up to the Russian outpost at Koorook Derch, and, after taking a good look at the Cossacks, were galloping back, when a shower of musket-balls were sent flying after them; a ball struck close to Mr. Duncan's stirrup on a stone, and several went over his head within half-an-inch.

The English courier from Persia had not yet made his appearance, and fears were entertained of his safety. Mr. Balfour, the "Times" correspondent, died a few days since, at Erzeroom, of rapid consumption. The roads between Erzeroom and Trebizond are infested with brigands.

The army at Choorooskoo is in a miserable plight; even after receiving large reinforcements from Varna, it is again reduced to 4,000 men, and if attacked by the Russians must be totally annihilated. The fever carries off hundreds daily, and Selim Pasha does nothing to render the sickness less dangerous; he amuses himself in his tent, at some distance from the camp, with a host of boys and Georgian girls, and from over-exertion suffers from pain in the back and weak legs, and makes these latter pretexts for not visiting the camp oftener. The doctors have all resigned except one; and the dead are buried or rather half-buried wherever they chance to fall. The stench from the bodies is awful.

The fever is also committing ravages at Redout Kaleh. Captain Chapman, who commanded some 140 Engineers and Sappers and Miners (English) stationed there, embarked on board the "Wasp" in a very poor state of health. Captain Gordon, who was at Sookoum Kaleh, was obliged to leave on account of ill health. Lieutenant Lampierre, R.E., now at Redout Kaleh, has caught fever. The "Furious" and "Firebrand" are sounding off Anapa. Captain Brock was at Bardari, and the "Wasp" was gone to him; he had not been able to reach Schumyl.

Some forty Circassian chiefs reached Trebizond some days ago, and went on to Varna, and among them was Schumyl's Deputy-Naib. They go to Varna to consult with Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud as to the future. They object to be put under Turkish yoke, and will be independent or under England; without some such promise they will not stir against the Russians, but take their chance. If their terms are accepted, they engage to furnish at once 80,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry.

The ex-French Consul at Tiflis arrived here yesterday, and goes on to Batoom in a few days. He is accompanied by a certain Shahoom, formerly a dragoman in Mr. Brant's service, when Vice-Consul here, who went into New Russia in 1838. He is a Russian spy, it is supposed, and was sent with the Frenchman to watch him. He accompanied the Consul as interpreter, and pretends to have availed of this excuse to come on to Trebizond and visit Smyrna. He is an Armenian by birth, and seems a very clever plausible rascal.

Charles Brumer, one of Lord Raglan's interpreters, is dead of typhus.

Inclosure 3 in No. 87.

Extract from Private Correspondence.

Trebizond, August 12, 1854.

ISKENDER BEY, a Hungarian in the Turkish service, who fought so nobly at Sockbatan, arrived here this day from Kars in four days, bearer of intelligence of a bloody battle fought on Saturday the 5th of August, between Kajee Veli Kioi and Koorook Derch. The details, as given by Iskender Bey are as follows; on the 4th instant, the Turkish force, all but five battalions and twenty-four cannon, left Kars, and marching through Veli Kioi halted before the Russian outpost of Koorook Derch. The Turks, counting that evening 30,000 strong, divided into two divisions, commanded the first by Kerim Pasha, and the second by Vely Pasha, with General Guyon as Chief of the Staff, and Zarif Mustapha Pasha as Commander-in-chief and Generalissimo. Hassan Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Arabistan Irregulars, commanded the reserve division in the field, and Pasha commanded the reserve division in Kars; Kmety commanding the advanced guard. During the night of the 4th, the Russians advanced to their outposts and took up a position on the plain, about 400 yards from the Turks, and exactly on the spot where their outpost stood the night before; they were commanded by General Prince Beibitoff, and General Prince Dolgorouky Baratinsky, Chief Staff Officer. At 5 A.M., on the 5th, a general action commenced; at 9 o'clock the left Russian wing commenced giving way, but being reinforced soon revived: at 11 both sides got so close that they charged each other with bayonets; and at 12 the action ceased as if by mutual consent. The Turks, leaving 6,000 dead on the field, retreated in a very orderly manner, except a small part of Kerim Pasha's division, which went rather hastily and clumsily to work, and retired helter-skelter.

The whole force got to Kars early in the afternoon, when the wounded were immediately dispatched to Erzeroom; these amounted to about 3,000. The Russians left 6,000 dead on the field and carried away about 2,500 wounded; one of their Generals was killed and a great many officers. Among the Turks killed was Hassan Pasha of the reserved division. Among the wounded Mustapha Pasha, Cochiminsky, a Hungarian Colonel, in the neck. Iskender Bey had a horse shot under him, and cut his forehead in the fall. All the European officers, from General Guyon downwards, behaved with great coolness of mind, courage, bravery, and activity, as did also Mr. Duncan, the "Chronicle" correspondent. During the battle the Russians had six guns dismounted, and the Turks ten. The Russians on the afternoon of the 5th surrounded these guns with cavalry, and walked the whole sixteen guns off to Koorook Dereh, after doing which they retired to their former camp, leaving a small force at one hour's distance, and exactly opposite Hajee Vely Kioi, where the Turks left two regiments of Cavalry and some Infantry under the command of General Kmety. For once in a way the Bashi Bozouks behaved well, and only about 600 fled to their homes, 5 deserted over to the enemy before the action commenced, and 1 after all was over. The Russians also had several deserters over to the Turks before and after the action. Both armies fought nobly and bravely, and although in strict military language the Turks may be said to have lost the battle, still the Russians suffered greatly, and every bit as much as the Turks. The day following the battle Iskender Bey went to General Beibitoff, by orders of the Mushir, and both sides agreed to allow each other to advance and bury their dead. The Turks and Cossacks consequently met alongside of one another, and appeared quite friendly. Zarif Mustapha Pasha's courage and presence of mind did much in keeping the army from giving way. The old man was in the heat of the fire

everywhere. It is much to be regretted that the Turkish Cavalry, from want of proper training, could not assist in the battle; it did little, and here the Russians had a great advantage, as also in the quickness and precision of their beautiful manœuvres, in which the Turks could in no way compete with them.

The following is perhaps not an inaccurate statement of the contending forces:

Turkish.	*Russian.*
20,000 Infantry.	25 Battalions Infantry.
4 Regiments Cavalry, of little use.	2 Regiments Don Cossaks.
4,500 Irregular bad horsemen.	2 Regiments Circassian Cossacks.
1,000 Artillery. 52 guns.	2 Regiments Dragoons.
In reserve at Kars.	2 Regiments Irregulars.
5 Battalions Infantry. 24 guns.	60 Field-pieces.
	2,000 Artillery.

On the 8th the Turkish army at Kars was ready to take the field again in an hour's notice if necessary.

No. 88.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 287.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1854.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 314 has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government approve of your having sent to Count Buol my despatch No. 262, and they receive with satisfaction the fresh assurances of his Excellency that the re-occupation of the Principalities by the Russian armies will be resisted by Austria, and that he is convinced of the importance of a Treaty being signed in support of the engagements taken by Austria with England and France; but your Lordship will inform Count Buol that it is quite impossible for Her Majesty's Government to adopt his Excellency's suggestion, that if by any official act the Russian Government accepted the proposed bases it might be considered as tantamount to preliminaries; for Count Buol will doubtless admit that these bases, although most useful as a point of agreement between Austria, England, and France—although indispensable as guarantees for the future peace of Europe—yet require to be both more fully developed and more accurately defined in order to fulfil the intentions of the three Powers: and in the improbable event of their being accepted with good faith and sincerity by the Emperor of Russia, they might when negotiations commenced be found more comprehensive in their nature, and more restrictive of the power of Russia, than His Imperial Majesty has been led to except from the notes exchanged between the three Powers.

Her Majesty's Government would be as little disposed to give an enemy just cause for complaint as an ally, but on the other hand they are determined to give no undue advantage to their enemy, and the adoption of Count Buol's proposal, leading, as it would do, to an armistice, would be a great and exclusive benefit to Russia.

My despatch No. 262 was explicit upon this point, and your Lordship could have no doubt respecting the determination of Her Majesty's Government: but you will again announce to Count Buol that England and France cannot permit hostilities and be dependent on negotiations, and that they are firmly resolved not to lay down their arms until preliminaries of peace with Russia are signed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 89.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 467.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 28, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL mentioned to me to-day that he had received despatches from Baron Werther at St. Petersburgh, who reported that Count Nesselrode had expressed much annoyance at the communications from Berlin in support of those lately forwarded from Vienna, and that he had especially observed on the tone in which the King of Prussia had written to the Emperor, urging His Imperial Majesty to accept the proposals which had been made as the bases for a negotiation for peace.

His Excellency said that the Russian Government had not yet decided on the answers to be returned, and that Count Nesselrode's observations to Baron Werther were very vague, but they left the impression on the Prussian Minister that the questions of the navigation of the Danube, the revision of the Treaty of 1841, and the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte, might be accepted; but the remarks of Count Nesselrode on the proposed future arrangement for the government of the Danubian Principalities led to the belief that they could with difficulty be entertained on account of the state of national feeling on this subject.

Baron Werther added that the Chancellor spoke of his desire that any concessions compatible with the honour of his country should be made, and the Prussian Minister seemed to hope something from the fact that Count Nesselrode's influence was said again to be in the ascendant.

Baron Manteuffel said to me that the Chancellor had observed that the Vienna communications did not contain the assurance that the four points named were proposed to Russia by England and France as the bases on which the Government of these countries offered to negotiate for peace, and that it might be considered doubtful whether these proposals were binding on them.

I replied to his Excellency that it was perfectly true that we had made no proposals to Russia, nor had we any intentions of making any to a country with which we were at war, but that Count Nesselrode might rest assured that if the Emperor consented at once to the terms which have been made known to them by the Cabinet of Vienna, the British and French Governments would not fail to abide by their engagements with Austria, and be found disposed to enter upon negotiations.

I then said that I apprehended Count Nesselrode had only raised this question because he had no better reason to offer for his hesitation to agree to the proposed terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 90.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 468. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August* 28, 1854.

WHEN I took leave of Baron Manteuffel to-day I told his Excellency that my absence from Berlin would probably not be of long duration, and that if it were thought that my return before the expiration of my leave could be of the least service in bringing about a more cordial understanding between our two Governments than now existed, I should be ready to resume my duties at a moment's notice; but that under the circumstances I had felt desirous to go home for a short time for the settlement of some urgent private affairs to which I was anxious to attend, and that your Lordship had kindly granted my request for leave of absence.

I then asked his Excellency if he had any communication which he wished me to make to your Lordship; and I asked, whether I could not report that there was any change in the policy of Prussia, any chance of its becoming more decided.

Baron Manteuffel replied that he could not say that he thought much was to be expected at the present moment; but if the Russian Government showed itself indisposed to agree to the propositions lately sent from Vienna, he believed the effect would certainly be to produce another state of things here, and in that case the position of Prussia would be changed, adding that next year matters may bear a different appearance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 91.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 33.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1854.

COUNT BERNSTORFF has read to me two despatches from Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Representatives at Madrid and Lisbon, upon the present state of affairs in the Peninsula. Baron Manteuffel deprecates the revolutionary spirit that has been manifested; expresses a hope that the Queen may be maintained on the throne; and states his objections to an union of Spain and Portugal.

I thanked Count Bernstorff for this communication, which accorded with the views of Her Majesty's Government; and I expressed my satisfaction, that upon this subject, at least, there should exist an identity of opinion between the Governments of England and Prussia.

Count Bernstorff said he could see no reason why, upon other and more important matters, the same agreement should not prevail; and on that account, he regretted that the communications of Her Majesty's Government to the Cabinet of Berlin had ceased to be of a cordial and confidential character.

I replied, that this was also a cause of regret to Her Majesty's Government, who had given abundant proof of their desire to act in the most friendly manner with Prussia; and if they had found it impossible any longer to do so, the Cabinet of Berlin was alone to blame. The King of Prussia, I said, desired peace; but His Majesty promoted war. If he had in March last consented, at the request of Austria, to sign a quadruple Treaty; if the four Powers had assumed a firm and united attitude in resistance to the pretensions of Russia, which Prussia, equally with the other three Powers, had denounced as unjust, there would have been no Conference at Bamberg, and Russia would not have obtained the triumph and benefit of checking the policy of Austria and producing disunion in Germany. My firm belief was, I said, that if Prussia had taken a decided course and had frankly supported Austria, no difference of opinion would have manifested itself in Germany; that the Emperor of Russia would not have found there the support which is now afforded to him by several of the German Courts, who are encouraged by the example, if not by the advice, of Prussia; and that the war might have been brought to a successful termination in the present campaign; but that, as a totally different course had been pursued by Prussia, she, and she alone, I ventured to say, was responsible for the state of things that now existed in Europe, and for the calamities that would ensue from a protracted war. I added, that I did not presume to question the good intentions of the King, but I doubted whether the interests either of Russia or of Prussia were promoted by his policy, as the longer the war lasted the more stringent might become the demands of the belligerent Powers upon Russia; and if Prussia virtually abdicated the position she has hitherto held in Europe, she might, on the conclusion of peace, find herself excluded from those arrangements in which, under other circumstances, she would expect, and be entitled, to take a prominent part.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 92.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, August* 14, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my despatch No. 19, Confidential, to his Excellency Viscount Stratford, together with its inclosure.

One of our largest landed proprietors and first Boyars told me this morning that if Prince Stirbey returned, he should quit the province.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Consul-General Colquhoun to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Bucharest, August* 13, 1854.

SINCE my arrival here, my house has been besieged by visits of all classes. My first visit was from M. Cantacuzène, now President of the Council. Our conversation was of the most confidential nature; he spoke to me of his position under the Russian occupation; and referred me to a period of nine months past, when, on being asked to accept service, he consulted me, and on my advice he consented to do so. He spoke to me with great uneasiness of the reports of Prince Stirbey's return to supreme power—a course which he considered most fatal to any hope of regeneration. He suggested that a provisional form, say a Caïmacamié, should be adopted, aided, if necessary, by foreign Commissioners, who should hold the administration till the present state of matters be passed, and such new form be granted to the Provinces as Turkey and her friends should deem most adapted to her situation, and calculated to prevent a recurrence of a series of circumstances of which they have been victims. He told me confidentially that a strong petition to the Sultan had been drawn up; that he had been requested to subscribe the petition, but that he had declined doing so, from the high position he at present held. He had hardly quitted my house when, in fact, I was waited upon by three of the senior Boyars of the country—M. Emanuel Balcano (Ban), M. Constantin Balatchano (Grand Logothète), and M. Alexandre Ghika (Grand Logothète). M. Balcano addressed me, in presence of Colonel Simmons, nearly as follows:

"Nous venons, M. l'Agent, au nom du corps des Boyars des différentes classes, des négociants et de près de deux millions de Valaques, remettre entre vos mains copie d'une humble pétition que nous avons rédigée pour être soumise au pied du Trône de Sa Majesté le Sultan par son Altesse Omer Pacha, laquelle pétition nous vous supplions de faire parvenir à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Constantinople, avec notre prière urgente que son Excellence veuille l'appuyer auprès de Sa Majesté. Le pays qui a tant souffert sous l'administration du Prince Stirbey, qui a donné des preuves irrécusables de son mépris pour son Souverain en se jetant dans les bras de la Russie tant que la Russie avait besoin de lui,—le pays, disons-nous, a besoin de repos, d'une administration honnête et loyale, pour se remettre des maux dont il gémit depuis l'occupation Russe. Ce repos ne peut venir de M. Stirbey, et nous prions que nos vœux soient exaucés."

I herewith annex the petition, my Lord. I have also by me the list of signatures, 135 in number, which contains a number of the most influential Boyars of all classes. I understand a copy is to be transmitted to the French Embassy by the French Chancellier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Petition.

A Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul Medjid Khan, Empereur de Turquie.

Sire,

NOUS, Soussignés, très humbles et très fidèles sujets de votre Majesté Impériale, osons soumettre à la souveraine et paternelle clémence, les souffrances et les continuelles oppressions qui ont pesé sur nous pendant le cours des cinq dernières années, jusqu'à la cessation du Gouvernement Hospodarial en 1853, par suite des circonstances survenues à cette époque.

Sire, il n'était donné qu'à un Gouvernement sage et juste d'effacer les traces que les événements de 1848 avaient laissées dans notre pays, et d'y faire renaître la prospérité qu'il plaît à votre Majesté Impériale d'y voir régner.

Mûe par un généreux sentiment de souveraine et paternelle sollicitude, votre Majesté Impériale voulut alors porter un prompt remède aux maux de la Valachie, et il daigna ordonner que le Gouvernement de la Principauté fût confié au Prince Stirbey, regardé alors comme un homme capable et rempli d'utiles intentions pour le bien général.

Nos espérances malheureusement furent bientôt déçues. L'administration vicieuse de ce Prince ne tarda pas à se manifester par des actes arbitraires, marqués par une longue série d'injustices et d'abus qui furent encouragés et tolérés par lui.

Le pays gémissant sous le poids de mille oppressions, présenta bientôt le plus triste spectacle. Les institutions et les lois furent violées, jusque dans leur sanctuaire, au lieu d'amener les améliorations garanties par leur essence, et leur intégrité ne fut nullement respectée par ce Prince à l'autorité duquel le maintien en était commis. Les unes furent complétement enfreintes, et devinrent les instruments de la corruption et de la vénalité; les autres furent dangéreusement défigurées dans leur esprit et dans leur application.

Le droit de nationalité appartenant, en vertu des institutions du pays, aux seuls indigènes, fut accordé tacitement et d'une manière abusive en dehors de l'esprit des bases prescrites, à certains hommes, qui, loin d'être utiles à l'Etat, devinrent dans ces derniers tems des instruments aussi dangéreux que nuisibles.

Sire, toutes les fois que les Valaques sont venus déposer leurs humbles plaintes aux pieds du Trône Auguste de leur glorieux Suzerain, ils ont de tout tems obtenu l'allégement de leurs souffrances. C'est pourquoi nous tous Soussignés, fidèles et dévoués sujets de votre Majesté Impériale, joignant nos voix à celles de deux millions de Valaques, osons supplier aujourd'hui votre Majesté Impériale de daigner dans sa magnificence souveraine, que nos plaintes exposées ici, succintement, deviennent l'objet d'une enquête faite sur les lieux même par l'organe d'un Commissaire Impérial délégué *ad hoc*.

Nous sommes pleinement convaincus qu'après examen impartial, la vérité surgira infailliblement, tant sur les points indiqués d'une manière générale dans cette humble supplique, que sur d'autres questions de nature à être révélées ultérieurement, et qui résultent d'actes consommés sous le gouvernement du Prince Stirbey.

Après avoir osé élever nos humbles plaintes contre ce Prince, qui n'est point resté fidèle à son mandat, nous osons encore supplier votre Majesté Impériale de daigner ordonner que le Gouvernement de la Principauté ne lui soit plus confié, et qu'après les injustices et les oppressions qu'il a osé exercer contre le bien de l'Etat, il ne puisse être réintégré, avant que le Commissaire Impérial ait soumis aux pieds du Trône de votre Majesté Impériale le résultat de l'enquête.

Quant à nous, nous prions avec ferveur le Tout Puissant de prolonger les jours précieux de notre glorieux et bien-aimé Suzerain, pour la plus grande prospérité de son vaste Empire et de tous ses fidèles sujets.

Nous sommes, Sire, &c.

No. 93.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 1.)

Vienna, September 1, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF has just communicated to Count Buol the Russian reply, dated the 26th August. It is a positive rejection of the four points.

No. 94.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 520.)

Foreign Office, September 1, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 458 of the 20th ultimo, respecting the mission of Dervish Pasha to Wallachia; and I have to state to you that I approve of your instruction to Mr. Colquhoun, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch.

Her Majesty's Government have no wish that the Hospodars should be restored, and desire to see the Principalities administered by functionaries possessing the confidence of the Porte and not obnoxious to the people, which Prince Stirbey appears to be in Wallachia, if the petition against his reappointment, alluded to by your Excellency, truly represents their feelings.

Your Excellency will have learnt by my despatch to the Earl of Westmorland No. 270, giving an account of a communication made to me by Count Colloredo, and of which a copy was inclosed to you in my despatch No. 500 of the 22nd ultimo, that the Austrian Government have stated that if the result of the inquiry into the conduct of either of the Hospodars should not be favourable, Austria would not feel herself called upon to support his pretensions, but would, on the contrary, have an interest in his being superseded by a person in whom the Porte could place more confidence.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 95.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3, 10·15 A.M.)

Vienna, September 2, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL having given me the despatch of Count Nesselrode to read, said that it is a complete refusal of the conditions, although the evacuation of the Principalities is maintained.

General Hess is instructed immediately to require from Prince Gortchakoff acquiescence in the precise declaration as to how and when that evacuation will take place.

Count Buol stated that he must wait for Count Esterhazy's report, as well as for the announcement of the reply received by Prussia, before he can take any new determination.

Copies of Count Nesselrode's despatch will be sent immediately to Count Colloredo and M. Hübner.

No. 96.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 2, 1854.*

ON my waiting on Baron Manteuffel this day his Excellency informed me that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at this Court, had communicated to him a despatch from Count Nesselrode, in reply to that which his Excellency had addressed to Baron Werther on the 13th ultimo (of which a copy was inclosed in Lord Bloomfield's No. 465 of 25th ultimo), instructing him to support the conditions submitted by Austria to the Imperial Cabinet.

Baron Manteuffel stated that the answer of the Russian Cabinet to those proposals had been forwarded to Vienna, and a copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Gortchakoff was inclosed for communication to the Prussian Government. His Excellency first remarked that Count Nesselrode had expressed to Baron Budberg his great annoyance and displeasure at the support which Prussia had given to the Austrian conditions, and likewise to the terms in which that support had been expressed.

He then informed me that the despatch to Prince Gortchakoff conveyed the Emperor of Russia's refusal to accept the condition submitted by Austria; it stated that the Emperor had made concession after concession, and that he could not yield any further; that he should evacuate the Principalities and withdraw his forces within his own frontier, and assume the defensive; that he was not indisposed to negotiate, but that he did not think that the present was the moment, and he should therefore await in his strong defensive position a more favourable one, and the march of events.

Baron Manteuffel, on mentioning to me the displeasure which the Emperor had expressed with respect to the terms of the despatch to Baron Werther, observed to me that Count Bernstorff had reported that your Lordship had equally found fault with that despatch, and that it was singular that it had neither pleased the English nor the Russian Cabinets. I replied that perhaps his Excellency would permit me to remark that in this respect the despatch might be a faithful representation of the Prussian policy, which it appeared had not the good fortune to please either party.

His Excellency informed me that he had left Puttbus before Count Benckendorff's arrival, and before His Majesty had been made acquainted with the Emperor's intentions.

I endeavoured, but in vain, to extract an opinion from his Excellency as to the course which the King would now pursue, and as to whether any hope could be entertained of the adoption of a more decided policy. He only repeated what he had previously expressed to Lord Bloomfield, that he did not think that any change would take place during this year, adding that it would be an illusion were he to state that Prussia would be found marching in our ranks.

I stated to his Excellency that the refusal of the Emperor to accede to the conditions proposed by Austria, and supported by Prussia, would, I trust, open the eyes of the King to the deceptive and ambitious policy of Russia; that the question was now clearly no longer an Oriental question—it was an European one, in which all the Great Powers were bound to coalesce to preserve the balance of power; that in former periods of history such coalitions had successfully combated against the aggressor and perturbator of the peace, and that I did not doubt but that on this occasion the same spirit would be awakened in Europe against the common enemy.

I remarked that duties were imposed on great Powers which they could not abandon without forfeiting their rank in the scale of nations, and that in the present crisis it was impossible that a country geographically situated as Prussia, with her large extent of territory and military forces, could remain inactive or neutral. Such neutrality would virtually imply nullity, and an entire sacrifice of all influence, rank, and participation in the great policy of Europe—a position which I could never believe would be borne by the Prussian nation.

His Excellency listened attentively to my observations, but maintained a placid reserve, without offering one word of comment or explanation.

I am informed that he maintained the same reserve with the Marquis de Moustier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 97.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 326.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August 31, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith, for your Lordship's information, translation of the Proclamation of General Hess on the entry of the Austrian troops into the Principalities, as given in the "Vienna Gazette" of the 30th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Proclamation.

(Translation.)

Inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia!

IN consequence of an agreement concluded by His Majesty, my most gracious Lord and Master, the Emperor, with the Sublime Porte, the Imperial Austrian troops enter the Principalities.

They will remove from you the hardships of war, and restore to you the blessings of peace.

Receive these hostages for your future tranquillity and security with love and confidence; they will deserve it by their correct conduct, by a constant display of order and discipline.

The privileges secured to you by the Sublime Porte remain in full force; but I expect on the part of your authorities every assistance for quartering and provisioning the troops, for whose wants a compensation will always be given; and on the part of the people tranquillity and order, for any disturbance or even threat of it by uproarious individuals or parties will be put down with all the severity of the law.

All authorities are at the same time herewith directed from henceforward, under all circumstances, to address themselves to Count Coronini, who has been named by His Majesty as Commander of all the troops in both Principalities, or to the military organs empowered by him.

No. 98.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 330.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August 31, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing a copy of the telegraphic despatch I transmitted to your Lordship on the 29th instant, which contained the intelligence received by Count Buol from Berlin, as to the communications which had been made to Baron Werther by Count Nesselrode.

Count Buol has since received a despatch from Count Esterhazy, dated St. Petersburgh, the 21st instant, in which he states that he had received no communication from Count Nesselrode, but that by Baron Werther he had

been informed of the language which Count Nesselrode had held to him, and which was similar to that which Count Buol had reported to me, but with this addition, that Count Nesselrode has said that he did not believe the official answer to the Austrian Government would be forwarded for some days.

Count Buol is anxiously waiting for this answer, but I know that up to this day Prince Gortchakoff has not received it, and consequently that he has made no communication whatever to Count Buol upon the subject of his despatch of the 10th instant—a delay which, considering the pressing nature of that despatch, is not very satisfactorily to be accounted for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 98.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August* 29, 1854.

COUNT BUOL is informed from Berlin that the Russian Government do not raise objections to the second, third, and fourth points of the guarantees, and on the first their objection is not insurmountable.

Count Buol has nothing himself direct from St. Petersburgh.

No. 99.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 98.)
My Lord, *Frankfort, August* 31, 1854.

BY the best information which I can obtain of the dispositions of the members of the Diet in reference to the Eastern question, more particularly with respect to the policy of the two great German Powers, the actual situation may be described as follows:

It is thought that Russia by declaring that she will evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, gives a sufficient satisfaction to Austria, and consequently to Germany, provided the declaration is honestly fulfilled within a reasonable period,—say the end of September.

Austria's declaration that her occupation of the Principalities on the retreat of the Russians, is not to be regarded by the Czar as a hostile measure, is generally approved.

If by undue delay of the Russian troops in the general measure of evacuation, or by their attempting to hold some strategic point within either province, the Austrian troops come into hostile collision with them, the Diet will not be inclined to consider such collision as a necessary *casus belli* for Germany.

If Austria occupies the Principalities without obstacle, but then puts forward further demands on Russia, the Diet will not support such demands.

If, on the other hand, Russia attacks, either in the Principalities or elsewhere, especially in the latter case, the Diet will make common cause with Austria. The latter supposition indeed brings the Treaty of the 20th April into play, but I am here referring rather to matters of inclination than of Treaty engagements, and much as I see the powers that be in Germany inclined to eschew a state of warfare as long as possible, I am equally convinced that the danger of a foreign attack on German territory would unite them in resistance.

We must not disguise from ourselves that the conduct of Prussia and the adherence which her policy has met with from the major part of the German Governments, has been greatly determined by the fears arising from the alliance between our own country and France, and its probable consequences on their own interests.

Powerful enough, individually, if aggressively inclined, what might not

two such Powers effect! and German reminiscences naturally teach her to dread her neighbour on the other side of the Rhine.

It may then be surmised that if Austria connects herself more closely with the Western Powers and with Turkey, this apprehension and fear of the future will be considerably augmented, and will lead to one of two things—either a desperate resolution to take part with Russia, or the more rational decision to act with the rest of Europe against the Northern Power.

As it may be presumed that natural connection with Austria would in such case have some influence, it will perhaps be the most reasonable to expect that in the last resort Prussia as well as the rest of Germany would march against Russia, but she will do it (as far at least as her Government is concerned) most reluctantly, and with many an uneasy look towards the western frontier.

In laying these considerations before your Lordship, I leave wholly out of sight the efforts of Russian or any other diplomacy, merely looking to general results which will, as I conceive, hardly be affected in the end, though they may be delayed in their progress by any efforts of intrigue or influence, excepting by warlike successes or the contrary on one side or the other.

I will, however, permit myself to observe that in the intercourse which I have with my colleagues, and with other persons in this residence, I distinguish with regret a greater degree of general mistrust and want of confidence towards England than existed previously to the commencement of the war. I am bound to add, that the inaction of our joint armaments has created impressions of our inability to coerce Russia, almost countervailing the altered opinion now conceived of that Power since the non-success of her operations on the Danube.

At this moment the Russian reply to the noted four points is still unknown here; it may produce a considerable change in the position, and if as reported, it proves decidedly unfavourable, will tend more to strengthen Austrian policy than any event which has occurred within a long period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 100.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 288.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 5, 1854.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches dated the 1st and 2nd instant, stating that the Russian Government has completely refused the conditions proposed by Austria, although the evacuation of the Principalities is adhered to.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the time has now arrived when the signature of an offensive and defensive Treaty between Austria, England, and France should no longer be postponed, in order to give effect to the policy upon which the three Powers are happily agreed; and to obtain those guarantees for the future tranquillity of Europe that they have pledged themselves to regard as indispensable.

Her Majesty's Government trust that this opinion will be shared by Count Buol, who must see in the Russian answer a pertinacious adherence to unjust pretensions, and the hopelessness of expecting any advantage from further delay or negotiation; and that it is only by vigorous action the calamities of protracted war can be averted.

Your Lordship will, therefore, in conjunction with your French colleague, earnestly request Count Buol to sign the Treaty of which a draft has been privately sent to you, and of which I now officially transmit to you the copy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Project of Treaty.

SA Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animées du désir d'abréger le plus possible la durée de la guerre actuelle, et de contribuer par leurs communs efforts au rétablissement de la paix sur des bases qui donnent à l'Europe entière toute garantie contre le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos, ont résolu de conclure entre elles un Traité, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires—

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,

Lesquels s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants :

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes ratifient les engagements contenus dans les notes échangées à Vienne le 8 Août dernier au nom de leurs Gouvernements. Ces notes seront annexées au présent Traité, et auront la même force et la même valeur que si elles y étaient textuellement insérées.

ARTICLE II.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'étant réservées le droit de proposer selon les circonstances et leurs positions particulières, en sus des quatre points spécifiés dans les notes échangées à Vienne, telles autres stipulations qu'elles pourraient respectivement juger nécessaires comme garanties d'un intérêt Européen, elles s'engagent mutuellement et réciproquement, jusqu'au rétablissement de la paix générale, à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en délibéré en commun.

ARTICLE III.

Les hostilités venant à éclater entre l'Autriche et la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, se promettent mutuellement leur alliance offensive et défensive dans la guerre actuelle, et emploieront à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre appréciées d'un commun accord, des forces de terre et de mer dont le nombre, la qualité, et la destination seront déterminés, s'il y a lieu, d'un commun accord.

ARTICLE IV.

Dans le cas prévu par l'Article précédent, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à n'accueillir de la part de la Cour Impériale de Russie, sans en être entendues entre elles, aucune ouverture ni aucune proposition tendant à la cessation des hostilités.

ARTICLE V.

L'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne porteront ensemble, dans le délai d'un mois après l'échange des ratifications, le présent Traité à la connaissance des autres Cours, et accueilliront avec empressement dans leur alliance celles qui voudraient co-opérer au but qu'elles se proposent.

ARTICLE VI.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, &c.

No. 101.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 290.)

Foreign Office, September 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest, inclosing the copy of a petition addressed by the principal Boyars and landed proprietors of Wallachia, deprecating the return of Prince Stirbey to the post of Hospodar of that Principality; and I have to instruct you to state to Count Buol that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the reinstatement of Prince Stirbey in authority would be most injudicious, as leading to popular discontent, and likely to thwart the measures of reform that the Province more than ever now requires, and which it is for the interest of Austria, as well as of England and France, to encourage.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 102.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 1,100. Confidential.)

Boulogne, September 6, 1854.

My Lord,

IT having been reported to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that M. de Bruck had claimed for the Austrian Government the exclusive Protectorate in Servia, his Excellency has written to M. de Bourqueney to desire him, if he can call Count Buol's attention to the question without unnecessarily irritating him, to show how completely M. de Bruck's language is at variance with the engagements taken by Austria. At one moment he claims for Austria the sole occupation of the Danubian Provinces, at another the exclusive Protectorate of Servia, while both these acts would have been a contravention of the declarations made by the Austrian Government to the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 103.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 465.)

Therapia, August 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith some further accounts of the decisive engagements which lately took place between the Turkish and Russian armies on the Asiatic frontier beyond Kars. The place which gives its name to the battle is Kooruk Dereh.

* No. 92.

The statements now forwarded herewith are doubtless more correct than those which I received from Samsoon. The Porte has not yet made any official communication of the particulars. The loss of the respective parties in killed and wounded is by no means so considerable as the first accounts asserted; but the general result of the battle is more decidedly unfavourable to the Turkish army, which lost 2,000 prisoners, and the reduction of whose efficient numbers may be safely stated at 10,000.

One of the accompanying reports is an extract of a letter addressed privately to me by a newspaper correspondent who happened to be in the battle. I beg your Lordship will consider it as confidential.

I have had some conversation with Reshid Pasha and the Seraskier as to the means of repairing the Turkish losses, and I am assured that the Porte may be able to send a reinforcement of 15,000 men to Kars before the close of the season, and 10,000 more in the spring.

It is still the Porte's intention to place Ismail Pasha in command of the army at Kars, and Mustapha Pasha is preparing to take the command of the smaller army at Batoom, where disease is thinning its ranks to a frightful degree.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, August* 10, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 54 of the 8th instant, I now regret to state, that by the post which reached this afternoon, the news of the occupation of Bayazid and the interception of the road to Persia, is fully confirmed. I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, extract from a private letter received from Mr. Brant on the subject.

Some merchants in town have also received news that a part of the Russian force had also occupied the quarantine station at Kizil Dizeh, at the foot of Kasli-Ghirol, a village laying across the caravan-road to Persia.

I do not concur in Mr. Brant's opinion as to the Russians retiring to their own territory, but think they will keep so valuable a stronghold as Bayazid, hoping by that means to draw Persia into forming an alliance with them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. A. STEVENS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, August* 12, 1854.

TWO Aide-de-camps in charge of despatches for Constantinople reached this to-day from Kars, which place they left on Tuesday last. On the Saturday previous (the 5th instant) a terrible battle was fought at Koorook Dereh, situated between Hadji Velli Khoi and Gumry. The Turks in two bodies commenced the attack at 5 o'clock in the morning, and were composed of 22,000 infantry, 4,000 regular cavalry, 4,500 irregular cavalry, 5,000 Bashi Bozouks and Redifs, with 52 field-pieces. A reserve corps of 5 battalions of infantry and four field-batteries were left in Kars.

The first body was commanded by Kerrim Pasha, the second by the Mushir Zarif Mustapha Pasha, and General Guyon acted as Chief of the Staff.

The Russians, on the other hand, consisted of 25 battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of Don Cossack cavalry, 2 regiments of Circassian Cossack cavalry, 2 regiments of dragoons, 6 regiments of irregulars, and 60 field-pieces, under General Prince Bebitoff, seconded by General Prince Dolgorouky Baratinski.

Both sides seem to have fought bravely, and all did their duty, save the Turkish cavalry, which proved very inferior.

The loss on either side was considerable, and is estimated at 5,000 to 6,000, besides 2,000 wounded.

After five hours' fighting, the Turks retreated in tolerable order to Kars, leaving Ismail Pasha (General Kmetz), with two regiments of cavalry and nine field-pieces, to watch Hadji Velli Khoi.

The Russians retook their first position. Ten Turkish and six Russian guns were dismounted, and owing to the superiority of the Russian cavalry were finally carried off the Russians. But for the loss of these ten guns, and the fact of the Turks having abandoned their position by retreating to Kars, the battle might have been considered as drawn. Those two circumstances unfortunately give Russia the right to the victory.

Amongst the Turkish officers killed was Hassam Pasha, belonging to the reserve. Mustapha Pasha, of the Arabistan troops, was wounded; as also Colonel Tufan Bey (Cochiniski, a Pole). On the Russian side a General fell, as well as many officers.

The sick and wounded had commenced reaching Erzeroom when the Aide-de-camps left the city last Thursday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. A. STEVENS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 103.

Consul Brant to Vice-Consul Stevens.

(Extract.) *August* 7, 1854.

THE Russians now occupy Bayazid and intercept the road to Persia, but the courier will come round by Van. On the 29th the Russians attacked the Bayazid division. We do not know the particulars, as many stories are told; but it is certain that Selim Pasha ran away without fighting. Some Bashi-Bozouks and Redif are reported to have behaved bravely, and suffered a great loss, as well as the Russians. All the tents were lost, and large stores of grain, biscuit, and ammunition, laid up at Bayazid. 12,000 Arabs of the Armassee tribes have arrived at Van, and are marching on Bayazid. The wreck of the Bayazid division were near Van, and Mehmed Pasha has assumed the command. I dare say, after the Russians have carried off their plunder from Bayazid, they will again withdraw to their own territory.

Inclosure 4 in No. 103.

Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Erzeroom, August* 10, 1854.

I HAVE been just informed that a messenger is going off to Trebizond in half-an-hour, and I have just time to give your Excellency information of the battle with the Russians which took place on the 5th instant. Two days since we knew that an action had occurred; but I could not learn any particulars that could be relied upon until yesterday evening, by an officer who was present. The confusion was so great, that the details I have collected cannot be implicitly depended upon, and I have therefore only given the main points.

The news of the defeat of the Bayazid division having reached Kars, it was determined, in council of war, to give battle; first, to attack before the detached corps rejoined; and next, to prevent their being taken in the rear. On the night of the 4th August preparations were made, and the plan of the attack arranged. The army marched about midnight, expecting to have arrived in face of the enemy at dawn; but the right wing did not take up at its position until 6 A.M. The left wing lost its way, and was two hours later. The whole Russian force attacked the right wing, strong about 10,000 regular infantry and cavalry; the left was about 12,000. There were besides 7,000 or 8,000 Irregulars. The Russians had been rejoined by the division from the victory of Bayazid, and are reported to have been about 27,000 to 28,000 strong. The right wing was broken before the left wing and centre got into position. The

right was commanded by Kerrim Pasha; the left, by General Kmetz (Ismail Pasha), who behaved well, and brought off his wing without the loss of a gun, or without being broken. The Bashi Bozouks, in general, conducted themselves ill, and fled soon. The Regular Cavalry could not be induced to fight, but left their European officers who headed them. The Redif would not stand, and have, since the battle, mostly deserted. The Regulars would have behaved well, but their officers deserted them; that is, the Pashas and Colonels. Kerrim Pasha, Surri Pasha, and Ressool Pasha all fled, and, with few exceptions, the Turkish officers behaved shamefully; all admit that the European officers, without exception, did their duty. The Turkish officers always hesitated to obey orders, and often refused altogether. The Mushir remained at his post, but he lost his presence of mind, and could not give an order; he tried to encourage and rally the soldiers. Colonel Meffray was, during the whole time, with the Mushir. The Russians did not pursue their advantage; perhaps the behaviour of the left prevented it.

About 15 guns, with 6 tumbrils and 2 ammunition waggons, a great many tents, and 2,000 prisoners, remained in the hands of the victors. About 2,000 were probably killed and wounded. The loss of the Russians was estimated at 1,200 to 1,600 killed and wounded. The Turkish army, by its loss in the field, by prisoners, and by desertion, is reckoned to have been diminished by 10,000 men; and the troops are so dispirited that they could never probably be brought to engage the Russians again, and the European officers despair of effecting anything with such officers and men. I believe that General Guyon is of opinion that, if an attack were now made on Kars, the troops would march away. Supplies of provisions are on the way, so that, for the moment, things may probably remain in their present position.

The battle occurred near the village of Koorook Dereh. I have not a moment to write to Lord Raglan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. BRANT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 103.

Mr. Duncan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Kars, August 6, 1854.

(Extract.)

THE action at Bayazid appears to have happened as follows: Selim Pasha who commanded them, with 3,000 Regulars, 7 cannon, and some Irregulars, contrary to the orders sent him by the Mushir of this army, marched against the garrison of Erivan, who it would appear had issued from that town. After a confused fight the Turks fled in great disorder, leaving 800 killed and prisoners, with 3 cannon. The remaining 1,200 men fled towards Van, thus leaving the road to Erzeroom open. It is said that the Russians are advancing towards the two above places. I do not credit this report, but rather think the victorious troops have marched to reinforce the Russian army on the Kars-tchai, which however, as events have shown, was not necessary.

The army of Kars, as your Lordship must have known, had left its winter quarters and taken up a position at Hadji Velli Khoi, whilst the Russians had invaded the Turkish territory and were encamped at Kuyukdéré, three hours distant from the Ottoman camp. Three weeks passed with nothing further occurring than a casual encounter between Bashi Bozouks and Cossacks. On the arrival of the Bayazid intelligence, the Mushir, Zarif Mustapha Pasha, assembled a council, wherein it was determined to attack the enemy before the reinforcements from Erivan could arrive. I will here mention that the strength of the Russians was never esteemed in the camp at more than 14,000 to 15,000, whilst in fact it was above 20,000. It was decided to advance by night on the enemy's position, and to attack him at daybreak. On the 5th instant, yesterday, at 1 o'clock in the morning, the army marched. The plan of battle was as follows: The Russian camp was to be menaced by Bashi Bozouks, who were to attack on both flanks, whilst the regular troops, divided into two divisions or wings, were to attack in front. The right wing was commanded by Kerrim Pasha, the left by Vely Pasha; with the latter were the Mushir and the

foreigners. Owing to its having lost its way in the night the left wing arrived two hours later than the right, which at daybreak occupied the heights above the enemy's camp. Instead of surprising the enemy, the latter were discovered drawn up in full force in battle array, whilst the baggage and tents had been sent to the rear across the Kars-tchai. Either by their spies or through treachery, the Russians were perfectly acquainted with our movements, and fully prepared to give battle. Kerrim Pasha seeing that the second division, or left wing, did not approach, took up his position and awaited its arrival. The Russian General, Behitoff, perceived the forlorn position of this corps, and at once attacked it with the whole strength of the army.

After a sanguinary struggle, the Turkish right wing, left to its own resources, crushed by cavalry charges and torn by grape, gave way and disbanded. Whole battalions ran away, not in a mass but in units. The whole place was covered with dots representing men, and Russian dragoons committed sad havoc amongst this living crowd. A more shameful sight could not be seen; officers set the example of flight, and the display of cowardice was incredible. The pursuit of the Russians was stopped by the arrival of the Turkish left wing, which now appeared, and attacked the Russian right. The enemy here gave way, but being reinforced by the dragoons, who returned from the pursuit, returned with vigour to the fire. The Turkish cavalry soon gave way; the artillery followed, which accounts for their not being captured; and the infantry disbanded, as was the case with the right wing. The Russian dragoons, mad with drink, here hewed down hundreds, whilst the cannon poured in grape on the retreating mass. The Russians suffered severely, for they soon desisted from the pursuit, which, had they only continued a little longer, would have resulted in the total capture of the Ottoman army, with arms, baggage, and cannon. The stream of fugitives extended from the camp to Kars, a distance of five hours.

The defeat must be attributed chiefly to the want of punctuality on the part of Vely Pasha, whereby the enemy was enabled to combat with full force each of the two divisions, and also to the intense cowardice of the Cavalry and Redif regiments. The latter were mixed up with the good regiments, and drew them away in their flight. The garrison of Kars was under arms, and prevented the entry into the town of Bashi Bozouks and fugitives, who would otherwise have pillaged the town. Last night we expected the Russians, who, however, did not appear. Should the enemy appear, not a man will show fight, and Kars with Erzeroom will fall.

In my opinion the policy of Russia, at present, in Asia is not to advance into the Turkish territory, but to act there strictly on the defensive. A few days will show what we have to expect.

Excuse, my Lord, the haste with which I write this, but, as I mentioned above, I am tired to death; we were seventeen hours on horse, without food or water.

I have merely given your Lordship an indistinct account of the action, but it will suffice to clear up many exaggerations which will be current in Stamboul. The Turks were 25,000 strong; the Russians 21,000. Our loss is of course not known, but I imagine it to be about 1,500 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, and 5,000 who have passed Kars and returned to their homes. The army is completely lost and demoralized. They say 5 cannons are lost, but I believe more than 20 have fallen into the hands of the Russians.

The Russians must have lost about 1,200 to 1,500 men.

No. 104.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 468.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 25, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a report which I have received from M. Pisani, relative to a communication made to Reshid Pasha by the Austrian Internuncio.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 104.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, August 24, 1854.

My Lord,

RESHID PASHA told me that M. de Bruck communicated to him, through his interpreter, that after the notes containing the basis upon which peace could be concluded, were exchanged between the Austrian Cabinet and the Plenipotentiaries of England and France, a despatch was drawn up in concert, and transmitted to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, for communication to the Russian Cabinet. That despatch left Vienna on the 10th instant. The Prussian Government gave its sanction to the proposed basis, and appear to act with the three others. Should Russia accept the proposal now made by the Powers without modification or reservation, Austria then will act as mediator. At all events, the Austrian troops received orders to march into the Principalities; and M. de Bruck presses for the sending there of the Turkish Commissioner without further delay.

In the communication made to Reshid Pasha of the note (which has not been left with him), it is said that Russia will not be allowed the official Protectorate of the Sultan's subjects; to this the Pasha protested verbally, and said that he would never admit such a thing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ETIENNE PISANI.

No. 105.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 22. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Stockholm, August 30, 1854.

THE French Minister at this Court received, a few days ago, despatches from his Government of the 21st instant, written after the receipt of his reports of his interview with the King, the substance of which I had the honour to bring to your Lordship's knowledge in my despatches Nos. 11 and 12 of the 14th instant.

M. Lobstein left these despatches with Baron Stierneld for communication to the King, and he could not in consequence read them to me; he has, however, communicated to me their contents, as well as his conversation with Baron Stierneld, who was absent from Stockholm when the negotiation for an alliance with the Western Powers was commenced with the King; and his Excellency has now, for the first time, taken a direct part in this negotiation.

I may here remark that M. Lobstein found the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs thoroughly acquainted with what had taken place during his absence, though he, on one occasion at least—when M. Drouyn de Lhuys alluded to the possibility of Russia requiring Sweden to close the ports of Elfsnabben and Carlshamn to the allied fleets during the winter, and grounded on that contingency an argument for Sweden seeking for support in an alliance with England and France—pretended not to understand the allusion.

M. Lobstein is instructed to submit to the King the course which the French Government think it expedient to pursue in this negotiation, and to inquire whether it meets His Majesty's views; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys in his despatch states, that it had been entirely approved of by Her Majesty's Government. It is, in the first place, proposed to conclude a Treaty Offensive and Defensive between the allied Powers and Austria; and the project of that Treaty already forwarded to M. de Bourqueney, is inclosed for M. Lobstein's information. That Treaty, besides an Article which may be applied to Sweden, contains an Article inviting the other Powers to accede to it; and in virtue of this, His Majesty's accession will be asked for. No specific mention of Finland is to be made in the Treaty; but in an arrangement between the Maritime Powers and Sweden, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys thinks may be effected by an

exchange of notes, the amount and nature of the Swedish auxiliary force, its destination, and the price to be paid for it, will be specified.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys alludes to the possibility of a part of the allied fleets wintering in the Baltic; and I may here observe, that Baron Stierneld expressed his opinion very strongly as to the expediency of that measure; he said, that if the allied fleets left the Baltic next month, the Russian fleets would come out of Sweaborg and Cronstadt, would be masters of the Baltic, and would in a great degree destroy the moral effect which the allied squadron had produced. It is not improbable that a still stronger reason for his Excellency's opinions on this subject, which he did not mention, may be found in Swedish apprehensions.

Baron Stierneld said it would be impossible for him to give an answer on so important questions without submitting them to His Majesty; and he pleaded his bad memory as a reason for keeping these despatches for His Majesty's perusal, which M. Lobstein consented to, though he added he had received no instructions authorizing him to leave them.

M. de Stierneld further informed the French Minister, that he feared he could not give him an answer in sufficient time to enable him to write by the Lübeck steamer of to-morrow morning, as His Majesty would probably require more than twenty-four hours to come to a decision, and it was only yesterday that M. Lobstein had an interview with the Swedish Foreign Minister.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 106.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 470. Secret.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 30, 1854.

A SECRET and confidential report addressed to me yesterday by M. Pisani, after an interview with Reshid Pasha, is inclosed herewith in original for your Lordship's information. I have not time to verify the correctness of the report; but neither have I reason to entertain any doubt of it, except that I find it difficult to reconcile the language ascribed to M. de Wildenbruch with the alleged fact that Prussia seconds the Austrian *ultimatum* at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 106.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord,

Pera, August 29, 1854.

M. DE WILDENBRUCH called this morning on Reshid Pasha, and communicated to him, very confidentially, a despatch which he had just received from his Court, complaining of the two Western Powers, who had exchanged notes with the Cabinet of Vienna, on the basis upon which peace could be concluded with Russia, without any previous communication with Berlin. This step is considered by Prussia as an insult, and calculated to disparage them.

Reshid Pasha asked the Prussian Minister what he thought of the retreat of the Russians from the Principalities? His answer was, that his opinion is that the Russian troops withdrew in order to prepare themselves to attack the Austrians. If such be the case, replied the Pasha, you must prepare to back Austria, with whom you have signed a Treaty, stating that in case the territory of one of the Contracting Parties was attacked, the other is compelled to lend its assistance. It is true, said M. de Wildenbruch; but I don't know what the

Government means to do. At all events, I am led to suppose that they will fulfil their engagement.

Reshid Pasha seems to think that Prussia is endeavouring to be left alone, and not to act against Russia. Such, at least, is his impression.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 107.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 472.)
Therapia, August 30, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith in copy is a despatch received this morning from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna. It relates to the embarkation of the armies, and to the state of their health.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, August 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the greater portion of the 1st Division of the British army, and a part of the Light Division, embarked this morning on board the fleet of transports laying in this bay, and forming together upwards of 200 sail. The whole of the expeditionary army to the Crimea, it is now understood, will have been embarked by the 2nd ultimo; and that the fleets will sail from the rendezvous at Baltchik the day following. The number of forces to be embarked, I am informed, will not fall short of 60,000, including 7,000 or 8,000 Turkish troops, and exclusive of cavalry and artillery. I am happy to be enabled to state to your Lordship, that very little sickness is reported now to prevail in the British and French armies; at and near Varna, occasional cases of cholera, however, still occur. I have the satisfaction of adding, that the health of the combined fleets is stated to be nearly restored.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 108.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 473.)
Therapia, August 30, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is copy of a reply from Vice-Admiral Dundas, to a despatch which I addressed to him on the 19th instant, with reference to the intended blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 108.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,
"Britannia," off Baltchik, August 23, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your letter of the 19th instant, No. 89, that, until the Commanders-in-chief of the combined armies shall have decided upon their movements, it will not be in the power either of Vice-Admiral Hamelin or myself to effectively establish the blockade referred to by your Excellency.

The blockade of the Danube has been and is fully maintained by the vessels of my squadron.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 109.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 474.)
My Lord,
Therapia, August 30, 1854.

THE regiments forming part of Her Majesty's army in Turkey, and detained here by Lord Raglan's command, embark to-day for Varna, where they are to join the combined expedition intended to proceed to the Crimea.

I understand that, with the exception of the Scots Greys, and a small detachment of infantry, the whole effective army is under orders for the same destination.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, whose health, I am happy to say, has been greatly improved by the good air of Therapia, returns to Varna this evening, with his staff, in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Caradoc."

Prince Napoleon, who arrived here some days before him, embarked for the same place two or three days ago.

We continue to receive more favourable accounts of the health of the allied armies and squadrons in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 110.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 10, 5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, September 10, 1854.

THE Austrian troops entered Buchrest on the 6th, and were received with the greatest distinction at the gate of the town, by Omer Pasha, the clergy, and all the principal authorities of the Principalities. A division of Turkish troops, and one of the Wallachian militia, were at the entrance of the town; and Omer Pasha rode with General Coronini at the head of the troops as they passed their quarters. The town was brilliantly decorated for the reception of the troops.

No. 111.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

Berlin, September 10, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

SINCE addressing to your Lordship my last despatches of the 8th instant, a Prussian circular to the Minister at the German Courts has come to my knowledge. It is in contradiction to everything which Baron Manteuffel has expressed to the Austrian and French Ministers and myself; its aim is to prevent Germany from arming and taking an offensive part against Russia, to paralyze Austria, and prevent a Triple Alliance. This proves that Prussia is seeking to deceive us with assurances, whilst attempting to thwart our policy with Austria and Germany. I have transmitted an analysis by the post this day.

No. 112.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 332.)

Vienna, September 6, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 280 of the 29th ultimo, inquiring what will be the duties of Baron E. Bach, as Commissioner in the Principalities, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that he is charged to act with the Turkish Commissioner in arranging all questions as to the government of the Provinces, where the Austrian military authorities are to cooperate with those of the Porte. The two Commissioners are to examine together into the questions relating to the return of Prince Stirbey, as settled by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and to decide, in concert, upon the various arrangements as to the mode of replacing the former authorities as appointed by the Government of the Hospodars.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 113.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 335.)

Vienna, September 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 279 of the 28th ultimo, expressing the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the intentions of Austria in occupying the Principalities, and his Excellency begged that I would express to your Lordship the pleasure with which he received this communication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 114.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 336.)

Vienna, September 6, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 282 of the 29th ultimo, inquiring what would be the course pursued by Austria in the event of the non-evacuation of Moldavia by the Russian troops, your Lordship will already

have been informed, by the reply of Count Nesselrode to the despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy on the 10th ultimo, that the Russian Government maintain the declaration they had already transmitted to the Imperial Cabinet of their decision to evacuate that Principality.

Your Lordship will also have been informed by my telegraphic despatch of the 2nd instant, that General Hess has been instructed to inquire of Prince Gortchakoff the date of the intended evacuation, and the manner in which it will be carried out.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have learnt that intelligence has been received here that General Gortchakoff has established his head-quarters at Jassy, and that the evacuation of Moldavia would take place on the 16th instant.

W.

No. 115.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 337.)

Vienna, September 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to report to your Lordship that Lieutenant-General Letang, whose appointment as Commissioner to the Austrian head-quarters I stated in my despatch No. 315 of the 23rd ultimo, has arrived here, and has had his audience of His Imperial and Royal Majesty the Emperor, who received him with great courtesy, and has appointed an aide-de-camp to attend him during his residence at the head-quarters of his army.

General Letang is preparing for his departure for the Bukovina, where he will report himself to General Hess, the Commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 116.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 338.)

Vienna, September 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of transmitting herewith to your Lordship the copies of the two telegraphic despatches I addressed to you on the 1st and 2nd instant.

The announcement by Count Nesselrode of the decision of the Russian Cabinet to reject all the terms which had been proposed by the note of Count Buol to Count Esterhazy of the 10th ultimo, as the basis upon which he would desire that a negotiation for peace might be established, was received by Count Buol (after the information which has previously been transmitted from Berlin) with some surprise; and in announcing that he should immediately transmit copies of this document to London and to Paris, he said that he should accompany it by the reflections which the new state of things created by the decision of the Emperor Nicholas had suggested to him.

He said that the engagements which had been entered into by Austria with the English and French Governments could in no way be affected by this decision; that it was only necessary still more to fortify the position which had been taken by his Government by obtaining the sanction of Prussia and the German States to the guarantees which had been adopted by the Allied Governments as the basis of any future negotiation. He was anxious upon this point, and was expecting a reply to the communication which he had already made with regard to it to the Cabinet of Berlin.

He considered the position in which the allied Governments were placed at the present moment was satisfactory. All the points contained in the guarantees which were required were in their possession: the Principalities were evacuated, and were about to be entirely occupied by the Austrian and Turkish armies, who would defend them against any future aggression on the part of Russia; the mouths of the Danube were almost entirely in the power of the allies; the Black Sea was under the control of the Western Powers; and if the Russian fleet was captured in Sebastopol, their influence there would be wholly destroyed; the Russian Protectorate of the Greeks was also annihilated; and under these great disadvantages, Russia had retired within her frontier.

I stated to Count Buol that I felt sure that your Lordship would be anxious under the present state of things to draw closer the bonds of alliance at present existing between the allied Governments and Austria by the signature of an offensive and defensive Treaty or Convention, such as had been already proposed: but Count Buol answered that until he had received the reports from Count Esterhazy at St. Petersburgh, and those he expected as to the attitude which Prussia would assume, he was unwilling to enter into any new negotiation; that he had explained the position which his Government would maintain in his communications to Count Colloredo and M. de Hübner, and that he should await the replies he should receive from them; but he repeated the assurance he had already given that his firm determination and that of the Imperial Government was to maintain every engagement he had taken with the allied Governments, and act in entire concert with them for the attainment of the important interests they had bound themselves to secure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 117.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 65.)
Berlin, September 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD an interview with Baron Manteuffel on Tuesday last the 5th instant, and I opened the conversation by calling his Excellency's attention to the striking contradiction which is contained in the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, conveying the refusal of the Russian Government to accept the terms which had been submitted by Austria. I observed to his Excellency, that in the preamble of that despatch great stress was laid on the concession which Russia had professed to yield to the remonstrances of Austria and Germany by the evacuation of the Principalities, whilst at the conclusion of the despatch Count Nesselrode states in unmistakeable terms, "que des motifs uniquement puisés dans nos nécessités stratégiques," had induced the Emperor to withdraw the troops within his frontiers.

In drawing his Excellency's attention to this striking discrepancy, I stated my hope that it might be the cause of opening the King's eyes to the duplicity of the Russian policy towards Germany. His Excellency perfectly concurred in this view, and remarked to me that it had not escaped his notice.

I then stated to his Excellency that I well recollected the great weight and value which he attached during the course of last winter to the concert of the four Powers. I expressed my regret that lately Prussia had for some not clearly explained reason withdrawn from that concert. I laid before his Excellency the great importance at this moment (since the Emperor had rejected the counsel of Germany) of reuniting the voice of Europe, and of proving to the Emperor that Germany condemns his obduracy, which was the sole obstacle to the restoration of peace. I represented here as forcibly as I could that no more favourable opportunity could occur for Prussia to regain the ground she had lost; that she could do so now by a voluntary act, "such as the formal adoption of the four conditions lately submitted to the Imperial Cabinet, and by her declaring them to be the indispensable conditions of a future peace."

I told Baron Manteuffel that it was but the necessary corollary to the step which the King had lately taken at St. Petersburgh, and that such a

measure would not only produce the best effect in Europe, but would prove of the greatest benefit to Prussia. In an European light it would re-establish her good faith and confidence with the three Powers. In a German sense it would regain for her the position which she had abdicated, and would harmonise her policy with that of Austria.

His Excellency replied that he had already spoken with the King on the subject even previous to the arrival of the Russian answer; that the King had raised objections on the score that these four conditions were not definitive on the part of the Western Powers, but were dependent as to their extension on the future eventualities of the war: that on this account he did not like to bind himself, and he was moreover indisposed to take any engagement which might force him into war, or oblige him to take an active military part.

I observed to his Excellency that there was a difference to be drawn between belligerents and non-belligerent Powers. We were actually at war, and therefore could make no proposition, or authorize any to be made, to Russia.

We had only expressed to Austria certain conditions, the acceptation of which we laid down as indispensably necessary previous to the commencement of any negotiations. Austria had accepted those conditions as her own, and had engaged herself to them; Prussia, on the other hand, had only approved of them and counselled their acceptation at St. Petersburgh. By accepting them in the same formal manner as Austria had done, Prussia would only bind herself to terms of peace, for the attainment of which the King of Prussia had always expressed the greatest anxiety.

As His Majesty had supported those conditions at St. Petersburgh, it might be supposed that he could have no insuperable objections to a formal and official adoption of them. They did not bind him to go to war, but they would have a powerful weight in giving an assurance to the Western Powers that Prussia did not withhold her moral assistance from them, though she at present denied her material aid.

I must do Baron Manteuffel the justice to say that he appeared really anxious to adopt this course, and informed me that he would submit the measure to the King, and counsel its adoption. He seemed to think that many difficulties would be raised, but I could perceive a ray of hope that he might bring the King to accede to it.

I finally remarked to Baron Manteuffel that His Majesty, who was so known for his devotion to peace, might be induced likewise to reflect that it was possibly in his power to circumscribe and shorten the war; but that he might be assured that if he wished to do so, and to prevent such future complications as might lead to a general conflagration, his only course was to act in union with the three Powers, and by entering the European coalition to reduce the Emperor of Russia to such concessions as would restore peace.

In terminating the foregoing conversation with Baron Manteuffel, I took care to state that the advice I had tendered was the expression of my own opinion, and dictated by a sincere and cordial feeling for the interest of Prussia.

I trust, my Lord, that you will not consider that I have been over zealous in urging this step on Baron Manteuffel. The present position of affairs led me to regard the present favourable moment as one not to be thrown away; the King and Court are much embarrassed in the position in which they are now placed; fear and doubt are the predominating influences; annoyance is felt at the isolation into which Prussia has fallen; whilst there are evident symptoms of a desire to re-enter the European concert.

By the course which I have recommended to Baron Manteuffel I conceive important results would be gained:

1. Prussia will be bound to certain conditions of peace, which will at once obviate all fear of her allying herself with Russia.

2. It will allay all doubt and suspicion on the part of Austria, and will relieve her of all anxiety in the event of her open rupture with Russia.

3. It will be an assurance to the Western Powers of the moral support of Prussia, and it will form a certain basis hereafter for her diplomatic action.

These are the grounds on which I have counselled the formal adoption of the four conditions by Prussia, and I look forward with some confidence that the King may be finally brought to accede to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 118.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 66.)

Berlin, September 8, 1854.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH it is probable that your Lordship is already in possession of this document, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship, herewith, a copy of the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, conveying the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to accept the terms which the Austrian Cabinet had submitted to His Imperial Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 118.

Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff.

St. Pétersbourg, le 14 *Août*, 1854.

J'AI reçu et placé sous les yeux de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, les communications que le Cabinet de Vienne nous a adressés en date du 10 Août, n. s.

En répondant à la demande que l'Autriche nous avait faite de ne point pousser plus avant nos opérations militaires en Turquie et de rappeler nos troupes des Principautés Danubiennes, nous avions eu exclusivement en vue les intérêts Autrichiens et Allemands, au nom desquels cette demande nous avait été adressée. La concession qu'on réclamait entrainait pour nous les conséquences les plus graves. Elle nous enlevait, comme nous l'avons fait remarquer au Gouvernement Autrichien, le seul point militaire qui pût rétablir en notre faveur l'équilibre des positions sur l'immense théâtre de la guerre. Plus encore, elle devait nous exposer inévitablement à voir les forces Anglaises, Françaises, et Ottomanes, désormais inoccupées en Turquie, se jeter en masse sur notre littoral Asiatique et Européen dans la Mer Noire.

Cependant, malgré ces inconvénients, malgré ces dangers palpables, prenant en considération les vœux de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne, nous nous étions déclarés prêts à nous retirer volontairement des Principautés tout entiers. Nous renoncions même en le faisant à toutes conditions de réciprocité de la part de nos adversaires. Nous ne demandions rien à ceux-ci. Nous exprimions seulement à l'Autriche le vœu de connaître quelles garanties de sécurité elle pourrait personnellement nous offrir; autrement dit et supposé, qu'il ne fût pas en son pouvoir de nous assurer un armistice, nous désirions savoir si, au moins, une fois l'évacuation consommée et ainsi rempli l'engagement qu'elle avait pris envers les Puissances, nous pouvions compter qu'elle cesserait de faire cause commune avec elle dans le dessein hautement avoué d'amener l'abaissement moral et matériel de la Russie.

En même temps et comme témoignage de nos intentions pacifiques nous nous disions prêts également à souscrire par anticipation aux principes du Protocole du 9 Avril.

Au lieu de répondre directement à des ouvertures, ou plutôt à des questions qui s'adressaient directement à l'Autriche, l'Autriche a cru devoir en référer aux deux Puissances, et faire dépendre de leurs décisions celle que nous attendions d'elle seule.

Il était évident que le sacrifice que nous étions portés à faire à ses intérêts particuliers comme à ceux de toute l'Allemagne, ne pouvait pas former un titre aux yeux de la France et de l'Angleterre, et que ces deux Cours, qui ont pour but d'arriver par la prolongation de la guerre à humilier et affaiblir la Russie, ne seraient disposées à entrer dans des voies de conciliation.

C'est ce que vient de nous attester malheureusement la communication que le Comte Esterhazy nous a faite.

En effet, le Cabinet Autrichien nous transmit aujourd'hui, comme résultat de ses pourparlers avec les Cours de Paris et de Londres, de nouvelles bases de pacification, rédigées, quant à la forme, de la manière la moins propre de toutes

à être acceptées honorablement par nous, et sur la pensée desquelles il ne nous est point permis de nous méprendre; puisque de l'aveu du Gouvernement François, tel qu'il est constaté ouvertement par la publication officielle de sa réponse à la Cour de Vienne, ce qu'on entend par "intérêt d'équilibre Européen," signifie anéantissement de tous nos Traités antérieurs, ruine des établissements maritimes qui par là manque de tout contre-poids constituent, dit-on, une menace perpétuelle contre l'Empire Ottoman, et limitation de la puissance Russe dans la Mer Noire.

Ces bases-là, ce sont pourtant celles que nous recommandent le Gouvernement Autrichien, et tout en nous exhortant à les accepter sans réserve, il croit devoir nous avertir que les Puissances Maritimes ne les regardent point de leur côté comme précises et définitives, et se réservent en temps utile de les modifier suivant les éventualités de la guerre en sorte que leur acceptation par nous ne suffirait pas à nous donner le certitude de voir même les hostilités cesser. Il fait plus; il nous déclare que ces bases découlent dans son opinion les principes du Protocole, et qu'elles sont les conditions nécessaires d'une paix solide et durable. Comme telles il nous annonce qu'il s'y associe complétement, et il a déjà même pris envers les Puissances Occidentales l'engagement formel de ne point traiter avec nous sur d'autres bases. Dans de pareilles circonstances il devient pour nous superflu d'examiner des conditions que tout en nous les posant on déclare mobiles et flottantes—des conditions qui, dussent-elles rester telles qu'on nous les présente aujourd'hui, supposeraient déjà l'Empire de Russie reduit à l'extrémité par l'épuisement d'une longue lutte, et qui, si la force passagère des choses pouvait jamais le contraindre à s'y résigner, bien loin d'assurer à l'Europe, comme semble le croire le Gouvernement Autrichien, une paix solide et surtout durable, ne ferait que rendre cette paix sujette à d'éternelles complications.

En souscrivant, comme il l'a fait, aux principes déposés dans le Protocole, l'Empereur n'avait point entendu leur donner l'interprétation qu'on leur prête. Puisque l'immense sacrifice que nous étions prêts à faire volontairement aux intérêts particuliers de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne doit rester de la part de l'Autriche sans aucune compensation, et qu'en lieu d'y voir un moyen de faire honneur aux engagements qu'elle avait pris jusque là, elle a cru devoir au contraire se lier envers les Puissances nos ennemies, par de nouvelles obligations plus fortes et plus étendues encore, nous regrettons profondement de ne pouvoir donner suite à ses derniers communications.

Nous croyons avoir, dans notre situation actuelle, épuisé la mesure des concessions compatibles avec notre honneur, et nos intentions sincèrement pacifiques n'ayant point rencontré d'accueil, il ne nous reste qu'à suivre forcément la voie de nos adversaires eux-mêmes, c'est à dire, d'abandonner comme eux aux éventualités de la guerre le soin ultérieur de fixer les bases définitives de la négociation.

Le Gouvernement Autrichien est déjà informé que des motifs uniquement puisés dans nos nécessités stratégiques, ont porté l'Empereur à ordonner à ses troupes de se placer derrière le Pruth. Rentrés ainsi dans nos frontières, et nous tenant sur la défensive, nous attendrons dans cette position que des ouvertures équitables nous permettent de concilier nos vœux pour la paix avec notre dignité et nos intérêts politiques, évitant de donner lieu gratuitement à un surcroît de complications, mais décidés à défendre résolument notre territoire contre les attaques étrangères de quelque côté qu'elles puissent venir.

Votre Excellence voudra bien porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance de M. le Comte de Buol.

No. 119.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 67.)

Berlin, September 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM informed by Count Esterhazy and M. de Moustier, that Baron Manteuffel has given them to hope that Prussia will formally adopt the four points lately submitted to the Russian Cabinet as the indispensable conditions of a future peace, and that a declaration of this kind will be transmitted through the Prussian Ministers at London, Paris and Vienna.

Baron Manteuffel informed me to-day, that he had written to Count Bernstorff to make a communication to your Lordship on this subject.

With respect to the form in which this measure should be carried out, Baron Manteuffel had not yet finally decided. He casually mentioned to M. de Moustier, as well as to myself, that it might be in the shape of a Protocol; but we both represented that course as likely to be objectionable, and his Excellency seemed to partake of that opinion.

It is therefore probable that there will be a simple declaration, in form of a note, delivered to the three Courts.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 120.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 36.)

Bucharest, August 25, 1854.

My Lord,

COLONEL KALICH, in announcing to Omer Pasha the entrance of the Austrian troops into the Principality, required that a deputation from the Government should be sent to meet Count Coronini; accordingly, four members of the Council left last evening for the frontier.

Colonel Kalich also proposed to Omer Pasha that an Austrian Commandant de Place should be named, to which Omer Pasha refused to accede. He communicated to his Highness a Proclamation which General Hess proposes to issue to the inhabitants. I have been confidentially furnished with a copy of the document, and here inclose it. It would be misplaced on my part to comment on this document, wherein the sovereign power is entirely laid aside—wherein all the authorities are invited to address themselves for the future, on every occasion, to Count Coronini, or to the persons named by him.

I have reason to know that Omer Pasha has felt much hurt at this ignoring of his presence, and of his army's, and of the state of things existing in the Principality for now some weeks. He has urged Colonel Kalich to defer the publication of this Proclamation till the Turkish Commissioner shall have been consulted.

The said Proclamation is already printed in Wallachian and French, and printed in Transylvania.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Proclamation.

Habitants de la Valachie et de la Moldavie!

EN vertu d'une Convention conclue entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Maître, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, les troupes Autrichiennes entrent dans les Principautés. Elles y sont appelées à écarter les fléaux de la guerre, et

à ramener parmi vous les bénédictions de la paix. Accueillez donc avec confiance ces garants de votre sûreté et tranquillité future; ils sauront la mériter par leur conduite réglée, par l'ordre et la discipline parfaite qu'ils observeront.

Les priviléges qui vous sont assurés par la Sublime Porte restent en pleine vigueur. J'attends d'ailleurs de la part des autorités du pays toute l'assistance nécessaire par rapport au logement et au ravitaillement des troupes, qui aura lieu contre indemnité régulière; ainsi que je prétends le stricte maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquillité de la part de la population même, vû que dans le cas contraire on procédera avec toute la sévérité de la loi envers chaque tentative de soulever ou même de menacer l'ordre public.

Toutes les autorités sont invitées en même temps de s'adresser dorénavant en toute chose au Lieutenant-Général Comte Coronini, nommé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur Commandant de toutes les troupes dans les deux Principautés, ou aux organes militaires qu'il autorisera à cet égard.

Le 18 Août, 1854.

Le Commandant-en-chef de la 3me et 4me Armée,
Général d'Artillerie,

(Signé) BARON DE HESS, M.P.

No. 121.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon. (Received September 12.)

(No. 1,107. Confidential.)

Paris, September 11, 1854.

My Lord.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received, while at Boulogne, a despatch from M. de Moustier, recounting a conversation which he had had with Baron Manteuffel, respecting the present position of Prussia in the Eastern question. Baron Manteuffel appears to have expressed to M. de Moustier, his regret at its being supposed that the Prussian Government was ill-disposed towards the Western Powers. What, he asked, could be done to prove the contrary? It seemed out of place now, either to exchange notes with the two Powers, as had been done with Austria, or to express the adherence of Prussia to the contents of those notes. Was there no other way of re-establishing an understanding with Great Britain and France?

Having given me this information M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that it seemed that the refusal of the Czar to accept the bases of peace proposed by the Cabinet of Vienna had had a beneficial effect upon the King of Prussia, and had opened his eyes to the danger of the situation; that it would be well to take advantage of this change, and that he would tell me in confidence that he intended to desire M. de Moustier to reply to the Prussian Prime Minister, that the French Government was pleased to find that the Prussian Cabinet was desirous of noticing that unanimity of action among the four Powers which had been unfortunately impaired by the conduct of Prussia; that perhaps an exchange of notes, or an adherence, on the part of Prussia, to the engagements entered into by Great Britain, France, and Austria, was not the best mode of proceeding at this late hour; but why should not Prussia propose some other course; for instance, the signature of a Convention, or of some instrument of a more solemn character than a note?

Your Lordship will observe, that this instruction coincides with the language held by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Hatzfeldt, as reported in my despatch No. 1,023 of the 17th August. His Excellency added that, in case M. de Manteuffel should catch at the idea, and inquire what sort of Convention was desirable, he should furnish M. de Moustier with a copy of the Convention which the two Governments had proposed for signature at Vienna, and direct him to propose it, at a favourable opportunity, as an elaboration of his own.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 122.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 1,108.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 11, 1854.*

THE latest accounts received by the French Government from Vienna are not of an encouraging character. Count Buol had been urged by the French and English Representatives to convert the notes exchanged between them on the 8th of August, into a Convention. He had, however, shown no disposition to take such a course, though he did not actually refuse to do so. In general he told M. de Bourqueney that he could not discuss the matter until he had taken the Emperor's orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 123.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, September 6, 1854.*

GENERAL OXHOLM spent a few days at Copenhagen last week. During his stay he stated to me, and also, I understand, to several other persons, that Her Majesty's Government were perfectly satisfied that Denmark should remain neutral during the present war, and that they had no wish whatever to secure her support and alliance. As this language did not appear to me to be quite consistent with your Lordship's opinions, I was glad to receive, by the messenger Webster, your despatch No. 107 of the 17th ultimo, acquainting me with what had passed at General Oxholm's interview with your Lordship previous to his departure from London. M. de Bluhme, however, was again confined to bed, and I could not see his Excellency until yesterday, in order to correct any erroneous impressions which he might have received on the subject; but in the meantime I mentioned to M. de Quaade, that I feared General Oxholm had misunderstood your Lordship's observations respecting it.

M. de Bluhme assured me that he had not understood General Oxholm to say more than that Her Majesty's Government did not intend to urge Denmark to abandon her neutrality. I said, in that case General Oxholm had correctly reported the intentions of Her Majesty's Government; but that, with a view to his Excellency's more complete acquaintance with their sentiments, I would read a despatch which I had received from your Lordship, containing your own statement of what you had said to General Oxholm. I then read your Lordship's despatch No. 107, and his Excellency seemed much gratified with the assurances and expressions which it contained with respect to the immediate question at issue. He observed, however, with regard to the latter part of the despatch, that he could not believe Denmark's claim to have her neutrality guaranteed by the Great Powers in the same manner as Switzerland, would be strengthened by her taking a part as a belligerent in the present war. He said also, that, independently of this consideration, he did not suppose the Great Powers would enter into such an arrangement out of pure benevolence towards Denmark; but that they would be in some degree influenced by what they might consider conducive to their own interests. I therefore replied, that whatever consideration may have hitherto induced the Great Powers to enter into arrangements of the kind, it was not to be denied that a guaranteed neutrality was a great boon to a feeble State; and that the obligations which it imposed on the Powers undertaking it might become, under many circumstances, a cause of embarrassment and inconvenience to them. If such a boon, therefore, I added, were desired by Denmark, she could only expect to obtain it through the friendship and goodwill of the Powers whose influence would predominate in the general arrangements for the reestablishment of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 124.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, September 2, 1854.*

I INFORMED your Lordship in my despatch No. 22 of the 30th ultimo that the French Minister at this Court had, by the instructions of his Government, submitted to the King the course which the French Government thought the most advisable to pursue in the negotiation for an alliance with Sweden, and had been directed to inquire whether that course met with His Majesty's approbation.

As I brought to your Lordship's knowledge in my despatch No. 22 the march proposed by France, it is unnecessary to repeat it at present.

The IInd Article of the project of a Treaty submitted to the King, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys applies to the particular position of Sweden, states: "Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'étant réservées le droit, en dehors des garanties d'un intérêt Européen qu'elles doivent s'employer à obtenir, de poser encore, le cas échéant, d'autres conditions résultantes de leurs positions particulières, et des sacrifices qu'elles se sont, ou se seraient imposés, elles s'obligent, jusqu'au rétablissement de la paix générale, à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun."

Baron Stierneld read to M. Lobstein on the 1st instant His Majesty's answer to these proposals, and the latter copied it from the Swedish Foreign Minister's dictation. M. Lobstein was good enough to communicate it to me, but I was unable to obtain a copy of it; its sense, however, was as follows:

The King thinks that, with respect to the project of a Treaty now submitted to him, it is impossible to modify the opinions which His Majesty has already expressed with regard to the Treaty proposed by Austria (those opinions are reported in my No. 12 of August 14). His Majesty must at the same time acknowledge that he sees, "avec un profond déplaisir," in the IInd Article of the present Project, that the question of Finland is looked on by France as "en dehors des garanties d'un intérêt Européen." His Majesty, on the contrary, regards the weakening of Russian power in the North as an indispensable guarantee of future peace, and consequently of European interest.

With regard to the withdrawal of the allied fleets from the Baltic, His Majesty admits that if the Aland Islands be evacuated, he sees no necessity for the fleets wintering there; he urges strongly, however, that they should remain until it be no longer possible for the Russian fleets to leave Cronstadt or Sweaborg. His Majesty advises, consequently, that the three-deckers and large classes of sailing-vessels should be sent home, but that a sufficient force of steam-vessels and frigates should remain to keep the Russians in check; these vessels, His Majesty thinks, might safely cruize off Gottland at first, and find harbours of shelter on the southern Swedish coasts and in Denmark till they left the Baltic.

The intelligence received by this Goverement both from St. Petersburgh and from Berlin represent the peace party at the former capital in the ascendant, and it is thought in consequence that the answer to the Austrian note of the 13th August will not positively reject the four conditions laid down in that note; it is further felt that the season is too far advanced for a campaign in Finland, and His Majesty not unnaturally is unwilling to declare himself at present. The steadiness with which he holds to the original terms proposed by him is thus explained; and I think it improbable that he will make any concession in those terms for the present. His Majesty has stated more than once to the French Minister that his alliance was first sought by us, and not ours by him; he also says that he is not anxious for conquest, and he desires that the taking of Finland from Russia, and its reannexation to Sweden, should be declared a guarantee of European interest to justify his forming the alliance, as well as perhaps to offer greater chances of its accomplishment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 125.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 70.)

Berlin, September 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an analysis of a circular bearing date the 3rd instant, addressed by the Prussian Government to their Representatives at the German Courts, as also a copy of the original text.

Time does not permit of my forwarding a translation* of this document by this day's post, but I think it desirable that the original text should be in your Lordship's possession without delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 125.

Analysis of a Circular addressed to Prussian Representatives in Germany.

Le 3 Septembre, 1854.

APRES l'ajournement des séances de la Diète, la question d'Orient a été l'objet de discussions au sein des Commissions sans que cependant il ait été pris de résolutions, les Plénipotentiaires n'étant pas munis d'instructions suffisantes. La question devant se représenter à la reprise des séances, le Roi regarde de son devoir de faire connaître à ses confédérés, avec une entière franchise, quelle est et quelle restera sa manière de voir au sujet des négociations ultérieures. Le Gouvernement Royal a reçu du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg la réponse à la note Autrichienne du 10 Août et la réponse à la note Prussienne du 13 du même mois. Vous communiquerez confidentiellement ces pièces au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité.

Nous regrettons que l'Empereur Nicholas n'ait pas cru devoir adopter la base des négociations de paix qui, si elles auraient pu arrêter les hostilités et préparer la paix, auraient répondu aux vœux et aux efforts de notre auguste Maître.

En examinant impartialement l'état de choses qu'amène ce refus, nous ne pouvons pas nous empêcher de prendre en considération, et en ayant égard à notre alliance avec l'Autriche et aux intérêts du reste de l'Allemagne, la déclaration qui se trouve à la fin de la dépêche Russe et d'après laquelle les troupes se retireront sur le territoire Impérial pour y prendre une attitude purement défensive.

Une déclaration aussi formelle exclue en général toute attaque Russe et en particulier une attaque contre l'Autriche. Les motifs stratégiques invoqués par la Russie ne sont pas de nature à amoindrir la valeur pratique de sa retraite. La Russie avait déjà renoncé à la théorie de gage par sa déclaration du $\frac{17}{29}$ Juin en donnant à l'occupation des Principautés une caractère militaire. Aujourd'hui elle les évacue non seulement de fait, mais elle déclare aussi qu'elle se maintiendra sur la défensive sur son propre territoire. Si malgré cela on voulait considérer la probabilité de la réoccupation des Principautés comme un danger permanent pour les intérêts Allemands, et en faire découler des obligations militaires, on arriverait à ce résultat paradoxal, que l'Europe entière, y compris les Puissances Occidentales qui dans le temps n'ont pas fait de l'occupation des Principautés un *casus belli*, en feraient un aujourd'hui du fait que les Russes les ont occupées.

En s'appuyant sur ces considérations le Roi pense que l'Article Unique du Traité est résolu et qu'une entente préalable des Parties Contractantes est nécessaire d'après les termes de l'Article II du Traité pour déterminer les cas dans lesquels les intérêts Allemands doivent être réellement défendus.

Il s'agit d'examiner si les quatre points répondent aux intérêts Allemands suffisamment pour que les Parties Contractantes se les approprient comme bases

* For Translation, see Inclosure in No. 140.

absolues de toute négociation. Si on avait pu admettre non seulement que la Russie accepterait ces bases, mais aussi qu'elles seraient maintenues par les Puissances Occidentales (et beaucoup de symptomes permettent d'en douter), et si on y avait entamé des négociations en suspendant les hostilités, un semblable résultat eût été de nature à faire cesser l'incertitude qui subsiste encore sur la question de savoir si les quatre points ont une valeur pratique pour les intérêts Allemands. Je m'abstiens pour le moment des remarques qui pourraient être soulevées à ce sujet. Je rappelerai seulement que les difficultés qui se rattachent au protectorat collectif tant sur les Principautés que sur les Rayahs, pourraient facilement prendre un caractère qui ne serait rien moins que favorable aux intérêts Allemands; et je remarquerai encore que si l'entrée des troupes Autrichiennes dans les Principautés nous garantie que les intérêts Allemands seront défendues énergiquement, les mouvements en avant des troupes Turques et autres troupes étrangères dans ces Provinces, et l'occupation de ces pays par de semblables éléments, en faisant abstraction des complications militaires qui pourraient en résulter, ne peuvent certes pas être considérés comme donnant aux intérêts Allemands une tournure satisfaisante.

Sa Majesté, malgré le désir qu'elle aurait eu de voir des négociations immédiates s'ouvrir sur les bases qu'elle a appuyées à St. Pétersbourg, ne peut pas dans sa conviction recommander à ses confédérés Allemands les quatre points de manière à ce qu'ils entraineraient pour eux des charges et obligations qui ne paraissent commandées ni par l'esprit ni par le but de l'alliance.

Plus Sa Majesté est décidée à exécuter fermement le Traité comme garantie de la puissance indépendante de l'Allemagne, plus sa conscience lui commande d'écarter des sphères du Traité des obligations qui ne resorteront pas d'intérêts Allemands généraux et clairement établis.

Sa Majesté espère se trouver d'accord dans ces appréciations avec ses confédérés Allemands. Sa Majesté espère surtout que l'Empereur d'Autriche ne les appréciera pas seulement de cœur et d'esprit, mais qu'il les partagera comme Prince Allemand. La sagesse, la modération et l'amour de la paix de Sa Majesté Impériale sont pour le Roi une garantie que l'Autriche, rassuré par la déclaration de la Russie contre toute attaque, renoncera de son côté à toute attitude agressive contre elle, et que par là on évitera des complications qui n'entraineraît pas la défense des intérêts Allemands, et auxquelles ne s'obligerait pas l'Article II de l'Alliance.

Les instructions qui seront adressées à notre Ministre près de la Diète seront conçues dans ce sens, et nous espérons que les Plénipotentiaires des Gouvernements confédérés recevront des instructions réposantes sur des mêmes principes.

No. 126.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 892.)

Foreign Office, September 13, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government concur in the instructions which your Excellency states in your despatch No. 1,107 of the 11th instant, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys intends to address to M. de Moustier respecting the wish of Prussia to reestablish an understanding with Great Britain and France.

Lord A. Loftus will receive instructions similar to those addressed to M. de Moustier; but Her Majesty's Government apprehend that there is little chance that Baron Manteuffel will be induced to accede to a Convention that is declined by Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 127.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 542.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1854.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I have instructed the Earl of Westmorland to direct Mr. Consul Gardner to return to his post, as soon as his Lordship shall be officially informed that the Principalities are evacuated by the Russian troops.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 128.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 297.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me, on the 10th instant, a despatch from Count Buol dated the 3rd instant, adverting to the return to Bucharest with the Turkish forces of individuals compromised in the troubles of the year 1848, and to the mischief which had already resulted from their presence; though admitting at the same time that Omer Pasha, in conformity with a promise which he gave to the Austrian Consul-General, had taken steps to remove agitators from Wallachia.

The interests of Austria however, Count Buol observes, preclude her from allowing revolutionary intrigues to be concocted on her frontier and under the eye of her troops. She is bound by Treaty to the Porte to concert with that Power for re-establishing a regular administration, and the attempt to do so could not fail to be impeded by those restless spirits who advocate ill-digested measures of reform, and seek to support them by unseasonable demonstrations. The removal of such persons from the scene of action is consequently a common benefit to all Powers interested in the common cause, and Austria does not doubt that, sharing these views, the British Government will instruct its agents in Turkey to assist in giving effect to them.

I asked Count Colloredo whether the persons alluded to by Count Buol were Wallachians or foreigners, and what were the objects they were supposed to be aiming at. He said they were Wallachians, and mentioned the names of Constantine Rosetti and Nicolas Gideno as the principal agitators, and their object was to excite the peasants against the proprietary class.

I informed Count Colloredo that I would instruct Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest to make inquiry, and to communicate with Omer Pasha upon the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 129.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 298.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me, on the 10th instant, a despatch which he had received from Count Buol, dated the 3rd, inclosing a copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, rejecting the propositions forwarded from Vienna on the 10th of August.

Count Buol speaks of the Russian despatch as dispelling the hopes that it might be possible to effect an understanding between the belligerent parties in regard to the bases of peace, and his Excellency says that the arguments of

Count Nesselrode in support of the course taken by Russia have not shaken his opinion that the guarantees which Russia has thus rejected contain nothing inconsistent with equity and the general interest of Europe; he therefore authorizes Count Colloredo to assure Her Majesty's Government that no change has taken place in the moral attitude of Austria, and that she will maintain the engagement contracted by the note of the 8th of August.

Meanwhile General Hess has been ordered to apply to the Russian Commander-in-chief for precise information as to the period of the retreat of the Russian forces, for his guidance as to the measures to be taken by him for the occupation of the evacuated Provinces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 130.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 301.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1854.

I FORWARD to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Wallachia, which has already passed through your hands, respecting certain proposals made to Omer Pasha by Colonel Kalich; and I have to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government have learned with surprise that a proposition has been made by Colonel Kalich to Omer Pasha to name an Austrian Commandant de Place at Bucharest; and that General Hess has issued a proclamation inviting the authorities to address themselves for the future to Count Coronini or to the persons named by him.

It would thus appear that the first step of the Austrian Commander-in-chief on entering the Principalities was to mark his disregard for the sovereign authority of the Sultan, and to ignore the presence of the Turkish Commissioner then at Bucharest, and of the Turkish Commander-in-chief, who, with his victorious army, had established a state of things satisfactory to the people of Wallachia.

It appears also that the request of Omer Pasha, that the publication of the document should be delayed, was refused by General Popovich, and that it had actually been posted at various places along the Austrian line of march from Puthenthurm.

Her Majesty's Government consider that General Hess, in adopting this decided course of policy, must have acted under the express orders of his Government, and they are further confirmed in this belief by hearing that Omer Pasha was required to withdraw his forces from Bucharest, and to occupy merely the positions of Giurgevo and Kalarasch, as such a movement would add weight to negotiations which Austria might be carrying on, notwithstanding that Omer Pasha had come to Bucharest with his army at the express request of General Hess, communicated to him three weeks before by Colonel Kulich and General Lowenthal, and on the engagement, approved of by the Commanders-in-chief of the allied armies, that his advanced posts should, by the 5th of September, be at Bouzeo, and that his army should be in and around Bucharest. It could only, therefore, have been by positive orders to that effect that General Hess departed from his own arrangement, and addressed to Omer Pasha a demand which that General properly resisted as offensive to his Government, and derogatory to his character as the Turkish Commander-in-chief.

But these proceedings on the part of the Austrian military authorities are altogether at variance with the assurances which the Austrian Government have given voluntarily, as well as in answer to the specific inquiries of Her Majesty's Government respecting their intentions in occupying the Principalities, and the character which that occupation was to assume; and although Her Majesty's Government have been informed that in consequence of Omer Pasha's refusal to fall back on Giurgevo and Kalarasch, the Austrian demand to that effect has been withdrawn, they still feel entitled to request from the Austrian Government an explanation of the course pursued by General Hess, and to inquire whether that course has been disapproved, and what instructions will be given him for his future guidance.

In communicating this despatch to Count Buol, your Lordship will recall to his Excellency's recollection the precise assurances he has given on this subject, and the great importance which Her Majesty's Government have always attached to the existence of a cordial understanding between the Austrian and the Turkish Commanders-in-chief, and that the former should in all his acts uphold the authority and consult the rights and interests of the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 131.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 49.)
Foreign Office, September 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, reporting the intention of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to furnish M. de Moustier with instructions with reference to the policy it was desirous for Prussia to pursue at the present moment, and I have to instruct you to act in concert with M. de Moustier upon this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 132.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 14, 4·40 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, le 8 Septembre*, 1854, 7 A.M.

LES escadres combinées et les bâtiments de transport prirent finalement leur départ de Baliack hier, pour la Crimée. Lord Raglan s'était déjà embarqué sur le "Caradoc."

No. 133.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 1,112.)
Paris, September 13, 1854.

My Lord,

IT would be a waste of your Lordship's time to call your attention to the substance of the communication made by M. de Hübner to M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the future intentions of Austria in regard to the Eastern question. Count Colloredo must have made a similar communication to your Lordship. But I have less scruple in recounting the substance of the observations made to M. de Hübner by M. Drouyn de Lhuys after hearing the explanations and intentions of the Austrian Cabinet.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he could not but regret a decision which was so contrary to the spirit of the assurances made until now by Austria, and so incompatible with the interests of Germany; and he must add, that the publicity which the Austrian Government had given to their resolution not to attack the Russian troops beyond the Pruth, was deserving of severe condemnations. It was tantamount to informing the Russian Government that they might employ all their forces against the allies, as they had nothing to fear from the hostility of Austria.

M. de Hübner did not gainsay these assertions; but he observed that the position of his Government was very delicate and difficult, and was rendered doubly so by the isolated position in which Austria was placed, in consequence of the expedition to the Crimea.

* No. 121.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that the difficulty was of Austria's own creating. He called to M. de Hübner's recollection that, for more than six months, the maritime Powers had been urging the Austrian Government to come to an understanding with them respecting future operations; that he himself had told M. de Hübner, when hostilities became inevitable, that there were two ways of prosecuting the war—one upon the Danube, the other upon the Black Sea; that to make a campaign upon the Danube, the cooperation of Austria was necessary; while the maritime Powers, if left to themselves, must carry on their operations in the Black Sea. Over and over again the Austrian Cabinet had been pressed to say when and under what circumstances they would join the allies. Count Buol had invariably refused every explanation, and had at last himself admitted that the allies were free to choose their own point of attack. In no way could the situation of the two parties be compared together: that of the allies was active warfare; that of Austria, next akin to neutrality; and the result was, that the active hostility of the allies drew upon them the resources which the passive neutrality of Austria permitted Russia to dispose of. He feared that the policy of Austria would lead to consequences that might prove most disastrous to herself. A little firmer language on her part in the beginning would have preserved peace—a little more decision later would have circumscribed the war within its proper limits. Let her beware, lest her present attitude, which freed so large a portion of the Russian army, did not lead to graver consequences and a wider extent of the war; lest the troops thus freed did not use their freedom to rouse the Slavonic tribes to arms, and to excite them against the German race. If Austria hoped, by her present attitude, to divert the wrath of Russia, he thought she would be fatally deceived. The same weapons which had been tried by Russia against Turkey, namely, creating disaffection in the Sultan's subjects, might be turned against Austria; and in trying to avoid a war in defence of justice, and for the protection of the oppressed, she might find herself involved, by the oppressor, in a war of nationality.

I understand it to be M. Drouyn de Lhuys' intention to embody these arguments in a despatch to M. de Bourqueney, which will be communicated to your Lordship.

M. de Hübner appears, in the course of the conversation which I have recounted, to have attempted to make M. Drouyn de Lhuys understand that the present attitude of Austria was but temporary; that she had contracted no engagement not to attack Russia; and that circumstances might yet force her to do so. But M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that such observations had but little value for him; that he looked to facts; that he contrasted the language of the Austrian Cabinet before the conditions of peace were sent to St. Petersburgh, with their conduct now; that the Russian answer had, in fact, been more peremptory and insolent than Austria could ever have expected it to be; that no one point had been obtained, for in the evacuation of the Principalities, on strategical grounds only, no guarantee was given that they were safe from invasion for the future; and the result was that, from the attitude assumed by Austria, Russia was relieved, to the detriment of the allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 134.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 1,113. Confidential.)
Paris, September 13, 1854.

My Lord,

IN the course of the conversation with M. de Hübner to which my preceding despatch refers, M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated to the Austrian Minister that he must be permitted to observe that inasmuch as there was a choice between a war on the Danube and a war in the Black Sea, so also there might be a peace concluded on the Danube or a peace concluded in the Black Sea. If Germany took no active part in the war, neither could she expect her interests to be consulted whenever peace was made.

M. de Hübner observed that the notes exchanged between Austria and the Western Powers provided for the conditions of peace; but M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that in his opinion these notes could not be considered binding on the Western Powers if Austria persisted in giving them no help beyond an armed occupation of the Danubian Provinces. The notes were exchanged under the supposition that a further Convention would be signed binding Austria to aid in bringing about such a peace as she herself had deemed essential to the future welfare of Europe. It could not have been intended then, and could not be pretended now, that France and England were to shed their blood for what was recognized by the German Powers to be essential to the interest of Germany, while Germany remained a passive spectator of the contest.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to me that he had not been sorry to have an opportunity of saying this much to M. de Hübner. He had, however, touched the subject very lightly, and solely with the intention of letting M. de Hübner see that there were two ways of viewing the engagements contracted between the maritime Powers and Austria.

To me, however, he must express the conviction that the time would come when it would be necessary for the maritime Powers to let Austria clearly understand that the engagements contained in the notes referred to the eventuality of war.

If Austria was not at war, she would have no Treaty of Peace to sign, and could not pretend that she should be consulted by those who were at war.

The notes were part and parcel of a general transaction; an exchange of notes was to be made, and a Convention founded upon the conditions which they contained was then to be signed; but as the latter part of the transaction had not been executed, it followed that the former part became a mere record of opinions exchanged, and that those opinions might be modified as circumstances dictated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 135.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 15.)

(No. 1,121.)
My Lord, *Paris, September* 14, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me yesterday that he was about to address a despatch to the French Minister at Berlin respecting some of the statements made in the circular despatch lately sent by the Russian Government to its agents at the smaller German Courts, and showing how completely that despatch was at variance with the Protocols of Conference signed by the Prussian Plenipotentiary at Vienna, and with the four points which the Cabinet of Berlin had recommended the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to adopt as a basis of negotiations for peace.

Your Lordship sent me, in your despatch No. 890 of the 12th instant, the copy of a telegraphic despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus, in which his Lordship adverts to the contradiction between the tenour of the circular despatch and the language lately held by M. de Manteuffel to the Representatives of France and England. M. de Moustier appears to have called M. de Manteuffel's attention to this discrepancy, which the latter excused by saying that the circular despatch was dated the 3rd instant, and that an alteration in favour of the policy of the Western Powers had since been operated on the King of Prussia's mind.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 136.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 16, 10 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 16, 1854.

THE Austrian troops, destined for the occupation of Moldavia, will commence their movements this day. The three brigades enter by Tologo, Oglosch, and Tömös, and will proceed as far as Galatz and Ibraila. An invitation from Dervish Pasha and General Coronini, dated the 12th, and expected to arrive this day, has been sent to Prince Stirbey, to return to Bucharest, and resume his functions as Hospodar in the Principality of Wallachia. A similar invitation from the Porte has been announced by telegraph.

No. 137.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 344.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September* 12, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 287 of the 31st ultimo, and which refers to the suggestion which had been offered by Count Buol, as reported in my despatch No. 314 of the 23rd of the same month, as to the possibility of entering into a negotiation of peace before the signature of the preliminaries, I considered, that as there was at present no chance of any such preliminaries being proposed, it was not necessary to make any fresh communication upon the subject; but it is rather to correct any want of clearness in the language in which I reported Count Buol's expressions upon this subject, that I take this opportunity of stating that Count Buol in no way expressed himself to me as desiring to insist upon the adoption of his suggestion; but, on the contrary, that he put it forward merely as a means by which (supposing a document to have been signed by Count Nesselrode accepting the guarantees, or an order to have been sent to Prince Gortchakoff to sign a pledge of their acceptance) the delay of assembling the Plenipotentiaries, and the effusion of blood consequent upon the continuation of hostilities, after the requirements of the allied Powers had been agreed to, might have been avoided. Count Buol, however, carefully explained that this suggestion was one with regard to which a perfect understanding between the allied Powers would be arrived at, and therefore it would only have rested with your Lordship to have adhered to the original resolution which you had declared upon this subject, and to have stopped all further discussion with regard to it, by stating that the official acceptation by Russia of the guarantees of peace which you required, made no change in your decision as to the necessity of insisting on the signature of preliminaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 138.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 346.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September* 13, 1854.

I SPOKE to Count Buol upon the subject of Prince Stirbey, as directed in your Lordship's despatch No. 290 of the 5th instant. He replied, as he had done upon former occasions, that he had no predilection for the Prince; and that he had perfectly agreed to the proposal, that an inquiry should be instituted

with regard to him; that having done so, he should pronounce no opinion which should prejudge what was to be examined into by the Commission: but he felt that, as he was the regularly appointed Hospodar, and as he was addressed by that title by the Porte (an evidence of which had just been brought before him in a letter directed to him from the Government of the Sultan), he could not but think a great deal of difficulty would be avoided by allowing him to return, at least provisionally, to his former position.

He was well aware that there were great intrigues going on at Constantinople, and in the Principalities, as to the nomination of a new Hospodar; there was a young Prince Gika, who was favoured by some parties; there was the person who had been second in authority during Prince Stirbey's government, Cantacuzene, who would now be desirous of transplanting him; but with all these intrigues, Count Buol stated that he no connection whatever; all he desired was to see an authority (having the sanction of the Sultan, and of the regulations of the country) established, and if, in the midst of the different interests which would be contending for power, we were to wait for a new choice, or a new election, the object we had in view might long be delayed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 139.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 348. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September* 13, 1854.

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 288, I waited upon Count Buol, in company with M. de Bourqueney; and I submitted to him that despatch, and placed in his hands the copy of the project of Treaty which was inclosed in it.

M. de Bourqueney had already communicated the substance of the despatch he had received from his Government upon the same proposal, for the signature of an Offensive and Defensive Treaty, and had delivered to Count Buol a copy of the proposed Treaty.

M. de Bourqueney and myself, in the fulfilment of this duty, accompanied it by those expressions which we considered the most adapted to impress Count Buol with the importance our Governments attached to the adoption of a measure by which the bonds of alliance already existing between our Governments would be drawn closer, and a greater effect would be given to the policy upon which the three Powers were so happily agreed, and a further security obtained for the attainment of those guarantees for the future tranquillity of Europe, which they had pledged themselves to regard as indispensable.

Count Buol replied that, notwithstanding the absence of the Emperor, who had left Vienna for Ischl, he felt himself in a position to state that his Government received, with feelings of the most entire satisfaction, the offer of cooperation made by the Governments of England and France in the eventuality of Austria being engaged in hostilities with Russia; but by the Treaty which was now submitted to him, the near approach of that eventuality was so clearly indicated as to attribute to the Government of Austria a position towards Russia more advanced than that which they had assumed: for if it held out the prospect, that they would consider the rejection of the four Articles of the proposed guarantees as a *casus belli*, it would convey a meaning which was contrary to their intention; for it was fitting that the Imperial Government should openly and distinctly declare, that not having made the acceptation of those articles by Russia a condition of the maintenance of peace, they could not make their rejection a ground for the commencement of hostilities. What they proposed to themselves was, at all risks, to carry out immediately the entire occupation of the Principalities, and to defend those provinces against all aggression.

The Imperial Cabinet feel that, by signing the proposed Treaty, they would expose themselves to questions as to its import, the answers to which would weaken or destroy all the importance which might be attached to it. Nor could they become parties to this Treaty under an apprehension of an attack from Russia at

a time when that Government had declared, in the most formal manner, that they assumed an entirely defensive attitude within their own frontiers.

If Austria, under these circumstances, was to sign this Treaty, she would be placing arms in the hands of the Governments of Germany who were adverse to her policy, and who would accuse her of having produced an irritation in the Russian Government destructive of all hopes of peace by negotiation, without adding to the general power of offensive action in case a peace was only to be obtained by war.

Count Buol stated that the Treaty would add nothing to the engagements which had already been taken by his Government with the allied Powers, to which, and particularly to those taken by the note of the 8th of August, he most steadfastly adhered, notwithstanding their rejection at St. Petersburgh; and, in exchange for the proposed Treaty, he would submit a project by the adoption of which the fidelity of his Government to these engagements would be still further demonstrated, and to which he anxiously desires the most serious attention of our Governments.

He would propose that England, France, and Austria should invite the Prussian Government to take part in a Conference in Vienna, to which a Plenipotentiary from the Porte should also be invited, and which should have for its object to discuss and define in separate Acts the questions of internal organization which are referred to in the four Articles. But, as we could only bring into such a Conference a power which was entirely engaged in the support of the principles laid down in the notes of the 8th of August, the Prussian Government would be required to engage themselves by an Act to acknowledge and adopt those principles, from which no deviation would be admitted.

If the Prussian Government should refuse this invitation, they would place themselves in an isolated position, but Count Buol does not consider that this should interfere with the determination of the other Governments; and he is of opinion that the meetings they would hold might be designated, if so judged advisable by the Cabinets of England and France, as a Congress for the regulation of the points involved in the four Articles.

The first object would be to regulate the organization of the Principalities under the collective Protectorate of the four Powers. The privileges and immunities would be examined and defined in relation to the action and position of the Sovereign Power. The questions as to the military and civil administration would be discussed and settled, and registered in a document which would be sanctioned by the guarantee of the Powers who took part in the discussion. The freedom of the mouths of the Danube would be secured by regulations and stipulations adopted by the Congress, and the mode of testing and securing the observance of these regulations would then be established.

The Article relating to the revision of the Treaty of 1841 would also constitute an object of discussion for the Congress, although at the present moment any decision with regard to it must be subject to the result of the operations which are now in the course of being carried out.

Lastly, the Congress would enter upon the consideration of the position of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and in the same spirit in which the Acts upon that subject have hitherto been framed, the Representative of the Sultan would be invited to make such proposals as would accord with the just solicitude which on all sides has been manifested upon this question.

By the adoption of these measures, Count Buol conceives that the great objects of the alliance will be placed on a footing of security, and that by the signature of the different Acts which will emanate from this Congress, a settlement of the future peace of Europe will be secured upon a firm and permanent footing, and will be relieved from those dangers and doubts which, by the possibility of disunion amongst the most influential Powers, might at one time have been apprehended or calculated upon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Count Buol will in the course of to-morrow transmit to Count Colloredo, for your Lordship's information, his own statement of the above proposal, and also copy of his despatch to Count Esterhazy, in answer to Count Nesselrode's late despatch addressed to Prince Gortchakoff.

W.

No. 140.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 15, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 70 of the 10th instant, forwarding to your Lordship a copy in original of a Prussian circular of the 3rd instant, addressed to the Prussian Representatives at the German Courts, I have now the honour to transmit herewith a translation of that document.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 140.

Circular addressed to Prussian Representatives in Germany.

(Translation.)

SHORTLY before the Diet temporarily suspended their sittings, the Eastern question was brought before the respective Committee, but no resolution was passed, the different Ministers not being provided with sufficient instructions. As it may therefore be expected that on the recommencement of the sitting of the Diet the united Committee will again occupy themselves with this important question, His Majesty the King, &c., considers it a duty enjoined by the confidential relations he entertains with his German allies, with perfect frankness to communicate to their Governments the views which guide and will continue to guide his further conduct in treating these affairs.

Since the above-mentioned sitting of the Committee, the Royal Government have received from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the answer to the Austrian despatch of August 10, which we supported on the 13th ultimo. It is contained in a despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, dated the $\frac{1}{13}$th ultimo, which was communicated to us in a short covering despatch, in reply to the steps we had taken at St. Petersburgh. I inclose, herewith, copy of the said despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, and request that you will communicate it confidentially to the Government to whom you have the honour of being accredited.

We regret that His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas did not consider himself to be in a position to accept a basis of negotiations of peace, which, if it had been accepted and in so far as hostilities might have been arrested and a peace prepared by those means, would have responded to the wishes and objects of our Royal master, and which he, precisely on that account, had recommended at St. Petersburgh. But whilst we impartially examine the position caused by this rejection, and whilst we more particularly take into consideration the declaration at the end of the Russian despatch, according to which the Russian troops, withdrawn within the territory of the Empire, will there hold themselves in a strictly defensive position, still we cannot lose sight of the great importance which is to be attached to this declaration, both as regards its value in a military and in a political light, with regard to the German interests, which are protected by our alliance with Austria and the other German States.

We believe that all apprehension of a Russian attack in general, and more especially on Austria, is entirely removed by so clear a declaration. That Russia still declares her retreat to have been directed by strategical motives, cannot diminish the practical value of that step. The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had already, in their declaration of June $\frac{1}{13}$, given up the theory of holding a pledge, when they described the occupation of the Principalities as a purely military position. At present she does not only really evacuate them, but she also declares that she will confine herself to the defensive within the Russian territory. To persist, in spite of this, in considering the danger of a possible reoccupation of the Principalities as a permanent peril to German interests, and in deducing therefrom a military obligation, would lead to the paradoxical result that while all Europe, the Western Powers included, at the time did not

consider the fact of the occupation of the Principalities as constituting a *casus belli*, it is now thought necessary to discover one in the fact of their having been there.

On these considerations it is His Majesty the King's conviction that the Additional Article of the Treaty, which referred to positive and real conditions, must be looked on as annulled; but the answer to the question as to the necessity of any further protection of German interests, if really endangered, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty, renders a previous agreement of the Contracting Parties necessary.

In applying this to the well-known four points, the question arises whether they in so far relate to the interests of Germany as to render it advisable to the members of the Alliance to adopt them as the exclusive basis of future negotiations. If one could be certain of the adoption of this basis, not only by Russia but also by the Western Powers (which from many symptoms appears more than doubtful), and if it had been followed by negotiations of peace with suspension of hostilities, such a result would have been well adapted to counterbalance the uncertainty which still exists as to the practical meaning of the four points with regard to the interests of Germany. I refrain from entering more particularly into the scruples which might be raised in this respect; I only observe thereon, that the difficulties which might be connected with the common protectorate of the Principalities, as well as of the Christian Rayahs, could easily assume a character anything but advantageous to the interests of Germany; and I also remark that although we are willing to look on the entry of the Austrian troops into the Principalities as a guarantee for the energetic vindication of the general German interests in that country, still the simultaneous advance of Turkish, or perhaps other foreign troops into those countries, and the establishment of such elements in them, cannot be considered as a state of things favourable to the interests of Germany, irrespectively of the military complications which arise from it.

This basis being rejected by Russia, and there being no doubt that, even if the Western Powers recognized it as binding on themselves, which is not the case, immediate negotiations of peace would not be attained, His Majesty the King, however ardently he may have desired an immediate negotiation on this basis, and had with particular satisfaction supported at St. Petersburgh the despatch of the Cabinet of Vienna which referred to it, still cannot reconcile it with his conviction to recommend to his German allies the adoption of the four points, in a manner which would and must entail burdens and obligations on them which do not appear enjoined by the spirit and object of the alliance.

The more strictly His Majesty the King intends to persist in a firm and undeviable execution of the Treaty, as a guarantee of an independent neutrality [Machtenhaltung (?)] on the part of Germany, the more conscientiously he believes it his duty to remove from its sphere all obligations which are not dictated by clearly recognized and general German interests.

His Majesty hopes to agree with his German allies in these views. He feels entire confidence that His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will not only enter into them with heart and soul, but also as a German Prince participate in them.

The wisdom, moderation, and love of peace of His Imperial Majesty afford to the King an increased guarantee that Austria, insured by the declarations of Russia against attack, will refrain from assuming any aggressive attitude against her, and thus avoid complications, a necessity for which cannot be found in the protection of the interests of Germany, and to which Article II of the Alliance would not be applicable.

The Royal Minister at the Diet will be instructed to conform his language in the Committee, as well as in the Diet, to these considerations, and to seek to give them due appreciation.

When you inform the Government to whom you have the honour of being accredited of this, by communicating to them the present despatch, you will also express the great importance we attach to being informed, as soon as possible, that its Representative at the Diet has been provided with instructions based on the same principles.

Berlin, September 3, 1854.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 141.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 77.)

Berlin, September 15, 1854.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 65 of the 8th instant, I reported to your Lordship the substance of my conversation with Baron Manteuffel, when he gave me to understand that the Prussian Government were disposed to give to the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna a declaration expressing their adoption of and formal adhesion to the four points which Austria had lately submitted to the Russian Government, as the indispensable basis of a future peace. On being made acquainted with the Prussian circular of the 3rd instant, addressed to the Prussian Ministers at the German Courts, I lost no time in informing your Lordship, by telegraph, of the nature of that document, and that it was in complete contradiction to what Baron Manteuffel had expressed to the Austrian and French Ministers and to myself. I have since learned the following details, explanatory of this extraordinary and deceptive conduct of the Prussian Government:

It appears that on the 13th instant, an Austrian circular was addressed to the Austrian Ministers at the German Courts, informing them of the four conditions which Austria had submitted to the Russian Cabinet, stating that, in the event of their rejection by Russia, the relations between Austria and Russia would be seriously affected, and calling on the German States to adhere to these four points in the Diet, in conformity with a resolution which would be presented to that body by Austria.

Shortly after this, Baron Prokesch, without having previously mentioned his intention to M. de Bismarck Schönhausen, submitted to the Diet a series of seven questions relating to the attitude which Germany should assume in the event of the rejection by Russia of the conditions required. I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a copy of these seven questions.

M. de Bismarck Schönhausen was excessively incensed at this proceeding of Baron Prokesch, and declared that he was wholly without instructions. He immediately started off for Puthus; represented to the King the imminent danger to Germany and Prussia, if, in the event of a refusal of the four points, Austria was to declare war against Russia; and excited the King to take some counteracting step with the smaller German States. This, consequently, gave birth to the Prussian circular, the aim of which was to paralyze the independent action of Austria, and to thwart her influence with the other German States. When, however, it was discovered that Austria had no intention of declaring war against Russia, or indeed taking any precipitate step, it was feared that the circular, when brought to light, would greatly compromise the Prussian Government with the Western Powers; and thus it was that Baron Manteuffel convinced the King of the necessity of taking some step in order to counteract the bad effect of the circular. On the 8th instant, therefore, Baron Manteuffel expressed to Count Esterhazy, M. de Moustier, and myself, his intention of making a communication to the three Courts, declaring that the Prussian Government were willing to give their adhesion, under a certain reserve, to the four conditions of peace which they had lately supported at St. Petersburgh.

I believe, my Lord, this statement to be the true key to the double policy which Prussia has attempted to play. The real fact is, that, to maintain himself in power, Baron Manteuffel is called upon to make large concessions to the King, and the party who enthrall His Majesty; in return for which he occasionally obtains a certain sacrifice on their part. But it must be remarked that the concessions wrested from Baron Manteuffel are of the largest magnitude, and wholly partake of a nature defensive of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 142.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 78.)

Berlin, September 15, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD an interview with Baron Manteuffel this evening, and expressed to his Excellency the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the intention he had expressed to me of using his best endeavours to obtain the liberation of the British subjects arrested by the Russian authorities near Memel.

I then stated to Baron Manteuffel that I had been much embarrassed since I had last had the honour of seeing him, on being made acquainted with a circular addressed by him to the Prussian Ministers at the German Courts, which was in complete contradiction with the assurances which he had expressed, not only to myself, but to the Austrian and French Ministers. I stated that I was placed thereby in a false position with respect to my Government, having reported to your Lordship the assurances which I had received from his Excellency that Prussia was willing to give a declaration of her adhesion to the four points of peace she had lately supported at St. Petersburgh; whereas the document he had signed a few days previously had positively stated that Prussia could not recommend the German Confederates to adhere to them.

His Excellency was much embarrassed, and at first seemed indisposed to allow that the circular did contain any such statement; but on my repeating to him the phrase, his Excellency remarked that the circular "was merely addressed to the German States, and was a reply to certain propositions which Baron Prokesch had submitted to the Diet without consulting them; that it did not in any way change the assurances which he had given to the Austrian and French Ministers and to myself; and that Count Bernstorff was already instructed to make a communication to your Lordship in the sense of this assurance."

I understood his Excellency to mean, that Count Bernstorff would communicate to your Lordship the willingness of the Prussian Government to adhere to the four conditions under a certain reserve—that they would not oblige the King to go to war.

His Excellency further informed me that Count Arnim had made the communication to Count Buol, who had expressed himself much satisfied with it.

I then inquired of his Excellency whether the declaration which the Prussian Government was ready to make would annul the circular addressed to the German States. He replied, "How can you ask me to annul a document which bears my signature?" I replied, that I was at a loss to understand the Prussian policy, when, in the course of a few days, two such contradictory statements had been put forth; and that, for my own part, I had felt it a painful duty to have to address to your Lordship two contradictory reports within the space of a few hours. I then remarked to his Excellency on the nature of the circular, saying that it offered a new proof of the endeavours of Prussia to thwart our policy with Austria and Germany. I stated, that it was a document decidedly hostile to us, and defensive of Russia; that we did not wish to dictate to Prussia what policy she should pursue, but that we had a right to expect that it should not be hostile to us; and that if she desired to be neutral, her neutrality could only be a total abstention from any interference between the belligerent parties.

I then took occasion to read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 2 of the 31st of August, relating your conversation with Count Bernstorff. He only observed, that there were many points to which he could reply, and he expressed himself as entertaining no fear that Prussia would be excluded from taking her part at the conclusion of peace.

The impression which I received from this interview is, that Baron Manteuffel is personally extremely annoyed and embarrassed at the publication of the Prussian circular, and that he has done all he could to retrieve the injurious effect it will produce in London and Paris. He finds himself powerless, and unable to prevent evil; and all his endeavours are devoted to repair the

mischief. But so long as the present Court party maintain their influence and ascendancy over the King, no salutary change may be expected in the policy of this country, nor can any confidence be placed in this Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 143.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1,132. Confidential.)

Paris, September 17, 1854.

My Lord,

THE correspondence from Constantinople having mentioned more than once the name of Captain Mauduit as being charged by the Emperor with a mission to Circassia, I inquired this afternoon of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether this officer was indeed an agent of the French Government, observing that, if he was, some notice ought to have been given to Her Majesty's Government of the intention of the French Government to send such an agent; first, because we had always apprised the French Government of the names of British agents employed in connection with the present war; secondly, in order that, if he came in contact with any of Her Majesty's officers or agents, he might be treated with proper consideration.

I gather from M. Drouyn de Lhuys' reply, given me very confidentially, that Captain Mauduit is a person of whom the French Government wished, for some reason or other, to be rid, and that not knowing what to do with him, they sent him into Circassia, thinking as he is of undoubted bravery, that he might excite the Circassians against the Russians, and aid them in their combats. M. Drouyn de Lhuys asserted, however, most positively that he had no mission, properly so called, from the Imperial Government, that he had no letters of introduction or of credence, and that he could only be regarded as a traveller undertaking a particular service with the knowledge and sanction of his Government.

I observed that Captain Mauduit appeared to be living in some luxury, and that he was said to be the bearer of presents from the Emperor to the Chiefs of the Circassian tribes.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys denied all knowledge of Captain Mauduit being the bearer of presents from the Emperor; but he said that he believed there was some latitude giving him of procuring arms for the Circassians, should they stand in need of them, and be willing to use them against the Russians.

I really believe that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has stated the exact truth of what he knows of this person; but it is very possible that Captain Mauduit may have instructions of which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has no knowledge.

To test him, I asked whether some mention should not be made of Captain Mauduit to Colonel Lloyd; but his Excellency replied that that would be giving an importance to Captain Mauduit which was by no means wished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 144.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 1,135.)

Paris, September 18, 1854.

My Lord,

M. BAUDIN will have communicated to your Lordship two telegraphic despatches received by the French Government, the one dated Constantinople the 10th instant, the other, Bucharest the 15th.

From the former of these it appears that the Porte had already begun to conceive suspicions of the good faith of Austria in the Principalities; from the latter, that the Porte was justified in entertaining these suspicions, inasmuch as General Hess had announced to Omer Pasha that he would not permit the Turkish army under his command to occupy Ibraila or Galatz; or to cross the Pruth. Omer Pasha had in consequence recrossed the Danube with the bulk of his army, leaving only a corps of 10,000 men at Bucharest.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote immediately by telegraph to M. de Bourqueney desiring him to inquire of M. de Buol whether this was the manner in which Austria proposed to enter into an alliance with France and England.

He told me further that he had expressed through M. Baudin a hope that your Lordship would desire Lord Westmoriand, by telegraph, to call Count Buol's attention to this matter.

I observed that I regretted that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not at once denounced the conduct of the Austrian General as a violation of the solemn assurances given by Count Buol, that there was no pretension on the part of Austria to stop the march of any of the belligerant troops who might enter into the Principalities in pursuit of the retreating Russians. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he should in a detailed despatch call M. de Buol's attention to the engagements into which Austria had entered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 145.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bucharest, le 19 Septembre, 1854.

EUPATORIA dans la Crimée est occupée par un détachement de trois armées; elle s'est rendue sans résistance. On s'attendait que les forces alliées tentassent un débarquement général le 14 Septembre sur quelque point de la côte plus près de Sébastopol. Toute l'expédition était réunie; sa santé, sa morale excellentes.

No. 146.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 306.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 19, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me on the 9th instant a despatch dated the 3rd from Count Buol, stating that before his Excellency can form a correct opinion upon the Russian answer, it will be necessary to wait for the report of Count Esterhazy and the information which the Cabinet of Berlin may be able to furnish, but that such explanations as may be received shall at once be made known to Her Majesty's Government, and will always be matter for common deliberation.

Count Buol considers that the objects of the notes exchanged on the 8th of August have been partly realized by the evacuation of the Principalities; for the Protectorate hitherto exercised by Russia over these Provinces has *de facto* ceased; the Austrian occupation will present a barrier against any future invasion, and the integrity of Turkey in that quarter will be secured by the present state of things: therefore a defensive position towards Russia is assigned to Austria, but at this moment there is no political or strategical motive for assuming an offensive attitude.

The navigation of the Danube, which is the second point in the notes of the 8th of August, will now be free from all obstacle, with the exception of the short passage between Reni and the mouths of the river which form the Turco-Russian frontier.

The third point in the note will be greatly facilitated if the expedition of the allies against the Crimea is successful.

With respect to the fourth point, which excludes Russia from any official Protectorate over the subjects of the Porte, Count Buol observes that such a Protectorate is now by the present state of things completely interdicted, and he considers that it is of great importance that the Powers friendly to the Porte should come to an understanding as to the means of inducing the Ottoman Government to take the initiative in permanently settling the religious rights of the different Christian communities, because that question once determined, Russia could not fail to recognize a fact of which the advantage, while it rendered any special protection unnecessary, would be shared by the Greek community.

Lastly, Count Buol thinks that Russia will more resign herself to make peace by adopting the guarantees which are essential to peace, in accordance with the notes of August 8, if these guarantees, by the irresistible force of things, had become accomplished facts.

I told Count Colloredo that I had listened to this despatch with great surprise and disappointment, as Count Buol's language appeared to indicate a change of policy that would secure to Russia the "neutralité bienveillante" she had all along insisted upon with Austria. Austria, I said, had made known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the bases that she considered indispensable for a solid and lasting peace, and they had been rejected in terms which clearly proved that the pretensions and ambitious views of Russia had undergone no change, but Austria in return declared that she had no motive for assuming an offensive attitude, and that she should merely occupy the Principalities, which for strategical reasons alone, and not as any satisfaction to Austria, had been evacuated by the Russian armies. I could not, I said, agree with Count Buol that by this movement the objects of the notes exchanged in August 8 were in any way realized; for Russia had not renounced her Protectorate over the Principalities, and Prince Gortchakoff had declared his intention of returning there, which intention he would probably carry into effect if the Austrian troops withdrew before the conclusion of a peace, which the present policy of Austria would indefinitely postpone. There was no security, therefore, as to the first point, except by a prolongation of the war, and finally compelling Russia to abandon all claim to interfere in this as in every other portion of the Turkish territory.

As regarded the second point, I could not understand how the navigation of the Danube could be considered free as long as it was in the power of Russia to obstruct the mouths of that river, and Austria appeared to have no intention of interfering with impediments the removal of which was a question of vital importance not only to herself but to the whole of Germany.

With respect to the third point, I said I earnestly hoped that the operations of the allies might be crowned with success; but so far from these operations being assisted by Russia they were endangered, because Russia being now secure from hostility on the part of Austria might detach a large portion of her army to attack the allies in the Crimea.

As to the fourth point, I did not think that the moment was opportune for pressing the Porte in the manner desired by Count Buol, and I could attach no weight to the argument used by his Excellency in support of the measure, namely, that it would render the Protectorate of Russia unnecessary, as Russia had no right to exercise any such Protectorate, and had only put forward the claim as a pretext for interfering in the affairs of Turkey, and acquiring an ascendancy that would be fatal to her independence.

I could not therefore but consider that matters stood in a worse position than before the Austrian Government had made known their demands to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and that the Emperor of Russia would be encouraged to persevere in his course by the conviction, that however indispensable Austria might consider the proposed bases of bases of peace, she never would assume an offensive attitude for the purpose of obtaining them.

This, I added, would also be an encouragement to Prussia and to the German Powers who were in league with her not alone against the Western Powers but against Austria, and must tend to prolong the war, which, however, would be carried on with unabated energy by England and France, and with all the means at their disposal, until they secured for themselves a just and honourable peace.

Count Colloredo said that as Austria had at great expense made complete preparations for war, and had rendered it impossible for the Russian armies to

remain longer in the Principalities, her position towards Russia could not be considered either friendly or neutral.

I have to instruct your Lordship to read the present despatch to Count Buol, and should he desire it to furnish his Excellency with a copy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 147.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 19, 1854.*

COUNT BERNSTORFF has communicated to me the substance of a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, stating that the King, without considering the four points as the exclusive basis of all negotiation, nor consequently intending to contract any fresh obligations with regard to them, is yet of opinion that they furnish the substance (noyau) for future arrangement; and in that point of view His Majesty will always be prepared to give them his moral support, and thereby to prove, as far as Prussian interests permit, his desire to concur with other Powers in effecting a speedy but desirable peace.

Baron Manteuffel added, that the Cabinet of Berlin was not opposed to a fresh meeting of the Conference at Vienna if it was desired by the other Powers, and that the King would not then hesitate to declare, by a Protocol, that the four points should have his moral support and good offices; with the clear understanding, however, that he contracted no engagement to enforce them by a military cooperation against Russia.

I told Count Bernstorff that Baron Manteuffel had had many proofs of the value attached by Her Majesty's Government to the alliance with Prussia, and of the satisfaction with which they had, at the beginning of the present crisis, cooperated with Prussia in support of principles which it was alike the duty and interest of honest Governments to uphold; that they had regretted the alienation which the unfortunate policy of Prussia had since produced, and that they would on every account rejoice that better relations were established between the two countries, and that Prussia should cease to occupy the isolated position in which she had placed herself; but that it was quite impossible to take advantage of the proposal now made by Baron Manteuffel.

England and France, I said, had agreed with Austria respecting certain bases indispensable for negotiation, but without pledging themselves that these bases would be the limits of their demands on Russia, which would be determined by the events of war; and they at the same time declared that they would be no parties, directly or indirectly, to any communication with Russia. Austria had, however, thought proper to make these bases known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and Prussia had thought proper to support them: they had been peremptorily rejected by Russia, and it would be the height of absurdity on the part of England and France; they would cover themselves with ridicule, if they consented to call together the Conference in order that the King of Prussia might announce his moral support of the bases, which had already been treated with contempt by the Emperor of Russia, and might declare his resolution not to act against Russia, which, in a variety of ways, His Majesty had already made notorious to the world.

Besides, I added, even if these reasons did not forbid the acceptance of Baron Manteuffel's proposal, the circular recently issued to the Representatives of Prussia in Germany, of which a copy was inclosed in your Lordship's No. 70, had destroyed all hope of united action. In that circular not only was the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas defended, and that of the Western Powers alluded to in terms that were offensive; not only were the bases of negotiation to which Prussia was now, for the second time, offering her moral support severely criticised, but Prussia had laid aside her character and her functions as an European Power, and had restricted the great question now at issue within the selfish and narrow limits of German interests. The policy of Prussia must, therefore, have undergone a complete change; or else, if she had from the first enter-

tained the views announced in the circular, she was not justified in entering upon negotiations which she must have intended to defeat, and adopting principles that she did not share with Powers whose policy she well knew was European, and whose objects were not exclusively confined to Germany.

Count Bernstorff here observed, that the circular was addressed exclusively to German Courts, and German interests could alone be treated of in such a communication.

I said I could not for a moment admit such a reason. The German States constituted a large portion of Europe; they were interested in the general policy of Europe; they were interested in the maintenance of international law, and of the distinctions between right and wrong, between justice and violence; and above all, they were interested that weak States should not with impunity be aggrieved by their more powerful neighbours, and if they were insensible to their own manifest interests, it would become a great German Power, when addressing them, to lay down certain broad principles for their guidance.

Be that as it may, however, I said, that England and France, far less immediately concerned that Germany in the issue of the struggle, had embarked in this war on principle; they were determined to maintain the balance of power by maintaining the Ottoman Empire; they were determined to protect Europe from the aggressive and unscrupulous policy of Russia; and they were resolved not to lay down their arms until a peace which they considered just and honourable was concluded; but so little mindful were they of their own exclusive interests, that their first step was to enter into a solemn and binding engagement not to derive any advantage for themselves.

In circumstances, therefore, so widely different, I lamented to think that whether in conducting the war, or in negotiating for peace, there could on the part of England and France exist neither cordiality nor united action with Prussia, who have appeared to have abdicated her position as an European Power, and to content herself with a fallacious immunity for German interests.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—Your Lordship will communicate this despatch to Baron Manteuffel.

C.

No. 148.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 1,134.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 18, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received yesterday morning, through M. de Bourqueney, the details of the fresh proposition made by the Austrian Cabinet for giving greater effect to the engagements recorded in the notes exchanged between Great Britain, France, and Austria, on the 8th ultimo. This morning the proposition was made in a more formal manner by Baron d'Ottenfels, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, during the temporary absence of M. de Hübner.

Your Lordship will have heard the project in detail from Count Colloredo. I confine myself, therefore, to remarking that Austria declines signing the Convention offered for her consideration by Great Britain and France, but she proposes that the three Powers should invite the Prussian Cabinet to renew the Conferences at Vienna, in order to discuss and settle the details of the four points recorded in the above-mentioned notes, by putting them in such a shape as will fit them for becoming acts of international law.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys told M. d'Ottenfels that he could give him no answer until he had consulted with Her Majesty's Government, but that he would make no secret that, in his personal opinion, the project was inadmissible.

In giving me yesterday the substance of the despatches received from M. de Bourqueney, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that the Emperor being in Paris he had had an opportunity of at once taking His Majesty's orders. That the the Emperor's opinion, in which he coincided, was that the Austrian Government

should be told shortly and decisively, first, that as far as Great Britain and France were concerned, this was the moment of action and not of deliberation; secondly, that the war was not sufficiently advanced to enable the belligerents to put forward practical, definitive, and special conditions of peace; thirdly, that those conditions must be settled by those Powers which had taken part in the war, for it could not be pretended that the decision of the belligerents should be in any degree made subordinate to the will of those who had remained at peace.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed great anxiety that your Lordship should take the same view of the Austrian proposition. He said that he would send to London, by to-night's mail, the draft of a despatch to M. de Bourqueney embodying the reply which he proposed to make to it, for your Lordship's approval; that he thought it of essential importance that Count Buol should receive an early answer, as it would show that there had been no hesitation as to the course which it behoved the two Governments to take.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that there appeared to me to be a still stronger objection to entertaining the new proposition than any he had mentioned. What was to happen if, as would probably be the case, we should find ourselves at issue with Austria on matters of detail? Suppose Austria to insist on one view and we on another, might not Austria see in such a divergence of opinion reason for drawing again nearer to Russia? If there could be any hope of an early peace, differences of opinion might give way for the attainment of an object which all actually desired, but there would be little chance of such moderation when the war could hardly be said to have commenced. But even admitting that a general agreement as to the meaning of the four points could be attained, would Austria bind herself to assist the Western Powers in obliging Russia to accept them? Nothing of the kind was promised, or even hinted at.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys again this morning, when he stated to me that the intelligence which he had received of the conduct of the Austrian authorities in the Principalities, and to which I allude in another despatch, had confirmed him in the opinion which he had expressed to me yesterday; and he again evinced the greatest anxiety that your Lordship should partake his view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 149.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 20, 1854.*

THE Internuncio writes from Constantinople on the 16th, that the allied forces, 25,000 English, 25,000 French, and 8,000 Turks, landed on the 14th at Eupatoria, without meeting with any resistance, and had commenced marching on Sebastopol. Transports had returned immediately to fetch the reserves who had remained at Varna. Baron Bourqueney and myself were leaving Count Buol, before whom we had together placed the question relative to the strategical movements of the Turks in the Principalities, which he will refer to the Emperor, who is expected this evening, when the above despatch arrived. Count Buol in reading it to us expressed his most hearty satisfaction at the information it conveyed.

No. 150.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 478. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 31, 1854.*

YOU are aware, I believe, that the Circassians who are now here, arrived with an officer called the Naïb, or Lieutenant, of Schamyl Bey. The same person sent his confidential interpreter this morning to inform me that he was embarrassed by intrigues, which had for their object to divide Circassia into four parties, one being destined for Seffir Pasha, who lived some time in exile near Adrianople, another for Schamyl, a third for Bektchet Bey, a creature of Reshid Pasha's, and a fourth for Ismail Bey or Pasha, of whom I never heard until the present occasion. The Naïb gave me to understand that, according to his impression, this plan was entertained by the Porte; that it had the effect of causing much division among his companions; that he was anxious to return to Circassia; and that he wished to be guided by my opinion.

I told the interpreter that I could neither express nor form an opinion without further inquiry, and that if he was sincere in wishing to know what I thought, he would give himself the trouble of calling again in three or four days.

I have since addressed my inquiries to Reshid Pasha. Inclosed herewith is a copy of the instruction by which I authorized M. Pisani to wait on his Highness, and also a copy of M. Pisani's report of his interview with that Minister.

Your Lordship will observe that an unlimited and peremptory denial is given to the Porte's imputed design, and also to the supposition that Colonel Mauduis, whose name is mentioned by M. Pisani, had been accredited to the Porte, either by M. Benedetti or Marshal St. Arnaud, though it seems that he is to embark for his destination with Mustapha Pasha, Commander-in-chief elect of the Turkish army at Batoum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 150.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, August 30, 1854.*

I AM told that the Porte has taken some step tending to annex Circassia, in whole or in part, to the Sultan's Empire, or placing the Circassians under his jurisdiction. You will lose no time in applying officially to Reshid Pasha on my part; you will ask him whether there is any truth in the foregoing report, and you will ascertain the exact nature of the measure adopted or contemplated, for the information of Her Majesty's Government. You will take the same opportunity to ask the Pasha whether he has any knowledge of the French Agent now here, destined for Circassia or the coast of Schamyl Bey—an Agent, named Mauduis, or something like it, who is in the habit of seeing the Circassians with Schamyl's Naïb; he is, or has been, lodged at the Hotel de Bysance.

I wish to know whether the French Embassy, or Marshal St. Arnaud, have made any communication to the Porte on the subject of the above-mentioned agent, who, I understand, is to go with Mustapha Pasha.

You will execute this instruction and report to me at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 150.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, August 31, 1854.*

IN pursuance of your Excellency's instruction of yesterday's date I applied officially to Reshid Pasha on your part, and requested him to acquaint me, for your Excellency's information and that of Her Majesty's Government, whether it be true that the Porte had taken some step tending to annex Circassia, in whole or in part, to the Sultan's Empire, or placing the Circassians under his jurisdiction. In reply to my demand, his Highness wished me to assure your Excellency, most formally, that the Porte has never contemplated any measure, nor does she entertain any scheme to annex the whole or any part of Circassia to the Turkish dominions, or placing its inhabitants under the Porte's jurisdiction. But what the Porte heartily wishes is, to see the Circassians rescued from the grasp of Russia, free and independent.

With reference to the French Agent now here, destined for Circassia, or the Court of Schamyl Bey, Reshid Pasha told me that neither the French Embassy nor Marshal St. Arnaud ever made any communication to the Porte on the subject of that Agent; but the latter called one day, and acquainted his Highness that he is charged with a mission on the part of the Emperor to Schamyl Bey, and that he was preparing to go with Mustapha Pasha; his name is not known to Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ETIENNE PISANI.

No. 151.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 482.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 5, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith is a copy of a note addressed to me by Reshid Pasha, in reply to my last complaint of culpable irregularities and atrocious outrages committed in Bulgaria, and forming the subject matter of my despatch No. 449 to your Lordship under date of the 15th ultimo.

I avail myself of the opportunity to forward also, in copy, an official report from M. Pisani, including a series of suggestions from me, accepted by the Minister and now before the Sultan; and a despatch from Lord Raglan, in answer to a previous communication from me on the same subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 151.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Translation.) *August 24, 1854.*

I HAVE your Excellency's note dated the 12th August, inclosing several despatches from His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and from Lord Raglan and Colonel Gordon, respecting certain reprehensible occurrences in Bulgaria; representing the necessity of promptly redressing the complaints in question, and requesting that strong and peremptory measures should be taken for securing the free purchase and procurement, without obstacle, of the provisions to be purchased for the auxiliary armies, and for protecting against injury or oppression the inhabitants of villages furnishing provisions to those troops; and I have given the note in question, and the inclosures, my full consideration.

The views and efforts of the Sublime Porte are directed solely to the general welfare, and your Lordship knows how sincerely and deeply afflicted His Imperial Majesty is on the occurrence of these atrocious acts. Owing to the present war the military authorities are all taken up with military matters, and the civil authorities are likewise fully occupied in their own districts; and it would be a useful and very efficacious plan, to appoint especial officers with reference to occurrences of this nature. The Sublime Porte has, therefore, resolved on appointing two Commissioners with full powers, who will not reside in any particular place, but go wherever it may be necessary. On the occurrence of acts of the nature in question, the culprits will be arrested on the spot; after examination they will be put upon their trial, and punished by the Commissioners without delay according to law, and without a reference for leave to Constantinople being necessary. They will likewise take measures for facilitating by every possible means the supply of provisions, and other wants, to the auxiliary forces in Bulgaria. There will be a separate Commissioner for the other side of the Balkan, and one for the country lying between the fort of the Balkan and Varna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RESHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 151.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, August 31, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to that part of your Excellency's instruction relative to Lord Raglan's complaints, I have the honour to state that I am informed by Reshid Pasha that the Governor of Varna is recalled, and is to be superseded by Adil Pasha, present Governor of Sinope.

The Commissioner who is to inquire into the grievances complained of, is appointed, and waits for the Sultan's sanction to proceed to his destination. His name is Mitad Effendi. The instructions he is to receive from the Porte are drawn up in accordance with the inclosed paper, and as soon as they are returned by the Sultan, to whom they have been submitted, I shall have the honour to forward a copy for your Excellency's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 151.

Memorandum.

IL y a deux choses à soigner: 1. La protection des habitants; 2. L'approvisionnement de l'armée.

Il faut une enquête rigoureuse sur l'une, comme sur l'autre.

Il faut aussi prendre des mesures dans le double but de punir les coupables, et d'empêcher le renouvellement de leurs crimes.

Un Commissaire Impérial sera chargé de cette besogne. Il doit avoir des pouvoirs complets et des instructions précises. Un firman adressé à toutes les autorités doit l'accréditer, et des ordres adressés soit à son Altesse Omer Pacha, soit aux autorités locales, doit mettre à sa disposition la force nécessaire pour mettre tout ce qu'il aura décidé d'après les instructions de la Porte à executer.

Le rappel du Gouverneur Civil de Varna doit être proclamé comme étant la conséquence de sa mauvaise conduite envers les armées auxiliaires; les paysans et les habitants des villes et villages doivent être encouragés et commandés à fournir leurs provisions de toutes espèce—faute de quoi, punition.

Les habitants loyaux et paisibles doivent être protégés non seulement par les ordres, par le canal de leurs autorités et leurs Imams, mais aussi par des gardes fournis par le Commandant-en-chef et rendus responsables de la tranquillité du pays et de bon traitement des habitants de toute classe.

Inclosure 4 in No. 151.

Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, September 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch No. 16 of the 1st instant, forwarding the copy of a note addressed to you by Reshid Pasha, with a copy of a report from M. Pisani, and I am glad to find that, owing to your Excellency's exertions, the Turkish Government are taking steps to protect the Bulgarian peasantry.

The supply of the British army ceases to be an object of anxiety; the greater portion of Her Majesty's having been withdrawn from this place and its neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RAGLAN.

No. 152.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 485.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 5, 1854.

THE most urgent want of the army at Kars at this moment is a Commander-in-chief. Seeing the doubts entertained as to General Guyon's capacity for the chief command, the difficulty of making a satisfactory appointment from France and England, the impossibility to all appearance of finding a Turkish General possessed like Omer Pasha of the requisite qualifications, and having a favourable opinion of General Klapka, founded on his recorded acts and personal qualities, I have long inclined to the opinion that the Porte would give itself the best chance of success on the Asiatic frontier by appointing the last-mentioned General to the chief command of the army there.

The objections to such an appointment were that it might give umbrage to Austria, that it might be irreconcileable with General Guyon's position, that the Turkish officers would be unwilling to second a Christian commander, and that General Klapka's ignorance of the Turkish language would furnish an insuperable barrier.

These various considerations occasioned much delay, and finally produced the substitution of a mission of inspection by General Klapka, in place of his elevation to the chief command.

The arrangements necessary to carry this limited idea into effect became in their turn matters of doubt and difficulty, till the course of events and the arrival of detailed information from Kars, combined with economical considerations, left little room for the motives which originally suggested the proposed mission to prevail.

General Klapka expressed, nevertheless, his readiness to undertake the charge if I continued to recommend it; but when I left the decision to his own judgment, he stated candidly that, although his services were still at the disposal of the Porte, he thought the season to be too far advanced to allow of his acting at present with any prospect of a really beneficial result.

In this view I thought it reasonable to acquiesce. The General parted from me with the declared intention of going to Switzerland, where he said that he should always be ready to obey a summons, if I thought that his services could be made available on a proper and efficient footing.

Intelligence of the disasters at Bayazid and Koorook Dereh arrived soon after, and it became more than ever desirable that a competent General should be placed in command of the discomfited army at Kars.

The Porte on this occasion revived its former intention of sending Ismail Pasha to supersede the present Mushir, but at the same time declared its readiness to appoint any French and British General to the command of divisions under him, who might be recommended by the respective Governments.

This idea presented more than one prominent objection, and it was a relief to me when I found that Lord Raglan was reluctant to support it, and that his Lordship was impressed with a conviction that neither in his own army nor in England would it be found practicable to realize it in a satisfactory manner.

Marshal St. Arnaud expressed his willingness to acknowledge either a French or an English General at the head of the army at Kars. He mentioned General Youssouf; he mentioned also General Canuon; and he declared that he had no objection to the appointment of General Klapka.

In this manner the name of General Klapka was again brought under consideration, and I must confess that, without presuming to form any military opinion, I saw enough to satisfy me that on the whole the Turkish Ministers would put the best chances on their side if they resolved to select him for the command in question.

In the meantime General Klapka had embarked for Malta, and it required an early decision in order to overtake him there. I pointed this out to Reshid Pasha, who professed himself well disposed to the appointment. It was to be remarked that the Internuncio had never objected to the selection of emigrants for command out of Europe; that the elements of discord at Kars were likely to cease on the recall of those officers who, on sundry accounts, were summoned to Constantinople; and that, as to the supposed feelings of the army, and the General's ignorance of Turkish, the necessities of the case might well be made to ride over such objections.

Last night the Ministers had a meeting, at which this question was discussed. M. Pisani reported to me this morning, on Reshid Pasha's authority, that the Grand Vizier alone made difficulties; that he wanted to make General Klapka the second in command; that he stated Ismail Pasha to have been already named by the Porte; and that he thought the chief command would be better in his hands.

Having received in the interval from Lord Raglan a confirmation of what I have before stated as to his inclination, and that of Marshal St. Arnaud's, in favour of General Klapka, I sent a message direct to the Grand Vizier, repeating my proposal in the form of a recommendation, and reminding him that the rejection of General Klapka, under present circumstances, would be without remedy for the present as far as he was concerned; and that his Highness, if he persisted in his objections, would necessarily remain under a heavy personal responsibility.

The appeal was not successful; and it appears that Ismail Pasha is to take the command of Kars, and to act entirely on the defensive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 153.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 21, 1854.

COUNT BUOL announces to me that orders have been sent by telegraph to General Hess, not to interfere with the movements of Omer Pasha, if he should decide to move his army upon Ibrail and Galatz. The right to an Austrian garrison in those places will, however, be preserved.

No. 154.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September* 17, 1854.

COUNT ESTERHAZY, the Austrian Special Envoy at this Court, had an interview with Baron Manteuffel last evening. He first expressed the surprise and pain with which his Government had received communication of the Russian circular of the 3rd instant. He stated that the circular was in direct contradiction to the assurances he had given him, and which he had also learnt he had given to M. de Moustier and myself. Baron Manteuffel endeavoured to refute this assertion, by denying that the circular contained any refusal on the part of Prussia to adhere to their conditions; but Count Esterhazy refuted the truth of this statement by immediately producing the circular, and reading the paragraph proving the assertion. Baron Manteuffel remarked to him that he was aware that he had held conferences with M. de Moustier and myself; to which Count Esterhazy replied that we certainly saw each other every day. Count Esterhazy then stated at some length the objects which the Austrian Government had in view in submitting the late proposals to the Diet; assuring him that Austria had no desire to impose immediate sacrifices on the German States; but that as an attack on Austria, on the part of Russia, could be scarcely doubted (était presqu'indubitable), it was of the highest importance that Germany should be prepared for such an eventuality by the adoption of an united policy. He was therefore charged to invite the Prussian Government formally to support the proposal which would be submitted to the Diet, of an unreserved adhesion to the four conditions. Count Esterhazy, on learning that Baron Manteuffel would see the King to-morrow, observed to his Excellency that he would detain his courier for Vienna until to-morrow night. Baron Manteuffel replied that he should not be enabled to receive him till late in the evening; when Count Esterhazy stated that he should then detain the courier till the following evening, and requested his Excellency to inform him in writing of the reply of the Prussian Government to this invitation. I am informed that in this interview a question was addressed to Count Esterhazy by Baron Manteuffel, which tends to prove what has been hitherto a surmise, and has been only indirectly alluded to in the public press. Your Lordship may have been informed that one of the great wishes of the King of Prussia has been to act as mediator between Russia and Austria. To this intent it is stated that His Majesty wrote secretly to the Emperor of Russia, saying that if he would promise not to attack Austria, His Majesty would also exert his influence to prevent the Emperor of Austria from drawing the sword against him.

Baron Manteuffel (when Count Esterhazy referred to the possibility of an attack on Austria by Russia) asked, "Had not the Austrian Government received a promise from the Emperor of Russia that he would not attack Austria?" Count Esterhazy indignantly replied, "that if such had been given, they would have immediately conveyed it to the knowledge of the English and French Governments, and to that of Prussia; for had they not done so, it would have been an act of bad faith of which Austria was not capable."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 155.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)

Berlin, September 17, 1854.

My Lord,

AS I am uncertain whether Count Bernstorff will have left in your Lordship's hands a copy of the communication which he has been instructed to make with respect to the declaration of adhesion by the Prussian Government to the four points lately supported at St. Petersburgh, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Counts Bernstorff and Hatzfeldt on this subject, which has been confidentially communicated to me.

It will readily appear to your Lordship from this document that the first and chief desire of the King of Prussia is to reenter on his own terms the European concert from which he had himself withdrawn, and that his present object is to do so without incurring any fresh obligations. It appears to me that the declaration which the Prussian Government should in fair reason be called upon to give, ought to be an unconditional and binding engagement to the four conditions, in the same manner as Austria has done; the declaration, accompanied with the reserves which she now proposes, appears to me of little value, and to offer no guarantee to the Western Powers that she will steadily and cordially support the policy to which she affects to give her approbation. No important result will be gained by such a declaration as she now proposes to give, except to herself, as she hopes thereby to reinstate herself in the European position which she had abdicated by her own vacillation and weakness. In all their arguments and public documents, the Prussian Government have invariably treated this question as if it alone affected German and Prussian interests, and not as one in which the balance of power and the safety of Europe are vitally concerned. If, therefore, Prussia desires to resume her place among the great European Powers, she must indubitably subscribe unconditionally and without reserve to those terms to which they are bound, or she must be content to confine her political action and influence in Europe to that of a merely German Power.

It is but too evident that great mortification is felt here, at the cessation of confidential communication with the English and French Governments, and the dread of isolation has worked, and is continuing to work, beneficially on the Royal mind.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 155.

Baron Manteuffel to Counts Bernstorff and Hatzfeldt.

(Confidentielle.)

Berlin, ce 5 Septembre, 1854.

M. le Comte,

LA dépêche du Comte de Nesselrode au Prince de Gortchakoff en date du $\frac{24}{12}$ Août, que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence, nous a été communiquée par l'Envoyé de Russie, comme annexe d'une autre dépêche du même jour adressée au Baron de Budberg et également ci-jointe en copie.

Nous avons eu lieu d'être étonnés de l'espèce de solidarité qu'on nous y octroie par rapport aux déclarations antérieures du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et que j'ai cru devoir décliner par la dépêche ci-jointe en copie adressé au Baron de Werther.

Les deux annexes ne sont principalement destinées qu'à l'information personnelle de votre Excellence; mais je dois lui abandonner d'en faire mention dans ses conversations avec Lord Clarendon. Le Ministre pourra se convaincre par la manière dont je me suis prononcé envers le Baron de Werther au sujet des quatre points, que sans les considérer comme base exclusive de toute négociation,

et sans, par conséquent, entendre contracter sous ce rapport des obligations nouvelles, le Roi notre auguste Maître est pourtant d'avis qu'ils sont de nature à former le noyau d'un arrangement futur, et qu'à ce point de vue Sa Majesté est et sera toujours prête à leur accorder son appui moral et à manifester par là le prix qu'elle attache à prouver et à maintenir, dans les limites tracées par les intérêts de la Prusse, son concours aux efforts communs des Puissances dirigés vers le but d'une pacification prompte mais durable.

J'ai été plus d'une fois, M. le Comte, dans le cas de vous dire que ce n'est pas le Cabinet du Roi qui s'oppose à ce que les quatre Représentants à Vienne se réunissent de nouveau, et si je crois devoir vous le rappeler encore aujourd'hui, c'est pour ajouter que pour peu que les autres Puissances désirent une réunion de la Conférence, le Roi n'hésiterait pas à déposer dans ses Protocoles une déclaration dans le sens sus-indiqué, qui tout en assurant aux quatres points l'appui moral et les bons offices de la Prusse, met pourtant hors de doute qu'elle ne reconnait aucune obligation contractuelle à les faire valoir par une coopération militaire contre la Russie. Votre Excellence voudra bien nous informer de l'usage qu'elle aura jugé convenable de faire de ces observations et de l'accueil qu'elles auront trouvé.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 156.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 556.)

Foreign Office, September 22, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 478 of the 31st ultimo, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the steps taken by you in consequence of the communication made to your Excellency from the Naïb of Schamyl, and Her Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction the course which the Porte is disposed to pursue, which should be made known as widely as possible in Circassia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 157.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 559.)

Foreign Office, September 22, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 485 of the 5th instant, in which you report the steps taken by you with reference to the person to be appointed to the chief command of the Turkish army at Kars.

Notwithstanding the remonstrance of Her Majesty's Government conveyed through your Excellency, and notwithstanding the recent defeats and losses which ought never to have occurred, the Turkish Government still seems animated by the same spirit, and determined that the army in Asia shall bring disgrace on the Sultan's cause, and continue to be an embarrassment to the allies of His Majesty. A foreign General of distinction, and said to possess great military talent, is on the spot, and willing to take the command at Kars. His appointment is advised by the Commander-in-chief of the allied armies, it is specially recommended by the British Ambassador, and agreed to by the whole of the Ministers with the exception of the Grand Vizier, and against all this weight of authority his decision is allowed to prevail.

Her Majesty's Government must again protest against this reckless disregard of the Sultan's interests, and they have a right to complain of the total disregard of their advice with respect to a fit commander in that portion of the Sultan's territory which must become the theatre of important operations.

Her Majesty's Government trust that Ismail Pasha, the newly appointed

General, may, unlike his predecessor, have been selected on account of his capacity, and they request that he may receive instructions to defer to the advice of Colonel Williams, who is thoroughly acquainted with the people and the country, and who ought to have a high Turkish rank given to him in order to insure respect for his authority.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to Reshid Pasha.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 158.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 1,145.)
My Lord, *Paris, September 21, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this morning a despatch which he was about to address to M. de Bourqueney respecting the conduct of Austria in the Principalities, recapitulating the various facts which had occurred in contradiction to the assurances given by the Austrian Government, not only to the Porte, but to the British and French Governments. M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarks that he is not surprised at the suspicion which this conduct has excited at Constantinople; and, he adds, the French Government have also need of some explanation to satisfy them. He desires M. de Bourqueney to ask for these explanations immediately. Speaking of the apprehensions of Austria of the revolutionary tendencies in the Principalities, M. Drouyn de Lhuys expresses a doubt whether the Austrian Government does not confound terms, and consider all those who do not pay court to her to be revolutionary. His Excellency declares, at the same time, that all real anarchical proceedings ought to be repressed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 159.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 1,154.)
My Lord, *Paris, September 22, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me two telegraphic despatches which he had addressed this morning to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople and to the French Agent at Bucharest; the former urging the Porte to send orders to threaten and harass the Russian troops in Bessarabia, the latter giving a message from the Emperor to Omer Pasha to the same effect. Both despatches state, that the French Government has an assurance from Austria that the Turkish troops shall not be molested in so doing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 160.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 351.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 20, 1854.*

THE Turkish Ambassador, who has been charged with the communication of the letter addressed by Dervish Pasha, in accordance with an Imperial Iradé, to Prince Stirbey, inviting him to return to Bucharest provisionally, to await

there the ulterior decision of the Sultan respecting the re-establishment of the Government of the Principalities, has communicated to me this document, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 160.

Dervish Pasha to Prince Stirbey.

Altesse! *Bucarest, le 20 Zilhidjé, 1270.*

LE fait de l'invasion de l'armée Russe ayant dérangé le réglement établi dans les deux Principautés selon les priviléges accordés par la Sublime Porte, ces pays se trouvent actuellement, malgré qu'ils ont été évacués par la dite armée, dans un état irrégulier.

Or, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, animé de ses sentiments bien connues de justice, d'équité et de sollicitude pour tous ses sujets et vassaux, étant pénétré du désir de rétablir l'ordre dans ce pays et d'y ramener un état de tranquillité et de prospérité pour les habitants, il a été jugé nécessaire, pour atteindre ce but, d'y rétablir préalablement et tout de suite, l'ancien régime; et cette mesure devant se compléter par le retour des Princes et la reprise de leur séjour dans leurs résidences, un Iradé Impérial m'autorise à inviter spécialement votre Altesse à revenir dans sa résidence et à y attendre la décision ultérieure de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Je prie donc votre Altesse de vouloir bien, dès qu'elle aura pris connaissance de l'ordre de mon auguste Souverain, hâter son départ de Vienne pour se rendre à sa résidence de Bucarest.

(Signé) DERVISH MEHEMED,
Commissaire de la Sublime Porte.

No. 161.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 354. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 20, 1854.*

THE messenger who was announced as charged with despatches which would be transmitted to me in the course of last week has not yet arrived. Count Buol stated to me that he had received despatches from Count Colloredo, which spoke of the early arrival in Vienna of this messenger, who would be the bearer of your Lordship's reply to the documents he had been directed to submit to you.

I told Count Buol that although I had no official instructions to communicate with him, I had privately been made aware that your Lordship was dissatisfied with the communications of Count Colloredo.

His Excellency replied that he thought the attitude of his Government had been too severely criticised both in London and Paris, but he should answer with perfect calmness any strictures which might be passed upon his policy, and await the time when it should meet with better appreciation. He said that he would not for the present enter into further explanations with me, but should postpone so doing until I received your Lordship's official instructions. In the meanwhile he hoped that any dissension that might arise, if it was not intended to lead to serious estrangement, might be kept altogether from the public, because nothing would give greater satisfaction to Prussia than to learn that there was disagreement between his Government and those of England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 162.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 356.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September 20, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of the telegraphic despatch which I addressed to your Lordship this afternoon, the substance of which had been communicated to me by Count Buol, and this evening I have transmitted another telegraphic despatch which has been addressed to me by Mr. Colquhoun from Bucharest.

Both these documents concur in announcing the important intelligence of the landing of the troops forming the expedition to the Crimea at the port of Eupatoria.

Although there are some variations in these accounts of the landing which has taken place, yet they both concur in reporting the safe disembarkation of a considerable portion, if not of the whole, of the expedition without opposition, and I therefore congratulate your Lordship upon the successful commencement of this most important operation.

At the moment Baron Bourqueney and myself received the first intelligence of this event from Count Buol, who offered us upon it his most sincere congratulations, we were taking leave of him after a prolonged audience, in which Baron Bourqueney had brought before him the substance of a telegraphic despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which animadverted upon the policy of the Austrian Government, by which the Turkish army was prevented from moving against the Russian forces in the direction of Ibraila and Galatz, and I had read to him your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 18th instant, by which I was directed to give my utmost support to the instruction sent to M. de Bourqueney.

Count Buol stated, in reply to the observations which with considerable vehemence were addressed to him by Baron Bourqueney and myself, in support of the representations in these despatches, that he was totally unacquainted with any proposal made by the Turkish Commander, Omer Pasha, to attack the Russian forces upon their retreat from Moldavia, and if any such plan had been proposed and had been objected to by the officers in command of the Imperial troops at present in Wallachia, he should have expected to have received a remonstrance either from the Turkish Ambassador or from Omer Pasha, but that no such representation had been made to him, nor had he received notice of any proposal of such a nature having been made to the Austrian military Commanders. He was aware, by a telegraphic despatch of the 19th instant from Bucharest, that the Turkish troops which had been in occupation of that city, had concentrated themselves upon the Danube, and that Omer Pasha had moved his head-quarters to Rustchuk, and he believed this movement to have taken place in pursuance of the representations of General Coronini, which had been founded solely upon the military considerations which presented themselves against a joint occupation of the Principalities, in which (by Article III of the Convention with the Porte) the Emperor of Austria had "undertaken to re-establish by common agreement with the Ottoman Government the legal state of things such as it results from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte in regard to the administration of these countries."

To the strong objections which M. de Bourqueney and myself raised to these representations, if they really expressed the cause of the movements which had taken place, and to our appeal to Count Buol not to allow any interference on the part of the Austrian military authorities to expose our armies, engaged in the expedition to the Crimea, to the attack of the Russian army now assembled upon the Pruth, but, on the contrary, to urge them to employ every means, military or other, to prevent an operation so menacing to the success of the important expedition in which our forces were engaged; Count Buol answered that he pledged himself to bring our strong representations before the Emperor, who was to arrive in Vienna this evening, and to report to us the result.

Under these circumstances our conference was broken up.

I must claim your Lordship's indulgence for the very imperfect account which I have given of the long discussion which took place upon this occasion,

but the late hour at which it terminated, and the necessary dispatch of the messenger, rendered it impossible to enter into greater detail. I must, therefore, reserve any further report which I may feel called upon to make, until I communicate the answer which Count Buol has engaged to submit to us after he has received the decision of the Emperor. I can only assure your Lordship that no pains were wanting on the part of Baron Bourqueney and myself to carry out to the utmost of our power the instructions we had received from our respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 162.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 20, 1854.*

THE Internuncio announces from Constantinople, of the 16th, the intelligence that the allied forces, 25,000 French, 25,000 English, and 8,000 Turks, landed on the 14th at Eupatoria, without meeting with any resistance, and had commenced marching on Sebastopol. Some of the transports returned immediately to Varna to fetch the reserve which had remained there.

Baron Bourqueney and myself were on the point of leaving Count Buol (before whom we had together placed the question relative to the strategical movements of the Turks in the Principalities, which he will refer to the Emperor, who is expected this evening) when the above despatch arrived, and Count Buol, in reading it to us, expressed his most hearty satisfaction at the intelligence it contained.

No. 163.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 87.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 22, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 49, instructing me to act in concert with M. de Moustier, in support of certain instructions which he should receive from M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the policy it was desirous for Prussia to pursue at the present moment, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Moustier lately, in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, casually alluded to the idea of a Convention, but that his Excellency in no way responded to the idea. In the present state of political affairs here, I conceive that there is no possible likelihood of His Prussian Majesty being induced to take any such proposal into consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 164.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 91.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 22, 1854.*

ON waiting upon Baron Manteuffel this evening, I found his Excellency silent and reserved. He informed me that he had received despatches from Count Bernstorff; but as he seemed disinclined to refer to their contents, I thought it most prudent not to press him. They had evidently produced an unfavourable impression, if I may judge from the extreme coldness of manner and reserve which his Excellency evinced.

I first inquired from his Excellency (on the grounds that my interpellation referred to a great European, and not a purely German question) whether the Prussian Government had come to any agreement with Austria with respect to the propositions which Baron Prokesch had lately submitted to the Diet. His Excellency informed me, in few words, that they had not yet agreed upon the course to be pursued, but that he hoped an understanding would be come to.

I further inquired whether the seven questions which Baron Prokesch had laid before the Diet were still to be considered as awaiting solution. His Excellency replied that he was not aware that Austria had withdrawn them.

I then expressed to his Excellency my regrets that the relations between England and Prussia had ceased to be of that cordial and friendly nature which had hitherto existed. I endeavoured to explain to his Excellency that we were engaged in a formidable struggle, and were interested to know upon whom we could reckon as our allies; that all we had hitherto asked from Prussia was her moral support—that support which would have circumscribed and shortened the war; that the war on our part was not one of conquest, for we had formally bound ourselves to derive no exclusive advantage from it; and I expressed my surprise and regret that Prussia should not have cordially united with us in support of those principles of which she had acknowledged the justice.

His Excellency regretted likewise that the relations between the two countries should not be of a more cordial nature; adding, that without inculpating either party, "they must be content to bear with it" (qu'il faliait le subir). He stated that they had to consider their own interests, and that no State could be blamed for doing so. I replied to his Excellency that this principle might be applicable to smaller States, but it was not a statesmanlike principle for a great European Power, for that the duty of the great Powers was to watch over the public law of Europe, to defend the weak against the strong, and to maintain the balance of power; and that it was a dereliction of duty if they held back from incurring sacrifices which their position rendered imperative.

His Excellency expressed himself as perfectly informed of the feeling which existed in England against the Prussian Government; and remarked to me that had he not used his influence, affairs here would have gone to greater lengths. I replied to him that I was quite aware of the difficulties he had to encounter, and of the opposition to us on the part of the Court party; and I further remarked to his Excellency that it was impossible for us to have any confidence in the Prussian Government as long as His Majesty was surrounded and counselled by persons who were openly and undisguisedly hostile to England.

I have thus given your Lordship the general tenour of our conversation, which was carried on without any anger or bitterness, but rather in a tone of mutual regret that a better unanimity did not exist between the two countries.

On taking leave of his Excellency, I assured him that I should gladly hail any event which might produce a salutary change in the policy of Prussia, and restore the cordial relations and good feelings which till now had ever existed between the two Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 165.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 22, 1854.*

IT has been only at a late hour this evening that I have received from a confidential source the inclosed copy, in original, of a circular addressed by the Austrian Government, on the 14th instant, to their Representatives at the German Courts; but as I conceive that this document at the present moment will be of considerable interest to your Lordship, I hasten to forward it by this messenger, without having had the time to peruse it with attention.

This circular is represented to be an answer of the Austrian Government to the Prussian circular of the 3rd. Its principal object is to prove to Germany

that her occupation of the Principalities is to defend the German interests, and therefore to validate her claims on Germany for support in the event of her being attacked by Russia.

I am likewise informed that another circular was addressed yesterday (the 21st) by the Prussian Government to their Representatives at the German Courts, with a covering despatch; the former confirming the views and opinions expressed in their circular of the 3rd; the latter indicating that answers have been received from the greater part of the German States, approving and adhering to the policy and views of Prussia. I hope to obtain a copy of this circular, and shall not fail to forward it to your Lordship in translation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 165.

Circular addressed to the Austrian Ministers accredited to the Governments of Germany, with the exception of the one at the Court of the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg.

(Translation.) *Vienna, September 14, 1854.*

AT the time when the Courts of Austria and Prussia jointly communicated to the German Federal Assembly, in the session of the 17th of August, the negotiations upon the Eastern question, important overtures had been sent to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, on the part of the German Powers, in the view of a peaceful understanding, whilst the Envoy of the Emperor of Russia made a preliminary announcement to us of the intention of Russia to withdraw her troops from the Danubian Principalities.

Since that time the declaration of the Court of Russia upon our propositions of peace have reached us through the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, which is sent herewith. It is decidedly a rejection, but it confirms the fact of the evacuation of the Principalities. I also inclose the despatch to our Minister at St. Petersburgh, in which we reply to that declaration, together with a second despatch, intended merely as an instruction for guiding Prince Esterhazy in his communications, the object of which is to show in its true light our share in the last negotiations, in correction of the very erroneous ideas of the Russian Cabinet thereupon.

Previously to communicating to our German confederates our ideas of the present state of affairs, we wish to understand how this state is looked upon at the Court of Prussia, and as soon as we are made aware of the views of that Court, we shall make it our duty to disclose fully to the Federal Governments the opinions which we have formed to ourselves, in order thereby to induce them at the same time to give a further consideration as to the resolutions which they may think the German Confederation is called upon to frame under present circumstances.

His Majesty the Emperor and his Court most deeply regret that the Court of Russia has not felt itself in a position to enter upon negotiations for peace on the bases which he, in union with the Courts of France and England, have admitted as being the necessary conditions of any resumption of pacific relations between Russia and the Porte, for the acceptance of which His Majesty the King of Prussia also has interested himself. The Imperial Government, on its part, cannot recede from those conditions, to which alone can now be attached any hopes of peace, and of security for the future; and it wishes that the period may not be distant when Russia also will no longer refuse to join in the now rejected negotiations upon these points.

On the other hand, His Majesty the Emperor cannot but admit the political importance which is undeniably to be attached to the declaration of Russia, inasmuch as it has removed the immediate danger of a conflict between the two Empires. The withdrawal of Russia from the Principalities had previously been announced to us merely as an exclusively military measure, which carried with it by no means the character of a political concession. The Court of St. Petersburgh repeats now, it is true, that the gathering together of its forces to its own territory comes exclusively under the point of view of a strategic necessity; but

yet, at the same time, it represents this withdrawal as a great sacrifice made to the interests of Austria and Prussia, and it expressly adds, which is true, that Russia, not gratuitously intending to increase the complication of affairs, but resolved to defend her territories against every aggression, from whatever quarter it may come, will remain within her frontier in a defensive attitude, until fair propositions shall allow her to manifest her desire of peace. By this a political situation is no doubt indicated, and not a military one only. Russia has declared that her intention is for the moment not only to abstain from all attacks upon Austria, whether on the territory of the Empire or in the Principalities, but also not to cross again the Turkish border, intent only on the defence of her own country.

By this time the evacuation of the Principalities is probably fully completed, and this is in the first place an important result, brought about by a cooperation of causes, among which we may consider our continued forbearance of active steps as one of the most decided. The occupation of the Principalities by Russia has been declared by the German Courts to be incompatible with the interests of Austria and Germany; it appeared not less so to the belligerent Powers, as well as the origin of the war, and as the first obstacle to every pacific arrangement, which was, under all circumstances, necessarily to be removed. Russia has now withdrawn the fatal step, and the importance of this fact is already felt in its immediate and nearest consequence, the limitation of the scene of land-operations to a scale quite within the hopes of peace. We shall certainly not omit anything which may conduce to render this now accomplished fact productive of all results favourable to the objects of reconciliation.

But, on the other hand, we cannot delude ourselves as to the fact that the declaration of the Russian Cabinet carries with it nothing definitive; that nothing assures to it a value extending beyond the circumstances of the moment. Even when Russia was in occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and still, when the Porte had already declared war, she announced the intention to remain in a defensive position and not to cross the Danube. Circumstances soon changed this resolution. Russia has not hitherto given up any of her claims; she has offered no securities for the maintenance of the interests of Europe and Germany. Should things turn out in her favour, she may even seize upon that guarantee which, yielding to necessity, she has now resigned. In looking to this, we are constantly thrown back upon our own energies to fulfil the duties we owe to the Powers who have joined us for a common object, and to ourselves also. We have incurred no obligation to hasten a final decision by an actual advance against Russia, but we must remain strongly prepared and perfectly free in our resolves, in order to be assured that our important interests may be properly attended to under every change of circumstances, and that afterwards, in the negotiations upon the restoration of peace, our efforts to bring back a secured condition of law and peace may be successful.

But if Austria, for the defence of those interests which Germany shares with her, finds reason to persevere in the armed attitude which she has assumed; if, for the attainment of a truly German object, she wishes to act in union with Germany, she may fairly claim to receive an ample and powerful support from the confederate Governments. What the state of Germany [may require?], if a condition of complications which we do not anticipate, and shall try to prevent so far as in our power, should compel us to assume a coercive position, is a question not now before us, and the special Conventions yet concluded would not certainly extend to such a case. But that Russia, so long as we do not attack her, could not make our occupation of the Principalities a ground of attack upon us, without finding all Germany united with us, this is what, in the state of uncertainty which still subsists, we must wish to see placed beyond a doubt, and made a matter of obligation. We might dwell upon the question, what force of obligation would in such case still remain in the Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th April? It appears to us, that in this Article, according both to letter and spirit, the alternative is simply that either the amplest securities must be given that the war will not be extended nor the Principalities occupied, or else that our occupation of these countries is placed under the guardianship of mutual obligation (solidarität) founded upon the confederation. But we believe that we need not go upon this point, because we are satisfied that every fresh investigation into the matter, on the basis of the

provisions of the principal Treaty, must lead to the same result. We maintain the rights of Europe by advancing to the Principalities, and therefore, in principle, we may not, by our occupation, exclude others who are entitled [to the same]. But while we protect the integrity of the Turkish Empire, in connection with the Sultan and his allies, against every new attack on the Principalities, we gain at the same time hereby, and hereby only, a weighty security for the preservation of the interests of Austria and Germany, as well in the course of events as in the future arrangements. The Confederation certainly cannot but approve of our proceeding in this matter, even if already this were not really shown with sufficient clearness by the Conventions and declarations hitherto made.

The King of Prussia has also promised to the Emperor, as a member of the Confederation, the powerful aid of Prussia in case any attack be made upon us, and has secured it to us by a binding obligation. In the supposition that Austria should not take a share in the offensive war against Russia, for instance should not pass the Russian frontier, Prussia would see, in an attack by Russia upon the territory of Austria, a danger to her own interests and to those of Germany, and would support Austria with all the means at her disposal. Prussia has, in this matter, expressed to us her conviction that the other Princes of Germany also would not, in such case, shrink from any sacrifice to avert from the closely-connected Austria the dangers which menace her, and therewith from Germany also. We cherish the same conviction, and we hope that this confidence will be responded to by the resolutions now about to be passed at Frankfort. If the German Confederation, by its declaration, gives us a pledge of its support, then, and then only, could we, as a German Federal Power and as a Contracting Party to the Alliance of the 20th April, even without any equivalent military dispositions on the part of the Confederation, feel ourselves in tranquillity at least for the future, although we should then have to bear exclusively those sacrifices and those efforts without which, in the present state of the world, Germany could not be secure.

Proceeding from these considerations, we have proposed to the Cabinet of Berlin to lay before the Federal Assembly, through a Representative of both, the despatch from Prince Gortchakoff; with a joint declaration, that although now, after the evacuation of the Principalities, the state of affairs does not imply the necessity of an immediate exhibition of the defensive power of the Confederation, yet that it affords an opportunity of declaring, that any apprehension of an attack by Russia upon the territory of Austria, would call forth in a common bond of defence all the Governments who shared in the alliance of the 20th April.

Further, we would hesitate to bring to discussion before the Confederation the difference in the attitude of Austria and Prussia in regard to the bases laid down for the future peace, and for a definite proposition for adopting the four points in the whole extent of the obligation incumbent upon us; it certainly seemed to us very desirable that Prussia, whose position in regard to Europe has hitherto always rested on the same foundation with ours, would also in the question of guarantees place herself on exactly the same line with us, and that the same course should be pursued by the whole of the Confederation. In the meantime Prussia has on her part warmly recommended in St. Petersburgh the acceptance of the four points which have been derived by the three other Powers from the principles of the Vienna Protocols; and it is satisfactory to us to have learned from the very last communications of the Cabinet of Berlin, that His Majesty the King, without contracting a binding obligation to military cooperation against Russia—an obligation which does not exist even for Austria—will further grant at all events his full moral support to the four points, and that he has made the like declaration to the other sharers in the Vienna Conference also. We may therefore, in furtherance of the work of peace, reckon upon the adoption by Prussia also of the same bases as those which we have agreed to, and in this respect also we look for counsel, with just confidence, to the circle of our confederates.

As we have the full conviction of having wrought for the interests of Germany, together with our own, by our influence in determining the points which we, with France and England, have set forth as the condition of peace—as these points especially tend to the furtherance of German interests in one part, and are nowhere in opposition to them, we must consider them to be of

great value; we even think it due to the dignity of the country that it should not only express the fullest acknowledgment of our proceedings, but also that it should aid our efforts to restore peace upon those bases by the weight of its suffrages, and in a suitable case by its action.

The required guarantees afford on one hand the necessary scope for future negotiations, and on the other hand they express with all precision what is required for Germany especially. If the Confederation, however, wishes, with a full approval of the four points, to make a distinction between the general interests of Europe and the particular interests of Germany, pronouncing especially in favour of those conditions which regard these last interests, that is to say, the discontinuance of the Protectorate hitherto subsisting in the Danubian territories, and the freedom of the trade of the Danube, we should make no essential objection to such a treatment of this matter.

You are solicited to communicate this despatch, with its annexes, to the Government to which you have the honour of being accredited. The present moment will certainly appear highly critical in the eye of all the German Governments, and they will be very desirous to contribute by their suffrages to strengthen the attitude of the Confederation, as towards other countries, through the measures which they adopt, and thereby to increase the friendly feelings of confidence between its members as such. It will give us the greatest satisfaction if you are able speedily to report to us that the overtures with which you are entrusted have been favourably received by

Receive, &c.

No. 166.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 93. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 22, 1854.*

I AM privately informed that Baron Manteuffel has submitted to the King's approval the answer which is to be given to the invitations lately addressed to this Government by Count Esterhazy, as reported in my despatch No. 82. It is drawn up in the most courteous and friendly terms, but the Prussian Government declines to accede to the proposals submitted by the Austrian Minister.

I cannot very correctly state to your Lordship what are the exact proposals which have been made by Count Esterhazy, but the substance of them is, I am informed, an invitation to Prussia to pursue an identic policy with Austria on the Eastern question, and to support the adhesion to the four conditions of peace to be submitted to the Diet.

It is evident that, if Prussia continues to refuse her assent to these propositions, and if Austria is unwilling to recede, a trial of strength will take place at the Diet; and it is generally believed that Prussia will command the majority. I am not, however, inclined to think that matters will be brought to this issue. The difficult question will be to find some form of agreement by which the Austrian policy will be confirmed by the Diet, without Germany and the Minor States being bound by any obligations of a military nature.

The position of Prussia, as far as I can learn, is as follows:—She recognises the validity of the Convention of the 20th of April, in as far as the mutual guarantees of the respective States are concerned. But she considers the cases laid down as obliging her to render military assistance to Austria as abrogated by the evacuation of the Principalities. She will now take no new obligations of any sort. If Austria should assume the offensive against Russia, she will do so at her own risk. If Austria, however, should be attacked by Russia in the Principalities, Prussia will come to her assistance; but she will do so voluntarily, spontaneously, and will make her co-operation the subject of future arrangements to be then settled between them.

The present crisis, therefore, is one between Austria and Prussia. It is a trial of strength in Germany for German influence. It is a reaction to the Treaty of the 20th of April between the two States, which was so discordant to

the feelings of many of the Prussian statesmen, and Prussia feels herself now relieved from a position which placed her in an inferior line to Austria.

But it may be regarded as certain, that if in this instance the Southern States of Germany accede to the Prussian rather than to the Austrian policy, it is solely for the purpose of preventing any aggressive action, present or future, of Germany against Russia. They will never desert Austria; nor would they do so in the present instance, were they not actuated by interested and selfish motives; and I firmly believe, that if Austria had the courage to pursue her own policy, she would soon rally Germany to her standard.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 167.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, September 22, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a French translation of the circular addressed by the Cabinet of Berlin to the Prussian Agents at the several German Courts, enunciating the views of that Government on the questions pending in the Diet in relation to Eastern affairs, and principally as to the four points recently rejected at St. Petersburgh.

The Cabinet of Berlin also pronounces a positive opinion, that the objects sought to be provided for by the Additional Article to the Berlin Treaty of April, are altogether attained by the Russian evacuation of the Principalities, and that further negotiations ought to be entered into, if the question of German interests requiring further protection is to be entertained.

The note recommends the members of the Confederation not to adopt the four points, and indicates wherein the Prussian Government considers embarrassments might arise to Germany from their adoption.

M. de Manteuffel further makes a strong profession in the King's name of entire confidence that Austria, assured against all attacks from Russia, will abstain on her part from any measure of aggression, and a conviction that this is the course best suited to German interests.

In this sense the Representative of Prussia will be instructed to act in the Diet, and to use his influence to make similar opinions prevail.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 167.

Circular addressed to the Prussian Representatives at the German Courts.

PEU avant l'ajournement pour quelques semaines des séances de la Diète, l'affaire d'Orient a été mise sur le tapis dans les Commissions respectives; mais une résolution n'a pas été prise, les Envoyés n'étant pas munis d'instructions suffisantes. Comme il faut s'attendre par conséquent à ce que, après la reouverture des séances de la Diète, les Commissions réunis s'occuperont de nouveau de cette affaire importante, Sa Majesté le Roi, notre auguste Maître, a cru de son devoir, commandé par les rapports intimes qui existent entre lui et ses confédérés Allemands, de communiquer aux Gouvernements de ces derniers, avec une entière sincérité, les vues qui seront pour lui le pivot de sa conduite dans cette affaire.

La réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg à la dépêche Autrichienne du 10 Août, soutenue et recommandée par celle de notre Cabinet du 13, est parvenue au Gouvernement depuis la dernière séance susmentionnée des Commissions de la Diète. Elle est contenue dans une dépêche du Comte de Nesselrode du $\frac{14}{26}$ du mois passé adressée au Prince Gortchakoff, et qui nous a été communiquée par une courte dépêche d'envoi, en réponse aux démarches que nous avons faites près le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Une copie de la dépêche précitée au Prince Gortchakoff est jointe à celle-ci, et j'invite votre Excellence à la communiquer confidentiellement au Gouvernement près lequel vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité.

Nous regrettons que Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas n'ait pas cru pouvoir accepter une base de négociations de paix qui, si elle l'avait été et avait en effet mis fin par là aux hostilités et préparé la paix, aurait répondu aux désirs et aux efforts de notre auguste Maître, et qui justement pour cela avait été recommandée par notre Souverain au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Cependant, en examinant la situation résultant de ce refus, et en prenant surtout en considération la déclaration qui se trouve à la fin de la dépêche Russe, et d'après laquelle les troupes Russes, rentrées sur le territoire de l'Empire, y garderont une position purement défensive, nous ne saurions méconnaître la haute importance qui doit lui être attribuée, tant pour l'appréciation militaire que pour l'appréciation politique de la situation, au point de vue des intérêts Allemands, lesquels doivent être maintenus par suite de notre alliance avec l'Autriche et les autres États Allemands.

Nous croyons que par une pareille déclaration si précise, la crainte d'une attaque Russe en général, et surtout contre l'Autriche, devra être entièrement écartée: l'importance de la retraite des troupes Russes ne peut pas être compromise, parce que la Russie allègue encore des motifs stratégiques pour justifier cette retraite. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a déjà fait abstraction dans sa déclaration du $\frac{17}{29}$ Juin, de la théorie des gages, en désignant l'occupation des Principautés exclusivement comme une position militaire. Elle évacue non seulement ces dernières maintenant, mais elle déclare encore qu'elle se tiendra exclusivement sur la défensive en dedans du territoire Russe. Si l'on voulait malgré cela regarder le danger d'une réoccupation possible des Principautés comme une question qui compromettrait les intérêts Allemands d'une manière durable et en déduire des obligations militaires, cette manière de voir conduirait au résultat paradoxal, savoir que pendant que toute l'Europe, les Puissances Occidentales y comprises, ne regardait pas encore en son temps l'occupation des Principautés par les troupes Russes comme *casus belli*, l'on trouverait maintenant un pareil cas dans le fait qu'elles y ont été.

En prenant pour point de vue ces considérations, Sa Majesté le Roi est convaincu que l'Article Additionnel du Traité d'Alliance qui a trait à des suppositions tout à fait précises et réelles doit être regardé comme accompli, et que la réponse à la question de savoir si la nécessité existe d'une autre protection d'intérêts Allemands effectivement compromis, conformément à l'Article II du Traité d'Alliance, suppose une entente préalable.

Si l'on applique cela aux quatre points bien connus, il s'agit de savoir s'ils répondent tellement aux intérêts Allemands qu'il soit avantageux pour les parties contractantes de se les approprier comme base exclusive de futures négociations. Si l'on avait supposé l'acceptation de cette base non seulement par la Russie, mais aussi par les Puissances Occidentales (ce que bien des symptômes font paraître plus que douteux), et si l'on y avait rattaché maintenant des négociations de paix et la suspension des hostilités, un tel résultat aurait été sans doute propre à faire disparaître l'incertitude qui règne encore au sujet de la signification pratique des quatre points pour les intérêts Allemands. Je m'abstiens de discuter les scrupules qui pourraient être élevés à cet égard. Je rappellerai seulement que les difficultés qui seraient jointes à un protectorat commun sur les Principautés et les Rayahs Chrétiens pourraient facilement prendre un caractère qui ne serait rien moins que favorable aux intérêts Allemands; j'ajouterai que, quoique nous aimions à voir dans l'entrée des troupes Autrichiennes dans les Principautés une garantie de ce que les intérêts Allemands y seront énergiquement sauvegardés, cependant l'entrée simultanée de troupes Turques, et peut-être d'autres troupes étrangères dans ces provinces, abstraction faite des complications militaires qui pourraient en résulter, ne peut être considérée comme une situation des choses favorables aux intérêts Allemands.

Maintenant que ces bases ont été repoussées par la Russie et qu'ainsi, même

si elles étaient considérées par les Puissances Occidentales comme obligatoires pour elles—ce qui n'est pas le cas—on ne pourrait y rattacher des négociations immédiates de paix, Sa Majesté le Roi, quelque vivement qu'il aurait désiré une négociation immédiate sur ces bases, motif pour lequel il a soutenu avec une satisfaction particulière la dépêche adressée à cet égard par le Cabinet de Vienne à St. Pétersbourg, ne saurait trouver compatible avec sa conviction de recommander à ses confédérés Allemands l'acceptation des quatre points, d'une manière qui pourrait et devrait entraîner pour eux des charges et des engagements lesquels ne paraissent point commandés par l'esprit et le but de l'alliance.

Plus Sa Majesté le Roi est résolu à persister dans l'exécution ferme et conséquente de l'alliance comme une garantie du développement indépendant de la puissance Allemande, plus aussi il croit devoir consciencieusement tenir éloignés de sa sphère des engagements qui ne découlent pas d'intérêts généraux Allemands clairement reconnus.

Sa Majesté espère être d'accord avec ses confédérés Allemands dans cette manière d'envisager les choses, et elle a surtout la ferme confiance que Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche non seulement l'appréciera de cœur et d'âme, mais la partagera aussi comme Prince Allemand. La sagesse, la modération et l'amour de la paix de Sa Majesté Impériale sont pour le Roi, notre auguste Maître, une nouvelle garantie de ce que l'Autriche, assurée par les déclarations de la Russie contre toute attaque de sa part, s'abstiendra de son côté aussi de toute mesure agressive contre elle, et évitera par là des complications dont la nécessité ne pourrait être déduite de la protection des intérêts Allemands, et auxquelles par conséquent l'Article II de l'Alliance ne saurait s'appliquer.

Notre Envoyé à la Diète Germanique sera invité à se prononcer, dans les Commissions comme dans la Diète elle-même, dans le sens de ces considérations, et à travailler à les faire valoir.

En portant cela à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité, tout en lui communiquant la présente dépêche, veuillez, Monsieur, exprimer la grande importance que nous mettons à être informés aussitôt que possible de ce que le Représentant de ce Gouvernement à la Diète a été également muni d'instructions découlant des mêmes principes.

Berlin, 3 *Septembre*, 1854.

(Signé) DE MANTEUFFEL.

No. 168.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 26.)

(No. 357.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September* 22, 1854.

I WAITED this day upon Count Buol to acknowledge the written communication I had received from him last night, and which I immediately transmitted to your Lordship by telegraph. Count Buol, in referring to that communication, assured me that his Government had till yesterday been in entire ignorance that any discussion, which had taken place between General Coronini and Omer Pasha, as to the distribution of the Austrian and Turkish troops in the Principalities, had referred to anything but the convenience and advantage of settling the different garrisons they were respectively to occupy; but from the moment that the Emperor had learnt, in consequence of the representations that M. de Bourqueney and I had made upon the subject, and which, according to his promise, Count Buol had brought before His Majesty, that Omer Pasha had contemplated, by a movement of his army upon Ibraila and Galatz, to make a demonstration against the Russian army in Bessarabia. His Majesty had immediately directed General Hess, by telegraph, not to interfere in any way with that movement, or with any operation Omer Pasha might contemplate, which had for its object to prevent the Russian Generals from detaching any part of their army, lately in occupation of the Principalities, to the prejudice of the allied armies at present acting in the Crimea.

Count Buol stated that he was very anxious that this intention of the Emperor should be most scrupulously carried out, and I consequently arranged with M. de Bourqueney that he (having a cypher to communicate with the French Consular Agent at Bucharest) should write instructions to that Agent to announce to Colonel Dieu, who was with Omer Pasha, the determination which had been taken by the Emperor, and the consequent order which had been sent to General Hess, and to desire him (Colonel Dieu) to press upon Omer Pasha the advantage of a forward movement on the part of his army, which might operate most favourably for our expedition in the Crimea.

I have the honour to inclose a translation of the despatch above referred to, which Baron Bourqueney has addressed to the French Consul at Bucharest, by which I trust that we shall avert any danger which might have threatened our armies in the Crimea by the detachment against them of any portion of the Russian troops now concentrated on the Pruth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 168.

Baron de Bourqueney to the French Consul at Bucharest.

(Translation.) *Vienna, September 22, 1854.*

ANNOUNCE to Colonel Dieu that I have received his letters of the 15th.

The Emperor sent yesterday a telegraphic order to General Hess to offer no obstacle to the movement of the Turkish army upon Ibraïla and Galatz, and only to reserve for himself eventually a right of garrison in these two places.

Colonel Dieu will have the goodness to inform Omer Pasha, without delay, of this decision, and to combine with the Turkish Commander-in-chief the movements which he shall judge the most adapted to attain the object we propose in the interest of our expedition to the Crimea.

The relations between Austria and Russia continually threatening a rupture, render it in fact little probable that the Russian army will dare to weaken itself in the face of the Austrian army; but a forward movement of the Turks would augment the measure of our security.

I beg Colonel Dieu to communicate this despatch to Marshal St. Arnaud.

Lord Westmorland, who is entirely a party to my proceedings, not having a cypher with Bucharest, desires that Mr. Colquhoun may be informed of my communication, and that he will act in concert with Colonel Dieu.

(Signed) BOURQUENEY.

No. 169.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 311.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO read to me, on the 22nd instant, a despatch from Count Buol similar in all respects to your Lordship's No. 348, with respect to the reasons which have induced the Austrian Government to decline the offensive and defensive Treaty which your Lordship and M. de Bourqueney were instructed to propose; and stating the grounds upon which his Excellency suggests that a Congress, where Prussia and the Porte should be invited to take part, should meet at Vienna, in order to discuss and define in separate Acts the questions referred to in the notes exchanged between Austria, England, and France, on the 8th of August.

I told Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government had proposed the Treaty as a necessary consequence of the notes, and in the firm expectation that if the bases of negotiation contained in these notes were rejected by Russia, Austria was determined to take active measures for securing an order of things which she herself considered indispensable for the future tranquillity of Europe. It was true that Austria did not say that at any particular moment, or for any special reason, she would declare war; but in expecting that she would do so, we were justified by the firm and decisive language of Count Buol respecting the policy of the Emperor of Russia; by the great military preparations made at such vast expense, and by the position which the Austrian army occupied on the Russian frontier; by the demand addressed to Prussia to adhere to the four bases, and the instructions to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh to decline all modification of them, and to require a categorical answer; and lastly, by the proposal for a combined military operation made by General Hess to the British, French, and Turkish Commanders-in-chief.

As, however, the peremptory rejection of the bases by Russia is not considered to be a *casus belli*, and as the Austrian Government sees no political or strategical motive for assuming an offensive attitude, and appears to think that advantages gained by war, and which can only be maintained by the continuance of war, are equivalent to conditions recognized by a Treaty of Peace, Her Majesty's Government can no longer attach the same importance to the Treaty proposed by England and France; and it only remains for them to accept the assurance given by Count Buol to your Lordship, that the Treaty would add nothing to the engagements which had already been taken by his Government with the allied Powers, to which, and particularly to those taken by the note of the 8th of August, he most steadfastly adhered, notwithstanding their rejection at St. Petersburgh.

With respect, however, to the Congress proposed by Count Buol in lieu of the Treaty, I told Count Colloredo that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the time for conferences and deliberations had long gone by, and that we must look alone to vigorous and determined action for the results which Austria, equally with England and France, was interested in obtaining; that the answer of the Emperor of Russia destroyed all prospect of a speedy termination of the war; and it was useless, therefore, to discuss the conditions of peace, which the events of war might materially alter, and to which, even if they were arranged by the Congress, Austria gave neither guarantee nor assurance of active support.

The proposed Congress, I added, would consist of three belligerent Powers, and of two non-belligerent, one of which was not prepared to make war, and the other had declared that it never would make war against Russia; and it was to be apprehended, therefore, that in debating the conditions of a distant peace grave differences of opinion might arise between Powers so differently situated.

It appeared, moreover, hopeless to expect that any discussions in which Prussia took part, could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion; as for months past she had rendered services far more important to Russia, than by openly taking part with her; for she had succeeded in paralyzing the action of Austria with the Western Powers, and in thwarting the policy of Austria in Germany. She had abdicated her position as an European Power, by restricting the great questions upon which the future destiny of Europe depends within the narrowest limits of German interests; and at the very moment when she was renewing in London and Paris her offer of moral support to the four bases, she was bitterly criticizing them in her circular to the German Courts.

When the position of the different Powers concerned shall be more clearly defined by the progress of the war, and when peace has become possible, a Congress will doubtless be necessary for the regulation of the various interests and questions that will then be pending; but at the present moment it could lead to no permanent settlement, while it might tend to disturb the good understanding with Austria, which it is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain and to improve.

And it is with that object, which cannot but be promoted by the frank interchange of opinions, that your Lordship is instructed to submit to the consideration of Count Buol the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the present position of affairs, with reference to the policy of Austria.

The Western Powers have agreed to four conditions, which Austria considers indispensable for a solid and durable peace. Russia, on the other hand, by the recent despatch of Count Nesselrode, shows that her pretensions are unchanged, and she evidently looks to,—Firstly. A restoration of her Protectorate of the Principalities. Secondly. The command of the navigation of the Danube. Thirdly. The monopoly of force in the Black Sea. Fourthly. The exclusive protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte professing the Greek religion.

These points are all inconsistent with the future peace of Europe and the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire; but upon none of these will the Emperor yield unless defeated, and it would seem therefore to be the obvious interest of Austria to disable him, and thereby put an end to the war. She has the means at her disposal; her magnificent army is more than sufficient for the purpose; and England and France, when, as it is to be hoped, the expedition to the Crimea has been crowned with success, are ready to cooperate with her for the common object. Austria can no longer hope to restore peace by negotiation; and her hesitation to make war may, in some measure, be caused by her apprehension of the neutrality, if not the hostility, of Prussia and of Germany.

But Prussia is bound to defend Austria if attacked, and would not venture to evade the obligation; and the smaller States of Germany, although now averse to engage themselves as parties to the war, would hasten to the support of Austria if she were in danger.

There are evils, however, to be incurred by prolonged inaction.

The inactivity of Austria, and her recent declaration that she has no cause of war with Russia, add to the number of troops with which England and France have to contend in the Crimea; and she is, therefore, passively favouring Russia.

Two of the conditions agreed to by the Western Powers, are more favourable to the interests of Austria than to those of England and France; but if Austria still stands aloof she must expect that England and France will insist upon arrangements more in accordance with their own interests and with the great sacrifices they have made, and will continue to make, in order to check the aggressive power of Russia, and to uphold the principles of international justice.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 170.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 312.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1854.*

I RECEIVED this morning your Lordship's despatch No. 357 of the 22nd instant, and I have to instruct your Lordship to state to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government have heard with great satisfaction that the Government of Austria had not authorized any opposition to be offered to the operations of Omer Pasha, but that on the contrary General Hess had been ordered not to interfere with any movement which the Pasha might undertake upon Ibraila and Galatz, or with any operation which he might contemplate for the purpose of preventing the Russian Generals from detaching any part of their forces to act against the allied armies in the Crimea.

I have also to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve of the joint recommendation made by M. de Bourqueney and yourself to Omer Pasha to regulate the movements of his army with a view to restrain the Russian Generals from sending reinforcements to the Russian army in the Crimea.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 171.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 314.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 354 of the 20th instant, reporting the wish expressed by Count Buol that any dissensions which might arise between the Austrian and British Governments might be kept from the public.

In reply I have to instruct your Lordship to assure Count Buol that it is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid dissension with Austria, and should any unfortunately arise, they have no wish to make it public; trusting that any difference of opinion between them will be transitory, and not of a character to affect the friendly relations which now exist between the two Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 172.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 33.)
My Lord, *Stockholm, September 19, 1854.*

I HAVE learned from various sources deserving of credit, that the warlike preparations of this country are carried on with as great activity as is possible, without wishing to excite too much public attention.

The gun-boat flotillas of Gothenburg and Gottland have been or are about to be concentrated here, and the Minister of Marine informed me that there were 100 of the smaller class carrying one heavy gun, and 60 odd of the larger, armed with two guns, one of which was of the largest calibre at Stockholm.

The military preparations are on a more unusual scale. The accoutrements for an army of 60,000 men are prepared, and winter greatcoats for 40,000. New swords and pistols are shortly to be given out to the army, and 6,000 new Minié rifles for distribution to the infantry, and I am told that all of the latter arm embodied are about to be exercised at ball practice. Parties of 100 men of the Guards, relieving each other, are employed in making ball-cartridges for twelve hours daily in this capital, and I am told can make 50,000 a-day, and have already completed 7,000,000 cartridges. I hear also that several new cannon have been ordered, and supplies of shells have arrived at Waxholm.

These armaments can hardly be required for the internal defence of the country, or to ensure respect to its declared neutrality; and though perhaps they might be accounted for by the wish of His Majesty to put himself in such a state of defence as would forbid any aggression or pressure on the part of Russia when the allied fleets withdraw from the Baltic, they appear to me rather to indicate that Sweden feels she may be called on to take a more active cooperation in the future campaign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 173.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 489.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 9, 1854.*

I AM informed that Ismail Pasha is ordered up from the Danube to take the command of the army at Kars. The Turkish Government declares its intention of keeping that army on the defensive. The retirement of the Russians, and the approach of winter, are in themselves sufficient securities that no forward movement will be attempted.

On further communication with Reshid Pasha I learn that his personal opinion is not so favourable to the choice of General Klapka for the chief command at Kars as I had been led to suppose. In a conversation which I had with him yesterday, he seemed to have adopted the Grand Vizier's opinion, according to which General Klapka might have the second but not the chief command. The reasons given for this distinction are, that a knowledge of Turkish is necessary, and that certain collateral duties to be performed by the Commander-in-chief require that he should be a "Mushir." I am inclined to think that the real difficulty lies in a deep-rooted jealousy of foreigners, which nothing but repeated disasters and a sense of imminent danger will entirely overcome.

The dead season, should war continue, will afford time for deliberation on the whole of this matter, and the reports of Colonel Williams may be expected to assist Her Majesty's Government in coming to a decision as to what may best be done in order to make the next campaign in Asia more successful than the last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 174.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 494.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 10, 1854.*

I WAS informed, some little time ago, by the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's army in Turkey, that the plan of having a corps of Bashi Bozouks, paid by Great Britain and organized under the command of General Beatson, was to be relinquished by his Lordship's direction.

I have since received letters from General Beatson, expressing much disappointment on account of that decision, and a strong conviction, founded on his late experience, that there is nothing in the character of Turkish irregular partisans to prevent their being brought into order, and rendered useful for military operations.

It is evident that the question thus raised does not belong to my province under the present instructions; and even if it did, my reliance on the soundness of Lord Raglan's judgment would make me slow to entertain any separate impressions on such a matter. It has, indeed, occurred to me that the failure in General Youssouf's case may be traced to special causes; and I have seen it stated that he has himself made admissions to that effect most creditable to his sense and candour. I have also been struck with the evidence afforded in favour of the Bashi Bozouks, and their susceptibility of organisation and management, by persons who have served with General Beatson, and who witnessed their conduct under severe privations. It would appear that such of them as were sent to that officer by Omer Pasha, were in a condition which implied no great inclination on the part of the Turkish Commander to facilitate the success of his undertaking; and in fact it may be alleged, without fear of contradiction, that the experiment, in so far as British management is concerned, has never been fairly tried.

I make a point of writing to your Lordship upon this subject by to-day's messenger, because I understand that the Honourable Mr. Walpole, who has been with General Beatson on the Danube, coming last from Bucharest, takes his passage for England by the French packet, with the view of submitting personally to your Lordship such information as an eye-witness fresh from the scene of action can alone supply.

It is not for me to determine whether a corps of Turkish Irregulars, misplaced perhaps in Europe, might be available in Asia, and whether General Beatson's experience in India, and national habits, may not fit him for a service which in other hands has caused disappointment and loss. But your Lordship is well aware that the question is not destitute of political bearings, and with respect to them I may be allowed to offer a few remarks.

Among the circumstances which tend most powerfully to keep this Empire in a state of comparative barbarism and disorder, are the unruliness of those wild mountaineers of whom the irregular soldiery is principally composed, and that jealousy of foreign interference which characterizes all Governments of Tatar origin. Great Britain by showing the Porte in what manner these rude people, however accustomed to independence and stimulated by want and cupidity, may be tamed into order and rendered serviceable to their own satisfaction, would confer an inestimable benefit upon this Empire, setting an example capable of being followed out, after a time, by the Porte itself on a larger scale, and with proportionate consequences. The comfort obtained by those who had the first experience of our treatment, founded, as it is, on providing for the wants of the men, respecting their religious prejudices and national usages, encouraging good, and never compromising with bad conduct, attending to them in sickness, and leading them gallantly into battle, could not fail of spreading a salutary contagion among the whole race, and disposing them for that state of discipline and submission to regular military service which the interests of Turkey so loudly demand.

The field of improvement is one where humanity walks hand-in-hand with true policy. In proportion as the wild tribes are reclaimed from their savage habits, the peaceful population have less to apprehend and more to enjoy.

The Government also would be gradually weaned from that mistrustful dread of foreigners which, however disguised and softened down, continues to exert an unhealthy influence, and to neutralize many important benefits necessary to the advancement of Turkey.

I confess that views of this description are a wide radiation from the establishment of a single corps of Bashi Bozouks under General Beatson. But the consequences are not the less deducible from the premise. Engaged as we are in a war against power, tending to shut out Western liberality and European improvement from this fine portion of the globe, advantage may surely accrue from viewing every measure with reference to those interests, and striving to make them all converge in their operation towards the same beneficial and indispensable result.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 175.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 495.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 10, 1854.*

THE Ottoman Secretary of State communicated to me yesterday, through M. Pisani, some interesting despatches from Dervish Pasha, the Porte's Commissioner in Wallachia, relative to his proceedings on arriving there, in concert with Omer Pasha. There are six of them in all. Three, translated by Mr. Alison, and dated the 1st instant, are inclosed herewith. The others are in the hands of M. Frederick Pisani, and the translations, if received from Pera in time, shall be added to the inclosures accompanying this despatch. My general impression, as derived from Dervish Pasha's despatches is, that he and Omer Pasha were following the right course. I hope that your Lordship will see reason to form the same opinion.

The Turkish Generalissimo has been blamed for ordering the Austrian Proclamation to be torn down by the police. I am informed by a person who arrived quite recently from Bucharest, that no such impropriety occurred, the proclamation not having been placarded, but only distributed.

Another rumour, equally destitute as I hope of foundation, is current. It is said that Omer Pasha, after having dismissed a number of refugees on the demand of Austria, surrendered one of them to the authorities of that country. The tale is more likely to be a fiction than a reality; and if the latter, Omer Pasha's known character warrants a belief that his conduct is susceptible of a satisfactory explanation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—The other three translations are inclosed.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 175.

Dervish Pasha to the Ottoman Porte.

September 1, 1854.

(Translation.)

THE Administration formed by the Russians at Bucharest was naturally broken up on the occasion of the Province of Wallachia being rescued from their hands under the august auspices of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

By the tenor of a Vizirial despatch, dated the 19th August, addressed to his Highness Omer Pasha, and communicated by him to me, the invitation to Stirbé Bey which I had been instructed to make, was to be put off for a while. But were such an extensive province to be left without a Government, affairs would fall into arrears to the prejudice of the inhabitants; and although the presence of Omer Pasha at Bucharest would naturally invest him with the reins of government, his Highness is already sufficiently occupied with the important charge confided to him, and would have no time in the midst of so many grave occupations to attend to all the details of the Administration as it behoved him. With the view, therefore, of transacting the more important business under my superintendence according to instructions, and with his Highness' sanction, and on the other hand for the settlement of routine business and of the important affairs of government in this quarter, &c., of the people under the Royal auspices, it was found expedient to constitute a little Administration under the title of Provisional Government.

Although it is clear that Kantacouzine, one of the first Boyars who came forward, who was appointed President of the Council by the Russians, is a Russian partisan, and that most of the actual members (of the Administration) are of the same category, there are no others at present among the Boyars capable of carrying on the Government.

With the view, therefore, of obviating difficulty in the conduct of affairs for the time being, and pending the receipt of the Porte's orders, the old Assembly has been temporarily confirmed in office under the Presidency of the aforesaid Kantacouzine. The Minister of Justice, however, Argyropulo, being a proclaimed Russian partisan, and having thrown up his place on the withdrawal of the Russians from Bucharest, and gone with them and subsequently returned, the President's eldest son, Jean Kantacouzine, was appointed Minister of Justice in his place, with the concurrence of his Highness Omer Pasha.

The necessary formalities were gone through, as your Highness will see by the inclosed paper, drawn up in French.

Inclosure 2 in No. 175.

Dervish Pasha to the Ottoman Porte.

Bucharest, September 1, 1854.

(Translation.)

TO-DAY the Austrian Consul resident here called upon me, and the subject of the Provisional Government established was broached. I have reported in another despatch the causes which led to the adoption of that measure, and when the circumstances, which had been already stated to Count Ladolf, were communicated to the Consul, he admitted the propriety of the proceeding in question.

I have, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 175.

Dervish Pasha to the Ottoman Porte.

Bucharest, September 1, 1854.

(Translation.)

ON Wednesday, the seventh day after my departure from Constantinople, I arrived at Rustchuk. His Highness Omer Pasha had entered Bucharest some days before, and it was reported that the Austrian troops had also entered Wallachia. I therefore, in pursuance of my instructions, started at once from Rustchuk on the following day, and reached Bucharest in order to meet and confer with Omer Pasha.

The general contentment and gratitude of all the Boyars and the inhabitants on the entry of the Imperial army into Wallachia appears from the public rejoicing on the occasion of Omer Pasha's entry with the Ottoman troops previously to my arrival, as well as from the satisfaction displayed in their reception of me. It was equally apparent they were all opposed to Stirbé Bey, great and small. I was thus thrown into some embarrassment as to how I should proceed about inviting Stirbé Bey (to return hither). His Highness the Grand Vizier at that juncture received intelligence that the Russians were about to evacuate Moldavia also, and considered that if the Austrian troops were not probably, in that event, to enter Wallachia, there would be no necessity for the insertion of the paragraph concerning them in the proclamation to be issued by me; neither would there be any for hastening the invitation to the Bey of Wallachia, and Omer Pasha communicated to me the Vizirial despatch by which I was instructed to keep back the proclamation until it was ascertained whether the Austrian troops had entered Wallachia. But, as already stated, I had entered Bucharest, and I reported in another despatch that the Austrian troops had *de facto* entered also, and it was thus found necessary to issue the proclamation.

In order, therefore, to postpone the recall of Stirbé Bey, and at the same time to obviate any alarm on the part of the people dwelling under the secure auspices of His Imperial Majesty, and to confirm the well-disposed, the proclamation was printed and issued with the omission of that part relating to the recall of Stirbé Bey. Five copies thereof are inclosed for your Highness' inspection.

I have, &c.

Inclosure 4 in No. 175.

Dervish Pasha to the Ottoman Porte.

Le 1 *Septembre*, 1854.

(Traduction.)

LES Valaques ont présenté une pétition à son Altesse le Généralissime, demandant que les troupes Valaques aient à faire le service, conjointement avec les troupes régulières Ottomanes.

Comme son Altesse a rapporté le fait avec toutes les circonstances, il est superflu que j'entre dans des détails à cet égard.

Afin, cependant, que votre Altesse connaisse exactement tout ce qui a trait à cette démarche, je prends la liberté de lui transmettre ci-joint copie de la susdite pétition.

(Petition not communicated.)

Inclosure 5 in No. 175.

Dervish Pasha to the Ottoman Porte.

Le 1 Septembre, 1854.

(Traduction.)

D'APRES le Traité, la Cour d'Autriche et la Sublime Porte doivent travailler ensemble au rétablissement de la précédente Administration des deux Provinces. Il est également vrai que cette Administration, une fois rétablie, il est dans la nature des choses de ne se mêler plus de rien.

A juger, toutefois, des procédés de l'Autriche jusqu'à ce moment-ci, c'est-à-dire, voyant sa manière d'agir, premièrement, par les nombreuses expressions inconvenantes contenues dans la proclamation dont j'ai transmis une copie à votre Altesse par une autre dépêche; secondement, par la persistance du Général Popowich à vouloir faire cette proclamation, malgré qu'on lui ait dit de différer de le faire avec les expressions qu'elle renferme; et troisièmement, la contestation faite par le Comte Ludolf relativement à la formation d'un Gouvernement provisoire, on voit, dis-je, que l'Autriche prend des mesures pour acquérir quelque droit sur les deux Provinces, et qu'elle veut, en obtenant des choses qui, bien qu'elles paraissent, d'abord, de peu d'importance, peuvent à la fin avoir de très mauvaises conséquences, se faire une position à pouvoir s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures du pays.

Je prends la liberté de soumettre ces réflexions à votre Excellence, à laquelle il appartient de donner dans cette occasion, comme dans tous les cas, les ordres qu'il lui plaira.

Inclosure 6 in No. 175.

Dervish Pasha to the Ottoman Porte.

Le 1 Septembre, 1854.

(Traduction.)

AINSI que je l'ai marqué à votre Altesse dans une autre dépêche, vu l'urgence d'établir, en me concertant avec son Altesse le Généralissime, une Administration provisoire jusqu'à ce que la volonté de sa Hautesse à cet égard émane du Trône Impérial, Jeudi 8 courant (31 Août) était le jour fixé pour son installation.

Mais deux ou trois heures avant la cérémonie le Comte Ludolf, un des Attachés de l'Internonciature d'Autriche, qui a été envoyé avec moi à Bucarest, est venu me voir, et m'a dit: "J'ai entendu dire que vous avez établi un Gouvernement." Mais le fait est que "nous venons de recevoir l'avis officiel que la Cour d'Autriche a nommé un agent avec le titre de Commissaire Civil. Ce personnage arrivera incessamment; ainsi, il ne faut rien faire avant qu'il arrive. Lorsqu'il sera arrivé, on communiquera ensemble et la mission sera remplie."

Comme le Comte Ludolf n'est pas, que nous sachions, investé d'un caractère officiel, j'aurais pu me dispenser d'entrer longuement en matière avec lui; mais réfléchissant sur les circonstances du temps, et pour ne pas lui faire de la peine, je lui ai répondu, que par suite de l'entrée des Russes dans la Valachie, qui a renversé le Gouvernement précédent, et de la rentrée de cette Puissance sans l'autorité Ottomane, la Sublime Porte veut rétablir le Gouvernement précédent, mais que cela ne peut guère se faire à la hâte; que d'après les privilèges dont la Valachie jouit, l'administration du pays appartient aux indigènes; qu'il était devenu nécessaire d'établir un Gouvernement provisoire, d'abord, pour qu'il

s'occupât des moyens de satisfaire aux besoins des troupes Impériales qui se trouvent ici, et des troupes Autrichiennes qui arrivent, et puis pour obvier aux graves inconvénients qui naîtraient si on laissait sans une autorité administrative un pays aussi important que la Valachie; que cette Administration étant provisoire, on ne peut guère le considérer comme la réstauration du Gouvernement précédent; qu'un rapport détaillé sur l'établissement de cette Administration provisoire va être adressé à votre Altesse; que j'agirai conformément aux ordres souverains que j'aurai reçus soit à cet égard soit par rapport à la formation du Gouvernement précédent; que je n'ai absolument aucune connaissance d'une telle chose que la nomination d'un Commissaire de la part du Gouvernement Autrichien, et que je ne suis pas chargé d'ouvrir des communications avec lui; que ma mission se borne à communiquer avec le Commandant-en-chef, ou bien avec celui qui tient sa place, et à communiquer avec lui sur le rétablissement du Gouvernement précédent; que jusqu'à présent je n'ai pas pu m'entretenir avec le Commandant-en-chef, et que lorsqu'il sera arrivé, je conférerai avec lui sur la réstauration du Gouvernement précédent.

Le Comte a répliqué, "Il faut suspendre le tout, et comme un Commissaire va arriver de la part de l'Autriche ou conférera avec lui et avec lui l'on établira un Gouvernement; voilà ce que vous devez faire savoir aux personnes que vous avez nommés."

Cette affaire, ai-je dit, en reprenant la parole, est une affaire résolue, après mûre réflexion, et vu son importance elle a été mise à exécution; il est impossible de revenir là-dessus ou de la différer, et comme elle va être rapportée à la Sublime Porte on fera ce qu'il plaira à sa Hautesse d'ordonner, et lorsque le Général Coronini, commandant les troupes Autrichiennes qui viennent à Bucarest, sera arrivé, je conférerai avec lui aussi. Nos discussions se sont terminés là.

Le rétablissement du Gouvernement précédent doit en effet, d'après le Traité, être fait avec le concours des deux Gouvernements, et mes instructions portent que je dois m'entendre là-dessus avec le Général-en-chef des troupes Autrichiennes, ou bien avec celui qui le représente. Mais il y a ceci à dire; l'état actuel de la province est ainsi qu'il sait; les Russes se sont tout-à-fait retirés; les troupes du Sultan sont entrées en Valachie avec les troupes Autrichiennes; les habitants ont de la sympathie pour la Sublime Porte, et la plus grande aversion pour les Autrichiennes. Ils s'inquiètent beaucoup, et ils craignent d'être protégés par l'Autriche, tout en voulant se soustraire à celle de la Russie. En effet, à juger des apparences, l'Autriche se comporte de manière à faire croire qu'elle veut anéantir complétement les droits souverains du Sultan.

Je prends donc la liberté de [vous prier?] me faire savoir comment je dois agir au milieu des circonstances que je viens de signaler.

No. 176.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September 27.*)

(No. 497.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 10, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translated copy of a telegraphic despatch received by the Porte this morning from Belgrade, announcing the rejection by Russia of the four Articles sent to St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 176.

The Turkish Ambassador at Vienna to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September* 3, 1854.

COUNT BUOL informed me to-day that the Russian Embassy here had communicated to him officially the reply from St. Petersburgh, containing the

complete and definitive rejection of the proposals sent thither, but stating that the Principalities were to be evacuated, as before.

The Count added that Austria would not be a party to any conference, except on the bases in question.

No. 177.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 500.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 10, 1854.

I HAVE not time at present to offer any further comments on the reports from Dervish Pasha, translations of which are forwarded to your Lordship in another despatch of this date. I may be allowed to hope that the impressions transmitted by the Sultan's Commissioner of the spirit and aim of the Austrian authorities in Wallachia are exaggerated. But a cursory perusal of the correspondence has left some painful misgivings on my mind, and it will be a relief to me to have them removed by communication with the Internuncio, or by advices from Lord Westmorland.

Reshid Pasha has applied for my advice as to the contents of the Commissioner's despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 178.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 501. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 10, 1854.

AMONG the British officers whom I have presented for employment in the Turkish service, by far the greater number have been accepted; and certainly those whose merit has been tried on the field of battle have given the Porte no cause to repent of its confidence. I have been careful never to recommend on insufficient grounds, and, after all, the number of applicants has not been great.

Since the retirement of the Russians I have found a diminished willingness to receive my recommendations, and the Seraskier, seeking to excuse himself, sent me several days ago a letter addressed to him by Omer Pasha. Of this letter, which I must request your Lordship will consider as strictly confidential, a translated copy is inclosed herewith. The off-hand and indiscriminating manner in which the Turkish Generalissimo has thought proper to express himself of British officers recommended to him by the Seraskier is as misplaced as it is unjust, and augurs, if it be not attributable to temper, an early forgetfulness of services which have covered his head with laurels ungathered by his own hand, and saved him, as I well know, in more instances than one, from the consequences of his own temerity and thirst for distinction.

Ignorance of the Turkish language is, no doubt, a fair obstacle to the employment of foreign officers in the Sultan's service, but the knowledge of it has never been a condition of their acceptance.

I purpose writing confidentially to Colonel Simmons upon the subject of this despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 178.

Omer Pasha to the Seraskier Pasha.

(Translation.) *Rustchuk, August* 15, 1854.

YOUR Excellency is aware that a number of English officers are sent from the capital to be employed in the Imperial army at their request. The fact is that they are unacquainted with the Turkish language, which is difficult of acquirement, and are of no use whatever here (so let it be). In the midst of the multifarious occupations of the army I am incessantly intruded upon with their visits; and I therefore beg it as a favour that no more of them may be sent in future, in order that I may be relieved from their extreme importunities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) OMER.

No. 179.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 564.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1854.

I RECEIVED this morning through Vienna your Excellency's despatches from No. 486 to No. 501, both inclusive, the last of the 10th instant.

With reference to the observations contained in your despatch No. 489 of the 9th of September, respecting the appointment of Ismail Pasha to command the Turkish army at Kars, and the objections stated by the Porte to the chief command of that army being entrusted to General Klapka, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have little doubt that a deep-rooted jealousy of foreigners is, as you suppose, the main cause of the neglect of the army in Asia; but the suicidal indulgence of that feeling ill becomes a Government whose very existence depends upon the support of foreigners.

Repeated disasters may possibly overcome the feeling, but these disasters must prolong the war at the cost of the blood and the treasure of England; and as Her Majesty's Government will not submit to disaster or disgrace that common precautions may avert, your Excellency will inform Reshid Pasha of the great dissatisfaction which all the proceedings in connection with the army of Asia have caused to Her Majesty's Government, who must insist that their advice shall be taken if their support is to be continued.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 180.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 568.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government agree with your Excellency as to the ingratitude exhibited by Omer Pasha in the improper letter to the Seraskier respecting the employment of European officers with the Turkish army under his command, of which a translation is inclosed in your despatch No. 501 of the 10th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 181.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 570.)
Foreign Office, September 27, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government consider that Dervish Pasha has acted rightly in the various transactions reported in his despatches of the 1st instant, of which translations are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 495 of the 10th instant.

Her Majesty's Government sincerely hope that the rumour to which you allude in the same despatch of a refugee having been surrendered by Omer Pasha to the Austrian authorities is unfounded; but your Excellency will make accurate inquiries upon the subject, and report to me the result.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 182.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September 28.*)

(No. 503.)
Therapia, September 11, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Turkish newspapers have lately given out, as the substance of a letter from Trebizond, that the Commander-in-chief of the army at Kars had sent a body of Regular Cavalry to attack the rear-guard of the Russian army while striking its tents preparatory to a retreat; and that, after dispersing the enemy, his detachment had taken 2,500 tents, a quantity of ammunition and provisions, and horses.

I have this day seen a young Englishman on his return from Kars, after having been present at the battle of Koorook Dereh, who assures me that nothing is true of the preceding intelligence except the retirement of the Russians, which he attributes to their having accomplished the original object of their advance, namely, the collection of forage for their horses.

He confirms the evacuation of Bayazid by Russia; but he states that a Russian force occupies the great commercial road between that city and the Persian frontier.

When I told him that General Guyon characterised the battle of Koorook Dereh as a Turkish victory, which would have been a triumph in appearance as well as in reality, if the General's orders had been obeyed, he described the incidents which he had witnessed during the battle in contradiction to so hazardous and absurd an assertion.

He confirmed the intelligence, previously reported, that the Russian troops at Bayazid had joined General Beburoff the night before the battle, to the number of about 6,000.

I learn from the same authority, that the character and power of Schamyl Bey are greatly overcharged in the popular accounts of him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 183.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September 28.*)

(No. 504.)
Therapia, September 12, 1854.

My Lord,

IN conversing yesterday with Reshid Pasha on the present state of affairs in Wallachia, M. Pisani received from his Highness a message for me, the purport of which was, that he should be glad to see detachments of British and French troops in that Principality, to the number of 4,000 or 5,000 men each, with the view of counteracting any unfavourable result to be apprehended from the fact of an exclusive foreign occupation on the part of any one Power.

Though I make a point of communicating this suggestion, confidentially, to Lord Raglan, I have little expectation that his Lordship will find himself at liberty to comply with it. At all events, it is evident that the British army can take no part in the proposed cooperative measure until the issue of the pending expedition is completely decided. In bringing this proposal under your Lordship's notice, I cannot abstain from remarking how much it betrays that mistrust of Austria which the late proceedings of Bucharest have been well calculated to rekindle at the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 184.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September 28.*)

(No. 509.)
Therapia, September 14, 1854.

My Lord,

THOUGH more than eight days have elapsed since the expedition was completely at sea, we have not yet received the slightest indication of its movements. The weather, which was very unsettled, and at times rough, during several days subsequent to its departure from Baltchik, has been very fine during the last eight-and-forty hours. To-day the wind is from the south.

I trouble your Lordship with this negative report, because I am well aware of the anxious expectation with which your Lordship must naturally be looking out for intelligence from the Black Sea at a moment like the present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 185.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September 28.*)

(No. 514.)
Therapia, September 15, 1854.

My Lord,

AN officer of Her Majesty's steamer "Harpy," which came in from the Black Sea an hour ago with despatches, has informed me that he left the allied expeditions about eight-and-forty hours ago at anchor off Eupatoria, which place had surrendered on being summoned, and was taken possession of by a detachment of the three armies. It was understood that the ships would weigh anchor towards

morning, and cover a landing of the whole force about twenty miles down the coast towards Sebastopol.

If this statement be correct, we may hope to receive intelligence of more important operations in the course of to-morrow or on the following day, which, if my expectation be realised, I shall not fail to transmit to your Lordship by telegraph.

It appears that the movement of the expedition had not been attended with a single accident up to the time when the "Harpy" came away. The cholera is stated to have disappeared, and the health of the soldiers and sailors was excellent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 186.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 515.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 14, 1854.*

THE day before yesterday, in the afternoon, I received despatches to the 9th instant, from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest. They gave an account of unpleasant differences of opinion between the Austrian Commander on one side, and Omer and Dervish Pashas on the other. Two matters remained after much discussion unsettled, and were held, by agreement, in suspense for a few days, until reference could be made to Constantinople. One of the points at issue was the Austrian proclamation, to which the Turkish General and the Turkish Commissioner equally objected. The other was the return of Prince Stirbey. Dervish Pasha, acting in concert with the Ottoman Commander-in-chief, was so apprehensive of endangering the public tranquillity by that measure that he determined on leaving out of his own proclamation the passage relating to Prince Stirbey, and on making an appeal to his Government before he forwarded the intended invitation to Vienna.

As these opinions accorded sufficiently with my own anticipations, I lost no time in waiting on Baron Bruck for the purpose of making him acquainted with the substance of Mr. Colquhoun's reports. I found M. Benedetti already with the Internuncio. He had received, as it appeared, advices similar in their general substance to mine, and had waited upon the Austrian Minister with the intention of prevailing upon him to take them into favourable consideration.

A discussion ensued, of which I have not time to relate the particulars, and Baron de Bruck persisted, to the close of it, in maintaining opinions opposed to ours. His Excellency stated that he was without advices of the same date as mine, and that he was in expectation of despatches from Count Coronini, by the hand of one of his attachés, Count Ludolf, who had accompanied Dervish Pasha to Bucharest.

On leaving his house I went to Reshid Pasha, and put him also in possession of what I had learned from Mr. Colquhoun. His Highness viewed, as I did, with regret, the differences which had arisen, and expressed a desire to support Dervish Pasha without exciting unfriendly sentiments on the part of Austria. When I left him he had made up his mind to propose an amendment, or an explanation, according to circumstances, of the Austrian proclamation, and to invite Baron de Bruck to a meeting at which the French Representative and myself might endeavour, in concert with him, to bring his Excellency into a way of thinking more accordant with ours.

This meeting, to which the Internuncio gave an accidental character, took place to-day, and the question of Prince Stirbey's recall was fully discussed without any apparent change in Baron de Bruck's opinion, who treated the measure as one to which the Porte was bound by a positive agreement, and which could not be departed from, or deferred, without embarrassing the Court of Vienna, and compromising the Commander of its troops at Bucharest.

Reshid Pasha finally threw out an idea which promised to remove the existing difficulties in a great degree, and to conciliate our conflicting opinions.

He proposed that Dervish Pasha should forward his intended invitation to Vienna without further delay, addressing it to the Turkish Ambassador, who would be instructed not to deliver it to Prince Stirbey without previously making known to Count Buol, Lord Westmorland, and Baron de Bourqueney, the objections entertained at Bucharest to the Hospodar's return by Omer Pasha, the Turkish Commissioner, Mr. Colquhoun, and the French Agent, to say nothing of Prince Alexander Ghika and a considerable number of his countrymen. Baron de Bruck was not inclined to accept even this very moderate proposal, and I was finally obliged to leave the meeting with the expression of a hope that he would be able to take a more favourable view of it on further deliberation with Reshid Pasha alone.

I have since learned from M. Pisani, whom I sent to ascertain the final result, that it has been agreed between the Pasha and Baron de Bruck that, with respect to the proclamation, it shall be amended or publicly explained in a sense satisfactory to the Porte according as it may have been published, or not, before the arrival of a fresh instruction to Dervish Pasha; and, with respect to the return of Prince Stirbey, that the invitation shall be forwarded in the way proposed by Reshid Pasha, if General Coronini consents to the arrangement in virtue of the observations which Baron de Bruck undertakes to address to him with that view.

The time for reference which has been allowed is so brief, that an express steamer must be dispatched to Varna this evening; and purposing, if possible, to avail myself of the opportunity for writing to Mr. Colquhoun, I transmit this hurried despatch without apology, relying on your Lordship's indulgence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 187.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 29, 1854.*

THE most precise instructions with respect to the movements of the Turkish armies have been drawn up by Count Buol himself, and sent to General Hess and Baron Bruck.

The movements of the Turkish troops have not been impeded. They have entered Ibraila, and their advanced guard is followed by a force estimated at 30,000 men.

This intelligence has been sent to Count Buol by telegraph.

No. 188.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 316.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 29, 1854.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship, for your own information only, copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting the wish of Reshid Pasha that detachments of British and French troops should be sent to Wallachia, with the view of counteracting any unfavourable result to be apprehended from the fact of an exclusive foreign occupation on the part of any one Power.

Your Lordship will, however, inform Count Buol, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government it is most unfortunate that the proceedings of the Austrian authorities in Wallachia, and the language of Baron Bruck at Constantinople, should have revived the mistrust of Austrian intentions that had latterly been subsiding.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 183.

No. 189.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 317.)

Foreign Office, September 29, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has this day communicated to me the substance of the letters which Count Coronini and Dervish Pasha have respectively addressed to Prince Stirbey.

In the first Count Coronini, after alluding to the terms of the Treaty between Austria and the Porte of June 14, observes that the first object of that Treaty having been effected by the retreat of the Russians, the Emperor of Austria had directed a portion of his army to enter the Principalities with a view to the second object of the Treaty, namely, the re-establishment, in concert with the Ottoman Government, of the legal order of things in the Provinces, and that Count Coronini was directed to put himself into communication with the persons entrusted by the Porte with the duty of cooperating with him for the re-establishment of order and the maintenance of tranquillity. That both Austria and the Porte had deemed it necessary, with a view to this object, in the first instance to replace the Government of the Provinces in the hands of their legitimate Princes, and so enable them to heal the wounds from which they are now suffering.

Count Coronini therefore invites Prince Stirbey to return without loss of time, and he would receive a similar invitation from Dervish Pasha, in virtue of the instructions which he had received from the Porte, and specifically in virtue of an order of the 31st of August.

Dervish Pasha's invitation says that as the Sultan is desirous of re-establishing order in the Principalities, and thereby providing for the well-being and peace of his subjects; and as for the attainment of that object it is requisite in the first instance, and as soon as possible, to restore the old system of administration, which will be effected by the return of the Princes, and their reinstatement, Dervish Pasha was directed to invite Prince Stirbey to return to Bucharest, and there await the further directions of the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 190.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 318.)

Foreign Office, September 29, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me to-day a despatch from Count Buol, dated the 23rd instant, in reply to the observations made to his Excellency by your Lordship and M. de Bourqueney, as to the painful impression produced upon your respective Governments by the intelligence which they had received of the opposition said to have been offered by General Coronini to the movement which Omer Pasha proposed to make on Ibraila.

Count Buol observes that in the absence of full details as to what may have really taken place, he would only say that it appeared from General Hess' reports, that Omer Pasha had himself objected to a proposed movement of General Coronini on Ibraila, and had made his assent to it depend on the opinions of the British and French Commanders-in-chief; but the Austrian Government were not aware of Omer Pasha having had any intention of moving the Turkish army on Ibraila with the view of menacing the Russians in Bessarabia. Nevertheless, the Emperor, immediately upon hearing a report of the jealousy felt at the proposed Austrian movement on Ibraila, directed General Hess not to interfere with Omer Pasha's advance on that place, as well as on Galatz, although reserving to the Austrian army a right of simultaneously occupying them.

Count Buol goes on to say that Austria does not pretend, under her Convention with Turkey, to any right of exclusive occupation in the Principalities, but only that as she has entered those Provinces for the interest of the Ottoman Empire, and has engaged by implication to defend them from fresh invasion, she had a right to expect that she should have full scope allowed her for her military arrangements, and be free to occupy the chief military points.

Count Buol adds, that it would seem to be for the interest of all parties that their respective parts in the contest should be apportioned to each. That Austria, in virtue of her Convention with Turkey, should be entrusted with the duty of protecting her on the side of the Danube; while the Turkish troops under Omer Pasha should either be employed to reinforce the Turkish army in the Crimea, or be transported to Asia for the purpose of acting in that country.

I told Count Colloredo that it was not alone the interference with the operations of Omer Pasha, but the conduct generally of the Austrian authorities since the occupation of Wallachia, that had produced a painful impression upon Her Majesty's Government. A marked disregard for the Sultan's authority had been exhibited; his victorious troops had been treated as intruders upon Turkish territory; and preparations were making for the administration of the Province by Austria alone, and not in concert with the Porte as stipulated by the Treaty of June; while the language and tone of M. Bruck at Constantinople were of a nature to alarm the Porte as to the actual, and still more as to the future, intentions of Austria.

Count Buol, I said, must therefore not be surprised that Her Majesty's Government are unable to reconcile the difference between the conduct of the Austrian Agents and the assurances of the Austrian Government, and that they should earnestly desire the termination of that difference.

For the accommodation and supply of his army, the Austrian Commander-in-chief must, of course, issue the necessary orders; but the distribution of his forces, and the occupation of important places, should be the subject of friendly understanding with the Turkish Commander-in-chief, whose operations against the enemy of the Sultan, so far from being impeded, should receive every facility from the Power which was occupying the Sultan's territory for the stipulated purpose of aiding his cause.

Austria, I added, has by solemn acts recognized the European necessity of maintaining the independence of the Ottoman Empire, but as that could only be secured by upholding the Sultan's authority throughout his dominions, Her Majesty's Government confidently hoped that instructions having that specific object in view would be sent to the Austrian authorities in the Principalities. Such instructions will be in accordance with the avowed policy and intentions of Austria, and cannot but promote the good understanding and cordial cooperation between Austria, England, and France, upon which a speedy termination of the war may in a great measure depend.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 191.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 1,172. Confidential.)

Paris, September 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I MENTIONED yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that your Lordship had had a lengthened conversation with Count Walewski respecting the future destiny of the Crimea, should victory place it within the power of the allied armies. I took this course with the hope, in which I was not disappointed, of leading the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to express his opinion upon this very important matter.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that there were three points connected with the subject which I had brought under his notice:—

1. Supposing Sebastopol to be taken, was it to be occupied or abandoned?

2. If it was determined to occupy it, was that occupation to be limited to the place itself, or to extend over the Crimea?

3. Were the defences of Sebastopol to be maintained or destroyed?

Upon the first of these questions he observed that, in whatever light he viewed it, his opinion was that the allied armies, if victorious, should winter in the Crimea. The climate of the southern portion of that peninsula was healthy and fertile; the port of Sebastopol would be a constant refuge for the fleets; from no place could further enterprises in the East, to whatever point directed, be more advantageously undertaken; the moral effect of wintering on Russian ground would be immense; and the armies would be removed from the chance of contemplating the cruelties and misgovernment still practised in Turkey, which had made so unfavourable an impression upon them during their occupation of Varna.

All these things spoke in favour of the armies wintering in the Crimea,—nothing as far as he was aware, against it.

With respect to the second question which he had raised, whether the occupation was to be limited or extended to the whole Crimea, he observed that this was a matter which depended on strategical measures, and could only be decided by the Commanders-in-chief of the armies; but he should be glad to find that their decision was in favour of the whole of the Crimea.

With regard to the third point, namely, the preservation or destruction of the fortifications of the Crimea, particularly of those of Sebastopol, a greater difference of opinion might prevail, because, if they were destroyed, and a necessity for them discovered afterwards, they were not so easily reconstructed; while if they were temporarily preserved, they might be destroyed at any moment. Nevertheless his impression was that they ought to be destroyed at once. Three eventualities were possible in disposing of the Crimea: It might be restored to Russia; it might be again placed under the rule of the Sultan; or it might remain in the possession of the French and English. In neither of these cases would there be any necessity for preserving the fortifications. If the Crimea was restored to Russia, it must be restored shorn of that which gave Russia such preponderance in the Black Sea. If it was to be again placed under the rule of the Sultan, it would not be prudent to place the Porte in possession of a place of such military importance: as the Russian fleet would be destroyed, the Porte would have nothing to fear from outward attack, and would have no need of such defences as now existed. Lastly, if the Crimea was to remain in the hands of the French and English, as they would have nothing to fear from maritime aggressions, it was clear that they could do without impregnable fortifications. For all these reasons he should prefer to see the defensive works of the Crimea destroyed at once.

I said that with regard to the allied armies wintering in the Crimea, I had reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government concurred in the opinion which his Excellency had put forward; that as to the second point, it was so clearly a matter which must be referred to the decision of the Commanders-in-chief, that there could be no difference of opinion between the Governments at home; but that with reference to the third point, namely, the destruction of the fortifications of the Crimea, I believed that it had been a question with Her Majesty's Government whether it might not be prudent to preserve the works which had been raised to defend Sebastopol against an attack by land, but to destroy those which rendered it so formidable a fortress by sea. I could only, I said, contemplate two out of the three contingencies adverted to by his Excellency, as possible with regard to the Crimea—that it should be restored to Russia, or replaced under the authority of the Porte; for as France and England had declared that, in engaging in this war, they renounced beforehand all advantage to themselves, they could hardly keep possession of the Crimea, or of any part of it, without placing themselves in contradiction to this declaration. There were many reasons, I thought, why, if the two Governments decided that in no case should the Sebastopol of to-day be allowed to remain in either Russian or Turkish hands, that that fortress should be dismantled as soon as Providence placed it in our power. Delays were proverbially dangerous. If the destruction of the fortification was postponed until the period came for evacuating of the Crimea, might not unforeseen difficulties then occur?

Supposing Russia were to accept all other conditions of peace, but to demand, as a *sine qua non*, the restoration of the Crimea, with its fortified places

uninjured, and that she should be supported by Austria and Prussia, how greatly should we regret that we had not forestalled the question by destroying them at once! Supposing also (for no Power should be so arrogant as not to contemplate the possibility of misfortune) we, in our turn, were dislodged from the Crimea, would not the reverse be doubly bitter if we had neglected, while it was in our power, to take every possible security against the future? These contingencies, I was aware, were improbable, but stranger things had happened in the world's history; and as I could see no motive whatever for preserving works from which the two Governments would not even desire a temporary benefit, and which they might hereafter bitterly repent not having destroyed, I trusted that if our arms were blessed with victory, the first use we should make of that victory would be to destroy the stronghold of the aggressor for ever; since, if once destroyed, it would be our own faults if it was rebuilt. Of course, I said, I was not presuming to give an opinion upon the preservation of such defences as were necessary for the safety of the allied forces; and, I added, I begged M. Drouyn de Lhuys in general to understand that I was only giving an individual opinion, and that I had no authority from your Lordship to enter into any discussion of the question with him.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he was in the same position; that he had not taken the Emperor's orders; and that his observations must be considered as entirely personal. But so much impressed was he, he added, with the necessity of coming to some distinct understanding with Her Majesty's Government on a matter of such paramount importance, that he should consign his ideas upon it to a despatch, which, if it received the Emperor's approbation, should be sent to Count Walewski.

I have, &c,
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 192.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September 29.*)

(No. 1,175.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 28, 1854.*

THE day before yesterday, and yesterday, M. de Hübner had interviews with M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the purpose of entering into some explanations with his Excellency respecting the present attitude of Austria towards the Maritime Powers, and with reference to her position in the Principalities.

M. de Hübner complained that the conduct of Austria had not been appreciated as it deserved. He maintained that she had faithfully observed the engagements into which she had entered with Great Britain and France, and he assumed that she had rendered great services to the general cause, inasmuch as the strategical position taken by her armies had forced the Russians to evacuate the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys would not admit M. de Hübner's statement to be correct. He maintained that Austria had pledged herself to sign a Convention with the Maritime Powers, if Russia refused to accept the four points; that Convention ought to have been signed, the answer of the Russian Government having been a direct refusal. And although he admitted that the evacuation by the Russians of the Principalities was in a great measure due to the strategical measures of Austria, yet he could not look upon it as a service rendered to the allies, since Austria in occupying the Principalities had given Russia clearly to understand that she would not pursue her successes further, and would on no account attack the Russian troops; the consequence was that the army in Bessarabia could be sent without danger to Russia into the Crimea. It was impossible, moreover, to look at the conduct of the Austrian authorities in the Principalities without being convinced that they were acting, however unintentionally, for the interests of Russia.

M. de Hübner explained why it had been impossible for Austria to sign the Convention at the present moment, and complained that the substitute of a further Conference or Congress which she had proposed had not been adopted.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys showed, as he thinks, even to M. de Hübner's satisfaction, the unsatisfactory results to which such a Congress must have led; but as there was nothing new in the arguments of either one side or the other, I need not repeat them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 193.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 29.)

(No. 1,177.)
Paris, September 28, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER stated yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Prince Gortchakoff had requested Count Buol to recommend the Russian prisoners in France to his (M. de Hübner's) protection, and to instruct him to advance them money if they stood in need of it.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he heard the statement with some surprise, inasmuch as M. de Kisseleff, before his departure from France, had placed all Russian subjects resident in France under Saxon protection. He could not therefore admit the pretensions of Austria to interfere in this matter. Any observations of the sort ought to have come from the Saxon Minister. He must moreover add, that France knew how to treat prisoners of war, and that she had already been in the receipt of the thanks of the Russian Government for the manner in which Russian prisoners had on former occasions been treated in France.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that this was evidently an attempt of Prince Gortchakoff to make it believed that the Austrian Government sympathized with the cause of Russia in the north.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 194.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 29.)

(No. 1,178.)
Paris, September 28, 1854.

My Lord,

IT appears that after the conversation which I had yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the Crimea, the substance of which is recounted in my despatch No. 1,172 of this day's date, his Excellency wrote to the Emperor, laying before His Majesty the views which he entertained upon the subject.

While I was at the Office for Foreign Affairs this morning, the Emperor's answer arrived by telegraph. It was to the effect that the allied armies ought to winter in the Crimea; that the extent of occupation must be left to the Commanders-in-chief; and that His Majesty thought that the maritime defences of Sebastopol ought to be destroyed immediately.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then read me the despatch to Count Walewski which he had written in anticipation of the Emperor's answer. It agrees in all essential points with the language which he had held to me. I was glad to find that my remark had been attended to, and that no mention was made of the possibility of the Crimea remaining in the hands of Great Britain and France.

I trust that I shall not be exceeding the sphere of my duties, if I earnestly recommend that advantage be taken of the present disposition of the French Government to prevent Sebastopol from ever again becoming a source of anxiety. In a country like this it is impossible to foretell how long the present disposition may last, and unless Her Majesty's Government contemplate a state of things that might render the preservation of this stronghold desirable, orders cannot be too promptly sent to dismantle and raze it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 195.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 29.)

(No. 1,179.)
Paris, September 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as directed by your Lordship's despatch No. 956 of the 27th instant, whether the French Government have heard any news in confirmation of the intelligence that reached them respecting the interference of the Austrian authorities with the movements of Omer Pasha to Galatz and Ibraila.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied in the negative; but he said that all the accounts which he had received from the Principalities showed that the Austrian authorities were assuming an arbitrary power; and he feared that Reshid Pasha, either from pusillanimity or from some worse motive (meaning that he had been bribed), was playing into their hands.

It now appeared that the permission for Prince Stirbey's return had been communicated by a despatch from Reshid Pasha to Count Coronini, and that Omer Pasha, and the Turkish Commissioner, Dervish Pasha, learnt this important fact from Count Coronini, instead of from their own Government. This had irritated Omer Pasha to such a degree that he had sent in his resignation. This, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, was the tenor of the information which had been conveyed to him from several quarters, though he could not say that they were all official.

His Excellency went on to state that he thought a great mistake had been made by the Governments of England and France in not insisting on naming Commissioners to act in the Principalities at the same time that Austria appointed one. It appeared now that in all the instructions regarding the Principalities sent from the Porte, the names of England and France were never alluded to, while the advice of the Porte's "good friend and ally," Austria, was always to be listened and attended to. The return of Prince Stirbey, in spite of the remonstrances of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe and M. Benedetti, proved where the real weight of influence was. It had been laid down at Vienna that there should be no exclusive protectorate of the Principalities hereafter, and yet Austria was to all appearance aiming at replacing Russia. He still thought that the two Governments would do well to name Commissioners, and to insist with the Porte on their being consulted in all administrative measures proposed for the government of the Principalities. He desired to submit this question to your Lordship's consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 196.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 971.)
Foreign Office, September 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your despatch No. 1,177 of the 28th instant, that I hope Count Buol will be asked by the French Government whether he consented to Prince Gortchakoff's request that M. de Hübner might be allowed to protect and assist Russian prisoners of war in France. That request was evidently made for the purpose of having it understood that the sympathies of Austria were with Russia, and that her good offices were at the command of that Power.

No such application has been made to Her Majesty's Government.

Russian subjects were placed under the care of the Danish Legation when

Baron Brunnow left England, and the Danish Chargé d'Affaires has lately applied for permission to a Greek priest to attend the Russian prisoners in this country who were of that persuasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 197.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 520.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 19, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information copies of my latest correspondence with the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 197.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Kalamita Bay, September 15, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that yesterday morning the combined armies commenced disembarking in Kalamita Bay, about twelve miles to the southward of Eupatoria. Nearly the whole are landed; but a heavy swell has stopped the disembarkation of part of the cavalry and guns; this however will be effected as soon as it moderates.

No opposition has been offered by the enemy, and the town of Eupatoria having declared itself utterly defenceless was not molested, nor as yet has it been occupied by the allied forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 197.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Therapia, September 18, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch apprizing me of the disembarkation of the allied forces on the coast of the Crimea in Kalamita Bay on the 14th and 15th instant.

It is with much pleasure that I beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on the success of so important an operation executed by Her Majesty's squadron your command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 198.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 523.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 20, 1854.*

I LEARN from Mr. Colquhoun, under date of the 14th instant, that no fresh instructions having reached Dervish Pasha by the 13th instant, the invitation for Prince Stirbey to repair to Bucharest had been forwarded to Vienna,

and that the Austrian Consul-General was preparing to visit that capital with the apparent intention of accompanying the Hospodar on his return to the scene of his former disobedience.

I am greatly surprised by a precipitation for which the last despatches from Wallachia had by no means prepared me. It would seem that although the 19th instant was specified in the Turkish correspondence, the 13th was really the day intended to terminate the period of reference to Constantinople. The shortness of the time deprived the reference of all utility, and it is difficult to comprehend in what misapprehension so obvious an error could have originated. Be that as it may, the discussions which took place here, as already reported to your Lordship, and the instructions dispatched to Bucharest, as well by Reshid Pasha as by myself, have proved to be unprofitable labour. Of the Pasha's instruction to the Turkish Commander-in-chief a copy is herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information, and it may still suffice to show in what spirit the points at issue were discussed and regulated here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 198.

Instructions addressed by the Porte to Omer Pasha.

(Translation.) *September 15, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Highness' despatches reporting the communications which had taken place with Count Coronini; and subsequently, between his Excellency on the one side, and your Highness and Dervish Pasha on the other. As some of the matters in question were settled there, I have to remark that the passage contained in the proclamation of the Austrian Commander-in-chief, namely, that reference was to be made by the local authorities, in all matters, to his Excellency, does certainly impair the sovereign rights and authority of the Porte; and it is of great importance that an amendment should be introduced into it, namely, that it should be clearly explained that the real object of such reference was connected with matters concerning the Austrian troops. It has been therefore agreed upon with the Austrian Minister, that if the proclamation in question has not yet been published, the passage in question should be altered in the above sense; and that if it has been published, you should enter into communication with Count Coronini, and frame a new proclamation to be signed collectively by the Count, your Highness, and Dervish Pasha, in which the meaning of the passage in question should be properly set forth. Your Highness is therefore requested to act in conformity therewith. With reference to the second point referred to Constantinople, namely, the subject of Stirbé Bey, the best endeavours were used to prevent the return of that Prince into Wallachia, and of which, the proceedings had at Bucharest, evincing the (public) distaste thereat, and the documents in my possession, came in support. Baron de Bruck, however, represented that he had also reliable information on this subject; that there was a good deal of personal animosity mixed up with it; and that it was not right that such hesitation should be shown with regard to it, after the receipt of the last instructions of the Porte at Bucharest. In short, there was no persuading his Excellency to the contrary.

We suggested, in the presence of his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and of M. Benedetti, that the aspect of the question having changed since the occurrence of the last events at Bucharest, which had been reported to Count Buol and to the foreign Representatives at Vienna, reference should be, at all events, made to Vienna for a fresh decision respecting the return or not of the Prince, and that the letter inviting him to return should be sent to the Ottoman Minister at Vienna, in order that he might proceed accordingly; but the Austrian Minister persisted in saying that the dignity of Austria required that the original arrangement should be carried out, and that the fermentation which would ensue at Bucharest, until an answer could be received to the reference to Vienna, would more particularly place Count Coronini in a difficult position; he could not, therefore, agree to my suggestion. The Austrian Minister, however, at length gave strong assurances that if Dervish Pasha were

written to again to send the letter inviting Prince Stirbey to return into Wallachia, according to his instructions, and that the Pasha were to make his remarks to Count Coronini on the subject, he would use his endeavours that the question should be again referred to Vienna for decision, if Count Coronini had no objection to make on the score of his own position, and of the state of matters at Bucharest.

On the other hand, I declared that if Count Coronini were to consent to a fresh reference to Vienna on this occasion, and insisted on Prince Stirbey's return, and that anything sinister should occur at Bucharest in consequence, the Austrian General would be responsible for it; and that, however it might be, Prince Stirbey's return was a temporary measure; and that the Porte might, in conformity with her sovereign rights, change and dismiss him, if it should be necessary, after inquiry to be made, at any time.

I informed the Austrian Minister that in neither case would the letter of invitation be sent direct to Prince Stirbey, but would be forwarded to Arif Effendi by Dervish Pasha, who has been instructed briefly to act upon this detailed despatch.

Your Highness will clearly see that, under the present aspect of affairs, it will not do to offend Austria; you will, therefore, in the first place, enter frankly into communication with Count Coronini on the subject; and if he agrees to the reference to Vienna, you will write to Arif Effendi, in conjunction with Dervish Pasha, to make the necessary communications to Count Buol, and to the foreign Representatives at Vienna; and you will, as a measure of precaution, send him the letter recalling Prince Stirbey, in order that he may deal with it according to the decision come to there.

If Count Coronini does not agree to the above plan, you will not hesitate equally to send the letter of invitation in question to Arif Effendi, in order that he may communicate the same to Count Buol, and the English and French Ambassadors, and then deliver it to Prince Stirbey. You will also send Arif Effendi a copy of this despatch for his information.

No. 199.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 525.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 20, 1854.*

JUDGING from appearances, I find it difficult, with every disposition fairly to appreciate the embarrassments and intentions of Austria, not to recur in some degree to the impression originally made upon me by the terms of the Austrian Convention with Turkey. The course pursued by General Coronini, according to the latest advices from Bucharest, corresponds not a little with that reality of an exclusive occupation which Baron Bruck in conversation with me has more than once endeavoured to substitute for the principle of a joint one accepted by Count Buol, as that which, together with other wholesome principles, was to prevail in the operation of rescuing Wallachia and Moldavia from Russian usurpation. At all events it is certain that if the plan recommended by the Austrian military authorities be carried into effect, as matters now stand, the Austrian army will occupy exclusively the two Principalities, interposing, *de facto*, a pacific though armed authority, between the two principal belligerents, and if Baron Hess's proclamation be literally maintained, assuming for the time that very position which Russia has reluctantly given up from motives of strategic necessity.

The Porte is fully in possession of your Lordship's views on this important and delicate subject, nor is there any backwardness on the part of its Ministers to acknowledge their soundness. But, practically, the course pursued by Austria, with the reluctant acquiescence of Turkey, has very much the air of leading to consequences not easy to be reconciled with the principles laid down by your Lordship on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 200.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 30, 12 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, September 30, 1854.*

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch from General Hess, dated Bucharest, the 27th, and received yesterday, acknowledges the receipt of the Emperor's orders with regard to the movements of the Turks under Omer Pasha, and announces that that commander has in consequence occupied the positions of Galatz and Ibraila, and that General Hess is in the belief that he will make an attack upon the Russians in Bessarabia.

No. 201.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 1,185.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 29, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a note which I have just received from the Foreign Office, respecting the movements of the allied armies in the Crimea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 201.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Lord Cowley.

Paris, le 29 Septembre, 1854.

LE Ministre des Affaires Etrangères présente ses compliments à son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, et s'empresse de l'informer que d'après les nouvelles officielles qu'il reçoit de la Crimée par voie Autrichienne, sous la date d'aujourd'hui, 1 heure, les armées alliées ont dû se porter le 20 sur la petite rivière Alma, et le 21 sur la rivière Katska, où elles devaient trouver quelques fortifications défendues par 8,000 Russes. La situation de l'armée continue d'être pleinement satisfaisante.

No. 202.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 1,187. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 29, 1854.*

I HAVE inquired of the Minister of War whether it is intended to reinforce the French army in the East; his Excellency replied that about 10,000 men, partly from Africa and partly from France, would be sent as soon as steamers could be collected for conveying them. Marshal St. Arnaud would also be joined by General Meran's Division from Athens.

Marshal Vaillant then read to me, in confidence, some instructions which had been lately sent to Marshal St. Arnaud. He is told that it is desirable to establish, as soon as possible, a *place d'armes* in some healthy spot in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, to which these reinforcements may be sent, and where stores for the French army in the shape of clothing, ammunition, provisions, ovens for baking, &c., may be established, and from whence the Marshal may draw his supplies both in men and stores. If Sebastopol is taken,

he is ordered to fortify it immediately on the land side; it being supposed that the Russians will attempt to retake it in the spring. If it is not taken now by the allies, the attempt must be renewed in the spring on their side.

It is not to be supposed that the Russians will abandon the Crimea without a desperate struggle, and the allies must be prepared for the sacrifices which it will cost them. To supply their losses, and in case of a reverse and to cover Constantinople, a *place d'armes* in front of that city is highly desirable.

An experienced intendant will be dispatched to Constantinople immediately to make the necessary arrangements.

I have to apologise to your Lordship for the hurry in which this despatch is written.

I have &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 203.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 360.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 27, 1854.*

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 305 of the 19th instant, together with the inclosure from Lord Cowley.

Count Buol said he was happy to learn that your Lordship did not believe that Baron de Bruck could have received instructions to hold such language as is reported in your Lordship's despatch, or that he would have done so without such instructions.

The desire of the Austrian Government was so far from wishing to exclude the Western Powers from having any influence in Servia, that their anxious desire was that all the States and territory belonging to the Turkish Empire should be placed under a general European guarantee, so that the Protectorate of a single Power, which had lately been so much diverted from its real object by the Russian Government, should be entirely done away with.

Under these circumstances he felt convinced that the language stated to have been held by Baron Bruck had been entirely misunderstood or misrepresented.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 204.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 361.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 27, 1854.*

AN aide-de-camp of Prince Danilo has been sent here on a mission to this Government to explain some of the late proceedings which had taken place upon the Turkish Montenegrine frontier, and which had been severely animadverted upon by the Austrian authorities.

This officer has received from Count Buol the strongest declaration of the dissatisfaction with which the Imperial Government would view any attempt against any portion of the Turkish territory upon any pretence whatever, and he was entrusted with a message to the Prince to the effect that he might rely upon the friendship of the Austrian Government so long only as he maintained those friendly relations with the neighbouring States which it would be his best policy to preserve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 205.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 362.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 27, 1854.*

I SUBMITTED your Lordship's despatch No. 301 of the 14th instant to Count Buol, and left it with him in order that he might, after considering it, give me the explanations required by your Lordship as to the conduct of the Austrian general officers towards the Turkish authorities in Wallachia.

Count Buol said that with regard to the proposals of Colonel Kalich, as reported in Mr. Colquhoun's No. 36 of the 25th of August, he must state that he had already early in September explained to me that these proposals had been withdrawn, and that although some misunderstanding had arisen, the matter had been settled by General Popowitch, and, with the full consent of Austria, had been referred for final decision to the Porte. This explanation I reported to your Lordship unofficially on the 6th of September.

With regard to the proclamation of General Hess, it had been drawn up and published by him at a time when it was not known that any Turkish troops or authorities were in the Principalities, and it applied to the reference to the Austrian General in all things relating to the Imperial troops, and the representations which had been made against it had been superseded by its correct publication by the Wallachian authorities and Council in Bucharest.

With regard to the invitation which had been addressed by General Hess to Omer Pasha to withdraw with his forces from Bucharest, and to occupy the positions of Giurgevo and Kalarasch, as detailed in the letter of General Coronini, which is inclosed in the despatch of Mr. Colquhoun No. 51 of the 16th instant, Count Buol stated that it was dictated only by a wish to arrange in the most convenient manner the dislocation of the forces composing the two armies, and to avoid the inconveniences which always must attend the joint occupation of the same garrisons by the troops of different nations, but not at all upon political grounds, as stated by General Coronini, who had nothing to do with any such considerations.

With regard to the allusion made by Omer Pasha as to his having formerly been invited by General Hess to occupy Bucharest, and advance upon Busco, this invitation had been addressed to him at the time the Austrian army was preparing, in conjunction with the allies, to march against the Russian forces in the Principalities, and drive them by force of arms from the positions they were occupying. As soon as the declaration that the Russians would evacuate these Principalities was made by Prince Gortchakoff, this proposed operation was naturally put an end to, and could have no reference to the movements which had afterwards been recommended, or had taken place. If Omer Pasha had regarded the proposals of the Austrian Generals as an attempt to interfere with his projected strategical movement on Ibraila and Galatz, his Highness would have been perfectly reassured by the orders which had been transmitted to General Hess in no way to impede the movements of the Turkish army; orders which his Government had forwarded immediately to the Austrian Commanders on receiving notice of the construction which was put on the advice tendered by them to Omer Pasha, which had been understood as an endeavour to prevent the Turkish troops from following the Russian army, and thus enabling it to march to the Crimea, to the prejudice of the allied forces now operating against Sebastopol.

Count Buol said that nothing could be more painful to his Government than that any suspicion of such a nature should be entertained; and while he knew that those who understood the policy of his Government must at once have rejected it, he trusted that the orders sent so promptly to General Hess would have effectually refuted the representations of those who appeared always willing to decry the policy of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 206.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 364.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September 27, 1854.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I communicated your despatch No. 206 to Count Buol, and left a copy of it in his hands.

Count Buol begged me to delay any discussion with regard to it till he had time to consider it, and I therefore returned to him this day for that purpose. Count Buol said that he had observed with great pain that your Lordship had expressed your general disagreement with the policy which had been pursued by the Imperial Government, and it was with equal regret that he had received an expression of the same feeling from the French Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

He stated that although in the despatch from Paris some points were referred to which were omitted in the one from your Lordship, yet the two documents might be considered as so nearly identic, that he would read me the despatch he had already written, and was about to address to M. de Hübner, the general arguments and statements of which he should embody in his despatch to Count Colloredo, to be placed in your Lordship's hands.

Count Buol said that your Lordship stated you considered the language he had used in his despatch to Count Colloredo as indicating a change of policy, which would secure to Russia the "neutralité bienveillante" which she had all along insisted upon from Austria. He said that he deprecated this inference altogether; that the Imperial Government had no such feeling towards Russia, and he had never given any countenance to such an assumption, which he hoped, therefore, that your Lordship would discharge from your mind; and he was very certain that the Russian Government did not indulge in any such delusion, as was proved by a despatch which he had within these few days received from Count Esterhazy, which stated that Count Nesselrode, in complaining of the continued concentration of Austrian troops in the Bukowina, had not disguised from him that the corps of Guards which had lately been marched from St. Petersburgh were "à l'adresse de l'Autriche."

Your Lordship stated that the Austrian Government had made known to Russia that the refusal of the conditions of negotiation which had been proposed to her did not give them any motive for war.

Count Buol said that he knew of no such declaration having been made to Russia; he had certainly informed his allies, as he felt he was bound to do, that his Government would not willingly commence a campaign in the Russian provinces in the month of October, but what he told to those he was in alliance with he did not intend as general information, and he had made no communication to this effect to the Russian Government.

With respect to your Lordship's belief that by the posture which Austria had assumed, the prolongation of the war would be entailed; Count Buol replied that no Government could suffer more from such prolongation than that of Austria, and that therefore her greatest interest would be to bring it to a speedy close. He said the Austrian Government had not declared war, though they had offered many occasions to Russia upon which that Government might have declared it against them, but they did not wish to enter at this moment upon a contest which they felt would be attended with every disadvantage.

As to assisting the allies in their expedition against Sebastopol, for the success of which he most ardently wished, Count Buol said that the Imperial Government had never pretended that they could be able to offer any more effective cooperation with the allies than by the concentration of their troops on the frontier of Bessarabia; but they did pretend that by the assembly of their great army in the Bukowina, and by placing the Russian army in the impossibility of undertaking any offensive operation to the south of the Danube, or of remaining in the Principalities, they had facilitated the great operation which had now been undertaken by the English and French Governments.

With respect to the discussion of the immunities to be granted to the Christians in accordance with the benevolent intentions of the Sultan, Count Buol stated that he could not but still consider that the present moment might

be advantageously employed in communication between the allies upon this subject, while the pretensions which had been put forward by Russia were entirely done away with by the state of war; but he would of course conform himself upon this subject to whatever should be agreed to by the Governments engaged in the discussion.

I have faithfully reported to your Lordship the language held by Count Buol in his conversation with me, and which will probably be repeated with more detail in his despatch to Count Colloredo. Your Lordship may be sure that I shall not cease to urge upon Count Buol the importance of a closer union of the three Powers, and of the more active employment of all the means at their disposal to bring to a termination a war which might lead to the most disastrous consequences to Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 207.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 1, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL decided three days since to transmit to London and Paris a communication having for its object to re-establish the good understanding between Austria and the Western Powers, which recent circumstances appear to have disturbed. The Cabinet of Vienna acknowledges the necessity to unite the action of all the Powers by a common Act of which the bases will be submitted to your Lordship. This document would avoid whatever France and England have objected to in the late Austrian propositions, and all other details would be embraced in the same Treaty of offence and defence.

No. 208.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 29, 1854.*

I HAVE obtained, from a confidential source, a copy of the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at this Court, inclosing the reply of the Imperial Cabinet to the four conditions lately supported at St. Petersburgh by the Prussian Government; as also copy of the reply thereto in a despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther, the Prussian Representative at the Imperial Court; both of which I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith.

Although these documents refer to conditions which have been disdainfully rejected by the Russian Government, and may be considered as out of date, it will be interesting to your Lordship to learn the tone of the communications which have been exchanged between the Prussian and Russian Governments on this subject.

I beg leave to draw your Lordship's special attention to that part of Count Nesselrode's despatch, in which he openly accuses the Prussian Government of a want of consistency in giving their support to these four conditions; observing, that as the last overtures of the Russian Government (viz., the answer to the Austrian summation, conveyed in a despatch addressed to Prince Gortchakoff of June $\frac{14}{26}$) had been drawn up at the suggestion, if not under the dictation, of Prussia, the Cabinet of Berlin ought not to have been surprised at the refusal of Russia now to depart from a basis of negotiation which they (the Prussian Government) had themselves deemed to be equitable and satisfactory.

Baron Manteuffel, in his reply to Baron Werther, endeavours to repel this accusation of inconsistency; he states, that the opinions of the Prussian Cabinet had not been entirely in accordance with the attitude taken by other Powers; and as a proof of this statement, his Excellency refers to the non-participation of Prussia in the exchange of notes with the Western Powers.

He ends his despatch in vague and sophistical language, evincing an evident desire to tranquillise the Imperial Cabinet, and continuing to assume for Prussia that active and prominent part in the future negotiations of peace, which indeed ought rightfully to belong only to those who have incurred the risks and sacrifices attendant on war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 208.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

St. Pétersbourg, ce $\frac{1}{13}$ Août, 1854.

M. le Baron,

LE Baron de Werther a placé sous nos yeux les communications de son Cabinet en date du $\frac{1}{13}$.

Le Gouvernement Prussien, y examinant les quatre points qui viennent d'être proposés par les Puissances Occidentales, et adoptés par l'Autriche, émet l'opinion que ces points seraient de nature à former la base d'une entrée en négociation pour la paix et comme tels nous en recommande l'adoption.

Je crois superflu, M. le Baron, d'énumérer ici les raisons qui ne nous permettent point d'entrer même dans l'examen des nouvelles conditions qu'on nous pose. Ces raisons se trouvent suffisamment développées dans la réponse, en copie ci-jointe, que nous venons d'adresser à l'Autriche, et que vous voudrez bien porter à la connaissance du Cabinet de Berlin en le priant de s'y référer.

Nous regrettons profondément de n'avoir pu en cette occasion déférer une fois de plus à ses suggestions amicales. Mais comme c'est d'après ses mêmes suggestions, et pour ainsi dire sous sa dictée, qu'ont été rédigées les dernières ouvertures de notre part, auxquelles l'Autriche vient de répondre d'une manière si différente de celle que l'approbation du Gouvernement Prussien nous avait permis d'espérer, il ne s'étonnera sans doute pas que nous ne puissions nous départir des bases de négociation qu'il avait lui-même jugé équitables et satisfaisantes. C'est en vain que nous avons fait tous les sacrifices qui dépendaient de nous aux intérêts de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne. Au moment où, même avant de connaître quelles sécurités nous offrirait l'Autriche, nous lui présentions par l'évacuation effective des Principautés un moyen de se délier des obligations du Protocole, elle a cru devoir, par l'interprétation abusive qu'elle donne à cet Acte, s'engager encore plus avant vis-à-vis des Puissances Occidentales dans la voie qui l'entraine à nous imposer avec elle des conditions qui, dans la pensée hautement avouée de celle-ci, ont pour but d'humilier et d'abaisser matériellement la Russie, non pour assurer, comme elles le prétendent, l'équilibre Européen, mais pour le changer à leur bénéfice exclusif ou le compromettre indéfiniment. Nous avons suffisamment prouvé par nos concessions successives de quel côté se trouvaient réellement les dispositions pacifiques. Aucune de ces concessions n'a été accueillie, chacune au contraire n'a servi qu'à amener de nouvelles exigences. Il ne nous reste donc plus à notre grand regret qu'à accepter la position qu'on nous crée et qu'à attendre des événements une occasion plus favorable pour entamer les négociations d'une paix, qui ne cessera jamais de former notre désir le plus sincère.

L'Empereur vous charge de vous expliquer dans ce sens auprès du Gouvernement Prussien en portant la présente dépêche à sa connaissance.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 208.

Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther.

Berlin, le 9 Septembre, 1854.

M. le Baron,

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint copie de la dépêche que le Baron de Budberg m'a communiquée pour nous faire part de son annexe, adressée au Prince Gortchakoff sous la même date du $\frac{1}{13}$ Août.

Je me bornerais aujourd'hui à vous exprimer mes regrets sur le refus du Cabinet Impérial d'admettre les bases de négociations qui lui avaient été proposées, si quelques passages de la dépêche au Baron de Budberg ne m'imposaient pas le devoir d'y répondre.

La dépêche Russe donne à entendre que les dernières ouvertures du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, c'est-à-dire, la dépêche du $\frac{17}{29}$ Juin au Prince Gortchakoff, auraient été rédigées sous notre dictée, et que par conséquent on aurait pu espérer qu'après avoir approuvé cette dépêche nous ne proposerions pas à la Russie des bases de négociation qui en différaient essentiellement. Certes, quand il s'est agi de donner dans le tems par nos conseils une impulsion aux décisions du Cabinet Impérial, nous l'avons donnée conformément à notre conviction, mais sans assumer à ce sujet une responsabilité quelconque, dans le sens de la conciliation et de la déférence aux demandes des Puissances Allemandes. Nous avons pleinement apprécié ce que les déclarations Russes ont offert à ce sujet de satisfaisant, et tout en déclinant la solidarité qu'on a l'air de vouloir nous rappeler, en y rattachant la reproche de l'inconséquence, nous avons lieu de croire que notre jugement sur les ouvertures de la Russie n'a point été sans influence sur les suites qui ont été données. Notre manière de voir à ce sujet n'a toutefois point pu être mise entièrement d'accord avec l'attitude prises par les autres Puissances, et il en est résulté que nous sommes restés étrangers à l'échange de notes qui a eu lieu à Vienne. Etait-ce à dire que le Cabinet du Roi renonçait à s'associer à toute démarche qui semblait offrir quelque chance d'établir une base pour des négociations et un point de départ pour la suspension des hostilités? Bien certainement non; nous ne revendiquons pas au quatre points, que la Russie vient de refuser comme base de négociation, le monopole d'être exclusivement propres à remplir ce but, mais nous continuons, en en détachant l'écorce d'une susceptibilité à laquelle nous ne contestons pas d'être naturelle, à y trouver un noyau appelé à reparaître tôt ou tard, avec telle ou telle modification, comme base de l'arrangement qui assurera à l'Europe les bienfaits de la paix.

Vous savez, M. le Baron, que c'est vers ce but que tendent tous les efforts du Roi notre auguste Maître, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous répéter que Sa Majesté ne s'en départira pas.

Veuillez, M. le Baron, donner connaissance de cette dépêche à M. le Comte de Nesselrode, et agréez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 209.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 2.*)

(No. 97.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 29*, 1854.

I WAITED on Baron Manteuffel on Monday last, and in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 51.

Baron Manteuffel stopped me at its commencement to remark that Prussia had never declared that she would not act against Russia.

I replied to his Excellency that I received his observation with satisfaction, and would faithfully report it to your Lordship.

His Excellency further remarked, with reference to the Prussian circular of the 3rd instant, that it must be borne in mind that that document was a communication to their German confederates.

I observed to his Excellency that at all events it might be expected that Prussia would advise her confederates to adopt the same course which she had professed the readiness to pursue herself; and I intimated to his Excellency that your Lordship's reply to a similar observation of Count Bernstorff's (which I was about to read to him in continuation of the despatch), most unanswerably refuted any such attempt to excuse the Prussian circular.

His Excellency made no further observation during the reading of this despatch, and its termination did not offer any further remark upon it. He informed me, however, that he had received a "good despatch" from London that day with respect to a Prussian vessel (the "Louisa," I believe), which had been seized and afterwards liberated; and he told me that this had produced a good impression on the King.

We had subsequently some conversation with respect to the negotiations with Austria. His Excellency remarked that he desired nothing better than to come to some agreement with her, but that it was easier to give expression to the feeling than to effect it. He complained that she was susceptible, and in mentioning her circular of the 14th, stated that it was very unclear and undecided; that at the commencement she recommended the four points, and afterwards withdrew them; and he finally remarked to me that even England and France no longer cared about them.

I replied to his Excellency, that with respect to these points he must bear in mind that two of them, and these more especially referring to German and Prussian interests, were already achieved—first, the Principalities were in the occupation of the Turkish and Austrian troops; and secondly, the mouth of the Danube, or at least the Sulina branch, was in our hands. It appeared to me, therefore, that if Prussia and Germany were really anxious for German interests, their only and best policy would be to act in union and harmony with Austria and the Western Powers, as their interests would certainly not be advanced in acting in opposition to us.

His Excellency seemed to recognize the justice of these observations, but appeared jealous and suspicious of Austria, and fearful that a conflict might yet arise in the Principalities between Austria and Russia, which, if Prussia entered into any fresh positive engagement, might entail upon her active military assistance.

I found his Excellency at this interview more conversible and friendly than I had reason to expect, nor did he evince any soreness or anger during the communication of your Lordship's despatch. Of a naturally cold and reserved temperament he seems determined to carry out at all price the inert policy of his Sovereign, unmoved by the difficulties of his task and the dangers which menace the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 210.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 29, 1854.*

AS some misapprehension may exist with respect to the number of the Russian Guards which have lately left St. Petersburgh for Warsaw, I take the liberty of reporting to your Lordship the following return, which I have received from a competent authority here.

The 2nd Division, which is now on its march, is composed of—

		Battalions.	Men.
1st Brigade.	Finland - - - -	3	2,700
„ „	Grenadiers - - - -	3	2,700
2nd Brigade.	Moscow - - - -	3	2,700
„ „	Paulow - - - -	3	2,700
		12	10,800
		Squadrons.	Men.
2nd Battalion of Hussars - - - -		8	1,100
Light Cavalry, composed of Lancers - -		8	1,100
		16	2,200

Making in all a force of *circa* 13,000 men, from which a deduction must be made for the non-effective.

It is thought that there is more of menace in this measure than real hostile intention on the part of Russia towards Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 211.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, September 29, 1854.*

ALTHOUGH I have little doubt that the two diplomatic documents which I have the honour to inclose have already come to your Lordship's hands, I think it right to transmit them, as a sequel to the Prussian circular note of September 3.

The first is the circular addressed by Count Buol, on the 14th instant, to the several Austrian Agents in Germany; the second, the note of September 12, written by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, in reference to the Russian rejection of the four points.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure 1 in No. 211.

Circular addressed to Austrian Representatives at the German Courts, September 14, 1854.

[See Inclosure in No. 165.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 211.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

Vienne, le 12 Septembre, 1854.

L'APPRECIATION des ouvertures dont vous aviez été chargé auprès de la Cour de Russie par notre expédition du 10 Août, se trouve consignée dans une dépêche adressée à M. le Prince de Gortchakoff en date du $\frac{1}{23}$ Août, dont cet Envoyé a bien voulu me donner communication, et que j'ai l'honneur de joindre ici en copie pour votre connaissance.

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg décline les bases préliminaires qui nous semblaient devoir offrir un point de départ équitable pour mettre un terme à une guerre aussi désastreuse. Sans les avoir même soumises à un examen sérieux, il déclare leur acceptation incompatible avec la dignité et les intérêts de la Russie.

Un rejet aussi complet que catégorique dispense le Cabinet de Vienne du soin d'entrer dans l'analyse des arguments destinés à servir de justification à cette regrettable détermination. Il lui suffit de repousser l'insinuation comme quoi l'Autriche aurait voulu s'associer à un projet hautement avoué d'amener l'abaissement moral et matériel de la Russie, et il ne peut que persister dans sa conviction que les bases recommandées à l'acceptation du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg sont les seules qui eussent pu, dans les circonstances du moment, nous mener à cette paix solide et durable qui se présente comme un besoin impérieux pour l'Europe.

L'Empereur, notre auguste Maître, en regrettant sincèrement que ses offres aient trouvé un accueil si contraire à ses désirs, réserve ses efforts et son action pour un moment où il pourra avec plus d'efficacité les faire valoir dans l'intérêt d'une solution telle qu'elle convient aux besoins de l'Europe et de son Empire. Sa Majesté Impériale, au reste, n'a pu relever qu'avec satisfaction—et vous êtes

expressément chargé d'en faire parvenir l'assurance à Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas—la confirmation de l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes par les troupes Russes. Cette occupation, vous ne l'ignorez pas, M. le Comte, a toujours été déplorée par nous comme une des principales causes de la guerre, et à la fois comme une grave atteinte portée à des intérêts majeurs que l'Empereur est appelé à sauvegarder. Mettre un terme à cette occupation, qui n'aurait pu se prolonger sans amener un surcroît de pénibles complications, et déclarer en même temps que les troupes Russes, après s'être placés derrière le Pruth, se tiendront sur la défensive, c'est donc, nous aimions à la reconnaître, écarter un fait qui, aussi longtemps qu'il subsistait, suffisait pour opposer un obstacle insurmontable à toute entente générale.

Vous voudrez bien donner communication de cette dépêche à M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

No. 212.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 1,195.)

Paris, October 2, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER received orders yesterday by telegraph to congratulate the Emperor and French Government, in the name of Count Buol, on the signal success obtained by the French army in the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 213.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 1,206.)

Paris, October 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a report made to the Minister of War by M. Blanchot, Intendant Militaire of the French army in the East, which has been published in the "Moniteur," by order of the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 213.

M. Blanchot to the Minister of War.

Rade de Baltchik, le 5 Septembre, 1854.

M. le Maréchal,

PENDANT les derniers jours qui précèdent le départ d'une expédition de l'importance de celle qui commence, il faut pourvoir à tant de nécessités imprévues, qu'il ne m'a pas été possible de rendre compte à votre Excellence de l'organisation administrative de l'expédition ; j'espère avoir le temps de le faire avant l'appareillage.

Intendance.—Le personnel de l'intendance attaché au quartier-général se compose de :

M. de Molines, Sous-Intendant Militaire, de première classe ;
M. de Ségauville, Sous-Intendant Militaire, de deuxième classe ;
M. Vignier, Sous-Intendant Militaire, de deuxième classe ;
M. Lévy, Adjoint de première classe.

Chacune des quatre divisions a un Sous-Intendant ou Adjoint, et un capitaine faisant fonctions d'Adjoint. Ces capitaines ont été choisis parmi ceux qui ont annoncé avoir l'intention de concourir pour l'admission dans le corps de l'intendance.

J'ai laissé à Varna M. le Sous-Intendant Militaire Bondurand, comme chef supérieur des services administratifs et mon délégué pour les décisions à prendre sur toutes les questions de détail ou dont l'urgence ne permettrait pas qu'elles me fussent déférés.

J'ai laissé également à Varna les Sous-Intendants chargés au quartier-général, des services des fonds, de la solde, et des revues, et des hôpitaux.

Pour le premier, la mesure était commandée par celle adoptée par le M. le Maréchal Commandant-en-chef pour la simplification du service de la trésorerie à l'armée de Crimée. Il n'y a qu'une seule caisse, celle de la première division ; un seul sous-délégataire des crédits, le Sous-Intendant de cette division. Les dépenses des autres divisions seront ordonnancées par leurs Sous-Intendants, mais au nom de leur collègue de la première division.

Hôpitaux.—Tout notre service des hôpitaux est en Turquie. Nous aurons certainement beaucoup de blessés en Crimée, mais ils ne feront qu'un séjour momentané dans les ambulances ; jusqu'à ce que nous puissons créer des établissements hospitaliers à Sébastopol, tout sera évacué sur Varna et Constantinople. Il fallait donc que le Sous-Intendant qui a dirigé cet important service depuis que nous sommes en Orient, restât sur les lieux ou à proximité des lieux où sont nos hôpitaux d'évacuation.

C'est aussi pour ce motif que M. le Maréchal a engagé M. le Docteur Lévy à ne pas accompagner cette première fraction de l'armée expéditionnaire. M. le Directeur Médical va se rendre à Constantinople pour diriger la requisition de médecins civils ; pour aider, par ses conseils et par l'influence de sa haute position, l'organisation de nouveaux hôpitaux que j'ai prescrit d'ouvrir. M. Lévy reviendra ensuite à Varna, où je laisse un ensemble hospitalier fort compliqué. Lorsque nous serons en mesure de penser au moyen de garder nos malades en Crimée, la présence du Directeur Médical y sera nécessaire ; elle sera réclamée.

Les ambulances des divisions sont fortement constituées. J'y tenais essentiellement. Elles ont chacune huit officiers de santé, dont quelques praticiens fort habiles en chirurgie. Les chefs primitivement donnés aux ambulances étaient des médecins distingués. C'était une bonne mesure alors que l'armée n'avait pas un grand rôle de guerre à jouer. La douloureuse crise que nous avons traversée a prouvé l'excellence de cette mesure. Mais nous allons avoir un autre ennemi à combattre. Il fallait préparer d'autres moyens ; les médecins sont rentrés dans les hôpitaux, les chirurgiens ont pris leur place aux ambulances.

L'ambulance et la réserve du quartier-général sont pauvres numériquement. Elles n'ont que M. Scrive, médecin chef, deux Majors et quatre Aides-Majors, et un seul adjudant d'administration pour comptable. Je ne pouvais faire plus, car, pour arriver à constituer les ambulances divisionnaires, j'ai dû laisser dans les hôpitaux un personnel insuffisant.

Chaque ambulance de division a trois caissons, une fraction de l'ambulance légère venue d'Alger et toute le matériel que j'ai pu y ajouter. Au quartier-général il y a également trois caissons et une forte réserve de médicaments, d'instruments de chirurgie et de mobilier.

Indépendamment des tentes d'ambulance et de 500 autres qui sont embarqués au titre du campement, il y a dans le convoi quatre baraques que j'ai fait construire à Constantinople et qui pourront être montées en vingt-quatre heures. Elles recevront 200 lits qui sont également embarqués. Elles serviront de salles d'officiers et de salles à amputation. Le deuxième convoi m'apportera de nouvelles baraques et de nouveaux lits.

Pour le couchage des autre malades ou blessés, nous avons quelques

centaines de petits matelas faits avec deux sacs des subsistances, et contenant 4 kilos de laine, 3,500 nattes, et 2,000 couvertures, non compris celles qui appartiennent aux ambulances divisionnaires, plus 4,000 couvertures embarquées par le service du campement, et qui, au besoin, seront versées à celui des hôpitaux.

Enfin, M. le Maréchal, je me suis attaché à tirer tout le parti possible des ressources dont je dispose et que j'ai pu trouver à Constantinople, pour que l'armée de Sa Majesté reçoive pendant et après le combat tous les soins nécessaires. Je crois y être parvenu.

Subsistances.—La question des subsistances a été ma plus grosse difficulté, parce que j'avais à lutter contre les nécessités des autres services de l'armée. Tous les jours je voyais diminuer le nombre des navires qui m'étaient accordés dans le convoi, pour augmenter les transports de l'artillerie et du génie.

M. le Maréchal Commandant-en-chef ne me demandait des vivres que pour dix jours. La marine s'est engagée à m'en remettre pour dix jours, plus quatre jours, que les hommes porteront dans le sac en débarquant. C'était donc un approvisionnement pour vingt-quatre jours. Je ne l'ai pas trouvé suffisant. Nous pouvions avoir des retards de mer qui diminueraient les ressources de la marine et ne lui permettraient plus de me faire le versement promis; et mes prévisions se sont déjà réalisées, puisque les troupes sont embarquées depuis le 31 Août et le 1 Septembre. Il y a, en outre, à craindre des avaries, des embarcations chavirées, des pertes quelconques. Enfin, le second convoi, qui sera en mer à l'équinoxe, peut éprouver de longs retards.

Une dernière considération m'obligeait à porter les approvisionnements à une plus grande hauteur. Une division de 6,000 à 7,000 Turcs est avec nous. Elle a fort peu de vivres. Tout semble que sont les soldats Turcs, ils ne vivent pas sans manger. Il faudra bien les nourrir lorsqu'ils auront épuisé leur faible réserve, et c'est moi que M. le Maréchal chargera de ce soin.

Ces nécessités bien comprises, je me suis mis en mesure d'y pourvoir. J'ai fait noliser à Constantinople tout ce qu'on a pu trouver de transports à voiles et de vapeurs porteurs ou remorqueurs. Je suis parvenu à avoir des transports en quantité suffisante, non-seulement pour le premier convoi, mais pour préparer le second, de manière à ce qu'il soit prêt à partir dès que les vapeurs détachés de l'escadre iront les chercher. J'ai obtenu, en outre, de l'Amiral de l'escadre Ottomane, qu'il prît sur ses vaisseaux 450 tonneaux de nos vivres. Grâce à ces moyens, l'approvisionnement de bouche, calculé sur 30,000 rationnaires, se compose de:

Biscuit, 25 jours } Ration de repas et de soupe.
Farine, 15 jours }
Riz, 45 jours. Rations à 90 grammes.
Sel, 55 jours.
Sucre } 50 jours. Ration double. La marine n'en versera pas.
Café }
Vin, 800,000 rations.
Eau-de-vie, 400,000 rations.
Salaisons, 17 jours.
Viande fraîche, 10 jours.

Votre Excellence remarquera que l'approvisionnement en viande est faible relativement. Il ne m'a pas été possible de me procurer une plus grande quantité de salaisons. Aucun des chargements expédiés des ports d'Angleterre ou des ports Français de l'Ocean n'était arrivé avant mon départ. J'espère qu'il en arrivera à Varna avant que le deuxième convoi prenne la mer. Quant à la viande fraîche, je n'ai pas pu faire embarquer plus de 800 bœufs, parce que les bateaux-écuries manquent. Cependant, je ne crois pas que nous soyons exposés à manquer de viande. La marine doit me verser pour douze jours de salaisons. Nous aurons donc un approvisionnement de trente-neuf jours; or, trente-neuf jours après le débarquement, nous aurons certainement reçu le deuxième convoi. D'ailleurs, la question de Sébastopol sera décidée, et il est probable que nous trouverons alors des bestiaux à acheter dans la Crimée.

La question des fourrages était la plus difficile à résoudre d'une manière satisfaisante; elle ne l'a pas été, sauf en ce qui concerne l'orge. Non seulement le foin est d'un transport difficile pour une expédition de cette nature, mais nous en étions faiblement approvisionnés à Varna. La plus grande partie de ce qui existait a été distribué sur les bateaux-écuries et étables. Il en reste à peine

pour huit jours dans le convoi, mais il y a de l'orge pour environ quarante jours, à la ration de 5 kilogrammes. J'espère que nous trouverons du foin et de la paille en Crimée. La commission envoyés par M. le Maréchal pour reconnaître la côte a vu de grandes quantités de meules de foin à peu de distance du point de débarquement. Si les Russes n'ont pas détruit cette précieuse ressource, elle fera disparaître la seule difficulté sérieuse de l'expédition au point de vue administratif. Cette difficulté existera toujours, M. le Ministre, partout où il ne sera pas possible de se procurer des fourrages dans les contrées occupées par l'armée. Les transports par mer sont si lents, si incertains, à cause des deux détroits à franchir, que, malgré les grandes ressources tirées de l'Algérie, et que votre Excellence a mises à ma disposition, malgré celles assez importants que j'ai fait réunir sur divers points de la Turquie, je suis toujours exposé à manquer de foin.

Nous avons sauvé seulement sept fours de campagne lors de l'incendie de Varna. Je les emporte; l'armée pourra donc recevoir, dès le début de la campagne, du pain pour un jour sur trois. J'emporte, en outre, les ferrements et le matériel de boulangerie pour vingt fours de construction. Un navire chargé de briques, un autre chargé de planches et de madriers, sont dans le convoi. En outre, plusieurs navires ont des briques pour lest.

Le point probable de débarquement est complétement dénudé. On n'aperçoit du bois qu'à une certaine distance. J'ai dû prévoir le cas où la résistance de l'ennemi ne permettrait pas à nos divisions de prendre position immédiatement sur les terrains boisés. J'ai fait charger 6,000 quintaux de bois sur des navires qui sont dans le convoi.

Campement.—J'ai déjà fait connaître à votre Excellence les quantités de tentes, de nattes et de couvertures qui sont embarquées, et que je destine en partie au service des hôpitaux. Il y a encore dans le convoi des effets de linge et chaussure, des outils et ustensiles de campement, des fers et clous, en quantité suffisante pour les besoins, pendant la plus longue durée de l'expédition.

Ce service est confié à un officier d'administration et un adjudant.

Transports.—Le détachement du train embarqué se compose de 250 mulets à cacolets ou litières; 50 par division et 50 de réserve au quartier-général; 15 caissons d'ambulance; 22 caissons de transport; 2 chariots et une forge. Un détachement d'ouvriers constructeurs accompagne ce matériel. Il y a, en outre, une réserve de 100 bâts à cacolets et quelques litières, qui serviront au transport des blessés en cas d'insuffisance des mulets et voitures du train, en mettant en réquisition les mulets de bagages des officiers.

J'ai laissé le Commandant Huguenet à Varna, où il arrive journellement encore des animaux et des voitures. Sa présence y était nécessaire pour organiser les compagnies non encore complètes. Il me rejoindra par le deuxième convoi.

J'ai donné l'ordre d'expédier directement sur la Crimée, au fur et à mesure de leur arrivée en rade de Varna et sans rien débarquer, 66 voitures dont votre Excellence m'a annoncé l'envoi, et dont j'ai appris l'embarquement à Marseille.

Les transports maritimes appartenant à l'administration se composent de:

92 navires à voiles remorqués et chargés de chevaux et de matériel appartenant aux divers services de l'armée et des munitions de bouche;

30 navires naviguant à la voile sous le commandement d'un lieutenant de vaisseau montant "La Ville-de-Perpignan," vapeur nolisé, et ayant un autre petit vapeur à sa disposition pour l'aider dans la conduite de ce convoi;

4 grands vapeurs, "Le Henri IV" et "l'Egyptien" de la Compagnie Bazin, le "Phœbe," Anglais, et "l'Indus," de la Compagnie des Messageries Impériales. Ce dernier a été requis par M. le Maréchal pour ce voyage. Les trois premiers sont nolisées pour trois mois, avec faculté de continuer la location;

1 petit vapeur Français, "La Ville-de-Perpignan," portant 150 tonneaux, nolisé pour deux mois;

2 remorqueurs nolisés au mois indéfiniment.

J'ai laissé, en outre, à Varna, un grand nombre de navires à voiles pour qu'on puisse préparer le deuxième convoi, et deux remorqueurs jugés indispensables pour faciliter et abréger les mouvements de la rade.

Il y a en outre deux remorqueurs à la disposition du Sous-Intendant de Constantinople, pour faire conduire nos navires à voiles à la sortie du Bosphore.

Je crois avoir déjà rendu compte à votre Excellence que j'en ai envoyé un en station aux Dardanelles. J'ai donc aujourd'hui à ma disposition sept remorqueurs. Un huitième a été nolisé; mais deux jours après son arrivée à Varna, il s'est jeté sur une roche, et il n'a pas été possible à la marine de le renflouer. J'ai laissé des ordres à Varna et à Constantinople pour qu'on termine l'affaire de ce sinistre.

Tous ces affrétements, M. le Maréchal, entraînent l'Etat dans des dépenses très-considérables; mais elles étaient commandées par les circonstances. La grandeur du but à atteindre ne me permettait pas d'hésiter à les faire. J'espère avoir l'approbation de votre Excellence.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
L'Intendant Militaire de l'Armée d'Orient,
(Signé) BLANCHOT.

P.S.—A l'article *Subsistances*, j'ai omis de mentionner le personnel de ce service. Il se compose, au quartier-général, de quatre officiers comptables, un pour chacun des services des vivres-pain, vivres de campagne, vivres-viande et fourrages. Chaque comptable a deux adjudants sous ses ordres. Chaque division a un officier comptable et deux adjudants. Cette composition de personnel me donne la garantie d'une très-bonne exécution du service, en même temps qu'elle me permettra d'exiger que les écritures soient toujours tenues à jour.

B.

No. 214.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 1,207.)
My Lord,

Paris, October 4, 1854.

I INQUIRED this morning of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he had received from M. de Bourqueney any intelligence such as that sent by Lord Westmorland to your Lordship by telegraph on the 1st instant, namely, that the Austrian Government was ready to make an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain and France.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he had received a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, stating that he (M. de Bourqueney) omitted no opportunity of letting the Austrian Government understand that the Emperor was not satisfied with the conduct of Austria in the Principalities, and that he thought that Count Buol was no longer so averse as he had been to the signature of a Treaty of offence and defence; that Count Buol was about to write to M. de Hübner on the subject, and that he (M. de Bourqueney) would immediately transmit to Paris the new propositions of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The messenger having the instructions to M. de Hübner has been telegraphed as on the road.

I expressed the hope that M. Drouyn de Lhuys would be very reserved with M. de Hübner until the opinions of Her Majesty's Government upon these new propositions were known.

His Excellency promised to be so. He gave no intimation that he wished to enter at present into any more binding relations with Austria, and he read me a despatch which he was about to send to-day to M. de Bourqueney.

It appears that M. de Bourqueney, in reply to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' remonstrances against the conduct of Austria in insisting on the return of Prince Stirbey to Bucharest, had stated that he considered that that event had been brought about by the supineness of the Porte more than by the dictation of Austria, and that Count Buol would not have insisted on its accomplishment if it had been energetically protested against by the French and English Governments. M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes in his reply, in citing passages of conversations which he had had on the subject with M. de Hübner, that the Austrian Government could not pretend ignorance on this point, for it had been expressly alluded to in Count Buol's despatches.

It appears also that Count Buol has told M. de Bourqueney that he is most desirous that some decision should be taken respecting the administration of the Danubian Provinces in order that they may not become the prey of anarchy and disorder, and that he wishes to consult the Western Powers on this point. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replies that, although the Emperor adheres to his decision of not discussing the four points, his Excellency has no objection to come to some common understanding with the Governments of Great Britain, Austria, and Turkey, respecting a temporary administration of those provinces, and he would like to know what M. de Bourqueney thinks can be effected. He promises to write to Count Walewski to call your Lordship's attention to the subject.

I asked whether any distinct proposition had been sent to Count Walewski. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied in the negative.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 215.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 590.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 6, 1854.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 525 of the 20th of September, respecting the course pursued by Austria in the Principalities; and it would appear from your observations, that while acknowledging the soundness of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Austrian occupation of those Provinces, as set forth in my various despatches to Lord Westmorland, of which copies have been communicated to you, the Turkish Ministers reluctantly acquiesce in the course pursued by Austria, although that course may have the appearance of leading to consequences not easily to be reconciled with the principles laid down in my despatches.

The views and principles of Her Majesty's Government as explained in those despatches were, that the occupation by Austrian troops of the Principalities should not be of an exclusive character; that no interpretation of the Treaty between Austria and the Porte would justify the Austrian Government in demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, against the consent of the Porte, nor, under such circumstances, would Her Majesty's Government recommend the Turkish Government to comply with the requisition; that the march of the allied troops should neither be opposed nor embarrassed, if they determined on pursuing the Russians through the Principalities; and that England and France would not consent to Austria assuming a position which would enable her hereafter to exercise an armed mediation.

The views thus entertained by Her Majesty's Government have more recently been impressed on the Austrian Government with reference to the proceedings of the Austrian Commander-in-chief on entering the Principalities, as your Excellency will have seen by my despatch to the Earl of Westmorland, No. 301 of the 14th of September.

Assurances, upon the whole satisfactory, have been received from the Austrian Government in reply to the several communications; but Her Majesty's Government have seen no reason to alter the opinion expressed in my despatch No. 485 of the 18th of August, as to the conditions upon which alone it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that the Austrian occupation of the Principalities might be safe and advantageous to the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 216.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 111. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, September 30, 1854.*

A DAY or two after I had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 34 of the 22nd ultimo, inclosing your Lordship's despatch No. 51 of the 19th, to Lord Augustus Loftus, I called upon Baron Prokesch, and found the Representatives of Bavaria and Saxony with his Excellency. When they had taken their leave, I said that I hoped my having found those gentlemen at his Excellency's house was a good sign, and that there might be some foundation for the reports that Bavaria and Saxony were more disposed than they had recently shown themselves towards Austrian policy.

M. de Prokesch answered that such was not by any means the case; MM. von der Pfordten and Beust pursued their course; the latter especially, said his Excellency, aims at taking a high place in European politics (veut faire de la haute politique), and that there was, in reality, no nearer approach, on the part of either State, to Austrian views on the Eastern question.

M. de Prokesch went on to say that he found the Diet so averse to pronouncing themselves in any way in the sense he and his Government desired, that he found it desirable to continue the same conduct which he had adopted respecting the question of putting the Federal contingents on a war-footing; namely, to allow the questions as to adhesion to the Treaty of the 20th of April, and all other subsidiary ones relating to Eastern affairs, to remain undecided, and to put off receiving the reports of the Committees.

M. de Prokesch was full of invective against Prussia, and repeated what he has often already said to me, that Austria could not feel assured of not finding that State arrayed in hostility against her.

M. de Prokesch, on our conversation turning upon the recent correspondence of M. de Manteuffel with the Prussian Representatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and London, read to me the note addressed to M. de Bernstorff, which drew forth your Lordship's despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, No. 51 of the 19th ultimo. This despatch I had with me, and allowed M. de Prokesch to peruse it. The contents appeared to afford him considerable satisfaction; and his Excellency then showed me copies of the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron de Budberg, by which that Minister was instructed to signify to the Cabinet of Berlin the Czar's rejection of the four points; and also the despatch which M. de Manteuffel had written to Baron Werther in reference to Count Nesselrode's communication.

These State Papers have no doubt been before your Lordship, and I need only remark in relation to them, that the point to which M. de Prokesch especially called my attention was the assertion made in the note of Count Nesselrode, by way of reproach to the Cabinet of Berlin, that the support given by His Prussian Majesty to the four points had much surprised his Imperial Master, as the demands they embodied were altogether beyond and at variance with the propositions antecedently made by Austria, which demands (if I recollect the wording of the despatch rightly) were asserted by Count Nesselrode to have been framed "sous la dictée de la Prusse."

In the despatch from Baron Manteuffel to M. de Werther, this observation of Count Nesselrode's was replied to in a way that fully admitted the gravamen of the charge of dictating to Austria, if such it can be styled; and Baron Prokesch seemed to think it a deadly offence to his Cabinet that M. de Buol should be supposed to have written anything whatever under the influence of Prussian inspirations.

His Excellency told me that it was incorrect to say that negotiations were at present going on between the two States; the dissidence was great, and the present efforts of Prussia were all directed to circumscribing and defining the action of Austria in the Danubian Principalities within limits favourable to Russia. Prussia was at present demanding categorical explanations from Austria as to her views and intentions in holding the Principalities. Would Austria, for example, allow the Turks (no allusion, I believe, is made to the

allied forces) to attack the Russian Province of Bessarabia? What would the Austrian Corps of Occupation do in case of Turkish successes or reverses? Would they permit the Turks to be reinforced? Would they allow the Russians to pursue the Turks, if repulsed, into Moldavian or Wallachian territory?

These queries, M. de Prokesch said, were in view of the counsels which Prussia would give her German confederates as to their adherence to Austrian views in respect of the four points. I had previously heard that Austria had expressed herself as only requiring the Diet's adhesion to two points, namely: first, the free navigation of the Danube and Black Sea; and secondly, the cessation of Russian Protectorate over the Principalities, and consequent sanction of Austrian occupation.

I put then the question directly to M. de Prokesch as to the foundation for such an assertion.

His Excellency did not explicitly reply to my query; but I am inclined to think from what he did admit, that this assertion of Austria's requirements from her German confederates is essentially correct, and is in fact the extent of concession to Prussia which it is thought prudent to make. It is sought hereby to extend the federal obligations of mutual defence to the Danubian occupation, and that a Russian attack on the troops of Austria in those Provinces should entail the same consequences as an aggression on any other Province of the Empire comprised in the Germanic Confederation.

I thought, I said to M. de Prokesch, that in order to secure the really free navigation of the Danube, it would be necessary to exclude the Russians entirely from the banks of that river; it might perhaps suffice to draw a line from Akerman, or some point agreed upon on the Black Sea, to the Pruth, effectually to obtain that object.

On this Baron de Prokesch said that his plans went far greater lengths; that he would deprive Russia of the whole of Bessarabia, and restore it to Turkey; that he had already said as much to his Ministry, and made no secret of his opinions, of his personal feeling of hostility to Russia.

I remarked that some disappointment had very naturally been felt in England and France at the recent decision of Austria not to consider the rejection of the four points by the Emperor of Russia as a *casus belli*. That in weighing the conduct of Prussia, which his Excellency appeared to consider in nearly the same light as I did myself, it seemed to me that the divergence might and ought to have induced Austria to take her own line. No doubt could be reasonably entertained that England and France, determined as they were to obtain a secure peace, were able to compass that object without aid from any quarter; but that if Austria had resolved to take an active part against Russia, there could not exist any difference of opinion as to the desired object of the war being likely to be more speedily obtained. Surely, I said, Austria could rely not only on our earnestness in pushing hostilities to the utmost, but on our good faith and abnegation of all aims at aggrandizement as consigned in our Treaty engagements with France.

To this M. de Prokesch promptly replied that this was not enough; that between individuals perfect reliance on good faith might subsist, and responsibilities be entered into accordingly; but with States it was otherwise, and nothing but the guarantee of written engagements sufficed in such emergencies. He had, he declared, advised his Government to enter into such engagements with the Western Powers, and said that had he himself been Minister, he would ere this have taken steps to enter into negotiations for an alliance irrespective of Prussia and her policy, which he characterized as double-dealing and insincere.

Such are the main points of M. de Prokesch's conversation and remarks upon this occasion. His Excellency's character and dispositions are already so well known to your Lordship, that it is not likely that you will attach an undue value to them, or be led to think that the opinions of the President of the Diet will have much weight with Count Buol.

Anything that for the moment opposes his own peculiar views becomes on the instant the object of Baron Prokesch's virulent enmity. Thus Russia, whose policy he had formerly to combat at Constantinople, and whence he consequently received proofs of his having made himself personally obnoxious, is not likely to be spared, if he had it in his power to wound her.

Our own country came in for a large share of similar feeling when his Excellency considered we had sought to weaken the Imperial Government in

Italy and Hungary; and Prussia, with whose German policy and traditional struggle with Austria for supremacy, he is now brought into immediate contact, is (for the present, perhaps) the object of his greatest aversion.

The statement of his Excellency as to the position of matters in the Diet, may be received without any mistrust; but his Excellency's views as to the general policy of his country are not likely to have any serious influence on the determinations of the Vienna Cabinet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 217.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 114.)

My Lord. *Frankfort, October 3, 1854.*

IN continuation of the series of diplomatic correspondence which has recently issued from the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin in relation to Eastern affairs, I beg to inclose the circular to the Prussian Agents at the various Courts of Germany, dated the 21st ultimo, of which a brief notice was given in my despatch No. 109 of the 30th ultimo, and which lays before the members of the Confederation the views taken at Berlin of Count Buol's circular of September 14.

This document will most likely have already come under your Lordship's notice; I need, therefore, only remark that its efforts to fix the limits of Austrian intervention in the Principalities to the narrowest bounds, and to tie Austria down by her own declarations in the fetters of neutrality, are the most salient points of M. de Manteuffel's note. The known sympathies of those to whom the Prussian Minister addresses himself, and the narrow principles of German interests, are appealed to with a full knowledge of the effect to be produced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 217.

Baron Manteuffel to Prussian Representatives at the German Courts.

Berlin, le 21 Septembre, 1854.

LE Cabinet Impérial Autrichien nous a communiqué, par l'office au Comte Esterhazy, en date du 14 de ce mois, ci-joint en copie, la circulaire, en grande partie textuellement la même, qu'il a adressée à ses Envoyés près les Gouvernements Allemands, et dont une copie métallographiée se trouve également jointe ci-contre.

Votre Excellence trouvera dans cette pièce une série de déclarations du Cabinet Impérial qui ont causé la plus vive satisfaction à Sa Majesté le Roi, notre auguste Maître, et dans lesquelles nous voyons des progrès essentiels vers le but de gagner, pour l'entente des deux Puissances dans chaque question spéciale, une expression de nature à fournir la base d'une nouvelle manifestation de l'unanimité de tous les alliés Allemands.

Le Cabinet Impérial voit dans l'évacuation des Principautés, combinée avec la déclaration Russe du 26 Août et du 29 Juin, l'éloignement du fait qui avait été regardé par les Cours Allemandes comme incompatible avec les intérêts de l'Allemagne et de l'Autriche, et qui était la cause de la guerre.

Le Cabinet Impérial, en partageant la conviction que le danger d'un conflit entre les deux Empires est maintenant écarté, y joint la promesse de ne rien négliger qui puisse contribuer à faire ressortir de cet événement tous les résultats favorables à la conciliation. Le Cabinet Impérial relève, comme le résultat le plus prochain et déjà acquis, la limitation du théâtre de la guerre sur terre. Nous nous associons volontiers à cette manière de voir, en reconnaissant que la

garantie des intérêts que l'Autriche et l'Allemagne ont sur le Bas-Danube est essentiellement favorisée par cette circonstance que les Principautés sortent du territoire accessible aux opérations militaires.

Si en outre, l'éloignement de toute crainte d'une attaque Russe contre le territoire de l'Autriche, joint à la retraite des troupes Russes, fait apparaître comme inutile en ce moment un appel des forces armées de la Confédération, ces résultats donnent un témoignage satisfaisant de l'efficacité avec laquelle les membres de la Confédération Germanique, unanimes sur la base du Traité du 20 Avril, sont en état de faire valoir leur politique commune; et, ainsi que le Cabinet Impérial, nous nous voyons engagés par cette considération à apprécier et à faire fructifier les avantages que le Traité accorde à tous les Contractants.

C'est dans ce sens que nous trouvons avec une vive satisfaction, dans la dépêche du 14, le vœu du Cabinet Impérial de voir constater, à l'égard de l'occupation des Principautés par les troupes Impériales, l'entente des autres membres participant au Traité du 20 Avril, et de voir manifester d'une manière obligatoire que la Russie, aussi longtemps qu'elle n'est pas attaquée par l'Autriche, ne pourrait faire de l'occupation Autrichienne des Principautés un cas de guerre contre l'Empire Autrichien, sans trouver réunie toute l'Allemagne avec l'Autriche.

Il est parfaitement conforme à l'esprit et à la lettre du Traité qu'un des Contractants qui croit le moment venu de s'avancer, pour sa part, d'une manière active, demande une déclaration des autres alliés sur leur entente, et le Traité d'Avril indique à ces derniers de se laisser guider dans leurs résolutions par la portée des intérêts Allemands qui se trouvent en question. Plus nous nous efforcerons, en maintenant ce point de vue, de remplir nos obligations, plus nous avons besoin, avant d'être en état d'établir nos vues et nos résolutions et de les exprimer à nos alliés, de quelques explications sur la dépêche du 14—explications que votre Excellence saisira l'occasion d'obtenir du Comte de Buol.

Les intérêts que l'Allemagne a sur le Bas-Danube seront protégés par l'entrée des troupes Impériales dans la mesure de la certitude que l'on aura que l'établissement d'éléments étrangers dans les Principautés se trouve par là écarté. Nous devrions conclure de la circulaire Autrichienne aux Gouvernements Allemands, en date du 14, qu'une garantie des intérêts Allemands n'est point fournie sous ce rapport, par l'entrée des troupes Autrichiennes, si le Cabinet Impérial n'est pas dans la situation de nous donner à ce sujet une explication ultérieure. En outre, nous ne nous rendons pas bien compte de la mesure dans laquelle les Principautés sont fermées, en général, par l'occupation Autrichienne, à des opérations militaires, et si elles peuvent être employées dans l'avenir comme point de départ d'une attaque contre le territoire Russe, par d'autres troupes que les troupes Autrichiennes, de sorte que l'attitude défensive promise par la Russie pourrait aussi mettre en contact les troupes Russes, lorsqu'elles seraient forcées de repousser une attaque, avec les corps d'armée Autrichiens qui occupent les Principautés.

Une pareille éventualité devrait porter préjudice à la confiance que l'Allemagne a puisée dans les assurances de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, sur l'éloignement d'un conflit entre les deux Empires; et ce préjudice devrait amener à peser les intérêts locaux de l'Allemagne que l'entrée des troupes Autrichiennes aura à protéger sur le Bas-Danube, mis en regard de l'intérêt général de la Confédération qui lui prescrirait de ne pas rester spectatrice impassible d'une guerre Européenne. C'est sous la protection exclusive des troupes Impériales que nous tiendrions pour parfaitement assurés les intérêts que l'Allemagne a dans ces contrées, et nous ne doutons point le Cabinet Impérial ne partage ces vues. Mais nous ne saurions apprécier à quel point la situation fait apparaître ces vues au Gouvernement Impérial comme pouvant être réalisées dans la pratique. Ce serait, de la part du Cabinet Impérial, s'assurer notre gratitude, si, par quelques explications sur les points ci-dessus exposés, il voulait bien compléter les matériaux que nous possédons jusqu'ici pour apprécier les garanties que l'occupation des Principautés offre aux intérêts Allemands.

Nous avons accueilli avec une joyeuse satisfaction l'expression de la confiance entière avec laquelle le Comte de Buol mentionne la promesse des secours de la Prusse, dans tous les cas où le territoire Autrichien serait attaqué sans que l'Autriche eût pris part, de son côté, à la guerre. Aussi devons-nous avoir la conviction qu'il n'existe plus dès à présent de doute sur cette promesse ni à St. Pétersbourg ni à Francfort.

D'ailleurs, la sollicitude éprouvée avec laquelle l'Empereur d'Autriche a toujours envisagé le salut et la paix de l'Allemagne, donne la certitude à Sa Majesté le Roi, notre auguste Maître, que les promesses de l'Empereur de Russie de ne pas attaquer l'Empereur d'Autriche trouveront leur écho dans les sentiments augustes de Sa Majesté l'Empereur François Joseph.

Cette confiance, qui est certainement partagée par tous nos alliés, a reçu un nouveau gage dans la déclaration du Cabinet Impérial, que l'Autriche n'a point contracté d'engagement d'amener une décision par une action agressive contre la Russie, et qu'elle ne reconnaît notamment pas pour elle comme un devoir obligatoire, de faire intervenir sa coopération militaire pour faire accepter les quatre points refusés par la Russie.

La proposition du Cabinet Impérial de nous abstenir, au sein de la Diète Germanique, d'une proposition formelle tendante à faire adopter les quatre points dans le sens des obligations contractées par l'Autriche, est regardée par nous comme un moyen satisfaisant de rapprocher les deux points de vue, et fait espérer que les divergences qui existeraient encore pourront s'aplanir et aboutir à une entente complète, à la suite d'une discussion qui pourrait être prochainement établie à Francfort. On pourrait, il est vrai, se demander d'abord si le moment actuel est bien choisi pour cela, puisque le refus de la Russie vient d'être constaté et que, suivant plusieurs indices, nous sommes fondés à mettre en doute que les Puissances Occidentales soient prêtes à reconnaître les quatre points comme des conditions de paix suffisantes et obligatoires.

Nous pouvons à peine nous promettre en ce moment des résultats pratiques d'une discussion des quatre points par la Confédération. Si, néanmoins, la Diète devait regarder une pareille discussion comme opportune et désirable, notre participation à cette discussion, eu égard à la position prise par Sa Majesté le Roi, notre très gracieux Souverain, et plus particulièrement indiquée dans ma circulaire du 3 Septembre, devrait tendre essentiellement à ce que la Diète exprimât sa disposition à faire valoir le poids de son appui moral en faveur des quatre points, dès qu'il s'offrira une nouvelle occasion d'ouvrir des négociations sur la base de ces garanties. Une plus stricte obligation de soutenir les quatre points, la dépêche du Comte de Buol le reconnaît elle-même, n'existe pas pour nous, et nous pouvons d'autant moins l'attribuer à la Diète que le Cabinet Impérial est lui-même de cet avis, la Confédération n'étant pas en position de négocier avec la Russie sur les bases de la paix.

Votre Excellence aura déjà reconnu, par ma circulaire du 3, que nous ne nous cachons pas les difficultés auxquels les quatre points sont soumis en partie. Cependant nous ne pouvons que partager l'opinion du Comte Buol lorsqu'il apprécie la latitude que ces garanties donnent aux négociations, et aussi longtemps que d'autres bases de négociation, lesquelles pourraient promettre davantage, ne se présentent pas en première ligne, nous regardons ces garanties comme un cadre qui pourrait bien être utilisé lorsqu'il sera possible de le remplir.

Votre Excellence voudra bien donner connaissance à M. le Comte de Buol de la présente dépêche en lui en communiquant une copie, et ajouter à l'expression du vif intérêt avec lequel nous attendons la réponse du Cabinet Impérial à nos observations franches et pleines de confiance, la communication que nous ne saurions mieux répondre à son désir de voir compléter notre circulaire du 3 aux Gouvernements Allemands, qu'en portant confidentiellement à leur connaissance le présent office.

(Signé) DE MANTEUFFEL.

No. 218.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 4.)
Stuttgardt, October 3, 1854.

My Lord,

IN conversing yesterday with Baron de Linden upon the Eastern question, I had occasion to observe that no Government desired peace more than that of Her Majesty, as their whole conduct had shown, when his Excellency remarked, that if peace was the object, the terms demanded should not be humiliating. I

inquired if his Excellency saw anything humiliating in the four points, when he replied in the negative; but added, that we had not bound ourselves not to go beyond them. I replied, that the longer the war continued, the more stringent might be our terms; that, for example, although the capture of Sebastopol might possibly find us still willing to accept the four points as the basis of peace, such might not be the case if a continuance of war in the spring were to bring about, through an expedition both military and naval, the capture of Cronstadt.

His Excellency expressed the opinion, that perhaps the fall of Sebastopol might lead us to insist less strongly on the four points; but I replied, that I considered we could never depart from them in the sense of diminution.

Baron de Linden further observed, that the explanations respecting the said points, which had been requested of Austria by Prussia, were necessary to the formation of a complete opinion regarding them.

It is to be presumed that this Government will follow at Frankfort in the wake of Prussia.

Baron de Neurath, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently told my informant that his return to office was rendered impossible by this Government's adhesion to Prussia's view of the Eastern question.

It is remarked that the language of Count Seckendorff, the Prussian Minister, has become less anti-Russian since his return to his residence about a month ago.

Of the feeling here, it may, perhaps, be said, that the upper class shows more Russian sympathy, and that the middle and lower classes show less Russian antipathy than they feel.

As partly indicative of this state of feeling, I may mention that Baron Handel, the Austrian Minister, has ceased to visit the Club here, on account of the hostile sentiments displayed towards his Government.

A natural reason for the smaller German Courts to look up to Russia, would seem to be, that all the Great Powers but Russia look down on them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 219.

Sir John Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 59.)
Munich, October 1, 1854.

My Lord,

THE slow progress made by the two great German Cabinets in the preliminary negotiations, which the nature of the projected communication to the Diet at Frankfort, in respect to their future attitude in the Eastern question, has rendered indispensable, has greatly increased the difficulty of pronouncing a decided opinion upon the possible ultimate conduct of the minor States of the Confederation, when the expected propositions shall be made to them. The great apprehension they entertain of becoming involved in a war, for objects in the attainment of which they, singularly enough, still persist in asserting that they are but remotely interested, naturally inclines them to side with the policy of whichever of the two Great Powers seems most likely to promise them the longest reprieve from the hard fulfilment of their Federal obligations, and the still more unpleasant prospect of finding themselves arrayed against a Sovereign whom they have long been accustomed to look upon in the light of a protector, and the preserver of order in Europe. At this moment there can be no doubt that they all give evidence of a leaning to Prussia, because they calculate that by aiding her to thwart and control the movements of Austria, they will succeed in preventing the Imperial Cabinet from committing them to any positive engagements, until the approach of winter shall render active hostile measures altogether out of the question for this year; and they hope that when the season shall be so far advanced as to oppose an obstacle to the further prosecution of warlike operations, means will be found for reverting once more to negotiation; for they still continue to cling to the notion that German interests will be best secured by avoiding an open rupture with Russia.

This view of the motives which guide the policy of the minor States in the present crisis, was strengthened by a conversation which I had with the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago, and which certainly left on my mind a strong impression that every expedient would be resorted to for putting off any decision of the Diet, until a more fixed and explicit basis for the conclusion of peace than is contained in the four points specified by the British and French Governments, should be brought forward. Indeed, he admitted that he was averse to a declaration of opinion on the part of the Diet upon propositions which, while they were pronounced on one side to be the minimum of what would be demanded, and were consequently not final, had been summarily rejected as altogether unacceptable on the other.

I entirely agreed with his Excellency as to the inutility of opening a discussion at Frankfort upon matters which, with their usual consistency, so many of the smaller Governments had been at such infinite pains to prove to be of subordinate importance to German interests, although in the same breath, almost, they clamour upon that ground to participate in the negotiations for their ultimate settlement. The conduct of the Prussian Cabinet, I said, was altogether inexplicable and, owing to the mistrust that it had inspired, even among the very States of Germany which were just now the most disposed to support its policy, highly dangerous to the future peace of Europe.

M. Von der Pfordten made an attempt to defend that policy, apparently from the conviction that, by carrying it out, there still remained some slight chance of escaping from any participation in the struggle for preponderance in the East, which he says is the sole question at issue between Russia and the Western Powers; and he avowed, without hesitation, that the object of Prussia, in common with the minor States of Germany, was no other than to avoid being drawn into the complications in which the recent steps taken by Austria seemed likely to involve them, if they should blindly consent to follow her lead by identifying themselves with the four points to which she alone has thought proper to bind herself. From all I could collect, the Governments of the smaller States are extremely dissatisfied at the little account taken of them by the Imperial Cabinet during the course of the transactions which have led to the present situation of affairs. It is reproached with ignoring the very existence of the Diet, until it is in want of the material aid of its federal allies to further its own ambitious views of conquest, for to that end they maintain its efforts are now directed; and admitting this to be the case, they bitterly inquire what advantage is to accrue to them, and what return they are to expect for the sacrifices they are called upon to make. They say that not having been even consulted upon all these matters, the results of which were only communicated to them months after they became public, they cannot and will not permit themselves to be made responsible for, and bear the burthen of, the consequences; and that as they resisted the attempts of Prussia to make them subservient to her exclusive policy three years ago, so will they now pursue the same course in respect to Austria.

My conversation with M. Von der Pfordten having taken this direction, I ventured to remark that, in the abstract, I could not blame the minor States for acting in the manner they thought most conducive to their own interests, provided they were strong enough, and united enough, to maintain their position; but I said that so many other considerations, and such important principles of international justice, which so nearly touched all weak States, were mixed up in the present question, that I thought it behoved them well to consider whether they had not as much miscalculated their true interests as they undoubtedly had their power. M. Von der Pfordten asserted, and I believe with great truth, that there is in Germany no sympathy whatever for Russia; but this must be understood to apply to the population, and not to the Courts and Governments, which are unquestionably more or less alternately influenced by their dread and adoration of the Emperor Nicholas. The same may be stated of the press, which is unceasingly at work to distort facts, and to keep up the prestige of the omnipotence of His Imperial Majesty; for instance, two articles, either, as I am assured on the best authority, from the pen of M. Von der Pfordten himself, or written under his especial direction, have recently appeared in a popular journal, of very extensive circulation, though without any official character, on the Eastern question; a translation of the concluding paragraph of the last of which I inclose, as confirming my views of the line which this Government, and

that of the other small States, intends to follow. They are too long for a translation, and are conceived in a sense anything but friendly either to the Western Powers or to Austria, and seem perfidiously intended to throw suspicion on the intentions of the former especially; they repeat that the surest mode of securing German interests on the Danube would be to open a friendly negotiation with Russia, who, in her present position, would concede much which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain from the Western Powers, who have so much embroiled matters. With respect to the guarantees for a future peace it is remarked, that what is impossible or difficult of attainment, and what, even supposing it is to be attained for the moment, would require an army to watch it, ought to be avoided; that the first, fullest, and most material guarantee lies in the removal of Asiatic barbarism, and the horrible, cruel oppression which weighs upon the Christians of European Turkey. That Power alone, they say, will appear great in history, and will carry off the victory in the East, which, regardless of the integrity of a State which has never deserved the name of civilized, and only hangs as a rotten member on to the rest of Europe, shall proceed to submit the evil to a radical cure. May this, it is added, be reserved to Germany; if the other Powers of Christian Europe will not unite for it—to what purpose a common Protectorate of the Great Powers over the Christians of the East if not proceeded by such a radical cure?—a common Protectorate which would be found unpractical, and would ere long become the source of fresh complications. The last article seeks to make out that the Emperor Nicholas has succeeded in the noble object he had from the first proposed to himself, by ameliorating the condition of the Christians in Turkey, who, it continues, will henceforth look up to him as their natural protector, whilst history will have to record that the disinterested efforts of this Emperor were, notwithstanding the union of England and France, alone able to obtain results in favour of the Oriental Christians.

This, my Lord, is the tone of these articles, which accord so completely with the usual language of M. Von der Pfordten, that I am by no means disposed to question the correctness of the information which has reached me as to their authorship.

Little more need be said on the attitude of the minor States of Germany on the Eastern question. That they are determined to hold aloof at any price, as long as they possibly can, is as good as established; and having acquired the certainty that, although Prussia will not ally herself with Russia, she will not embark in hostilities against her, they hold to the former as the Power which best represents their sentiments, in which no change is likely to take place, except in the improbable event of an attack upon the Austrian dominions by Russia. Under such circumstances all efforts to persuade them that they may possibly be gaining a momentary reprieve from embarrassments which, to all appearance, will, if they persist in their present hazardous policy, come upon them with redoubled violence at no very distant period, are, as your Lordship may easily imagine, totally unavailing. The answer to all such admonitions invariably is an enumeration of the millions they will have saved, and the lives they will have spared, if they can manage to tide over to next spring without being forced to put their federal contingents on the war footing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

Inclosure in No. 219.

Extract from the "Neuste Nachrichten."

(Translation.)

THE attitude of Prussia in this great political drama merits the greatest acknowledgments. So long as there was a question of representing real and positive German interests, Prussia was seen in the closest union with Austria, determined to use every means to defend and protect those interests; and all the other States of Germany were found ready to accompany them in this path. When, however, these interests, as has been above observed, do not appear to be in any immediate danger, all ground for active demonstrations against Russia

disappears of itself, and the only further task which remains for Germany, is to follow with proper attention the course of events which the continued demonstrations of the two Western Powers against Russia may develop, and which may have an influence upon German interests. The weakening of Russia which is projected by the Western Powers can never be conducive to the welfare of Germany, but least of all when the latter will have to effect it by the dissipation of its own forces; for it has to hold them firmly united, in continual readiness to repel political desires which may become threatening from quite a different quarter than from Russia.

No. 220.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 593.)

Foreign Office, October 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consul-General and Agent at Bucharest, instructing him to communicate to Omer Pasha the hope of Her Majesty's Government that his Highness will pay immediate attention to any application which he may receive from Lord Raglan for an additional force of Turkish troops to cooperate with the allied armies in the Crimea.

I have to instruct your Excellency to inform the Turkish Government of the instruction which has been given to Mr. Calquhoun, and to urge them to send, without loss of time, instructions to Omer Pasha to accede, if possible, to any request, such as that referred to, which may reach him from Lord Raglan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 221.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 365. Confidential.)

Vienna, October 2, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL dispatches this day to London and to Paris a communication which Count Colloredo, and M. de Hübner, are instructed to submit to your Lordship and to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

This communication is the result of long and serious meditation on the part of the Austrian Cabinet, who have not failed to appreciate in all its importance the rejection, by the Cabinets of London and Paris, of the last propositions which had been submitted to them on the part of Austria. His Majesty the Emperor has felt no less keenly than Count Buol himself, the absolute necessity of more clearly defining the position of Austria towards the Western Powers, and of drawing closer the bonds of that alliance into which she has entered with them for the prosecution of a common policy, and for the attainment of a common end. It became, therefore, a question of the highest importance to ascertain whether the Austrian Government, after the rejection of their last propositions by England and France, might not still find some means of defining and establishing their position towards the allies, and of responding thereby to the expectations entertained of them by the British and French Governments. The solution of this question, which has been agitated during the last week, and which was finally arrived at four days ago, is contained in the communication forwarded this day to London, and which will be submitted to your Lordship by Count Colloredo. Your Lordship will learn by that communication, that the Austrian Government acknowledges the necessity of concluding a Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with the Western Powers; and Count Buol is of opinion that the project of Treaty which was formerly submitted to him might, with certain modifications, serve as the basis of the new engagement which he proposes should be forthwith contracted by the three Powers. He would wish that this fresh Treaty should commence—

* No. 222.

1st. By recapitulating the principles embodied in the notes exchanged on the 8th of August, with liberty to add any special conditions which might seem necessitated by the course of events.

2nd. That it should define the character of the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, and should place that occupation in harmony with the end which it is destined to attain and with the duties of Austria towards the Western Powers, precisely in the manner in which the Convention of the 14th of June defined the position which Austria assumed towards the Porte in occupying those provinces.

3rd. That it should invite the Contracting Parties to assemble in Conference, for the discussion of the questions arising from the application of the principles set forth in the notes of the 8th of August.

4th. That in anticipation of Austria becoming belligerent, it should secure to her an alliance offensive and defensive with the Western Powers, towards whom she would contract a similar obligation.

5th. That it should provide, by a special stipulation, to call upon Prussia to bind herself to effective cooperation before admitting her to the benefits of participation in the alliance.

Such are the heads of the document proposed by Count Buol and sanctioned by the Emperor, which will be submitted to your Lordship by Count Colloredo. If the Western Powers should approve the project of Austria, Count Buol wishes that they should authorize their Representatives to draw up, in conjunction with him, the draft of a Treaty which would be submitted to the several Governments for their approval before signature.

Count Buol proposes that between the signature and the ratification of this Treaty, it should be submitted to Prussia, but the three Powers would previously determine upon the form and the terms of engagement which it would be necessary to require from the Cabinet of Berlin.

Count Buol trusts that your Lordship will perceive in the communication he has forwarded to you, a fresh proof of the earnest desire of his Government to ally itself more closely with the Western Powers. He does not conceal from himself that the position which Austria would assume by the signature of such a document as he proposes, would lead inevitably to active cooperation with the allies; would put an end to her neutrality, and would render mediation on her part impossible; and he awaits therefore, with the greatest anxiety, your Lordship's judgment on the proposal which Count Colloredo is instructed to submit to you.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 222.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 366. Secret and Confidential.)

Vienna, October 2, 1854.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of the assurance I gave your Lordship in my despatch No. 361 of the 22nd September, I have not ceased to urge upon Count Buol the importance of a closer union of the three Powers, and the necessity of making every possible effort to secure the object of the allies by conducting the present war to a successful issue. There was certainly on his part no reluctance to seek the mode in which this might be accomplished, and in conformity with the intentions which he had already expressed, Count Buol has anxiously been employed in consultation with M. de Bourqueney and myself, and in drawing up the proposals which will be submitted to you by Count Colloredo, and to which I have referred in my despatch of this day, No. 365.

M. de Bourqueney and myself have been in constant consultation together, as to the best mode of bringing before our Governments the precise value and extent of the proposals which he would be willing should be adopted, and with this view we have drawn up a project of Treaty which embodies in as clear a manner as we have been able to arrange them, the terms of the stipulations which the Austrian Government would agree to, and confidentially I submit it

to your Lordship as a project to which we feel that we can confidently state that the sanction of the Imperial Government would immediately be obtained.

We have felt that this Treaty, such as we have drawn it up, might meet with your Lordship's approbation, or rather we have thought that it offered such advantages towards drawing closer the bonds of alliance with Austria as ought to be submitted to you for your consideration. It is merely a project, and therefore entirely subject to be disposed of as your Lordship may consider most adapted to the policy which Her Majesty's Government has determined to pursue. But it is a step in advance of that line of conduct which this Government has hitherto pursued.

I have been encouraged to undertake the task of assisting in drawing up this project by the conviction that the Austrian Cabinet is anxious to fortify and strengthen the alliance in which it is already engaged with our Governments, and by so doing to put an end to the uncertainty of their position relative to Prussia, and to the difficulties entailed upon them by the vacillating conduct of that Government.

I think it right to state that Count Buol has not concealed from M. de Bourquency and myself that he is entirely in the belief that the adoption by our Governments of the proposals he has now submitted to them will inevitably lead to hostilities with Russia, and that His Majesty the Emperor foresees the same result.

I have engaged with Baron Bourquency to communicate the inclosed project of Treaty only to your Lordship, and in the strictest confidence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 222.

Project of Alliance between Austria, England, and France.

SA Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animées du désir de mettre fin à la guerre actuelle par le rétablissement de la paix générale sur des bases solides, donnant à l'Europe entière toutes garanties contre le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos;

Convaincues que rien ne serait plus propre à assurer ce résultat que l'union complète de leurs efforts jusqu'à l'entière réalisation du but commun qu'elles se sont proposé;

Et reconnissant en conséquence la nécessité de s'entendre dès aujourd'hui sur leurs positions respectives;

Ont résolu de conclure entre elles un Traité d'Alliance, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,

Lesquels s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêtés et signé les Articles suivants:

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, ratifiant les déclarations contenus dans les notes échangés à Vienne, le 8 Août dernier, au noms de leurs Gouvernements et annexées au présent Traité pour avoir la même force et valeur que si elles y étaient textuellement insérées, s'engagent à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie qui n'impliquerait point de la part de la dite Cour une adhésion pleine et entière aux quatre principes énumérées dans les dites notes.

ARTICLE II.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'étant réservé le droit de proposer, selon les circonstances et leurs positions particulières, en sus des quatre points spécifiés dans les notes précitées échangées à Vienne, telles stipulations qu'elles pourraient juger nécessaires dans un intérêt Européen, elles s'engagent en outre, mutuellement et réciproquement, à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun.

ARTICLE III.

En attendant que la Cour Impériale de Russie ait rendu possible le rétablissement définitif de la paix générale, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de donner, dès à présent, aux dits principes le degré de développement que comporte leur application. Elles s'engagent en conséquence à accréditer respectivement, sans retard, leurs Plénipotentiaires spéciaux à Vienne, qui, reunis en Congrès ou en Conférences avec des Plénipotentiaires également accrédités à cet effet par Sa Majesté le Sultan, examineront les questions soulevées par les principes sanctionnés en commun, et destinées à recevoir leur solution définitive dans des Actes placés sous la garantie collective des Hautes Parties Contractantes.

ARTICLE IV.

Le rejet par la Cour Impériale de Russie des quatre propositions énumérées dans les notes précitées du 8 Août, ayant laissé subsister entre la Russie, d'une part, la France, la Grande Bretagne, et la Sublime Porte, de l'autre part, l'état de guerre ouverte, conformément aux stipulations arrêtées par les trois dernières Puissances entre elles dans les Traités du , et du , déjà communiqués officiellement au Gouvernement Impérial d'Autriche, et l'Autriche de son côté ayant déjà, en exécution du Traité conclu entre elle et la Sublime Porte, fait occuper provisoirement par ses forces les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie; Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche s'engage à maintenir cette occupation jusqu'au rétablissement de la paix général sur les bases énoncées dans les deux premiers Articles ci-dessus, et à défendre en conséquence, le cas échéant, les frontières des dites Principautés contre tout retour des forces Russes.

ARTICLE V.

Pendant l'occupation des Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie par les forces Autrichiennes, les mouvements des forces Anglo-Françaises ou Ottomanes sur ces mêmes territoires, contre les forces militaires ou le territoire de la Russie, seront, le cas échéant, préalablement concertés entre les Commandants des forces respectives.

ARTICLE VI.

Pour le cas prévu par l'Article III, où la guerre viendrait à éclater entre l'Autriche et la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, se promettent mutuellement leur alliance offensive et défensive dans la guerre actuelle, et emploieront à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre appréciées d'un commun accord, des forces de terre et de mer dont le nombre, la qualité et la destination seront déterminées d'un commun accord.

ARTICLE VII.

Dans ce même cas, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à n'accueiller de la part de la Cour Impériale de Russie sans s'en être

entendues entre elles, aucune ouverture ni aucune proposition tendant à la cessation des hostilités.

ARTICLE VIII.

L'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne porteront ensemble le présent Traité à la connaissance de la Cour de Prusse et recevront avec empressement son adhésion dans le cas où elle engagerait sa coopération à l'accomplissement de l'œuvre commune.

ARTICLE IX.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié, et les ratifications seront échangées à Vienne dans le délai de quinze jours.

En foi de quoi, &c.

No. 222*a*.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 325.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me to-day a despatch from Count Buol, dated the 3rd of October, in which his Excellency, after adverting to his having received from your Lordship and M. de Bourqueney an intimation that the Governments of England and France declined to enter into fresh discussion with the view of defining more exactly the preliminary bases of peace lately rejected by Russia, expresses the hope that on further consideration those Governments will modify their first impressions.

As regards the statement of the two Powers that the Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was the only course applicable to the state of things resulting from the refusal of Russia, Count Buol observes, that although that Treaty was perfectly well adapted to the circumstances of the time when there was a question of common concert to expel the Russians from the Principalities, yet as the Russians retreated of their own accord, and as Austria had neither undertaken nor purposed to attack Russia beyond the Pruth by declaring war against her at the beginning of the winter, the Treaty now appeared to Austria unseasonable. Austria considered that as such a Treaty would not be followed up by her immediately taking the field, it would not have a favourable effect on public opinion, and that it was preferable therefore for her to keep herself unfettered as regards Russia, and to leave that Power in a state of uncertainty as to the course which she might eventually adopt.

Such was the ground taken by Austria towards Russia in the despatches addressed to Count Esterhazy on the 12th of September. Austria still adheres to the guarantees which Russia has rejected, and the Emperor reserves to himself to select the means for bringing about peace on those bases. Austria has never given Russia any assurance that those means would in no case assume a character of coercion, but has on the contrary resisted all attempts to induce her to give such an assurance. But Austria thought that she owed it to the Powers with whom she was engaged in the pursuit of a common object, not to leave them ignorant that important considerations prevented her from taking at the present moment an active part in the war. But as the object of the Treaty originally proposed had been effected by the retreat of the Russians, it became the more necessary to record in some other diplomatic form the union still subsisting between her and the belligerent Powers after the rejection by Russia of the guarantees. It was for this reason that she proposed a Conference for defining and consolidating, as far as circumstances admitted, the four points expressed in the note of August 8, with the understanding that Prussia and the Porte, in taking part in such Conference, would equally with the other Powers have formally engaged not to treat with Russia on other bases.

As regards the observation that it may be possible, during hostilities, to lay down generally the conditions on which peace may be reestablished, but that it

was a thing unheard of that a belligerent should settle beforehand all the details, Count Buol disclaims any pretension to discuss and irrevocably fix at the present time the conditions of peace: but he thinks it advantageous not to leave indefinitely in suspense such of the points of the notes of August 8 which might be adjusted at once, without the concurrence of the adverse party, and the settlement of which is desirable for the interests of humanity, as well as for those of all Powers in alliance with the Porte. Among these are the consolidation of the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and the settlement of affairs in the Danubian Principalities. England and France admit that the first calls for the attention and solicitude of the Christian Powers in the highest degree; the necessity for a common understanding being arrived at as regards the second, with the view of obviating misunderstandings, is demonstrated by the existing state of affairs in the Provinces.

Austria, moreover, cannot see why the questions relating to the Danube and the Black Sea should not equally be discussed beforehand, for although the course of the war might influence the solution of these questions, no harm, but much good might come of their being thoroughly investigated in the first instance.

The difference between the position occupied by belligerent and by non-belligerent Powers does not seem to offer any obstacle to the discussion of these questions.

It might be possible, however, to reconcile the opinion of the Cabinets of London and Paris in regard to the Treaty of Alliance being alone applicable to the existing state of things, with the importance attached by Austria to give as soon as possible practicable application to the four points, by so altering the Treaty as to make it applicable to the existing state of things.

Thus a Treaty might be agreed upon, not solely confined to a stipulation of mutual assistance in case of war, but conferring at the same time a formal sanction on the engagement of the 8th of August, and providing for a Conference being summoned in order to give a collective guarantee to the principles laid down, and to deliberate upon such further stipulations as might be judged necessary for the interests of Europe; a Treaty, in fact, which would give a clearly defined character to the Austrian occupation of the Principalities as regards the maritime Powers, as it now only has as regards the Porte.

Prussia and the Porte might be invited to accede to the Treaty; the former, however, on her giving a positive pledge as to the course of her policy.

I told Count Colloredo that without consulting my colleagues I could give him no definitive answer, and should therefore only express my own opinion upon the despatch he had just read, which contained a proposal differing in no essential respect from the one that England and France had recently thought it their duty to decline. I said that even if a Conference were not now entirely at variance with the anxious and excited state of public feeling in England at this moment, I could discover no practical utility in three belligerent Powers discussing with each other, and with one non-belligerent Power, the bases of negotiation which another belligerent had just declared it would never accede to. Those bases would doubtless come under consideration when peace was actually negotiating, but others, and possibly of far greater importance, might then have become indispensable; for military successes might bring about a state of things altogether different from any yet contemplated, and which would then be dealt with as suited the dignity and interests of the Powers whose blood and treasure had been exhausted in the cause; and it was out of the question therefore that England and France should now in any way tie their hands with reference to ultimate negotiations with Russia, or deprive themselves, whether as regarded war or peace, of that perfect liberty of action which Austria has throughout so carefully stipulated for herself. I said it was useless to repeat my assurance that Her Majesty's Government was most anxious for the intimate alliance of Austria, and was prepared to make sacrifices in order to obtain her active cooperation; but as the interests of Austria were quite as great, and much more immediate than our own in the question at issue with Russia, it was difficult to see what advantage would accrue to England and France by recording in a Treaty, that unless Austria was attacked by Russia for her occupation of the Principalities, no *casus belli* for her would arise. Such an attack was to the last degree improbable, and England and France would therefore only be Contracting Parties to an engagement taken by Austria not to go to war with Russia.

Prussia, I added, had now thrown off the mask, and no longer disguised the "neutralité bienveillante" that Russia insisted upon, and to invite that Power to take part in a Conference which she would do her best to thwart, or to adhere to a Treaty which she would be sure not to fulfil, seemed to me impossible. I admitted, however, the urgent necessity of some agreement for regulating the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, and imposing some check upon Austrian authorities who seemed to disregard their instructions, and to be acting in a manner to produce distrust between the Austrian Government and the allies.

I concluded by requesting Count Colleredo to consider what I said as expressing my own opinion only as to the difficulties that might present themselves in agreeing to the proposal of his Government, and I promised to lose no time in ascertaining the opinions of my colleagues and the views of the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 223.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul-General Calquhoun.

(No. 14.) *Foreign Office, October 7, 1854.*

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct you to make a communication to Omer Pasha to the following effect:

That circumstances may render it necessary for Lord Raglan to obtain reinforcements for the army under his orders, but that the distance from England may render it impossible to send them out as quickly as would be desirable.

That under such circumstances it is possible that Lord Raglan may apply to Omer Pasha with the view of inducing his Highness to detach an additional force of Turkish troops to cooperate with the allied armies; and that Her Majesty's Government feel confident that Omer Pasha, with the zeal which he has shown in his Sovereign's cause, will not hesitate to afford such reinforcements as he can safely supply, for operations in a quarter where the effect to be produced on Russia cannot fail to be most advantageous to the Sultan.

Omer Pasha may be assured that Lord Raglan will not apply to him except he sees urgent occasion for the presence of a further number of the Sultan's forces in the field to cooperate directly with the allied armies; and Omer Pasha may safely rely upon the judgment of Lord Raglan as to the benefit likely to result from a compliance with any application which his Lordship may make to his Highness on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 224.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 526. Confidential.) *Therapia, September 22, 1854.*

My Lord,

THE accompanying letter, addressed to me by the Greek Patriarch, and its inclosure, which has been since published, were accidentally overlooked at the time as documents fit to be transmitted to your Lordship's office, and in forwarding copies of them now I have no other object in view but to place them on record in the correspondence.

I have marked the communication as "Confidential" on account of the letter to me, and the nature of its contents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 224.

The Greek Patriarch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Translation.) *July 15/27, 1854.*

Sir,

IN the course of a visit which I paid his Highness Reshid Pasha yesterday, he instructed me to draw up a letter of exhortation to the Christians, for the purpose of being read in the churches. I inclose a copy of the above paper, confidentially, begging you kindly to take it into your consideration, and favour me with your opinions and observations thereupon.

† ANTHINUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 224.

Proposed Letter of Exhortation to the Christians in Turkey by the Greek Patriarch.

IT is at all times the imperative duty of every man of sense and prudence to afford by his conduct a practical acknowledgment of benefits which may be conferred upon him, and more especially so when such benefits, far from being limited to trivial and unimportant favours, are exposed to a contest affecting the existence, the honour, the property, and the general security of those benefited.

No one can be ignorant that the above principle, whether viewed naturally, politically, or spiritually, is founded upon fixed immutable bases, and can only be controverted by those thoroughly corrupt natures which refuse to acknowledge any generous sacrifice in their behalf, and are stigmatized as ungrateful in the face of all mankind.

Individuals of our kindred race have been guilty of such ingratitude towards the French soldiers, as we have to our great grief been informed: they have descended to the basest and most unseemly actions towards them, assailing them in solitary places with laughter and insult, and having the crowning audacity to push them into the sea. Such a barbarous act is to be condemned by all thinking men; such a depth of ingratitude does it evince on the part of the above reckless and demented individuals, who ought to bear in mind what a fearful responsibility they entail by their conduct upon the whole of our race, and who ought rather to love and conciliate those friends and allies of our precious Monarch at present here for the purpose of supporting his just sovereign rights against the demands of the Court of Russia, and to protect and watch over his interests—interests common to us, his faithful and obedient subjects, and in the prosecution of which we are engaged in full liberty and freedom from molestation under the Imperial auspices, and in the enjoyment of political and spiritual privileges granted to us without stint.

Of such important character is the present contest, in which the allied Western Powers have embarked, regardless of pecuniary and personal sacrifice, and for which they are met with the above ungenerous and unprincipled requital.

Having thus shown to what extent we owe a tribute of gratitude to the friends and allies of our Monarch, it become our duty, in which we do not fail, to exhort paternally and in decided terms by means of this ecclesiastical letter, those among you, our kindred, who have been guilty of acts so unseemly and at such variance with your character as Christians and subjects of the Porte, to desist for the future, and to conduct yourselves in a friendly and becoming manner, thereby affording sincere proof of your gratitude for the countless services and dangers undergone in order to maintain the rights of the Porte against Russia; which latter Power, under the pretext of protecting the Orthodox Church, cherishes, as we have on many occasions exposed, secret and political designs; while working for a pernicious and destructive purpose, she proclaims a different language in public, and endeavours to seduce the more

simple among us by these delusive proclamations, and by so doing has become the cause of such dangers and calamities through nearly the whole world, and has brought universal distress upon the poor, who are barely able to obtain a living.

But the Almighty Judge, who is alone acquainted with the secret thoughts of man, has not suffered the world to be afflicted with the scourge of a war raised for ambitious designs without retribution, but has declared himself for the right cause, and has granted his blessing upon the Imperial and allied armies. He has accorded them a complete victory over the enemy's force at Silistria; he has broken them and put them to flight, and dispersed them beyond the boundaries.

Being, therefore, clearly convinced of the deceitful policy of that country, do not give, any of you, the least faith or attention to the above delusions, unworthy of the notice of any prudent man, but remain as heretofore faithful to the Imperial Government, preserving pure and intact your sentiments of obedience, submission, and devotion to the supreme and beneficent power set over us from on high.

It is for you on the present occasion to redouble your proofs of complete obedience and sincere devotion to that Power which has not ceased to extend its fostering care over all classes of its subjects, and under whose protection we live in full enjoyment of the national and spiritual privileges accorded to us of old, which our gracious Sovereign has lately confirmed and secured to us by his Royal sign-manual, under the impulses of his natural benevolence.

Similarly, in the fulfilment of a Christian duty, cherish sentiments of sincere friendship towards the friendly and allied Powers, which have ranged themselves in sincerity for a good cause alongside our Government. Wherefore, you will not only abstain from affording their soldiers any cause of dissatisfaction, as has been done by certain ill-advised persons, but will behave in a conciliatory spirit towards them, and become thereby the object of the common regard and goodwill of the Porte and the allied Powers; discharging with Christian zeal your imperative duty of offering up prayers for the salvation and prosperity of our most gracious Monarch, for the success of his arms, and the establishment of the long-cherished peace and tranquillity, as result of the contest now undertaken with the blessing of God. May He also grant the allied Powers a worthy recompense for their efforts, and confer His grace upon all who cooperate with zeal in the humane and sagacious views of our Sovereign. Heaven grant it!

No. 225.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 8.*)

(No. 528.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 22, 1854.*

I HAVE received communication from Reshid Pasha of a despatch addressed to him by the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna, under date of the 11th instant. It contains his Excellency's report of a conversation which had passed between Count Buol and himself, relative to the course which Austria intends to pursue now that Russia has rejected the four Articles proposed as bases of negotiation. A translation of it is inclosed herewith. Though it will not have the same interest for your Lordship in England as it has for me in the present uncertain state of affairs, it may afford your Lordship an opportunity of comparing the language held by Count Buol towards Arif Effendi, with that which Count Colloredo is instructed to use in London, on a question of vital importance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 225.

The Ottoman Minister at Vienna to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) *Vienna, September 11, 1854.*

I HAVE set forth in two successive reports, the rejection by the Russians of the proposition containing the four Articles, and the assurances given thereon by Count Buol. Although the Count had before said that Austria would never consent to any other than the four Articles in question as the basis of the future pacification, I could not obtain any precise information as to what course Austria would pursue until Russia was compelled to accept peace on those terms. I however had an interview with Count Buol to-day, with the view of clearing up this point as much as possible, and the following is the substance of his statement: that Russia, namely, having evacuated the two Principalities, Austria had not at present any ostensible cause for declaring war, but that she had not given the Russian Government any assurances whatever that she would not go to war later; that if Russia were to re-enter the Principalities, or not to evacuate them completely, Austria would, in that event, be compelled to go to war; likewise, that if the Russians were to cross again to the Balkan, Austria and Prussia would declare war in conformity with the Treaty existing between those two Powers; and that were even Austria to declare war at present, no great advantage would be gained, as the fighting season had passed. He repeated, that although Austria had no longer any cause for going to war, there was no chance whatever of the Treaty of Alliance concluded with the Sublime Porte being in any way impaired, or of any change taking place in the scope or vigour of the political relations between Austria and the other Powers; and Count Buol added, that as he was going to address this Embassy during the present week, inclosing copies of the correspondence between Austria and Russia on these subjects, together with the observations of the Austrian Cabinet thereon, the Sublime Porte would thus acquire full information on the question. I made an appropriate reply to the Count; and the operations of the forces and the fleets of the allied Powers having been touched upon, he stated very impressively that he was in the expectation of receiving good news on that score. We then parted.

No. 226.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 8.*)

(No. 535.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 25, 1854.*

INCLOSED are copies of letters addressed severally from Vienna to Reshid Pasha by the two absent Hospodars, who have been since invited to repair to their respective Principalities. The Ottoman Secretary of State has been long in possession of your Lordship's opinion on the subject of Prince Stirbey's return, and a few days ago I confirmed it, by reading to him your Lordship's instruction to Lord Westmorland as dated on the margin.

I greatly fear that it is now too late to prevent the Prince's return, and I can only hope that Dervish Pasha will duly perform his duty, and bring the truth to light so forcibly as to leave the Porte without excuse if, on the close of the intended inquiry, the period of his Highness's administration be not at once terminated by an Imperial decision.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.

Vienne, le 7 Septembre, 1854.

Monseigneur,

DE retour à Vienne d'une excursion que je me suis trouvé dans le cas de faire dans l'intérêt de ma santé, mon premier soin est de me rappeler du gracieux souvenir de votre Altesse Sérénissime.

Je ne dois pas, à cette occasion, dissimuler à votre Altesse Sérénissime que l'incident d'une enquête judiciaire à laquelle ma conduite serait assujetie, m'a causé une peine sensible en égard aux tendences que l'intrigue, l'ambition et la malveillance sont habituées à manifester toutes les fois que l'occasion leur en est fournie en Moldavie, où l'élément d'une opposition systématique est en permanence. Ne sera-ce pas, en effet, aussi humiliant pour la dignité Hospodariale, qu'encourageant pour ceux qui ont intérêt à me nuire, de voir une enquête qui dénote déjà un commencement de suspicion, et qui, par mon absence, laisse le champ libre à mes ennemis, et me met dans l'impossibilité de me défendre ? Vous êtes trop juste et trop éclairé, Monseigneur, pour ne pas apprécier, dans toute leur gravité, les inconvéniens que j'ai lieu d'appréhender.

Quant à ma conduite, envisagée sous tous ses rapports, je puis m'en rapporter en pleine confiance à l'opinion que votre Altesse Sérénissime a été dans le cas de s'en former, et aux conjonctures qui lui sont connues, soit par mes rapports, soit par la notoriété publique ; elle a été tel, je m'en flatte, qu'elle ne saurait redouter la plus minutieuse investigation.

Ayant vu inopinément ma position impliquée dans les événements qui eurent pour théâtre la Moldavie, sans être muni d'aucune instruction de la Sublime Porte pour la circonstance, ma première pensée, après mûre réflexion, fut de maintenir mon poste, afin de sauvegarder, autant qu'il était en mon pouvoir, les intérêts qui m'étaient confiées, et de me conformer en même tems au vœu de mes administrés ; je soumis, dès lors, cette détermination au jugement de votre Altesse Sérénissime, et ce ne fut que vers la fin du mois d'Août qu'elle me transmit l'ordre de mon rappel. Je m'étais préparé à y obtempérer, lorsque je me vis obligé de différer mon départ de quelques jours, afin de vous soumettre au préalable, Monseigneur, le vœu si prononcé de toutes les classes d'habitants, qui dans les circonstances qui pesaient sur la Moldavie envisagèrent mon absence comme une calamité. Autorisé gracieusement par votre Altesse Sérénissime, à ne pas abandonner mon poste, pourvu que je ne manque pas à mes devoirs envers la Sublime Porte, et que j'effectue à tems la transmission du tribut, je n'ai pas attendu d'autre injonction pour quitter la Moldavie, en changeant le Conseil de l'Administration du pays, dès que l'échéance du tribut fut arrivée, et que l'état de guerre ont rendu ma position à l'avenir incompatible avec mes devoirs. La réponse de votre Altesse Sérénissime au rapport que je lui adressai en cette occasion, réponse qui m'est parvenue à Vienne, est un document précieux, qui témoigne irrécusablement que ma conduite a été hautement appréciée, et que vous avez rendu pleine justice, Monseigneur, aux sentiments qui m'ont guidé au milieu des conjonctures graves où je m'étais trouvé sans autre direction que celle de ma conscience et d'un dévouement que ne s'est jamais démenti. Personne mieux que votre Altesse Sérénissime n'aurait pu me juger en parfaite connaissance de cause, et votre jugement ne saurait être sans doute sujet d'appel.

Si en définitive l'enquête doit avoir pour objet principal ou secondaire les actes de mon administration, je laisse à dire qu'ils sont consacrés par la forme et par les témoignages de gratitude du Divan *ad hoc*, des municipalités et des communautés en général, pour ne m'en rapporter qu'à la notoriété publique et à la bonne foi de tous les habitants de la Principauté, à l'exception du petit nombre de ceux qui sont intéressés à me calomnier. Ayant pris les rênes du Gouvernement au milieu de circonstances exceptionnelles et difficiles, et en présence de graves embarras financiers, je parvins à combler le déficit, à réorganiser différentes branches du service, et à doter le pays de plusieurs institutions de bienfaisance et d'utilité publique, en suppléant à la gêne des finances par le sacrifice d'une partie considérable de ma propre fortune ; le progrès eut été bien plus sensible si l'application des projets que je méditais n'avait été arrêtée par les circonstances qui ont motivé ma retraite prématurée, et si les deux principaux besoins du

pays, l'institution d'une banque nationale et la confection d'un chemin de fer, n'avaient rencontré des obstacles insurmontables de la part d'une Puissance.

Les actes de mon administration sont donc attestés par des faits patents et irrécusables, et rien ne saurait mieux prouver le désintéressement et l'abnégation avec lesquels j'ai voué au bien public mes facultés intellectuelles et les ressources de ma fortune, si ce n'est la dette considérable dont je me suis trouvé obéré au moment de ma retraite du pouvoir.

Vous n'ignorez pas, Monseigneur, que la Sublime Porte avait dans l'origine octroyé à mon collégue de Valachie, comme à moi, une indemnité de 100,000 ducats à prélever sur une augmentation du prix du sel, et que pour ma part je ne profitai pas de cette ressource, afin de ne pas grever un objet de première nécessité pour le peuple ; je me bornai par conséquent au droit de l'exportation des céréales dont tous les Hospodars avaient disposé, et qui ayant été employé presque en totalité à des gratifications, n'a pu servir à me procurer aucun soulagement sensible. C'est ainsi que ma dette originelle, augmentée des donations consacrées à des établissements d'utilité publique, s'élève aujourd'hui à plus de 70,000 ducats, et qu'il ne me reste d'autre moyen d'acquitter qu'en aliénant mon patrimoine.

La Cour de Russie, en compensation sans doute du tort que j'ai éprouvé en ne complétant pas les années de mon mandat, et dont elle a été la cause, avait résolu de me procurer, pendant l'occupation, une indemnité, sur les fonds de ma liste civile, propre à faire face à mes dettes ; mais ce projet ne s'est pas réalisé pour des motifs qui me sont inconnus. Les circonstances présentes ont néanmoins raffermi mon espoir, qui réside dans la magnanime équité de la Sublime Porte, et dans les bonnes graces de votre Altesse Sérénissime. Si la Cour de Russie a, par une impulsion consciencieuse, jugé équitable de penser à me procurer un dédommagement, je suis d'autant plus fondé à en espérer la réalisation de la générosité et de la haute bienveillance de la Sublime Porte, dont je tiens le mandat qui m'a été confié et au service de laquelle je me suis consacré avec une fidélité et un dévouement à toute épreuve. J'ose donc placer entre vos mains, Monseigneur, ma confiance et mon sort, me réservant, si j'y suis autorisé, de soumettre, lorsqu'il en sera tems, à votre haute appréciation les moyens qui s'offrent pour suppléer à ceux qui m'avaient été déjà octroyés en guise d'indemnité—moyens qui ont d'ailleurs l'avantage d'être exempts de tout caractère onéreux.

Daignez, Monseigneur, excuser la franchise avec laquelle j'ai osé exposer mes appréhensions et mes vœux à celui qu'il m'a été donné de considérer comme mon bienfaiteur, et qui peut seul, dans sa haute sagesse et ses inépuisables bontés, conjurer les unes et réaliser les autres en faveur du plus fidèle et du plus reconnaissant de ses admirateurs.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) GR. GHYKA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.

Vienne, le 11 Septembre, 1854.

Monseigneur,

DANS la communication que j'ai pris la hardiesse d'adresser à votre Altesse Sérénissime en date du 9 du courant, j'ai eu l'honneur de vous reposer, avec la respectueuse confiance que vos bontés m'ont inspiré, les inconvénients que je suis fondé à appréhender d'une enquête sur ma conduite qui éveillerait les instincts malveillants de ceux qui par tactique et par intérêt sont prédisposés à me calomnier.

J'ai eu déjà lieu en effet de me convaincre que parmi les membres de l'aristocratie, ceux qui par des raisons personnelles avaient formé, pendant mon administration, un noyau d'opposition systématique, ont commencé à se grouper autour d'un candidat de leur choix, et à préparer contre moi les traits acérés de leurs passions. Les motifs égoïstes qui les font agir ne sauraient tellement se masquer sous les dehors d'un prétendu patriotisme, qu'ils ne deviennent patents au moindre examen. Ayant usé, dans l'accomplissement de mes devoirs, et dans

la stricte exécution des lois, d'une droiture qui n'était dominée par aucune considération secondaire, je me vis dans le cas de frapper les abus, et par conséquent les hommes habitués à les commettre le plus couvert impunément. Ceux donc qui avaient essayé en vain, ainsi qu'il est de notoriété publique, soit de surcharger les villageois, soit de dépouiller leurs voisins, soit d'évincer des héritiers faibles de leur légitime patrimoine, ne saurait avoir d'autre désir, ainsi qu'ils l'ont témoigné en toute occasion, si ce n'est de se saisir à leur tour du pouvoir, et de se venger de leurs désappointements. Cependant ce sont ces mêmes individus, et non point le grand nombre, qui, dans le cas d'un enquête, se mettront en avant pour m'accuser. Si cette circonstance n'était de nature à avoir des effets dégradants pour moi, et encourageants pour l'intrigue et la malveillance, j'aurais été au devant de toute investigation sérieuse, bien assuré que mes actes ne sauraient donner prise à la censure, de même que ma conscience est exempte de tout reproche. Mais dans le cas qu'une enquête deviendrait malgré cela inévitable, ce que je me crois en droit de solliciter, Monseigneur, de l'impartialité qui est inséparable de l'élévation de vos nobles sentiments, et ce que j'ose être sûr d'avance d'obtenir de votre justice, c'est qu'elle ait les conditions qui peuvent seules en garantir l'authenticité.

Que, par conséquent, je ne sois pas exposé à subir les accusations d'un petit nombre des témoins à charge, mûs par des motifs égoïstes et agissant dans des vues intéressées, mais que la généralité des habitants soit appelée à énoncer son opinion à mon égard; que les municipalités, les corporations, et les communes soient interrogées sur les actes de mon administration. De cette manière ce ne sera plus l'esprit de parti mais l'opinion de la nation Moldave qui se prononcera, et la vérité que la Sublime Porte se propose pour but de dévoiler, pourra se faire jour sans laisser ni doute ni régret.

Si ma fidélité à mes devoirs, si mon dévouement inaltérable à votre illustre personne, me donne le droit d'attendre un nouvel acte de votre justice, je vous supplie, Monseigneur, de donner à qui il appartient des instructions analogues, dans le cas où l'enquête ne vous paraîtrait pas superflue en raison de ses graves inconvénients.

Daignez, &c.
(Signé) GR. GHYKA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 226.

Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.

Baden, le 11 Septembre, 1854.

Monseigneur,

J'AI reçu hier par l'obligeant intermédiaire de son Excellence Arif Effendi, la dépêche que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 1 courant.

Je me tiens prêt à exécuter les ordres du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et à partir pour me rendre à mon poste à Bucharest, aussitôt que j'aurai reçu l'avis que M. le Commissaire Impérial dans les Principautés est chargé de me transmettre conformément aux instructions dont il a été muni par la Sublime Porte, ainsi que votre Altesse daigne m'en faire part.

Je la prie d'être pleinement convaincu, et de compter en toutes occasions, sur le dévouement absolu et empressé dont je suis animé pour le service du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Tous mes efforts dans la rude tâche qui m'est dévolue au milieu des circonstances actuelles de mon pays, dont personne ne peut méconnaître la gravité, tendront uniquement à concourir de tous mes moyens à améliorer la position déplorable où il se trouve de nouveau réduit, par suite des calamités d'une invasion qui a pèsée sur lui une année entière, et dont il a été heureusement délivré par les armes victorieuses de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

C'est en secondant de tous mes moyens la réalisation des bienfaisantes et paternelles intentions de votre gracieux Maître, que je m'attacherai à justifier la haute confiance dont j'ai été honoré, et à mériter la satisfaction dont la Sublime Porte a daigné me donner en divers temps des témoignages si flatteurs pour moi.

Votre Altesse voudra-t-elle mettre le comble à ses bontés en disposant à cette occasion au pieds du Trône de Sa Majesté Impériale l'hommage de mes sentiments de profonde gratitude et de fidélité inaltérable à son auguste personne. C'est un nouveau titre qu'elle acquerra à ma vive et éternelle reconnaissance.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) STIRBEY.

No. 227.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 538.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 25, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, relating to matters connected with the expedition; as also copy of a despatch from Vice-Admiral Dundas, containing an account of the battle of Alma.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 227.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe

My Lord, *Varna, September* 21, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that, yesterday and to-day, several British and French transport steamers and vessels have arrived in Varna from the Crimea, to embark the troops remaining here. Some vessels will also proceed, I understand, to Bourgas, to embark the French cavalry hitherto stationed at Aidos. Her Majesty's steam-ship "Spiteful" also arrived this morning from the Crimea, to expedite the embarkation of the four regiments of British cavalry.

I am informed that the allied armies had advanced towards Sebastopol, and that an encounter with the enemy was expected to take place yesterday or to-day.

The only deficiencies stated to be experienced by the troops was that of wood and water.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 227.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, September* 21, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the first direct and authentic intelligence of the landing of the allied armies in the Crimea was brought here by the French war-steamer "Tisephone," which reached Varna at 11 P.M. on the night of the 19th instant. At 1 A.M. I dispatched a courier to Bucharest, conveying the intelligence to Her Majesty's Consul-General, and transmitting to him a despatch which I addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, communicating the same intelligence to be forwarded by the speediest channel. Her Majesty's Consul-General will doubtless send forward a telegraphic message from Hermanstadt, which will probably reach London on or about the 23rd instant.

I have now the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency that a line of telegraphs from height to height, has been completed between Varna and Rustchuk, and across the river to Giurgevo, where a courier is always in

readiness to proceed to Bucharest. Intelligence may thus be conveyed from Varna to Bucharest in four, or at the most five, hours, and from thence to Hermanstadt in a day. In order to test the working of the telegraph from Varna, I transmitted the intelligence referred to at the beginning of this despatch a few hours after its receipt, and as soon as the daylight appeared, but I regret to say that some of the persons appointed for this service at some of the stations were not on the look-out for the signals, and I have since learnt that some of the signal-posts were in course of removal to a better situation, and thus the message was not transmitted. I am now assured, however, by his Highness Omer Pasha's aide-de-camp who has been sent down here expressly to superintend the transmission of intelligence by couriers and by telegraph, that the latter is now perfectly ready to act, and the persons stationed at the several posts warned to be always in readiness and on the look-out.

I should observe to your Excellency that the telegraphic messages are necessarily transmitted in the Turkish language.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inform your Lordship that upon the departure of Lord Raglan, I applied to his Lordship to know his desire respecting the Tatars who were employed in the British postal service here. His Excellency directed that they should be kept on pay, and remain at Varna, where their services might be required. I have this morning, however, received a letter from Colonel Steele requesting that two of the Tatars, with their chief, should be sent to head-quarters in the Crimea, by the first steamer; the two remaining Tatars will therefore still remain in Varna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 227.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off the Alma River, Crimea, September 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 20th instant, the allied armies forced the passage of the Alma river, and carried the entrenched camp of the Russians to the southward.

The loss of the Russians has been very great. We have captured two general officers, three guns, and many prisoners, most of whom are wounded.

The French loss is estimated at about 900, and the English at 1,200 killed and wounded.

The Russians are retreating on Sebastopol, and have burnt the villages on the Katscha, and it is I believe the intention of the allied armies to advance to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 228.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 539.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 25, 1854.*

YOU can hardly fail to have anticipated me when I state that the communications between the Austrian and Ottoman Commanders in Wallachia, on the one hand, and the military bearings of the policy pursued by the Court of Vienna towards Russia, on the other, warrant an apprehension of serious complications and untoward contingencies.

It may be inferred from the language of Austrian agents, that Austria looks to maintaining relations of peace with Russia, grounded on the evacuation of the two Principalities by the Russian army, and that she reckons upon being allowed,

in reality, to enjoy the exclusive occupation of these Provinces without firing a shot for their delivery or in their defence.

The Porte, informed by its Commander-in-chief and Commissioner, looks with repugnance, not unallied to mistrust, on this course of proceeding. She approves Omer Pasha's desire to take up positions at Galatz and Ibraila, with a view to further eventual demonstrations against Russia. She can support her own view of the case by referring to the earlier proposals of Austria, intent, in appearance, at that time on active and combined operations. She can also call to her aid the opinion of Marshal St. Arnaud communicated through M. Benedetti, and intimating, on military grounds, an apprehension of Russia's being enabled, by the prolonged inactivity of Austria, and the withdrawal of the Ottoman army, to detach a powerful reinforcement from Bessarabia to her troops in the Crimea.

The Turkish Ministry summoned to decide between the conflicting dangers of indisposing the Austrian Cabinet and leaving the allies in an exposed condition, naturally appeal to the Representatives of those allies.

Partaking the anxieties created by so doubtful and embarrassing a question, I agreed with my French colleague to reserve our opinion till after the arrival of the accelerated steam-packet yesterday. Unfortunately no clear light is thrown upon our uncertainty by the correspondence then received. What information has reached us tends rather to increase our apprehension, and is certainly not calculated to remove our embarrassment.

Your Lordship can hardly be surprised if under such critical circumstances we prolong our hesitation until we can discuss the matter at leisure in all its bearings, and agree on what advice it will be most prudent to offer to the Porte. My own inclination is to avoid every abrupt or hazardous proceeding not warranted by a distinct and urgent necessity; but at the same time not to shrink from maintaining the full rights of the Porte in active operation, if such a course be deemed, on mature reflection, indispensable to secure the allied armies in the Crimea from any additional danger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 229.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 540.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 26, 1854.*

A MESSAGE from Reshid Pasha informs me that the Internuncio has complained officially of Omer Pasha and Dervish Pasha, whom he describes as insisting upon General Coronini's consenting to retract the proclamation, and also as seeking to refer the question of Prince Stirbey's return to the Conference at Vienna, and threatening to enter a formal protest in case of a refusal on his part.

I learn from the same source that Baron Hess demands the disavowal of Omer Pasha's proceedings, requiring that his Highness should be ordered to conform with strictness to the tenor of the Convention, and intimating that Austria will otherwise not hesitate to seek redress by her own means.

The Turkish Ministers are to meet in deliberation on this matter to-morrow, and Reshid Pasha applies in the meantime for my opinion, which, after communicating with the French Chargé d'Affaires, I shall not withhold.

The return of Prince Stirbey, as Hospodar, is no doubt to be regretted, and the last paragraph of Baron Hess's proclamation requires to be explained in order to lose its present objectionable character.

But the Porte will itself, as I anticipate, recoil from hazarding a collision, under present circumstances, for either of these points. I conceive, at the same time, that Austria is not borne out by the terms of the Convention in maintaining them, although it cannot be denied that the instructions originally given to Dervish Pasha decide the question of Prince Stirbey's provisional return, justly, however, subject to reconsideration in virtue of subsequent incidents.

The military differences between the Austrian and Ottoman Commanders still remains to be settled, and I hear of nothing to remove the cloud which hangs over the demands of the former, contrasting practically, as they do in some respects, with the assurances of Count Buol and the views of Marshal St. Arnaud. The complication is evidently increased by a revival of the two preceding questions, the former of which, at least, I understand to have been thrown into abeyance by the transmission to Vienna of the Porte's invitation to Prince Stirbey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 230.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 544.)
Therapia, September 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I AVAIL myself of the present opportunity to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, three important documents bearing on the unfortunate differences which have arisen between the Austrian and Ottoman Commanders in Wallachia.

One is copy of a despatch from Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan, dated Bucharest, September the 15th.

The second is copy of a letter from Count Caronini to Omer Pasha, dated September the 13th.

The third is translation of a despatch from the Turkish Generalissimo to the Seraskier, dated September the 16th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 230.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan.

Bucharest, September 15, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship in my despatch No. 35 of the 9th instant, that it had been decided at a conference held on the preceding day, between Omer Pasha and General Coronini, that a considerable portion of the Turkish force should move upon Ibraila, in order to occupy the Russian army lately withdrawn from the Principalities. I have now to inform your Lordship, that before carrying this operation into effect, General Coronini communicated with the Baron von Hess, who has sent a reply through him, a copy of which I herewith transmit to your Lordship, as translated from German into French by one of his Highness's secretaries.

His Highness being desirous that this communication should reach your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud with the least possible delay, Colonel Dieu has charged Captain Jumell, of the Etat Major of the French army, who will kindly take charge of this to convey it to the head-quarters of the allied forces.

His Highness feels that the positions taken by the Austrian forces in Wallachia are such, that he cannot make the contemplated diversion under existing circumstances, and finding his army paralyzed and unable to operate upon the plan which he understood to have been agreed upon, after the communication which passed between Colonel Kalich and the Baron Löwenthal, on the part of Baron von Hess, your Lordship, Marshal St. Arnaud and himself, at the commencement of the month of August, he is anxious to acquit himself of the responsibility of not acting up to this arrangement. The propositions made by him would, he considers, have the effect, if adopted, of preventing at least a large portion of the Russian forces from being moved towards the Crimea and the shores of the Black Sea; an effect which would be particularly useful, if it should be in the contemplation of your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud to operate upon any other point on the shores of the Black Sea west of the Crimea, after completing the operation now in execution by the English and French armies.

I am to inform your Lordship that his Highness, being about to leave this place for Rustchuk for a few days, has deferred replying to the proposition contained in General Coronini's communication, thinking it probable that in the meantime information may be received relative to the operations of the allied armies which may materially affect the position of affairs in the Principality.

In the meantime his troops remaining in the positions before taken by them, will be ready to continue their movement to the front, or to make any other which the eventualities of the moment may require. I propose, however, to report to your Lordship a few of the remarks which his Highness made to me, relative to the communication in question.

His Highness considers it a duty which he owed to your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud, to use his utmost endeavours to act up to the arrangement concluded in the beginning of August, and from which it may enter into the calculations of your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud that the Russian army in and near the Principalities would be occupied in this direction, whilst the English and French armies were operating upon the rear of that army.

Instead of this being the case, information has arrived here, which appears to be of a positive nature, that the greater part of the Russian army is moving upon Odessa and towards the Crimea, leaving only the 5th Corps d'Armée under General Lüders, between the Pruth and the Dniester.

His Highness also considers that until Austria declares war, the Russian army is not kept in check by the Austrian forces sufficiently to prevent a large portion of them from being moved towards the shores of the Black Sea, and that an advance of the Turkish army could not fail, even if the contrary were the case, to add to the Russian force which would thus be kept in check; whereas, if the proposition now made by Baron von Hess were carried into effect, the Turkish army becomes altogether paralysed, and has little or no effect upon the operations of the war.

His Highness also feels, that although the complete evacuation of the Principalities is in great measure due to the attitude assumed by the Austrians, it cannot be entirely attributed to them.

He cannot forget that the preparations made by your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud, and the position of the Turkish army, brought about the abandonment of the siege of Silistria, the evacuation of Little Wallachia, and the concentration of the Russian forces on the left bank of the Lower Danube; that subsequently the forced passage of the Danube by his troops, and the fortifying of a secure position on the left bank of the Danube at Giurgevo and Slobodzie, placed it in the power of the allied forces at war with Russia; to cross the Danube and carry the war into Wallachia that it was only after these operations had been effected, that the proposition of Baron von Hess was made, and that appearances led to the belief that the Austrians were going take a decided part in the next struggle.

His Highness also observed that in carrying into effect the operation proposed, through Colonel Kalich and the Baron Löwenthal, by Baron von Hess, the Turkish army was for some time exposed to attack by the forces of Russia, then concentrated in his front; the Austrian army being too far distant and not in a condition to render him any assistance, not being at war with Russia.

His Highness further remarked that instead of preventing any attempt at negotiation, any movement which could have the effect of harassing the enemy, or rendering greater the probabilities of success against him in any other quarter, must tend to make him more ready to accept the terms required of him by the allies.

The movement proposed by his Highness would also have the advantage of not being attended with risk, and would place his army in such a position, that if thought desirable a junction with it of the English and French armies under your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud, could be effected by sea.

These are in brief the observations made by his Highness, with which I think it right your Lordship should be acquainted; his answer however to the communication of General Coronini will not be sent for a few days.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

P.S.—In consequence of your Lordship's absence from Varna, I have forwarded a copy of this despatch and its inclosure to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople.

J. L. A. S.

Inclosure 2 in No. 230.

Count Coronini to Omer Pasha.

Le 13 Septembre, 1854.

A LA suite de la communication confidentielle de votre Excellence du 8 du mois courant, disant que votre Excellence voulait étendre une partie de l'armée Ottomane au-delà du Jalonitza jusqu'à Gradeschti et Ibraila, pour faciliter d'une part la subsistance à la cavalerie Ottomane, et puis par l'occupation et la fortification d'Ibraila de faire une démonstration contre l'aile gauche de l'armée Russe postée derrière le Pruth, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence ce qui m'a été notifié par M. le Lieutenant-Colonel Kalich à la suite des ordres et instructions du Général-en-chef Baron Hess.

En général son Excellence le Baron de Hess ne voit aucun inconvénient dans cette dislocation de la cavalerie Ottomane au-delà de la Jalonitza jusqu'à Gradeschti, mais comme son Excellence vient déjà de donner l'ordre aux trois brigades de mon corps qui se trouvent dans le moment en Transylvanie de se porter dans la Moldavie, par quelle mesure l'occupation complète de la Moldavie et d'Ibraila comme d'un poste militaire dépendant de Galatz serait effectué jusqu'à la fin du mois présent, par conséquence chaque extension ultérieure donnée au cercle de l'occupation par l'armée Ottomane, et notamment l'occupation d'Ibraila, deviennent vis-à-vis de la situation politique et militaire des Principautés Danubiennes complètement superflues; il est évident que ces Principautés sont suffisamment à couvert contre chaque attaque des Russes autant par les corps qui les occupent que par la présence d'une armée de 200,000 hommes postée dans la Galicie et en Transylvanie.

En outre, l'armée Russe qui se trouve entre le Dniester et le Pruth est menacée par cette position prise par l'armée Impériale et Royale, qui est à chaque instant prête à entrer en campagne pour qu'il lui paraissait convenable d'envoyer des renforts en Crimée et aux côtes de la Mer Noire aux dépens de ces forces qui sont concentrés entre le Pruth et le Dniester.

Les démonstrations projectées par l'armée Ottomane par Ibraila vers le Pruth sont d'autant plus inadmissibles qu'elles ne peuvent être exécutées que sous la protection de la politique de l'Autriche, et sur la base éventuelle des positions occupées par l'armée Impériale et Royale dans les Principautés et le long de leurs frontières occidentales—conditions sans lesquelles elles ne pourraient jamais être prises en considération.

Aussi sont ces démonstrations dans les circonstances actuelles sans aucune perspective d'un succès militaire désiré, et ne serviraient qu'à contrecarrer chaque tentative des négociations de paix avec la Russie et ne manqueraient pas de faire renouveler dans les Principautés, qui ont déjà tant souffert, tous les malheurs d'une lutte infructueuse.

En considération de cet état de choses, votre Excellence est humblement invité à abandonner le projet de l'occupation d'Ibraila et de toute démonstration sur la rive gauche du Danube, et dans le cas si la dislocation de l'armée Ottomane ne permettait pas à elle de rester longtemps dans cette position, votre Excellence est invité à échelloner plutôt une partie de ses troupes sur la rive droite en Bulgarie et de laisser aux soins de l'armée Impériale et Royale la défense et le maintien des Principautés contre la Russie.

Dans l'intérêt de la Sublime Porte et à la suite de la Convention du 14 Juin qui existe entre celle-ci et le Gouvernement d'Autriche, votre Excellence laissera ses soins au Général-en-chef de l'armée Impériale et Royale, qui ne manquera pas de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que dans le cas d'une attaque générale sur les positions Russes les points de débouchés soient mis dans l'état convenable.

(Signé) CORONINI, *F. M.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 230.

Omer Pasha to the Serashier Pasha.

(Traduction.) *Le 16 Septembre*, 1854.

VOTRE Altesse aura vu, par ma dernière communication, que les troupes Ottomanes devait passer la rivière Jalonitza; mais si jusqu'à présent elles n'ont pas passé cette rivière, c'est parceque le Général-en-chef, Baron Hess, a déclaré qu'elles ne doit pas le passer.

Mais si les troupes du Sultan continuent à occuper leur position actuelle, il y a là deux inconvénients: l'un c'est que lorsque les Autrichiens nous ont invités à avancer, j'ai communiqué là-dessus avec le Maréchal de St. Arnaud et avec le Général Lord Raglan, qui ont dû compter, d'après cette communication, que nous venions vers la fleuve Sereth, et mêmes plus en avant, et ils sont, en conséquence, partis pour la Crimée; et l'autre inconvénient c'est que non seulement il y aura des difficultés à maintenir un si grand nombre de troupes dans un endroit d'aussi peu d'étendue, mais dans un endroit aussi étroit que celui-ci, des maladies surviendront, car cette partie du pays est plus exposée aux maladies que les autres bords du Danube.

J'ai fait savoir que, conformément au plan arrêté dernièrement, l'armée allait passer la rivière Jalonitza pour aller à Ibraila et à Galatz. C'est sur cela que les Autrichiens ont dit que le mouvement en avant des armées Turques est un obstacle à entrer en négociation pour la paix, et qu'ils n'ont pas consenti à un mouvement en avant des armées Turques. Ils ont fait la proposition suivante: "Si les troupes Ottomanes ne peuvent pas s'abriter là où elles sont, qu'elles passent le Danube, et nous autres nous protégerons Ibraila et Galatz en y envoyant des troupes."

Mais à l'heure qu'il est, l'Autriche n'a pas déclaré la guerre à la Russie, et les officiers Autrichiens et autres autorités Autrichiennes vont chez les Russes et ils en viennent; aucun avantage ne résulte du séjour des troupes Autrichiennes là où elles sont. Il est clair qu'une division sera détachée de l'armée Russe pour être envoyée en Crimée, et que si l'armée Turque avançait il serait impossible de diviser les forces Russes.

Cet état des choses est en opposition avec ce qui a été concerté avec le Maréchal St. Arnaud et Lord Raglan, et sera très-nuisibles à l'entreprise; et à dire vrai, l'opposition des Autrichiens à ce que nos armées avancent, en donnant pour prétexte des négociations de paix sur lesquelles il n'y a encore rien d'arrêté, et n'ont encore aucun fondement, d'autres allures, et le langage tenu par les officiers, me préoccupent beaucoup.

Les hommes politiques de l'Europe pensent à la vérité que l'Autriche déclarera la guerre à la Russie; mais moi je ne le crois pas. L'Autriche, en nous empêchant d'avancer, ce qui est une nécessité pour nous, rend par là un véritable service à la Russie: voilà ma façon de penser. Quoiqu'il en soit, l'hiver approche; il est difficile d'abriter les troupes dans leur état actuel ici, et les Autrichiens ne consentent pas à ce que nous avancions. D'après ces considérations, j'ai établi des quartiers d'hiver comme il offert par la note ci-jointe, et pris des mesures pour le repos des troupes de manière à ce qu'au besoin il soit possible de les conduire avec promptitude et facilité à Ibraila et à Galatz.

J'ai informé de cet état de choses leurs Excellences le Maréchal de St. Arnaud et Lord Raglan par une dépêche que je leur ai expédiée par un officier Français qui est employé auprès de moi, et que j'ai fait partir après. Votre Altesse trouvera ci-joint copie de ma dépêche, dont la lecture la mettra aussi au fait de ma position.

Seulement, comme les communications relatives à la défense à l'armée d'avancer ont été faites verbalement, j'ai demandé qu'elles fussent faites par écrit, et en conséquence le Général Comte Coronini a fait à cet égard une déclaration par écrit.

A la date de cette dépêche je parts pour Rustchuk pour indiquer les cantonnements nécessaires à Jehyozghie (à Giurgevo), où les troupes seront établies, et pour préparer les vivres dont elles auront besoin, et je retourne au bout de quelques jours.

Il se peut que la nouvelle de quelque victoire en Crimée fasse changer le langage aux Autrichiens. Je l'espère, et voilà pourquoi je n'ai point fait de

réponse à la déclaration dont j'ai parlé plus haut, et cela afin de gagner quelques jours de temps. Plus tard, je ferai une réponse convenable, que j'aurai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse.

No. 231.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 8.*)

(No. 545.) *Therapia, September 27, 1854*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch from Vice-Admiral Dundas, stating that the Russians have sunk several vessels of war in the entrance of the harbour of Sebastopol.

The plan alluded to by the Admiral will be transmitted to your Lordship by the next opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 231.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," off the Katscha, September 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 21st instant, the day after the defeat of the Russian army on the Alma, the Russian fleet made an extraordinary alteration in the position they had previously maintained in the harbour of Sebastopol, and that yesterday, on the appearance of the allied fleets, the Russians sunk all the vessels lying across the harbour, as marked in the inclosed sketch. Their mastheads are more or less above water. The sunken vessels close the passage, and secure the inner booms across the harbour. Their guns and stores were on board, which would indicate much precipitancy in executing this singular measure.

Eight sail of the line are moored inside the booms to defend the north shore.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 232.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 8.*)

(No. 1,216.) *Paris, October 7, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship the accompanying extract from the "Moniteur," containing Marshal St. Arnaud's report to the Emperor of the battle of the Alma.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 232.

Marshal St. Arnaud to the Emperor of the French.

Au Quartier-Général à Alma,
Champ de Bataille d'Alma, le 24 Septembre, 1854.

Sire,

LE canon de votre Majesté a parlé. Nous avons remporté une victoire complète. C'est une belle journée, Sire, à ajouter aux fastes militaires de la France, et votre Majesté aura un nom de plus à joindre aux victoires qui ornent les drapeaux de l'armée Française.

Les Russes avaient réuni hier toutes leurs forces, tous leurs moyens, pour s'opposer au passage de l'Alma. Le Prince Menchikoff les commandait en personne. Toutes les hauteurs étaient garnies de redoutes et de batteries formidables.

L'armée Russe comptait 40,000 baïonnettes venues de tous les points de la Crimée; le matin, il en arrivait encore de Théodosie, 6,000 chevaux, 180 pièces de canon de campagne ou de position.

Des hauteurs qu'ils occupaient, les Russes pouvaient nous compter homme par homme, depuis le 19, au moment où nous sommes arrivés sur le Bubbanach.

Le 20, dès 6 heures du matin, j'ai fait opérer par la division Bosquet, renforcée de 8 bataillons Turcs, un mouvement tournant qui enveloppait la gauche des Russes et tournait quelques-unes de leurs batteries.

Le Général Bosquet a manœuvré avec autant d'intelligence que de bravoure. Ce mouvement a décidé du succès de la journée.

J'avais engagé les Anglais à se prolonger sur leur gauche pour menacer en même temps la droite des Russes pendant que je les occuperais au centre, mais leurs troupes ne sont arrivées en ligne qu'à dix heures et demie. Elles ont bravement réparé ce retard. A midi et demi, la ligne de l'armée alliée occupait une étendue de plus d'une grande lieue, arrivait sur l'Alma, et elle était reçue par un feu terrible de tirailleurs.

Dans ce mouvement, la tête de la colonne Bosquet paraissait sur les hauteurs. Je donnais le signal de l'attaque générale.

L'Alma fut traversée au pas de charge. Le Prince Napoléon, à la tête de sa division, s'emparait du gros village d'Alma, sous le feu des batteries Russes. Le Prince s'est montré digne en tout du beau nom qu'il porte. On arrivait en bas des hauteurs sous le feu des batteries ennemies.

Là, Sire, a commencé une vraie bataille sur toute la ligne—bataille avec ses épisodes de brillants hauts faits et de valeur. Votre Majesté peut être fière de ses soldats, ils n'ont pas dégénéré: ce sont des soldats d'Austerlitz et d'Iéna.

A quatre heures et demie, l'armée Française était victorieuse partout.

Toutes les positions avaient été enlevées à la baïonnette au cri de "Vive l'Empereur!" qui a retenti toute la journée; jamais je n'ai vu d'enthousiasme semblable; les blessés se soulevaient de terre pour crier. A notre gauche, les Anglais rencontraient de grosses masses et éprouvaient de grandes difficultés; mais tout a été surmonté.

Les Anglais ont abordé les positions Russes dans un ordre admirable sous le canon, les ont enlevées et ont chassé les Russes.

Lord Raglan est d'une bravoure antique. Au milieu des boulets et des balles, c'est le même calme qui ne l'abandonne jamais.

Les lignes Françaises se formaient sur les hauteurs en débordant la gauche Russe, l'artillerie ouvrait son feu. Alors ce ne fut plus une retraite, mais une déroute; les Russes jetaient leurs fusils et leurs sacs pour mieux courir.

Si j'avais eu de la cavalerie, Sire, j'obtenais des résultats immenses, et Menchikoff n'aurait plus d'armée; mais il était tard, nos troupes étaient harassées, les munitions d'artillerie s'épuisaient; nous avons campé à 6 heures du soir sur le bivouac même des Russes.

Ma tente est sur l'emplacement même de celle qu'occupait le matin le Prince Menchikoff, qui se croyait si sûr de nous arrêter et de nous battre, qu'il avait laissé sa voiture. Je l'ai prise avec son portefeuille et sa correspondance; je profiterai des renseignements précieux que j'y trouve.

L'armée Russe aura pu probablement se rallier à deux lieues d'ici, et je la trouverai demain sur la Katcha, mais battue et démoralisée, tandis que l'armée alliée est pleine d'ardeur et d'élan. Il m'a fallu rester ici aujourd'hui pour évacuer nos blessés et les blessés Russes sur Constantinople, et reprendre à bord de la flotte des munitions et des vivres.

Les Anglais ont eu 1,500 hommes hors de combat. Le Duc de Cambridge se porte bien; sa division et celle de Sir J. Brown ont été superbes. Moi, j'ai à regretter environ 1,200 hommes hors de combat, 3 officiers tués, 54 blessés, 253 sous-officiers et soldats tués, 1,033 blessés.

Le Général Canrobert, auquel revient en partie l'honneur de la journée, a été blessé légèrement par un éclat d'obus qui l'a atteint à la poitrine et à la main: il va très-bien. Le Général Thomas, de la division du Prince, a reçu une balle dans le bas-ventre, blessure grave. Les Russes ont perdu environ 5,000 hommes. Le champ de bataille est jonché de leurs morts, nos ambulances

sont pleines de leurs blessés. Nous avons compté une proportion de sept cadavres Russes pour un cadavre Français.

L'artillerie Russe nous a fait du mal, mais la nôtre lui est bien supérieure. Je regretterai toute ma vie de ne pas avoir eu seulement mes deux régiments de Chasseurs d'Afrique. Les Zouaves se sont fait admirer des deux armées; ce sont les premiers soldats du monde.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) MARECHAL A. DE SAINT-ARNAUD.

No. 233.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 1,223.)

Paris, October 8, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE SEVRES, the French Secretary of Legation at Vienna, arrived in Paris late on Thursday evening with despatches from M. de Bourqueney dated the 2nd instant. These despatches relate to the fresh propositions which the Governments of England and France had been led to expect would be made to them by the Cabinet of Vienna in regard to the Eastern question. The nature of the propositions themselves is to be found in Lord Westmorland's confidential despatch No. 365, also of the 2nd instant, which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship on the 6th instant. It would be superfluous, therefore, for me to go into any details of them. I will only remark that M. de Bourqueney has accompanied his statement by a "Projet de Traité."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys being in the country, the despatches were sent to him, and I was unable to ask his opinion of them until yesterday afternoon.

His Excellency said that he had just come from a council at St. Cloud, and that he was enabled to speak the Emperor's sentiments, as well as his own; that he thought the propositions detestable (détestables), and that they could not be seriously entertained. He proceeded to recapitulate them seriatim as contained in the "Projet de Traité," and remarked that they were in general a repetition of what the allied Governments had refused in another shape. England and France, he observed, were required to consign to a Treaty the principles embodied in the notes exchanged on the 8th August. What advantage would they derive from such a proceeding which they did not possess already? They were asked to define more precisely the character of the Austrian occupation of the Principalities; but this was already defined by the Convention of the 14th of June, signed between Austria and the Porte. A pretension, indeed, was put forward that if the allied armies entered the Principalities to attack the Russians, their movements should be continued in concert with the Austrian Commander-in-chief; that is to say, the allies, who had a signed a Convention with the Porte permitting them to occupy, during the war, any part of the Turkish territory which suited their strategy, or their convenience, were to make their entry into the Principalities to depend in some measure on the permission of Austria. The proposal of a Conference or Congress was equally inadmissible. It was tantamount to preparing a Treaty of Peace in the midst of war, and to place a non-belligerent on a footing of equality with belligerents.

But the worst clause of all was that which stipulated for an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the three Powers, in case Austria, in consequence of her occupation of the Principalities, should be attacked by Russia. That is, the allies were called upon to sign a Treaty which should sanction the theory maintained by Austria, that as long as she was not attacked by Russia, there existed no *casus belli* for her.

Your Lordship will be good enough to recollect that I have not seen the "Projet de Traité," and can only report M. Drouyn de Lhuys' appreciation of it.

His Excellency concluded, therefore, and so had the Emperor, that the propositions could not be entertained. But another question remained for consideration.

M. de Bourqueney's despatches showed that both the Emperor of Austria and Count Buol were most anxious that they should be accepted; and the former had expressed himself with some sensitiveness respecting the suspicions

to which his conduct had given rise in London and Paris. If these fresh overtures on his part were rejected at once, might there not be danger of his becoming alarmed at the estrangement evinced towards him by England and France, and might he not seek to draw nearer again to Russia? Under this apprehension, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, he had been considering in what way the proposition could be refused without giving offence, and it appeared to him that, as the last accounts which he had received, both from Constantinople and Bucharest, showed that the Austrian agents at those places were acting in direct opposition to the stipulations which the Treaty proposed to consecrate, an answer might be returned to the Austrian Government that so long as these crying acts of injustice were not remedied, the allied Governments could not entertain the fresh overtures made to them by Count Buol.

I asked whether this would not imply an engagement that, the evils once remedied, the propositions would be entertained; while, if I had understood M. Drouyn de Lhuys rightly, he was of opinion that they could be acceptable under no circumstances. I was confident, I added, that Her Majesty's Government would feel, equally with him, the necessity of replying to Austria with all possible courtesy; but might not this be done by acknowledging Count Buol's offer to be a pledge of the desire of the Emperor of Austria to draw closer the bonds of his alliance to Great Britain and France? by pointing out the disadvantage to which the stipulations of the Treaty would subject the allies? and by proposing a counter-project, in which a clause might be introduced binding Austria to declare war against Russia in the spring, if a peace on the basis of the four points had not been previously concluded? This would give the two Governments an opportunity of reassuring Austria by showing that they still adhered to the four points, while it would not bind them unnecessarily for the future. If Austria accepted this counter-project, well and good; if she refused, she could not take it amiss if we, on our part, declined to agree to her conditions.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared inclined to abide by his own idea, and I said no more; the more particularly as I could not tell what might be your Lordship's impression. But on going to him again this morning I found that he preferred the plan which I had ventured to suggest. He had seen M. de Hübner, he said, who had communicated to him Count Buol's despatches, upon the subject to which this despatch relates, and he told him that he could give him no answer until he had taken the Emperor's orders, and had consulted Her Majesty's Government; but he had allowed him to see that his personal opinion was not favourable to the project.

M. de Hübner, however, did not allude to any "Projet de Traité," and had merely spoken in general terms of what might be done.

Count Walewski will receive by to-morrow's messenger a despatch for communication to your Lordship, detailing at length the opinions of his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 234.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 1,224. Confidential.)

Paris, October 8, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my preceding despatch I have the honour to add that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, during the conversation therein adverted to, which he had with M. de Hübner, intimated the expectation that Austria should engage to declare war against Russia at some specified time, if she desired the allies to bind themselves in the manner suggested by Count Buol, upon which M. de Hübner produced a private letter from Count Buol, by which he was enjoined to declare at once, should such a proposal be made, that Austria would enter into no engagement of the kind.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 235.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 1,225.)

Paris, October 8, 1854.

My Lord,

THE accounts lately received by the French Government from Constantinople and Bucharest continue to exhibit a demeanour on the part of the Austrian agents completely at variance with the assurances given by the Austrian Government. I mentioned in my despatch No. 1,154 of the 22nd ultimo, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had written to M. Benedetti, and to the French Consul at Bucharest, to engage, the one the Porte, and the other Omer Pasha, to send troops towards the Pruth for the purpose of making a diversion in favour of the allies. Yesterday an answer, dated the 3rd instant, was received from Bucharest stating that Omer Pasha could do nothing, because he was thwarted in all his movements by the order of General Hess. M. Drouyn de Lhuys desired M. de Bourqueney immediately, by telegraph, to communicate this intelligence to Count Buol, and to ask how it came that the Emperor of Austria's orders, sent on the 21st ultimo to General Hess, were not obeyed. M. de Bourqueney answered this morning, by telegraph, that Omer Pasha's assertions were not true, and that no impediment existed to his marching towards the Pruth if he pleased.

It appears to me not unlikely that Omer Pasha may not like to see the Austrians in the Principalities, and no covering army between them and Constantinople, and that, instead of fairly stating as much, he has recourse to excuses for not quitting his present position, or he may have received orders from the Porte to watch the Austrians. I hinted as much to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who replied that he also began to think that the difficulties which Omer Pasha asserted existed to his following the Russians were exaggerated. At the same time there could be no doubt, he said, that the conduct of the Internuncio at Constantinople was very overbearing, and he was about to address a despatch to M. de Bourqueney recapitulating the various facts in connection with Austrian agents which had been brought to his knowledge, and desiring him to point out to Count Buol how little they were in accordance with the sentiments of which the new propositions of Austria purported to be the proof. In this way, he hoped, he said, to obtain some advantage to the Porte. Count Buol seeing that no other notice was taken of his new project would probably suppose that those complaints were the obstacle to its adoption, and would remedy them, while nothing like a pledge would exist that their remedy would hasten the negotiation of a Treaty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 236.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 368.)

Vienna, October 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's despatch No. 312 of the 26th of September to Count Buol, who learnt with sincere pleasure that Her Majesty's Government had received with great satisfaction the orders sent to General Hess not to interfere with the movements of Omer Pasha's army. I have also to express the pleasure with which I learnt that Her Majesty's Government had approved the joint recommendation made by Baron Bourqueney and myself to Omer Pasha, to regulate the movements of his army with a view to restrain the Russian Generals from sending reinforcements to the Russian army in the Crimea; and I am happy to inform your Lordship that, in consequence of that recommendation, Omer Pasha, after deliberation with General Hess, had determined to move upon Galatz, and had sent orders to Ferik Mehemet Pasha at

Buseo, and Mouschir Pasha at Ursitscheni, to proceed by forced marches to that city. He had communicated his movements to the Commanders of the allied armies in the Crimea, and intended to await at the mouth of the Pruth their answer; on the receipt of which he would be ready to commence operations against Bessarabia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 237.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 373.)

Vienna, October 4, 1854.

My Lord,

THE "Oesterreichische Correspondenz" of this evening contains a telegraphic communication from Jassy, dated the 2nd instant, to the effect that on the morning of that day, the Austrian troops under the command of Baron Hess had made their entry into the town. The division of Count Paar, consisting of six battalions, eight squadrons, and three batteries, garrisoned the town of Jassy. The remaining twelve districts of Moldavia were likewise in the occupation of the Imperial troops, who, wherever they had shown themselves, had been received by the inhabitants in the most friendly manner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 238.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 375.)

Vienna, October 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I READ to Count Buol, in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, your despatch to me No. 311 of the 26th ultimo.

Count Buol stated, that as most of the points brought forward by your Lordship in this document had already been mentioned in the private communication I had made to him of your Lordship's views, he would not now recapitulate his replies upon that occasion; but he would reconsider what was more precisely stated by your Lordship in this despatch; and he would instruct Count Colloredo to communicate to you his further remarks with regard to those observations.

Count Buol remarked, that while his Government had never let it be understood that they would make a *casus belli* of the refusal of Russia to accept the four points, they had, on the other hand, never declared that they would not have recourse to arms to oblige Russia to sign a just and equitable peace, but it was impossible to disguise the very critical position in which Austria was placed; for, although the assistance of Prussia and her German allies had been promised to her in case she should be attacked by Russia, that assistance could hardly be counted upon at the present moment if she took the initiative by declaring war and commencing hostilities; and she might find herself exposed alone to the attacks of Russia during a winter campaign.

Count Buol said that he hoped that your Lordship would see, in the new project he had instructed Count Colloredo to submit to you, the means of bringing Prussia from her present policy, and of attaching her to the views of the allies, by the menace of leaving her in a completely isolated position if she persisted in the vacillating conduct she had hitherto pursued.

With regard to the desire expressed by your Lordship, in speaking of the Congress proposed by Count Buol, to do nothing which might hazard the good

understanding between Austria and the Western Powers, Count Buol said that he most heartily reciprocated the desire to preserve that good understanding, as it was to the union of the three Powers alone that he looked for the solution of the great question which at present disturbed the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 239.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 104. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, October 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM confidentially informed by Count Esterhazy, that at an interview he had with Baron Manteuffel, his Excellency informed him that Baron Budberg had read to him a few days ago an extract from a private letter from Count Nesselrode, in which the Chancellor had stated that Russia was not indisposed to admit of the first Article of the conditions lately proposed to the Imperial Cabinet by Austria, namely, that relating to the future Protectorate of the Principalities, provided that the rights and privileges of the Provinces should be respected, and that the Protectorate should be given over to the five Powers collectively.

Baron Manteuffel, in mentioning this circumstance to Count Esterhazy, and in requesting him to convey it to Count Buol, particularly desired that it might not be thought that he was the promoter, or even the direct channel of communication, of this proposal. He merely wished to transmit the information as it had reached him.

Count Esterhazy, in communicating this information to me, requested that it might be considered as strictly confidential.

Your Lordship will doubtless perceive in the hint thus put forward by Russia a wish to disengage Austria from the Western Alliance; nor do I think, from the views and opinions lately expressed by the Prussian Cabinet with respect to the Principalities, that they would view with disfavour any attempt of the Russian Government to purchase Austrian neutrality at the price of concessions to her with respect to the future Protectorate of the Danubian Provinces.

If I may judge, however, from present appearances, neither the Russian nor the Prussian Government are likely to inveigle Austria into any such compromise, alike derogatory to her honour and her interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 240.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 108. Confidential.)

Berlin, October 6, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT ESTERHAZY has informed me that he has received and presented to the Prussian Cabinet the reply of the Austrian Government to the last Prussian despatch of the 21st ultimo, addressed to Count Arnim.

As your Lordship will have received communication of this despatch from Count Colloredo, it is unnecessary for me to detain your Lordship with referring to it, further than to state that it has created great anger and annoyance to the King and the Government. It is evident that the Austrian Government is firmly resolved not to bend to the exigencies of Prussia, while on the other hand

this Government views with serious alarm the policy which the Austrian Cabinet is determined to pursue.

I am informed that Austria has addressed a circular despatch to all the German Governments to know whether they will support her at the Diet; and I have reason to believe, that if the majority of the States reply satisfactorily, Austria will pursue her own line at the Diet, independently of Prussia. On the other hand, I am informed that this Government feels assured of a majority in their favour at the Diet, in which case Austria must be prepared to act as an independent great Power, and must lean on the Western Powers for her own security.

Count Esterhazy had an audience of the King to-day, to deliver an autograph letter from his Sovereign. This interview, I am given to understand, was anything but satisfactory; His Majesty was exceedingly angry with the Austrian reply, and evinced no pliable disposition. His great aim was for peace. He also expressed an opinion, that even if the allies took Sebastopol and the Crimea, it would not render the Emperor Nicholas more pacific.

Count Esterhazy seems to think that the feeling of anger against Austria is at this moment too great to allow this Government to treat this subject calmly and dispassionately, and therefore trusts that in a few days, when the first ebullition has expended itself, they may perhaps evince some moderation and reason. In the meantime events may occur which may assist the Austrian endeavours to produce a more cordial and harmonious understanding with this Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 241.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, October 9.)

Vienna, September 30, 1854.

(Translation.)

COUNT ARNIM has communicated to me a despatch, of which a copy is inclosed, containing the reply of his Court to our overtures of the 14th instant. I have not delayed to submit the same to our gracious master the Emperor, and in obedience to the commands of His Majesty I address to your Excellency the following observations.

We must first take the liberty to correct in some points the meaning which the Prussian Cabinet has attached to our communication of the 14th instant. The more sincerely we desire a union with Prussia and the other Governments of Germany, the more decidedly important do we consider it that our declarations be guarded from all misunderstanding.

We have not said, nor can we say, that by the retreat of the Russian troops from the Danubian Principalities, the danger of a conflict between the two Empires has been removed. We said this of such immediate danger only.

In calling to recollection that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia was the origin of the war, and that the German Courts had declared that the continuance thereof was incompatible with the interests of Austria and Germany, in admitting the consequent importance of the fact of the evacuation, we were still very far from considering that evacuation to be equivalent to a maintenance of those weighty interests; we rather looked upon them as deeply engaged, so long as Russia does not give securities for the establishment of a sure and lasting peace.

We mentioned the narrowing of the theatre of war as an immediate consequence of the evacuation of the Principalities. In so doing we had in view the fact that Russia has withdrawn her army from Wallachia and Moldavia, and that Austria is invited to protect those countries from a second invasion. But we have not arrogated to ourselves a right to separate the Principalities from the territory open to warlike operations, and we are not in a position to claim such a right.

Nor have we proposed that Austria and Prussia should abstain from bringing a definite motion before the Diet, in respect to the disposal of the guarantee-points established by the correspondence of the 8th August. On our part we look upon this as a motion already made by the communication of the note of the Imperial Cabinet of that date, and we shall not be able to consider as quite satisfactory the resolutions which the Committee shall, after examination of the documents laid before it, propose to the Federal Assembly, unless they put the Confederation in the same position with regard to the guarantees, as that which is already held by us. It is only to avoid unnecessarily giving a formal prominence to the attitude of Austria and Prussia, that we have now, on submitting the reply of Russia, declared ourselves prepared, as we did on the occasion of communicating the correspondence to the Confederation, to abstain from making a formal motion in regard to the disposal of the four points, and merely to wait for the Confederation's initiating the resolutions thereupon.

Finally, it was declared by us that we had contracted no obligation to carry into effect the four points by active proceedings against Russia; but this declaration makes known in the most definitive manner that His Majesty the Emperor reserves full liberty to himself to make further resolves.

Proceeding from the points of view here again detailed, we proposed to the Cabinet of Berlin that we should jointly lay the reply of Russia before the Confederation, whose dignity requires that it should be made acquainted with the same, and consulted thereupon; and that we should accompany this by moving that a declaration be made, to the effect that an attack made by Russia upon Austria in consequence of our occupation of the Principalities, would call out the whole Confederation in our defence; a declaration which Prussia has already made to us for herself. We can therefore only view with sincere regret that the Prussian Cabinet is now raising up difficulties against an adherence to this proposal.

A claim is made on the part of Prussia to put a new explanation upon our communication of the 14th instant. The Prussian Government will not consider the interests of Germany on the Lower Danube as protected, unless the marching in of the Imperial troops shall prevent the establishment of other elements in the Principalities. It wishes that an explanation be given upon the point, whether or not the Principalities will be altogether closed to warlike operations by the Austrian occupation, and whether Russia will thereby be secured from having to meet an attack from thence by other than Austrian troops; and it intimates that if Russia should have to repel such an attack, and if her forces should thereby come in contact with our troops, Germany would then have to weigh her local interests against the general interest, which is connected with the question of taking part in a European war.

Prussia has already assured us of her assistance generally, for the case that we do not advance to attack Russia; we cannot therefore assume that she will narrow this promise by any limitation. Apart from this, we have only to observe that the Prussian Government is perfectly acquainted with the state of the obligations contracted between the different Powers concerned, and also with the manner in which we have explained ourselves in regard to our advance into the Principalities. She knows that the Treaty of the Porte with the Maritime Powers concedes to them the right of selecting any point of the Ottoman territory they choose for the operations of the allied troops; that therefore, even if the Porte had wished to exclude her own Danubian army from entering the Principalities, she was not at all in a position to yield to us a right to exclusive occupation, and that we, on our side, have not claimed such a right. We may, in this matter, avail ourselves of military and political facilities; we may take care that countries already so rarely visited may still remain exempt from the troubles of war and excessive annoyance; and we may endeavour to act so that we may not be compelled by mere fortune of war to do anything which may not seem prompted by our spontaneous resolutions; but to this our rights in the Principalities are limited.

Moreover, as the Cabinet of Berlin has gone back upon this point, since we expressed our sentiments upon it in our communications of the 14th instant, we cannot but express our conviction, with the candour which we owe to the confederate Courts, that Prussia is not in a position to declare that the maintenance of German interests in the Danubian Principalities depends upon the exclusiveness of the Austrian occupation. We are very far from wishing to excite

discussions upon the past, but if the Cabinet of Berlin will look back upon its recollections, it will be compelled to acknowledge that it has acted, upon the question of our advance into the Principalities, in a manner which cannot well entitle it to object to the non-exclusiveness of our occupation of the Principalities.

If in this there is nothing which can afford us any better elucidation of our earlier communications, we find also on the other hand, in what is said by Baron Manteuffel, no security for a proper result of any discussion in Frankfort, which should be introduced by the two Powers jointly. It is true that the Prussian Cabinet, remaining bound to the European Powers for the moral support of the four points, by virtue of its communication of the 6th instant, expresses a disposition to use its influence in the Confederation, to the effect that the Federal Assembly on its part should declare that it will bring forward its moral support in favour of those points, so soon as any new opportunity offers itself of introducing discussions upon them. But at the same time the Prussian Cabinet repeats its claim to retain some degree of hesitation in regard to those points, and hereupon it expresses a doubt whether a discussion upon them in the Confederation would be likely at this moment to promise a practical result. But the Prussian Court will surely think it but just that we, on our part, should resolve to introduce in Frankfort such notions only as are calculated to bring the position of the Confederation in harmony with ours; and that at all events we should look upon any objections against the four points as being incompatible with the promise to afford a moral support to them.

Under these circumstances we regret that we cannot but share the doubts of Prussia as to the expediency of the two Powers introducing a joint motion for the present. We shall therefore deliberate, whether it be advisable to bring forward our propositions in Frankfort separately, through the Imperial Presidential Deputy, and to call upon the Confederation for a decision, so that we might then be enabled to take our further measures accordingly; or whether, first of all, it would be better to wait until the Governments of the German Confederation shall find it to their interest to take up again the discussions upon the question by which Europe is so deeply agitated.

All the steps taken by His Majesty the Emperor bear witness that he is profoundly penetrated with the feeling how inealculably important it is that Austria in the present universal crisis should remain closely united with Prussia and with the Germanic Confederation. But the efforts of Austria alone are not sufficient to effect the attainment of this object. They must be met by the cooperation of the Governments of Germany, and, above all, by that of His Majesty the King of Prussia, whose elevated mind and highly enlightened intellect afford the best assurances of salutary determinations.

You will make known the present communication to Baron Manteuffel. We shall at once transmit the same confidentially to the German Courts.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

No. 242.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, October 9.)

(Translation.) *Vienna, September 30, 1854.*

WE will add to the preceding despatch a few observations as to our relations with the belligerent Powers.

There are two points which are more or less explicitly demanded of us from Berlin. It is believed that we ought to close the Principalities against offensive operations against Russia on the part of the Turks or their allies; and it is wished to obtain from us an assurance that if Russia does not attack us, we shall, on our side, not proceed to aggressive measures.

Either supposition is, however, decidedly inconsistent with our position. We do not consider ourselves warranted to impede in the Principalities the operations of the belligerent Powers; and we can in no case renounce the right

to change our present attitude of an armed expectation for a participation in the war.

We will not dwell at length on this latter point. It is self-evident that we cannot expect to attain the peace that we require through the exertions and combats of others, nor can we take the engagement to bear for an unlimited time the heavy sacrifices which so passive an attitude must entail; it is therefore only as regards the first point that we consider it expedient to state to your Excellency the grounds of our decision.

We can only consider ourselves as entitled to the occupation of the Principalities under the condition that we will defend them against every attack by Russian arms, and that we shall not oppose the military measures of the Allied Powers.

This is the necessary consequence of our Treaty with the Porte, and it is likewise in complete unison with what we have always maintained and declared, as well to Russia as to others. When we demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, we expressly stipulated that no condition, the fulfilment of which would be beyond our power, should be attached to this evacuation. Russia on this declared herself ready to evacuate, but at the same time demanded guarantees of us that she should not be exposed to the pursuit of the enemy and to further attack. This we refused: for Russia had in the first instance declared that it was her intention to retreat from purely strategical motives, and she therefore avoided a conflict which must have followed the irrevocable decision we had taken. Russia consequently did not deliver the Principalities up to us, but merely left them to their fate. We occupied them because we had received the authority of Turkey so to do. The Turks enter in consequence of their military operations, and the French and English, owing to their Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, may follow them.

We consequently have the right to be in the Principalities, but nowise the obligation to exclude thence by force any but the enemies of the Porte. Still less are we entitled to prescribe to the belligerent Powers for what military purposes they should be at liberty to advance. We could not advance such a pretension without giving just cause for remonstrances against our proceeding.

It cannot be denied but that this state of things involves some difficulties, but these may be overcome by a frank admission of the limits of our rights, and by amicable representations made in the form of negotiations.

It will only be in such manner, and in the interest of the Principalities themselves, that we shall be able to use our influence that these districts may be freed from the operations of war.

It thence further follows, with reference to the validity of the Treaty of the 20th April, that no distinction can be made whether an attack, in which we do not share, be made on Russian territory, or not. If we have not the right to hinder such an attack, neither does it follow that by allowing it we change our position to the offensive. But Russia will on its part be compelled to confine herself to resistance of attack on the Pruth, if she wishes to avoid a conflict with Austria. Prussia and Germany will consequently, if they generally acknowledge our advance into the Principalities to be dictated by German interests, not be able to except from their promise of assistance a contingency, the occurrence of which our position does not warrant us in opposing.

Your Excellency is authorized under fitting circumstances to make use of this despatch, and not to allow any doubt to prevail, that with respect to the above mentioned two points we are determined in no wise to recede from the position which we have deliberately assumed.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) BUOL.

No. 243.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 109.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 6, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a copy and translation of a despatch addressed to Count Esterhazy by Count Buol, dated Vienna, September 30, 1854, which most satisfactorily and most clearly exposes the terms on which the Austrian occupation of the Principalities is based. It most ably refutes the idea held out by Prussia that the Principalities should be solely and exclusively occupied by Austrian troops, on the grounds that German interests alone were to be protected there, and that the occupation of those Provinces by the allied troops might possibly give rise to a conflict in which Austria, by becoming a belligerent, might thereby drag Germany into a war with Russia.

I have not time to take, by this evening's messenger, a copy of this despatch in the original text, but will forward one to your Lordship by the next opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 243.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, September 30, 1854.

[See No. 242.]

No. 244.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.

(No. 546.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September 27, 1854.*

REFERRING to my previous correspondence respecting the differences which have arisen between the Austrian and Ottoman Commanders in Wallachia, I have the honour to state that after conferring with the French Chargé d'Affaires this morning, I sent Mr. Alison to put Reshid Pasha in possession of my sentiments on that subject.

I directed Mr. Alison to say that if Baron Hess and Count Coronini persisted in requiring the return of Prince Stirbey, and the maintenance of the Austrian proclamation in its present shape, as there was every reason to presume, it would be better for Omer Pasha and the Turkish Commissioner to acquiesce, under reserve of whatever might be subsequently arranged among the respective Governments, and that, as to the required censure of their late proceedings, I saw no reason for it myself, but the Porte was evidently the best judge.

I further directed Mr. Alison to express my desire that Omer Pasha should by no means be encouraged to risk a collision with the Austrian army at the present critical juncture for the sake of realizing his military plans in Wallachia, though founded on right and calculated to produce a good effect. He ought, in my opinion, to be instructed not to push his pretensions to the point of acting in defiance of Baron Hess, but, on the supposition of the forward movement which he contemplated having been concerted with the Commanders of the allied forces, and of his having reason to presume that Prince Gortchakoff, taking advantage of the attitude assumed by Austria, would detach a part of his army towards the Crimea, only to relinquish his plan after having formally ascertained that the Austrian General was prepared to resist its execution, and after discharging his own responsibility by an ostensible act of protest.

Mr. Alison was authorized by me to add that if Omer Pasha were thus precluded for the present from taking up an advanced position in Wallachia, he

might, perhaps, effect his object of retaining the Russian army in Bessarabia by making an incursion into that province, which Austria could hardly presume to bring within the range of her inactive and neutral policy, but that the expediency of the measure was to be decided on military grounds by competent authority.

Reshid Pasha was in council with his colleagues when Mr. Alison reached the Porte, and he came out to receive my message.

I am led to believe that the Council's opinion is not likely to differ essentially from mine, which is also that of M. Benedetti.

The instructions to be prepared for Omer Pasha and communicated to me, will show more exactly the line of proceeding when finally adopted by the Porte.

Meanwhile it is impossible not to regret the threefold discrepancy which manifestly exists, on several important points, between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities practically, between the views of Austria and those of the allied belligerents, and, finally, between the language of the Austrian Cabinet and that of its Agents at Bucharest and Constantinople. These differences can hardly continue without producing the most serious consequences. They are not of a nature to be settled by any subordinate authority. The several positions require to be made clear by the immediate action of the Cabinets. For one, I can only hope to assist in preventing the main interests at issue from being irrevocably compromised, without an entire surrender of passing claims or a sacrifice of important principles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 245.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 547.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September* 27, 1854.

INCLOSED herewith is copy of a letter addressed by Marshal St. Arnaud to M. Benedetti, respecting the intended movements of the Turkish army in Wallachia, and communicated by M. Benedetti to me. It does not appear, nor am I at all assured, that in writing that letter his Excellency wrote in concert with Lord Raglan. It is, moreover, doubtful whether the Marshal had in mind the combined movements proposed by Baron Hess through Colonel Kalieb several weeks ago, or any plan concerted between Omer Pasha and the two Commanders-in-chief when they were preparing to start for the Crimea. His expressions are general, intimating a wish that Russia should not be left in full security on the side of Bessarabia.

I have not hesitated, however, to second the French Chargé d'Affaires in his endeavours to obtain the cooperation of the Austrian Internuncio for that purpose. My representations have had no better success than his.

Baron de Bruck claims credit to his Government for having procured the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia, and deprecates every movement that may compromise her pacific attitude. He sides with the Austrian Generals in restraining the movements of the Turkish army, and shows no inclination to admit either the danger to which the allied forces are thought to be exposed on that account, or the duty of taking measures to prevent its occurrence.

With respect to the reality of such danger, I have to state that Omer Pasha makes mention of advices purporting that Prince Gortchakoff had detached, or was likely to detach, a part of his army towards the Crimea; that private letters from the Crimea affirm that the Russians were expecting reinforcements from the side of Odessa; and that Russian prisoners, in answer to questions addressed to them, confirm that report.

The distance, on the other hand, is great; the operations against Sebastopol are on the eve of their final issue; and any reinforcements arriving there, even from Odessa, would be exhausted by fatigue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 245.

Marshal St. Arnaud to M. Benedetti.

Au Quartier-Général à Old Fort,
M. le Chargé d'Affaires, *le* 18 *Septembre*, 1854.

PENDANT que les armées alliées poursuivent laborieusement en Crimée leur entreprise, il est du plus haut intérêt que la retraite de l'armée Russe ne s'accomplisse pas dans des conditions de sécurité militaire et telles que le Gouvernement du Czar, se considérant comme libéré de toute appréhension du côté des Principautés, puisse faire refluer peu à peu vers le sud de l'Empire, et particulièrement vers la Crimée, des forces considérables.

C'est à la Turquie et à l'Autriche qu'il appartient d'agir par leur diplomatie et par leurs armées pour, assurer cette action que j'appellerai "dérivatrice" et dont l'importance ne saurait vous échapper.

Je vous recommande de ne négliger aucun moyen pour déterminer la Porte et l'Autriche, par l'intermédiaire de l'Internonce, à remplir ce rôle indispensable; mais il est bien entendu que vous ne direz et ne ferez rien dans ce sens sans vous être au préalable concerté avec Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Je ne doute pas que la question ne lui paraisse aussi importante qu'à nous-mêmes, et qu'il ne vous prête tout son concours pour en assurer la solution.

Recevez, &c.
Le Maréchal Commandant-en-chef,
(Signé) A. DE ST. ARNAUD.

No. 246.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 548.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September* 27, 1854.

IT would seem that something untoward and ominous hangs over that unfortunate army at Kars. Ismail Pasha, who was lately appointed to the command of it, has been taken ill here. His complaint is an inflammation of the eyes, which may endanger his sight. A provisional commander, by name Shukri Pasha, is appointed in consequence, with the rank of General of Division. To me the individual and his name are alike new. He is said to have been strongly recommended by Omer Pasha, and also by Ismail, to whom, when with the army, he is to act as Chef d'Etat Major, superseding in that capacity General Guyon, and having as second in command a certain Hassan Pasha, who is stated to have been serving with Omer Pasha as General of Brigade. The arrival of these two officers will be followed by the departure of Mustafa Zariff Pasha, Kerim Pasha, and other superior officers, including General Guyon, for Constantinople, where they will be submitted to a court of inquiry.

Colonel Stein, who has turned Turk, assuming the name of Ferhad Pasha, is attached to the Seraskier's staff. He was removed from the army at Kars at my suggestion, as a man suspected even by his countrymen, and neutralizing by a spirit of intrigue the effects of his natural capacity and professional knowledge.

There is much in all this to cause apprehension for the future. The removal of Zariff Pasha is indeed a most laudable measure; and an inquiry into the causes of the late defeat at Kooruk Dereh, which the Russian Commander in his official report describes as the result of his manœuvres to bring on a general engagement, is natural enough, and, it may be, necessary. But the Porte's main object appears to be a riddance of foreigners, and the Seraskier is but too likely to secure his old associate, the discarded Mushir, at their expense. On the whole, I see few real elements of improvement, which is the more to be regretted as the Russians are thought to have derived small profit from their victory, while the Turkish army is said to have gained in self-reliance and fitness for the field. The approach of winter, the defensive attitude of Russia, and other circumstances, diminish for the present our interest in these matters.

It may be hoped that Colonel Williams, who probably reached the army some days ago, will soon be able to throw a clearer light on its real state, its merits, its wants, and its prospects.

On looking back, with the view of establishing a balance between loss and gain, we may easily perceive that if opportunities, as it is alleged, have been thrown away, and much waste of life occasioned by mismanagement, the enemy has made no conquest; and, supposing the war to continue, there is reason to hope that, if past experience be turned to account, a new campaign may be entered upon with fair prospects of success. The reasons for standing on the defensive will in all likelihood cease to exist, and it may be hoped that the allies will be at liberty to direct a larger portion of their attention to the Asiatic frontier and other adjacent provinces of Russia. Meanwhile, the tone and language of our latest advices from that quarter warrant a suspicion that the wants of the Turkish army have been exaggerated, and its capacity for active operations considerably undervalued. It is still more evident that in assuming the offensive, contrary to the Porte's instructions, the Mushir in command did but play the Russian game, and glorify his courage at the expense of his discretion. I have seen letters which speak of the battle fought at Koorook Dereh as a Turkish victory; but, unfortunately, I have also seen English spectators, who, after having been in the thick of it, give a very different account of what they saw.

In general parlance, the defects and vices of the Turkish officers are notorious; and it cannot be denied that if the bravery and fortitude of the soldiers have been brought occasionally into action with corresponding vigour, the success which has ensued, is mainly owing to renegades and foreign volunteers. Nevertheless, as much of the old pride still hangs about the Turkish character, there is a jealous mistrust of foreigners, which rarely slumbers and is never extinct; a natural policy, after all, and by no means confined to Turkey. How, then, can we wonder at the difficulties experienced by General Guyon, even in those matters to which his public spirit and bold energies were applied with unsparing and useful activity, or seek any further explanation of the perseverance with which his doubtful pretensions to the chief command were resisted? Has General Klapka fared better? Yet history has recorded his tried abilities in command; and the recommendations of the Embassy were backed by the favourable suffrages of those to whom England and France have confided their choicest battalions. I am bound in truth and justice to say that General Guyon with all his merits, which are by no means small, has not earned, even among his friends and subordinates, the reputation of an officer equal to the chief command. The impressions entertained in that respect can hardly be removed, either by his own very sanguine assurances, or by the clamorous panegyrics of those who have no military knowledge to guide them, and little inspiration but what is kindled by the heat of self-confidence and intemperate zeal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 247.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 550.)
Therapia, September 29, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, are copies of an instruction addressed by me to Mr. Cunningham, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Galatz, of a circular addressed to the several Consuls enumerated in the margin, and of the printed documents which are referred to therein.

The instruction to Mr. Cunningham contains a full explanation of the objects in view, and I hope that the course which I have taken will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 247.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Consul Cunningham.

Sir, *Therapia, September* 29, 1854.

THERE is reason to suppose that the Russians have by this time evacuated completely the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, including Galatz and Ibraila. I do not find, however, that official intelligence to that effect has yet been received, either by the Turkish Government or by the Austrian Legation. I conceive, therefore, that, while it is desirable for you to put yourself in readiness for returning to your post, and even to set out at once for Bulgaria, your services may be rendered available there for a purpose which I now proceed to explain to you.

In consequence of my representations, founded on information received from Lord Raglan, the Porte has issued a firman, and appointed a Commissioner invested with high powers, to protect the Sultan's peaceable subjects from the lawless atrocities to which they had lately been exposed; to redress the grievances already experienced; and to bring the offenders to condign punishment.

The name of the Sultan's Commissioner is Medhet Effendi. Printed translations of his instructions, and of the Imperial firman to which they refer, are inclosed herewith. The translation of an anterior firman, bearing upon the same subject, and regulating the punishment of such individuals as may be convicted of having contravened its enactments, is also inclosed for your more complete information.

The particular object for which I wish to enlist your services in Bulgaria is, to ascertain by local inquiry in what manner the Commissioner, and those authorities to whom the firmans are addressed, have executed, or are engaged in executing, the Sultan's commands. Strong motives of humanity and of policy concur in giving a character of more than usual gravity to the performance of their duties; and by obtaining trustworthy information in that respect, I may hope to have it in my power to obviate the consequences of any mischief on their part, and to render the responsibility under which they are acting effective.

You will probably find it convenient to proceed, in the first instance, to Varna, and there communicate with Her Majesty's Consul, whose attention has been called to the subject-matter of this instruction, by a circular, copy of which is inclosed herewith.

You will learn from Colonel Neale what course the Sultan's Commissioner has taken, and to what parts of the province he has first addressed himself. Your own course may, perhaps, be most usefully regulated by the information you receive from him. If Medhet Effendi has already been at Varna, or is still there, Colonel Neale will himself inform you of his proceedings. Should he have commenced his labours elsewhere, it would be desirable for you to go to the places where he has been, and subsequently to any place where he may be still remaining. You will find no difficulty in making his acquaintance, and giving him to understand that Her Majesty's Embassy, and, indeed, Her Majesty's Government itself, take the deepest interest in the due execution of the Sultan's commands; and that circumstantial reports of the manner in which they are carried out will be conveyed by an impartial observer to Constantinople.

Whenever you find it necessary to communicate with local functionaries or private individuals for purposes of inquiry, you will be careful, in eliciting the truth, to avoid the use of language tending to disparage the Government or its Agents; and should you have occasion to bring any grievances or instances of neglect under the notice of the authorities, you will also be careful not to compromise your informants.

As soon as you learn that the Russians have actually evacuated Galatz and Ibraila, and that you have reason to believe that your presence there may be required for the protection or promotion of our commercial interests, you will proceed to your post, after apprizing me of your intention, and completing, if not too long, any transaction in which you may be engaged with reference to the Commissioner and his proceedings.

For your travelling expenses while employed upon this service, you are at liberty to draw upon me, accompanying your letter of advice with an account

and vouchers in the usual form. I need not remind you that every expense incurred on the public account must be regulated by the strict necessities of the case.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 247.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Her Majesty's Consuls in Turkey.

Therapia, September 27, 1854.

Sir,

INCLOSED for your information are translated copies in print of a Viziriál firman, and instructions to a Commissioner appointed by the Sultan in consequence of my representations to enforce His Majesty's commands for the protection of his subjects of all classes against the lawless and sanguinary ruffians who, under the name of Bashi Bozouks, or as simple brigands, have of late committed so many outrages in the European provinces of Turkey.

I have to call your attention to the proceedings of the Commissioner and local authorities in the execution of their respective instructions, conceiving that no small advantage may result from their sense of having to act under your observation, with the certainty that while your good offices, when at all seasonable and useful, will never be withheld from them, any remissness in the performance of their duties will be brought, in its true colours, under the notice of Her Majesty's Embassy and that of the Supreme Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 247.

Instructions addressed to Medhet Effendi.

(Traduction.)

C'EST une chose connue que les Bashi Bozouks osent commettre dans les endroits par où ils passent et là où ils s'arrêtent, une foule d'actes coupables et des vexations envers toutes les classes de sujets. On sait aussi que, dans certains endroits, des brigands ont fait leur apparition, et font beaucoup de mal à un grand nombre de Musulmans et de Chrétiens innocents, ainsi qu'à leurs familles. Tant que des gens de cette trempe resteront impunis, il est évident qu'on ne pourra guère arrêter le cours des maux sus-énoncés. Il est donc nécessaire d'y apporter un prompt remède.

Mais à cause des événements de la guerre qui donnent tant d'occupation à l'armée Impériale, elle ne peut pas naturellement exercer une surveillance sur des choses pareilles de là où elle se trouve; les Valis sont très occupés; et quant aux autorités inférieures, elle ne donnent point, qu'elle qu'en soit la cause, tous leurs soins aux affaires de cette nature.

C'est pourquoi, Medhet Effendi, susmentionné, a été, ainsi que cela est dit dans le firman qui le charge de cette mission, destiné par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale à cette affaire avec des pleins pouvoirs. Et comme sous le règne plein d'équité de sa Hautesse, on ne permettra pas que des vexations et des procédés barbares aient lieu envers qui que ce soit, l'Effendi s'efforcera de remplir sa mission de la manière qui suit:

Ainsi qu'il appert des papiers remis entre ses mains, des brigands ont commis dans les environs de Varna, envers quelques Bulgares innocents, des scènes horribles et propre à faire saigner le cœur. Or, la Sublime Porte est la première à vouloir en tirer vengeance, et il est de l'essence de tout Gouvernement d'infliger aux auteurs de pareilles atrocités les châtiments qu'ils méritent, et en même temps de punir, suivant le degré de leur culpabilité, celles des autorités qui ont favorisé ou négligé d'empêcher ces crimes, comme c'était leur devoir de le faire.

L'Effendi partira donc d'ici par mer, et dès qu'il sera arrivé à Varna, il se rendra sur les lieux où les scènes d'horreur se sont passées, et il fera tout son possible pour se saisir des auteurs de ces crimes, et pour découvrir quels sont

ceux qui ont favorisé ces crimes ou fait preuve de négligence à cet égard. Aussitôt que les coupables auront été arrêtés, ils devront être jugés de la manière la plus équitable et la plus minutieuse. Et si l'Effendi ne les fait pas punir sur-le-champ, conformément au firman et aux instructions générales publiées il y a quelque temps, et dont copies ont été mises entre ses mains, il s'en rendra responsable. Il se peut qu'un cas extraordinaire arrive, et qu'il faille pour cela procéder en dehors des dispositions du firman et des instructions générales précitées; dans ce cas seulement, l'Effendi se trouvera obligé de prendre d'ici les ordres nécessaires. Il doit tenir le Gouvernement au courant de tous les crimes qui se commettent.

La mission de Medhet Effendi ne se borne point aux alentours de Varna; mais commençant de là il parcourra tout le pays au delà des Balkans; et si dans ce pays-là aussi il a été commis des actes coupables, il procédera à les vérifier, pour agir en conséquence. Il ne doit s'arrêter nulle part plus de temps qu'il ne faut.

Nous avons écrit à son Altesse le Généralissime de donner partout où il faut les ordres nécessaires, afin qu'au besoin, une force armée suffisante se trouve auprès de lui; et il est ordonné, par le firman dont il est porteur, à toutes les autorités de lui donner toute l'assistance nécessaire pour l'exécution de la mission dont il est chargé. Il ne lui reste donc qu'à faire preuve d'activité, et à remplir sa mission exactement; il doit aussi nous faire connaître ceux qui auront manqué à faire les choses qu'il aura demandées d'eux.

L'Effendi doit voir par les papiers remis entre ses mains qu'on néglige beaucoup de fournir les vivres, toute sorte de comestibles et autres objets dont les troupes auxiliaires des Puissances alliées aux environs de Varna ont besoin. Or, c'est un devoir sacré de chercher, en y mettant tout le zèle possible, à faciliter les affaires des troupes expédiées avec tant de sacrifices uniquement pour défendre l'Empire Ottoman; et cela étant, la négligence à cet égard ne peut provenir que d'un manque de zèle pour le bien de la patrie, et comme telle, elle ne peut être que fortement blâmée par la Sublime Porte; et c'est pour cette même raison que l'ex-Commandant de Varna, Hussan Pacha, a été destitué. Medhet Effendi doit prendre des renseignements pour découvrir quels sont ceux qui ont agi à cet égard contrairement à la volonté de la Sublime Porte, pour les punir, afin que désormais chacun soit plus soigneux là dessus, et que chacun s'empresse d'offrir aux troupes les vivres et toute espèce de comestibles, à des prix raisonnables; l'Effendi prendra et publiera des mesures dans ce sens, mesures très-nécessaires.

L'Effendi prendra des renseignements, ouvertement et sous-main, sur la manière d'administrer le pays, et la conduite, à tous égards, des Valis des pays qu'il parcourra, car cela fait partie de sa mission; et il fera connaître toutes ces circonstances à la Sublime Porte. Il ne lui sera pas permis de cacher l'inconduite de qui que ce soit; mais aussi la justice exige qu'il ne croie pas légèrement à des calomnies et à des imputations. Il faut donc qu'il prenne des renseignements exacts sur ce qu'on lui dira, et c'est un devoir de faire en sorte que leur jugement se fasse avec impartialité et justice, et d'une manière très minutieuse.

Si c'est une œuvre qui mérite récompense que d'accepter cette mission avec probité, on se rend, dans le cas contraire, responsable de sa conduite, et Medhet Effendi doit, conséquemment, agir, à cette occasion, droitement et honnêtement.

Il est aussi essentiel qu'il fasse publier que tous ceux qui ont des sujets de plainte, peuvent se présenter et exposer librement leurs griefs.

Inclosure 4 in No. 247.

Instructions addressed to Selim Pasha.

(Traduction.)

C'EST une chose connue que, partout où ils passent et s'arrêtent, les Bashi Bozouks commettent des actes coupables et des vexations envers toutes les classes de sujets; on sait aussi que, dans certains endroits, des brigands ont fait

leur apparition et font beaucoup de mal à grand nombre de Musulmans et de Chrétiens innocents, et à leurs familles. Tant que des gens de cette trempe resteront impunis, il est évident qu'on ne pourra guère arrêter le cours des maux sus-énoncés. Il est donc nécessaire d'y apporter un prompt remède.

Mais à cause des événements de la guerre qui donnent tant d'occupation à l'armée Impériale, elle ne peut pas naturellement exercer une surveillance sur des choses pareilles de là où elle se trouve; les Valis sont très occupés; et quant aux autorités inférieures, elles ne donnent pas, quelle qu'en soit la cause, tous leurs soins aux affaires de cette nature.

C'est pourquoi le Pacha susmentionné a été, ainsi que cela est dit dans le firman qui le charge de cette mission, destiné par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale à cette affaire avec des pleins pouvoirs. Et comme sous le règne plein d'équité de sa Hautesse, on ne permettra pas que des vexations et des procédés barbares aient lieu envers qui que ce soit, le Pacha devra s'efforcer de remplir sa mission de la manière qui suit:

Nous avons écrit à son Altesse le Généralissime de donner les ordres nécessaires à qui il faudra, de fournir au Pacha une force armée suffisante dans le cas où cela serait nécessaire; et comme par le firman dont le Pacha est muni, il est ordonné à toutes les autorités de lui donner toute espèce d'assistance dont il aura besoin pour l'exécution de sa mission, le Pacha n'a plus qu'à y mettre de l'activité. Le Pacha devra aussi nous faire savoir, sans aucun délai, ceux qui auront manqué de faire les choses qu'il leur aura demandées.

Selim Pacha commencera par la partie en deçà des Balkans; et passant par la partie droite de la Roumélie, il passera jusqu'à Janina. De là il reviendra jusqu'à Larisse; et partout où des actes coupables auront été commis, il les vérifiera et fera ce qui est nécessaire.

Une partie de la mission du Pacha est de prendre, ouvertement et sous main, des renseignements exacts sur la manière d'administrer le pays, et sur tous les procédés des Valis et des autres autorités dans les pays qu'il aura parcourus, et de nous en faire connaître le résultat; et n'étant pas permis de cacher l'inconduite de qui que ce soit, il n'est pas juste non plus de croire légèrement aux imputations et aux calomnies; il faut donc qu'en prenant des informations, et dans les jugements qui auront lieu, on procède d'une manière impartiale, minutieuse et équitable. Voilà comment le Pacha aura à se comporter en remplissant sa mission.

On croit par les papiers dont le Pacha a été muni que les événements qui se sont passés dans le voisinage de Janina, sont horribles. Ainsi, il se concertera avec son Excellence Vassi Pacha pour la répression complète de ces scènes, et pour la punition rigoureuse de leurs auteurs, telle étant notre ferme volonté. Il tiendra la même conduite à Larisse, si à Larisse de pareils actes ont eu lieu.

Si l'exécution franche de cette mission sera une œuvre digne de récompense, une conduite opposée sera suivi d'une grande responsabilité. Il faut donc faire preuve à cette occasion de fidélité et de probité. Il est aussi très-important de publier que tous ceux qui ont des sujets de plainte, n'ont qu'à se présenter pour les faire connaître sans la moindre hésitation.

Inclosure 5 in No. 247.

Firman addressed to the Authorities of the Country from Roumelia to Janina.

(Traduction.)

Il nous est parvenu, et nous en avons acquis la certitude, que quelques écervelés et insensés parmi les Bashi Bozouks ont attenté, dans les pays par où ils ont passé et où ils se sont arrêtés, à la vie, à l'honneur et aux biens des sujets Musulmans et Chrétiens de mon Empire, et commis mille excès coupables et incompatibles avec les devoirs de l'humanité; que dans quelques endroits, des brigands et voleurs de grands chemins attaquent plusieurs de mes sujets et leurs femmes et enfants, et leur font du mal; que ces excès ont lieu à cause de la négligence et par la connivence de quelques autorités qui, ce qui est pire encore, ont l'audace de commettre elles-mêmes une foule de vexations, et manquent au devoir de fournir des vivres aux troupes auxiliaires des Puissances alliées.

Inutile de dire que je tiens beaucoup à préserver de toute espèce de vexations, à protéger et assurer le repos et la tranquillité de toutes les classes de mes sujets qui sont un dépôt que la Divine Providence a mis entre mes mains. Il est impossible, d'ailleurs, de différer le châtiment de ceux qui manquent au devoir de donner des facilités aux affaires qui concernent les troupes auxiliaires. Or, tandis que des firmans émanés exprès de mon Trône Impérial ont été publiés dans toute l'étendue de mon Empire, il y a quelque temps, par lesquels il était ordonné que les auteurs de pareils actes eussent à subir une punition sévère, que des scènes semblables à celles dont il est fait mention plus haut se commettent encore, c'est là vraiment une manière d'agir abominable; et, par conséquent, il est devenu nécessaire d'infliger, sans le moindre délai, la punition la plus sévère à ceux qui se rendent coupables de pareils excès, aussi bien qu'aux autorités qui se rendent coupables de connivence contrairement à mes ordres souverains.

Toi, Sélim Pacha sus-mentionné, tu auras à parcourir les pays situés dans la partie gauche de la Roumélie jusqu'à Janina; et conformément aux instructions qui t'ont été données, tu procéderas au jugement soit des particuliers soit des autorités coupables, et tu leur feras appliquer, sans prendre les ordres de la Sublime Porte, les dispositions insérées dans mes firmans précédents. Et s'il arrive quelque cas non prévu par le code pénal, tu ne perdras pas un instant à prendre là-dessus les ordres de la Sublime Porte.

Telle est la mission confiée avec pleine autorité au bon jugement et à la droiture de Selim Pacha. Et d'après les ordres émanés à cet égard du Trône Impérial, il est déjà parti.

Attendu la probabilité que le Pacha ait besoin d'une force armée pour pouvoir se saisir des coupables dans certains endroits, nous avons fait savoir à son Altesse le Généralissime qu'il doit publier et donner à cet égard les ordres nécessaires.

Le présent firman Impérial qui contient la mission et l'autorisation confiées à Selim Pacha, est émané de ma Chancellerie Impériale et remis entre ses mains.

Vous tous, Valis susmentionnés, informés que vous serez de quoi il s'agit, vous comprendrez que cette affaire n'est à nulle autre semblable, et qu'elle commande la plus grande attention et les plus grands soins; et il faut, par conséquent, que sans perdre un instant, et sans laisser échapper la moindre occasion, l'on procède à la punition des coupables; car, sans cela, ceux qui montreront de la négligence et de la connivence à cet égard, auront assumé par là les conséquences les plus funestes.

Il faut que vous prêtiez aide et assistance au Général de Division dans les choses qu'il doit exécuter d'après ses instructions, et que vous ne cessiez pas d'y apporter tous vos soins. Vous lui consignerez les individus coupables, afin qu'ils soient jugés et punis.

Et toi, Général de Division susmentionné, tu partiras incessamment, et ainsi que ta mission l'exige, tu te rendras aux susdits endroits; et dans les pays que tu parcourras tu procéderas au jugement des Bashi Bozouks ou autres coupables, conformément à tes instructions, et tu les feras punir d'après les dispositions de mon susdit firman Impérial avec la plus grande rigueur; et cela, sans demander les ordres de ma Sublime Porte et sans le moindre délai.

Tu auras soin de faire connaître minutieusement à la Sublime Porte celles des autorités qui auront montré de la négligence ou de la connivence à ces égards, afin qu'elles aussi soient punies comme elles le méritent.

Dans ces sortes de cas, il faut que justice soit faite sans exception de personnes; mais il faut aussi avoir bien soin, et ceci est un point essentiel, que les innocents et les hommes qui vivent honnêtement, n'aient à souffrir la moindre molestation.

Enfin, tu feras tout ton possible pour remplir ta mission avec équité et impartialité.

Et vous autres Caïmakams, Naïbs, Muftis, Mudirs, Membres des Conseils, &c., lorsque, vous aussi, vous aurez pris connaissance du contenu de ce firman Impérial, vous devrez vous conformer à tout ce que Sélim Pacha vous dira par rapport aux affaires dont il chargé. Gardez-vous bien de cacher les coupables, mais, au contraire, il faut les faire connaître, afin que justice soit fait. Et comme, si vous contreveniez à mes ordres souverains, vous prendriez sur vous une terrible responsabilité, et qu'un pareil procédé vous attirerait les conséquences

les plus funestes, vous devez vous en garder bien; faites tout votre possible de donner, au contraire, des preuves de fidélité et de dévouement.

Donné dans les derniers jours du mois de Zilhidjé, l'an mil deux cent soixante-dix.

(Une pareille mission a été donnée à Medhet Effendi, Second Secrétaire du Conseil d'Etat, pour la partie droite de la Roumélie jusqu'aux Balkans et bords du Danube. Le firman est adressé à Mehmed Said Pacha, Vali de Silistrie, et à Abdul Rahman, Vali de Widin.)

No. 248.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 552.) *Therapia, September 29, 1854.*

My Lord,

THE Vienna post having arrived last night, I called upon Baron de Bruck this morning to ascertain whether any new decision had been taken by the Austrian Cabinet, and whether his language had undergone any change respecting the movements of the Turkish army in Wallachia.

On the former point I learnt from his Excellency, that the Cabinet of Vienna had postponed its final decision until reference was made, not only to the Prussian Government, but also to the German Diet, under an impression that it would not be prudent for Austria to risk a collision with Russia before she was thoroughly secured on that side.

With respect to the Turkish army, I heard a repetition of his former arguments, with the addition that any incursion of the Turks into Bessarabia was to be deprecated, not only as tending to bring on a fresh aggression by the Russians, but as being too hazardous in a military sense, from the nature of the country and the strength of the Russian fortresses along the Danube.

Baron de Bruck repeated at the same time that the present uncertainty could not last long, and that any unprovoked attack on the Principalities by Russia would, in the mean time, be resisted by the Austrian forces. He asked why a part of Omer Pasha's army could not be detached, if wanted, to the Crimea; and such an arrangement appeared to be contemplated by him with evident satisfaction.

It is unnecessary for me to trouble your Lordship with my remarks in answer to the Internuncio's. They produced no other effect than an intimation from him that, although his opinion might have some weight at Vienna, it was not to be relied upon when placed in contradiction with that of the military authorities at Bucharest.

Speaking of Prince Stirbey, the Internuncio, though stating that no importance was attached at Vienna to his reinstatement in power, manifestly discouraged the idea of his being recalled after the inquiry, and scouted the expression of popular opinions to his discredit as the work of a party and the result of prejudice. He alluded to the proposed explanation of Baron Hess's proclamation, only to say that it might have been easily amended, had not Count Coronini been wounded by the language and manner of Dervish Pasha, and consequently no longer so well disposed as at first to modify expressions which, however, he admitted were carried beyond their legitimate scope.

The instructions to Omer Pasha and the Turkish Commissioner have been drawn up, but they are not in a state to be forwarded to your Lordship, and I must confer with the French Chargé d'Affaires before I can hope to convey my sentiments respecting them to Reshid Pasha in a satisfactory manner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 249.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 1,226. Confidential.)

Paris, October 9, 1854.

My Lord,

IN the report made by Marshal St. Arnaud to the Emperor of the events connected with the battle of the Alma, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch No. 1,216 of the 7th instant, the Marshal, after representing that the division of the French army commanded by General Bosquet had marched at 6 o'clock in the morning to turn the left wing of the Russians, makes the following statement:

"J'avais engagé les Anglais à se prolonger sur leur gauche pour menacer en même temps la droite des Russes, pendant que je les occuperais au centre, mais leurs troupes ne sont arrivées en ligne qu'à dix heures et demie. Elles ont bravement réparé ce retard."

I have remarked that since the commencement of active operations on the part of the allies, the public reports of the French Commanders-in-chief suggest a certain dilatoriness in the proceedings of Her Majesty's forces. I had reason to believe that the difference of time which is referred to in Admiral Hamelin's despatches, between the disembarkation of the first French and of the first British soldiers in the Crimea, had been occasioned by a proceeding not altogether fair on the part of the French Admiral; and General Rose's interesting reports of the battle of the Alma, joined to a short conversation which I had with Lord Burghersh on his passage through Paris, convinced me that the reproach conveyed in Marshal St. Arnaud's despatch quoted above, was unmerited. I resolved therefore to call M. Drouyn de Lhuys' attention to this matter.

Had I known when I sought M. Drouyn de Lhuys with this intention yesterday afternoon, that the hand was cold which had penned the lines on which I was about to animadvert, I should certainly have abstained from my purpose. But strange to say, the intelligence of Marshal St. Arnaud's death had not then reached Paris. At least, nothing which fell from M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave me reason to suppose that he was aware of it.

I began the conversation by saying that it was a great relief to me to feel that I could speak with his Excellency on all subjects without reserve, or without a fear of giving offence. I then read to him the passage in Marshal St. Arnaud's despatch quoted above, and I expressed my regret that it should have been published with the sanction of the French Government. There were, I said, two facts implied by the paragraph in question. First, that the Marshal had the direction of the movements of Her Majesty's forces, and secondly, that the fortunes of the day were to a certain degree compromised by the delay which was said to have occurred in the advance of the British troops; for the use of word "réparer" could not but imply that a fault had been committed.

It was impossible, I continued to remark, to prevent the French Commander-in-chief, or the French Admiral, writing what they pleased; but it was clearly the province of the French Government to take care that nothing offensive to their allies was published by their authority.

I then went into some details respecting the disembarkation and the battle of Alma, to shew that there were two sides to all stories, and I said that if there had been any delay in the advance of the British troops on the Alma it was because they had to bear the brunt of the action, the Russian main position having been in their front, while General Bosquet had nothing to confront but some difficult ground.

I said that I made these observations because I felt certain that, unless more care was taken by the French Government in publishing the reports which they received from the East, serious consequences might ensue. A Government might be calm and prudent enough to overlook such matters, but when these reports went back to the East, not all the calm and prudence that the Commander-in-chief could exercise would prevent young officers from showing their indignation at such language. Answers would be made, quarrels would ensue, and all cordiality cease between the two armies. I therefore entreated M. Drouyn de Lhuys to speak to the Emperor and to his colleagues of the War and Naval Departments to prevent a recurrence of such publications.

P P

It gives me great satisfaction to add that M. Drouyn de Lhuys received my observations in the most courteous manner. He said that he had himself remarked and regretted the publication of the paragraph in question, and that he had stated as much to the Emperor, and he quite admitted the necessity of greater care in future. The Emperor's anxiety to give the country the earliest news of the success of the expedition had led His Majesty to order the immediate publication of the Marshal's report; but he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) would much prefer that the publication should be retarded for four-and-twenty hours than that expressions calculated to give pain to the allies of France should be permitted to go forth. But, he added, he could assure me with truth that the conduct of Her Majesty's troops had been the admiration of the whole French army; the steadiness with which they had advanced under a most galling fire against a most formidable position was mentioned on all sides with the warmest praise, and he was certain that the Marshal had not intended to convey the shadow even of a reproof.

I said that I was perfectly sure that the reproach was not intentional, but that I thought that for the future the reports published on so delicate a matter as the participation of two armies in one great enterprise, should be confined as much as possible to facts.

The conversation was carried on between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself in the most friendly tone, and I trust that your Lordship will not disapprove the step which I have taken. I have remarked among the English here great disgust at the general tone, not only of the reports to which I have alluded, but of the public press in France, which would seem to ignore that such a thing as an English General or an English army existed in the East. With the latter of course I do not pretend to interfere; but I humbly conceive not only that I have been justified in pointing out, but that it was my duty to point out, the consequences which might ensue, if expressions derogatory to the character of the British army were allowed to be published as proceeding from the French Commanders.

Your Lordship will have no doubt remarked that there were other expressions in Marshal St. Arnaud's reports, besides the paragraph to which I have alluded, which it would have been wiser to have suppressed, but as they were offensive only from inference, I did not consider it worth my while to mention them.

As a further sample of the extraordinary inexactitude of the French reports, I do myself the honour to inclose herewith the copies of two plans of the battle of the Alma, which were published by order of the Minister of Marine, with the "Moniteur" of this morning, in one of which the English army does not even find a place, while in the other it is made to occupy a very different position from that which, to judge from the accounts I have read, it must have really had.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 250.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,007.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency held to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as reported in your despatch No. 1,223 of the 8th instant, regarding the new Austrian propositions for a closer alliance with England and France, and the project of Treaty sent home by M. de Bourqueney and Lord Westmorland, and they concur generally in the objections raised by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the terms of the Treaty. I have held similar language to Count Colloredo, adding, however, that any proposition emanating from the Cabinet of Vienna, and particularly one to which it attached so much importance, would not fail to receive from Her Majesty's Government the most attentive consideration; but that, by reason of the importance as well as of the difficulties which presented themselves to its realization, it was impossible for me to give an answer without consulting my colleagues, and ascertaining the views of the French Government.

I told Count Colloredo that the Cabinet would probably meet in a few days, and that the delay could be of no consequence, as there was no immediate necessity for coming to a decision.

I inclose herewith copies of Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 365 of the 2nd instant, to which your Excellency refers, and of his despatch No. 366 of the same date, inclosing the project of Treaty*; and your Excellency will observe to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that that project purports to be drawn up by Lord Westmorland and Baron de Bourqueney, and that we have no reason to suppose that it has been submitted to Count Buol. In the event, therefore, of the two Governments acceding to a Treaty, it would be open to them at the same time to propose their own project, and the onus of objecting to it would then be thrown upon Austria.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 251.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,008.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which your Excellency states, in your despatch No. 1,226 of the 9th instant, that you held to M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the publication of Marshal St. Arnaud's account of the battle of Alma.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 252.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 111.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October* 8, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a copy, in translation, of a circular despatch of the 1st instant, addressed by the Austrian Government to their Ministers at the German Courts.

This document invites the German States to declare, categorically, whether they will support the views and wishes of the Austrian Cabinet at the Diet, even though Prussia might not think fit to act in concert with her.

Upon the nature of the replies received to this circular, will depend the further reference of this matter to the Diet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 252.

Circular addressed to Austrian Ministers in Germany.

(Traduction.) *Vienne, le* 1 *Octobre,* 1854.

VOUS aurez vu par nos communications de ce jour, que n'étant presque plus autorisé à compter sur un complet accord avec le Gouvernement Prussien dans la question d'Orient, au sein de la Diète, il ne nous reste plus que l'alternative, ou de soumettre à nos confédérés, indépendamment de la manière de voir de la Prusse, nos propres opinions et propositions, ou de renoncer à traiter jusqu'à nouvel ordre la grande question du jour au sein de l'Assemblée Fédérale. On comprendra facilement que dans de pareilles circonstances, nous attachions un grand prix à être informés, d'une manière exacte et positive, sur

* Nos. 221 and 222.

les intentions de nos confédérés, et particulièrement et à savoir, si l'on désire que nous fournissions éventuellement à la Diète, en faisant à Frankfort une communication en notre propre nom, l'occasion de prendre une résolution sur son attitude dans les complications actuelles. Nous nous sommes efforcés jusqu'à présent d'empêcher qu'une diversité d'opinion entre la Prusse et l'Autriche n'éclatât au sein de la Diète, et nous ne cesserons pas à l'avenir d'hésiter à mettre nos confédérés dans la situation de devoir se prononcer, en quelque sorte, contre leur gré entre les deux Puissances.

D'un autre côté, nous ne nous dissimulons pas que de hautes considérations de dignité, et même de sécurité, pourraient bien ne pas permettre aux Gouvernements Allemands de condamner, en silence, à une inaction et à une apathie complète l'organe central de la Confédération, par suite d'un manque d'entente entre les Cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin. Et de notre côté nous sentons tout aussi fortement la nécessité de baser nos démarches ultérieures dans la question pendante sur une connaissance positive de ce que nous avons à attendre de la Confédération Germanique.

La sincérité de nos sentiments fédéraux nous inspire comme devoir, de déclarer, à temps et ouvertement, ce qui nous apparaît comme le minimum de l'assistance à laquelle nous croyons devoir prétendre de la part de la Diète. Notre circulaire du 15 du mois dernier, indique ce minimum d'après l'état des choses actuel. Elle se borne à demander la déclaration que notre entrée dans les Principautés Danubiennes tombe sous les dispositions de l'Article II de notre Traité d'Alliance Offensive et Défensive, et que par suite toute attaque de la Russie contre l'Autriche, soit dans les Principautés, soit contre nos propres frontières, oblige la Diète à la défense du territoire Impérial; et elle réclame une approbation formelle des bases de la paix formulées dans l'échange des notes du 8, ou au moins des deux points qui touchent directement et particulièrement aux intérêts Austro-Allemands.

D'après les principes que la Diète a établis en adhérant à la Convention du 20 Avril, on pourra se prononcer sur les deux points à la simple majorité.

La marche des gardes Russes en Pologne, montre de nouveau combien une résolution pareille est nécessaire, malgré la déclaration dépourvue de toute garantie faite par la Russie de se maintenir dans une position défensive.

Après des considérations mures et étendues sur la situation politique, nous vous chargeons, M. le Comte, sans faire une démarche officielle, et sous une forme confidentielle, de vous renseigner sur les points suivants:

1. Le Gouvernement est-il en général disposé à voter à la Diète au moins, pour une proposition dans le sens que nous venons d'indiquer, et de s'approprier obligatoirement les deux points des bases de la paix concernant la liberté du commerce du Danube, et l'abandon du Protectorat Russe sur les Principautés?

2. Les dispositions se maintiendraient-elles également dans le cas où la Prusse ne croirait pas devoir formuler les propositions de concert avec nous, et si, malgré la divergence d'opinion qui existerait entre nous et la Prusse, nous nous décidions à présenter ces propositions à la Diète?

Du reste, vous voudrez bien ne pas perdre de vue, qu'en nous chargeant de ces communications, nous sommes loin de l'intention d'imposer à nos confédérés des déclarations obligatoires dans notre intérêt particulier.

Nous désirons seulement, dans un esprit fédéral, fournir aux Gouvernements Allemands, dans un moment qui nous paraît très grave, l'occasion de se prononcer ouvertement, à notre égard, sur leurs intentions dans une question d'un grand intérêt général, de même que nous leur avons fait part des nôtres avec notre franchise habituelle.

No. 253.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 112.)

Berlin, October 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in original, copy of the reply of the Austrian Cabinet to the despatch addressed by the

Prussian Government to Count Arnim of the 21st ultimo, and which has appeared in the Berlin "Press" of this day's date.

I have also the honour to inclose an analysis of this document in French, which I have received from a private source.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 253.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, September 30, 1854.

[See No. 241.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 253.

Analysis of a Note addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, September 30, 1854.

LE Comte Buol, en répondant à la note du 21 qui lui a été remise par le Comte Arnim, commence par réfuter les interprétations inexactes que le Cabinet de Berlin a données à l'office Autrichien du 14 Septembre. Nous n'avons jamais déclaré, dit M. de Buol, que l'évacuation des Principautés eut écarté le danger de tout conflit entre les deux Empires; nous n'avons parlés que d'un danger immédiat. En reconnaissant l'importance de l'évacuation, nous avons été bien éloignés cependant de voir dans cet événement une garantie suffisante pour les intérêts si importants de l'Allemagne; nous considérerons au contraire les intérêts comme profondément atteints aussi longtemps que la Russie ne donnera pas des garanties pour le rétablissement d'une paix sûre et durable. L'évacuation des Principautés a assurément relevé le théâtre de la guerre, et l'Autriche en les occupant n'a pu avoir en vue que de protéger les contrées contre une seconde invasion. Mais elle ne s'est jamais attribué le droit, et elle n'est pas en position d'élever une semblable prétention, de fermer le territoire des Principautés aux opérations de la guerre.

Il n'est pas vrai non plus que nous ayons demandé à la Prusse de renoncer à soumettre à la Diète une proposition au sujet de l'appropriation des points établis comme base de la paix par l'échange des notes du 8 Août. D'après nous au contraire nous avons introduit cette proposition par le fait de la communication de notre note du même jour. Nous ne nous considérerons satisfaits qu'autant que la Diète prendra dans la question des garanties la position que nous y avons prise nous-mêmes. Si nous renonçons à soumettre à la Diète une demande formelle au sujet de l'appropriation des quatre points, et si nous lui laissons l'initiative d'une résolution à cet égard, c'est uniquement afin que la divergence qui existe entre la France et l'Autriche n'éclate pas inutilement dans la forme. Si enfin nous avons déclaré n'avoir pris aucun engagement d'agir activement contre la Russie pour en obtenir les quatre points, l'Empereur notre auguste Maître, et c'est là le sens véritable de nos déclarations, ne s'en est pas moins réservé la liberté complète de ses résolutions.

Nous avons proposé au Cabinet de Berlin de soumettre la réponse Russe à l'Assemblée Fédérale, en lui demandant de déclarer qu'une attaque dirigée contre l'Autriche par suite de notre occupation des Principautés nous vaudrait l'assistance de toute la Confédération.

Cette déclaration la Prusse nous l'a déjà faite en son propre nom. Nous ne pouvons voir qu'avec un profond regret les difficultés que le Cabinet de Berlin suscite aujourd'hui afin de ne pas adhérer à cette proposition. La Prusse nous demande de nouvelles explications sur notre dépêche du 14 courant. Elle ne veut considérer les intérêts Allemands comme sauvegardés sur le Bas Danube qu'autant que l'occupation des Principautés par des troupes Impériales éloignera de ces provinces tout élément étranger. Elle désire savoir si par notre occupation les Principautés resteront soumises aux opérations militaires, et si la Russie ne se trouvera qu'en face de troupes Autrichiennes. La Prusse fait entendre que si par suite d'attaque de la part des troupes étrangères la Russie se trouvait en

conflit avec nos armées, l'Allemagne aurait à peser ses intérêts locaux avec l'intérêt général qui s'attacherait à une participation à une guerre Européenne.

La Prusse nous a déjà promis son assistance d'une manière générale dans le cas où nous n'attaquerons pas la Russie. Nous ne pouvons pas admettre qu'elle ait l'intention aujourd'hui d'imposer des limites à cette promesse. Nous ferons remarquer seulement que la Prusse connait complétement les engagements qui lient les Puissances intéressées, ainsi que la manière dont nous envisageons notre entrée dans les Principautés. Elle sait que le Traité entre la Porte et les Puissances maritimes donne à ces dernières le droit d'étendre leurs opérations militaires sur chaque point du territoire Ottoman; que dès lors la Porte, si même elle fermait à ses propres armées l'entrée des Principautés, ne serait plus en condition de nous conférer le droit d'une occupation exclusive—droit que du reste nous avons été fort éloignés de réclamer. Nous pouvons à cet égard faire valoir des considérations politiques et militaires; nous pouvons dire que nous prendrons à cœur d'épargner à ces pays si rudement éprouvés de nouvelles infortunes et que nous aurons soin de n'être pas entraîné par les événements de la guerre à des résolutions qui ne seraient pas libres. Mais c'est à cela que se borne notre droit dans les Principautés. Puisque le Cabinet de Berlin revient sur ce point, que nous pensions vidé par notre communication du 14 Septembre, nous croyons devoir déclarer avec la franchise que nous devons à une Cour alliée, que la Prusse n'est plus en position de considérer notre occupation exclusive comme condition *sine qua non* d'une protection efficace des intérêts Allemands dans les Principautés. Nous ne sommes nullement disposés à vouloir récriminer, mais pour peu que le Cabinet de Berlin veuille consulter ses propres souvenirs il conviendra qu'au sujet de notre entrée dans les Principautés, la Prusse a suivie une ligne de conduite telle, qu'elle n'a plus aujourd'hui aucun droit à nous reprocher que notre occupation ne soit pas exclusive. Après ces explications, il ne nous reste plus rien à dire sur nos communications antérieures, et nous cherchons en vain dans les allégations de M. le Baron de Manteuffel une garantie des succès que nous étions en droit d'attendre des délibérations provoquées en commun à Francfort.

Le Cabinet Prussien, s'engagé par ses ouvertures du 6 vis-à-vis des Puissances Européennes à continuer son appui aux quatre points, déclare il est vrai qu'il est disposé à engager la Diète à leur prêter son concours moral, aussitôt que l'occasion de négocier sur ces bases se présenterait; mais en même temps le Gouvernement Royal annonce de nouveau que ces quatre points ne lui semblaient pas exempts d'objection, et ajoute qu'il ne croit pas le moment opportun de les soumettre aux délibérations de la Diète. La Cour de Prusse trouvera sûrement bon que nous de notre côté nous ne portions à Francfort que des propositions qui seraient de nature à mettre en accord l'attitude de la Confédération avec notre attitude propre, et qu'en tout cas nous considérerions des objections aux quatre points comme incompatibles avec la promesse de l'appuyer moralement. Dans un tel état de choses nous sommes forcés de douter avec la Prusse quoiqu'à regret de la possibilité de faire des propositions communes. Nous nous consulterons pour savoir si nous ferons mieux de soumettre nos propositions à Francfort séparément par l'organe de notre Ministre, afin d'amener ainsi une résolution de la Diète par laquelle nous réglerons notre conduite ultérieure, ou si nous attendrons jusqu'à ce que les Gouvernements confédérés croiront devoir reprendre les négociations sur la question qui ébranle si profondément l'Europe.

Toutes les démarches de Sa Majesté l'Empereur témoignent combien il est pénétré de l'importance du maintien de l'accord entre l'Autriche, la Prusse et la Confédération Germanique dans la crise actuelle. Les efforts de l'Autriche seuls ne suffisent pas pour atteindre ce but; il faut que les Gouvernements Allemands, et avant tout Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, dont les sentiments élevés et l'intelligence éclairée sont le meilleur gage pour des décisions salutaires, viennent au devant de nous.

No. 254.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 551.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 30, 1854.

I LEARN with much concern from the French Embassy, and also from our own officers, that when the last advices came away from the Crimea, Marshal de St. Arnaud was too ill to continue in the active command of the army, which he had therefore consigned to General Canrobert; and that, in fact, his valuable life was all but despaired of.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 255.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 553.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 30, 1854.

I HAVE this day forwarded both to Varna and Marseilles a message to be transmitted to your Lordship, by the electric telegraph, in the following words:

"*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*

"*Constantinople, le* 30 *Septembre,* 1854, 9·30 A.M.

"Les armées alliées ont établi leur base d'opérations à Balaclava le matin du 28, et s'y préparaient pour marcher sans délai sur Sébastopol. 'L'Agamemnon' et autres bâtiments de guerre des alliés se trouvaient dans le port de Balaclava. On y avait toute facilité pour débarquer l'artillerie de siège. On mande que le Prince Menchikoff tenait la campagne à la tête de 20,000 hommes attendant des renforts; que la place forte d'Anapa avait été brûlée par les Russes; que sa garnison se dirigeait sur la scène d'action; et qu'un convoi de munitions, escorté par des Cosaques, avait été pris et détruit par un détachement Anglais. La 'Banshee,' porteur de ces nouvelles, a quitté la Crimée avant hier au soir."

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

No. 256.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 377.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October* 6, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the rough draft of a précis of the note addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy on the 30th ultimo, to which I refer in my despatch No. 374 of the 4th instant, as having been transmitted to Count Colloredo to be communicated to your Lordship.

I have felt that your Lordship might desire to have the résumé of this despatch, which is looked upon as of considerable importance; and I have therefore not hesitated to send the rough draft, which I should not have had time to get copied before the departure of the post.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

Inclosure in No. 256.

Précis of a Despatch from Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

Vienna, September 30, 1854.

COUNT ARNIM has communicated to us the answer to our communication of the 14th.

We desire to make the opinions expressed in that despatch as clear as possible.

We did not say that by the retreat of the Russian troops from the Principalities, the danger of war was avoided; we only spoke of immediate danger.

We are far from considering that evacuation as a security for German interests; we think those interests are endangered so long as Russia gives no sureties for a lasting peace.

As Russia had withdrawn her armies from Wallachia and Moldavia, and as we had bound ourselves to protect those countries from a second invasion, we mentioned that the seat of war was diminished in extent, but we had no right to close the Principalities against warlike operations.

We made no proposition that Austria and Prussia should refrain from proposing to the Diet to adopt the guarantees. We consider this proposition as already made by the communication by the Austrian Cabinet; and we shall consider the decisions of the Diet only then satisfactory when they adopt the position we have taken.

Though we have made no agreement to actively support the four points, we declare that His Majesty the Emperor has kept himself perfectly free to take a further determination.

We have proposed to the Cabinet of Berlin to communicate, in common with Prussia, to the Diet, the Russian answer; and to propose that the Diet should declare that a Russian attack upon the Principalities would require a defence on the part of the whole Confederation. We can therefore only lament that the Prussian Cabinet raises difficulties to this proposition.

The Prussian Cabinet wishes to know whether the Principalities, by the Austrian occupation, will be closed against all warlike operations; and hints that if Russia has to repulse other than Austrian troops in the Principalities, Germany must weigh her local interests with the general interests which are connected with the question of a share in an European war.

The Treaty of the Porte with the maritime Powers leaves them the choice of any point they please for the operations of the auxiliary forces; therefore the Porte could not give up an exclusive right to Austria to occupy the Principalities.

We must say that, after the communications of the 14th, the Prussian Cabinet has no right to declare German interests to depend upon the exclusiveness of the Austrian occupation of the Principalities.

We see in Baron Manteuffel's declaration no promise of a successful issue to a united action of the two Powers at Frankfort. The Prussian Government declare themselves in favour of a moral support of the four points; but doubt whether, at this moment, a discussion of these points at the Diet would produce a practical result. The Prussian Government will certainly not object to our presenting them to the Diet, and endeavouring to assimilate the position of the Diet with our own.

Under such circumstances, we can only share in the regret of the Prussian Cabinet at the inopportunity of a common presentation of these propositions. We will therefore consider whether we shall separately present them through the Imperial Minister, President of the Diet, and demand an answer, according to which we may regulate our conduct; or whether we must wait till the Governments of the Confederation find it for their interest to take up again the question which is so deeply interesting to all Europe.

All the steps taken by His Majesty the Emperor prove his anxious desire that Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation should remain united. But Austria's efforts alone are not sufficient; the other Governments of Germany, and particularly that of Prussia, must assist.

No. 257.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 1,231.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 10, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from this day's "Moniteur," containing a further report addressed to the Minister of Marine by Admiral Hamelin, and dated on board the "Ville de Paris," off the Katscha, 27th September, 1854.

From this letter it would appear that the mode of attacking Sebastopol was changed in consequence of the entrance into the harbour being blocked up by the sinking of seven Russian ships.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 257.

Vice-Admiral Hamelin to M. Ducos.

"Ville de Paris," devant la Katscha, le 27 Septembre, 1854.

M. le Ministre,

PAR ma lettre en date du 23 Septembre, j'informais votre Excellence que nous avions accompagné l'armée le long du littoral compris entre l'Alma et la Katscha, où nos troupes avaient bivouaqué le soir et où les flottes avaient elles-mêmes jeté l'ancre le même jour. Ce fut donc le 23 Septembre au soir que je pus informer le Maréchal de la détermination extrême qu'avaient prise les Russes de couler à l'entrée de leur port de Sébastopol cinq vaisseaux et deux frégates, ne conservant plus dans l'intérieur de ce port que neuf vaisseaux, dont deux à trois ponts, auxquels, d'après le dire de marins Polonais déserteurs, ils réservaient le même sort une fois la prise de Sébastopol assurée.

Cette nouvelle, que le Maréchal ne put s'empêcher de qualifier de déplorable, à plus d'un point de vue, devait concourir à modifier ses projets d'attaque; en effet, il avait été en quelque sorte admis qu'une fois le fort Constantin pris et les batteries élevées sur la partie nord du port enlevées, les flottes donnant alors dans le port en brisant les estacades, non-seulement achèveraient l'œuvre de l'armée en attaquant les batteries du sud, mais offriraient un concours assuré à cette armée, quels que fussent le temps et la saison, dans le port même de Sébastopol.

Le barrage de ce port changeait donc tout à fait la face des choses, et comme, d'ailleurs, des ouvrages extérieurs avaient été élevés récemment autour du fort Constantin pour en rendre les approches aussi difficiles que meurtrières, les Généraux-en-chef se décidèrent à tourner Sébastopol par l'est et à se jeter dans le sud de la ville pour l'attaquer de ce côté, peu ou point pourvu de défense, après s'être mis en communication avec les flottes à Balaclava et en avoir reçu des vivres et des munitions. Ce mouvement stratégique, assez osé pour des troupes complétement dépourvues d'approvisionnements roulants, s'est effectués dans les journées des 24, 25, et 26. Les deux armées, après avoir passé la Belbeck à quelques milles au-dessus de son embouchure, ont rabattu ensuite sur la vallée d'Inkerman, l'armée Française servant de pivot à l'extrême droit et, par suite, observant les plateaux environnants du sud et du sud-est de Sébastopol à petite distance dans ce mouvement tournant, pendant que l'armée Anglaise, à l'extrême gauche, venait aboutir aux hauteurs de Balaclava, où elle n'parut le 26 au matin; l'armée Française l'y a ralliée 24 heures après, c'est-à-dire ce matin.

Au moment où nos troupes arrivaient devant ce petit port, autour duquel croisaient trois frégates et corvettes à vapeur Françaises pour veiller leurs mouvements, les vaisseaux le "Napoléon" et le "Charlemagne," remorquant cinq bâtiments chargés de vivres, y paraissent du côté de la mer. Mais cette crique étroite de Balaclava, comme votre Excellence pourra s'en convaincre en jetant les yeux sur le plan, me semble pouvoir difficilement suffire aux mouve-

ments de ravitaillement des armées en vivres: j'attends donc en ce moment une réponse du Général-en-chef, laquelle me fera connaître si je dois en outre y faire commencer les opérations de déchargement du matériel de siége. Dans le cas de l'affirmative, quelques vaisseaux iront mouiller à proximité des points où s'opérera ce déchargement: quant à celles de nos frégates qui n'ont pas été envoyées à Varna, je les emploi à surveiller l'ouvert du port de Sébastopol et les parages d'Odessa.

Il m'est, en effet, parvenue que les bâtiments à vapeur, grands et petits, de la marine Russe, espéraient pouvoir parvenir à franchir, la nuit, le labyrinthe de carcasses mouillées à l'entrée du port, et, par suite, se réfugier dans quelques possessions Russes de la Mer Noire. Quelques facilités qu'offre la vapeur à des entreprises de ce genre par des nuits sombres et déjà devenues longues, l'Amiral Dundas et moi avons pris nos mesures pour tâcher d'y mettre obstacle.

Je termine cette lettre en informant votre Excellence que le Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud, dont l'état de santé était déjà déplorable avant de débarquer, n'a pu résister aux fatigues de ce début de la guerre, et qu'il s'embarque aujourd'hui sur le "Berthollet" pour rallier le Bosphore, après avoir remis son commandement aux mains du Général Canrobert

Je suis, &c.

Le Vice-Amiral, Commandant-en-chef l'Escadre de la Méditerranée,
(Signé) HAMELIN.

No. 258.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 1,232.) *Paris, October* 10, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will observe that in the instructions sent yesterday to Count Walewski on the subject of the new Austrian propositions, it is recommended that if the counter-propositions which M. Drouyn de Lhuys is of opinion should be made to the Cabinet of Vienna are not accepted, it will be at all events desirable that some permanent arrangements should be made between the three Powers and Turkey for the administration of the Danubian Provinces.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys when he read me this passage in his instructions, that I feared he would find that Austria would put forward pretensions in regard to the future government of those Provinces to which England and France might be little disposed to accede, and the discussion of which might produce irritation on both sides.

His Excellency replied that he considered the question might be limited to the regulation of the powers and duties of the military Commandants, and that as we should probably vote in the proportion of three to one against Austria, our position would be the stronger of the two.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 259.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 11. 4 P.M.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 5 Octobre*, 1854.

LES avis de Balaclava de la soirée du 3 courant nous apprenent que les batteries de siége étaient presques achevées, que les tranchées avaient été avancées jusqu'à 1,500 (yards) mètres de Sébastopol, et que le bombardement de la ville devait commencer hier ou aujourd'hui. Les armées alliées avaient coupée les sources qui fournissent de l'eau à la ville. Les Russes se préparaient à couler les neuf vaisseaux de ligne qui leur restaient. On s'attendait à emporter la place en quelques jours.

No. 260.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 606.)

My Lord *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1854.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 546 of the 27th of September, respecting the differences which have arisen between the Austrian and Ottoman Commanders in Wallachia, I have to state that the copies of my despatches to Lord Westmorland will have placed your Excellency in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the conduct adopted by the Austrian authorities towards those of the Porte in Wallachia; and I have on several occasions and in strong terms remonstrated with Count Colloredo upon the subject, and upon the difference that existed between the language of the Austrian Cabinet and that of its agents at Bucharest and Constantinople. I warned him that such a state of things was destructive of confidence, and must lead to very serious results; and I have no doubt that Count Colloredo fulfilled his promise of faithfully reporting my observations to his Government.

Your Excellency is also now aware of the positive instructions sent to General Hess not to interfere with the military movements of the Ottoman Commander-in-chief; and Her Majesty's Government have been given to understand that General Hess and Baron Bruck had not acted in accordance with the intentions of their Government.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that our representations and those of the French Government may have produced the desired effect; but in the meanwhile I have the satisfaction of informing you that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which your Excellency has given to Reshid Pasha, as reported in your despatch No. 546 of the 27th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 261.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 290.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, October* 7, 1854.

YESTERDAY being the King's birthday, His Majesty held a levée at Christiansborg Palace, to receive the congratulations of the Court and of the officers of State and other public functionaries. Audiences for the same purpose were also granted to the members of the Diplomatic body.

When I had the honour of waiting upon His Majesty with the gentlemen of the Mission, His Majesty, in referring to the events which have taken place in the Baltic during the summer, requested me to convey to the Queen his grateful acknowledgments for the respect which Her Majesty's Government had paid to his neutrality, and for the friendly manner in which they had acted towards the Government of His Majesty since the commencement of the war.

In expressing my satisfaction at being charged with such a commission, I said I felt assured that the Queen and Her Majesty's Government felt grateful to His Majesty for the good offices which his servants had always been ready to render to Her Majesty's ships when in the waters of Denmark.

To which the King replied that it had been his wish that Her Majesty's ships should find a hospitable reception in Denmark, and he hoped that they had done so.

His Majesty then adverted to reports in circulation, and which were only officially contradicted later in the day, of the capture of Sebastopol by the allied army in the Crimea. The King said that as he was neutral in the war, the sentiments which he would express to me on the subject must not be considered as those of the King of Denmark; but at the same time he would not conceal from me his desire and hope that the reports which had reached Copenhagen

were well founded; adding, that he wished most sincerely that the great efforts which had been made by England and France might be crowned with success.

Though His Majesty afterwards endeavoured to qualify what he had said by attributing his sympathy with the expedition in some degree to the gallantry and magnitude of the enterprise, I observed that as the sacrifices and efforts of the allies were not made for mere selfish objects, but in defence of the interests of Europe, I was glad to hear, and I felt assured that the Government of the Queen would learn with satisfaction, that His Majesty had entertained the sentiments he had expressed concerning them.

The King gave a State dinner in the afternoon at Christiansborg Palace, at which I and the other foreign Representatives at Copenhagen had the honour of being present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 262.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 41.)
My Lord, *Stockholm, October 3, 1854.*

THE intelligence of the success of the allied British and French forces against the Russians at Alma on the 20th ultimo, was received here by telegraph from Copenhagen yesterday morning. The same despatch mentions, on the faith of a communication from Omer Pasha to the British Consul at Bucharest on the 28th, that Sebastopol had fallen.

This news was quickly circulated, and was generally known before its publication in the evening papers, and produced great sensation; the effect was much greater than that called forth by the capture of Bomarsund, though the result of the latter so nearly concerned Swedish interests. I am told that, on Change, it caused almost a cessation of business, and congratulations were exchanged, as if the victory had been gained by Swedish arms.

It is impossible to mistake the leaning of the public in this capital, in the sympathy shown for the success of the allied arms; and I find it very generally thought, that renewed successes will force the Government to assume a more decided attitude. Public opinion, it is said, by persons who know this country much better than I can pretend to do, is slow in coming to a decision, but equally obstinate in holding to that opinion when formed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 263.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8, 12.30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 8, 1854.*

THE French Ambassador has received intelligence from the French Consular Agent at Bucharest, [and] copy of a letter addressed to him by Omer Pasha, and forwarded by him to his Government.

The French Ambassador took this letter to Count Buol, and complained of the language stated to have been held by General Hess. Count Buol would not admit the correctness of the language thus reported, and stated, that not only entire liberty had been left to Omer Pasha to march whatever troops he chose upon Galatz and Ibraila, but that General Hess had even decided to withdraw the Austrian garrisons from these two [places?]

Count Buol said General Hess also reclaimed a certain liberty for his own movements upon the extreme front, where Russian and Austrian advanced posts were close to each other, and collisions might take place at any moment.

No. 264.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 611.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 12, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have again had under consideration the reports of Colonel Beatson respecting the Bashi-Bozouks, and relying upon the knowledge and explanations of that distinguished officer, as well as upon the information that the Duke of Newcastle and I have received from Lieutenant Walpole, Her Majesty's Government consider that there is no reason to doubt that, at a comparatively small expense, a very efficient corps of Irregular Cavalry may be organized.

It has not been the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to grant a subsidy to the Sultan, nor to take any portion of the Turkish army into the pay of England; but their intention was, that the corps of Bashi-Bozouks, to be raised by Colonel Beatson, should be attached to the British army, and placed under the command of Lord Raglan. This intention, however, has not hitherto been carried into effect, as Lord Raglan declined the services of men who had made themselves notorious by their lawless conduct and the outrages they had committed on the peaceful and loyal subjects of the Porte.

Lord Raglan's decision was also confirmed by the determination of Omer Pasha to get rid of the Bashi-Bozouks, and by the unsuccessful experiment made by General Yussuf, who disbanded the Bashi-Bozouks for their misconduct on his return from the Dobrudscha. But Lord Raglan, whose opinion has of course great weight with Her Majesty's Government, only knew these men by their habits in a wild and undisciplined state. Omer Pasha had not the means of paying or feeding them, nor consequently of checking their outrages.

General Yussuf admitted he did not know how to command them, and his corps was handed over to him by Omer Pasha, and was not composed of volunteers.

But the men whom Colonel Beatson desires to enrol, would all be volunteers, and all are eager to enter the British service, and to be commanded by British officers; and Colonel Beatson reports, that if they are well treated and duly paid and cared for, the Bashi-Bozouks can, in his opinion, be formed into a most efficient and serviceable body of Irregular Horse, and, as such, render most valuable assistance to the allied armies in the field.

Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government have determined to authorize Colonel Beatson to select 4,000 of the best men he can find among the Bashi-Bozouks; but such a corps cannot be attached to the British army which is absent in the Crimea, nor, for the reasons I have above stated, can it properly be attached to the army of Omer Pasha; and still less can it act as a corps independent of either army. Her Majesty's Government propose, therefore, that Colonel Beatson should proceed with the organization of the corps, which, it is to be hoped, will be in a state to render efficient service next spring under the orders of Lord Raglan; and that, in the meanwhile, Colonel Beatson should consider himself under the command of Omer Pasha.

Your Excellency will therefore request that orders to that effect may be sent to the Turkish Commander-in-chief, who, doubtless, will learn with satisfaction that he is to be relieved from the task of superintending men for whose existence he has no means of providing.

An officer of the Commissariat Department will be sent to Bucharest, where it appears that the greatest facilities exist for paying and providing for the proposed corps; and to that officer, as well as to Colonel Beatson, Her Majesty's Consul-General will be instructed to furnish all the assistance in his power.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 265.

Project of Treaty between Austria, France, and England. — (Communicated confidentially to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, October 12, 1854.)

SA Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animées du désir de mettre fin le plus tôt possible à la guerre actuelle par le rétablissement de la paix générale sur des bases solides donnant à l'Europe entière toute garantie contre le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos;

Convaincues que rien ne serait plus propre à amener ce résultat que l'union complète de leurs efforts jusqu'à l'entière réalisation du but commun qu'elles se sont proposé, et reconnaissant en conséquence la nécessité de s'entendre aujourd'hui sur leurs positions respectives et sur les prévisions de l'avenir;

Ont résolu de conclure entre elles un Traité d'Alliance, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, à savoir:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,

Lesquels s'étant communiqué leurs pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants.

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes ratifient les engagements contenus dans les notes échangées à Vienne le 8 Août dernier, au nom de leurs Gouvernements; ces notes seront annexées au présent Traité et auront la même force

(Proposed to be substituted for Articles I and II.)

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes considèrent les déclarations contenues dans les notes échangées à Vienne le 8 Août, et annexées au présent Traité, comme devant servir de bases aux négociations qui auront pour but le

et valeur que si elles y étaient textuellement insérées.

ARTICLE II.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'étant réservé le droit de proposer, selon les circonstances et leur position particulière, en sus des quatre points spécifiés dans les notes échangées à Vienne, telles stipulations qu'elles pourraient juger nécessaires dans un intérêt Européen, elles s'engagent mutuellement et réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun.

ARTICLE III.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes accréditeront à Vienne, aussitôt que faire se pourra, et inviteront Sa Majesté le Sultan à accréditer de son côté, des Plénipotentiaires spéciaux qui examineront ensemble les questions se rattachant aux principes consignés dans les notes du 8 Août, et destinés à recevoir une consécration ultérieure dans des Actes placés sous la garantie collective des Hautes Parties Contractantes.

ARTICLE IV.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche ayant déjà, en exécution du Traité conclu le avec la Porte, fait occuper par ses troupes les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, s'engage à maintenir cette occupation jusqu'au rétablissement de la paix générale et à défendre les frontières des dites Principautés contre tout retour des forces Russes.

ARTICLE V.

La Valachie et la Moldavie étant occupées, comme il est dit dans l'Article précédent, au nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan par les forces Autrichiennes, et les troupes belligérantes Anglo-Françaises ou Ottomanes pouvant toujours opérer librement sur le territoire des deux Principautés contre les forces militaires ou le territoire de la Russie, les divers généraux en chef se donneront réciproquement l'avis préalable de leur mouvements.

rétablissement de la paix; toutefois les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'étant réservé le droit de proposer, selon les circonstances et leur position particulière, en sus des quatres points spécifiés dans les notes échangées à Vienne, telles stipulations qu'elles pourraient juger nécessaires dans un intérêt Européen, elles s'engagent mutuellement et réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie même sur les bases précitées avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun.

ARTICLE VI.

Les hostilités venant à éclater entre l'Autriche et la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, se promettent mutuellement leur alliance offensive et défensive dans la guerre actuelle et emploieront à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre appréciées d'un commun accord, des forces de terre et de mer dont le nombre, la qualité et la destination seront, s'il y a lieu, déterminés par des arrangements subséquents.

ARTICLE VII.

Dans le cas prévu par l'Article précédent, les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à n'accueillir de la part de la Cour de Russie, sans s'en être entendues entre elles, aucune ouverture ni aucune proposition tendant à la cessation des hostilités.

ARTICLE VIII.

L'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne, porteront ensemble le présent Traité à la connaissance de la Cour de Prusse, et recevront avec empressement son adhésion dans le cas où elle engagerait sa coopération à l'accomplissement de l'œuvre commune.

ARTICLE IX.

Le présent Traité

quinze jours.

ARTICLE SECRET.

Dans le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie n'aurait pas au mois d'Avril de l'année prochaine, consenti à traiter sur des bases qui auraient été arrêtées en commun dans la Conférence spécifiée dans l'Article III du présent Traité, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni d'Angleterre et d'Irlande, conviennent qu'elles ne tarderont pas davantage à conclure

les arrangements particuliers dont il est parlé dans l'Article VI de la présente Convention, et à s'entendre sur les moyens les plus efficaces de réaliser, sans autre délai, le but de leur alliance.

Le présent Article sera ratifié, et les ratifications échangées en même temps que celles du Traité signé le même jour.

En foi de quoi, &c.

No. 266.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 612.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter from the Duke of Newcastle respecting the wants of the English military hospital at Selimnié. I feel that it is quite unnecessary for me, in transmitting to you this letter, to furnish your Excellency with any precise instructions on the subject, as your own feelings of humanity and the deep sympathy you entertain for the brave men who are now suffering from the casualties of war, will have induced you even to anticipate the wishes of Her Majesty's Government that everything should be done to alleviate their condition.

To relieve your Excellency, however, from any responsibility which, in the absence of instructions, you may have undertaken in their behalf, I have to authorize you, on communication and in concert with the medical authorities, to obtain for the sufferers whatever Constantinople or its neighbourhood can supply in the way of comforts or sustenance; and I have, moreover, to instruct your Excellency to report to me at the earliest moment what further assistance may be required from England to supply any local deficiencies, in order that no time may be lost in sending stores or other articles which may be wanted from this country.

Your Excellency will keep a separate account of the expenditure which you may incur under this instruction, which will eventually be repaid by the Army Department.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 267.

Colonel Hodges to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Hamburgh, October* 11, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the accounts of the first operations of Her Majesty's arms and those of France being so far successful in the Crimea, have been received by the public of this large commercial city, and the neighbourhood far and near, with the greatest joy; and this feeling was shown in a most marked manner on the Hamburgh Exchange on the receipt of the details of the battle of the 20th of September, on the River Alma. It was indeed most gratifying to see Germans of all classes congratulating their English fellow-citizens upon this first victory, and they could not have testified more heartfelt gladness had their own fellow-countrymen been participators in the brilliant feat of arms.

A sermon was preached on Sunday last at the Episcopal Church on behalf of the widows and orphans of those who may fall in action in the pending

contest, and many Germans attended and contributed to the collection at the church, which produced altogether about 70*l.* Several further contributions have also been made, and I have issued a notice saying that I will receive any further subscriptions that may be sent me; and I shall transmit the amounts altogether to the Committee that may be appointed in England in aid of the sufferers, and of this I trust you will approve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 268.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 1,245. Confidential.)
Paris, October 13, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER informed me this afternoon in confidence that Prince Gortchakoff had asked explanations of Count Buol respecting the message of congratulation sent by the Court of Austria to that of France on the victory of the Alma. Prince Gortchakoff told Count Buol that he could understand those congratulations proceeding from Count Buol personally—that he could understand even others rejoicing in the occupation of the Crimea by the allies, as a step towards peace; but that he must consider it to be a calumny when he was told that the Emperor of Austria rejoiced in the defeat of troops which had bled in his cause. Count Buol replied that he had no explanations to give respecting the proceedings of the Austrian Government with the Government of France. Prince Gortchakoff then requested that his exact words might be conveyed to the knowledge of the Emperor of Austria, which Count Buol declined undertaking, observing that the Emperor and his Government were one, and that when he (Count Buol) spoke officially he spoke in the Emperor's name.

M. de Hübner stated further to me that from inquiries made at Bucharest by the Austrian Government, it turned out that no impediments had been raised by the Austrian Generals to Omer Pasha's advance; but more comprehensive instructions on this point had, he added, been forwarded to General Hess on the 3rd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 269.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 1,250.)
Paris, October 15, 1854.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on Friday last, I called his Excellency's special attention to the conclusion of your Lordship's despatch No. 1,007, where you observe that in the event of the British and French Governments acceding to a Treaty with Austria it would be open to them to propose their own project, since the project sent from Vienna purports to be drawn up by Lord Westmorland and M. de Bourqueney, and there is no reason to suppose that it has been submitted to Count Buol.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys agrees with your Lordship that this course may be pursued.

Two other courses likewise suggested themselves:—

To request Austria to propose to the allies such a project of Treaty as she considered would carry out the propositions which she had made to the English and French Governments through Count Colloredo and M. de Hübner, and to meet this project hereafter by a counter-project;

To place Lord Westmorland and M. de Bourqueney in possession of the views and opinions of their respective Governments, accompanied by such a project of Treaty as the two Governments would be willing to sign, and leave it to their

discretion to present it or not for the consideration of the Austrian Government, after further communication with Count Buol.

The advantage of this latter course would consist in a frank exchange of opinions between England and France on the one side, and Austria on the other, without either party necessarily refusing a direct proposition of the other.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 270.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 115.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 13, 1854.*

ON my waiting upon Baron Manteuffel this day, I commenced by expressing my regret that I had not been fortunate enough to see him at my last visit, and with a view of giving him an opportunity (if he desired it) of conveying some compliment on our victory on the Alma, I remarked to his Excellency that great events had passed since I had last had the honour of seeing him. His Excellency maintained silence, carefully abstaining from any allusion whatever to the events which had passed in the Crimea.

I then observed to his Excellency that I had again to call his notice to the passage of a large quantity of lead from Bromberg into Russia, which was evidently destined for the allies in the shape of bullets. I remarked to his Excellency that it was perfectly fruitless to make any further representation to the Prussian Government on this subject, as they appeared to be wholly intent on furthering the cause of Russia against us, but that I begged to read to him a despatch (your Lordship's No. 92 of the 10th instant) in order to prove to him that we were perfectly aware of the aid and assistance which Prussia was rendering to Russia in thus permitting the transit through her territory of munitions of war, to be used against the allies. His Excellency appeared a good deal disconcerted by this communication, but scarcely vouchsafed to make any remark, merely observing that he was perfectly ignorant on the subject, and that we appeared to be more informed than he was. I merely referred his Excellency for further information to the Berlin "Press," in which the statements on the subject were most detailed and circumstantial.

I then touched upon the late Austrian note, and inquired whether the Prussian Government had yet made any reply to that communication. His Excellency replied that the answer would be transmitted in a few days, and expressed himself as most anxious that an agreement should be arrived at, assuring me that his strenuous endeavours would be directed to this end; but he remarked that Austria rendered it very difficult to them.

I observed to his Excellency that the Prussian despatch to Count Arnim of the 21st ultimo, assuming the pretension to demand of Austria the exclusion of the allied troops from the Principalities (as was natural to be supposed), had created the worst possible impression in London. His Excellency replied that no such demand was contained therein; but that, as Prussia was liable to be called upon by Austria for succour in case of attack, Prussia had merely wished to know the conditions on which she occupied the Principalities.

I did not enter into any discussion on this subject, but I took occasion to inform his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government were quite tired of the Prussian attempts to favour Russia, and that an avowed hostility on the part of Prussia would be far preferable to one of masked neutrality. I said, that as Prussia had chosen to abdicate all pretence and right to deal with European questions, we should neither consult her during the war, nor at the conclusion of the peace; and that she had entirely effaced herself as a Great Power.

Baron Manteuffel coolly remarked that we might do as we pleased; adding, "Que nous forcerons personne de traiter avec nous."

While expressing my deep regret that Prussia had thus alienated herself from us at the moment of a great European crisis, I endeavoured in a mild and quiet manner to open Baron Manteuffel's eyes to the dangerous position to which the

Prussian policy was advancing. I remarked that from having been in concert with us, Prussia had passed to a sort of neutrality; that she had subsequently withdrawn from the European concert; and that ever since that period she had been gradually retrograding. I endeavoured to pourtray the dangers to which Prussia would be thereby inevitably exposed, but the only reply which his Excellency made to my observations was, "that there were dangers on all sides."

I inquired of his Excellency what effect the success of the allied troops in the Crimea had produced on His Majesty. He replied that the King had from the first predicted that the allied armies would be victorious, and had been prepared for their successes.

During my interview, Baron Manteuffel was calm and composed, but I was unable to extract from his Excellency a single expression which could throw light on the present state of the political relations of Prussia, or which could give the smallest indication of the future. I believe that he is almost without influence on the King, and that he has become the mere instrument of a party in whose hands the destinies of this country for the moment are unfortunately placed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 271.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 116.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 13, 1854.*

THE glorious victory gained on the Alma must inspire every loyal subject of Her Majesty with gratitude and thanksgiving to the Almighty Disposer of events, and I beg permission humbly to express to your Lordship on my own part, as well as that of Her Majesty's Legation at this Court, our sincere and heartfelt felicitation on the brilliant success which has attended Her Majesty's arms and those of Her Majesty's allies.

It would have afforded me great gratification had I been enabled to report to your Lordship that the triumph of the allied armies had elicited any sympathetic expression on the part of the Prussian Government. Neither the French Minister nor myself have received the smallest mark of satisfaction, or any expression of congratulation from any official personage, military or civil, of this Government. I believe, on the contrary, that the Court party, and all those more or less under their influence, deeply deplore the reverses which the Emperor of Russia has sustained, and, in daily expectation of learning the fall of Sebastopol, are crestfallen and despondent. But on the other hand, I have much satisfaction in stating that beyond the pale of this narrow circle the joy and satisfaction of every class at Berlin at the defeat of the Russians has been unbounded, and I am credibly informed that on the evening when the reported intelligence arrived here of the taking of Sebastopol by the allied armies, the delight and satisfaction of the public was evinced to a remarkable degree at all the places of public resort, which were crowded, and where repeated toasts were drunk to the health and success of the allies.

Count Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister, M. Liebe, the Brunswick Minister, and Count Launay, the Sardinian Minister, are those of the foreign Ministers who have expressed their felicitations at our success. The Hanoverian Minister, Count Knyphausen (who is certainly not Russian), and Baron Nothomb, the Belgian Minister, are now absent from Berlin. The Wurtemberg Minister, Count Linden, the Hesse Cassel Envoy, M. de Wilkens, Count Hohenthal, the Saxon Minister, M. de Schimmelpenninck, the Dutch Minister, and the other German Ministers, are all more less devoted to the Russian cause, and I can perceive that our successes are harrowing to their feelings, and are viewed with a jealous eye, if not with a deep regret. The other foreign Ministers are decidedly in favour of the Western Powers.

I cannot fail to mention to your Lordship that I had a visit this evening from

the Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, when His Royal Highness expressed to me in the warmest terms his congratulations on the triumphant victory of the British and allied armies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 272.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 13, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith the analysis of a despatch lately addressed by Count Buol to Count Appony, the Austrian Minister at Munich, in reply to certain objections raised by M. Von der Pfordten to the Austrian propositions on the Oriental question submitted to the Diet.

I am informed that the Prussian Government have received assurances from the majority of the German States (inclusive of the four kingdoms) approving the line of policy which Prussia has declared her intention to pursue.

With respect to Hanover I have reason to believe that instructions have been forwarded to her Minister at the Diet to support the views which Prussia has expressed. These States in general are disinclined to adhere in the form of a Federal resolution to the four conditions which are urgently required by Austria, on the grounds that they have been rejected by Russia, and also that they are not regarded by the Western Powers as the extent of their demands on Russia. They further evince a great disinclination to take any engagement which may render them liable to be called upon to take any active part in the war. Their whole efforts are now devoted to prevent Austria from taking the offensive against Russia, and from causing the Diet to adopt any species of obligation (beyond that already provided by the Pacte Fédéral and the Convention of the 20th April,) which might plunge Germany into a war with Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 272.

Analysis of Note addressed by Count Buol to Count Appony.

Vienne, le 23 Septembre, 1854.

1. LE Traité du 20 Avril garantit-il la Monarchie Autrichienne tant que celle-ci n'attaque pas? Oui, dit le Gouvernement Bavarois, si la Prusse et le reste de l'Allemagne, en cas d'attaque de quelque part que ce soit, peuvent compter sur l'appui de l'Autriche. Cette supposition est évidemment valable que la Prusse et l'Allemagne remplissent leurs devoirs et l'Autriche remplira les siens.

Le Gouvernement Bavarois considère l'Article Additionnel comme détruit dans son contenu. Nous ne pouvons le reconnaître. Il ne peut être détruit qu'avec le Traité lui-même. Inapplicable tout au plus si le but en est vraiment atteint. Mais ce but n'est pas sûrement atteint, comme le prétend le Gouvernement Bavarois, par le fait seul de l'évacuation des Principautés. L'Article Additionnel ne parle pas du désistement des prétentions de la Russie, et il demande des assurances positives touchant la guerre et l'évacuation des Principautés qui garantissent les Puissances Allemandes sur ces deux points. Cela sans aucun doute est valable pour toute la durée du Traité et surtout de la guerre.

Il n'est pas dit que les mesures à prendre doivent être nécessairement guerrières; au contraire, cette assistance doit nous être acquise avec d'autant plus de raison si pour la garantie du but de l'Article Additionnel l'occupation des Principautés a lieu d'une manière pacifique. Supposons que la Russie ne soit pas décidée volontairement à l'évacuation des Principautés, que nos troupes l'eussent rejetée au delà du Pruth, et qu'elle eût envoyé sur nos frontières une

armée deux fois supérieures à la nôtre, pourrait-on dans ce cas prétendre en Allemagne que le but de l'Article unique a été atteint par le seul fait de l'évacuation et qu'en conséquence l'Article est résolu et que l'Allemagne est exonérée de ses obligations?

Quelle différence y a-t-il dans la situation actuelle?

Rien ne nous garantit que la Russie ne nous attaquera pas, si elle y trouve son intérêt; que cette sûreté nous soit donnée; alors seulement l'Article Additionnel n'aura plus d'existence. On prétend qu'un retour offensif de la Russie n'est vraisemblablement plus possible; il suit de là que les devoirs imposés par le Traité à l'Allemagne ne sont plus immédiatement nécessaires, mais non pas qu'ils ne soient plus obligatoires.

"L'occupation des Principautés par nos troupes paraît au Gouvernement Bavarois utile aux intérêts Allemands et convenable à la position de puissance de l'Autriche, et sous ce rapport nous sommes dans le cas d'exprimer notre juste satisfaction et en même temps l'espérance que la Bavière continuera à influer dans ce sens sur l'opinion des nôtres Gouvernements Allemands.

"Restent maintenant les questions 2 et 3, qui traitent des quatre points de garantie formulés dans l'échange de la note du 8 Août. Pour le premier la cessation du Protectorat Russe dans les Provinces Danubiennes et l'établissement d'un garantie commune des priviléges de ce pays par les Grandes Puissances, la Bavière ne trouve rien à opposer sur le principe fondamental; mais elle ne trouve pas les intérêts Allemands suffisamment assurés, parceque la lutte d'influence entre les quatre Puissances ne pourra pas toujours être favorable aux deux Puissances Allemandes. La Bavière recommande donc pour le maintien de l'équilibre d'appeler la Diète à prendre part à cette garantie." Vous avez remarqué avec justesse que la Diète ne pourrait élever une telle prétention que si elle contribuait effectivement à l'établissement de ce point.

"Le second point, à savoir, la liberté du commerce du Danube, est reconnu par la Bavière comme important à un haut degré pour les intérêts et besoins de l'Allemagne.

"Qu'il soit facile d'obtenir ce point de la Russie en son entier et de l'établir d'une manière sûre, il n'y a rien d'extraordinaire, mais rien ne nous le démontre encore.

"La réaction du troisième point, concernant la nécessité de la révision du Traité de 1841, paraît à M. Von der Pfordten trop large et trop peu positive, et il exprime la pensée que cette condition, si elle entend le libre passage des Dardanelles, ne sera qu'au profit de l'Angleterre. Nous ne sommes pas en état, et le moment n'est pas venu, de donner à ce point une explication plus étendue. Pour l'instant l'intérêt de l'équilibre Européen est seul présenté comme principe de la révision du Traité. La fixation d'une modalité ultérieure doit rester réservée nécessairement pour les négociations de la paix, et pour ce qui regarde l'ouverture ou la fermeture de la Mer Noire aux pavillons de toutes les nations c'est une question qui selon nous est encore jugée très différemment par les Puissances immédiatement intéressées—l'Angleterre, la France, et la Russie."

Quant au quatrième point, d'après lequel l'intérêt commun des Puissances en ce qui doit remplacer le Protectorat de la Russie, M. Von der Pfordten voudrait que les Rayahs fussent placés sous le Protectorat collectif des Puissances Chrétiennes. M. de Buol répousse cette proposition.

Les Puissances Occidentales ne nous sont point garanti que leurs exigences ne dépasseraient point les quatre points; nous n'avons aucun droit et aucune chance de succès d'obtenir d'elles de semblables promesses nous-mêmes: d'ailleurs nous pensons que c'est à la Russie d'abord de donner des garanties. Le Ministre de Bavière regrette que nous ayons signé le Traité avec la Porte sans en prévenir la Diète et qu'en général nous n'ayons pas suffisamment tenu compte de l'Assemblée Fédérale. Qu'il nous soit permis de demander à M. Von der Pfordten, qui a fait ses preuves d'homme d'état, s'il croit qu'il eût été possible au Cabinet Autrichien de conduire une affaire comme la question d'Orient s'il avait dû faire défendre toutes ses démarches des réponses de ses confédérés? Ni la Convention à Berlin ni la sommation concernant l'évacuation des Principautés, ni l'établissement des bases de la paix si favorables aux intérêts Allemands auraient pû être menées à bonne fin dans de pareilles conditions, et il n'est pas un Ministre Autrichien qui eût osé donner à l'Empereur le conseil de mettre sur pied une grande armée, et de decréter l'emprunt national.

Ce que l'Autriche eût alors perdu en force et en influence, ce n'est pas la

Diète à qui il faut d'habitude des mois pour s'étendre sur une question préalable de vocation qui en eût répondu. M. Von der Pfordten désire trop vivement le bonheur de l'Allemagne et le dévouement des intérêts Allemands, pour vouloir soumettre la poursuite de ce but à des conditions qui seraient en opposition formelle avec notre situation. Parcequ'il nous est impossible de renoncer à notre libre action en qualité de Grande Puissance, il ne voudra pas pour cela séparer l'action de la Diète de la nôtre. On admettra en général qu'il n'est pas donné à l'Autriche en sa double qualité de Grande Puissance et de Puissance Allemande de poursuivre une double politique, et qu'elle remplit consciencieusement ses devoirs si dans sa marche elle représente les intérêts Allemands avec toute sa force.

La dignité de la Diète n'est pas compromise si elle approuve les efforts que nous avons faits pour sauvegarder les intérêts de l'Allemagne. La Convention avec la Porte n'était du reste qu'une suite nécessaire du Traité de Berlin, car nous devions nous mettre en règle avec la Turquie du moment que nous montrions en perspective notre entrée dans les Principautés.

M. Von der Pfordten fait remarquer ainsi que quand bien même l'obtention des quatre points serait désirable pour l'Allemagne, ce serait l'acheter trop cher que d'arriver à ce but au prix d'une guerre. Une telle considération devait-elle venir poser des règles et des limites? D'une part, il ne s'agit pas d'une déclaration de guerre contre la Russie. De l'autre les quatre points ne sont pas seulement mis en avant dans leur valeur pour les intérêts spéciaux désignés, mais bien pour un intérêt général, et destinés à prévenir dans l'avenir une attaque de la Russie contre l'Orient. De son côté enfin le Gouvernement Bavarois nous porte deux questions:

1. L'Autriche est-elle décidée à soutenir à tout prix les quatre points, même par une attaque contre la Russie?

2. S'il en est ainsi, quelles garanties ou sûretés donnera l'Autriche que les Puissances Occidentales se contenteront des quatre points?

La réponse à ces deux questions se trouve déjà dans notre note du 6 Août. Nous ne nous sommes point engagés pour l'obtention des quatre points à une guerre offensive contre la Russie: en grande partie ces points sont déjà de véritables garanties dans les circonstances actuelles.

No. 273.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 121. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October* 13, 1854.

COUNT ESTERHAZY called upon me to-day, and told me that he had just had an interview with Baron Manteuffel. His Excellency informed him that the reply to the last Austrian communication was to be submitted this day to the King for His Majesty's approval, and that he hoped to send it in a day or two to Vienna. His Excellency said that it was "satisfaisante." Count Esterhazy remarked to me that Baron Manteuffel was excessively reserved, and little communicative to him.

A report has been in circulation that the Prince of Prussia was to go to Vienna on a special mission, but Baron Manteuffel contradicts this report both to Count Esterhazy and myself.

Count Esterhazy expressed a belief that the Prussian Government would be inclined to come to an agreement with Austria as regards the occupation of the Principalities, and to give the required assurance of her support to Austria if attacked by Russia in those provinces; but in return they expect that Austria will come to some arrangement with them at Frankfort, and on this latter point the chief anxiety of the Prussian Government appears to rest. With respect to the former, the engagement amounts to a very improbable contingency, as the Prussian Government will take care that Russia shall not be the first aggressor against Austria in the Principalities. On the latter point will exist the chief difficulties; both parties have taken up their separate line of policy, and have appealed to the support of their German confederates. It has thus become a question of honour, which renders it difficult for either party to recede.

The position of the two States may be defined as follows: Prussia regarded the Convention of the 20th April as a means afforded her of continually checking the Austrian policy, and of restraining her from taking any aggressive part against Russia. Austria, on the other hand, sought by this Treaty to attach Prussia to her, and in case of need to oblige her to afford material aid.

Both States have been constantly endeavouring to influence the Diet in their own sense. Both have been more or less deceived by each other in the object they had in view, and the differences which have since arisen on this account between them have now been extended to the Diet. I have some reason to suppose that Austria will be satisfied if the Diet will formally approve her occupation of the Principalities, as being in the defence of German interests, and if the Diet will accept and formally adhere to the two first conditions to which Austria is bound by her exchange of notes with the Western Powers.

It remains to be seen whether Prussia will accede to any such terms or arrangements, or whether she will maintain her ground and thus force matters to an open rupture between the two States.

Your Lordship will probably receive a copy of the Prussian reply to the last Austrian communication from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, but I shall use my best endeavours to procure one, and shall transmit it to your Lordship by the earliest opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 274.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 380.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October* 11, 1854.

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the copy of a despatch in which, in pursuance of your Lordship's directions as contained in your despatch No. 277 of the 28th of August, I have directed Mr. Gardner to return to his post as Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy.

I transmit also the copy of the reply which I have received from Mr. Gardner, by which he informs me that it is his intention in a few days to quit Vienna for the purpose of resuming his Consular duties at Jassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 274.

The Earl of Westmorland to Consul Gardner.

Vienna, October 6, 1854.

Sir,

IN compliance with the directions I have received from the Earl of Clarendon, I have to announce to you that having now received official intelligence of the evacuation of the Principalities of Moldavia by the Russian troops, and of the entry into Jassy of the Austrian forces, and the establishment there of a Provisional Government for the country, I hereby inform you of these facts, and I direct you to return to your post.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 274.

Consul Gardner to the Earl of Westmorland.

My Lord, *Vienna, October* 9, 1854.

YOUR Excellency has done me the honour to acquaint me, under date of the 6th instant, that official intelligence had been received by your Lordship of the total evacuation of the Principality of Moldavia by the Russian forces; of the establishment of a provisional Government for the country; and of the entry of the Austrian troops into Jassy; that in compliance, therefore, with the tenor of the Earl of Clarendon's instructions, your Excellency directed me to return to my post as Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy. I have the honour to state that it is my intention to obey immediately those orders, and that I hope to be enabled in the course of three or four days to quit Vienna, and, by the route of Cracow, Lemberg, and Czernowitz, to re-enter the Principality by the frontier town of Muchaceni.

In announcing my intention to your Excellency, allow me to repeat my grateful assurances of respect and devotedness which I shall ever entertain for the kindness and protection which I have experienced during my residence in Vienna, from your Lordship, extended to my family by your honoured name.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SAMUEL GARDNER.

No. 275.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 384.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October* 11, 1854.

THE entry of the Austrian troops, under General Hess, into Jassy, took place on the 2nd instant. General Hess was received at the gate of the town by the Hetmann of Moldavia and the Municipality, and conducted to the Palace, where he was received by the Minister Stourdza, and where the Clergy, the Ministers, and the Boyars were presented to him. The General received their congratulations on his arrival.

The fête-day of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, on the 4th, will be celebrated with the usual festivities on such occasions.

I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the Proclamation issued to the inhabitants of Moldavia, apprising them of the intention of the Sultan to maintain all their privileges, and announcing the order given to Prince Ghika to return to the Principality, and resume his administration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

Inclosure in No. 275.

Proclamation by Dervish Pasha.

Moldaves!

SA Majesté Impériale le Sultan, notre gracieux Souverain, dans sa haute et paternelle sollicitude envers tous ses sujets sans distinction aucune, s'est plu à vous donner un nouveau témoignage de sa bienveillance en daignant me nommer son Commissaire Impérial dans les deux Principautés pour veiller à votre bien-être et rétablir l'ordre qui a été malheureusement troublé par l'injustice et l'arbitraire du Gouvernement Russe.

En vous faisant part de cette gracieuse détermination de Sa Majesté Impériale, je m'empresse de vous faire connaître ce qui suit:

La Sublime Porte ayant conclu une Convention Spéciale avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, comme elle en avait

préalablement conclu avec les Gouvernements de France et de la Grande Bretagne, je dois vous informer que selon la teneur du susdit Acte, des forces militaires Autrichiennes entrent provisoirement dans les deux Principautés. La présence de ces troupes en Moldavie ne doit nullement vous inquiéter, puisqu'elles y entrent comme appartenant à une des Puissances amies et alliées de la Sublime Porte; elles ne vous seront aucunement à charge, puisqu'elles payeront exactement et en argent comptant tout ce dont elles auront besoin de faire l'achat dans le pays.

Les Russes ayant définitivement quitté les Principautés, l'état précédent du pays doit être rétabli et son Altesse le Prince Ghika a reçu l'ordre de venir reprendre les rênes de son administration.

Les anciens priviléges et immunités sont et seront toujours maintenus, et vous verrez encore par là que le maintien de ces priviléges n'est dû nullement aux Traités qui sont déjà annulés, mais bien à la sollicitude bienveillante et paternelle de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan notre gracieux Souverain, dont l'honneur et la gloire y sont profondément intéressés.

Moldaves!

Votre pays a bien souffert; mais sous l'égide protectrice de notre gracieux Souverain tout va y rentrer dans son état normal. En attendant que les circonstances en permettent un plus heureux développement, vous devez continuer à obéir aux lois qui vous régissent et à conserver pour elles ce sentiment de respect qui est si indispensable au bonheur et à la prospérité d'un pays. A cette condition rien ne sera plus facile et plus doux que de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité publique, auxquels notre auguste Souverain m'a chargé de veiller avec soin.

Je place toute ma confiance dans vos sentiments de dévouement et de fidélité à Sa Majesté Impériale, notre bien-aimé Soverain, et dans votre légitime affection au pays qui vous a vu naître.

Commissaire Impérial Ottoman, le Général de Division,
(Signé) DERVISCH.

Bucharest, le $\frac{17}{29}$ Septembre, 1854.

No. 276.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 119.)
Frankfort, October 12, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Circular Note of September 30, has produced and maintained a stronger sensation in Germany than any political document which has come to public knowledge for a very long period.

The effect on the general public is undoubtedly favourable to Austria, but on most of the Governments, and those connected with them, as cutting short vexed questions, and likely to bring matters to a crisis, it is judged differently.

Anything that forces a decision is most unwelcome to people of such inveterately dilatory and procrastinating habits, nor do they at all seem to consider that the position of Austria absolutely requires that an end should be put to hesitations as regards herself, whatever may be the dispositions of the other States of the Confederation, and accuse Count Buol of imprudence in exposing to the world the whole extent of Austrian and Prussian discord on Eastern affairs.

In this conjuncture I have learnt with much interest, and think it my duty to convey to your Lordship, the opinion of a person whom I need not further designate than to say, that he has, in several matters connected with the relations of Prussia in recent events, exercised considerable influence, and that in the present instance he has been consulted by his Cabinet, and will no doubt have given advice in accordance with what I have the honour to report.

This opinion is, that the Austrian note will produce no other change in Prussia's position than to designate more clearly her difference of views on the Eastern question with those taken by Austria. That the Austrian note is the

less likely to cause a change in the policy of the Berlin Cabinet, as it approaches a tone of menace. That nevertheless Austria has no sincere intention of acting hostilely against Russia.

The real object of the note is to provoke such a reply to the language and views which it maintains, both from Prussia and from the rest of Germany, as shall enable Count Buol to come before the world with documents in hand of such a nature as will enable him to rest upon that ground the impossibility of pushing matters against Russia to extremity, endeavouring thus to lay upon Prussia the whole odium of a policy which the Austrian Cabinet has in fact devised as a means of cloaking its own predetermined action.

Your Lordship must have means of testing the value of this extreme view of Austrian bad faith, on which, therefore, I need make no remark. The notice given of the course likely to be taken by Prussia coming from the source it does, is more worthy of your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 277.

Mr. Bligh to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 93.)
Hanover, October 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I TOOK the earliest opportunity that presented itself, after I had received your Lordship's permission so to do, of communicating to M. de Lenthe the despatch to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, of which I received a copy in your Lordship's despatch No. 31 of the 23rd ultimo, telling his Excellency, at the same time, that this permission had been granted to me as a proof of confidence in the Hanoverian Government.

The communication itself, and the reasons given for making it, produced the effect which I had expected; and his Excellency charged me particularly to convey to your Lordship his warm acknowledgments, and assurances of his desire to merit and to reciprocate the confidence thus placed in him.

A long conversation ensued between us, in which were discussed the various points connected with the Eastern question; the course which England was decided upon pursuing respecting it; and that which it would be the interest of Germany to enter upon in concert with her: but, as in my former reports I have detailed what may have passed between us in other conversations respecting these matters, I shall not trouble your Lordship by useless repetitions, more especially as (if faith can be placed in the most explicit assurances) we may rest satisfied that Hanover will not be found wanting whenever her voice shall definitively be required to join in the concert against the disturber of the world's peace. In the first place, M. de Lenthe informed me in confidence, that this Government had, after some hesitation, decided upon answering the invitation of the Cabinet of Vienna to pronounce as to the course which Hanover would take in the Diet upon the Eastern question; that they would vote for aiding Austria, in case of her territory being attacked by Russia on account of her occupation of the Principalities, and would support the Austrian interpretation of the two first of the four points which had been declared by the Treaty of April 20 to be the *sine qua non* basis of an accommodation with Russia; namely, those relating to the Danube and to the Principalities, which, his Excellency said, was all that the Cabinet of Vienna would require from the Diet. Certain explanations, however, would be asked for by the Hanoverian Minister, as to the nature of the occupation of the Principalities. In short, said his Excellency, you may assure Lord Clarendon that Hanover will go along with Austria, and that no reports to the contrary are to be credited. That observation was doubtless elicited by my having just before communicated to his Excellency, for the purpose of provoking some such declaration, what I had heard from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, that Hanover was counted upon there as a sure card in the Prussian sense.

I did not fail, in the course of this conversation, to impress upon his

Excellency, as authorized by your Lordship, that even those who might be well-wishers of Russia would be serving her badly by encouraging her in resistance to the Western Powers, whose demands would rise in proportion to the duration of the contest. This I did, not because doubtful of the assurances of M. de Lenthe, which I have just reported, but from my knowing his Excellency to belong to a party or class which has hitherto looked to Russia for support; which fears the increase of French power and influence from the humiliation of Russia; and which is at last beginning to recognize the prestige of the unassailable superiority of Russia, to have been the production of a well-contrived system of deceit which strenuous action could destroy; and I took this, as I shall every opportunity, to assist M. de Lenthe and his party in recovering from their delusion.

As regards M. de Lenthe, also, I would observe that, although for the reasons given above, he may have been, until lately at least, Russian in his predilections, he has a still stronger and more enduring bias—one almost universally prevailing amongst Hanoverians, and indisposing them to follow any line of policy which might tend to increase in Germany the authority and influence of Prussia, against which Power there exists a widely spread and deeply rooted jealousy and dread. On the other hand M. de Lenthe, and all who pretend to be statesmen, know that they have nothing to fear and everything to hope for from England and Austria, and will consequently endeavour at every important crisis, such as the present, to be in strict alliance with those Powers. He also is strongly in favour of united action on the part of Germany. He apprehends that the machinations of Prussia, even if they should be abetted by the minor States of Germany, will no longer prevent an independent course being taken, if necessary, by Austria. For all which reasons I cannot doubt the sincerity of the assurances which, as above related, he charged me to give to your Lordship.

M. de Lenthe told me that he should communicate to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, the decision which this Government has come to upon this point. The answer of Brunswick has been an unreserved acquiescence in all that Austria has required. That from Oldenburg has been delayed, upon the plea of the Grand Duke's absence in Holstein; but from its close union with Prussia it is not to be expected that, in that quarter, the wishes of the Cabinet of Vienna will be responded to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. D. BLIGH.

No. 278.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 326. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me in strict confidence, on the 14th instant, the contents of a despatch from Count Buol to M. de Hübner, dated the 10th instant, in which Count Buol, referring to the instructions given to Baron de Hess not to interfere with the free movement of the Turkish forces in Moldavia and Wallachia, and to maintain the best understanding with Omer Pasha and the Commanders of the allied armies, observes that Omer Pasha is consequently free to undertake any operation in the direction of Bessarabia, and that the intelligence of an opposite tendency which has reached the French Government is only the result of a misunderstanding which will speedily be cleared up.

But the Austrian Government is of opinion that a good understanding between the respective Commanders would best be secured by a Convention between the several Powers, and by the establishment of a common centre of discussion in the immediate vicinity of the theatre of war, by which among other things the continual bickerings between the Austrian and Turkish authorities would be obviated, which are so little in accordance with the harmony which prevails between the Internuncio and the Porte.

The Internuncio reported on the 28th of September, that Omer and Dervish

Pashas had received orders from the Porte, on the 15th, to come to an understanding with Count Coronini as to the passage in General Hess' proclamation requiring all communications to be addressed to the Austrian Commanders; that the Pashas had thereupon proposed to make a collective proclamation explanatory of the passage; that the Austrian Commander had objected to this, but offered, instead, to write to the Administrative Council to say that the Emperor of Austria could never depart from his purpose to re-establish, in concert with the Porte, the legitimate order of things in the Principalities; that Dervish Pasha having been appointed Turkish Commissioner, the authorities would naturally have to apply to him likewise, until the full restoration of a regular administration of the country, in conformity with its established privileges, in order to settle all important points by common agreement between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities.

Count Buol was of opinion that Count Coronini's suggestion was the best.

As regards Prince Stirbey's recall, the Internuncio wrote that Omer Pasha had been informed that as the result of a conference between the Internuncio, Reshid Pasha, and the Representatives of England and France, the former had undertaken to request Count Coronini to discuss with the Porte's Commissioner whether Prince Stirbey's recall should be made subject to a previous understanding between the Imperial Cabinet and the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, upon which Dervish Pasha, whose invitation to Prince Stirbey had already been sent off, announced to Count Coronini that he would write to Vienna to delay his departure.

The fact, however, Count Buol says, is that Arif Effendi, who had already forwarded the invitation to Prince Stirbey, had never mentioned to him (Count Buol) that he had received further instructions on the matter.

The Internuncio further states that Omer Pasha had been strongly urged to maintain the best understanding with the Austrian Commanders.

Count Buol says upon this, that while the Austrian Cabinet has reason to be satisfied with the instructions given by the Porte to its Representatives in the Principalities, the manner in which those instructions are carried out is not equally satisfactory.

Meanwhile Prince Stirbey arrived at Bucharest on the 5th of October, and was received in a proper manner by the populace and Wallachian authorities, while the Turks kept aloof from him.

I told Count Colloredo that as an improper proclamation had at first been issued by General Coronini, the best course would have been to issue another that should leave no doubt as to the intentions of the Austrian Government in the Principalities; but that the point of real practical importance was the interference with the military movements of Omer Pasha, and I feared there could be no doubt that the Austrian authorities had thereby rendered an essential service to Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 279.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 17. 8·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October* 17, 1854.

THE question contained in your Lordship's letter of the 13th is answered by my telegraphic despatch of yesterday. Count Buol has informed me that he will communicate to me to-morrow the instructions addressed to Baron Bruck and to General Coronini. I will transmit to your Lordship this evening an account of what has passed on these affairs.

No. 280.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 67.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 17, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 115 of the 13th instant, reporting your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the policy of Prussia, I have to inform you that I approve the language held by you on that occasion. It does not, however, under present circumstances appear desirable to invite discussion with Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 281.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 17, 10·25 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 16, 1854.*

A TURKISH courier who left Constantinople on the 9th, has brought the order to Arif Effendi to require a distinct declaration on the part of the Austrian Government relative to the liberty of the movements of the Ottoman army in the Principalities. M. de Bourqueney and myself have supported by all means in our power the step taken by the Ambassador. Count Buol's reply is perfectly satisfactory, and we have dispatched by telegraph to our Agents at Bucharest, directions to inform Omer Pasha that he is at liberty to carry on offensive operations against the Russian territory, that he may execute them by Galatz and Ibraila with the number of troops he may consider necessary. If he wishes to cross the frontier at any other point, he will come to an understanding upon the subject with the Austrian General, who will, on his part, take the measures rendered necessary by this movement. Instructions for M. de Bruck will be forwarded to him by Count Buol this day, with the view of directing the Internuncio in the policy of his Government.

No. 282.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1,257.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 17, 1854.*

I SAW Marshal Vaillant this morning just after his Excellency had received his detailed reports from General Canrobert of the 3rd instant.

It would appear from what the Marshal recounted to me that the allies had found Sebastopol more formidably defended on the south and east than they had hoped would have been the case. The artillery of the Russian fleet had been placed in position, and the crews landed to serve it; 25,000 Russians were supposed to be in the place, and about 40,000, under Prince Menchikoff, on the road to Simpheropol, about ten miles from the allies.

The allies had divided their forces; two divisions of each army were appointed to attack Sebastopol, and two other divisions of each force were ordered to protect the besieging army. The remainder of the allied troops, with the Turkish division, were placed between the besieging and the covering armies so as to act as a reserve to either.

General Canrobert computed the heavy guns of the allies to amount to 160.

The French army was beginning to want provisions, and unfortunately

nothing had been heard of the ships which had been sent back to Varna from Kalamita Bay on the 17th ultimo, to fetch the remainder of the French army and a further supply of provisions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 283.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 555.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 30, 1854.*

I HAVE forwarded this evening, by a French express to Belgrade, for transmission to your Lordship through Semlin, a telegraphic message in the following words:

"Le Maréchal de St. Arnaud est mort. Ses dépouilles viennent d'arriver à bord du 'Bertholet,' destiné à les porter en France. Ce bâtiment apport des nouvelles de la Crimée jusqu'à matin du 29. On croyait que le Prine Menchikoff était rentré à Sébastopol. Les armées alliées étaient au moment de commencer le siège. Le Général Canrobert avait succédé au commandement de l'armée Française."

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 284.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 558.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 4, 1854.*

COLONEL WILLIAMS, as he has himself informed your Lordship, took advantage of his brief stay at Erzeroom to obtain information as to the wants of the frontier army, to dispose the Pasha to provide in time for such of those wants as come within reach of his authority, and to point out the importance of sending with all expedition to Kars certain enumerated articles of supply, including specie.

Immediately on the receipt of his clear and temperate statement, I addressed an instruction to M. Pisani for the purpose of bringing the required objects without delay to the knowledge of the Porte, and accelerating their transmission to the army.

M. Pisani appears to have found no difficulty in obtaining the assent of the Turkish Ministers to my urgent recommendations, and I am led to hope that there will be no want of exertion on their part.

For your Lordship's more complete information I forward herewith in copy my instruction to M. Pisani, and his report in answer to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 284.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir, *Therapia, October 1, 1854.*

I HAVE received despatches this afternoon from Colonel Williams. He writes to the 17th from Erzeroom, whence he proceeded two days later to the army at Kars.

At Erzeroom, with the Mushir's assistance, he went over the buildings capable as serving as winter quarters for part of the army. He also inspected

the military hospital. He speaks highly of the Pasha's willingness to provide for the troops, and particularly of Enim Bey, the chief medical officer, to whose care the good appearance of the hospital is owing. In the apothecary's department much is wanting—more surgical instruments of good quality to begin with; sundry articles of medicine, lint of better quality, and, above all, money. Noureddin Bey is mentioned with praise.

It is very desirable that the Pasha of Erzeroom should be encouraged in preparing winter quarters, together with fuel and provisions, for the troops. From want of proper care in these respects last year thousands perished in the army, and were lost to the Sultan's service.

The pay of the soldiers is greatly in arrear; only 10,000 purses have been lately sent out, nearly two-thirds of it in paper. More money in specie is indispensable.

No winter clothing has been yet sent, though the application for it was sent to Constantinople some time ago. This want must be supplied without delay, or the consequences may be fatal. Everything announces an early and severe winter.

Wheat and barley are wanted from Sivas, Kharpoot, Diarbekir, &c.; 35,000 Kars samars of wheat, and 60,000 of barley. This want is also urgent.

Strong shoes and worsted stockings are also of essential consequence. They should be sent with all speed. The importance of this cannot be exaggerated.

Mustapha Liva Pasha and Enim Bey are highly commended. If the former were made Ferik, and the latter promoted, the service would gain, and others would be encouraged. I hope these recommendations will be attended to.

The troops at Erzeroom are fifteen, seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen months in arrears of pay. They received one month's pay before the last Bairam. The soldiers are much exposed to privation by the delays, and much discontent is engendered thereby.

It is thought most expedient, as well as practicable, that Bayazid should be re-occupied by the Sultan's troops, and the great commercial road into Persia freed from the Cossacks and Koords. Orders should be given from Constantinople, leaving the mode of execution to military judgment.

You will make known the whole contents of this instruction to Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the Seraskier, leaving a copy, or Turkish translation, with the former.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—Intrenching tools, 2,000 sets, are wanted at Erzeroom without delay, for the purpose of being used in re-occupying Bayazid and clearing the road. This also is strongly recommended.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 284.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, October 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that I have communicated separately to Reshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the Seraskier Pasha, your Excellency's instruction of the 1st instant, relating to the wants of the army, &c., and also left a Turkish translation with the former.

Reshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier told me that the Seraskier Pasha had received a list of the different items described in your instruction, but were not aware whether they had been forwarded.

As to the fuel and provisions, the Grand Vizier said that he has transmitted orders to the Pasha of Erzeroom to supply grain for the use of the army from Diarbekir, Sivas, Amassia, and the neighbourhood of Erzeroom.

Having afterwards called on the Seraskier, he informed me that 30,000 sets of winter clothes had been ordered, two-thirds of which have actually been forwarded, and the rest are to be shipped in a day or two. 30,000 pairs of

boots and shoes, and a similar number of worsted stockings, together with caps and linen for the soldiers, are on their way to Trebizond. Besides, a number of saddles, tents, and a certain quantity of ammunition, have also been sent.

The Pasha of Erzeroom, he added, was requested to supply the necessary quantities of wheat and barley wanted, and to provide winter quarters for the troops.

Surgical instruments of the best qualities possible to procure at Constantinople, as well as the sundry articles of medicine, lint, &c., mentioned in the list transmitted to the Seraskier by the chief medical officer at Erzeroom, are ready for shipment.

With reference to the payment of the arrears, the Seraskier Pasha observed that this point cannot be settled until the Commission sits, and the sooner they meet the better. Meanwhile, 5,000 purses in specie are prepared for transmission to Erzeroom for the pay of the soldiers.

Reshid Pasha requested me to write and say that he wished to be informed officially of the name of the British Commissioner, so as to transmit orders to the Malieh, for the purpose of assembling the financial Commission, and setting to work at once, as the armies are in great need of money.

The intention of the Porte is to reoccupy Bayazid, and the Seraskier said that orders to that effect have been transmitted to the Commander of the Turkish forces in that quarter.

The number of the intrenching tools are preparing. A portion of them has already been sent.

Mustapha Liva Pasha and Enim Bey have been recommended by the Seraskier to the Porte for promotion. He is expecting the Porte's answer for the transmission of the firman.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 285.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 563.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 4, 1854.*

HAVING been informed by Her Majesty's Agent at Bucharest that a letter addressed by Prince Stirbey to Count Nesselrode in June 1853, contained a passage expressive of devoted submission to the Emperor of Russia, I wrote to request that a copy of the letter might be sent to me.

Mr. Colquhoun has since replied that his exertions to obtain the letter in question had failed of success, and he explains the difficulties which had baffled them, but he has forwarded instead the correspondence between Prince Stirbey and Prince Gortchakoff, of which the part originating with the former agrees pretty much with the sentiments alleged to have been conveyed by his Highness to Count Nesselrode.

Copies of the two letters are inclosed herewith. I have communicated them of Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 285.

Prince Gortchakoff to Prince Stirbey.

Mon Prince, *Kicheneff, le 17 Juin, 1853.*

NOTRE Consul-Général dans les Principautés a eu la mission d'inviter votre Altesse aux motifs de haute importance qui ont déterminé Sa Majesté l'Empereur à faire occuper par ses troupes la Valachie et la Moldavie. Mon auguste Maître a voulu donner à cette occasion un nouveau témoignage de sa constante sollicitude pour le bien-être des Principautés, en ordonnant que cette

occupation s'opère sans porter la moindre atteinte aux privilèges accordés aux Provinces confiées à l'administration de votre Altesse et sans leur imposer aucune charge ou corvée.

Ayant reçu l'ordre de franchir la frontière, je me fais un devoir empressé d'en informer votre Altesse en vous transmettant ci-joint la proclamation que j'adresse aux populations Moldo-Valaques. M. le Conseiller d'Etat Actuel Khaltchinski est chargé de s'entendre avec vous, mon Prince, pour la publication de cette pièce. Les intentions bienveillantes de l'Empereur y sont pleinement exprimées, et je suis convaincu que votre Altesse, animée des dispositions dont elle n'a cessé de donner des preuves au Gouvernement protecteur des Principautés, prêtera tout son concours pour subvenir aux besoins des troupes Impériales. Vous connaissez, mon Prince, la discipline et l'excellent esprit qui les distinguent; elles rempliront scrupuleusement les hautes intentions de l'Empereur.

Je me félicite, &c.

(Signé) PRINCE MICHEL GORTCHAKOFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 285.

Prince Stirbey to Prince Gortchakoff.

Bucharest, le 22 Juin, 1854.

Mon Prince,

JE m'empresse d'avoir l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de la lettre qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser le 17 courant.

Les autorités locales ne manqueront pas, mon Prince, de prêter leur concours zélé et l'assistance la plus complète à l'effet de faciliter aux troupes Impériales placées sous le commandement de votre Excellence les fournitures nécessaires, et de leur procurer pendant leur marche toutes les facilités qui dépendent d'elles.

Je me félicite, mon Prince, et je m'estime véritablement heureux d'avoir l'occasion d'entretenir des relations directes avec votre Excellence, et je suis impatient de l'assurer de vive voix de mon dévouement pour le service de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et du sincère désir qui m'anime de vous être agréable en toutes choses.

C'est dans ces sentiments que je vous prie, &c.

(Signé) STIRBEY.

No. 286.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 18, 11·30 P.M.)

Vienna, October 18, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL has just communicated to the French Ambassador and myself, the instructions he addressed yesterday to the Internuncio and General Coronini. They are quite satisfactory in every respect, and dictated by the sincere desire to maintain in full force the alliance between the Four Powers.

No. 287.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 622.)

Foreign Office, October 19, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 558 of the 4th of October, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the steps taken by your Lordship to induce the Porte to supply the Turkish army at Kars with money and various articles of which it stands in need.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 288.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 333.)

My Lord *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1854.

COUNT COLLOREDO called here yesterday by appointment, when I told him that the proposal of a Treaty which he had been instructed to make had received the anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government, who saw in it a satisfactory proof of the disposition of Austria to draw closer to the Western Powers, but that it was my intention frankly and without reserve to state to him the difficulties which appeared to stand in the way of a Treaty such as I gathered from Count Buol's despatch would be agreeable to the Cabinet of Vienna; assuring him at the same time that the question was one to which Her Majesty's Government attached the highest importance, and earnestly desired to arrange in a manner alike honourable and advantageous to the Contracting Powers.

The chief difficulty of Her Majesty's Government, I said, consisted in the resumption of the conferences; for whether as regarded the position of England and France as belligerents, or that of Austria with respect both to Russia and to Germany, it was essential that no step should now be taken which was not in advance, and which was not to forward some practical object, and it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that to renew the conferences for the purpose of discussing the bases of negotiation contained in the notes exchanged on the 8th of August, would neither be a step in advance nor conduce to any practical end. The events of war must determine the conditions of peace, and any attempt to settle those conditions at a moment when the war was most active, and when Russia, one of the principals in the war, must necessarily be excluded from the discussion, would not only be a fruitless labour, but throughout Europe, and more particularly in England, it would give rise to misinterpretations, and would probably lead to misunderstandings between the three Powers whose union and harmony of action were so desirable for the restoration of peace. Austria, England, and France have agreed between themselves that, except upon certain bases, they will not treat with Russia, and they have recorded their determination in the notes they exchanged on the 8th August. No Treaty would add force to the engagement thus contracted, and no step in advance would therefore be made by embodying those notes in a Treaty; but the three Powers have also agreed that other and further conditions might be rendered necessary by the events of war, and to discuss those conditions now, before the events by which they are to be determined have occurred, could serve no practical object, while the hypothetical cases on which the discussion would turn might disturb the unity of action we desire to promote, by leading to apprehensions, possibly unfounded, of a divergent policy hereafter. The wise and prudent course would therefore be to abstain from deliberation upon such questions, until the moment should arrive for real and *bonâ fide* negotiations for peace; and I moreover appealed to Count Colloredo's knowledge of this country; to the painful excitement that pervaded all classes; to the misery and mourning into which thousands of English families are now plunged, by the perverse obstinacy of one man; and I asked him whether Her Majesty's Government, even if they were so disposed, could accept a position so false and so utterly at variance with public opinion, as England would occupy in a conference for discussing, at such a moment, the terms of peace that are known to have been contemptuously rejected by the Emperor of Russia.

With respect to that portion of Count Buol's proposal which contemplated an offensive and defensive alliance, I said it was impossible to exaggerate the importance that Her Majesty's Government attached to such an engagement with Austria, but they desired that it should be a real and active, and not merely an hypothetical, engagement.

An agreement between the three Powers that no *casus belli* would arise for Austria unless she were attacked by Russia, would be a gain to that Power, and a disadvantage to the allies. It would relieve Russia from all apprehension

with respect to Austria, and she would be at full liberty to concentrate her forces and her energies against England, France, and Turkey. Austria, I added, was of course only guided by her own interests, and was the best judge of what would most conduce to them, but I must be permitted to observe that a longer perseverance in her present course could have no other effect than to retard the peace of which she, in common with England and France, ardently desired the restoration. She had declared that certain conditions were indispensable for peace, she had pledged herself not to negotiate upon any others, and yet if she remained passive, if she was not to take steps for bringing about the arrangements she meant to insist upon, it was clear that the whole brunt and burden of the war would fall upon the allies, and that it must then not only be protracted, but might, or I should rather say certainly would, acquire a development beyond what Austria contemplated or desired, as the result of events that she would be unable to control. Ten months ago the Emperor of Russia might have renewed the old Treaties with Turkey; three months ago he might have negotiated on the bases of the notes; six months hence conditions of a far wider scope, and embracing territorial changes, may become indispensable. England and France, I said, as was well known to Austria, had embarked in this war unwillingly and disinterestedly, but they were determined to carry it on with the utmost energy, until they brought it to a close by a just and honourable peace. If they were to depend upon their own resources alone, the duration of the war would be protracted; but it would then rest with them alone to fix the conditions of peace.

The position of Austria with respect to Russia was no longer one of neutrality, and she had not hesitated to make that manifest in her recent communications with Prussia and the German Courts, and that position would be weakened rather than improved by a Treaty with England and France, which would not in reality draw the three Powers closer together, nor pledge them to united action. A Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance should be more positive, more binding, and better adapted to the great crisis upon which Europe was about to enter, than that which appeared to be contemplated by the Cabinet of Vienna.

Austria might have her own sufficient reasons for not at once declaring war against Russia, but she cannot disguise from herself that it is inevitable, and that the time is not far distant when her own dignity and interests will prescribe a more decided course of action.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol. You will renew to his Excellency the assurances of the sincerity with which Her Majesty's Government desire the cooperation of Austria, and you will state how thoroughly they feel the expediency and the advantage of fixing the period when that cooperation shall become active, and of contracting by a Treaty reciprocal obligations on terms of complete equality.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 289.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 1,263.)
My Lord, *Paris, October* 20, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS saw M. de Hübner this morning, and gave him to understand that it was impossible for the French Government to entertain the late overtures of the Austrian Government in their present form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 290.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 1,264.)
My Lord, *Paris, October* 20, 1854.

COUNT HATZFELDT read this morning to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the answer returned by the Prussian Government, on the 13th instant, to the Austrian despatch of the 30th ultimo. As your Lordship will have received a similar communication from Count Bernstorff, it is unnecessary that I should attempt to detail it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 291.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 21, 1:30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October* 20, 1854.

I HAVE just received a despatch, in private cypher, from Bucharest, dated 18th October, which has come incorrectly, owing to the telegraph line being broken. It states, however, quite intelligibly, that the English Consul at Varna had received a private letter, date, Above Sebastopol, October 13; saying, "We open fire from 200 guns, and expect the place will hold out five days longer."

No. 292.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 387.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September* 16, 1854.

I CAN conceive nothing so truly astonishing as the communication I have this day received from Lord Stratford, by which I learn that Baron Bruck had decidedly objected to the instructions proposed to be sent to Omer Pasha by his Government, to advance into Bessarabia; to which Count Coronini had already declared his opposition. Baron Bourqueney had received a similar report from M. Benedetti. I therefore proposed that M. de Bourqueney and myself should proceed together to Count Buol, in order to express to him the surprise and resentment which we felt at this conduct, and at the manner in which we were requited for the confidence which we had reposed in the assurances we had received from him, and which we were under the necessity of declaring were in the most direct contradiction to the language which Baron Bruck was reported by Lord Stratford and M. Benedetti to have held at the Conference which had taken place between them and Reshid Pasha.

With the view of bringing the matter clearly before Count Buol, we read to him extracts from the despatches which we had received from the British and French Representatives at Constantinople, as well as from the instructions which had been addressed to Arif Effendi, the Ambassador at this Court, and from the other documents inclosed in the above-cited despatches. From these documents we brought before Count Buol the following important statements of all the proceedings we came to him to complain of, some of which had been already the subject of discussion with him, and had received explanations which we had considered as satisfactory: first, that the Austrian Commander-in-chief had opposed the movements of Omer Pasha in the Principalities; secondly, that it appeared that Austria intended to hold the line of the Sereth and the Pruth with their army, to serve as a barrier between the Russian and Turkish forces, and that she would oppose any movements of the allied troops through the Principalities; thirdly, that Baron Bruck had stated that an advance into

Bessarabia by Omer Pasha would be objected to, if not resisted, by General Coronini; that such an advance would be injudicious and compromising; that it might lead to direct opposition, and probably to the retreat of the Austrian army from the Principalities.

We stated that the impressions produced by these facts had been sanctioned by the language of General Baron Hess; we added that the statements we had thus made were supported by such evidence and authority that we were compelled, notwithstanding their total disagreement with the assurances and declarations which Count Buol had on so many occasions repeated to us, to bring them before him, and to call upon him to furnish us with such explanations as might remove the doubts and mistrust which acts and proceedings so contrary to the reports we had made to our Governments were calculated to inspire. Count Buol replied that he received these communications with the greatest surprise; that he was not cognizant of the greater part of them; and he remarked that many of them referred to what had taken place before he had forwarded, on the 21st of September, the instructions which he had reported to us; he had since that time been informed by Baron Hess that he had stated to Omer Pasha that he was perfectly free to occupy Galatz and Ibraila, and that he was ready to remove the Austrian garrison to make way for the passage of his troops, but that he had since learnt that Omer Pasha had renounced his intention of entering Bessarabia, and that he was to occupy Ibraila; but that if any doubts could exist upon these subjects, he stated to us most distinctly, authorizing us to convey his declaration to our Governments, to our respective authorities in the Principalities, and to our Representatives at Constantinople, that the Austrian Government did not pretend exclusively to hold the line of the Sereth and the Pruth, or to employ their army to serve as a barrier between the Russian and Turkish forces, or to oppose any movement of the allied armies through the Principalities; that they entirely admitted the complete freedom of the movements of the Turkish troops in the Principalities, who would only be expected to combine those movements with the Austrian Commanders where Austrian garrisons were already existing; that they recognized that the Convention with the Porte did not give them any exclusive right of occupation in the Principalities, and that English and French troops, by the Convention of their Governments with the Porte, had a right to march into the Principalities.

Count Buol also stated that since there had appeared sufficient ground upon which these representations had been made to him, he would immediately repeat the orders he had already transmitted to the officers in the Principalities, and he would call upon them in the strictest manner to conform to them, and to carry them into execution, while he would also demand the fullest explanations of the transactions which had taken place in the Principalities, and which had given rise to the remonstrances which had now been made with regard to them.

After we had received these communications from Count Buol, I thought it was essential to bring strongly before him the language which Lord Stratford reports Baron Bruck to have held at the conference with Reshid Pasha and M. Benedetti, by which, after objecting to the advance of the Turkish troops into Bessarabia, he had refused to sanction the transmission to Omer Pasha of the instructions which his Government had drawn up for him, and had only admitted the proposal of Lord Stratford that the question might be referred to Vienna, by which the asperities which had existed at a previous interview had been mitigated, but that he had vehemently complained of the conduct of Omer Pasha and of Dervish Pasha, and had pressed for a disapprobation of their proceedings, which Reshid Pasha had refused, and had only expressed to those persons his regret at any disagreements which had taken place at Bucharest, and the desire of the Turkish Government that their authorities should act in a frank and cordial spirit with those of Austria.

Count Buol, in order to explain the conduct of Baron Bruck, read to M. de Bourqueney and myself a portion of the despatches he had just received from him, and which referred to the transactions alluded to in Lord Stratford's reports; and in commenting upon some of those despatches, he did not hesitate to condemn the arguments Baron Bruck had used, and the declarations he had made, as contrary to the views of the Imperial Government, and to the instructions which had recently been transmitted to him. Count Buol expressed the greatest regret at this circumstance, which he hoped would already have been remedied by the last communications which had been sent to the Internuncio, and which he believed would certainly be so by those which would be transmitted to him this day.

With respect, however, to the operations which had been proposed by Omer Pasha, Count Buol declared he had never clearly understood why that officer had not originally pursued the plan of attacking the Russian army in Bessarabia at the time he had followed it from the neighbourhood of Giurgevo as far as Busco, where he arrived as early as the 10th or 15th of August. Count Buol stated that Omer Pasha was at that time in the command of a force of not less than 80,000 men; that he was alone in front of the Russian army, who shortly afterwards abandoned Galatz long before any Austrian troops entered Moldavia; that there could at that time have been no impediment to this movement of the Turkish army to the Pruth, near Reni; and that it was after that time only when the Austrian troops were about to enter Galatz and establish a garrison there, that any question had arisen upon the subject. Whatever were the reasons which during that time had prevented Omer Pasha from carrying into effect the operation he now proposed, Count Buol hoped that the renewed instructions he should transmit to General Coronini would so entirely remove any of the obstacles he had complained of from the Austrian authorities, that he would at once effect the movements which were in contemplation.

With respect to the question which is asked by the Turkish Government, whether the Austrians will be content with remaining in the Principalities, and if so, whether they would oppose any attempt of the Russians to cross the Pruth, Count Buol repeated the declaration he had so often made before, that his Government unhesitatingly adhered to the engagements they had entered into to defend those Provinces from any invasion by the Russian army; that they had no right, and would never attempt, to prevent the entering into those Provinces of the Turkish forces, or of those of their allies; that if the movements of these troops should bring them into contact with the Austrian cantonments, the Austrian Government would require that such movements should be concerted with their officers, but that they considered their right of interference with the operations of their allies was confined to these contingencies.

Baron Bourqueney and myself stated to Count Buol, after we had received these explanations from him, that we were desirous of giving every support in our power to the representations which the Turkish Ambassador was instructed to make to him upon the same subjects which we had now brought before him, and that we hoped he would give to the Ambassador such assurances as would serve to tranquillize his Government upon the points which he was now directed to submit to him, and we received from Count Buol the assurance that it was his greatest object to act towards the Turkish Government in the strictest amity, and upon the terms of the most entire confidence; and we have since learnt from Arif Effendi that he was perfectly satisfied with the assurances he had received from Count Buol, and that (upon the military questions) he had transmitted to Omer Pasha the telegraphic message, a copy of which I transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 386 of to-day, and of the purport of which I informed your Lordship in my telegraphic message of this afternoon. I now also inclose a copy of the joint communication which Baron Bourqueney and myself addressed, by telegraph, to the English and French Consuls at Bucharest.

I sincerely hope that by these repeated orders from the Imperial Government to their military authorities in the Principalities, the inconceivable and reprehensible obstacles which have been opposed to the movements of the Turkish army in those provinces may now be put an end to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 293.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 571.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 9, 1854.

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, are copies, translated into French, of four despatches, addressed respectively by the Porte to Omer Pasha, Dervish Pasha, and Arif Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, under date of the 4th and 5th instant. Your Lordship will perceive on reading them that I have already reported their substance in the preceding parts of my correspondence, and that they are intended, without an open abandonment of the points at issue between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities, to avoid, if possible, the continuance of difficulties tending to establish a more serious disagreement.

The amendment which Baron Bruck accepted, in so far as he was concerned, at my suggestion, in Count Coronini's draft of a note to the Administrative Council of Wallachia, and which appears in the copy of that paper already transmitted to your Lordship, is evidently not to be pressed, if Count Coronini persists in objecting to its admission.

It is impossible not to deplore so vexatious and compromising a state of things, or to desist from apprehending the worst consequences if a more decided course be not promptly adopted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 293.

Reshid Pasha to Dervish Pasha.

(Traduction.) 13 *Mouharem*, 1271. (5 *Octobre*, 1854.)

J'AI pris connaissance du contenu de la dépêche de votre Excellence. Votre dépêche a trait à ce qui a été écrit à l'Ambassade Ottomane à Vienne, touchant les questions de la proclamation et de Styr Bey, et tout ce qui s'y rattache.

Comme la question de la proclamation s'est entortillée là bas, n'importe par quel motif, le Comte Coronini doit écrire une pièce et l'adresser au Conseil de l'Administration Provisoire de la Valachie, et cela devra suffir.

Un passage de la pièce susmentionnée a été corrigé avec la connaissance de son Excellence l'Internonce; et je vous transmet la pièce même, et il faut que l'affaire soit arrangée de la sorte afin que cet embarras cesse tout-à-fait.

Et comme des renseignements suffisants ont été transmis à Vienne sur le compte de Styr Bey, et que la décision définitive de la Sublime Porte à son égard défendra du résultat dès l'enquête qu'elle a résolu de faire faire, il ne faut pas revenir sur ce qui concerne Styr Bey. Voilà ce que j'avais à faire savoir à votre Excellence.

Inclosure 2 in No. 293.

Reshid Pasha to Arif Effendi.

(Traduction.) 13 *Mouharem*, 1271. (5 *Octobre*, 1854.)

J'AI transmis à votre Excellence par ma dépêche précédente copie de celle que son Altesse le Grand Vizir avait écrite à son Altesse Omer Pacha relativement aux mouvements en avant de l'armée qu'il commande. Je vous envoie ci-inclus maintenant copies de deux autres lettres Vizirielles adressées plus tard à son Altesse sur le même sujet.

J'ai eu sur cette question une conférence avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et le Chargé d'Affaires de France; et le jour d'après, j'ai eu avec M. l'Internonce

un entretien sur la même question. Les Représentants d'Angleterre et de France ont assisté à cet entretien. Vous verrez, en lisant les copies susmentionnées, quel a été le résultat des conférences.

Tant que les Russes se trouvent dans la Bessarabie exempts de toute crainte, ils peuvent envoyer des secours en Crimée, et cette pensée donne à la Sublime Porte, ainsi qu'à nos alliés, un juste sujet d'inquiétude. D'un autre côté, l'attitude actuelle de l'armée Autrichienne dans les deux Principautés fait croire que son intention est d'empêcher une collision entre les troupes des deux Puissances belligérantes.

Voilà ce que votre Excellence aura à représenter au Comte Buol d'une manière détaillée. Si toute difficulté cesse à Vienne par rapport au mouvement en avant d'Omer Pacha, il faudra que sans le moindre délai vous fassiez savoir à son Altesse se mettre en mouvement. Mais il faudra aussi en cas que le Comte Buol tiendrait un langage qui tendrait à donner à entendre que si Omer Pacha avance, il faudra que l'armée Autrichienne se retire de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, que vous en préveniez immédiatement Lord Westmorland et M. de Bourqueney; et, sans perdre un instant, vous en informez aussi Omer Pacha.

Il est aussi très important que vous nous fassiez savoir, sans aucun délai, l'état des choses.

Votre Excellence s'acquitte des devoirs de sa mission avec une sagacité et une intelligence vraiment digne d'éloges. Ainsi je vous écris la présente pour que vous donniez de nouvelles preuves de savoir-faire et d'habilité dans cette question délicate.

Inclosure 3 in No. 293.

Reshid Pasha to Omer Pasha.

(Traduction.) 13 *Mouharem*, 1271. (5 *Octobre*, 1854.)

JE viens de recevoir la dépêche que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, par laquelle elle m'informe que les autorités Autrichiennes n'ayant pas consenti à la rédaction collective d'une nouvelle proclamation pour modifier le passage de la proclamation Autrichienne, passage contesté, un projet a été rédigé, à la place de la dite proclamation, pour être adressé par le Comte Coronini au Conseil de l'Administration Provisoire de la Valachie; que son Excellence Dervisch Pacha, de son côté, n'est pas content de ce projet; et que malgré l'intervention de votre Altesse pour le faire accepter par Dervisch Pacha, bien entendu qu'une partie des choses à dire serait modifiée, et que la pièce serait publiée dans toutes les parties de la Valachie, cela n'a pas été possible.

En conséquence, nous avons conféré là dessus avec l'Internonce d'Autriche, qui a dit que, conformément à ce qui avait été convenu ici pour le passé, il a déjà écrit à Bucharest pour qu'on eut à rédiger une à deux proclamations; que cette affaire pouvait être arrangée là bas, mais qu'elle est venue au point où elle est aujourd'hui à cause de la roideur du caractère de Dervisch Pacha; qu'à présent la pièce qui sera adressée au Conseil Provisoire suffit; et que si cette pièce est publiée, ainsi que votre Altesse l'a trouvé très judicieusement à propos, partout où il faut, l'objet qu'on a en vue sera rempli.

Je m'empresse donc le faire savoir à votre Altesse qu'il est à propos que cette affaire soit arrangée de la manière sus-énoncée.

C'est, &c.

Inclosure 4 in No. 293.

Reshid Pasha to Omer Pasha.

(Traduction.) 12 *Mouharem*, 1271. (4 *Octobre*, 1854.)

LES dépêches de votre Altesse, savoir, celle du 2 de ce mois (24 Septembre, 1854) et celle en date du 5 courant (27 Septembre), ayant été communiquées par son Altesse le Ministre de la Guerre à la Sublime Porte, j'ai pris connaissance de leur contenu.

Je vois par vos dépêches qu'étant prête à faire un mouvement en avant

pour inquiéter les Russes, votre Altesse s'est ensuite contentée d'envoyer seulement un petit nombre de troupes à Ibraila, et qu'elle s'occupe à former des quartiers d'hiver.

Ainsi que je l'ai marqué en détail dans une de mes précédentes dépêches, il faut agir conformément à ce qui a été décidé entre votre Altesse et les Commandants-en-chef Français et Anglais; d'autant plus que, d'après ce qui a été dit dans la conférence tenue entre le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte et les Ambassades d'Angleterre et de France, il faut se conformer à la publication qui a été envoyée de Vienne. Il faudra faire marcher en avant l'armée Impériale Ottomane, ainsi qu'il a été convenu entre les Commandants-en-chef des deux Cours alliées et votre Altesse. Seulement il faudra prendre garde aussi, qu'avant que l'armée Impériale Autrichienne ne soit prête à agir de concert, on n'expose l'armée Turc à être attaquée par des forces ennemis supérieures à sa force actuelle.

Avant de faire marcher l'armée en avant, il sera nécessaire d'en avertir le Maréchal Hess; et si, contrairement à tous les droits, on s'aperçoit de dispositions à s'opposer de fait et matériellement à ce mouvement, il faudra que votre Altesse ait recours ici, en donnant en même temps des preuves de ces dispositions.

Tout ce que je viens de dire jusqu'ici est conforme aux opinions bien arrêtées des deux Ambassades; et la proclamation susdite de Vienne ne disant autre chose que ce que dit la lettre télégraphique qui est arrivée par rapport à la non-opposition de la part de l'Autriche aux mouvements en avant de l'armée Ottomane, votre Altesse agira en conséquence; et je la prie de me faire savoir, sans délai, ce qu'elle fait: et c'est dans ce but que je lui écris la présente.

C'est, &c.

No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 572.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 9, 1854.*

ON the morning of the 7th instant I received an application from Lord Raglan for such of the reinforcements which I had urged the Turkish Government to prepare, as could really be collected and sent to him with all practicable dispatch. I lost no time in acting upon the intimation of his Lordship's wishes, and 4,000 men, to be embarked in three British steam transports, will start to-morrow morning for Balaklava. For your Lordship's more complete information I inclose herewith, in copy, Lord Raglan's letter to me and my reply. Eleven more battalions of Turkish regular infantry are to be placed at his Lordship's disposal, partly from Batoum and partly from Volo, as soon as an adequate supply of steam conveyance can be obtained. At this moment a large proportion of our steamers are employed in carrying French troops from Varna and Gallipoli to the Crimea. The weather, moreover, is boisterous, and may occasion further delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 294.

General Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My dear Lord Stratford, *Balaklava, October 5, 1854.*

YOUR letter of the 30th ultimo has just been sent to me by Admiral Hamelin.

In it you say that the greater part of the Turkish troops at Batoum are ready to join me so soon as I send for them, with means of conveyance; and, moreover, that you have been assured by Reshid Pasha that a reinforcement of 8,000 or 10,000 men is in preparation at Constantinople, if wanted.

It is of the greatest importance that every effort should be made to augment this army as speedily as possible, and with this view steamers will be immediately sent to the Bosphorus, capable of conveying 3,000 Infantry (we do not want Artillery), in the hope that that proportion of the 8,000 or 10,000 men stated to be in course of preparation, will be embarked without the loss of a moment and sent up here.

If, however, that number should not be ready, and could not be got ready in a shorter time than the steamers would take to go round by Batoum, the vessels should at once be sent there with a peremptory order for the embarkation of as many men as could be taken on board, although I cannot but hope that, through the exertion of your influence with the Turkish Ministers, one or more, if not the whole, of these vessels may have orders to receive on board an efficient body of troops from Constantinople without having to go to Batoum for them: and I would recommend, that whatever troops are sent through your suggestion should be held distinct from the Turkish division already here, and placed exclusively under my orders.

A copy and translation of the instructions given to the senior officer should be sent to me, in order that it may clearly be understood by all parties how they stand with regard to me.

The troops should bring their own ammunition, and arrange for their provisions according to their habits and convenience. Our rations are quite at their service, but they may not suit them.

Sir Edmund Lyons will direct Commander Hoseason to wait upon you with this letter, and he will direct Admiral Boxer to place himself in immediate communication with you on the subject of it.

I hope that the Turkish authorities, and Admiral Boxer, will feel that time is everything. I am certain that you will do all you can to make them sensible of this important fact.

We are still busily occupied in getting up our guns and warlike stores, and the navy are working with hand and head to the same end, having landed many guns, and meaning to take an active and, you may rely upon it, glorious part in all important operations of the siege.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to General Lord Raglan.

My dear Lord Raglan, *Therapia, October 9, 1854.*

I RECEIVED your demand for Turkish reinforcements on the morning of the 7th, and I have done my best to meet it. Six battalions, three of Regulars and three of the Imperial Guard, are to embark to-morrow morning in the three steamers sent to receive them. I am assured that they amount to 4,000 men; but 3,500 would suffice to fulfil my expectation. They are supplied with arms, ammunition, accoutrements, a month's provisions, and 1,000,000 piastres in money.

They are exclusively under your orders, and have a distinct Commander, whom I have recommended to be carefully chosen. I inclose you herewith a copy and translation of his instructions.

All was announced to me as ready yesterday evening; but the coaling of the steamers cannot, Admiral Boxer assures me, be completed before to-morrow morning. I saw him, myself, yesterday, and send you now a copy of my subsequent notification to him.

I also inclose you an instruction for the Commander at Batoum, who will send you all the troops he can spare, not less, I trust, than 2,500, and as many, I hope, as nearly 4,000.

Admiral Boxer informs me that the coals on board the three steamers will suffice for their going to Batoum and back, after completing their voyage hence to you.

Several battalions, seven of Infantry, are also waiting in Thessaly for the means of their conveyance from Volo. I have applied for such means to the

Seraskier, and also to Admiral Boxer. The former cannot even hold out a hope for more than one steamer for that purpose. The latter is less hopeful, and only undertakes to let me know by-and-bye. Cannot you send down steamers for the purpose from Balaklava?

From here, from Varna, from the Dardanelles, not another Turk is to be got. Here, we must use the Tunisians in garrison. The arrival of the Egyptians is uncertain.

When all is steamed together, you will be lucky to get an effective force of 12,000 men. I was not aware that the garrison of Constantinople was reduced so low. Recruits are coming in; but they are too raw for service in the field.

The Seraskier appears to have acted in good earnest on this occasion; but it was necessary to get him out of bed for that purpose.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—It would seem that the Turkish Ministers meant to include the Batoom, or Thessalian battalions, in the 8,000 or 10,000 Infantry of which they talked. They are loose in their expressions, and one department does not always know what is passing in another. At all events, you are in a fair way to get, in the first instance, 1,000 more men than you reckoned upon; and I hope, and believe, that, with steam conveyance, you will have 8,000 more in a short time. Mr. Pisani informs me that the "Orinoco" will take 1,750 men, the "Cambria" 1250, and the "Medway" 1,000.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 3 in No. 294.

Instructions addressed to Rustem Pasha.

(Translation.)

THE six battalions of troops added to the British army at Sebastopol by His Imperial Majesty's orders, having been embarked on steamers, accompanied by the aforesaid Pasha, it will depend upon circumstances of time and place whether these troops are to be employed in conjunction with, or separately from, the auxiliary forces; but they are to act in all military movements, and under all circumstances, according to the opinion of the Commander-in-chief of the auxiliary forces, and the Pasha will direct and employ the Imperial troops in such manner as Lord Raglan, the British Commander-in-chief, may deem fitting.

The troops are to march on whatever point he may direct, and the Pasha will be constantly vigilant in defending and protecting them against the enemy, and in providing for their comfort, so that they may suffer from no difficulty or want.

The ammunition and matériel of the troops is to be kept in a safe place, and to be guarded against every danger of destruction. The Pasha will be careful not to neglect his duty in these respects.

The Pasha will continue to report to Constantinople, in the best way he can, on the manner in which the troops are employed and administered, &c., and on any occurrences of interest. He will equally report on the same subjects to Lord Raglan.

Although instructions like these may be compared to a key, the officer to whom they are addressed is held bound to do his duty to the best of his ability, according to time and circumstances. The Pasha will be therefore held responsible, like any other functionary, in the event of his transgressing these instructions, or any which he may receive from General Lord Raglan.

The Pasha will be, as above stated, under the direction and superintendence of Lord Raglan, and will act according to his directions. But if his Lordship should deem it advisable that the troops under the Pasha's command should be stationed and employed at any place as a detached force, the Pasha will then have to receive instructions from Lord Raglan on the course to be pursued by

him; and he will report to this place, as well as to his Lordship, on his military proceedings as on other matters.

The necessary ammunition, provisions, and winter clothing, has been provided for the troops during the appointed time of their service, and a sum of 2,000 purses has been also given, in case it should be required. A Mouhassebidgi has been likewise appointed to superintend the expenditure and chancelry of the force. It will be the duty of the Pasha to see that the aforesaid ammunition, provisions, and clothing are properly served out and used; and if it should be necessary to purchase provisions or other necessaries for the troops at the place where they may be stationed, a council to be held with the other officers of the force, the Mouhassebidgi being present, and care is to be taken with reference to the necessary outlay, as well as to the purchase to be made, according to the prescribed Chancelry forms.

On the arrival of the troops, the Pasha will put himself into immediate communication with General Lord Raglan, announcing his arrival, will ask for instructions concerning his movements, and act conformably therewith. It will be, in short, the duty of the Pasha to act in no manner against the directions and advice of Lord Raglan.

The greatest attention must be paid to the comfort of the troops.

With the help of God, success will thus attend the Imperial troops commanded by the Pasha, under the direction and superintendence of Lord Raglan. At whatever place the troops may arrive, any of the inhabitants coming under the shadow of the Imperial shadow, are to be considered as worthy of the same degree of full protection enjoyed by the people and inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. The Pasha will attend carefully to the means of securing them full protection for their lives and property.

Inclosure 4 in No. 294.

Instructions addressed to Mustafa Pasha.

(Translation.)

A REQUEST having been made from the British Embassy, that certain Imperial troops to the amount of ten battalions, *i.e.*, six from the Constantinople and four from the Batoom army, to co-operate with the British army at Sebastopol and be under the orders of General Lord Raglan, should be dispatched to the above spot as a measure of precaution; such a step being in full accordance with the rules of precaution, a special firman for the purpose has been issued by the Sultan. According to its terms, on the day of the issue of this instruction, six battalions, with all their necessary preparations, &c., complete, will be embarked under the command of Artillery Liva, Rustem Pasha, in steamers, and dispatched to Sebastopol, after which, as it has been determined similarly to transport the battalions of the Batoom army thither, the steamers will take them up from Batoom, and convey them under the above dispositions, to the amount of four battalions of Regulars, with the whole complement of officers and all other necessary preparations complete: and you are hereby instructed that it will be necessary for the troops to be dispatched according to the above dispositions. The necessary supply of winter clothing for the above troops is being prepared for sending shortly to their destination, and although it may be possible to send it to Batoom before the disembarkation of the Constantinople contingent, and arrival of the steamers at Batoom, yet to secure against all contingencies, it has been decided to forward it at once to Sebastopol hence, and you are hereby informed to this effect, and instructed to execute with all speed the orders contained in the above firman.

18 *Mouharem*, 1271.

No. 295.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 574.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 9, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is a copy of a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Trebizond, under date of the 1st instant.

The French officer mentioned as being in company with Schamyl's Naib, and having a supply of muskets from the French Government, is the M. Mandait respecting whom Lord Cowley has lately made inquiry of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 295.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, October 1, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship the arrival here last Wednesday of four Turkish steamers, having on board about 2,000 Tunisian Nizams, destined to Choorooksoo.

Mustapha Pasha, the new Commander-in-chief, came in one of the steamers. His Excellency delivered your Lordship's packet, the various inclosures in which have been duly transmitted to their destination. Emin Pasha, the Circassian Naib, was also on board. The latter was accompanied by a French officer on a mission to Schamyl, with a lot of muskets from the French Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS S. STEVENS.

No. 296.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 575.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 9, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to incloso herewith, for your Lordship's information, a despatch addressed to me on the 7th instant by Her Majesty's Consul at Varna. It relates to the arrival in that port of British steamers sent thither by Admiral Dundas for the conveyance of French troops to the Crimea, and to the circumstances which delayed the embarkation at a time when steam conveyance is wanted so much for other urgent objects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 296.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, October 7, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of your Lordship, the copy of a despatch I have this moment received by the "Simoon," which, with the "Vulcan" and "Cyclops," have anchored in this bay.

Yesterday the "Mauritius" steam-transport arrived here from the Crimea, for the purpose of embarking French troops, having been furnished with a

memorandum to that effect; but the General Le Vaillant, commanding the French troops here, not having as yet received any orders respecting the embarkation of the troops here from the General commanding the French troops in the Crimea, I fear some delay may occur in their departure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDW. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 296.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Consul Neale.

Sir, *"Britannia," off the Katscha, October 5, 1854.*

I ACQUAINT you that I have sent the "Simoon," "Vulcan," "Cyclops," and several steam-transports, to Varna, to embark French troops from that place and Bourgas, for the army in the Crimea; as General Canrobert is extremely anxious to have the troops as expeditiously as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 297.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 577.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 10, 1854.*

THE unquiet state of the population at and near Scutari, in Albania; the occasional incursions of the Montenegrins; and the active measures employed by the Austrian Government, with the apparent view of extending its protection and religious influence over the Catholics, as well in that quarter as in the neighbouring Province of Bosnia, concur to attract a more than usual degree of attention.

I have lately received, in confidence, from Reshid Pasha the draft of a note to the Internuncio, requesting that the territory of Montenegro may be occupied by Austrian troops. I have given it as my opinion, that if the Porte has need of foreign aid on that side, she ought to be careful, when applying for it, to specify the object, to regulate the mode, and to limit the terms of the occupation. I am not aware that the application has yet been made.

On the other hand, M. Bonatti states that the Montenegrins, headed by Prince Daniel, have failed in their attack on the Sultan's territory; and that the late Pasha of Scutari has departed, on the arrival of his successor, without occasioning any tumult or disorder in the town.

An extract of his last despatch to me is inclosed herewith.

As to the movements of Austria, for the extension of her influence by means of religious education, I submit to your Lordship's notice herewith a statement extracted from the correspondence of Tevfig Effendi, the Sultan's Commissioner at Scutari, and communicated to me from the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 297.

Abstract of Consul Bonatti's despatch No. 37 to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated Scutari, September 30, 1854.

ACCORDING to despatches arrived from Podgoritza and Spux, and communicated to M. Bonatti officially by Osman Pasha, it appears that on the 19th September, Prince Daniel attacked the town of Spux with 2,000 Montenegrins, but was met by an animated resistance on the part of the inhabitants, and a body of Tosk Albanians who formed the garrison. The combat lasted

four hours, and terminated in the repulse of the assailants. A simultaneous attack was made by the Montenegrins of Piperi upon the town of Podgoritza; a vigorous resistance was offered by Dilaver Bey, with a battalion of Regulars and two guns, and these Montenegrins were equally forced to retreat. In the combat at Spux seventeen Turks were wounded; in the Podgoritza action, three killed and four wounded. The number of casualties on the Montenegrin side is supposed to be greater.

On the 22nd, Raghib Pasha arrived; and on the 23rd his predecessor, Osman Pasha, left Scutari. They were respectively escorted out of and welcomed into the city by deputations of the principal people, &c. Some merchants, however, refused to attend Osman Pasha's deputation, and even wished to impede his departure till he had paid certain accounts with the custom-house; they made representations on the subject to the new Governor, who referred them to the Divan, transmitting their memorial to Osman Pasha. The latter at once declared himself ready to satisfy their claims, upon their being laid and substantiated before the Divan.

A fresh body of Scutarines is about to start to relieve those who have been in Spux.

Inclosure 2 in No. 297.

Report by Tevfig Effendi.

(Traduction.)

LE Gouvernement Autrichien a établi dans la ville de Scutari d'Albanie une école, chose nouvelle, pour l'étude des enfants Chrétiens; et les frais de construction ont été payés par le Consul d'Autriche ici, qui a été autorisé à payer 3,000 florins par an pour l'entretien de l'école, de prêtres employés à cette école, et des enfants.

Le Gouvernement Autrichien a fixé une pension de 400 florins par an à chacun des sept Vladika des districts de Scutari, de Prisrend, de Durazzo, et de Mirdaia.

Il a envoyé 15,000 florins pour la réparation des églises et des couvents dans les districts de Scutari, d'Alessio, et de Mirdaia, et les réparations ont commencé.

De même qu'une somme d'argent a été destinée pour l'école des enfants Chrétiens à Scutari, une somme de 3,000 florins par an a été destinée pour l'entretien des écoles en Montenegro; et cet argent a été consigné au Vladika Zéko une quinzaine des jours avant la date de mon rapport.

J'ai appris de quelqu'un que les sommes d'argent susmentionnées ont été consignées au Consul de la part du Gouvernement d'Autriche, mais je l'ai cru trop. Cependant, les Consuls de l'Angleterre et de France, avec lesquels j'ai eu occasion de m'entretenir sur d'autres objets, me l'ont confirmé. MM. les Consuls ont rapporté le fait à leurs Ambassades respectives; et j'ai cru de mon devoir d'en informer votre Altesse aussi.

29 *Zilhindje*, 1270. (21 *Septembre*, 1854.)

(Signé) MEHEMET TEVFIG.

No. 298.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 582. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 10, 1854.

THE accompanying letter to Lord Raglan having been sent to me in copy by Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, in consequence of his Lordship's absence in the Crimea, I forward it herewith for your perusal, under an impression that more than one passage in it is well worthy of the most serious attention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 298.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to General Lord Raglan.

My Lord, *Bucharest, September* 28, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the day following that on which I informed your Lordship that Omer Pasha had ordered a movement upon Ibraila of a corps of 40,000 men, this movement was countermanded, in consequence of a communication which his Highness received from Baron Hess, based upon written instructions which he had received from Vienna.

These instructions were to the effect that the Austrian Government desired that the occupation of Ibraila and Galatz should be effected jointly by the Austrian and Ottoman forces. As a joint occupation by the Austrian troops with a considerable corps of the Turkish army cannot be effected, on account of the difficulty of finding accommodation for the troops, his Highness decided only to send a brigade of the Ottoman army to Ibraila, with the regiment of Cossacks under Zadik Pasha to Galatz.

Your Lordship will not be surprised to hear that the instructions sent by the Austrian Government to Baron Hess, being of a totally different nature from the communication relative thereto made to Colonel Dieu by the French Ambassador at Vienna, have somewhat confirmed the Pasha in the doubts he entertained as to the sincerity of the Austrian Government.

These doubts have, I regret to add, been strengthened by the manner of the Austrian Commander-in-chief, the Baron Hess, who, in a conversation with Dervish Pasha relative to the explanations to be given on the subject of the Austrian proclamation, and which had been under discussion at Constantinople, observed to the Pasha, upon his objecting to the explanations which he proposed to give, "Nous sommes forts, vous êtes faibles; et c'est inutile de lutter contre nous."

Dervish Pasha expressed his surprise at hearing such language from his Excellency, and observed that it would tend to lessen in the opinion of Europe the merit which might attach to any assistance which Austria might send to the Sultan.

As tending still further to show the tone assumed by the Austrians, I would inform your Lordship that Omer Pasha gave a dinner last evening to Baron Hess, at which about sixty persons were present.

His Highness, after several other toasts, proposed the allies of the Sultan, which was responded to in a few words by Mr. Colquhoun, who invoked the favour of Divine Providence on the great enterprise which has been undertaken by the allied armies under the command of your Lordship and Marshal St. Arnaud, and expressed a hope that it might meet with that success which all sincere friends could desire.

After retiring from the dining-room, the expedition to the Crimea being the subject of conversation between Omer Pasha and Baron Hess, the latter observed; "We do not desire the success of the allies, nor that they should receive a severe check. What we desire is, that the expedition should have no decisive result, for if successful, the allies will gain too high an ascendancy."

I repeat this observation, as twice stated to me this morning by Omer Pasha, as I think it most desirable your Lordship should be intimately acquainted with those events which occur here, and may enable your Lordship to judge of the real position of affairs on this scene of operations.

If necessary I could multiply facts which show that similar sentiments pervade the Austrian army, who have come here more with the attitude of conquerors than that of friends. The treatment of the inhabitants of all classes, both princes and Boyars, as well as the labouring classes in this town, as regards billets, is most imperious. Austrian soldiers enter houses, turn out the servants, and occupy their rooms and beds. They remove gentlemen's horses from their stables without speaking to their proprietors, and substitute their own in their places; and, in fact, if the undoubted stories I daily hear were repeated, your Lordship would scarcely credit the treatment received by the people at their hands.

I have heard from several respectable persons not at all well inclined to

Russia, that the Russian occupation, which was much more numerous, did not weigh nearly so heavily on the inhabitants, who begin to think that it would have been better for them that our enemies had remained than that the Austrians should have come.

It is much to be regretted that this treatment should be permitted, and that the good feeling of the inhabitants towards the cause of Turkey should be weakened, as the resources of the Principality are great, both in men and provisions; and if the war be continued, it may be of importance to find them available against the enemies of Turkey and her allies.

I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter from Prince Stirbey, by which your Lordship will perceive that the Prince is on his way from Vienna to this capital. He is believed to have left Vienna on the 25th, and is expected here on or about the 30th instant.

Omer Pasha leaves this to-morrow for Silistria. His absence from Bucharest will only be of a few days' duration. He has requested me to accompany him.

Baron Hess left this morning for Fokschani.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. A. SIMMONS.

No. 299.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 628.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1854.

WITH reference to Colonel Williams' despatch of the 16th ultimo to your Excellency, respecting the wants of the Turkish army at Kars, and to your despatch to me No. 558 of the 4th of October, reporting the steps which you had taken with the Porte on this matter, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government cannot in too strong terms express their desire that this army should be placed on a proper footing, and your Excellency will spare no efforts to secure supplies and money being sent to it. The sacrifice of 18,000 men last year for want of proper precautions, is an event that inflicts indelible disgrace on the Turkish Government and their functionaries, and no remonstrance on the part of Her Majesty's Government ought to be required for guarding against its recurrence; but Her Majesty's Government have a direct interest in the effective state of this army, as it is likely that military operations upon a large scale will be carried on in Asia next year, and they must therefore again insist upon the necessary measures being taken without delay.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 300.

Mr. Forbes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Dresden, October* 18, 1854.

I HAD the honour of receiving, on the 26th of the preceding month, your Lordship's despatch No. 38 of the 23rd of the same, transmitting to me, for my information, a copy of one addressed to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, recording a conversation between your Lordship and Count Bernstorff on the policy now pursued by Prussia in Eastern affairs.

M. de Beust is now exerting himself to draw nearer to the Cabinet of Berlin, but if I am to believe what I hear, his success in that quarter will not be very great. Shortly after the receipt of the despatch acknowledged above, his Excellency, in the course of conversation, began criticising the policy of Austria, as compared with that of Prussia, and saying that Austria was not acting wisely in Germany. I answered, that in this I could not agree with him,

and that, intimate as we were, I would not hesitate in saying that the latter opinion applied more to himself; that neither England nor France would nor could give up the war, unless with some positive guarantee of its not being again begun by Russia the moment she was able, or that we had withdrawn our forces; that with the experience of the Russian policy towards Turkey, and her cautious as well as insidious attacks on its independence, we must look to her weakness as the only safe assurance against a recommencement of what had forced the war on us; and that Germany, in her own interest, ought to side frankly and openly with the Western Powers, and take steps at Frankfort to prove it to Europe. M. de Beust said, that if they were to arm, it would put them all to great expense, and without the slightest prospect of any advantage resulting to them. I answered, that he mistook the sense of what I had said, that there was no present need of their arming, but that instead of making a third party in Germany along with M. Von der Pfordten, they ought to join with Austria, and use all their moral influence to destroy the illusions existing in a high quarter in Prussia, so as to force the latter to act on Russia, and put an end to a war which I assured him, if not terminated in the winter, would be carried into Germany. He said, that there was no ascertaining what we wanted, although Prussia was ready to re-open the Vienna Conference, which it appeared we were not. I said that your Lordship had set that question at rest, in a conversation with Count Bernstorff, and that although not exactly authorized, I would take upon myself to communicate to him the substance of it, as contained in a despatch addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus, and which had been shown to M. de Manteuffel.

He read it with great attention, saying, at the end, "Voilà ce qui est bien fort." I merely added, that Count Bernstorff had brought it down on himself, at which I was not much surprised, from former personal acquaintance with the Count, and that your Lordship's admirable observations were not to be refuted.

In a subsequent conversation—for they turn on no other subject—I told M. de Beust that I had heard from two sources, and they were persons who had their wits about them and their ears open, that the idea of the re-establishment of a kingdom of Poland, as a barrier against Russia, had existed at Vienna; that Austria would not be indisposed to give up Gallicia, which would entail the cession of Posen on the part of Prussia; that each of these Powers would certainly not do it without indemnities, and Austria looked to the Principalities, whilst Prussia had never since 1815 taken her eyes off Saxony. He said, "If this be the case, all that we can do will not, in the long run, prevent it." I said I could not agree in this; that by adopting the line of policy I always recommended, the danger might be averted from Saxony for the present, and that others might later prevent what they were too weak to effect. I could perceive that all this had struck him; for two days later, I found him more reasonable, excepting as regards Austria, whose publication of the last despatch (of the 30th September) to her Minister in Berlin, he blamed very much, saying it committed her in an useless manner.

I said that he must not indulge in any illusions as to either Austria or Prussia; that the former must now go on, for that if we all did not succeed in rendering Russia powerless for a time, the latter would naturally avail herself of the first opportunity and pretext to fall upon and revenge herself on Austria; and that what with her Rhenish provinces and Baltic ports, a very categorical answer as to her intentions and position must be demanded from Prussia in the spring.

My humble opinion is, that M. de Beust feels the false line he has been pursuing, but does not exactly see how he can better the position of being situated between the two Great Powers of Germany, both of which he has managed to indispose towards himself. His despatch to Count Vitzthum of the 9th of July last, in answer to your Lordship's No. 24 of the 21st of June, (a summary of which was given in my No. 42 of the 13th of July), has been published in the "Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung," and a German translation of it is in several of the Saxon papers of this morning.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS R. FORBES.

No. 301.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 334.)

Foreign Office, October 21, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 387 of the 10th instant, on the subject of the alleged interference of the Austrian authorities in the Principalities with the movements of the Turkish army, and I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings and language on this subject, as well as the despatch which you have addressed with respect to it to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest.

The explanations given by Count Buol to your Lordship are satisfactory, and the instructions he has issued appear to be sufficient if they are obeyed; but the conduct of General Hess and the language of Baron Bruck are so irreconcileable with good faith and friendly feeling towards the Porte, that some further explanation is manifestly required. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, learn with pleasure that such explanation has been called for by Count Buol, and they trust that when received it will be communicated by his Excellency to your Lordship.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 302.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 636.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to what is contained in your Excellency's despatch No. 572 of the 9th instant, I have to state that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your Excellency's proceedings in obtaining reinforcements of Turkish troops for Lord Raglan in the Crimea.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 303.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 127.)

Berlin, October 20, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch marked "Circular" of the 8th July last, addressed to Lord Bloomfield, relating to the recognition of a certain Russian loan, it is my duty to inform your Lordship that I find that a public quotation of this loan is daily given in the printed list of the Berlin Exchange, a copy of which I have the honour to forward to your Lordship, with a specific indication given of the loan to which I refer.

Although I am informed that few, if any, transactions take place at Berlin in this loan, still I am given to understand that some surprise and jealousy has been expressed at Hamburgh that it should be allowed to be publicly quoted at the Berlin Exchange, when the same power is virtually denied to Hamburgh and other European Exchanges, in consequence of the stringent declaration made by the French Government at the time when the negotiation of the loan was first announced.

At the same time I must inform your Lordship that the publication of the Exchange List is not official in Prussia, nor is it under the control of the Government, as it is in France. There is, however, no doubt that if the quotation of this loan is continued at Berlin, other neutral States and commercial towns will

likewise adopt the same course, and that means will be thereby afforded to Russia to carry out the purpose of the present loan, as well as to facilitate to her any future financial operation of a similar nature.

I have also to state that the Russian loan is equally quoted in the "Staats Anzeiger," the official Prussian Gazette, although under the specified head of non-official quotation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 304.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 128.)

Berlin, October 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE taken means to inquire what are the military reports received here as to the number and disposition of the Russian armies in Poland. The following report has been given to me as the latest correct intelligence received here by the War Department:—

1st corps d'armée, 50 battalions, centre of position at Wilna.

2nd corps d'armée, 50 battalions, centre of position at Zamosky, with its left wing extending to the Dniester.

32 battalions—1st division of Grenadiers, centre of position at Minsk; 2nd division of Grenadiers, between Bresletelsky and Warsaw.

Two divisions of 32 battalions of the Guards, now on their march into Poland, amounting in all to 164 battalions.

The nominal force of a battalion is 1,000 men, but its effective cannot be rated at above 800.

The whole Russian force in Poland may therefore be computed, inclusive of cavalry and artillery, at about 160,000 men

It is stated that the reserves "Sapazny" have not hitherto proved themselves to be an efficient force, and are only available for garrison duty, or for covering the communications of the army.

The Austrian forces concentrated on the Russian frontier, inclusive of the army in occupation of the Principalities, are estimated by the official authorities here at 240,000 men.

As the foregoing information is derived from the official reports received by the War Office here, I do not hesitate to communicate it to your Lordship as means of corroborating the reports which your Lordship may receive from other quarters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 305.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 130.)

Berlin, October 20, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BEUST, the Minister Resident for the Saxon Duchies, returned this day to Berlin from Weimar, where he had been to attend a meeting of the several Ministers of the Thuringian States to decide on the course they would pursue in the present conflicting posture assumed by the two great German States.

I am informed that they have agreed to support the views and policy of Austria at the Diet, their decisions being subject of course to the assent of their respective Sovereigns.

This communication was made this evening to M. Balan, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom, I am told, it caused some surprise and still greater dissatisfaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 306.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 20, 1854.*

I AM privately informed that the Prussian Government are not a little astonished and somewhat alarmed at the effect produced on all the German States by the last Austrian circular; and they are beginning to discover that they trusted on a very flimsy foundation in placing their hopes on the support of the Bamberg Coalition. Hanover has, I am told, openly declared her intention of supporting the Austrian propositions, although she had already, on the 16th ultimo, addressed instructions to her Minister at Frankfort in a Prussian sense. Bavaria, I am informed, is indisposed to desert Austria, and M. Von de Pfordten is reported to me as having written to Count Beust, declaring that he would not take the responsibility of giving up a sure and stable alliance for one so uncertain as that of Prussia.

There are some symptoms of a change also in Saxony, who will not separate from Bavaria; Hesse Darmstadt and Nassau and Baden are likewise said to incline towards Austria. According to present appearances, if Prussia persists in her opposition to Austria she will become as isolated in Germany as she is in Europe. It is probable, however, that in view of the extremity to which they are reduced, the Prussian Government will come to an agreement with Austria, and that a common proposition will be submitted to the Diet by the two great German Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 307.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 391. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 18, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to your Lordship, confidentially, a translated extract of the despatch addressed by M. de Bourqueney to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, M. Benedetti, and which relates to the discussions which took place between Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney, and myself, upon the communication which we respectively received from Constantinople, and of which I have made a report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 387 of the 16th instant. M. de Bourqueney has referred in his despatch to information which he had received from the French Consul at Bucharest, which had not been transmitted to me by Mr. Colquhoun, more particularly as to a Convention agreed to between General Hess and Omer Pasha, with reference to which Count Buol has stated that he has never received any notice, that he has learnt from the Emperor that His Majesty was ignorant of it, and that in consequence he was satisfied that nothing of such a nature had taken place in writing.

I cannot therefore but suppose that there has been some misunderstanding upon this subject, although I saw the despatch to M. de Bourqueney in which it was reported.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 307.

M. de Bourqueney to M. Benedetti.

(Translation.)

(Extract.) *October 17, 1854.*

IT was with great surprise that we learnt by the despatches from Constantinople of the 5th, that Omer Pasha had encountered obstacles in carrying on his military operations from the Austrian Generals. We had supposed that all opposition on the part of General Hess would have ceased with the instructions sent to him and to General Coronini on the 21st of September, and which related to the movement of the Turkish troops on Ibraila and Galatz; and on the 6th of October we learnt from M. Ponjade that Omer Pasha had signed a Convention with General Hess, by which he was to occupy Ibraila, and leave Galatz to the Austrians, and that this Convention had completely satisfied the Turkish Commander. You will see by this short statement that we have had difficulty in reconciling facts and dates with the reclamations we have had to address to Count Buol. After careful perusal of the account of the conference at Constantinople, I am well convinced that Baron Bruck has culpably ignored or neglected the views of his Government, and I trust that the steps which have now been taken by the Cabinet of Vienna, and the clear expression of its sentiments and policy, will prevent any further misunderstandings from taking place. I will not conceal from you that the conduct of certain Austrian Agents, both military and civil, has deserved great censure, but I reiterate my hope that future discussions will now be obviated.

Although these disputes had already been the subject of grave discussion between Lord Westmorland, Count Buol, and myself, my English colleague and I repaired immediately to the Turkish Ambassador on receipt of our despatches from Constantinople, and we lent him every assistance in obtaining from Count Buol those full and satisfactory explanations which he transmitted by telegraph last night to Omer Pasha. Lord Westmorland and I transmitted similar information to our respective Agents at Bucharest.

No. 308.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 392.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 18, 1854.*

ACCORDING to the statement I transmitted yesterday to your Lordship by my cyphered telegraphic message, a copy of which I herewith inclose, I have this day waited upon Count Buol, who read to me the instructions he has addressed to Baron Bruck and to Count Coronini, with reference to the representations which Baron Bourqueney and myself had made as to the interference of the Austrian authorities with the military movements and operations of the Turkish armies under Omer Pasha.

Count Buol, in his despatch to Baron Bruck, recapitulates the instructions he had already transmitted to him on the 25th of September, and refers particularly to what he had therein stated as to the perfect freedom of the movements of the Turkish armies, or of their allies, in the Principalities, and as to the wording of the Treaty of the 14th of June with the Porte, in which no stipulation exists upon which to found a different pretension, and Count Buol authorizes Baron Bruck to make this distinct declaration to the Turkish Government and to his colleagues.

Count Buol also states that he cannot approve his saying in his conference with Reshid Pasha and with Lord Stratford and M. Benedetti, that if an offensive operation was undertaken by the Turkish army, the Austrian troops would evacuate the Principalities; that such language had the appearance of a menace, whereas the great object of the Imperial Government was to act in the most perfect union with the allied Governments upon this as upon every

other question in which they might be called upon to cooperate, and Count Buol instructs Baron Bruck to bear in mind that his first object in his communications with his colleagues is to give every support to the alliance which happily exists between the four Governments.

To General Count Coronini, Count Buol writes nearly in the same terms as to Baron Bruck, with respect to the non-interference with the military movements or operations of Omer Pasha or of the allied troops, and he directs him in all questions in which he may have any discussions with the Turkish authorities or with those of England and France, to refer them to Vienna, when Count Buol will discuss them with the Representatives of the three Governments, and will transmit to him the common decision which will have been arrived at, and the orders which will, consequently, be founded upon it.

Count Buol, in closing this interview with me, expressed his anxious hope that by these instructions he had effectually put a stop to the continuance of those misunderstandings which had been the cause of the present representations on the part of my Government, and that he had also provided against every contingency which might henceforward disturb the cordial action of our respective Agents, and had secured on the part of the Imperial authorities the recognition of the leading principle of their Government, which was the maintenance of the Quadruple Alliance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the telegraphic despatch which I addressed to your Lordship this day.

W.

Inclosure 1 in No. 308.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

Vienna, October 17, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE question asked by your letter of the 13th is answered by my telegraphic despatch of yesterday. Count Buol has just informed me that to-morrow he will communicate to me the instructions addressed to Baron Bruck and to General Coronini. I will transmit to you this evening by post my despatch giving an account of what has taken place on these affairs.

Inclosure 2 in No. 308.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

Vienna, October 18, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL has just communicated to Baron Bourqueney and myself the instructions he addressed yesterday to the Internuncio and General Coronini. They are quite satisfactory in every respect, and dictated by the sincere desire to maintain in full force the alliance between the Four Powers.

No. 309.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 393. Confidential.)

Vienna, October 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE misunderstandings which have arisen between the Austrian and Turkish Commanders in the occupation of the Principalities, have been the subject of long and serious debate between Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney and myself. It is only justice to Count Buol to say, that we have found him as much disturbed as we have been ourselves at the vexatious discussions which

have taken place between the Agents of his Government and those of the Porte, and while showing an earnest desire to put a stop to them, he has forcibly pointed out to us the serious obstacles which he has had to encounter in carrying out the policy of his Government. The revolution (for it is nothing less) which has been accomplished in the alliances of Austria, has met with many and powerful opponents among certain ranks of the army and some portions of the civil administration, and although the continuous and decided expression of the Sovereign's will and sentiments has reconciled many to the new policy which has been adopted by his Government, there are still found some to resist it, and the Emperor, who had much to overcome in his own mind, feels indulgent to those who did not accept the conversion to this new policy as quickly as he did himself. These considerations do not mitigate the vexatious proceedings which have tended to disturb the good understanding between Austria and the allied Powers, but they may serve to indicate the magnitude of those difficulties which have encumbered, and still do encumber, our path towards the object we wish to attain, and which I still hope we shall ultimately arrive at.

The question is further complicated by the pretensions of the Austrian Generals, who require a certain liberty of action in order to secure the safety of their troops in the event of a sudden rupture with Russia, and to avoid compromising the honour of their arms by exposing them to the attack of a belligerent army before their own Government have declared war; and acting under a sense of this responsibility, the Austrian Commanders have hazarded decisions which were at variance with the general spirit of their instructions.

Count Buol both acknowledges and deplores this fact; and the only excuse he can offer for them lies in the conviction, which from their reports he believes them to have entertained, that Omer Pasha's army would have been exposed to an almost inevitable check by an offensive movement in Bessarabia against the forces of General Lüders, which amount to 120,000 men, and have not as yet been weakened by a single detachment.

Count Buol indulges the hope that the misunderstandings which have arisen may now be considered to have ceased, and that harmony may henceforth subsist between the Chiefs of the two armies in all that concerns the liberty of strategical movements. With a view, however, of preventing the recurrence of those acrimonious discussions which have arisen in the Principalities, Count Buol has proposed to Baron Bourqueney and myself that any further dispute which may arise between the Austrian civil or military authorities and those of the Porte, or between the former and the Agents of the allied Powers, should be sent for settlement to Vienna. He proposes that orders should be transmitted to our Consuls-General to refer whatever differences may arise to their Missions here, and the Austrian Agents would receive similar instructions to refer to their Cabinet. He wishes that Baron Bourqueney and myself should assemble with him for the purpose of deliberation upon these matters, and that we should invite the Turkish Ambassador to join us, when we might examine in a spirit conformable to the amity of our policy, and to the text of the documents which regulate that policy, whatever question should arise between our Agents in the Principalities, and which they should be unable to settle amongst themselves. The Porte would be requested to furnish her Representative with powers to this effect, and our Governments would be invited to authorize us to transmit to Bucharest the decisions which might result from our deliberations, excepting, of course, in such cases as would demand direct reference to our respective Governments.

Count Buol, in submitting this proposal to your Lordship, trusts that it sufficiently indicates how far he is from entertaining any idea of exclusive preponderance in the Principalities; and should it meet with your Lordship's approbation, he thinks that it would be well to proceed forthwith to its execution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 310.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 394.)

Vienna, October 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE answer of the Prussian Government to the despatch addressed to them by the Imperial Government on the 30th of September, has been received by Count Arnim, and delivered to Count Buol.

I have learnt from his Excellency that he does not consider it as having brought to any satisfactory conclusion the questions which he had addressed to the Cabinet of Berlin. Count Buol remarked upon the courtesy and the friendly bearing of the language in which this despatch was couched, but he stated that he did not conceive it would call for any immediate reply, and that his intention was to call upon the Diet of Frankfort to declare whether, if an Austrian army was attacked by Russia, they would or would not give it their support.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 311.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 395.)

Vienna, October 19, 1854.

My Lord,

THE confidential despatch of Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister in Berlin, which accompanied the transmission of the note of the Austrian Cabinet of September 30th, having been published in the "Ost-Deutsche Post Journal" of this day, I have the honour of forwarding it in original and translation to your Lordship, as it enters into the questions relating to the occupation of the Principalities by the Austrian troops, to which my despatches of yesterday and the previous day have referred.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 311.

Count Buol to Count Esterhazy.

Vienna, September 30, 1854.

(Translation.)

WE add some remarks on our position towards the belligerent Powers, to the contents of our previous despatch. There are two points which are more or less decidedly required of us at Berlin. It is thought that we should close the Principalities against any offensive operations of the Turks or of their allies against Russia, and an assurance is desired, that if Russia does not attack us, we, on our part, will not proceed to attack her.

Both these requirements are, however, quite incompatible with our situation. We do not consider ourselves empowered to hinder the operations of the belligerent Powers, and we can in no case give up the right of passing from our present position of armed expectation to that of a participator in the war.

We will not discuss this last point any further. It is evident that we cannot expect to obtain the peace we should require by the efforts and the arms of others, and that we cannot engage ourselves to continue for an indefinite period to bear the heavy sacrifices which such a passive position entails on us. It is, therefore, only on the first point that we consider ourselves called upon to explain our reasons somewhat more fully.

We can only consider ourselves justified in occupying the Principalities by

the two-fold assumption, that we will defend them against any attack of the Russian forces, and that we will not in any way impede the prosecution of the war on the part of the allied Powers. This is in consequence of our Convention with the Porte, and is in perfect accordance with what we have always expressed and declared, as well towards Russia as towards others. When we demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, we expressly stipulated that no conditions should be annexed whose fulfilment would be beyond our power. Upon this, Russia declared herself ready to evacuate, but required guarantees of us that she should not be exposed to pursuit or to further attacks of the enemy. These we refused. Then, only, Russia declared that she should retire on purely strategical grounds, and thereby avoided the conflict which would otherwise certainly have followed our irrevocable determination. Russia did not, therefore, give us up the Principalities. She abandoned them to their fate. We then entered, having obtained the consent of the Turks to our doing so. The Turks may enter them in the prosecution of their military operations, and the French and English may likewise enter, on the strength of their alliance with the Porte.

We have, therefore, a perfect right to be in the Principalities ourselves, but no power whatever to close them by force against anybody excepting the enemies of the Porte, still less to dictate in any way to the belligerent Powers for what military objects they may enter these countries. We could put forward no such pretensions without entailing on ourselves very just remonstrances against our proceedings.

That this state of things is the cause of many difficulties cannot be denied, and these can only be removed by friendly representations and by an honest acknowledgment of the limits of our rights in the course of negotiation. It is only by such means, and for the sake of the Principalities, that we can preserve these countries from the evils of military operations.

It appears further, with respect to the validity of the Treaty of the 20th of April, that it would make no difference whether an attack, in which we should take no part, were or were not directed against the Russian territory from the Principalities; as we have no right to prevent or hinder any such attack, our consent to it does not imply our assuming an offensive position. But, on the other hand, Russia, in repulsing an attack, must halt at the Pruth, if she wishes to avoid a conflict with Austria. Prussia and Germany cannot, therefore, if they look on our entrance into the Principalities as desirable in the interest of Germany, exclude an eventuality from their consent to assist us, to oppose which our position gave us no right.

Your Excellency is directed to make what use you may judge proper of this despatch, so as to leave no doubt of our determination not to depart in any way in the two above-mentioned points from the course we have expressed our resolution to pursue.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

No. 312.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 565.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 5, 1854.*

THE correspondence received from Bucharest within the last four or five days, relative to differences manifested between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities in Wallachia, has almost absorbed the attention of the Porte, and occasioned some rather warm discussions between its Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Internuncio. The questions at issue could not be viewed with indifference by the French Chargé d'Affaires and myself. We have, consequently, been engaged in deliberating with Reshid Pasha on the most advisable course of proceeding; and, finally, we have found it necessary to take, conjointly, a direct part in the pending controversy.

The matters in immediate dispute, as I have stated before, are the Austrian

proclamation, Prince Stirbey's return, and the advance of the Turkish army. Both parties, in addition, complain of each other's language and pretensions. On one side the Turkish authorities are represented as making unnecessary difficulties, retarding the execution of their instructions, and manifesting sentiments of ungrounded mistrust. The Austrian Generals, on the other, are taxed with using dictatorial and almost intimidating language; of seeking to participate, without due warrant, in the local administration; and of presuming to impede the operations of the Turkish army, at the risk of bringing the allied forces into difficulty.

These differences are the more important as they correspond with the doubtful appearances unhappily continued at Vienna; the more vexatious, as they infuse an acrimonious spirit into the execution of friendly engagements; and the more to be regretted, as they tend to unsettle and impede the military operations in progress.

It is time, as your Lordship well knows, that so embarrassing and dangerous an inconvenience should cease; and I must do Baron Bruck the justice to acknowledge that his language expresses a deep conviction of this truth.

Not to trouble your Lordship with unnecessary details, I refer to the translations, inclosed herewith, of the Porte's instructions to Omer Pasha, Dervish Pasha, and Arif Effendi. They are four separate documents in all.

My previous despatches, and Mr. Colquhoun's reports to your Lordship, may serve to complete the necessary information.

The accompanying translations were taken from the Turkish drafts, which have been slightly amended at my suggestion, or that of M. Benedetti.

Having had occasion to explain these amendments, such as they are, to Mr. Colquhoun, I beg to inclose herewith an extract of my letter to him. Translated copies of the instructions, as sent to their respective destinations, shall be forwarded to your Lordship by a later opportunity.

Inclosed meanwhile with this despatch are copies of my replies to Mr. Colquhoun's advices of the recent occurrences at Bucharest. Bearing the date of yesterday, they leave but little for me to add on the present occasion.

What remains, however, to be stated is not entirely without interest.

At an interview with Reshid Pasha and M. Benedetti the day before yesterday, we agreed on the exact expressions which were to be used in the instruction to Omer Pasha, and on the terms of the communication to be made to Baron Bruck, who had asked to see the instructions *in extenso*. The one and the other were consigned, severally, to a memorandum, which is inclosed in a further correspondence, addressed by me this day to Mr. Colquhoun, and transmitted herewith in copy.

The Internuncio, on receiving the memorandum prepared for him, expressed such positive dissatisfaction, and intimated so clearly that a forward movement of the Turkish army in Wallachia would be resented, and perhaps even resisted, by Count Coronini, that Reshid Pasha, taking alarm, requested the French Chargé d'Affaires and myself to join him in conferring with the irritated Minister, and endeavouring, by actual explanation, to bring the pending differences to a more comfortable issue. I acceded to his Highness' wish, and an immediate meeting at Baron Bruck's house was the consequence.

If I were to state the particulars of our discussion, I should only repeat what it has been my duty to relate more than once before. It may suffice for every useful purpose to inform your Lordship that Baron Bruck was completely inaccessible to our arguments. While admitting the orders which had been sent by telegraph from Vienna, and which had led to the plan of jointly occupying Galatz and Ibraila by an agreement between the Ottoman and Austrian Commanders, and generally acquiescing in the principles asserted by us, he maintained that any further advance towards the Pruth by Omer Pasha would be so injudicious in itself, so idle with respect to the Crimea, and so compromising for the Austrian army, that Count Coronini could not possibly consent to the proposal, but, on the contrary, that he would probably be compelled, by the duties and necessities of his situation, to place himself in direct opposition to the intended movement, which, though he was not instructed to say so, he could not but foresee might end in the evacuation of Wallachia altogether by the Austrian forces.

Such being the Internuncio's language, repeated again and again with every appearance of conviction, and accompanied with assurances of his anxiety to

promote a favourable solution of the existing differences by an immediate appeal to his Government, we thought it useless, and at the same time too hazardous, to carry out our own views without consideration for his. We saw no reason to change the instructions to Omer Pasha so completely as not to authorize his proposing a forward movement for the purpose of alarming and harassing the Russians; but there was no longer any necessity for ascertaining formally the determination of Count Coronini to resist such a measure. There could be no doubt that he would view the advance of the Turkish army with irritated feelings: and it was impossible to deny that more might be lost by the failure than gained by the success of the experiment.

The sum of the matter is this: Omer Pasha will make his proposal to Count Coronini, and if he finds him unable to consent, he will suspend its execution. The Internuncio will make his report to Count Buol. The Porte will send its instruction to Arif Effendi. I shall write to Lord Westmorland, and I presume that M. Benedetti will write to Baron Bourqueney. Should the Court of Vienna act in this instance as in the preceding one, immediate orders may be sent to Count Coronini, and Omer Pasha may be free to take his own line according to circumstances. If a less favourable decision be taken, it will not be taken without the knowledge of the two belligerent Governments.

With respect to the other points of difference, your Lordship will perceive, on perusing my despatches to Mr. Colquhoun, in what manner they have been treated, and to what degree they have been arranged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 312.

Instructions addressed to Omer Pasha.

(Translation.)

YOUR despatches of the 17th September have been received and laid before the Council. It would appear from them, that Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan having gone to the Crimea in the persuasion that your Highness was going towards the Pruth, and perhaps further on, the Austrian Commander-in-chief opposed the passage even of the Calonitza river by the Sultan's forces, and stated that their further advance would be an obstacle in the way of the negotiations for peace; and that, as it would be difficult to divide the army in its present quarters, measures were being taken so as to enable it, if necessary, rapidly and easily to advance direct upon Ibraila and Galatz. It would appear, moreover, from all your Highness' despatches, that the Austrian civil and military officers come and go [between Bucharest] and the Russians.

Explanations having been required of the Austrian Legation on these subjects, it was replied that the "negotiations for peace" meant the proposals lately made by Austria to the Russian Cabinet, and that the Austrian General had alluded to that subject before the negative reply of Russia had been received; that although no value was any longer attached to this at present, the reason why your Highness' advance was objected to is, that the troops under your command are not considered sufficient to encounter the Russian forces about the Pruth, and that Austria, not having yet declared war against Russia, would not be able to come to the assistance of the Sultan's army, when a disaster might ensue; moreover, not to afford Russia any cause for returning into the two Principalities before their complete evacuation, that your Highness, without looking to the opinion of the Austrian Generals, ought, in the event of your advancing, to have considered beforehand [the chances] of coming into conflict with the Russians, as well as that the two provinces would have been left to defend themselves; and that they would not at all admit the assertion of the Austrian officers and employés being in communication with the Russians.

In the opinion of the Porte, the main point is to devise the means of forwarding her own interest and of facilitating [the operations] of her two allies. The provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, signed with Austria, are limited to the entry of the Austrian army into the Principalities, and to the restoration therein of the legitimate form of government; but the right of

Austria to prevent any movement which it might be considered advantageous by the Sultan's army to make against the enemy, or to make any objection to the advance of troops into the Principalities, or through the Principalities, by the Governments of England and France, the allies of the Porte, if it should be desired, cannot be recognized. If, therefore, your Highness does not advance according to your agreement with Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, it is certain that the Russians may detach a portion of their forces in that quarter to succour the Crimea. But, besides this, supposing some of these apprehensions even to be ill-grounded, the measure in question, of advancing, is not to be abandoned. It is of the utmost importance to facilitate the success of the present great undertaking of our allies in the Crimea. The troops, moreover, under your Highness' command are sufficient to meet the enemy in the field, and are fully appointed and equipped, and your Highness can be under no such apprehensions. Your Highness will, therefore, confer in a friendly spirit on the subject of your advance with Count Coronini; and more especially with Baron Hess, lately arrived in Bucharest, and with the English and French Generals on his staff. It may be expedient not only to pass the Sereth, but perhaps the Pruth likewise, and to weaken the Russians by every possible means in Bessarabia, and thus prevent them from sending succour into the Crimea; and we trust that this course will be adopted. But if your Highness, unmoved by the arguments of the Austrian Commander-in-chief, should decide on advancing against his opinion, and should have reason to believe that they were prepared to offer a material resistance [to your advance], you will not go to the length of coming into conflict with them; but you will put the Austrians in an official position to declare this resistance on their part and postpone the measure for the time, with immediate reference to Constantinople. Such is the agreement which has been come to between the Foreign Office and the English and French Embassies. It has met with His Imperial Majesty's sanction, and you will act accordingly, and communicate with all speed with this department thereon

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Inclosure 2 in No. 312.

Instructions addressed to Omer Pasha.

(Translation.)

ON the 15th instant, we wrote to your Highness concerning the amendment of the disputed passage in the Austrian proclamation, and the last correspondence on the subject of Prince Stirbey's return. We understood by the reply to our previous communication that the expiry of the term fixed for inviting the Prince to return would coincide with the date of the arrival of despatches from this quarter; but this was not the case, and it having been decided that the Prince should be invited to return four days after the date of the conference with Count Coronini, in the event of fresh instructions not being received from the Porte, it appears from Dervish Pasha's last despatches that the letter of invitation had been sent to Prince Stirbey before any communication was sent from Constantinople.

According to the communications made from the Austrian Legation to the Foreign Office, a conference was held with General Coronini, Dervish Pasha being present, after the receipt of the despatches addressed to the Foreign Office, in which it was proposed that the Austrian proclamation [having been already published], a second proclamation should be framed contradicting it, and that the question of Prince Stirbey should be referred to the Vienna Conference; but that it was impossible to come to any agreement on these points; and the Internuncio complained loudly of this, as well as of the contradiction evinced in the proceedings at Bucharest to the decisions and assurances given at Constantinople. His Excellency then demanded in an official manner whether the Treaty of Alliance between Austria and the Porte was to be observed or not; and whether the instructions sent to Bucharest were to be enforced or not.

In the instructions sent from hence there is not question of contradicting the first proclamation. Our intention was that the disputed passage should be explained in its true meaning; for example, that in the joint proclamation to be drawn up applications on all matters relating to the Imperial army should be

made to your Highness, and, in like manner, all matters relating to the Austrian army should be referred to the Austrian Commander-in-chief. Those relating to the administrative or political affairs of the Principalities would be naturally referred to the Commissioner of the Porte; but while the question might have been adjusted in this sense with proper management, Dervish Pasha made it one of *amour propre* on the part of Austria by inserting the proposal for contradicting the proclamation. The Austrian Commander-in-chief demanded the confirmation in full of the first proclamation. A pretext was given to the Austrians for saying that while the previous letter of invitation had been sent to Stirbey (however that may have happened), and while there was no mention of the conference whatever in the despatches from the Foreign Office, the assumption of such demands on the part of Dervish Pasha has left no doubt in their minds that he would not act with impartiality in the inquiry which he was charged to make into the conduct of Prince Stirbey, and that they could therefore have no confidence in the Pasha's statements. This proceeding [on the part of Dervish Pasha] is in truth to be regretted, and such disagreements must be adjusted as soon as possible. As the letter of invitation has been sent to Prince Stirbey as before stated, the subject of that Prince must not be again revoked until after the result of the inquiries to be made with respect to him, and your Highness will make the Pasha understand this.

With respect to the proclamation, that subject has been written upon to Arif Effendi, our Minister at Vienna. You will, therefore, state this frankly to the Austrian Commander-in-chief at Bucharest; and if he does not consent, you must refer to Constantinople. It is inconsistent with the attributes of Governments to act without the provisions of Treaty, and it is equally irregular that the Agents of a Government should act beyond their instructions.

We have afforded the Austrian Government every official assurance in this respect, and we expect of your Highness that Dervish Pasha will henceforward act in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty and with his instructions.

This communication is addressed to you by His Imperial Majesty's orders.

Inclosure 3 in No. 312.

Instructions addressed to Dervish Pasha.

(Translation.)

WITH reference to the subject of complaints which have been made on the part of the Austrian Embassy here, relative to the disputes which have occurred with Count Coronini upon the demands that the questioned paragraph in the first Austrian proclamation should be reversed in the proclamation to be subsequently made, and that the subject of Prince Stirbey's return should be referred to the Conference at Vienna, despatches have been addressed and sent to his Highness Omer Pasha by the Grand Vizier upon the subject, containing the necessary instructions and reflections, a copy of which, in order to avoid repetition of details, is herewith transmitted to you, and it will be necessary for you to conform your conduct completely to the injunctions therein contained. Your despatches, which have just arrived, state that, whereas it had been stipulated in the 3rd Article of the Treaty of Alliance with Austria, that the administrative system in the Principalities, in accordance with the privileges granted them by the Porte, should be settled and confirmed in concert with Austria, the desire of the Austrian authorities was to view this as meaning the restoration of the system in force at the time of the Russian occupation of the Principalities; and that the fourth paragraph of your instructions, setting forth that the system of administration framed in accordance with the privileges granted by the Porte to the Principalities, having been destroyed by the Russian occupation, in order to avoid any disorder at the time of the present Russian occupation, the restoration of the above system with all possible speed was necessary,—although apparently in accordance with the wish of the Austrians,—was yet considered as contrary to their Treaty; and, in addition, that whereas your proclamation contained a statement to the effect that the whole of the Treaties existing between the Porte and Russia were annulled, you were, nevertheless, in the apparent

position of wishing to restore an administrative system resting upon one of those Treaties so abrogated—that of Balta Liman; and that dissensions among the inhabitants on that account were apprehended.

Before your departure hence, statements of the nature of these hair-splitting observations had been laid before me, and it was verbally explained that it would be necessary to maintain the system in vigour at the time of the Russian occupation, even though the whole of the Treaties were abrogated. The privileges bestowed by the Porte upon the Principalities are matters which, in old times, and under the pressure of compulsory circumstances, had been the object, in Treaties with Russia, sometimes of confirmation, sometimes of extension; and, whatever kind of connection the system in force at the time of the Russian occupation may have with the Convention of Balta Liman, still previous administrative systems, it is evident, have equal dependence upon other Treaties; and there is no doubt that the evils of the Boyars at the Convention of Balta Liman, at the same time that no objections are raised to matters in connection with other Treaties, arise from their desire of speedily opening the National Assembly, temporarily suspended by the above Convention, and from the delusion of retaining Prince Stirbey in the Hospodarate for the complete seven years. The object of the Porte in proclaiming the abrogation of the Treaties with Russia, was to make manifest that henceforward the privileges and the administration of the Principalities were completely independent of Treaties; and as the Convention of Balta Liman forms part of the latter, it too is clearly to be considered as no longer in existence. With reference to the system of administration, the maintenance, according to circumstances and provisionally, of points connected with the above Convention, is part of the supreme administrative right of the Empire, yet it does not result from this that the above Convention is considered as being in vigour, and the people have assuredly no right to raise any discussions on this score. In critical times like the present, it is necessary to act upon what is practicable, and to avoid raising difficulties; the meeting, therefore, of the National Assembly henceforth, in war time, and especially with the presence of an Austrian army, would be impossible; even if, for instance, it were opened, it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind that such a step would lead to a variety of difficulties. To come to the question of Prince Stirbey, as it has been decided that he may be dismissed and replaced by another, in accordance with the result of inquiries made upon the subject, there is no occasion for the Convention of Balta Liman to be associated with this matter.

The most necessary course for your adoption is, accordingly, to execute completely the instructions conveyed to you; and, while maintaining the Porte's rights of sovereignty, to abstain from raising any unnecessary dispute with the Austrian functionaries. Moreover, certain Poles in Wallachia view the participation taken in the present question by Austria as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the independence of Poland; and while endeavouring, as they naturally would do, to induce a coldness between Austria and the Porte, it is evident that they will make use of similar efforts with reference to the party in the Principalities who are desirous of absolute independence. It is also certain that the Boyars who are aiming at the Hospodarate will, in the excess of their rivalry, be dissatisfied with Austria, supporting, as she does, the claims of Prince Stirbey. There is also no doubt that the Russian partizans among the population, taking them at their just estimation, will avail themselves of every opportunity to create disagreement between the Austrian and Turkish authorities. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that you bring your sagacity to bear on these points, and discharge the duties of your appointment in the various affairs that present themselves, by disregarding the views of the conflicting parties, and being careful not to lay undue stress upon unimportant, to the detriment of more weighty affairs. As the continuance of Prince Cantacuzene in the Presidency of the National Assembly—he having been ascertained on many grounds to be a Russian partizan—would be most unsuitable, it is necessary that he be immediately removed from his post.

This instruction is addressed to you by His Imperial Majesty's orders, &c.

Inclosure 4 in No. 312.

Instructions addressed to Arif Effendi.

(Translation.)

WE inclose to your Excellency the copy of a Grand Vizirial letter to Omer Pasha on the movements of the army, and the copies of the letters to His Highness and to Dervish Pasha concerning the discussions held with Count Coronini; and you will learn from them the views entertained by the Porte with respect to those military operations and to the occurrences at Bucharest. It is, in truth, to be regretted that the Austrian Commander-in-chief should have opposed the movement in advance of Omer Pasha, considered advantageous by Marshal St. Arnaud and by Lord Raglan.

The Convention signed with Austria was limited to the entry of the Austrian troops into the Principalities and to the restoration of the form of administration [belonging to those Principalities].

It would now appear, from this opposition on the part of Austria, that it is her wish, in occupying the Principalities, to hold the line of the Pruth, and to serve as a barrier between the Sultan's army and the Russian forces.

In that case, if our allies of England and France meditated sending forces into the Principalities, or further on through them, Austria might wish to oppose that also.

It is needless to say to your Excellency that it will never do to leave any doubt on such subjects in critical times like the present. It is highly important that every one should know what he is about, and take his measures accordingly. We therefore communicate to you all our views on these matters, and it will be requisite that the Austrian Government should afford an explanation of her intentions.

Our desire is, that the Sultan's troops should operate against the enemy in conjunction with the Austrian forces; but if the Austrian Government objects to this, the Sublime Porte has no right to press the question; but it is equally clear that Austria has no right, by the Convention concluded with the Porte, to interpose any obstacle to such movement of the Ottoman forces as it may be deemed expedient to make.

According to the Convention made between England and France with the Porte, those allied Governments have the right to move troops on any point of the Ottoman Empire which they may deem expedient; and it naturally results that, whenever they may wish it, England and France may march troops into Wallachia and Moldavia, both provinces of this Empire.

If the Austrian and the Ottoman Commanders-in-chief are not required to co-operate with each other in their military movements, at all events the Ottoman General must be left free to act where Austria takes no part in the war.

This, then, is what the Porte has to observe on the subject. Russia has weighed the late proposals made on the part of the Austrian Government, and it is expedient to know what course Austria intends henceforward to pursue. Are the Austrian troops which have entered the Principalities, to act against the enemy in conjunction with the Ottoman forces? or are they not to do so, and be content with remaining in those provinces? If this be the intention of the Austrian Government, are they prepared to make an armed opposition to the Russians, in the event of the latter desiring to cross the Pruth on this side? If, also, for example, the Ottoman Commander-in-chief were to deem it advisable to advance and engage the Russians, against the opinion of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, would this latter look on merely as a spectator? or would he go to the length of opposing the hostilities by force of arms? While it is patent that the Sublime Porte has no objection, and will not entertain any, to the entry, if necessary, of English and French troops into the Principalities, will Austria have any opposition to make on this score? It is necessary to make all these points clear, and you will demand the fullest explanations thereon from Count Buol, and communicate his answer to the Porte without loss of time.

The discussions at Bucharest about the proclamation and the subject of

Prince Stirbey have been a cause of much regret to the Porte. The despatch sent to Omer Pasha was forwarded to your Excellency at the time to make you cognizant of the decision which the Sublime Porte had come to on this subject. Although there is no necessity to objecting to Prince Stirbey for the time at Bucharest, it is highly important that the disputed passage in the proclamation should be rectified, and you must state frankly to Count Buol that it will be necessary to send suitable orders to the Austrian Commander-in-chief for obviating the deplorable consequences which would arise from it [its promulgation].

Although the conduct of Prince Stirbey is highly reprehensible in the eyes of the Porte, the leniency temporarily shown to him is solely out of consideration to Austria, the Porte's ally. The Wallachians are openly opposed to him, and you will take an opportunity to let Count Buol know, in as delicate a manner as possible, that the Prince cannot long hold office, and that the Sublime Porte will be under the real necessity of deposing and replacing him.

You will perceive from the inclosures that Dervish Pasha has been peremptorily instructed to act in conformity with the provisions of the Convention and with his instructions; and that a communication thereon has been also made to his Highness Omer Pasha. There is no doubt, also, that he will act in a spirit of conciliation in all matters coming from the Austrian Commander-in-chief. We entertain strong hopes that, henceforward, everything will be conducted conformably with the alliance subsisting between the two Governments, and you will state this to Count Buol.

This instruction is addressed to you by order of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, &c.

Inclosure 5 in No. 312.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Calyphona.

Therapia, October 4, 1854.

(Extract.)

THE translations I have sent you of the instructions are from the original drafts. The Porte has adopted three or four amendments of no great importance, but I have not yet obtained possession of the corrected drafts.

In speaking of the National Assembly, the Pasha has left rather more latitude for its re-establishment under more favourable circumstances.

Where Dervish Pasha is instructed to avoid disputes, the last word is qualified by the epithet "unnecessary."

In giving instructions to Omer Pasha, the strategical question of moving a-head is left to his own discretion, and upon his own responsibility; but on this point you have in a confidential despatch *ipsissima verba*.

Inclosure 6 in No. 312.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Calyphona.

Therapia, October 4, 1854.

Sir,

YOUR despatches to No. 52 of the 27th ultimo, have reached me.

It is painful to learn that the language and proceedings of the Austrian military authorities in Wallachia continue to be inconsistent, as well with the declarations made at Vienna as with the impressions entertained and the expectations recorded in London and at Paris. I venture, however, to hope that the explanations demanded by Lord Clarendon will have the effect of removing all doubt and obscurity from the intentions of the Austrian Government. In the meantime the Porte has again taken into serious consideration the points of difference brought under his notice by Omer Pasha and the Turkish Commissioner. Reshid Pasha has opened fresh communications respecting them with the Austrian Internuncio on one side, and with the Representatives of England and France on the other. The instructions which are addressed by the present opportunity to the Generalissimo and to Dervish Pasha, are the

results of the Council's decision, after deliberating on the contents of their despatches, and the communications to which they gave rise.

Inclosed herewith, for your confidential information, are copies of the instructions in question; two addressed to the Commander-in-chief, and one to the Commissioner. They will put you fully in possession of the views entertained, and of the course intended to be pursued by the Porte with respect to the questions at issue. They were prepared before the last official reports from Bucharest had been received at Constantinople, and it has not been found necessary to make any material alteration. A separate instruction, addressed to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, is to be forwarded by express this evening. The correspondence inclosed herewith will be communicated to his Excellency, who will have it in charge to demand the necessary explanations from Count Buol.

Looking to the general purport of the instructions, it appears that the Porte is anxious to combine the maintenance of the Sultan's sovereign rights, with a due regard for the friendly assurances of Austria and a faithful execution of the engagements contracted between the two Powers. The Turkish Ministers are fully sensible of the service rendered by Austria to the common cause, and to the Ottoman Empire in particular, by facilitating the deliverance of the Principalities from a Russian occupation, but they are equally alive to the importance of limiting the interference of Austria to the terms of the Convention, and of not allowing the operations of war to be hampered or compromised by the interests of that Power, while bent on maintaining a neutral attitude.

Looking to the questions more particularly in view, the Porte considers the return of Prince Stirbey, and the inquiry which is to ensue, as left to take their course under the previous instructions, unless the communications at Vienna should have the effect of producing some change.

With respect to the Austrian proclamation, the Porte's objections are unaltered. The words may be amended or not, but the principle which they seem to involve, namely, that of a participation by Austria in the administrative functions of the local Government, is distinctly repudiated, as warranted neither by the terms of the Convention nor by any admissible claim on the part of Austria to exercise a protectorate in the Principalities. The participation of that Power is evidently confined to the re-establishment of legal order. That desirable object being accomplished by the joint action of Turkish and Austrian authority, the internal administration of the country is to be carried on by its independent means, with the reservation of those cases in which the Sultan, as Sovereign, is entitled to interpose.

The movements, in fine, of the Turkish army, are not to be regulated by the will of a Power taking no part in hostilities, and anxious, for the present at least, to avoid any risk of being brought into collision with Russia, but obviously and necessarily by the interests of a belligerent condition, by the duties of a cooperative alliance, and by considerations of military prudence.

Under the influence of these principles it is most desirable that Omer Pasha should not be restrained from acting up to his obligations towards the allied armies in the Crimea; and if independently of strategical motives he were compelled to forego the advantage derivable under present circumstances from his taking up an advanced position in the Principalities, it would be incumbent on him to leave no doubt as to the cause of his difficulties, and the quarter to which in justice the responsibility of his inaction must be referred.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 312.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Therapia, October 4, 1854.

Sir,

INCLOSED herewith is a memorandum in French of the exact terms in which Omer Pasha is instructed to act with respect to a forward movement of his army in Wallachia, and the contingency of its being resisted by the Austrian Commander-in-chief.

The French Chargé d'Affaires agrees with me in supporting the course thus taken by the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 8 in No. 312.

Memorandum of Instructions to Omer Pasha.

LA Porte donnerait ordre à Omer Pacha d'agir dans le sens de la déclaration communiquée de Vienne, et par conséquent de faire avancer son armée, conformément à ce qui était convenu entre lui et les Commandants-en-chef des armées auxiliaires. Il se garderait toutefois d'attirer sur lui des forces ennemies supérieures avant que l'armée Autrichienne ne fût prête à coopérer. Avant de mettre ses troupes en mouvement il avertirait le Baron Hess de son intention, et si, contre tout droit, le Général Autrichien s'y opposerait au point que de faire prévoir une résistance matérielle, il constaterait formellement le fait, et s'en rapporterait à Constantinople.

Inclosure 9 in No. 312.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun

Therapia, October 5, 1854.

Sir,

IN consequence of objections made by Baron Bruck to parts of the memorandum communicated to him of the Porte's instructions to the Ottoman Commander-in-chief, and the Sultan's Commissioner at Bucharest, it became necessary to suspend the departure of the messenger, and to have some further explanation, at which the French Chargé d'Affaires and myself might assist in concert with Reshid Pasha and the Internuncio. A meeting took place in consequence; but the discussions which ensued were only satisfactory in so far as they tended to soften asperities, and to shorten the time which must elapse before the respective positions can be entirely freed from doubt and anxious misgivings.

The Porte's instructions, as already prepared for Omer Pasha, undergo no alteration, except that the Generalissimo will not have to establish, formally, the fact of Count Coronini's intended resistance to the advance of his army beyond Ibrail. The language of Baron Bruck was sufficiently explicit on that point, and his Excellency brings the whole question before his Government by to-day's post.

I also shall write to Lord Westmorland, as, if the Court of Vienna gives way, it is to be hoped that corresponding orders will be sent at once to Bucharest by telegraph.

Looking practically at the question, we have, in truth, no action to bring upon the Russians which can now affect the issue of our operations in the Crimea.

If Prince Gortchakoff has felt himself at liberty to send reinforcements in that direction, he must, for any efficient purpose, have taken the step some time ago.

With respect to the other points, it is agreed that Count Coronini's draft shall be given in with one amendment, which, in my opinion, answers the principal objection advanced by Dervish Pasha. Instead of announcing the Turkish Commissioner's appointment, the note is so worded as to state that the Commissioner, having himself announced his appointment to the Administrative Council, is to be on equal terms with the Austrian General in matters of communication.

This I conceive to be a correct principle during the period which precedes the complete restoration of what is called in the Turco-Austrian Convention "the legal order of things in the Principalities."

Baron Bruck pressed hard for a clear expression of disapproval in the Porte's instructions to Omer Pasha and the Commissioner; but I hope that Reshid Pasha has adhered to his previous intention of recommending frankness and cordiality in their dealings with the Austrian authorities, expected to reciprocate the same.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 312.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.

(Private and Confidential.)

Dear Sir, *Therapia, October* 5, 1854.

I SEND herewith, for your more complete and confidential information, a translated copy of the memorandum of the Porte's instructions communicated by Reshid Pasha to Baron Bruck the day before yesterday, and also a copy of the draft of Count Coronini's note.

Some marginal remarks are added in explanation.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 11 in No. 312.

Substance of Despatches to Omer and Dervish Pashas, communicated by the Porte to Baron Bruck.

(Translation.)

Baron Bruck objected to any expression of doubt as to Stirbey's return, and this passage of the instructions has probably been modified.

BOTH Omer and Dervish Pashas have been written to to say that the Porte regrets the disagreements which have taken place between her authorities at Bucharest and the Austrian authorities. They have been recommended to fulfil the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance between Austria and the instructions addressed to them, and to enter upon the discussion of all matters between the two parties in a frank and cordial spirit. It is hoped that the Austrian authorities will adopt the same course.

The decision of the Porte with regard to Prince Stirbey will be naturally in conformity with the result of the inquiry into his conduct. Unless fresh intelligence should be received from Vienna on this subject, it has been notified that the question of Prince Stirbey is not to be opened again until after the inquiry.

This has been settled; see the draft inclosed with this.

It has been stated that it being necessary to amend the disputed passage of the proclamation, the subject should be discussed with the Austrian authorities, and suitably arranged.

The Porte considers it highly important that the decision between the allied Commanders-in-chief and Omer Pasha for pushing forward the Ottoman forces in order to prevent the Russians from sending succours to the Crimea, should be carried into execution. Omer Pasha has been therefore told to take the necessary steps for harassing the Russians from the best and easiest positions, and to communicate the same to Marshal Hess.

Inclosure 12 in No. 312.

Projet of Note to be addressed by Count Coronini to the Council.

EN vertu de la Convention du 14 Juin, 1854, Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Maître, a pris l'engagement de rétablir l'ordre légal dans les Principautés de commun accord avec le Gouvernement Ottoman et ne saurait jamais dévier du noble but qu'il s'est proposé à cet égard.

Son Excellence le Général de Division, Dervisch Pacha, ayant annoncé au Conseil Administratif qu'il avait été nommé Commissaire Impérial Ottoman, les autorités sont appelées comme de raison à s'adresser de même à son Excellence jusqu'au rétablissement parfait de l'administration régulière du pays telle qu'elle résulte des privilèges qui lui sont assurés par la Sublime Porte, pour régler en attendant toutes les questions importantes de commun accord des autorités Impériales Autrichiennes et Ottomanes.

Le Soussigné se fait un agréable devoir d'en informer le Conseil Administratif de la Principauté pour éloigner toute ambiguité et pour écarter chaque doute qui aurait pu s'élever à cet égard.

No. 313.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 568.)

Therapia, October 5, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, are copies of two despatches addressed by Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan, and sent to me in copy on account of his Lordship's absence in the Crimea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 313.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to General Lord Raglan.

Bucharest, September 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, that Baron Hess having received the instructions therein mentioned, it has been arranged between him and Omer Pasha that Galatz and Ibraila will not be occupied by Austrian troops.

Omer Pasha has consequently given orders for the following columns to move forthwith upon Ibraila:

Ismail Pasha's division, 14 battalions of infantry, to move from Bucharest by Urzicheni, Luçin, and Janka.

Twelve battalions of Jossun Pasha's corps will move from Giurgevo by Kalarasch, being preceded from the latter place by the whole of Achmet Pasha's corps (lately Ismail Pasha's), 48 battalions, at an interval of two days' march.

The whole force when united will therefore amount to 74 battalions, with 19 batteries together mounting 114 pieces of artillery, and 9 regiments of cavalry.

Omer Pasha calculates his force at 45,000 men, but I should be inclined to estimate it at 40,000.

Bucharest will thus be left to the exclusive occupation of the Austrians.

It is the intention of the Pasha to move the bridge now at Rustchuk, thence to Silistria, and there to strengthen his tête du pont.

The detachment of Sappers under Major Bent, Royal Engineers, as well as the detachment of French Pontooneers, will move upon Ibraila with Ismail Pasha's division.

The Pasha himself intends to move his head-quarters from this on the 27th instant: he will probably reach Ibraila about the 10th October.

I have &c.

(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 313.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to General Lord Raglan.

My Lord, *Bucharest, September* 24, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency the Baron Hess arrived here yesterday from Cronstadt *viâ* Plojesti.

When at Plojesti his Excellency directed the Austrian troops which were stationed there upon Ibraila and Galatz, to which places I understand they are moving by forced marches.

His Excellency was received upon his arrival here by all the troops of the Austrian and Turkish armies now in the garrison, which were drawn up outside the town to receive him, under their respective Commanders, with his Highness Omer Pasha and Count Coronini.

This morning a telegraphic despatch in cypher from the French Ambassador at Vienna reached Colonel Dieu, by which he was informed that a telegraphic despatch had been sent to Baron Hess, directing him not to oppose any obstacle to the occupation of Ibraila and Galatz by the troops of the Ottoman army, but only to reserve to himself the right of eventually occupying those places by Austrian troops if necessary.

The French Ambassador adds, that the position of Austria becoming more threatening towards Russia, renders it improbable that the Russians will weaken their forces much towards Bessarabia, but at the same time that the presence of the Turkish forces near the Russian frontier cannot fail to add to their inquietude in that direction.

The above is the sense of the despatch, a copy of which will however be communicated by Colonel Dieu to Marshal St. Arnaud.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

P.S.—Copy sent to Lord Stratford.

J. L. A. S.

No. 314.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 132.)

Berlin, October 20, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, in original and in translation, a copy of the reply of the Prussian Government, dated the 13th instant, to the last communication addressed to them by the Austrian Cabinet of 30th ultimo, through Count Esterhazy.

With respect to the question of promising aid to Austria if attacked in the Principalities, this document gives no satisfactory assurance. It states that military measures may become necessary in the Principalities, in which the German interests are not involved, and that the Prussian Government does not consider that the consequences of these military measures come under Article II of the Treaty, for they cannot acknowledge the apprehension of any unprovoked attack against the Austrian territory to be well founded; nor do they consider the march of the Russian Guards into Poland as grounds to warrant any intention on the part of Russia of departing from the defensive attitude she has assumed. On this subject Baron Manteuffel merely adds, that His Majesty the King is aware of the duties imposed on him for the safety of Germany in the East.

Baron Manteuffel then enters into a long explanation with regard to the four points. He defends the policy of Prussia, which had been accused of inconsistency, on the ground of their having acted in a German as well as in a European point of view; and he further appears wholly to take his stand on the protection of German interests. He acknowledges that the two points relating to the Danube and the protectorate of the Principalities do refer to German interests, and he expresses a readiness, if Austria and her allies deem it desirable, to assent to an expression of this nature in a suitable form by the Diet.

He declares the determination of Prussia to adhere to the Treaty of April 20, and more especially to Article II; adding, that if any modification in that Treaty may be desired, he is ready to examine conscientiously any proposal which may be submitted to Prussia on this subject.

The Prussian Government finally reserve to themselves, with respect to the proposition which Austria has expressed her intention of submitting to the Diet, a further decision as to the course they may pursue.

There is, however, one part of Baron Manteuffel's reply to which I beg leave to direct your Lordship's attention.

In my despatch No. 90 of September 22, I reported to your Lordship that M. Von der Pfordten had stated that if the Treaty of 1841 required revision, the German interests might claim with much greater reason a revision of the Treaty of London of 1852, settling the Danish succession.

Baron Manteuffel clearly reverts to the same subject in the following paragraph:—

"His Majesty the King has on more occasions than one sought to vindicate for the German Confederation a higher and greater importance among the European States. These endeavours have been opposed more than once, and more lately have been foiled by the almost unanimous resistance of Europe, in a matter which affected the interests of Germany more closely than the present Oriental question."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 314.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

Berlin, October 13, 1854.

(Translation.)

ON the evening of the 4th instant Count Esterhazy made a very detailed communication to me on the part of the Austrian Cabinet. It consists of two despatches of Count Buol, of September 30, addressed to him, and of two

circulars of the 1st instant, conveying these despatches to the knowledge of the German Governments. I inclose to you copies of these documents, although you will have learnt the contents of the first named despatch, as it was already published in a Vienna journal on the 6th, a few hours after I was enabled to lay them before the King.

You will conceive that it was not that separate despatch alone, but the whole of the last Austrian communication, which claimed the consideration of His Majesty and of his Government.

We are obliged to acknowledge the frankness with which the Austrian Cabinet points out the minimum of the demands which, under present circumstances, and under a reservation of further proposals, it feels itself under the necessity of making to the German Governments. And as Austria puts the direct question to them, whether they will express themselves in the sense of these demands at the Diet, even if Prussia should not agree to a proposal of this nature, with reference to our former communications, which could leave no doubt as to the view we took, and being guided by the wish to avoid even the appearance of intending in any way to forestall the free decisions of our allies by fresh explanations of our views, we believed it more compatible with the dignity of the Diet, as well as with our own, and therefore more advisable, not to exercise any direct influence on these decisions, by means of communications from us. Even the unusually early publication of the above-mentioned despatch would not induce us to break this expective silence. But we considered it necessary to attach importance to the circumstance, that a great part of our German allies have not only addressed the question to us, but also expressed the confidential wish to be informed whether, and how, we were going to reply to the last Austrian communications, and what attitude we intended to assume in consequence.

In obedience to the order of His Majesty the King, I have the honour to address to you the following remarks, which you will bring to the knowledge of Count Buol by communicating to him a copy of this despatch, which we will likewise confidentially communicate to our other German allies.

It was the object of my despatch of the 21st ultimo to request of the Austrian Cabinet, in a political and military sense, some more particular explanations respecting the influence their occupation would exercise on the Principalities. We thought them necessary (and have been confirmed in this opinion by their receipt) for the purpose of judging how far we should be able to express ourselves at the Diet in the way proposed by Austria, and thus to recognise that all eventualities connected with the occupation of the Principalities by Austrian troops come under Article II of the Treaty of the 20th April and the Decree of the Diet of the 24th July.

We are far from attributing to the Austrian Cabinet any wish to disguise her relations with Turkey and her allies, but we wished to see clearly in what light she views them, what are the rights and duties imposed on her by her Treaty with the Porte, which was concluded without our concurrence or that of the Confederation, and what military agreements may have been made for the purpose of devolving on Austria alone the protection of the Principalities against the eventuality of a renewed entry of Russian troops, which has been removed for the present by the declarations of Russia. The astonishment which is conveyed in Count Buol's despatch, at our having considered it necessary to attach importance to this exclusive action of Austria, has surprised us. We were not aware that we require any particular permission to express a confidence that Austria, even if her interests in the Principalities are not always identic with those of Germany, will give effect to the interests of Germany, and in proportion to the amount of her influence. We cannot think of permitting this confidence to be shaken by the remark of Count Buol, as long as facts do not prove the contrary. On the other hand, we can no longer doubt that the question, whether and how the Principalities may again become the seat of war, depends on military measures, in the execution of which the protection of German interests might possibly not be thought of at all, and we therefore cannot consider their consequences as coming under Article II of the Treaty. This view is by no means at variance with our former declarations, as the Austrian despatch seems to have the intention of hinting. They, according to the spirit and the words of the Federal Laws, as well as of Article I of the Treaty, only referred to the case of an unprovoked attack against the Austrian territory. We cannot acknowledge the apprehension

of such an attack to be for the time well founded ; and when one of the Austrian circulars in this respect mentions the march of the Russian Guards to Poland, we submit the question to the impartial judgment even of those Powers who are at war with Russia, whether the circumstance of Russia's drawing her military forces to her frontiers in the face of hostile troops displayed partly on her territories, partly menacing it, affords grounds to assume an intention on her part of returning from the defensive attitude she had assumed to the offensive. Nevertheless we fully acknowledge the gravity of the present situation, and His Majesty the King is perfectly aware of the full extent of the duties which are imposed upon him by a solicitude in all eventualities for the safety of Germany in the East.

With regard to the four points which should be the bases of the future peace, the attitude assumed towards them by the Prussian Government has often been subjected to a perverted and unfavourable judgment. We have supported them in St. Petersburgh, although, as my circular of September 3rd says, we do not see from their general and vague character whether, and how far, they will be of any practical advantage to the German interests. We did so, because we nevertheless thought that we perceived in them the germ of future negotiations of peace for the durable repose of Europe. When Russia rejected these bases, perhaps more on formal than on material grounds, we declared to her, in spite of the irritation which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh displayed on our first supporting them, that we could but regret this rejection, as we did not look on the four points as the only possible basis of peace, but as containing such elements which sooner or later would again be brought forward.

We have communicated this confidentially to the Cabinets of London and Paris, and have expressed our readiness, if the other Powers wished it, to declare ourselves in this sense in a fresh Protocol of the Vienna Conference, but particularly added, that neither in this Act, nor in the signing of the former Protocols, could we recognise an obligation by contract of military co-operation against Russia. These are the declarations of the 6th ultimo, which are mentioned in the Austrian despatch in a manner as if they were at variance with our intended attitude in the Diet. We totally deny the imputation. The doubts which, in a German point of view, do not sufficiently appear to relieve, so as to recommend them to a binding acceptation of the Diet, and though Austria herself points out the elasticity of the separate Articles, still they cannot prevent us, in a European point of view, from giving them our moral support on every occasion, and under modalities which we may determine; and we attached greater importance to an attestation of our readiness to declare this in a formal manner, as the erroneous opinion, which can only be explained by an intentional misconception, that Prussia had prevented the meeting of the Vienna Conference, has found its way not only into the public prints, but also into the Cabinets. The European Powers have not unfrequently reproached us with our German point of view, in a manner as if we, by maintaining it, undermined the position of Prussia as a great European Power. We have intentionally avoided a discussion of this point. We are perfectly conscious of our rights and duties as a great European Power, and we will not, for the purpose of fulfilling them* . . . . . but rather maintain them in undiminished vigour against all encroachments. We have too high an idea of the mission of Germany, which is so closely united with the two great Powers, to perceive a diminution of our position in Europe in the fact that we look on the maintenance of the interests of Germany as one of our first duties in the present political complications.

As the Cabinet of Vienna separates the four points, and only recommends two for the acceptance of the German Governments, it acknowledges that the whole of the four points, as was expressed by the exchange of notes of the 8th August, are not required by those interests of which the Diet ought to consider itself the organ, and to express itself accordingly. That the free navigation of the Danube is a German interest, no German Government can deny, as little as that the former condition of the Protectorate of the Principalities could be replaced by a state of things more favourable to the German interests. To see this expressed in a suitable form by the Diet would, therefore, if Austria and our allies attach any importance thereto, only coincide with the views and intentions of Prussia.

* *Sie in wrig.* Probably omitted: "neglect our duties and rights as a German Power."

If, on the contrary, the confidential circular of Count Buol implies that the dignity of the Confederation demands that a decided attitude should now be assumed in the face of this European question, and that a binding declaration should be made, in order not to proclaim the total apathy and inactivity of the Central Organ, we can only concur with this opinion very conditionally. His Majesty the King has, on more occasions than one, sought to vindicate for the Germanic Confederation a greater importance among the European States. These endeavours have been opposed more than once, and more latterly have been foiled in a matter which affected the interests of Germany more closely than the present Oriental question in its original extent, by the nearly unanimous resistance of Europe. But also in the present European complications, His Majesty adheres to his opinion that an honourable and influential position is due to the Germanic Confederation. Just this was and is the idea which suggested to His Majesty the Treaty of the 20th April. But His Majesty believes it his duty to hesitate before he considers this position as maintained and improved, if the Diet pronounces, in consequence of facts which were carried out without its co-operation, and the effects of which it cannot fully foresee, a verdict in a binding manner, the practical value of which, for Germany, has not been sufficiently explained, either as regards the object to be attained or the means to be employed.

We believe that there is a tranquillity which is not a sign of weakness, but rather a pledge of unweakened strength, and we firmly trust that this strength, when called into vigour by a real danger of the rights and interests of the common fatherland, will be proved by unity and fidelity.

The above remarks will sufficiently show to the Austrian Cabinet how we judge of the position announced by its last communication. We most sincerely regret that we cannot conceal from ourselves that differences in the opinions on both sides have manifested themselves. But we believe that we are not mistaken (and the Austrian despatch itself seems to be of this opinion), if we assume that these differences have arisen, not so much out of a diverging explanation of the Treaty of the 20th of April itself, as out of the circumstance that Austria, without consulting us or the Confederation, has taken decisions and contracted obligations, the importance of which can be acknowledged for the Empire, although the same would not be the case with the other parties of the Treaty. This does not appear to us to be the way of turning the Treaty to good account, to meet eventualities which will present themselves in the course of events, and in a manner corresponding with the great object for which it was concluded. We, for our part, are resolved, in spite of the reproaches and insinuations which we prefer not to reply to, to adhere to the Treaty, and particularly to Article II.

Should the other party desire some modifications, we will conscientiously examine the proposals addressed to us on this subject, and in doing so will not lose sight of our own interests and those of Germany; as also will we consider the great importance which we attach not only to the safe position of Austria, but also to her close connection with the rest of Germany.

Whether Austria will now immediately make her proposals to the Diet alone, or whether such answers from our German allies as would correspond with our wishes, will afford matter and form for a common declaration of both Cabinets on this point, and with regard to the question which Austria has framed for the German Governments in so decided a tone, we consider ourselves obliged, for our own part, to abstain from any initiative step, and rather to reserve our further decision on future proposals of that tendency.

As I already remarked, you will communicate a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 315.

Memorandum on Protestant Interests in the Danubian Principalities.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Bernstorff, October* 23, 1854.)

LES rapports existants entre la Prusse et les communautés Protestantes dans les Principautés Danubiennes sont variés. La plupart des Protestants résidant dans ces pays étant de nationalité Allemande, il était naturel qu'ils cherchassent à se rapprocher de l'Eglise du pays qui, parmi les États Protestants de l'Allemagne, est le mieux en état de prêter aide et protection à ses coreligionnaires Allemands à l'étranger. C'est ainsi que la communauté Evangélique à Jassy s'est placée, il y a assez longtemps déjà, sous le patronage de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

A Belgrade c'est autour d'un ecclésiastique envoyé par le Gouvernement Prussien, que les Protestants y résidant se sont réunis en communauté.

A Galatz de même, il est principalement dû aux efforts de la Prusse qu'une communauté Evangélique se soit formée. Celle de Buchrest, qui était placée autrefois sous la protection de la Suède, a été mise depuis quelque temps sous le protectorat de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, mais souvent des voix se sont fait entendre qui désiraient la protection exclusive de la Prusse.

L'Eglise Evangélique jouit dans les Principautés Danubiennes d'une position assez favorable. Des conflits avec le clergé de l'Eglise dominante Grecque n'ont jamais eu lieu, ou très rarement du moins.

Les Gouvernements Princiers n'ont pas seulement mis aucune entrave au développement du Protestantisme, mais l'ont même favorisé, en accordant des secours d'argent pour des bâtisses, d'églises, &c.

Le protectorat Russe ne s'y opposait pas. Non pas que le Gouvernement Russe ait des sympathies pour l'Eglise Protestante, mais les Consuls et Agents Consulaires de Russie appartenaient en partie aux communautés Evangéliques, et eux, ainsi que les officiers Protestants de l'armée d'occupation Russe, favorisaient le Protestantisme.

Tandis que, par conséquent, ce dernier n'était gêné dans sa liberté de mouvements, ni par l'Eglise nationale, ni par les autorités séculières, ses rapports avec le Catholicisme ont été moins favorables. L'Eglise Catholique dans les Principautés Danubiennes, quoique se trouvant nominalement placée encore en partie sous protectorat Français, dépend cependant essentiellement de l'Autriche, et y a trouvé son principal appui.

Lors des différends que le clergé Catholique suscita, il y a quelques années, à la communauté Protestante à Buchrarest, le Gouvernement Autrichien a toujours favorisé d'une manière frappante le Catholicisme. De même, on cherchait de la part de l'Autriche à déconsidérer la communauté Evangélique. C'est ainsi que le second pasteur de l'Eglise Protestante à Buchurest, qui s'était rendu indigne de la confiance de la communauté, trouva un soutien énergique dans le Consulat-Général d'Autriche, tandisque le premier pasteur, qui jouissait à juste titre de la confiance de la communauté, fut continuellement exposé à des attaques de ce côté-là. Le Consulat-Général d'Autriche tâcha à différentes reprises d'ébranler les anciennes institutions de la communauté, et récemment encore le Gouvernement Prussien a été obligé de réclamer contre ses tentatives auprès du Cabinet de Vienne.

Il se peut que l'individualité du Consul-Général actuel d'Autriche soit en partie la cause de cet état de choses; néanmoins, le fait que le Gouvernement Autrichien continue de maintenir dans son poste un homme contre lequel des accusations fondées se sont élevées de toute part, jette un singulier jour sur ce Gouvernement. Quoiqu'il en soit, les expériences qu'on a faites, montrent le danger que courrait le Protestantisme dans les Principautés Danubiennes, si l'Autriche y acquérait une influence prépondérante.

No. 316.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 1,271.)

Paris, October 23, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a telegraphic despatch, dated the 12th instant, received by the French Government this morning from Bucharest, of which my telegraphic despatch to your Lordship of this day gave an extract.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 316.

The French Consul-General at Bucharest to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, October 12, 1854.

[See No. 317.]

No. 317.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 24, 12·15 P.M.)

(Télégraphique.)

Vienne, le 23 *Octobre*, 1854, 1 P.M.

LE BARON BOURQUENEY vient de recevoir la dépêche suivante du Consul de France à Bucharest:

"J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre copie d'une lettre d'un de nos officiers en date du 13 Octobre, devant Sébastopol:

"'La tranchée a été ouverte dans la nuit du 9, et l'on est maintenant à 700 mètres en moyenne de la place. On fait encore des travaux de terrassement, et quant aux feux il est probable qu'ils ne commenceront que le 15 pour les Anglais et pour nous; bien que quelques batteries Anglais soient établies, elles restent masquées et attendent les nôtres, que des relèvements des terres exigés par le Génie et que notre débarquement effectué après le leur, ont retardées de quelques jours. Les Russes tirent constamment sur les travaux sans effet; les alliés ne perdent pas plus de 4 à 5 hommes par jour. Les Russes ont tenté quelques sorties, mais dès qu'ils apercoivent un Zouave ou une carabine de chasseur, on peut juger s'ils ont du jarret.'"

No. 318.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 72.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 127 of the 20th instant, I have to instruct your Lordship to inform Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government have learned with regret, but unfortunately without surprise, that a fresh service has been rendered to Russia by the Prussian Government, authorizing the quotation of the Russian loan in the official Prussian "Gazette."

Her Majesty's Government have no intention of remonstrating upon this or any other proceedings of the Prussian Government, as they well know it would be useless; but Baron Manteuffel may rest assured that Her Majesty's Government are not unmindful now, nor will they be forgetful hereafter, of the policy pursued by Prussia in this great crisis of European affairs.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 319.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 337.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1854.*

I HEREWITH inclose to your Lordship, for your information, copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, forwarding the copy of a report made by Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan. Her Majesty's Government have read Colonel Simmons' letter with feelings of surprise and deep disappointment, as it can hardly be doubted that the inexcusable proceedings of the Austrian military authorities have been in accordance with the instructions of their Government.

Your Lordship will make known to Count Buol all the facts contained in this letter, without naming the quarter from which the information is derived; and you will more especially call his Excellency's attention to the maltreatment of the inhabitants by the Austrian officers, and the deplorable results that must be anticipated if such a state of things is any longer permitted to exist. It can surely neither be the policy nor the intention of the Austrian Government to cause the Russian occupation to be regretted by comparison with that of Austria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 320.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 339.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1854.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch† from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, inclosing copies of a correspondence between Prince Stirbey and Prince Gortchakoff, evincing the Russian tendencies of the former; and I have to instruct your Lordship to communicate these letters, confidentially, to Count Buol, and to say that it is not to be wondered at that the Wallachians of all classes should dislike again to find themselves under the rule of a man so devoted to the Emperor of Russia as Prince Stirbey avowed himself to be in June last year, when the Principality was about to be exposed to a fresh invasion, and when all the disasters of the previous occupation were still fresh in the memory of the people.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 321.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 341.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1854.*

HER Majesty's Government adopt with much satisfaction the proposal of Count Buol, communicated in your Lordship's despatch No. 393 of the 18th instant, that any further dispute which may arise between the Austrian civil or military authorities and those of the Porte, or between the former and the Agents of the Allied Powers, should be sent for settlement to Vienna; and they think, moreover, that the moment is happily chosen for such an arrangement, which will be a sequel to the instructions that Count Buol has lately addressed to the Austrian authorities, and will render more clear the character of the

* No. 298. † No. 285.

occupation, and the harmonious feeling that exists between the four Powers with respect to the Principalities.

Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bucharest will accordingly be instructed to refer to your Lordship all questions of differences that may arise in Wallachia, and your Lordship will then, in conjunction with the Baron de Bourqueney and the Turkish Ambassador, examine them with Count Buol, in the spirit that will tend to promote a united policy; and you will then transmit to Mr. Colquhoun the decisions resulting from such deliberations, with the exception of those cases that may demand reference to the respective Governments.

Her Majesty's Government gladly admit that this proposal indicates the absence of desire on the part of the Austrian Government to obtain exclusive preponderance in the Principalities, and they trust that it will put an end to a state of things which could no longer have continued without giving rise to serious discussions.

I conclude that the arrangement will extend to Moldavia, and Her Majesty's Consul-General at Jassy will receive instructions similar to those addressed to Mr. Colquhoun.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 322.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 356.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 21, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing a copy of a letter addressed to Prince Ghika by Dervish Pasha, inviting him on the same terms as the letter addressed to Prince Stirbey, and which has been communicated to me by the Turkish Ambassador, to whom it was transmitted for delivery.

I also inclose copies of two documents which have been submitted by Prince Stirbey and by Prince Ghika to Baron Bourqueney and to myself, and which contain explanations as to their proceedings in the government of their respective Provinces, and of the views they entertain for their future government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 322.

Dervish Pasha to Prince Ghika.

(Traduction.)

Altesse, *Bucharest, le 20 Mouharem, 1271.*

LE fait de l'invasion de l'armée Russe ayant dérangé le réglement établi dans les deux Principautés selon les priviléges accordés par la Sublime Porte, ces pays se trouvent actuellement, malgré qu'ils ont été évacués par la dite armée, dans un état irrégulier.

Or, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, animé de ses sentiments bien connues de justice, d'équité et de sollicitude pour tous ses sujets et vassaux, étant pénétré du désir de rétablir l'ordre dans ces pays et d'y ramener un état de tranquillité et de prospérité pour les habitants, il a été jugé nécessaire, pour atteindre ce but, d'y rétablir préalablement et tout de suite l'ancien régime; et cette mesure devant se compléter par le retour des Princes et la reprise de leur séjour dans leurs résidences, un Iradé Impérial m'autorise à inviter spécialement votre Altesse à revenir dans sa résidence et à y attendre la décision ultérieure de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Je prie donc votre Altesse de vouloir bien hâter son départ de Vienne dès qu'elle aura pris connaissance de l'ordre de mon auguste Souverain, pour se rendre à sa résidence de Jassy.

(Signé) MEHEMED DERVISCH,
Commissaire de la Sublime Porte.

Inclosure 2 in No. 322.

Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.

Le 8 Septembre, 1854.

J'AI dû me retirer devant l'invasion Russe, qui avait rendu impossible l'exercice de l'autorité légitime. Votre Altesse a bien voulu m'écrire à la suite, en date du 9 Novembre, 1853, une dépêche dont je prends la liberté de reproduire les passages suivants :

"Notre auguste Souverain, ayant pris connaissance de votre résolution de quitter provisoirement la Principauté de Valachie, a daigné me charger de vous transmettre l'expression de sa haute satisfaction pour la nouvelle marque de fidélité que vous lui donnez dans cette circonstance.

"Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale est d'autant plus content de cette conduite de votre Altesse que vous venez de devancer, mon Prince, les nouvelles instructions qui vous ont été envoyées dans ce sens par la Sublime Porte, en date du $\frac{1}{13}$ Octobre."

Quant à ma conduite pendant les quatre années de mon administration, ce n'est point à moi de retracer tout ce que j'ai pu faire pour mon pays, ni d'exposer les efforts et l'abnégation que je n'ai cessé de vouer à son bien-être, pour me conformer en tous points aux augustes prescriptions et à la haute sollicitude de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Je me bornerai à dire que la situation critique dans laquelle se trouvait la Valachie en 1849, est assez connue. Bouleversée par le mouvement communiste, soumise ensuite à une occupation militaire prolongée, la Principauté était complétement épuisée et profondément démoralisée.

Les finances ruinées, et surchargées du fardeau d'une dette considérable, étaient appelées à faire face aux besoins pressants du service, en même temps qu'aux exigences d'une occupation étrangère.

Tous les services sans exception se trouvaient entièrement désorganisés, les écoles fermées depuis plusieurs années, la milice en état de dissolution, et ce qui est pire encore, le peu qui en restait complétement démoralisé.

C'est sous de tels auspices que je fus appelé au Hospodarat en Juin 1849; et votre Altesse connait mieux que personne les difficultés inhérentes à ma position, et les conditions qui m'étaient faites.

Je suis parvenu, Altesse, à réorganiser la milice, à former un corps de gendarmerie et un corps de gardes-frontières, à rétablir sur des bases solides la sûreté intérieure du pays, et à hâter le terme d'une occupation qui l'énervait et l'épuisait, et qui en se prolongeant serait devenue la source de nouvelles complications politiques. La tranquillité publique fut en effet maintenue, prit tous les jours plus de consistance, et resta inébranlable, en dépit de toutes les tentatives qu'on fit pu faire pour la troubler.

Toutes les branches du service furent réorganisées et prirent un essor, j'ose dire, inconnu jusqu'alors.

Les finances furent restaurées, les budgets équilibrés, l'exercice de 1852 ayant même été clos par un excédant de recettes; et la dette de la Vestiarie, qui à la fin de 1849 était de piastres 19,066,040, se trouvait réduite à la fin de 1852 à piastres 6,760,047, dont seulement 1,071,000 portant intérêt.

La caisse centrale, celle des hôpitaux, celle des écoles et celle des ponts et chaussées, après avoir satisfait à tous les besoins par des budgets spéciaux, avait chacune au commencement de 1853 un fonds de réserve considérable.

Ces résultats ont été obtenus, tout en complétant l'organisation des divers services, en y apportant successivement les améliorations requises, et sans imposer au pays aucune charge ni contribution nouvelle.

M'étant trouvé dans des circonstances difficiles et critiques, je n'ai eu

recours à aucune mésure de rigueur, personne n'a été distrait de ses juges naturels, et la légalité la plus stricte a été observée envers le plus infime. Toutes les classes d'habitants avaient repris courage et confiance, et chacun content de sa situation ne demandait qu'à jouir du repos qui lui était assuré et des bienfaits de l'ordre légal. Un fait hors de toute contestation, c'est l'aisance dont tout villageois commençait à jouir, libéré de toute dette et de tout arrière de quelque nature que ce soit. Et les caisses rurales, qui avaient été vidées au milieu des troubles de 1848, contenaient à la fin de 1852, après vérification faite, plus de 3,000,000 de piastres.

La Sublime Porte connaît tous les actes de mon administration, et a daigné les apprécier, comme en font foi les témoignages nombreux de satisfaction qu'elle a bien voulu me donner dans les termes les plus explicites et dont je suis possesseur. Quant au pays, si l'on juge à propos de l'appeler à se prononcer, est-ce bien dans une pétition revêtue de quelques signatures de Boyars, qu'on a quêtées et réunies par de moyens honteux, qu'on prétendra trouver l'expression de son opinion? Mais cette opinion a déjà été exprimée d'une manière non-équivoque par l'organe légal de ses véritables représentants, comme en fait foi l'adresse ci-jointe, que l'Assemblée du Divan Général, appelée à examiner et contrôler les comptes des diverses branches de l'administration, m'a présentée pas plus tard que l'année passée, à la suite d'une délibération adoptée à l'unanimité séance tenante, et qu'on ne peut en conséquence soupçonner d'avoir été influencée.

L'invasion a cessé, Altesse, et les troupes victorieuses de notre gracieux Maître ont occupé la Valachie. Un Commissaire Impérial chargé de réaliser les vues de sa paternelle sollicitude est arrivé à Bucarest; et pourtant, l'administration du pays continue à rester entre les mains d'hommes installés par les autorités Russes, d'hommes qui ont rendu tous les services en leur pouvoir aux ennemis de l'Empire, d'hommes enfin qui ont sollicité et obtenu des rangs et des titres nationaux de ces mêmes ennemis de la Porte et de leur pays, et qui profitent du pouvoir illégal qu'on leur permet de continuer, pour satisfaire leur ambition personnelle et leurs passions haineuses, en remuant et agitant profondément un pays qui a tant souffert, et qui n'aspire qu'après le repos. Et moi, qui suis resté fidèle à mes devoirs et à mon Suzerain, qui me suis conformé en toutes occasions à son auguste volonté, et qui depuis un an me nourris du pain amer de l'étranger, quelle est la justice qui m'est rendue? C'est seulement par le bruit public que j'apprends, avec une douloureuse surprise, qu'il serait question de procéder à une enquête sur ma conduite, ou plutôt, car il faut poser la question dans ses véritables termes, de me mettre en état d'accusation. Non! un pareil renversement des principes les plus sacrés est impossible! On a trompé par un indigne surprise la religion de la Sublime Porte, pour arriver par des moyens détournés à satisfaire des passions personnelles, et à sacrifier les intérêts les plus précieux de la Porte, ainsi que la tranquillité de la Principauté. Car votre Altesse ne peut manquer de reconnaître dans sa haute sagesse que ce serait le renversement du principe de restauration, et la consécration des usurpations de la puissance envahissante. Ce serait le bouleversement mis en place de la conservation, et le découragement des habitants fidèles et dévoués à la Sublime Porte.

Quel pourrait être, Altesse, dans le cas présent, l'objet d'une enquête, tandis que mes ennemis se trouvent en possession du Gouvernement à la tête duquel ils ont été placés par la volonté de la Russie? Je n'y vois qu'un but, le besoin de ma condamnation, n'importe par quels moyens. Mais la Sublime Porte ne saurait autoriser de pareils moyens!

Altesse! pendant toute mon administration est-il un seul de mes actes, ai-je pris aucune mesure que je n'aie portée à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte, et qui n'ait obtenu son approbation? De quoi s'agit-il donc maintenant et tout à coup? Est-ce une poignée de Boyars dégénérés, ne vivant que d'intrigues et d'abus, ennemis irréconciliables de tout Gouvernement réparateur, qui constitue le pays? Voudrait-on faire passer leurs clameurs, qui n'ont d'écho que parmi eux, pour une manifestation générale? J'en appelle au besoin aux habitants des communes, aux corps des commerçants, aux corporations de la bourgeoisie, enfin au clergé.

La Sublime Porte connaît tous mes actes, Altesse! C'est à sa haute justice seule que je dois, le cas échéant, me soumettre avec confiance. Je ne puis que protester aux pieds du Trône de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan contre

toute autre mesure exceptionnelle ou détournée qui serait prise à l'égard de ma personne.

Je viens prier votre Altesse de vouloir bien déposer aux pieds de Sa Majesté l'exposé respectueux que je soumets à sa haute équité. Elle ne permettra pas sans doute dans sa magnanimité que l'autorité légitime, dont j'ai l'honneur d'être le délégué, soit avilié dans ma personne, tandis que j'ai été constamment honoré des témoignages de sa haute satisfaction.

Veuillez, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 322.

Address presented to Prince Stirbey by the General Divan.

Altesse Sérénissime,

LE Divan Général, à la suite de l'examen des comptes de la Vistiairie pour l'exercice de 1852, de ceux de la caisse spéciale d'amortissement, et des renseignements fournis par le Chef du Département des Finances, a eu occasion de constater avec une vive satisfaction les sages et intelligentes mesures qui ont été prises par votre Altesse Sérénissime dans l'intérêt de l'Etat.

Il en résulte qu'après avoir couvert toutes les dépenses du budget, avoir fait face à toutes celles occasionnées par les améliorations notables qui ont été effectuées, et avoir régulièrement servi les intérêts onéreux de la dette publique, il reste à la fin de l'exercice 1852 un excédant des recettes de piastres 566,465 ; et que la dette réglée en 1850 au chiffre de piastres 19,066,040, a été réduite dans un si court espace de temps à la somme de piastres 6,760,047.

Prince! l'état dans lequel se trouvaient les finances à votre avènement, les circonstances graves contre lesquelles vous avez eu sans cesse à lutter, sans même avoir fait usage des voies et moyens extraordinaires que le Divan Général avait, par son rapport de 1851 No. 347, mis à la disposition de votre Gouvernement, sont autant des preuves éclatantes de la sollicitude paternelle et des efforts persévérants que vous avez consacrés au bien-être de la Principauté, dont toutes les classes d'habitants vous doivent aujourd'hui l'allégement des charges qui pesaient sur elles.

C'est pourquoi l'Assemblée du Divan Général, organe du pays, vient avec respect et sincérité offrir à votre Altesse Sérénissime l'hommage de sa profonde reconnaissance pour les bienfaits que vous doit la Principauté, et entre autres pour la régularité parfaite observée dans la terme de la comptabilité de toutes les caisses publiques.

Prince! l'Assemblée du Divan Général est convaincue que si, dans un si court espace de temps, vous êtes parvenu par vos sages mesures à obtenir des résultats si éminemment heureux, de même à l'avenir vous n'épargnerez ni efforts ni sacrifices pour libérer le pays du montant de sa dette. Ce nouveau bienfait sera gravé dans nos cœurs en caractères ineffaçables, et sera transmis avec reconnaissance à notre postérité.

A cette occasion l'Assemblée du Divan Général croit devoir exprimer des remercîments au Chef du Département des Finances, pour le zèle dont il a fait preuve sous la haute direction de votre Altesse Sérénissime.

(Suivent les signatures de tous les membres de l'Assemblée.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 322.

Memorandum by Prince Ghika as to future Government of Moldavia.

LA Moldavie, féconde en ressources vierges mais variées en tout genre, possédant un sol riche et fertile, des débouchés assurés pour le commerce d'exportation, et avantageusement située pour celui d'importation, est restée néanmoins en arrière des progrès qui ont imprimé une impulsion immense à l'industrie Européenne.

Sur une superficie d'environ 1,750 lieues carrées, la Moldavie n'est habitée que par une population qui ne s'élève pas à un million et demi ; son agriculture,

bien que vivifiée par le développement du commerce, n'est point sortie de ses antiques ornières et ne compte aucune amélioration en aucun genre ; l'industrie proprement dite y est nulle ; les grandes entreprises que les associations seules des capitaux rendent possibles et dont les résultats sont souvent gigantesques, y sont inconnues ; les voies de communication, ce prélude indispensable de tout progrès industriel, n'offrent aucun de ces perfectionnements qui facilitent l'écoulement des produits et animent le travail ; des cours d'eau, artères naturelles du commerce, semblent attendre qu'on en tire l'usage auxquels ils sont destinés, comme les richesses cachées sous le sol attendent leur tardive exploitation ; le crédit n'y joue aucun rôle et l'intérêt de l'argent y est à 12, à 18, et à 24 pour cent.

A quoi tient cet état stationnaire qu'a laissé la Moldavie bien loin de la distance incommensurable franchie par tous les Etats de l'Europe? Il n'entre pas dans le sujet de ce mémoire d'examiner les conditions politiques qui ont pu y contribuer ; à ne rechercher que les causes locales, elles se résument dans ces deux mots, défaut "d'avenir" et de "stabilité."

Les grandes entreprises ne surgissent qu'à la condition d'être garanties par un avenir sûr et certain ; les progrès sont enchaînés l'un à l'autre ; ils doivent marcher de conserve protégés par des institutions spéciales qui leur frayent la voie.

Il faut avant tout à la Moldavie un Gouvernement fort pour faire respecter les lois, et stable, pour être maître de l'avenir. S'il peut avec cela disposer de ressources suffisantes pour prendre l'initiative des reformes et ne pas être gêné dans sa marche, les principales conditions du progrès seront accomplies.

Du Système Représentatif.—Le régime sous lequel se trouve le pays a été établi par le Réglement Organique et modifié en ce que touche le système représentatif par le Traité de Balta-Liman.

L'assemblée élective succédant à l'antique droit dévolu aux principaux Boyars de participer aux mesures d'intérêt général, a dans une série de dix-sept ans de 1832 à 1849, mis en évidence les défectuosités essentielles de son organisme. Instituée pour servir de contrôle au pouvoir et de contrepoids à l'autorité si elle se laissait aller à l'arbitraire, elle ne prit conseil que des intérêts personnels de ses membres. Dès lors, pour éviter de trouver dans son sein une opposition compacte et puissante, le Gouvernement a mis tous ses efforts pour influencer les élections et faire tomber le choix sur des individus dociles pris dans des conditions subalternes. L'assemblée devint ainsi l'organe du pouvoir et ne fit que sanctionner ses volontés. Un publiciste Français qui a visité les Principautés avait apprécié judicieusement cet état des choses, en avançant que l'assemblée dans ces pays était ou servile ou séditieuse. Le fait est que chaque réunion de colléges électoraux devenait pour les turbulents une occasion de se signaler et pour le Gouvernement une source d'embarras.

Le Divan *ad hoc* institué comme un régime transitoire par le Traité de Balta-Liman, et composé des membres du Conseil Administratif et des Cours de Justice, ne constitue pas une représentation sérieuse. Consistant en une réunion de fonctionnaires amovibles, il n'offre aucune garantie de contrôle, si ce n'est celle qui émanerait de la bonne volonté du Gouvernement. Le Divan *ad hoc* est en lui-même un contre-sens, puisque, par sa composition, il érige en juges et contrôleurs de leurs propres actes les fonctionnaires appelés à rendre compte de la manutention des déniers publics.

Cependant le régime représentatif, de même que le principe électif, malgré ses défectuosités, font désormais partie intégrante de la machine gouvernementale, ils se sont implantés dans les mœurs et se trouvent étroitement liés avec le progrès des institutions. Le pouvoir législatif et le suprême contrôle du maniement des déniers publics, sont des attributions qui reviennent essentiellement à une assemblée représentative. Mais quelles seront les conditions de son organisation ? Il serait hardi de prétendre indiquer dans le cours de ce mémoire, le moyen d'éviter les écueils sur lesquels le régime représentatif est venu échouer jusqu'ici, ou spécifier les conditions auxquelles une nouvelle organisation aurait des chances assurés de succès ; un pareil résultat ne peut être obtenu qu'après de longues méditations et un mûr examen des précédents et des conditions locales. Il serait possible cependant de planter sur la voie qui y conduirait quelques jalons propres à en faciliter le trajet.

La principale qualité requise par le Réglement pour les fonctions d'électeur, aussi bien que pour celles de Député à l'Assemblée Générale, était celle de

Boyar ou de fils de Boyar—condition absurde qui n'impliquait ni la capacité ni une garantie sociale telle que la propriété, et qui offrait au Gouvernement la faculté de prodiguer des rangs pour s'assurer la majorité des électeurs.

Le système électif pourrait être mitigé par l'élection dans chaque district de deux candidats parmi lesquels le Gouvernement en confirmerait un; la capitale en fournirait de la même manière huit sur un nombre double. L'aptitude aux fonctions d'électeur et d'éligible aurait pour base la propriété territoriale à différents degrés. Le Président de l'Assemblée serait désigné par le Prince. Des instructions spéciales régleraient les attributions de ce corps et la tenue de ses séances.

De la Partie Financière.—La partie financière est sans contredit celle qui doit particulièrement attirer l'attention, puisqu'elle est le pivot sur lequel repose toute amélioration.

Le revenu public s'élève actuellement de 11,000,000 à 12,000,000 de piastres, ou environ 4,000,000 de francs; mais le développement des institutions et les besoins du service ayant marché progressivement, ce modique revenu est non seulement insuffisant à assurer la perspective d'un progrès quelconque, mais il est en disproportion même avec les exigences actuelles. De plus, le système d'imposition est en tout point irrationnel et défectueux. Il repose principalement sur une capitation payée par la partie pauvre et laborieuse de la population qui ne possède pas de bien fonds, tandis que les classes aisées, qui profitent plus particulièrement des avantages d'une bonne administration, sont exemptes de toute contribution. En outre le chiffre des recettes est complété par quelques revenus indirects dont la fluctuation sur un budget resserré dans des limites aussi étroites, est une cause permanente de gêne et de perturbation pour les finances.

Le système financier est donc à refaire sur des bases plus équitables et plus larges. Mais ici encore on ne saurait qu'indiquer superficiellement les éléments d'une reforme, vu qu'aucune des améliorations consignées dans cet aperçu rapide ne pourrait être projetée avant d'avoir été soigneusement élaborée.

Comme base principale d'un système d'imposition rationnel se présente nécessairement l'impôt foncier, qui pourrait être calqué ou sur le revenu ou sur l'étendue du terrain. Si l'on considère que toutes les reformes, dont le besoin se fait sentir, se rattachent à un but commun, qui est le progrès dans toutes les branches de l'économie sociale, le sacrifice imposé aux propriétaires serait compensé et au-delà par l'accroissement infaillible de leur revenu. En revanche, la partie nécessiteuse de la population serait allégée d'une charge qui lui devient souvent fort sensible. Les contribuables proprement dits, pourraient être taxés en proportion du terrain dont ils ne sont que les usufruitiers. De cette manière les villageois cultivateurs et les Mazîles dégrévés de la plus grande partie de leurs redevances actuelles et affranchis des obligations qui leur font perdre un temps précieux, ne seraient tenus qu'au service de la milice ainsi qu'il en sera parlé ci-après.

De la Force Armée.—La force armée destinée à protéger le pays, et la gendarmerie qui fait le service administratif, et celui de la police, sont également insuffisantes. Il est indispensable d'augmenter celle-ci et d'organiser la milice, de manière à pouvoir compter, dans le besoin, sur une force relativement plus imposante. En bornant le service actif à deux ans et en appelant successivement sous les drapeaux les Rézèches et les Mazîles pour la cavalerie et les simples villageois pour les autres armes, on étendrait graduellement la discipline militaire sur tout le pays et l'on aurait dans un temps donné en disponibilité une milice aussi nombreuse que le permettront les limites de la population valide.

De la Législation.—La législation dans toutes ses ramifications n'est plus depuis longtemps en rapport avec les progrès effectués et les besoins de l'époque actuelle.

Le code pénal est tout-à-fait vicieux et incomplet, et les différentes procédures sont dépourvues de codes spéciaux. Une commission instituée pour s'occuper de la reforme de la législation, ayant déjà achevé la première partie du code civil, qui a été adoptée par le Divan *ad hoc*, avait commencé à élaborer le code pénal et les procédures civile et criminelle.

L'application de la législation reformée nécessitera infailliblement un remaniement de la branche judiciaire régulier. De plus la hiérarchie des Instances laisse beaucoup à désirer, vu la complication de ses rouages et peut-être aussi la surabondance des degrés de juridiction qui assujettit les plaideurs à des frais et à une perte de temps inutiles. La Dernière Instance, qui est le Divan princier, devrait être convertie en Cour de Révision ou de Cassation pour toute espèce de cause suivant des règles qui seraient établies; une pareille modification réunirait à l'avantage de diminuer le nombre des instances à parcourir, celui plus grand encore de rendre les tribunaux indépendants de l'influence aussi irrationnelle qu'impolitique du département de la justice et du Hospodar, et de mettre ce dernier à l'abri des obsessions des plaideurs et des plaintes qui rejaillissent le plus souvent sans raison sur sa personne; puisqu'il est dans l'obligation de recevoir des requêtes sur les affaires judiciaires et de confirmer les jugements. Mais cette matière délicate doit faire l'objet d'un exposé spécial afin d'être convenablement approfondie dans ses détails; d'ailleurs la commission qui depuis plusieurs années s'occupe de l'élaboration des codes, pourrait être avantageusement consultée à cet égard, afin qu'un remaniement éventuel de la branche judiciaire soit concordant avec les principes qu'elle a été dans le cas de poser.

De l'Instruction Publique.—L'instruction publique, qui est l'éducation de la jeunesse, doit être mieux dirigée dans un but utile pour les élèves et avantageux pour le pays. Il ne suffit pas aux classes nécessiteuses que leurs enfants quittent les écoles plus ou moins éclairés sur quelques sciences, si le temps précieux qu'ils ont employé aux études ne leur a pas procuré le moyen de pourvoir à leur subsistance. L'enseignement dirigé en partie vers les études spéciales, servira non seulement à utiliser le savoir de l'élève, mais à implanter dans le pays le goût des théories industrielles et des principes qui président aux progrès et à la richesse des nations—principes qui jouent aujourd'hui un si grand rôle dans l'économie sociale des Etats civilisés et qui sont totalement ignorés dans le pays.

Des voies de Communication.—Pour qui connaît la difficulté et le prix élevé des transports en Moldavie, les entraves qui en résultent pour les communications commerciales, l'impossibilité où l'on se trouve souvent d'expédier un produit à six lieues de distance sans que les frais de transport en couvrent le prix, il n'est pas douteux que l'établissement d'une voie de communication économique et accélérée ne soit un des premiers besoins publics, ou plutôt un de ces bienfaits destinés à changer comme par enchantement la face du pays. Une ligne de chemin de fer qui des frontières de la Bukovine aboutirait à Galatz, avec embranchement aux salines, assurerait un débouché à la grande voie commerciale d'Allemagne avec le Levant et imprimerait à l'intérieur une impulsion incalculable à la production et à l'emploi des capitaux. D'ailleurs les conditions du sol qui n'exige presqu'aucun travail dispendieux, sont les plus favorables qu'on puisse rencontrer pour l'érection d'une voie ferrée, sans compter que des articles ailleurs très couteux n'exigeront en Moldavie presque aucun déboursé, l'expropriation du terrain y a lieu sans aucun frais, le bois pourra être fourni gratis par les forêts des biens conventuels, et la main d'œuvre nécessitera relativement une dépense minime.

D'une Institution de Crédit.—Sous les conditions dont cet aperçu rapide n'a pu donner qu'une faible idée, il ne paraîtra pas surprenant qu'il n'existe presque pas de fortune qui ne soit grevée de dettes dont l'acquittement, par suite du taux élevé des intérêts, devient souvent impossible sans la ruine totale du débiteur. Cette situation désastreuse est encore aggravée par une disposition législative qui défend aux étrangers d'acquérir des propriétés territoriales en Moldavie, en sorte que la concurrence de la demande est toujours excessivement restreinte et parfois nulle. Aussi la plus grande partie des propriétaires appelent-ils aujourd'hui de tous leurs vœux la reforme de cette disposition restrictive; sa révocation serait donc un précieux avantage pour le pays. Dans cet état de choses une institution de crédit entourée de garanties convenables, sera la planche de salut des fortunes privées en même temps qu'elle enrichira le pays par la circulation des valeurs jusqu'ici improductives et facilitera les entreprises de tout genre.

Du Réglement Organique.—Le Réglement Organique, qui est la base du régime intérieur de la Moldavie appliqué en 1832, a subi depuis des modifications d'autant plus radicales et nombreuses qu'il avait compris dans son texte des dispositions de détails essentiellement variables. Sans s'arrêter sur ces dernières il suffit de mentionner que le 1er chapitre, concernant l'élection du Hospodar, n'a jamais été appliqué, du moins en Moldavie, et se trouve abrogé par le fait; le 2e chapitre, relatif à l'assemblée général, n'est plus en vigueur depuis le Traité de Balta-Liman. L'ordre judiciaire, qui est l'objet du 8e chapitre, à été remanié à plusieurs reprises, laissant en desuétude la plus grande partie des prescriptions réglementaires. Si les améliorations proposées dans le présent aperçu viennent à être appliquées, elles acheveront de modifier la teneur originelle du Réglement dans ses dispositions fondamentales et de nécessiter absolument une opération de refonte de la Loi Organique adaptée aux nouvelles conditions du régime administratif de la Principauté.

On ne s'est pas sans doute proposé d'énumérer ici les reformes ou les progrès dont la Moldavie est susceptible, et moins encore d'approfondir les sujets qui ont été esquissés et dont chacun requiert une étude particulière; mais on croit être dans le vrai en avançant que les améliorations pré-exposées forment la base indispensable de tout progrès ultérieur et résument les besoins qui doivent être satisfaits d'urgence. Dans le cas donné où elles mériteraient l'approbation supérieure et quelles dussent être mises en application, il serait de rigueur que le Gouvernement Moldave procédât par confier l'élaboration des projets qui y ont rapport à des Commissions composées de gens spéciaux pour chaque matière. Ces projets, après avoir été revêtus de l'assentiment de la représentation législative, seraient en définitive soumis à la haute sanction de la Sublime Porte.

No. 323.

Sir John Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 25.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Munich, October* 20, 1854.

THE recent communications which have been interchanged between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, on the eventualities which may arise out of the Eastern question, and especially the attitude assumed by the former in the despatches addressed to the Imperial Representative at the Court of Prussia on the 30th ultimo, which have been communicated to this and the other small Courts of Germany, seem at length to have fully opened the eyes of all to the imminent danger of the position they have been at so much pains to create for themselves, and to have dissipated the illusions under which they have so long laboured, in spite of all the warnings they have received. It has at last become evident to them that the policy they have heretofore pursued is no longer tenable; and they see with the utmost alarm, that unless something like a community of views can be re-established between the two Great German Powers, they must inevitably ere long be called upon to decide on which side they will range themselves. The alternative involves considerations of the deepest importance to them, both in a political and commercial point of view, since from the moment it is seriously put to them, the worn-out fabric of the Germanic Confederation, which has been undermined by the events of the last few years, is virtually destroyed; and the Zollverein will have received a blow which cannot fail to shake it to its very foundations.

To these two institutions most of the minor States are perfectly aware that they have, in latter times, principally owed their individual safety, as well as their prosperity; and it can therefore be by no means matter for wonder, if they perceive with dismay the rapid approach of a state of affairs which must peril their existence. Perhaps the only exception to this appreciation of their position is to be found in this country; for, I understand that M. Von der Pfordten, who, four years ago, was a most ardent advocate for giving a more extended sphere of action to the organ of the Confederation at Frankfort, now declares that it fetters the Bavarian Government in many ways; and maintains that the extent and importance of Bavaria quite

enables her to keep her position without any extraneous aid: giving it to be understood that, in point of fact, Bavaria would have but little to apprehend from the dissolution of the Confederation. However, notwithstanding this language, he is not less alarmed at the present aspect of events than the statesmen of the other small States of Germany, as your Lordship will readily comprehend, when I state that he has so far surmounted his disapproval of the policy of Austria, and so far conquered his Russian sympathies, or fears, as to have induced his Sovereign to address to the King of Prussia strong representations on the danger to which Germany is exposed by the increasing disunion between the two Great Powers, to which he urges His Prussian Majesty to put an end, by at once giving his cordial and hearty support to the measures which the Austrian Cabinet may think proper to adopt for the common interest. This advice, with the precise terms of which I am not acquainted, M. Von der Pfordten informed my Austrian colleague it was his intention to back up in the most earnest manner in his instructions to the Bavarian Minister at Berlin, where, by this time, I imagine they must have arrived. Had they been written some months, or even weeks, earlier, they might perhaps have produced some effect; but coming at a moment when, according to all accounts, the decision of the Prussian Cabinet is already taken, in a sense which is the very reverse of what is desired, I can scarcely hope that the tardy efforts made to heal the breach will be attended with much success.

This sudden change of views might, under other circumstances, have raised suspicions as to the sincerity of so prompt a conversion, but your Lordship will probably agree with me in considering that the sentiment of a common danger impending over the minor States, by which all their rulers are tormented at the present moment constitutes a sufficient guarantee for the honesty of their endeavours to bring about a reconciliation between the two Great Federal Powers.

Since writing the above, I have learnt that, in the hope of giving greater weight to his representations, M. Von der Pfordten has himself proceeded to Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 324.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 26, 9 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October* 25, 1854.

YOUR Lordship will have received from Berlin, direct from Warsaw, the news that the bombardment of Sebastopol, both by sea and land, had begun on the 17th, and been continued on the 18th. The loss of the Russians is said to have amounted to 500 in killed and wounded. Amongst the former was Admiral Korniloff. On the 18th the bombardment was continued from the land batteries only.

No. 325.

Colonel Hodges to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 26.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Hamburgh, October* 21, 1854.

THE progress of the allied armies in the Crimea is watched with the greatest anxiety by all classes in this town and neighbourhood, and the best wishes are expressed for their success before Sebastopol. But, coupled with this sympathy, the strongest indignation is felt against the Prussian Government for the policy they have hitherto pursued in the Eastern question. Indeed, I should be unwilling to repeat the very severe remarks that I hear on all sides against that Government at the present time. And these censures are not limited to private circles, but they are openly and loudly spoken in clubs, reading rooms, and

places of public resort. It was no later than the day before yesterday, that I heard a conversation, in which the forbearance of England and France, in enduring the wavering and pusillanimous conduct of Prussia, was commented upon with great severity, and it was said, What have they, England and France, to dread from Prussia when they have the great mass of the German people with them? we know well that, at the last moment, the Prussian Government must follow Austria; for they dare not gratify their own selfish feelings by a coalition with Russia. These observations were not made by men under the influence of passion and prejudice, but by sober-minded reflecting Germans, who have much to lose by war, and whose material interests must render them averse to it. In fact, amongst those best acquainted with the motives and system of the present rulers in Prussia, the general opinion is, that she will join Austria in the end, but not until every art of intrigue and persuasion has been tried in vain to induce that country to refrain from taking an active part against Russia.

It does, indeed, appear to me, that if Austria, or any other German Government, should at once commence active hostilities against Russia, the feeling of satisfaction in favour of such a step would be general throughout Germany, and such a Government might, if she required them, count on multitudes of the bravest volunteers flocking to her standard, confident of success; for the German people are well agreed that the alliance with England and France is to be relied upon. The present anti-Russian feeling in Germany, I consider not the result of momentary excitement in the masses, but, founded on reflection, that it has originated with the leading intelligence of the country, and extended gradually downwards to the great body of the people; it will, therefore, in all probability, prove of a permanent and unflagging nature.

Connected with the preceding remarks is an article in the "National Zeitung," of Berlin, a liberal journal, with a large circulation; which appears to be again opposed to the policy of the Prussian Government, although lately it had, during a short time, endeavoured to encourage distrust of Austria. This article, which I inclose in original, has excited some attention; it declares to Germans, what I have before stated to your Lordship as my conviction, that the policy and inclinations of many of the German Governments in regard to the Oriental question, are in direct opposition to the feelings and sympathies of their people; and as it contains some striking observations on that point, it may be of some interest to your Lordship, and especially as they relate to a despatch, lately published of M. de Beust, in reply to a despatch of your Lordship, to the Saxon Government relating to the Bamberg Conferences.

The article is headed, "The Note to Saxony of the 9th July," and says: The publication of diplomatic documents, which, in the course of the complication of Oriental affairs, has become absolutely necessary, is a complete acknowledgment that foreign policy, the questions of peace and war, and as to the position and relations of the State in regard to foreign countries, can no longer be withheld from the immediate participation of the public.

By the publication of diplomatic documents the wide difference between the views of the Government and those of the people are very often shown, to whom their contents, when they become known, often appear as incomprehensible as if they had come from another world, or been drawn up in an unknown language.

But such publications, and the discussions and opinions that they lead to, may be a means of bringing Government and people into a better understanding of each other, by showing them how widely they differ, and in what they differ, and how disadvantageous for both are, the want of a mutual understanding and the disharmony caused by each party taking directly opposite ways, in positions and at times when a co-operation of all their strength is imperatively required.

Such reflections are suggested by diplomatic documents, that were formerly only communicated to Cabinets, being published and communicated during the last year and a half to the people; and this is especially the case with regard to the observations of M. de Beust, addressed to the Saxon Minister in London, in reply to the despatch of Lord Clarendon on the Bamberg Conferences.

The Saxon Minister is considered as the zealous advocate of the claims of Russia to the thanks of Germany, and as the representative of the opinion that Germany, in the Oriental question, must stand at the side of holy Russia from

Christian motives; because Russia in her progress in the Orient was promoting Christianity, and advancing the cause of humanity.

The writer of the article in question further says: In the despatch of 9th July, M. de Beust declares the accusation against Russia, of having at all times sowed dissensions in Germany, as unjustifiable, 'when he considers in what manner Russia occupied herself with Germany and her affairs during the years in which internal complications menaced the unity and tranquillity of Germany when all the efforts of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh were directed to arrange the differences between the two German Great Powers."

The German nation, says the writer, in reply to the remark quoted, considers it as inadmissible as it is intolerable, that the Petersburgh Cabinet, whose 60,000,000 of subjects, 40,000,000 of whom are serfs, give it enough to do, should occupy itself everywhere, and on all sides, with German affairs.

The "efforts" of the St. Petersburgh Cabinet in 1848 and 1849 were directed to prevent the realization of a Federative Union of German States; she twice threatened Prussia that she would occupy East Prussia; as if our provinces, like Moldavia and Wallachia, were to be held in pledge by her, and she demanded that England should blockade the coasts of the Baltic and North Sea, in order to bring about the settlement of the Danish-German differences according to Russian views.

Through those "efforts" nothing came of the Constitution of the German Empire, nor the Berlin Union, which M. de Beust, in need of protection and full of gratitude, had acceded to; that Prussian pioneers threw the bridge over the Elbe, across which Austrian troops advanced into Holstein; that, contrary to every German interest and only in favour of Russia, the way might be prepared for a state of things under which Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark suffer alike with Germany; that in Hesse the Constitution might be set aside, and a German race, remarkable for a sense of their rights, for their love of order and loyalty, might be kept to this day by M. von Hassenpflug under martial law.

Thanks to those "efforts," the old Federal Constitution, as to which numerous Representatives at the Diet, of many years standing, had expressed the most severe censures; which was generally allowed to be insufficient, and the principal cause of the catastrophe from 1848 to 1850, was reestablished unchanged, and no notice was taken of the representations of a German King, at the time of the Dresden Conferences, to Prince Schwarzenberg, for the establishment of German Parliament, on the grounds of the observations of a long life and many years' experience as a ruler; that since then, in reality, nothing has been done by the Diet beyond reviving old objectionable laws in new forms, and allowing our having to witness, at a critical moment, what fruit the settlement of the differences between the two German Great Powers has produced, brought about by the "efforts of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh."

M. Von Beust, however (who, in regard to the principle, very pertinently remarks that where it is a question of German interests, the smallest German Government can better judge than foreign Governments), is of opinion, and lets it be officially announced in London, "that the unity of Germany was never better secured, and that never had the principles of the Confederation better stood the proof."

The journalist remarks hereupon:

The German nation has never stood before the world in its dismemberment, its divisions, in insignificance of power and importance, so miserably as at the present moment; at a time when all the world is aroused, after long neglect; when the national enmity between England and France—which had become an article of European faith—has changed into a cordial understanding, not a diplomatic or simulated one, but confirmed by facts; and when there is required action for magnanimous intentions, inspired by elevated impulses and high motives of national policy, and the wide perspective of the future is to be taken in at a view.

Germany and the whole world remember the Bamberg and Weimar Conferences; the peculiar and separate position of Wurtemberg; that deceased, she would never draw the sword against Russia; the *liberum veto* that the two Mecklenburgs gave at the last resolution of the Diet, as to the adhesion of the Treaty of April; and the Austro-Prussian differences.

Germany might, and should be, so much; she should have taken the initiative against Russia, from which Power, as a frontier neighbour, since the

destruction of Poland, she has had so much to suffer openly, again and again. There is afforded her an opportunity, in concert with the whole of civilized Europe, to put Russia, with her interference in German affairs—with her systematic aggression and disturbance of peace—with all her arrogant bearing—once and for ever within her proper bounds.

And see! instead, there is only one question to be asked; whether Germany really is no more—is nothing whatever? M. de Beust affirms that the unity of Germany was never better secured; that the principles of the Confederation have never better stood the trial.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 326.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 645.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 26, 1854.

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 565 of the 5th of October, I have to convey to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government of your Excellency's proceedings with regard to the differences between the Austrian and Turkish authorities in Wallachia.

Her Majesty's Government trust that all cause of difference is now removed by instructions given by the Austrian Government, and the establishment of a Mixed Commission at Vienna, to which all questions in dispute will be referred.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 327.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 1,286.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 26, 1854.

THE messenger from the East having brought no despatches from Constantinople, I went to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, to inquire if any news from that capital had reached the French Government by the present mail.

The despatches had been sent to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who is in the country; and M. de Thouvenel informed me that no political news of any importance had arrived. M. de Bruck continued to harass the Porte by his language; but intelligence had already been received by the Ottoman Government from Vienna of the more conciliatory policy of the Austrian Cabinet, and they were, consequently, more ready to withstand the Internuncio's pretensions.

The military news from the Crimea was favourable, and no doubt was entertained of the eventual fall of Sebastopol.

The "Caffarelli," French steamer, had grounded close to the quarantine battery, but luckily, in the night, and she was released from a position which must otherwise have ended in her destruction.

A sortie made against the British lines on the night of the 9th, had been repulsed with a loss of 400 to the Russians.

A corps of 15,000 to 16,000 Russians had been severely cannonaded by the allied steamers left to guard the Isthmus of Perecop. It was supposed to be a reinforcement under General Lüders, but this latter fact wants confirmation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 328.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 594.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 15, 1854.

OUR latest advices from the camp near Sebastopol, instead of announcing the commencement of the attack, mention the increased security of our position, and the expectation that fire will be opened upon the place to-morrow, or next day. The difficulties of getting the heavy guns into position, and completing the trenches, have been found, I believe, to be greater than we had originally expected.

The want of reinforcements continues to be felt. The French army has been largely recruited from Varna, Bourgas, and Gallipoli. A large British steamer, of the transport service, went up this morning with a crowd of French soldiery on its decks.

I have obtained 300 artillerymen from the Porte for Lord Raglan's army. They entered the Black Sea yesterday. I despair of obtaining more Regular Infantry from here at present; and I have requested Admiral Boxer to send the steamers at his disposal to Volo, where the Seraskier promises to embark about 5,000 men, of good troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—With reference to the subject matter of this despatch, a copy of Colonel Neale's last report to me is inclosed herewith.

S. DE R.

Inclosure in No. 328.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, October* 9, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 7th instant, I have the honour to statethat the General commanding the French troops here, having subsequently received despatches from General Canrobert, about 3,400 French and 200 Turkish troops are in course of embarkation on board Her Majesty's ships "Simoom," "Vulcan," and "Cyclops," and the British transport steamer "Mauritius." The French troops now remaining in Varna amount to about 2,000 Infantry, and one or two squadrons of Hussars. There are still, however, three or four batteries of field artillery, and upwards of 3,000 reserve artillery horses.

The British depôt remaining here, I am informed, amounts to about 1,500 men; the half of that number, however, only are reported to be effective. The whole of the British Cavalry has now been embarked for the Crimea. I regret to add that of the Dragoons, who left Varna about twelve days ago, upwards of 220 horses died and were killed on board the sailing transports which conveyed them, during the gale which occurred at that period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. NEALE.

No. 329.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 595.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 15, 1854.

THE little success which I continue to experience in urging the Porte to bring to light the more immediate causes of those disasters which we have had reason to deplore since the commencement of the war, and to do justice on

the convicted offenders with a view to future improvement, has reduced me to the alternative of giving up the matter in despair, or of taking more decided steps in prosecution of my demands. I have thought it my duty to prefer the latter course; and in order to avoid giving offence by unnecessary abruptness, I have thrown my remonstrances into the shape of an instruction (copy inclosed) to M. Pisani. Language and arguments of the same tenor may be hereafter employed, if requisite, with greater effect in the form of an official note addressed directly to the Ottoman Secretary of State. It is evident that, if the Porte is allowed to ride off upon general assurances and unproductive formalities, when such great interests are at stake, the hope of any effective reform must be reduced to the lowest ebb. On this account I feel the necessity of making a stand on the ground laid out in my instruction to M. Pisani, and I venture to reckon with confidence on your Lordship's approval, and, should the resources of the Embassy be exhausted to no purpose, on the full support of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 329.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Therapia, October 10, 1854.

Sir,

THE conduct of the Turkish Ministers on certain points, whatever may be the cause of it, is quite inconceivable, and the more difficult to explain or to understand, because it is no less injurious to the Empire than insulting to its friends and advisers. I use not this language without sufficient grounds to warrant it. My complaint is borne out by facts, and it is become necessary to bring the matters complained of to an issue. While the Porte's allies are sacrificing blood and treasure in her cause, they are entitled to satisfaction in those things which either affect the progress of the common cause, or the permanent welfare of that Empire for whose maintenance they are contending. It is not to be expected that they can consent to have their labours frustrated by the Porte's perseverance in errors frequently pointed out, to have their counsels treated with indifference or sham respect, to look idly on while the grossest acts of inhumanity pass unpunished, and while the most obvious means of increasing the resources of the Empire, and bettering the condition of its inhabitants, are neglected or misapplied.

Inquiries, Commissioners, and Councils, are mere mockeries, when they lead to no practical result. Since the introduction of the Tanzimat, the Porte and its successive Ministers have dealt largely in such expedients. The springs of that machinery are, however, too much worn to be kept longer in play. Those who have power expect realities. Corruption must be put down by punishment. Justice must be administered impartially. Public functionaries must be appointed and supported according to their merits. The several departments of the Government must be carried on with more decision and activity. Sterile prejudices, and jealousies, that obstruct the paths of improvement, must yield to the necessities of the State and the requirements of the time.

Let us now look to facts:

Sinope! What has been done? Where is the report?

Ahmed Pasha and Ali Ferik! What has resulted from their trial and conviction?

The massacre near Sidonien! What has the Commission done? What punishment has been inflicted on the guilty?

The atrocities in Bulgaria! Who has been convicted? Who has been punished? What local measures, preventive or remedial, have been enforced?

The more recent massacre near Damascus! What measures have been taken for redress or punishment?

The Doojik Koord chiefs! Why have the repeated orders of the Porte for their return been neglected? What has become of them? Why do they not appear?

The outrage at Jerusalem! A proved offence; the culprit in custody; a

Consul's house, and the religion of England, openly insulted; yet weeks allowed to pass without any public atonement adequate to the offence.

Other examples may be cited, but the list is already too long; too long for any period, but more especially for one distinguished by events which make an irresistible appeal to every sentiment of justice and gratitude, while they afford, perhaps, a last opportunity for rescuing a great Empire from the natural consequences of misgovernment and its attendant evils.

To no one better than to you can I address the outpourings of my disappointment and vexation on this painful topic. You can bear testimony to the frequent remonstrances which I have addressed to Reshid Pasha and his colleagues. You have often laboured in vain, under my directions, to obtain the redress which the Porte is as much impelled by interest as justice to accord. You know that, in prosecuting a just claim, or declaring a monitory opinion, I express the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, and not unfrequently incur responsibility by too much forbearance.

You will read my preceding remarks to Reshid Pasha. You will impress upon his Highness the serious intention with which they are made. The acts of justice which I have so often demanded, must be no longer withheld. I am thoroughly convinced that no solid reasons exist for their indefinite postponement. It is, otherwise, my firm resolution not to stop here. More efficient steps will have to be taken. Her Majesty's Government will find it indispensable to come forward in a more decided manner, and full responsibility will be made to rest wherever it is justly due.

I speak as a friend, and hope that my admonitions will be appreciated.

Your faithful and obedient,
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 330.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 596. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 15, 1854.

AT a late hour to-night I received a message from Reshid Pasha, informing me that, out of deference for the Representatives of its allies, the Porte is willing to forego its claim to indemnity from Greece, for the losses sustained by Ottoman subjects during the late incursions into Turkey.

This fresh concession, which reflects more honour on the Porte than it confers advantage on Greece, is to be understood with reference to what passed between Reshid Pasha, the French Chargé d'Affaires, and myself, at our last collective interview on the subject of Greek affairs. It has still to receive the Sultan's formal confirmation.

I mean to propose another conference, which may be expected to take place in two or three days, and at which I hope we shall be able to settle completely the course of proceeding in so far as Turkey is concerned. As your Lordship has done me the honour to signify the approval by Her Majesty's Government of our preceding steps, and has, moreover, instructed Mr. Wyse to the same effect, I entertain a sanguine hope of our being able before long, with the concurrence of our colleagues at Athens, to replace the friendly relations of Turkey and Greece on their former footing, with a fair prospect of their acquiring in time a greater degree of firmness and cordiality.

I abstain from trespassing further on your Lordship's time at this stage of the proceedings, and reserve whatever may be needed in the way of explanation for my report of our next collective interview.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 331.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 28.*)

(No. 597.)

Therapia, October 16, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING this morning received from Colonel Simmons copies of his last despatches to Lord Raglan, I have the honour to forward them to your Lordship, as containing matter of very considerable interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 331.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to General Lord Raglan.

Bucharest, October 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that Omer Pasha returned here yesterday, after visiting the fortress of Silistria, to which considerable important additions are being made; amongst others a *tête du pont* on the island opposite, the character of which will be rather that of a permanent than of a field work.

It is of an extent that will require from 1,200 to 1,500 men for its defence when completed, and it will add much to the strength of Silistria, being established on a point about 600 yards from the town, upon which the Russians in their late attack placed a battery, which caused more loss in the town than any other.

It will be of importance that in any negotiations which may take place, Turkey should acquire a right to maintain this or any other work that may be deemed preferable with the necessary *entourage* on the left bank of the Danube, from which a great part of the works of the fortress itself may be rendered untenable.

The garrison of Silistria consists at present of 20 battalions, and there are at Kalarasch 26 battalions of infantry. These troops were drawn out upon the news of the victory gained by the allies in the Crimea on the 20th September, and a salute fired in honour thereof, in compliance with orders received from the Porte.

I regretted to observe the weakness of the battalions, which did not average certainly 350 men on parade; and if allowance be made for absentees, I doubt if these battalions are at the present moment more than 400 bayonets strong.

The men appeared in excellent health and good condition. Cholera had entirely disappeared from among them, and generally from the whole of the Turkish army in Bulgaria and Wallachia: it is followed, however, in some places by typhoidal fevers, which as yet have not assumed a very grave character.

When it is remembered that these battalions have been enduring the fatigues of two campaigns of a long and severe winter under great exposure, without any measures having been adopted to complete their numbers, your Lordship will not be surprised that they are reduced at present to such mere skeletons.

If to these considerations be added the shameful neglect of which they have been the victims, the Government of the Sultan have much to answer for that these battalions are not more efficient.

It was only after repeated representations by Omer Pasha at Constantinople, enforced at length by Her Majesty's Ambassador, that clothing was sent to the army last spring, and which arrived so late that it was issued only to a great portion of them after their entry into Wallachia.

Your Lordship will scarcely credit that the authorities of Constantinople are so negligent of the health and condition of the Ottoman army, that at the present moment when the weather is becoming cold, and the winter approaching, the men have only summer trousers, and are almost barefooted, their boots being worn out and almost unwearable, and this because they have no others or that their winter clothing is in rags.

It is to be wondered that the Sublime Porte have not a stronger feeling of *amour propre* than to allow their soldiers to be in this state in close proximity with the army of a foreign nation. I am satisfied that their appearance leads foreign troops wrongfully to despise what, so far as the private soldiers are concerned, is as good an army as exists in almost any country.

Another cause of the diminution of strength in the battalions is the absence of a properly organized hospital establishment, which can alone be effected by the authorities at Constantinople. It is impossible for the Generalissimo to organize a complicated establishment of this nature, whilst his army is occupied in the field.

At the present moment the whole system is so bad, the medical officers and the supply of medicines and hospitals so defective, that serious losses to the army are the result. Slight illnesses become serious and fatal by unnecessary neglect and the gross incapacity of the medical officers; and wounds, even though slight, are generally fatal.

I have no doubt that at least one-half of the deaths, which amounted last winter at Kalafat and Widdin to 8,000, are to be attributed to this cause alone—a fact which reflects discredit principally on the administration of the army at Constantinople, although without doubt the officers who had medical and military charge of the force are also blameable.

I mention these causes as accounting in great measure for the reduced state of the Ottoman army principally in the cause of humanity, which requires that immediate and most decisive steps should be taken to prevent a repetition of the losses of the last winter, and of the sufferings which the Turkish soldier will otherwise unnecessarily and inhumanly be compelled to endure.

The subject of the re-organization of the army, and its establishment on a more solid basis, is one of great extent and importance, as upon it the existence of the Turkish army depends. It has occupied much the attention of the Generalissimo, who has not failed from time to time to communicate his views to his Government on many points connected therewith; and at the present time it is occupying his most serious attention, with a view to the employment of the ensuing winter in reconstructing the army, which unless something be done soon will within a short period cease to exist.

During the late tour from which the Generalissimo has just returned, the subject was one of frequent conversation with him, and I hope that some good results may ensue. Everything, however, will depend on the support he may meet with at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 331.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to General Lord Raglan.

Bucharest, October 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that Prince Stirbey entered Bucharest upon the 5th instant, upon his return to resume the Government of the Province of Wallachia.

On his passage through the town he was greeted by "vivas" from the Austrian soldiery, who were under arms in the streets to receive him, and by some few cheers from the people, and on his arrival from the palace he was received by General Coronini with a guard of honour of the Austrian army and of the Wallachian.

No demonstration was attempted, and I am informed that his reception was anything but enthusiastic.

Not a single Turkish soldier was drawn out to receive him, nor any Turkish guard turned out to salute him.

Omer Pasha entered the town about two hours after the arrival of the Prince.

I regret to inform your Lordship that almost daily quarrels occur in the streets between the Austrian and Turkish soldiery, some of which have been rather serious. In several cases officers of the Austrian army have drawn their swords upon Turkish soldiers, and I fear that ere long some serious encounters may result.

The Austrian force here daily increases by the addition of small detachments which continually arrive. At present I am credibly informed there are not less than 18,000 of them in the town. The object of this increase of force is inconceivable, as the town is perfectly tranquil, unless it have for its object the oppression of the people, or an apprehension of difficulties with the Turks.

The result of this occupation is most troublesome to the inhabitants, and reduces the accommodation which the Turkish army, after the assistance they rendered in gaining this position from the enemy, had a just reason to expect for repose during the winter.

As to any dreaded *émeute* in the town, the force which accompanied General Coronini on his entry would be amply sufficient to keep the inhabitants in check; and therefore this cause cannot be assigned for the augmentation of the occupying force.

The brigade of the Turkish army, which I informed your Lordship had been directed upon Ibraila and Galatz, will consist of eleven battalions of Infantry, with a battery of Artillery, and three regiments of Cavalry, which latter will make patroles and reconnaissances towards the Pruth. It is the intention of Omer Pasha to go in person to Ibraila in a few days.

While at Kalarasch on the 2nd instant, he received a confidential message from the Emperor Napoleon, through the French Consulate here, begging him to occupy the enemy as much as possible in the direction of Bessarabia, notwithstanding the difficulties which have been made by the Austrian authorities.

It was in consequence of this message that the cavalry was ordered to the front; but the Pasha replied that, as the operations in the Crimea are so far advanced, if the time requisite for increasing the force already in motion towards the Russian frontier be considered, he feared it would be too late for him to operate an useful diversion on a large scale in favour of the operations in the Crimea, which he has always been most desirous of doing, and should have done if it had not been for the interference of Austria, who, through Baron von Hess, informed him that such a movement was inadmissible, as it might compromise the Austrian army.

After all that has happened, Omer Pasha feels assured that if reinforcements have been sent from the Russian army of the Danube to the Crimea, it has not been from want of energy and an anxious desire on his part to occupy that army; but it is solely to be attributed to Austrian interference, and the occupation by the Austrian army of this Principality in the manner in which it has been effected.

If the Austrian Government had not undertaken to expel the Russians from the Principalities, employing in case of necessity the force of arms, it is true that the Turkish army might not have produced the entire evacuation of Wallachia: but it would at any rate have given occupation to the Russian army of the Danube within the Principalities, and would have prevented any portion of it from being detached to the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 332.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 590.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October* 15, 1854.

A NEW and embarrassing demand is now made by the Austrian Commander in Wallachia, and by the Austrian Representative here. They require the recall of the Sultan's Commissioner, Dervish Pasha. Count Coronini is described as having been so much offended by that functionary as to think seriously of retiring; but, convinced on reflection that the retirement of his

antagonist would be preferable, the Porte is called upon somewhat imperatively to give up its Representative. M. Pisani's report, of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy, will serve to explain the position more fully to your Lordship. Complaints had already been made of Dervish Pasha, and, in truth, his ways of proceeding have been often more remarkable for zeal and national feeling, than for the art of removing difficulties or reconciling differences. But complaints, not destitute of foundation, have also been made of the Austrian authorities; and the Porte might perhaps be warranted in requiring that they also shall be disavowed, if not recalled, or reprimanded. I have not seen any statement particularising the act for which Dervish Pasha's recall is demanded, but an unpleasant correspondence, and also an irritating altercation, have recently passed between his Excellency and Count Coronini; and it appears from M. Pisani's report that the intention of Austria to uphold Prince Stirbey is a principal element of the determination to get rid of the Commissioner. Copies of the correspondence to which I allude are inclosed herewith; and to them are added, also in copy, a letter, with its inclosure, from Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.

It is impossible not to look forward with anxiety to the serious consequences which are but too likely to flow from these personal disagreements. I fear that there is little chance of amendment without a more complete understanding between the respective Governments, and the adoption of a more decided and consistent course of policy by the Court and Cabinet of Austria. This is a repetition of what I have already submitted to your Lordship, but for the moment I see no other resource.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 332.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, October* 14, 1854.

THE Austrian chief interpreter waited this morning on Reshid Pasha, to tell the Porte that the Internuncio expects the Porte will recall Dervish Pasha, and in case it persisted in leaving him in the Principalities, General Coronini would break off his relations with him, and take no notice of his presence: that the General's first impulse was to tender his resignation, in order to cease all intercourse with the Porte's Commissioner, but being aware that such a step would produce a sad impression upon the army, he prefers adopting the course stated above; that since the reinstatement of the legal authority in the Principalities, he does not consider the presence of a Turkish Agent of any advantage to the public interest; and finally, that no faith whatever could be placed in the inquiry to be instituted by a person whose personal feeling and opinions are known to be against the Prince. In short, he informed Reshid Pasha, that Colonel Dumond was preparing to leave on Wednesday next, and that Baron de Bruck was anxious to have a categorical and positive answer before then as to the Porte's intention.

Under these circumstances, Reshid Pasha wishes to ascertain what course you advise them to adopt, and will feel obliged to your Excellency to let him know your answer at your earliest convenience.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 332.

Dervish Pasha to Count Coronini.

Bucharest, le [illegible], 1854.

C'EST avec un sentiment bien pénible que le Soussigné, Commissaire Impérial de la Sublime Porte dans les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, s'acquitte de son devoir en portant à la connaissance de son Excellence Général

Comte Coronini, Commandant des troupes Impériales Autrichiennes dans ces deux pays, que depuis l'entrée en Valachie de ces troupes, en vertu de la Convention du 14 Juin, 1854, de nombreuses plaintes continuent à lui être adressées, notamment par les habitants de Bucharest, contre des actes de violence, des exactions, et des attentats aux mœurs, que rien ne saurait justifier, de la part des militaires Autrichiens en garnison de cette ville.

Le Soussigné n'a pas besoin de rappeler à son Excellence Comte Coronini, que d'après l'Article VI de la Convention, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, pour donner une nouvelle preuve de l'intérêt sincère qu'il porte au bien-être de l'Empire Ottoman, s'est engagé entr'autres à veiller au maintien de la plus étroite discipline parmi les troupes et à faire respecter par elles les propriétés de même que les lois, le culte et les usages des Principautés, dans le cas où les forces militaires Autrichiennes devraient entrer dans ces deux pays. Il suffira au Soussigné de signaliser à son Excellence les faits déplorables et les coupables écarts qui font l'objet de la présente communication, pour attendre avec une ferme confiance dans ses sentiments de justice et d'équité, et de son manifeste désir d'écarter tout ce qui, en troublant le repos et le bien-être public dans ce pays, pourrait être considéré comme incompatible avec les dispositions amicales et on ne peut plus franches et désintéressées du Gouvernement Autrichien envers la Porte, qu'elle s'empresse de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour mettre fin à une situation des choses si contraire au noble but que les deux hautes Cours alliées veulent obtenir d'une commun accord dans les Principautés. Mais une circonstance d'une nature plus grave que les plaintes dont il s'agit, vient d'avoir lieu, et qui, portant le caractère d'une insulte à la fois à l'uniforme militaire Ottomane et à une autorité constituée de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, impose au Soussigné le pénible devoir d'en faire auprès de son Excellence le Comte Coronini l'objet d'une réclamation spéciale.

Le Commandant de la ville de Bucarest, le Général de Brigade Mazhar Pacha, avait envoyé son aide-de-camp, officier Valaque, pour demander des explications relativement à un malentendu revenu dans la maison Princesse Troubetzkoi pour des logements militaires. Un capitaine Autrichien, faisant partie de la commission du logement, à l'aide-de-camp: "Allez dire à votre Pacha que je ne veux pas de troupes Turques dans cette maison, et s'il en vient je les ferai sortir par la fénêtre." Le capitaine s'est servi de cette occasion d'une expression grossièrement injurieux, et a ajouté; "car nous sommes plus nombreux et plus forts que les Turcs: ce que je vous dis là ne s'applique pas à vous, mais seulement aux Turcs."

Le Soussigné s'adresse avec une juste confiance aux sentiments d'honneur et de loyauté qui distinguent si éminemment le Comte Coronini, pour obtenir du tribunal de son autorité militaire supérieure une réparation d'honneur aussi éclatante qu'elle aurait été en droit de réclamer si les autorités militaires Autrichiennes eussent eu à se plaindre d'un semblable procédé de la part des officiers de l'armée Impériale Ottomane.

C'est, &c.

(Signé) DERVISCH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 332.

Count Coronini to Dervish Pasha.

Bucharest, le 3 Octobre, 1854.

JE viens de recevoir l'office en date du [illegible] que votre Excellence a cru devoir m'adresser.

Je ne puis pas vous cacher, M. le Général, combien je suis étonné de me voir adressées, dans une communication officielle émanée d'un aussi haut fonctionnaire, des plaintes et des accusations vagues contre le maintien d'une armée qui s'est toujours distinguée par la discipline qu'elle a su maintenir dans tous pays.

Si des circonstances tout à fait exceptionnelles ont pu donner parfois lieu à quelques légers inconvéniens, provoqués presque toujours par la mauvaise volonté et la résistance de quelques locataires, chaque excès de ce genre, tout léger qu'il soit, a d'abord été et sera toujours sévèrement puni.

Désirant toujours contribuer de mon côté autant que possible à maintenir le bon accord et à éviter tout ce qui pouvait produire des altercations inutiles, je me suis toujours abstenu de toute récrimination à cet égard pour ne pas inconvénier des relations qui d'après mon avis devaient toujours être réglées par les sentiments qui ont dicté la Convention du 14 Juin.

Je dois être d'autant plus frappé en voyant que vous avez cru, M. le Général, devoir vous faire une arme de cette Convention pour reprocher à mes troupes des "exactions" et "des attentats aux mœurs" dans des termes indécis dont le vague me rend tout à fait impossible de vous donner des explications. Je dois d'ailleurs prier votre Excellence, dans l'intérêt de l'ordre public, de bien vouloir, le cas échéant, me signaler spécialement des faits de ce genre pour que je puisse y pourvoir, et m'envoyer directement les habitants de cette ville qui croient devoir recourir auprès d'elle pour se garantir des actes de violence qu'ils prétendent avoir subi par des soldats Autrichiens.

En suivant avant tout comme principes inébranlables les règles de la justice et de l'équité, je saurai satisfaire à toute requête de ce genre.

C'est en déférant à ce sentiment de justice que je n'ai pas hésité, bien avant de recevoir l'office de votre Excellence, d'infliger une détention à l'officier dont il y est question en le faisant démettre en même temps de ses fonctions auprès de la commission des quartiers. Je dois d'ailleurs observer que toutes imprudentes qu'elles aient pu être, les paroles de cet officier, blessé par de semblables propos d'une nature bien plus grave qu'il avait entendu proférer par des organes Turcs et aigri de plus par les vexations continuelles auxquelles il était exposé dans les fonctions épineuses et pénibles desquelles il était revêtu, ont été rapportées d'une manière tout à fait défigurée. La locution à laquelle votre Excellence a fait allusion dans sa note et que M. le Commandant de la ville a fidèlement transcrite dans un office qu'il a cru devoir m'adresser préalablement, est si peu coulante à nos officiers, même à ceux qui parlent bien le Français, que cette unique circonstance aurait suffit pour exciter des doutes à la vérité de cette assertion, si l'officier, qui j'ai interrogé moi-même, ne m'avait pas assuré sur sa parole d'honneur de ne pas s'en être servi. C'est donc tout bonnement une broderie de l'officier Valaque qui a trouvé bien de rapporter son pourparler avec le capitaine Autrichien. Je dois vous faire remarquer de plus que j'ai dû être d'autant plus étonné de la communication que votre Excellence m'a adressée aujourd'hui à ce sujet, vu que j'avais délégué encore hier matin un officier d'Etat Major de ma suite auprès de Mazhar Pacha pour lui offrir toutes les explications nécessaires, or que d'après les assertions du Commandant de la ville j'avais tout lieu de regarder la chose arrangée à l'amiable.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) CORONINI.

Inclosure 4 in No. 332.

Prince Stirbey to the Inhabitants of Wallachia.

A tous les Habitants de la Principauté de Valachie!

PAR notre office du 14 Octobre, 1853, No. 1,737, nous avons fait connaître au public que les circonstances du moment nous imposaient le devoir de quitter temporairement la Principauté.

Nos compatriotes seuls comprennent toute l'étendue du sentiment douloureux que nous dûmes éprouver en nous séparant d'eux, forcé d'interrompre l'œuvre réparatrice à laquelle nous consacrions nos veilles et tandis que le pays se trouvait dans les circonstances les plus graves.

Actuellement par l'assistance Divine, et par ordre de la Sublime Porte, nous sommes retourné à notre siége Princier, et avons repris les rênes du Gouvernement.

Le rétablissement du Gouvernement légal du pays est une nouvelle preuve de la paternelle sollicitude de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Notre auguste Suzerain, pour garantir encore plus efficacement la sécurité de ce pays, a bien voulu s'entendre à cet effet, par une Convention spéciale, avec son haut allié, amie et voisin, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, qui s'est

engagé à envoyer dans la Principauté le nombre de troupes nécessaire. Elles y ont été accueillies comme amies et alliées de la Sublime Porte. Leur présence avec celles des victorieuses troupes Ottomanes est un nouveau gage de paix et de sécurité pour le pays.

Valaques, compatriotes bien aimés! nous nous connaissons depuis longtemps. Vous savez avec quelle sollicitude nous parcourions tout le pays, étudiant vos vœux et vos besoins, et nous attachant à les satisfaire par tous les moyens possibles. Vous savez quels temps difficiles nous avons traversé, surtout dans les deux premières années de notre administration, 1849 et 1850. Vous savez si nous vous avons toujours porté des sentiments de père. Vous n'avez pas oublié le calme et la prospérité dont le pays jouissait dans les dernière années. C'est toujours comme un père que nous revenons parmi vous. Nous ressentons profondément toutes vos souffrances; nous sommes pénétré de l'étendue et des difficultés de notre tâche.

Soyez certains que nous vouerons tous nos efforts les plus persévérants au rétablissement du bon ordre et du bien-être général. Nous n'épargnerons ni peines ni sacrifices, soyez en bien convaincus, pour réaliser les hautes et bienfaisantes intentions de notre auguste Suzerain.

A cet effet nos bras seront ouverts à tous ceux sans exception qui viendront nous apporter un concours zélé et sincère.

Plus notre mission est difficile en raison des circonstances actuelles et de la profondeur des plaies du pays, plus nous apprécierons le dévouement et le mérite de chacun; comme d'autre part nous exercons une vigilance infatigable pour réprimer tout désordre et redresser le moindre écart.

C'est ainsi que nos efforts communs obtiendront la bénédiction Divine, et qu'un heureux avenir s'ouvrira pour notre pays.

Le $\frac{\text{11 Septembre}}{\text{Octobre}}$, 1854.

Inclosure 5 in No. 332.

Dervish Pasha to Reshid Pasha.

October 4, 1854.

(Translation.)

I INCLOSE to your Highness a statement in detail of the irregularities incessantly committed by the Austrian troops, to the great alarm and annoyance of the inhabitants. As it is to be apprehended that evil might arise were the irregularities in question not to be suppressed, I addressed a note on the subject of these and other irregularities committed by the Austrian troops to Count Coronini, copy of which is inclosed, together with the Count's reply just received.

Inclosure 6 in No. 332.

Memorandum of Irregularities committed by Austrian Soldiers in Bucharest.

(Translation.)

1. AN Austrian soldier quarrelled with the coachman belonging to the master of the house on which he was billeted, and wounded him in the head with his sword.

2. A soldier committed violence upon the person of a woman residing in the house where he was quartered.

3. An officer left the French hotel without paying his bill, and while the landlord was trying to get his money from another officer who wanted to play the same trick, the soldiers who were there seized the landlord, and took him off to the guard-house; the latter has complained to the French Consul on this subject.

4. A dispute having arisen between a Turkish and an Austrian soldier, the latter drew his sword on his adversary.

5. A most abominable outrage was committed by some Austrian soldiers on the person of a lady named Dupuis; the criminals have been tried and found

guilty by General Popovitch, and ample satisfaction has been promised to the lady.

6. A soldier had a quarrel at his quarters with one Simon, whom he struck and wounded on the head with his sword.

7. Some of the privates go about at night to various houses, letting the horses out of the stables, routing the servants out of bed, and turning in themselves in their places.

8. In fact, they even treated Colonel Simmons, an Englishman, in this way; some soldiers went at night to his house, and turned his horses into the street.

9. The local laws of the Province forbid quartering strangers on priest's houses; yet some soldiers have forcibly entered and established themselves in a priest's house.

Inclosure 7 in No. 332.

Dervish Pasha to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) *October* 4, 1854.

I RECEIVED a communication some days ago from the Moldavian Administration, congratulating me on my appointment as a Commissioner; announcing the total withdrawal of the Russians from that province, and the entry of a part of the Austrian forces, and asking for instructions for their guidance. It would have been requisite for us to have proceeded thither, and to have, in the first instance, issued a proclamation like that issued at Bucharest, pending the invitation sent to the Prince on his arrival; but the local Administration was dissolved, as a matter of course, and it was necessary that there should be some acknowledged Government to act up to the proclamation to be issued, and to carry on the administration of affairs until the arrival of the Prince. The actual administration has been therefore confirmed temporarily by me, as at Bucharest; and I inclose to your Highness my letter on that subject, and a copy of the proclamation sent for publication.

Inclosure 8 in No. 332.

Dervish Pasha to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) 12 *Moukarem*, 1271. (*October* 4, 1854.)

I HAD the honour to state in a previous report, that after the dispute which had occurred between Count Coronini and myself, I at once sent for Mazhar Pasha, and inquired whether he had warned the police authorities with reference to the printing and affixing publicly in the streets of the paper in question; he replied that he had not forbidden its being printed and posted, but stated that he did not know whether it was to be placarded in the streets for public information, or circulated in another way. I told him in answer, to forbid the printing; this point not having been touched upon in conversation (with Count Coronini) and our decision not having sanctioned its printing, which, moreover, Coronini opposed, and I directed him to proceed to the Count's house, and inform him that it would not be printed; and he accordingly repaired thither.

I have now the honour further to report, that after a long dispute between the Pasha and Count Coronini, the latter insisted upon the entire suppression of the paper in question, and the recall of the orders given to the police; being unable to entertain this proposition, the Pasha rejected it, and came to inform me of the circumstance. However, the police inspector had sent a copy of the paper to be printed at the office. Upon being informed of this, I sent at once to instruct him to forbid the printing, and to choose some other method of conveying the injunctions therein contained for the public information. At this time Count Coronini dispatched General Popovitch, whom he had appointed "Commandant du Place," to the printing office, and the latter forcibly seized the copy of the paper from the printer's hands, and took it away with him. I was informed

of the above circumstance by Mazhar Pasha. The fact of an officer being sent in such a manner, and forcibly seizing a paper from the printer's hands, although I had in the first place assured Count Coronini that it would not be printed, and subsequently reiterated my promise by sending to inform him, being ruinous to the influence of the Porte's functionaries; upon these irregular proceedings of the Austrians taking place, in spite of the issue of orders against the printing, I directed that it should be printed, and 200 copies were accordingly struck off, though I abided by my former decision, in not authorising their being published or placarded.

A request was lately made by the Austrian Vice-Consul that some copies should be sent to the Consulate, in order to serve as documentary testimony or foundation to any complaints they might have to make on the subject, to which a reply was given, that nothing been published, they would not be sent; nor were they: however, by some means they have got hold of two or three copies. At the English Consul's unofficial request two or three were sent him; the rest have been retained.

With reference to Coronini's coarse and violent language, as he will probably address complaints to his Government on the subject, and make mountains out of molehills, I have deemed it my duty to represent the truth for the information of the Porte.

Inclosure 9 in No. 332.

Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.

Bucharest, le $\frac{21 \text{ September}}{3 \text{ October}}$, 1854.

Monseigneur,

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Altesse que pour me conformer aux ordres de la Sublime Porte, je suis arrivé aujourd'hui même à Bucharest.

Des députations du Conseil Provisoire d'Administration et de toutes les classes des habitants sont venues hier au devant de moi à Giurgevo. Le contentement des populations, comme des habitants de Bucharest, était trop visible pour pouvoir être revoqué en doute.

Je me fais un devoir d'envoyer ci-joint à votre Altesse une traduction de la publication que j'ai cru devoir faire pour annoncer mon retour à mes compatriotes.

Je ne puis toutefois ne pas exprimer à votre Altesse le sentiment pénible que j'ai éprouvé en apprenant que trois jours avant mon arrivée, l'acte ci-joint avait été publié à Bucharest.

Votre Altesse appréciera ce procédé et jugera de l'impression qui ne peut manquer de produire sur les esprits l'emploi de pareils moyens, tendants à frapper de déconsidération le chef de l'administration, au moment où, par ordre et au nom de son Suzerain, il vient reprendre l'exercice de l'autorité dont Sa Majesté Impériale a daigné l'investir.

Un tel acte ne peut être certes qu'en contradiction avec les sages et bienfaisantes intentions de la Sublime Porte, qui, en m'invitant à reprendre les rênes de l'administration, n'a eu en vue que de réinstaller l'autorité légale pour qu'elle puisse remettre l'ordre dans le pays, à la suite de tant de calamités, et travailler à réparer ses maux.

La Sublime Porte jugera, dans sa haute sollicitude, si les conditions dans lesquelles on cherche à me placer sont propres à atteindre ce but, et s'accordent avec la mission dont j'ai eu l'honneur d'être chargé par la confiance de mon auguste et gracieux Maître.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) STIRBEY

Inclosure 10 in No. 332.

The Commandant of the City of Bucharest to the Prefect of Police.

Alterations in printed copy published in Wallachian and French.

Bucharest, le $\frac{19 \text{ September}}{1 \text{ October}}$, 1854.

même le retour du Prince dans les circonstances actuelles;

En conséquence je vous invite, M. le Préfet, d'empêcher, &c.

Bucharest, le $\frac{15}{27}$ *September*, 1854.

Monsieur,

VU les accusations graves nombreuses et officielles qui pèsent aujourd'hui sur le Prince Stirbey; vu la répugnance d'une grande partie des notabilités et des habitants de la ville, à voir même dans les circonstances actuelles le retour du Prince; j'ai cru de mon devoir de déférer au sentiment public;

Et vous ordonne en conséquence d'empêcher à ce qu'on élève des arcs de triomphe, présenter des adresses, &c., &c., lors de son entrée dans la capitale, afin d'empêcher par tous les moyens possibles que des manifestations intempérées ne viennent à aigrir les esprits et faire éclater des désordres.

Le Commandant de la ville de Bucharest,
(Signé) MAZHAR PASHA.

Inclosure 11 in No. 332.

Dervish Pasha to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) *October* 4, 1854.

YOUR Highness is already aware that the invitation to Prince Stirbey has been sent. Having ascertained that a party of men and disreputable women had been hired by Prince Stirbey's partisans, consisting of eight or ten persons, to raise triumphal arches on his road on the day of his arrival, to scatter flowers from the windows on his passage through the streets, and to express the public rejoicing by having his horses unharnessed and his carriage dragged by men, &c.; and informed that the opposite party would likely take measures for counteracting this display in the event of its taking place, I felt strongly that there were many serious objections to such irregularities taking place, and the Commandant of the place, Mazhar Pasha, with my knowledge and by my direction, addressed the order, copy of which is inclosed, to the Chief of the Police.

On Saturday afternoon, the 30th of September, Count Coronini came to me and said, with much violence of manner, "If you are going to act in this way on every occasion, I will now throw up my commission and go away." I asked him what he meant, when he took out a copy of the order to the police and read it, stating that it was my intention to cause it to be published. I said that such an order had certainly been sent to the police, but that it was not to be printed and published by being posted in the streets, but to be communicated to the parties concerned. The Count said, "You gave orders for its being printed. How is this? You invite Prince Stirbey to come here to assume the government, and why do you at the same time make such statements to the public against him? This is a proceeding by which the Austrian forces here are completely set aside," &c. (and other violent language to the same effect). I observed to him, that I not only did not order, but that it never entered my thoughts that it should be printed and published, and that it was

not to be published; that it was simply an order to the police; that there was nothing in that order which could afford a cause for such violent language; that the object was to prevent a conflict between the partisans and the enemies of Prince Stirbey, and all the evil resulting therefrom, so as not to necessitate the interference of the Ottoman, and perhaps of the Austrian troops; and that I was surprised that, instead of approving of my proceeding, he condemned it in such violent terms.

Count Coronini replied, "Is it not necessary that I should use strong language when you have recourse to such proceedings on your own account without communicating with me in the first place? You look upon us as nothing. The Sublime Porte engaged to restore the tranquillity and the administration of the Provinces, in conjunction with my Government, and you, by thus acting on your own bottom, desire to do the business yourself. Let me, at all events, withdraw and go, and do you proceed to act as you please."

I said that I could see nothing in this which required any communication with the Count; that, moreover, when the objections to the publication of the proclamation were made known to him, with the request that it should be deferred for a short time, he had not consented, and that I had been therefore under the necessity of protesting. The Count observed that my protest was wounding to the honour of the Austrian army, upon which I replied that, setting that aside, I had represented the matter to my Government, and would act in conformity with the answer I received; that, although the Count had said that he was content to act in harmony with the orders received by me, he did not do so on my making them known to him; that no advantage had proceeded out of our discussions for acting conformably with the orders received by me from the Porte relative to the invitation to Prince Stirbey; that when I had, on several occasions, discussed with him the impropriety of receiving the Prince with military honours on his entry to Bucharest, when he was about to arrive and to be put on his trial, the Count had not agreed to this; and that, finally, the Count had sent to tell me that he was going to do military honours to Prince Stirbey by sending a company of cavalry as far as the town gate, and a detachment of troops to his house. I said that I had thus seen no advantage, hitherto, in the discussion we had held together, and that how could I, therefore, confer upon a discussion on such a trifling matter as the present; that according to the third Article of the last Convention, Austria is engaged, conjointly with the Porte, to establish the form of Administration which proceeds out of the privileges granted by the Porte to the two Principalities; that the establishment of local order was one thing, and the legitimate form of Government deriving from the privileges was another; that, in my opinion, the time had not yet come for establishing the legitimate form of administration as deriving from the privileges; that the Porte had hitherto sent me no instructions on this subject; that I did not know whether I or another person was to act with the Austrian Commissioner for restoring the legitimate Government, but that any attempt proceeding from any quarter whatever to impair the sovereign rights of the Porte over these Principalities would be resisted by me, as I officially stated to the Count.

His Excellency replied: "If, in that case, any troubles should break out here, do you suppose that I, backed by so many troops, am to remain a quiet spectator? According to the late Convention the rights of the two Governments are equal here."

I observed that I did not understand what he meant by this equality of rights.

"We must act conjointly," said the Count, "for restoring local order and tranquillity. We cannot act separately for this purpose."

I replied that I was the Agent of the Sovereign and Master of these Principalities, and that the Count was the Commander of the forces of another Sovereign; that this was my appreciation of my own, as well as of his position; that I was commissioned personally to preside over the consolidation of the local order and public tranquillity; that nothing had yet taken place to disturb order, and that it was necessary, above all things, to see that nothing should; that if unfortunately any disturbance should arise, the Ottoman forces here would take measures to quell them, and that the Austrian troops might assist them; but that such interference on the part of the Austrian forces must always take place with the concurrence of the Sublime Porte.

Count Coronini again got violent on this, and said, "I tell you officially, that should any such thing take place, I will not wait for the concurrence of the Porte."

In order to put a stop to this discussion, and to keep it within its legitimate bounds, I replied that it was highly important to avoid all subjects which might lead to disorders of this nature, and the discussion then ended.

It would appear from the proceedings of these gentlemen that it is their intention to apply the provisions of Article III of the late Convention concerning the establishment of the legitimate administration, deriving from the privileges conferred on the Principalities, to the establishment of local order and public tranquillity, and to seek a pretext for interfering with their internal affairs and with the sovereign rights of the Porte. This is not only contrary to the will of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, but the reports openly and secretly circulated by them, namely, that Stirbey is returning because Austria desires it; that it will be out of the Porte's power to depose him; that those who are hostile to the Prince will be punished; that the Ottoman troops are not to remain here; and that Austria will always protect them—disturb the public mind, and will lead eventually to disorder. I therefore report these matters in detail to your Highness, and request to be furnished with early instructions how to act.

No. 333.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Mageais.

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 28, 1854.*

ADMIRAL VIRGIN, on the day before his departure, inquired of me what were the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government respecting the co-operation of Sweden with England next year in the war against Russia. I said that the question could be more easily answered if he could inform me what were the views of the Swedish Government, as it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to urge Sweden to take any part she thought contrary to her interests, or likely to endanger her safety; and that so long as she determined to remain neutral, the promise given by Her Majesty's Government to respect her neutrality would be faithfully fulfilled, whatever our opinions might be upon the inexpediency, if not impossibility, of Sweden remaining neutral in the present war. A desire, however, had been manifested at Stockholm to abandon that position, and negotiations with that object, as Admiral Virgin must be well aware, had been commenced, and had been carried to some length, but they had been put a stop to by the King requiring that the restoration of Finland should be guaranteed to Sweden, and that the policy of Austria should guide that of Sweden.

The first of these conditions was, I said, quite out of the question, for Her Majesty's Government would never give a guarantee without a reasonable expectation of being able to fulfil it, and it was impossible to foresee the events of war, or whether it would be practicable to wrest Finland from Russia, and restore it permanently to Sweden; and although Her Majesty's Government would consider such an arrangement on every account satisfactory, they would not be prepared indefinitely to prolong the war in order to secure it.

With respect to the second condition, I said it was not encouraging to find that the active alliance of Sweden with England and France was to depend on the policy of Austria, which would be determined by a variety of circumstances with which Sweden was not particularly concerned.

I lastly told Admiral Virgin that it was the intention of England and France to prosecute the war with increased vigour next year, and that we should gladly find ourselves co-operating with Sweden, but we hoped that no unacceptable conditions would be proposed to us, and that Sweden would rest content with the assurance that in negotiations for peace her interests would be fully and anxiously considered.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 334.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 135.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October* 27, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Minister President, arrived in this capital on the 22nd instant.

The differences existing between the two great German States, and the imminent danger to which the minor States of Germany are exposed in consequence of a threatened rupture, have occasioned the visit of this statesman to Berlin.

It cannot be said that his presence here, under existing circumstances, can be agreeable to the Prussian Government, who have at all times repudiated the mediation of the minor German States when differences have arisen with their German ally. But on the present occasion the presence of this Minister is received with more than ordinary suspicion and dissatisfaction, as it is evident that the object of the Bavarian Minister is to exercise a pressure on the decision and policy of the Prussian Government.

I am informed that M. Von der Pfordten has declared, both to His Majesty and Baron Manteuffel, that in the event of any separation between Austria and Prussia, the geographical position of Bavaria would oblige her to remain in alliance with Austria. He is reported to have clearly laid before the King the necessity of an understanding between the two German Powers, in failure of which he foretells a dissolution of the Confederation, and that the minor States will be driven to ally themselves with their nearest and most natural ally.

I am further informed that M. Von der Pfordten, in striving to induce Prussia to yield to the demands of Austria, is also desirous that Prussia should require reciprocal concessions from Austria; and that his proposals are that,—1. Austria should promise to take no offensive part against Russia; and 2. That Austria should engage herself to enter into no alliance with the Western Powers.

These are, as far as I can ascertain, the principal objects of M. Von der Pfordten's mission. Your Lordship will perceive that the firm and consistent language held by Austria towards Prussia and the German States have been the means of completely counteracting the evil effects of the Bamberg Coalition; who in view of a triple alliance between England, France, and Austria, entertain very just fears that they may be exposed to considerable dangers and defeat by allying themselves with Prussia.

No direct proposals have been as yet submitted to the Government by M. Von der Pfordten. He has been anxious to await the return here of Count Esterhazy from Vienna, and to be informed of the reply of the Austrian Cabinet to the last Prussian communication of the 13th instant.

From information which has reached me from another quarter, I am induced to believe that the Bavarian Minister is endeavouring to influence both the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets towards the ends he is anxious to obtain, by holding out the Bavarian support or threatening its withdrawal, as may suit his purpose. The object he has in view is evidently to produce such an understanding between Austria and Prussia as shall effectually restrain the former from any offensive action against Russia, and prevent her from entering into any separate alliance or Treaty with the Western Powers.

I entertain confident hopes that the mission of M. Von der Pfordten will prove fruitless, in as far as he aspires to utilising the action of Prussia for the purpose of fettering and restraining the free action of Austria.

Count Esterhazy informed me this morning, in the most positive and decided terms, that the Austrian Cabinet were determined to bind themselves by no engagement which would prevent them acting offensively towards Russia; and that they were further resolved to pursue the course of policy which they had expressed to their German confederates in their late communication.

It is probable that the Prussian Government will courteously but decisively decline any mediating endeavours of M. Von der Pfordten, and that they will bring about by direct means an arrangement of their difference with Austria. It

is not in my power to inform your Lordship what that ultimate arrangement may be; but I am of opinion that whatever understanding is arrived at, it will be but ephemeral, and will only last until a fresh crisis shall arrive, and when the active co-operation of Prussia is required.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 335.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October* 27, 1854.

COUNT ESTERHAZY returned to Berlin on the 25th instant from Vienna, and has delivered to Baron Manteuffel the reply of the Austrian Cabinet to the Prussian communication of the 13th.

I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith, a translation of this document, but I am unable to accompany it with a copy of the original text.

Count Esterhazy informs me that the Austrian Government will wait to learn the views and decisions of Prussia previous to submitting any proposition to the Germanic Diet. Should the Prussian Government still decline to accede to these proposals, and to join in a common communication to the Federal Diet, the Austrian Cabinet will invite that body to agree to a resolution declaring their adoption of the two first points of the four conditions laid down as the bases of peace, and their readiness to support Austria if her territory should be attacked.

This resolution will be submitted to the "Engerer Rath," the restricted Council of the Diet, in which the collective States number seventeen votes. Ten have already declared their intention to vote for Austria, viz:

Austria.
Hanover.
Electoral Hesse.
Grand Ducal Hesse.
Holstein (Denmark).
The Thuringian States.
Brunswick and Nassau.
The Hanse Towns.
Oldenburgh, Anhalt, and Schwarzburgh.
Baden.

The remaining minority, seven, on the Prussian side, are as follows:

Prussia.
Bavaria.
Saxony.
Würtemburg.
Two Mecklenburghs.
Luxemburgh.
Two Lippé (Lichtenstein, Waldeche, Homburg, and Reuss).

M. de Beust, the Saxon Minister President, has however expressly stated that if a vote was called for at the Diet, he could not take the resolution for Saxony of voting in the minority.

I am also informed that Bavaria has given the Austrian Government assurances of their support. Prussia, therefore, cannot reckon on the votes of Bavaria and Saxony, and the great majority of the Diet will be incontestably in favour of Austria.

I am told that the Prussian Government are very much annoyed at the

defection of these States, on whom they thought they could securely count, and that they complain that they have been led into error by the false reports of M. de Bismarcke-Schönhausen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 335.

Instructions addressed to Count Esterhazy.

Vienne, le 23 Octobre, 1854.

PENDANT votre court séjour à Vienne vous avez pris connaissance de la dépêche de M. de Manteuffel.

Le Cabinet Prussien n'a fait que répondre à notre propre désir, en examinant mûrement, comme il l'observe lui-même, l'ensemble de nos communications du 1er de ce mois. Nous avons pu appeler un tel examen avec d'autant plus de tranquillité que son résultat, si pénible que les conséquences puissent en paraître à certaines des parties intéressées, ne peut certainement pas être de nature à ramener dans nos négociations les occasions d'une division dont nous ne pouvions nous résoudre à envisager la possibilité. Nous avons été de tous tems forts éloignés de vouloir limiter d'une manière quelconque le droit qu'à la Prusse de réserver son opinion personnelle en présence des négociations dont nous avons pris l'initiative; mais de notre côté nous avons également dans le Traité du 20 Avril, comme dans les négociations qui ont suivi, conservé, en vue des nécessités pratiques de notre position, la liberté de faire des démarches indépendantes, et les circonstances de faire des alliances, autant qu'elles se conformeraient pleinement avec les principes du Traité. Pourquoi donc nous opposer d'une manière indépendante, car nous y étions autorisés? Pourquoi ne pas demander si nous sommes avancés autrement que dans les limites de la plus étroite et la plus ponctuelle observance des principes fondamentaux du Traité et de ce qui était nécessaire pour en attendre le but? Le Traité avec la Porte était la condition nécessaire de l'exécution de l'Article Additionel: notre situation actuelle dans les Principautés en est la conséquence nécessaire. Lorsque le Traité d'Alliance offensive et défensive a été fait, la Prusse ne prétendait pas qu'au cas où la Russie ne se résoudrait pas à une évacuation volontaire, nous ne devions pas coopérer avec les adversaires de la Russie: elle devait prévoir que le contraire arriverait. Les opérations des armées dans les Principautés n'auraient alors eu certainement pas pour but unique la garantie des intérêts Germaniques; pourquoi donc maintenant nous poser cette condition impossible?

Si nous devons exprimer l'impression générale que les dernières déclarations de la Prusse ont laissé en nous, cette impression est celle-ci qu'en fait ce n'est pas, nous le disons avec une juste satisfaction, par un dissentiment dans les principes fondamment essentiels, ou par une divergence inconciliable dans la manière de comprendre nos droits et nos obligations réciproques, que la Cour de Berlin a jugé les éclaircissements que nous lui avons donnés, comme ne répondant pas à sa propre manière de voir. Ce sont les faits qui ont pris aux yeux du Cabinet Prussien un autre caractère qu'aux nôtres, et nous croyons précisément après cela pouvoir fonder l'espérance de plus en plus vive que leur simple exposé aura pour résultat le raffermissement d'une entente entière et dégagée de tous doutes entre nous et nos alliés. Le Cabinet de Berlin semble attacher au fait de l'évacuation des Principautés par les Russes une signification politique que nous ne pouvons pas reconnaître à une mesure toute militaire; et il voit au fond de la déclaration de la Russie de vouloir se renfermer dans la défensive, une garantie que de notre côté nous nous n'y apercevons pas. Il ne trouve pas de motif de crainte dans l'établissement d'un noyau d'armée Russe en Pologne; mesure qui nous paraît une menace fatale contre l'Autriche. Chaque jour la position devient plus claire et plus sérieusement pressante; et il ne nous reste plus qu'à exprimer notre confiance dans l'assurance encore réitérée, que Sa Majesté le Roi a conscience dans toute leur étendue des devoirs que lui impose le soin de garantir la position de l'Allemagne en Orient pour toutes les éventualités.

Quant à la démarche commune de l'Autriche et de la Prusse près de la Diète, nous lui attribuons encore aujourd'hui, comme toujours nous l'avons fait, la plus grande importance. Nous nous sommes efforcés avec soin et persévérance de nous tenir sur la ligne que la Prusse et nos confédérées doivent reconnaître avec nous comme la véritable. Dans l'affaire du Holstein que rappelle le Cabinet de Berlin, les commotions universelles ont empêché la Prusse d'observer la même conduite. On ne doit donc tirer du dénouement aucune induction si ce n'est que l'accord de la Prusse et de l'Autriche a pour toute l'Allemagne une valeur essentielle.

Nous croyons dans cet état des choses pouvoir encore maintenant vous imposer le devoir de recommander une action complétement concordante des Représentants des deux Puissances auprès de la Diète. Dans cette supposition nous vous communiquons l'instruction éventuelle, ci-jointe en copie, que nous avons adressée à M. de Prokesch avec l'autorisation d'en faire part confidentiellement à M. de Manteuffel, en lui faisant observer que nous ne comptons point en faire usage avant que le Cabinet Prussien ait fait réponse sur son contenu.

Vous voudrez bien aussi laisser copie de la présente dépêche entre les mains du Président du Conseil.

No. 336.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 27*, 1854.

I LEARN from a confidential but authentic source, that a note was addressed on the 22nd instant by the Prussian Cabinet to the Russian Government, counselling the Emperor Nicholas to accept the four conditions for peace which he had lately rejected, and stating, that in the event of his non-compliance, Prussia would be forced to abandon her present neutral policy.

This note is reported to have forcibly expressed to the Emperor of Russia the present difficult position of Prussia in consequence of the menacing attitude assumed by Austria and the probable defection from her of the smaller German States.

I have very great reason to suppose that this step has been taken at the instigation of Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister. His language has within the last few days assumed a most conciliatory and pacific tone, and in a conversation on the risks and losses to which Russia was now exposed in the Crimea, he stated, "Cela m'est bien égal pourvu que nous puissions avoir la paix. Je suis las de tout cela."

I would here remark to your Lordship, that Russian Agents seldom give vent to any personal sentiment (if they even entertain one) unless it derives its source from a higher quarter, and in the present instance this pacific expression is diametrically opposite to opinions expressed by Baron Budberg previous to the descent on the Crimea.

I cannot but think that at the present moment, when the neutrality of Germany must be regarded by Russia as hopeless, this new intrigue has been devised by Russia, in order (by accepting the four conditions) to detach Germany wholly from the Western Powers, and to prevent it assuming towards her any hostile attitude.

On the other hand, the Prussian Government, I am informed, represent this step as a last effort for peace, and, in case of a refusal, as a reason afforded to them of co-operating with Austria in a more active sense.

I am also confidentially informed that the King of Prussia has strongly urged on Count Nesselrode in a private letter the acceptance of the four conditions, and that His Majesty confidently awaits a favourable reply. It is reported to me that no further answer will be given to Austria until the Prussian Government are in receipt of the Emperor of Russia's decision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 337.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 140. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 27, 1854.*

I LEARN from an undeniable source that the King of Prussia stated, the day previous to Count Esterhazy's return, that he would await his arrival, and the proposals with which he should be charged; and that he would then accede to an arrangement with Austria.

His Majesty added that he would make another appeal to the Emperor of Russia, to induce him to accept the four conditions he had previously rejected; in failure of which, His Majesty declared his readiness to cooperate actively with Austria for the restoration of peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 338.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 141.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 27, 1854.*

THE Marquis de Moustier, the French Minister at this Court, informs me that he had, a few days ago, a very interesting conversation with M. Von der Pfordten.

In the course of this discussion, during which M. Von der Pfordten was very animated, he expressed himself in bitter terms against Austria, stating that she had shown ingratitude towards those who had rendered her such signal service, and restored her influence in Germany. He particularly alluded to the Treaty and engagements into which she had entered both with Turkey and the Western Powers, without any previous consent with the Confederation. He spoke in deprecatory terms of Prussia, and very strongly against England. With respect to the German press, he remarked that it did not represent the opinions of the great majority of the people, but only the revolutionary party; and he stated that for half-a-million he would buy it up, and change completely its tone. He asserted that none but the revolutionary party in Germany were anti-Russian: and that were there "six hommes de moins" in Austria, her policy would be quite changed. To this latter remark M. de Moustier replied, that one of those six was the "Emperor;" and on M. de Moustier remarking that the Austrians could scarcely be called the revolutionary party in Germany, he exclaimed, "Pourcqu'ils marchent entièrement avec vous."

M. Von der Pfordten then defended the policy which he had pursued. He said all he desired was the independence of Germany; that as for the domination of Russia, it was not more to be feared than the preponderance of England and France.

With respect to the Bamberg Coalition, he said that those States had only met to exchange opinions; that undue importance had been given to that meeting; and that with respect to the "memorandum" drawn up, it was only a secret paper intended for the German States, and he expressed great anger at its publication.

He stated that if Austria and Prussia did not come to an understanding, that the Confederation would be dissolved, and that each member would have to provide for his own safety.

Baron de Malzen, the Bavarian Minister at this Court, was present during this conversation, and repeatedly attempted to check the animated and indiscreet language of M. Von der Pfordten, and on the following morning he called on M. de Moustier to excuse the imprudence of his chief.

I have given your Lordship but a faint outline of this conversation; but it affords strong evidence of the disappointment of the ambitious hopes which the head of the Bamberg Coalition had ventured to indulge in.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 339.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October :)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 29, 1854, 1 A.M.*

I RECEIVED this morning the following telegraphic despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bucharest, dated October 26th, 3 P.M.:

"A letter from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna of the 23rd instant, 10 A.M., states that the contents of his last letter are confirmed by another French ship which left the seat of war on the 21st; the Captain said that a breach had been effected by the English batteries.

"The French had not yet completed theirs. This once done the assault should take place immediately. This information is forwarded with reserve in consequence of the private nature of the communication between the Crimea and Varna."

No. 340.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 398.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 25, 1854, 1 A.M.*

THE reports received from the Austrian head-quarters in Bucharest state that the Russian advanced posts on the Danube are at Matchin, Isatcha, Babadagh, and Tultcha.

General Lüders and his staff, and a brigade of Infantry, are at Satarrof. General Engelhardt with the 15th Division and a brigade of Hussars, are at Reni and Wadoul Isaki. General Ouchakoff is at Ismail with three regiments of Infantry, and three regiments of Cossacks. The rest of the 5th corps d'armée, and a division of the 4th, are on the line of the Danube and the Pruth. General Anrep has been sent with his division, some Dragoons, and a brigade of Lancers, and two regiments of Cossacks, to Chotzine, to form a cordon towards Gallicia and the Bukovine.

It also stated that Prince Gortchakoff is at Kicheneff, where he has received the Russian Grand Dukes, and that General Dannenberg is likewise there.

According to these accounts the force of the Russian army in Bessarabia has lately been increased by reinforcements from the interior, so that, including the troops in the Dobrudscha, it amounts to from 100,000 to 120,000 men.

The Russians have began to transport their magazines and hospitals to the left bank of the Dniester. Their flotilla is at Isatcha and Ismail, and a part at Kilia. It is said that the Russians mean to pass their flotilla into the mouth of the Dnieper, and that it is for that purpose that they keep possession of the Dobrudscha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 341.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 399.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 25, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Bourqueney and myself have this day received a telegraphic despatch from Bucharest, addressed to us conjointly by MM. Colquhoun and Poujade, in which these gentlemen state

that they had communicated to Omer Pasha our telegraphic message of the 16th instant (a copy of which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch No. 387 of that day), and had received from the Turkish Commander-in-chief a verbal reply to the effect that he considered any important movement on the Pruth as now useless; that the Russian troops which had left Bessarabia for the Crimea could no longer be turned away from their destination; that the season was too far advanced to allow of a campaign in Bessarabia; that Varna was the point at which a disposable force was now required, and that he had taken the necessary measures to that effect. The despatch ends, however, by stating that Omer Pasha proposed to reinforce the division at Ibraila by an additional brigade, so as to keep the Russians in alarm and uncertainty as to the movements of his troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 342.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 660.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1854.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 590, containing copies of correspondence bearing on the discussions which have taken place at Bucharest between Dervish Pasha and Count Coronini.

Her Majesty's Government trust that these painful and unseemly differences are now at an end, but the fault does not appear to lie exclusively with the Austrian authorities. The Porte determined to have a judicial inquiry into the conduct of Prince Stirbey. Her Majesty's Government and the Austrian Government considered this to be both proper and necessary. But instead of proceeding with it at once, an invitation was sent by Dervish Pasha to Prince Stirbey to return to Bucharest, and resume his functions; and then a notice was published by the Turkish authorities there that the Prince was not to be received with honour, and in such a course there was neither consistency nor prudence.

Count Coronini appears to have conducted himself throughout in an arrogant manner; still Her Majesty's Government cannot forget that Dervish Pasha was the man who, when acting as Commissioner for settling the Turco-Persian boundary, forcibly seized upon Kotoor, in defiance of the British Commissioner, and in disregard of the obligations of his own Sovereign. He is violent and unscrupulous, and should not have been selected for the office he now fills, which is one of a delicate nature, and requiring tact and moderation for dealing with the various embarrassing questions that were certain to arise out of a joint occupation of the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 343.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon—(*Received October* 31, 2·45 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October* 30, 1854, 2 P.M.

THE Russian Legation here has given circulation to a telegraphic despatch dated Warsaw, the 29th, with news from Sebastopol of the 23rd.

Prince Menchikoff states, "that matters are taking a favourable turn for the besieged; that the bombardment caused but little damage to the fortifications; and the allied fleets had suffered."

In a second despatch Prince Menchikoff adds, "that the besieged had made a successful sortie, and had spiked some French mortars and guns. Lord Dunkellin had been taken prisoner."

I send you these Russian accounts as I have received them; but having, myself, no direct information by which to form a judgment as to their value.

No. 344.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received* .)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October* 31, 1854.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF has received a telegraphic despatch from Warsaw, with intelligence from Sebastopol of the 25th, which states that the Russian army had attacked the detached camp of the English, and had taken redoubts which covered it, and eleven cannon. At the same time an attack of cavalry took place, in which the English lost nearly half their Light Cavalry under Lord Cardigan, who escaped with great difficulty. This intelligence, coming from the Russian head-quarters, you will judge how much value is to be attached to its details.

No. 345.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 1,307.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 31, 1854.

IT was next to impossible that, with the opinion I entertained of the Emperor's letter to the widow of the late Marshal St. Arnaud, I should see M. Drouyn de Lhuys without mentioning the subject to him. Accordingly, during the first interview which I had with his Excellency after its publication, I pointed out to him the effect which I feared the expression of "timides avis" must have in England and among the English Generals in the Crimea. I was quite certain, I said, that the Emperor had not seen the sense which must necessarily be given to them, or he would have avoided employing the words; but that I trusted there would be greater circumspection in future, for I could not answer for the consequences if such language was repeated.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was profuse in his assurances that no imputation upon any Englishman was intended by the expressions to which I alluded. He said that he would write to the Emperor upon the subject, who, he was certain, would confirm these assurances.

I heard no more on this matter until this morning, when I saw the accompanying article in the "Moniteur," explaining that the obnoxious words applied only to the diversities of opinion respecting an expedition to the Crimea, which were known to have existed in the French military and naval services.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon. His Excellency said that he had written to the Emperor after his conversation with me, and that His Majesty had ordered, in consequence, the insertion in the "Moniteur" of the explanatory article to which I have the honour to call your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 345.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of October 31, 1854.

Paris, le 30 *Octobre.*

CES mots de la lettre de l'Empereur à la Maréchale de Saint-Arnaud: "résistant à de timides avis," ont servi de texte à de fausses interprétations. Ils avaient pour unique but de faire ressortir particulièrement l'énergie du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud en l'opposant aux dissidences fort naturelles des opinions qui, à la veille d'une résolution aussi grave, se sont manifestées dans les conseils de l'armée et de la flotte Françaises.

No. 346.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 1.)

Chaumont, le 1 Novembre, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French Minister here has just received from the French Consul-General at Bucharest the following telegraphic despatch, dated the 30th instant:

"The movement made by Sadyk Pasha has already caused Prince Gortchakoff to order the troops that had not yet crossed the Dneister, to return to their positions on the Pruth and the Danube. Achma Pasha, by order of Omer Pasha, has quitted Baharasch with 10,000 men to join Sadyk Pasha. Iscender Bey was to leave Rassova yesterday with 4,000 Cavalry, and to enter the Dobrudscha.

"My English colleague begs that you will communicate this intelligence to the British Minister at Vienna.

"P.S.—The English steamer the 'Trent' left Sebastopol on the 25th, and arrived at Varna on the evening of the 26th. The bombardment continued without interruption, and with the greatest vigour; some guns directed against the gates of the city. The number of dead was so great as to infect the town. Admiral Nachimoff had been killed by a shell."

No. 347.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 69.)

Munich, October 28, 1854.

My Lord,

THE messenger Drury arrived here on the morning of the 24th instant, and delivered to me your Lordship's despatches to No. 63 inclusive.

The accounts which have reached this place of the proceedings of M. Von der Pfordten, at Berlin, are so extremely vague and uncertain, that I hesitate to detain your Lordship with them. All that has transpired respecting them is, that he has pronounced himself satisfied with his reception at Berlin, and it is now reported that he is about to proceed to Vienna, which is interpreted here in a favourable sense.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 348.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 128. Confidential.)

Frankfort, October 30, 1854.

My Lord,

THE position of matters in reference to the Oriental question in the Diet is so slightly changed since my last public reports to your Lordship that, were it not that my transmitting this despatch by messenger enables me to mention names, I should have no occasion to give it a confidential character.

The influence of Austria is rather in the ascendant than otherwise.

I have had, recently, occasion to converse with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Grand Ducal Hesse and of Nassau, Baron Dalwigk and Prince Wittgenstein, and both have given me to understand, unequivocally, that their leanings are Austrian.

I have had assurances of similar import from the Representative of Hesse Cassel, Baron de Trott, as to his Government; and the Baden Minister, M. de Dungern, has also spoken of passing events in a way to lead me to infer that

any decided move on the part of Austria would have the support of his Government.

If what is reported of Hanover be correct, viz., that the vote of that State will be decidedly Austrian, this would give six votes to be deducted from the Bamberg coalitionists; and as Austria can command at least two of the minor votes, the Diet would be equally divided, if it were not that the President has a casting vote, so that a majority of one would remain to the Cabinet of Vienna.

All that has yet reached us in relation to M. Von der Pfordten's efforts to bring about a good understanding between the two great Powers, is too vague and conjectural to lay before your Lordship.

It is, however, asserted in well-informed quarters, that if an understanding between Austria and Prussia should be brought about, good care will be taken to let it be known that it was not obtained by any efforts of the Bavarian Statesman, but by the necessities of the case and by the mutual moderation of the two Cabinets.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 349.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 9.)

Stuttgardt, October 25, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON DE TALLEYRAND, the French Minister at Baden, showed me at Carlsruhe on the 17th instant, a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 14th, which he was about to communicate to Baron de Rüdt, setting forth with great clearness and ability the mischievous effect upon the Eastern question of the want of unanimity in Germany; maintaining the impossibility of Germany's neutrality in the existing struggle; and forcibly recommending the Government of Baden to give full support to Austria in the Oriental discussions which might take place at Frankfort.

My departure from Carlsruhe prevented me from seeing Baron de Talleyrand after his interview, but he informed me that not long since Baron de Rüdt had told him that he disapproved of the Prussian distinction between German and European interests, and that he had instructed the Baden Minister at Frankfort to speak in that sense.

With me Baron de Rüdt lamented the want of practical views in the King of Prussia, but strongly praised His Majesty's conscientiousness, whilst his Excellency passed the highest eulogy on the good sense and loyalty of the Prince of Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 350.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, November 1, 1854.

MR. COLQUHOUN sends to me from Bucharest, October 30, news from Sebastopol of the 25th.

Some English engineers, deserted from Sebastopol to our lines, represent that the town was pestilential from the number of dead bodies in the streets. Provisions were very short. Reinforcements are said to have joined Menchikoff, and some part of his army appears to have come round to the south near Balakhava. Skirmishes daily take place. The upper tier of Fort Constantine completely destroyed. Two line of-battle ships which were firing shells at us from the inner or south port sunk by one of our batteries. The Commandant of Sebastopol, the same that commanded Sinope, killed by a shell.

No. 351.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 3.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 28 Octobre, 1854, à minuit.*

LE capitaine d'un transport à vapeur Anglais, qui a quitté Balaklava le 26 au soir, confirme en grand partie les avis apportés ce matin par un bâtiment Français et transmis de suite à Londres par voie de Marseilles. Il paraît que les Russes ont attaqué les forts dans le voisinage de Balaklava le 25. On leur prête un nombre d'environ 30,000 hommes. L'attaque fut imprévue. Les Cosaques ont précédé l'Infanterie. Pour leur résister d'abord il y avait des troupes Ottomanes et des Ecossais. Les Turcs ont lâché pied sans même enclouer les canons, qui, saisis par les Russes, furent tournés contr'eux. Les Ecossais, au contraire, sont restés fermes dans leur position. D'autres forces sont arrivées et les Russes ont dû céder le terrain; en restant, pourtant, maîtres de deux forts, d'où ils tiraient sur les autres. Trois régiments de Cavalerie Légère Anglaise, exposés au feu croisé des batteries Russes, ont souffert immensément. Les Français ont pris part à l'affaire avec une bravoure admirable. Le lendemain leur position fut attaquée par un corps de 8,000 Russes, soit du côté de la ville, soit de celui de Balaklava. Ils ont repoussé l'ennemi avec un grand carnage. En général la perte des Russes a dû être des plus fortes. On affirme que le feu des batteries de la ville s'était beaucoup ralenti, et, d'après le dire des officiers blessés, dont quelques uns sont arrivés à Buyukdéré, on persistait à croire que Sebastopol serait bientôt entre les mains des alliés. Voilà à peu près ce qu'on vient de recueillir de plusieurs personnes, qui ont été témoins oculaires de ce qui s'est passé. Les noms des tués et blessés sont réservés pour l'occasion officielle. Parmi les noms cités celui d'aucun officier général ne figure.

No. 352.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 1,315.) *Paris, November 3, 1854.*

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY writes word that M. de Buol is determined not to listen to M. Von der Pfordten's attempt to control the future action of Austria. Under no circumstances will M. de Buol engage that Austria shall not attack Russia; and if asked to what terms of peace he will consent, he intends to reply that it is a question which must be addressed to France and England, and not to Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 353.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 1,326.) *Paris, November 4, 1854.*

My Lord,

MARSHAL VAILLANT informed me yesterday that he had received the Emperor's orders to write to Omer Pasha to engage that General to send a Turkish division along the Pruth, so as to threaten an invasion of Bessarabia. It might be possible, the Marshal says in his letter to Omer Pasha, under favourable circumstances, to convert the feint into a real attack, and to march on Kishenew. At all events, the presence of a large body of Ottoman troops on this side of the Pruth must prevent Prince Gortchakoff from weakening the army under his command by sending a part to the Crimea.

In the same letter the Marshal inquires whether Omer Pasha can do nothing to destroy the flotilla of Russian gunboats which is still on the Danube, and to get possession of the large magazines which it is understood the Russians have formed at Reni, Ismail, and Kilianova.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 354.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 598. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 19, 1854.*

THE departure of Baron Dumont, who was sent to Constantinople by Count Coronini to obtain the recall of Dervish Pasha, has been postponed for a week. The Internuncio continues meanwhile to press the object of his mission. Reshid Pasha having applied for my opinion, I told him that while the charges against the Sultan's Commissioner were couched in general terms, I did not see how the Porte could acquiesce in the demands of Austria without risking in some degree its character and independence. Baron Bruck being, in consequence, called upon to define his heads of accusation against Dervish Pasha, instructed his interpreter to make a verbal statement comprising sundry charges, among which are, a course manner of proceeding; a demonstration of strong prejudices against Prince Stirbey; an offensive style of communication with the Austrian functionaries; and a want of fidelity in the execution of his instructions; the conclusion being that Count Coronini had found it impossible to act in concert with him, and that if he remained in Wallachia, the Count would hold no intercourse whatever with his Excellency. Such is the substance of what Reshid Pasha stated to M. Benedetti and myself this morning, at the same time that he requested to know our opinions, and declared the readiness of the Porte to act accordingly.

It cannot be denied that the question which we are called to decide is full of embarrassment. On the one side there is no possibility of maintaining with propriety that the conduct and manner of Dervish Pasha are free from objection and liability to blame. On the other, the Ottoman Commissioner has had to execute his instructions under new and unexpected circumstances; he has displayed much zeal for the interests and dignity of his Sovereign; the Austrian functionaries are themselves by no means free from blame; and while the faults of Dervish Pasha are open to correction by the usual means of explanatory instructions, his recall on a peremptory demand from Count Coronini would be, more or less, an humiliation for the Porte, and a practical admission of much that is wrong in the conduct of Austria or its Agents.

A lively perception of the difficulty resulting from these opposite considerations, and of the expediency of avoiding any improper concession while striving to bring the parties destined to cooperate with each other into better harmony, led to an early agreement as to the most advisable mode of proceeding. It was evident that if the Commissioner had completed his work, he might return with the advantage of removing a cause of estrangement from Austria, without in any way compromising the honour of the Porte, or the principles which it was necessary to uphold. Now, the objects of Dervish Pasha's commission were two, namely, the restoration of legal order in Wallachia, and an inquiry into Prince Stirbey's conduct. The former object was already accomplished; the latter required only a report from the Commissioner to be equally complete. Dervish Pasha had been at Bucharest long enough to obtain the requisite information; if he had obtained it, he could come away at once with perfect consistency; if not, he could be ordered to complete his inquiry without delay, and then return to Constantinople. In either case his stay in Wallachia would be more or less brief, and his retirement would be according to the natural order of things.

One difficulty, however, remained. Count Coronini had declared that he would have no further dealings with the Commissioner; whereas the Commissioner had been instructed to inform him of the progress or result of his inquiry. It was therefore proposed that Dervish Pasha, on the completion of his inquiries, should acquaint the Austrian General with his readiness to communicate their substance to him; and in case of Count Coronini's declining to receive the communication, or returning no answer, the Ottoman Commissioner should consider his duty in that respect discharged, and equally return to Constantinople.

But a point of greater importance remained to be considered in connection

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with what more particularly regarded the person of Dervish Pasha. The Porte, as the Ottoman Secretary of State unhesitatingly declared, is not disposed to give its confidence to Prince Stirbey; but, on the contrary, it has come to the resolution of dismissing him, even on grounds independent of any opinions expressed by its Commissioner, who, nevertheless, by the transmission of corroborative facts, may further justify and confirm the unfavourable impression already entertained.

By adopting this course, the Sultan's Cabinet would deprive the Austrian Government of every pretext for maintaining Prince Stirbey as Hospodar, on the allegation of Dervish Pasha's opinions against his Highness being a mere effect of prejudice and animosity.

Prince Stirbey's correspondence with Prince Gortchakoff, already transmitted to your Lordship, might alone be considered as warranting a decision for his removal, even if all recollection of the circumstances recorded in Mr. Colquhoun's correspondence were extinguished.

Reshid Pasha has undertaken to draw up an answer to the Internuncio, on the basis of this understanding; and an opportunity of suggesting remarks and amendments will be afforded to M. Benedetti and myself before the paper is consigned to its destination.

The matter is one which evidently requires the most delicate arrangement: and I shall be anxious to learn that the course which I am pursuing, in concert with the French Chargé d'Affaires, has met with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 355.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 599.) *Therapia, October* 19, 1854.

My Lord,

THE French Chargé d'Affaires has apprized me of his having instructions to suggest to the Porte the extreme importance of fixing, by means of a special agreement adopted in common, the several positions of the parties now called upon to take an immediate interest in the affairs of the Danubian Principalities. He expressed at the same time a wish and a hope that I might feel myself at liberty to cooperate with him for the accomplishment of that object.

Though I have not yet received any corresponding instructions from your Lordship, I find no difficulty in affording to M. Benedetti the support he desires, and I trust that in so doing I only anticipate your Lordship's intentions.

I am careful, however, while taking this line, to know the precise terms of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' instruction to the French Embassy, and to abstain from committing Her Majesty's Government prematurely to anything like an engagement.

An extract of the instruction, obtained from M. Benedetti, is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information; and Reshid Pasha has undertaken to throw upon paper the draft of a communication to the two Embassies embodying the points on which a formal agreement is thought to be desirable, and submitting it for consideration in a confidential shape.

The meeting at which this mode of proceeding was adopted, took place this morning, and I do not expect to receive Reshid Pasha's communication before the departure of the messenger to-morrow. The French instruction will, however, enable your Lordship to anticipate the general purport of it, and I propose to resume the subject by the next opportunity.

Meanwhile, I have apprized the Ottoman Minister of my being unprovided with your Lordship's instructions on the matter in question, though, in acting upon the French instruction, I feel confident that the course proposed tends to a good result on principles generally approved and indeed recommended by Her Majesty's Government. The cloud of uncertainty which still hangs over the policy of Austria, and the frequent divergencies between the assurances given by Count Buol and the language held by the Austrian Agents, both here and in

Wallachia, make it, indeed, extremely desirable that the positions should be settled, and the duties which they involve clearly and unmistakeably defined.

If Her Majesty's Government agree with that of France in recommending the several points, as the Porte may be prepared to draw them out, to the acceptance of Austria, Reshid Pasha would, I conceive, be authorized to sign, in concert with the three Representatives here, a formal instrument calculated to give them a practical and permanent effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 355.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. Benedetti.

(Extrait.) *Le 4 Octobre*, 1854.

MON intention ne saurait être d'ailleurs, Monsieur, de me livrer à des récriminations, et je ne songe plus qu'à rechercher un mode d'accord qui empêche l'occupation Autrichienne en Valachie et en Moldavie de devenir une pierre d'achoppement pour les bonnes relations de la Cour d'Autriche avec la Turquie et avec nous. Il nous serait assurément très difficile à distance d'arrêter tous les détails d'un plan qui répondit à ce but, mais il me semble que l'on pourrait pour certains principes qui, arrêtés en commun par la Porte et ses alliés et consignés dans un Acte diplomatique, serviraient à guider les autorités chargées de les appliquer. Ainsi les pouvoirs du Général Commandant-en-chef les troupes d'occupation seraient limités aux besoins de son armée, à son entretien et à sa sûreté.

L'administration proprement dite appartiendrait en entier aux Hospodars; les fonctionnaires indigènes ne relèveraient que d'eux et ne recevraient des ordres que par leur intermédiaire. Il serait entendu que, non seulement toutes les routes des deux Principautés demeureraient librement ouvertes à l'armée Ottomanes et aux nôtres, mais que les forces militaires de la Turquie et de ses alliés occuperaient sans obstacle les points indiqués par les nécessités de la stratégie. La Porte enfin aurait le droit d'envoyer, quand bon lui semblerait, des Commissaires à Bucharest et à Jassy soit pour s'enquérir de l'état de choses, soit pour réclamer le concours effectif des Principautés dans une guerre dont elles sont appelées au rétablissement de la paix à recueillir de réels avantages.

Je vous prie, Monsieur, de communiquer à Réchid Pacha les idées sommaires que M. le Comte Walewski exposera de son côté à Lord Clarendon, et si elles sont approuvées, nous pourrions inviter M. le Baron de Bourqueney et Lord Westmorland à se concerter avec M. le Comte de Buol et le Ministre Ottoman à Vienne pour les sanctionner officiellement. L'arrangement qui serait conclu à cette occasion constaterait une fois de plus que l'organisation actuelle des Principautés n'est que provisoire et que sa forme définitive ne doit résulter que d'une entente entre les signataires de la note du 8 Août d'une part, et de la Turquie de l'autre.

No. 356.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 600. Confidential.) *Therapia, October* 19, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's confidential information, are letters addressed to me by Colonel Simmons.

Those portions of them which relate to the condition of Omer Pasha's army, and the consequent necessity of opening a wider range for recruitment, will not escape your Lordship's observation. The suggestions thrown out on Omer Pasha's authority correspond with information received and advice tendered by me to the Porte several years ago, and I am inclined to think that the time is now at hand when a new source of strength may be opened to the

Turkish Empire in connection with those administrative reforms, involving an extension of Christian privileges, which are now under the immediate and, as I venture to hope, the serious consideration of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 356.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, October* 11, 1854.

IN a communication which I had yesterday with his Highness Omer Pasha, he expressed his intentions as to his mode of procedure here now that Prince Stirbey has returned, and desired me to communicate them confidentially to your Lordship.

His Highness said that he considered the Prince's return entirely as a concession to Austria, and although he could not personally approve of the resumption of authority by the Prince, still, as he had returned under arrangements entered into between the Porte and her allies, he felt himself bound to accept that condition, and visits have accordingly been exchanged between the Prince and himself.

He added that it was not his intention in any way to interfere with or to counsel the Prince as to the operation of his government, which, being left entirely free to himself, he would have an opportunity of showing his inclinations unfettered, and proving whether henceforth he desired to promote the interests of his Suzerain or those of a foreign State.

His Highness intends therefore to maintain a strict attitude of observation.

If no amelioration in the government takes places, or if it continue as formerly, and Russian agents, or those strongly inclined towards the interests of Russia, are introduced into power, it will be his duty as a military Commander to represent the circumstances to his Government, and to the allied Commanders, and to declare the impossibility of acting with his army in the field, that is, if the operations continue in this quarter of the Empire, so long as its movements are liable to be known in detail to the enemy, and to have obstacles placed in their way by the local authorities, with whom he will have to communicate in utilizing the resources of the country.

His Highness, assuring me that he was incapable of deceiving your Lordship, and that he used all possible means to prevent his being deceived, so that he might not unintentionally deceive, desired me to inform your Lordship that he was perfectly satisfied with the honesty and loyalty of Dervish Pasha's acts and intentions towards Austria. He desired me to point out to your Lordship that Austria holds two distinct languages at Constantinople and at Bucharest, and that by her representations at the former she endeavours to make it to be believed that Dervish Pasha has already acted in such a manner that any report which he may make with reference to Prince Stirbey will not be free from prejudice, and therefore not worthy of that credit which would ensue from an impartial judgment of the matters brought to his attention.

His Highness desires me to assure your Lordship on the contrary that the conduct of Dervish Pasha here has been most loyal towards Austria and the interests committed to his charge, and he is perfectly satisfied of the purity and goodness of his intentions in these respects.

With respect to the instructions which have been sent to him as to the movement of his troops to the front, his Highness desires me to inform your Lordship that the time has now passed when such a movement could be useful with reference to what is taking place in the Crimea, and that, therefore, he cannot now make any proposition to that effect to the Austrian Commander-in-chief, especially as the movement at this season would entail much fatigue, and probably considerable loss, on the troops. He feels that he has done all that was possible towards making the movement, and that it is solely due to Austria that it was not made, and therefore that Power must bear the entire responsibility, if any portion of the Russian army of the Danube has been transferred to take part in the operations of the Crimea.

His Highness added, that after the late satisfactory information received from the Crimea, he has every confidence that the Russian reinforcements will not arrive in sufficient time or strength to be brought to act efficiently against the allies, although he has strong reason to believe that large bodies of troops have been for some time in march from the army of the Danube to the Crimea, under the command of General Lüders.

In the communications which his Highness has had with Count Coronini, the Count has pressed upon him the advisability of his taking measures to compel the small body of Russians, which may amount to 3,000 or 4,000 men, now in the lower part of the Dobrudscha towards Isaktchi and Toultcha, to recross the Danube.

His Highness desired me to inform your Lordship that he does not take, nor wish to take, any steps against these troops, as he does not consider their position dangerous or very injurious. Moreover, as Austria has declared her object to be to obtain for Germany the free navigation of the Danube, he does not consider that this object is obtained so long as the Russians occupy both banks of the Danube, including all its mouths, and therefore he considers it desirable to leave this small force of Russians unmolested in the Dobrudscha pending the assumption of a more decided attitude by Austria; and he added, that unless Austria interferes to procure the abandonment of this position by the Russians, it cannot be considered that the military occupation of the Principalities by Austria has secured one of the conditions which Austria, as well as the allied Powers, deem essential to a re-establishment of peace, viz., the free navigation of the Danube.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 356.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Bucharest, October* 11, 1854.

OMER PASHA thinks it absolutely necessary that decided measures should be taken for the enlistment of the army from the Christian subjects of the Porte, as he conceives there is a prospect of a continuation of the war, and unless such measures be taken, the Ottoman army will within a short period cease to exist.

He considers it impossible that the Mahomedan subjects of the Porte can supply the necessary numbers for the recruitment of the army, and that the present moment is particularly favourable to commence drawing from the Christian element, especially as there are a number of foreign officers who are anxious to serve in the army, who could be usefully employed in organizing and commanding these troops until officers can be formed from among the Christian subjects of the Porte themselves.

The outline which he proposes for adoption in the first instance, is to form a fourth battalion of Christians to serve with every three battalions of Mahomedans, a proportion which he considers could not be dangerous to the Empire, and which the Christians, after the liberties which have lately been conferred upon them by the Sultan, may reasonably be called upon to supply. The experiment has been tried by the Pasha, and to a certain extent successfully, by the measure he adopted about four months ago, when he formed two companies from the Christian Miridites, who were compulsorily converted from irregular into regular troops for leaving the fortress of Silistria without orders during the siege.

A second measure which he intends to propose for consideration is to raise a force of 15,000 men in Wallachia, and probably some in Moldavia, either as an augmentation to the local militia, or to serve with the armies of the Porte.

The other measures which he considers as requiring immediate attention are the recruitment of the Mahomedan battalions, and the formation of depôts for the maintenance of the army on the footing upon which it may be decided to keep it.

No. 357.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 601.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 19, 1854.

SIR STEPHEN LAKEMAN, who has recently appeared, under the Mahomedan title of Mazhar Pasha, in the service of the Ottoman Generalissimo, has addressed me, in explanation of his conduct as Commandant of Bucharest, on the approach of Prince Stirbey to that city. His letter is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information, and I add to it, in copy also, a letter addressed to me by Colonel Simmons upon the same subject.

The Anglo-Turkish Commandant may, in my humble judgment, fairly compete with General Popovitch in want of attention to the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety. How he could think of applying to the Hospodar, still invested with the Porte's authority, such terms as he has employed in his letter to the police, or how he could purpose to carry out the object of his communication without publishing the notice, I am at a loss to conceive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 357.

Sir Stephen Lakeman to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Bucharest, October* , 1854.

I HAVE taken the liberty to send your Lordship the following letter, because its contents are not only an explanation of my conduct, but relate also to public matters.

When I took the post which I at present occupy, namely, that of Commandant of the town of Bucharest, a bitter feeling had already sprung up between the Turkish and Austrian authorities; this I considered it my duty to allay by every possible means: thus by visits that were never returned, by courteous letters that were not answered, I attempted the difficult task; before however any good results could be obtained, Prince Stirbey announced his early arrival at Bucharest. Omer Pasha having previously left town without giving me any orders as to the line of conduct I was to pursue, I was left entirely to my own resources, and therefore determined to be guided by that common justice to all parties which an Englishman always supposes every one is entitled to. If I therefore forbade triumphant public demonstrations (by order of the police), it was because public opinion condemned them. If I prevented military honours being paid the Prince, it was because he had not thought proper to inform the Ottoman authorities of his intended arrival; and it was to carry out this line of conduct that I sent the following letter to the Prefect of Police:

"M. le Préfet,

"Vû les accusations graves, nombreuses, et officielles qui pèsent aujourd'hui sur le Prince Stirbey; vû la répugnance de la majeure partie des notabilités et des habitants de la ville à voir même le retour du Prince dans les circonstances, j'ai cru de mon devoir de déférer au sentiment public.

"En conséquence je vous invite, M. le Préfet, d'empêcher à ce qu'on élève des arcs de triomphe, donner des adresses, &c., &c., afin d'empêcher par tous les moyens possibles à ce que des manifestations intempérées ne viennent aigrir les esprits et faire éclater des désordres.

(Signé) "Mazhar Pacha,

"*Commandant Militaire de la ville de Bucharest.*"

Before I sent this letter I had had a long conversation with Dervish Pasha, who told me that he should consider any demonstration of joy an insult to the Sublime Porte, for he knew that the people would raise no triumphal arches, &c., and, therefore, he would not allow a false triumph, in which it might be

supposed that his Government took no part, and he desired me to send a letter to that effect to the police. I must here beg to remark to your Lordship that my letter bears no resemblance to a proclamation, neither had I the remotest intention that it should be taken as such; if the police thought proper to get it printed, it was their act and not mine, although I am quite willing to take the responsibility, as I see nothing reprehensible in the wish to spread an order that was evidently intended to prevent disturbances.

Count Coronini, being informed that such a letter was to be published, sent General Popovitch to the printing office, who attempted to obtain possession of it in the name and by the order of Count Coronini; in this he failed, as the printer refused to give it up, unless upon a written order of the Prefect of Police, by whom it had been left with him. The Austrian General, however, at length succeeded in the following manner: "Mais, M. l'Imprimeur, si vous ne voulez pas me la donner, laissez-moi au moins la lire." This the printer allowed him to do: when the Austrian General said, "C'est très bien; bon jour," puts the manuscript in his pocket and walks away.

Count Coronini having thus obtained the letter, went to Dervish Pasha, and asked him what it meant, at the same time threatening to leave Bucharest. Dervish Pasha, ignorant of the exact wording, although he knew its purport, asked to see the letter, and, after reading it, told Count Coronini that it met with his decided approval. Thus thwarted he left Dervish Pasha, who immediately sent for me, and desired that I should go and see Count Coronini, and endeavour to appease him. I went; and tried every means in my power to do so. I said that the letter was dictated by no other motives than those of preventing a disturbance; that I knew positively, from official and other sources, that if any demonstrations were made in favour of Prince Stirbey, counter ones would also take place. This, Count Coronini denied; he said, that he was determined to put down all demagogues with a strong hand; that he had just received a letter from his Ambassador at Constantinople, in which he was told that they held him responsible for any political disturbances, which they had good reason to believe would be attempted when the Prince entered Bucharest; he was therefore fully prepared for them, and I need not be afraid of any counter demonstration succeeding. I told him that I thought he took a position which virtually deprived the Ottoman Government of its sovereignty in the Principalities; that, however, Dervish Pasha must decide upon; I merely obeyed his orders, and I trusted they would not, for the sake of all parties, be found on a closer examination to differ much from his own. He said that if disturbances took place, he should not wait to see if our orders agreed, but should act independently. He was pleased further to say, that men had no right to judge the conduct of Princes; that letters like mine had brought Louis XVI to the scaffold; that "il faut toujours agir avec beaucoup de délicatesse en matière politique;" and many other things of the same nature, to which I considered it unnecessary to reply; for little did I think, whilst he was reading over and making his remarks upon my letter, that it was the manuscript he held in his hand.

I then left Count Coronini, and reported his conversation to Dervish Pasha; who said that it was becoming a very serious matter, and he thought I had better suspend the publication, and even withdraw the letter altogether. To the latter course I demurred, on the plea that it was derogatory to himself, and to me, thus to eat our own words; but that, as I had never given orders to have the letter printed, I would willingly consent to prevent its being done. To the latter course he at last agreed; and I gave the necessary orders to stop the printing. It was then only, when my aide-de-camp went to the printer's, that I became aware of General Popovitch's proceedings before-mentioned. I now considered it necessary, for the honour and dignity of the Sublime Porte, that the letter should be published; and accordingly sent a detachment of Turkish soldiers to the printer's office, wrote the letter a second time, and had it printed. An Austrian officer presented himself at the door whilst the printing was going on; but on being told that any attempt to enter would be resisted by force, contented himself with protesting.

The Prefect of Police now came to me, and said that he plainly saw a conflict would take place, for the friends of the Prince, supported by the Austrians, were determined to make a demonstration in his favour, and he could not then answer for the results: he further said, that he saw but one way to

prevent it, and that was to go to Giurgevo, and inform the Prince of the true state of affairs; and he asked to be allowed to do so. I consulted with Dervish Pasha on the point, but he refused to give an opinion. Thus left to myself, everybody shrinking from responsibility, I decided upon allowing him to go. Things remained in this state until the Prefect returned; when he told me that he had been charged officially, by Prince Stirbey, to inform Count Coronini that it was his (the Prince's) earnest wish that no Austrian troops should be sent to meet him; but that, nevertheless, Count Coronini persisted in doing so; which, however, he did not do to any great extent (three regiments only); but still, this was in opposition to what he had told Dervish Pasha a few days previously, viz., that he intended to send one squadron only to the Barrière, and a guard of honour to the palace. The Prince was received by the inhabitants in the deepest silence.

These are the facts, my Lord, relating to this case; and I trust your Lordship will find in them a sufficient justification for my asking for your support should any unfair charge be brought against me at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STEPHEN LAKEMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 357.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Bucharest, October* 14, 1854.

YOUR Lordship is aware, by letters from Mr. Colquhoun, and also from one which has lately been addressed to your Lordship by Mazhar Pasha (Sir Stephen Lakeman), of the circumstances relating to a certain letter written by Mazhar Pasha to the Aga of Police here, having reference to the return of Prince Stirbey to this city.

It having been the subject of conversation yesterday with Omer Pasha, he desired me to inform your Lordship that he was aware that the conduct of Mazhar Pasha was being made the subject of representations to the Ottoman Government at Constantinople, and therefore he was desirous your Lordship should know that he attributed it entirely to Mazhar Pasha's letter that there were no disturbances when the Prince entered the capital.

His Highness is certain that in the prospect of a favourable demonstration being prepared by the Prince's partisans, counter demonstrations were meditated, and actually in course of preparation, which would probably have been the signal for riot and disorder. For instance, he stated that bouquets of onions were prepared to be thrown upon the Prince, in return for any similar demonstration of flowers.

As your Lordship is aware, the day passed off in perfect tranquillity; and although, perhaps, the language in the letter in question, which Mazhar Pasha never intended for publication, may be strong, the fact of the order which reigned must be taken as most satisfactory, especially as, in the present state of the feelings of the inhabitants, it cannot be doubted that any demonstration against the Prince would have been equally directed against the Austrians, who are, as they themselves are perfectly aware, unpopular to a degree almost amounting to detestation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 358.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 602.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 19, 1854.

RESHID PASHA has communicated to me the despatch, or rather, confidential letter, of which a copy is inclosed herewith, from the Turkish Envoy in London to his Highness.

Of the information on which your Lordship acted in speaking to M. Musurus on the subject-matter of his letter to the Pasha, I perceive traces in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' conversation with Lord Cowley, as reported in the correspondence from Paris.

Reshid Pasha denies, in positive terms, that he ever addressed to Count Coronini the letter imputed to him; and I do not remember to have heard of anything which may be quoted in corroboration of the contrary supposition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 358.

M. Musurus to Reshid Pasha.

Monseigneur, *Londres, le* 3 *Octobre*, 1854.

LORD CLARENDON m'a dit, à l'occasion d'une entrevue que j'ai eue, il y a quatre jours, avec sa Seigneurie, que d'après des renseignements qu'il tenait d'une source non pas d'autorité Anglaise, mais cependant assez digne d'être prise en considération, votre Altesse, à l'insu des Représentants d'Angleterre et de France à Constantinople, ainsi que d'Omer Pacha et de Dervisch Pacha, aurait adressé à Bucharest, au Général Autrichien Comte Coronini, une lettre par laquelle elle l'aurait autorisé à inviter le Prince Stirbey à retourner en Valachie pour y reprendre ses fonctions; que les Ambassades d'Angleterre et de France auraient protesté contre cette démarche, et qu'Omer Pacha s'en serait tellement formalisé qu'il aurait donné sa démission. Il a ajouté que tandis que sa Seigneurie avait insisté avec succès auprès du Cabinet de Vienne sur la condition de soumettre à une enquête sérieuse la conduite du Prince Stirbey lors de l'invasion Russe, une telle démarche de votre Altesse serait d'autant plus regrettable qu'elle contrarierait gravement la politique du Cabinet Britannique, et neutraliserait ses efforts, par la raison qu'elle offrirait à l'Autriche le moyen d'écarter, en vertu de la lettre adressé au Comte Coronini, toute représentation des deux Puissances Occidentales sur la question Moldo-Valaque, et conférerait ainsi à l'Autriche seule le droit de faire prévaloir son influence en Moldo-Valachie, à l'exclusion de celle de l'Angleterre et de la France, et au grand préjudice des intérêts de la Sublime Porte. Enfin, sa Seigneurie m'a engagé à exprimer à votre Altesse la peine que lui avaient causé ces renseignements, bien qu'ils n'émanassent pas d'une source Anglaise, et d'appeler l'attention de votre Altesse sur une circonstance qui concernait les intérêts les plus chers de la Sublime Porte, non moins que les égards dus à l'Angleterre et la France, dont les efforts tendaient au rétablissement des droits de souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan sur les deux Principautés.

Il est inutile de dire à votre Altesse que j'ai donné le démenti le plus complet et le plus formel aux renseignements dont Lord Clarendon venait de m'entretenir, et que je les ai déclarés avec assurance et sans nulle hésitation dénués de tout fondement. Cependant, n'ayant pas sous la main une preuve plus palpable pour réfuter de telles assertions, je suis rentré immédiatement à l'Ambassade; j'ai cherché dans le "Journal de Constantinople" du 19 Août un article que j'y avais lu au sujet des instructions données à Dervisch Pacha lors de son départ de Constantinople, et qui lui enjoignaient d'inviter le Prince Stirbey à aller reprendre ses fonctions de Hospodar de Valachie. Muni de cette feuille, je suis retourné sur le champ au Foreign Office; et, mettant l'article en question

sous les yeux de sa Seigneurie, je lui ai prouvé que l'invitation pour le Prince Stirbey de retourner à son poste n'avait été adressé ni au Général Coronini ni à l'insu de Dervisch Pacha, qui, au contraire, avait des instructions spéciales à ce sujet; que, lors même que la Sublime Porte aurait omis d'en informer directement Omer Pacha, celui-ci ne s'en serait point formalisé, sachant que c'était Dervisch Pacha qui était chargé de cette mission d'un caractère tout politique; qu'enfin cette circonstance seule suffisait pour démontrer le manque de fondement des renseignements parvenus à sa Seigneurie.

Lord Clarendon m'a répondu qu'il appréciait d'autant plus mes observations que, dans l'intervalle de mon absence il avait vu M. Colloredo, qui lui avait montré la copie de la lettre de Dervisch Pacha concernant l'invitation adressée au Prince Stirbey; que, d'ailleurs, il m'avait déjà fait observer lui-même qu'il ne tenait pas d'une autorité Anglaise les renseignements dont il m'avait parlé, mais que cependant il m'autorisait à faire part à votre Altesse de ses observations sur les renseignements en question.

En mon particulier, si je juge nécessaire de me conformer au désir exprimé par Lord Clarendon, ce n'est point parceque des renseignements aussi inadmissibles puissent être envisagés par sa Seigneurie comme probables et sérieux; mais parceque je tiens à ce que votre Altesse soit assurée par les observations mêmes de sa Seigneurie de l'intérêt que l'Angleterre et la France prennent à fortifier les droits de souveraineté et l'influence réelle de la Sublime Porte sur les deux Principautés, et à empêcher que l'Autriche ne succède aux prétentions de protectorat de la Russie sur la Moldo-Valachie, convaincu que je suis que votre Altesse saura, dans sa haute sagesse, faire tourner ces dispositions de l'Angleterre et de la France au profit des intérêts du Gouvernement Impérial, et tenir vis-à-vis de l'Autriche le langage le plus propre à contrarier la poursuite des vues que cette Puissance pourrait avoir quant au réglement ultérieur de la question Moldo-Valaque.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) C. MUSURUS.

No. 359.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 605. Confidential.)

Therapia, October 19, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is copy of a letter addressed by Prince Adam Czartoryski to Reshid Pasha on the subject of employing Polish emigrants in the Cossack regiments commanded by Sadik Pasha, a Polish renegade, and forming part of the Sultan's army under Omer Pasha.

It appears, from the tenor of Prince Czartoryski's letter, that the French Government is by no means unfavourable to his views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 359.

Prince Czartoryski to Reshid Pasha.

A Chanzy, près Bessay, Département de l'Allier, le 24 Septembre, 1854.

Altesse,

IL y a longtemps que je n'ai eu l'honneur de me rappeler au souvenir de votre Altesse. Je savais combien d'affaires importantes et difficiles l'occupaient, et je craignais de l'importuner de mes lettres, d'autant qu'aucune parole d'encouragement qui me tranquillisât à ce sujet ne m'était parvenue de sa part.

Je crois cependant indispensable de m'adresser aujourd'hui directement à votre Altesse et de réclamer ses anciennes bontés dont j'ai éprouvé dans maintes occasions les résultats.

Des difficultés diplomatiques ont décidé la Porte à renoncer jusqu'à présent aux avantages qu'elle aurait retiré de la formation de corps Polonais en face de l'ennemi.

Néanmoins la plupart de mes compatriotes, qui dès le début de la guerre, et dans l'espoir d'une pareille formation, s'étaient rendus à Constantinople, ont trouvé place dans le corps Cosaque, qui à leurs yeux la remplace en quelque sorte, car ils s'y voient réunis sous un chef de leur nation.

Les régiments Cosaques de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan n'ont pas pour le moment de caractère politique, et ne doivent reveiller aucune susceptibilité diplomatique.

L'Empereur des Français a senti l'utilité de cette formation pour la Turquie et ses alliés. Il lui a déjà envoyé des armes, et maintenant le Gouvernement Français accorde aux Polonais qui désirent y servir contre l'ennemi commun le transport à ses frais jusqu'à Varna. Il en viendra également d'Angleterre.

Ce sont des volontaires animés du zèle le plus pur pour le service du Sultan, qu'ils croient identique avec celui de leur patrie. Ils se rendent en Orient sans aucune prétention personnelle; officiers et volontaires, tous déclarent être prêts à s'engager comme simples soldats dans les Cosaques du Sultan. Il leur suffit d'y être réunis, de combattre leur oppresseur et de se vouer au bien de la Turquie et de la cause commune.

Mais ces dispositions favorables de la part de la France, et méritoires dans mes compatriotes, ne peuvent avoir de résultats que par la volonté de la Sublime Porte. Je prie donc instamment votre Altesse d'obtenir par votre intervention du Gouvernement Turc, et nommément de son Altesse le Seraskier, que les Polonais qui arrivent ou arriveront sur des vaisseaux Français à Varna ou à Constantinople pour servir dans les Cosaques, soient sur le champ acheminés à cette destination. Sadyk Pacha désire avoir dans ses rangs des soldats hardis, intelligens, disciplinés, et dévoués. Je réponds que ceux que j'enverrai se distingueront par ces qualités.

Les Cosaques du Sultan ont déjà fait leurs preuves, leur réputation s'est établie en France; ils ont mérité l'approbation d'Omer Pacha.

L'importance des services qu'ils peuvent rendre s'accroîtra à mesure que les armées Ottomanes s'approcheront du Pruth et de l'Ukraine.

La haute perspicacité de votre Altesse se convaincra facilement combien il serait désirable au succès à venir des armes Ottomanes que les corps Cosaques soient augmentés, et qu'on y ajoute de l'Artillerie et de l'Infanterie Légère, ainsi qu'il en a été plusieurs fois question, et comme le firman du Sultan qui institua cette formation semblait le faire présenter en fixant à 10,000 hommes sa force future et complète. Les transfuges et prisonniers de guerre, Polonais de nation et de cœur, déjà présents à Constantinople, ceux de Bomarsund que la France pourrait envoyer, ceux que des victoires prochaines amèneraient, donneront des volontaires plus que suffisants à ces formations.

Voilà les demandes, les vœux, et les considérations que je soumets à votre Altesse en la suppliant de leur donner suite et effet.

Si mon neveu Zamoyski s'était trouvé présent à Constantinople, il les aurait présenté plus tôt et en temps opportun à votre Altesse: je la prie d'excuser le retard que son absence, et la mienne de Paris aux eaux de Vichy et à la campagne, ont apporté à la demande que j'ai l'honneur de lui adresser. Mon désir le plus vif est d'agir toujours avec l'assentiment du Gouvernement Turc, et selon ses vues, qui resteront toujours, j'en suis convaincu, favorables aux destinées futurs de ma patrie, inséparables de celles que prépare à la Turquie le glorieux règne de Sa Majesté Impériale Abdul-Medjid.

Je me réserve d'entretenir une autre fois votre Altesse, si elle me le permet, de la convenance des formations Polonais en Asie. Je voudrais aussi lui faire l'aveu de mes craintes à l'égard de l'influence fâcheuse que peut exercer l'intervention de l'Autriche sur les événements et les résultats de cette guerre.

Mais aujourd'hui je me hâte de finir en priant votre Altesse, &c.
(Signé) A. CZARTORYSKI.

No. 360.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 401.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 31, 1854.*

IN pursuance of your Lordship's directions as contained in your despatch No. 340 of the 24th instant, I communicated to Count Buol the information contained in the despatch of Lord Augustus Loftus No. 131, as to the States of Germany who are believed to be in the intention of supporting Austria, in her appeal to them in the Diet of Frankfort, to agree to the propositions she has brought before them. Count Buol told me that he considered Lord Augustus Loftus' report to be perfectly correct, except that since the date of that report the Duchy of Brunswick, the Saxon Duchies of Thuringia, the Town of Frankfort, and the Hanse Towns, had given in their adhesion.

Count Buol has received notice from M. Von der Pfordten that he will arrive from Berlin in Vienna on Thursday next, and that the great object of his mission to the Prussian Court has been the settlement of the existing differences between Austria and Prussia as to the proposition to be submitted to the States of Germany. Count Buol stated that he should wait for the communication of the result of M. Von der Pfordten's mission with the attention which was due to it; that he had not yet received any indication of it, but that he should not be swayed from the line of conduct which, in conformity with the decision of his Government, had been agreed upon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 361.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 408.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 1, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of forwarding to your Lordship herewith inclosed a copy of the letter I have addressed to Messrs. Colquhoun and Gardner, covering the transmission of the instruction for those gentlemen which your Lordship sent to me under flying-seal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 361.

The Earl of Westmorland to Messrs. Colquhoun and Gardner.

Sir, *Vienna, November 1, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to you herewith an extract of the instruction I have received from the Earl of Clarendon, as well as the instruction which is addressed to yourself, announcing the decision come to by Her Majesty's Government, "that any further dispute which may arise between the Austrian civil or military authorities and those of the Porte, or between the former and the Agents of the allied Powers, should be sent for settlement to Vienna."

I am also directed to furnish you with such instructions as I may think necessary towards carrying out this object.

I feel, Sir, that I have no need to do more than, trusting to your zeal and discretion, to recommend to you the early attention to this decision on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and to recommend to you, without delay, to put yourself in communication with the Austrian and Turkish authorities, as well as with your French colleague, for the purpose of carrying into execution

the above arrangement, from which Her Majesty's Government anticipate the most beneficial results.

In transmitting to you these directions, I beg to assure you that I will receive with the utmost attention, the statements and representations you may feel yourself called upon to make to me, and in every way that I will endeavour to secure the same harmonious feelings between the different authorities with whom you are acting that exists between the Four Powers with respect to the Principalities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 362.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 409.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 1, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL, to whom I read your Lordship's despatch No. 333 of the 20th ultimo, expressed to me his great satisfaction at the language in which it was couched, and at the assurance it contained that the question of a Treaty with Austria was one to which Her Majesty's Government attached the highest importance, and earnestly desired to arrange in a manner alike honourable and advantageous to the Contracting Parties.

Count Buol stated that there was a great deal in your Lordship's despatch to which he entirely subscribed, and to which he would give his most serious attention; that the postponement of the signature of a Treaty such as he had suggested he did not object to, but his reason for the proposition he had made, was, that if any sudden event had placed Austria in hostility with Russia, the Treaty providing for mutual support would already have been determined upon and signed.

Count Buol will reply to your Lordship's despatch through Count Colloredo, to whose conversation with you it refers, but he will delay doing so until he is able to ascertain what is the position in which Austria is likely to be placed with Prussia, and which, as he expected the arrival of M. Von der Pfordten this evening, he will be able more clearly to understand than he has hitherto been able to do from the communications that have reached him.

Count Buol has learnt from Paris that your Lordship has suggested some new form of Treaty, and I have not in any way combated this impression, although in an official form I was not authorized by your Lordship to communicate it; but I cannot augur from the feelings Count Buol expressed upon the subject that he would at all object to the general stipulations it would propose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 363.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 410.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 1, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 337 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that I have stated to Count Buol, without naming the quarter from whence the information was derived, the language which Baron Hess is reported by Colonel Simmons to have held both as to the strength of Austria as compared with Turkey, and as to the expedition of the allies to the Crimea, and his Excellency replied that he could not for one moment believe that General Hess had been so imprudent and unwise as to have held the very foolish language which was attributed to him, and he could not persuade himself that these and similar stories had anything but rumour to rest upon. He said that the conduct of the Agents of the Austrian Government

was sometimes, as he had had occasion lately to remark upon in the late transactions in the Principalities, not in accordance with the intentions of their Government; this required to be put right, and at the same time he felt that the Agents of other Governments required equally to be restrained from the expression of their individual opinions, which differed from the courteous and friendly expressions of their Governments. He had himself received many complaints of such language; but he had never taken any notice of them, as it might lead to the annoyance of individuals; and he felt satisfied that in the end the opinions of these persons would be brought to coincide with the feelings and policy declared by their Governments.

In remarking upon this subject Count Buol again alluded to the conversation of the Chevalier de Prue, upon which I had spoken to him when I received the report of it direct from Sir Henry Ward: he said he condemned it as foolish and as altogether in opposition to the feelings of his Government; but that it was impossible to control the unofficial language of persons who had nothing to do with the political conduct of their Governments, and it was impossible to deny that there were some officers both of the navy and army who still were indisposed towards England by the recollection of her supposed hostility towards Austria in the years 1848 and 1849.

With respect to the burthen of the Austrian troops on the inhabitants of the Principalities, Count Buol said that when all the expenses of an occupation were paid by the Government of the troops employed upon that service, there could not be much to complain of; the Austrian soldier certainly was accustomed to a better bed, and to a more substantial nourishment, than a Russian soldier; he had these luxuries, if they are to be called so, in his own country, and as every other expense belonging to him was paid for by his Government, it was hard if the Municipalities were not able to compensate the peasants or householders for the bedding and the other trifling articles which they furnished to the soldiers that were billeted upon them, and it is hardly to be believed that the general population would allow such inconveniences to weigh in the scale as, compared with the advantage of having been relieved from the presence of the enemies of their legitimate Sovereign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Since writing the above, General Hess has called upon me. It appears that Count Buol has placed in his hands the different reports of his conversations and proceedings which have been communicated to him. General Hess therefore proceeded at once to speak to me with regard to them, and to express his grief as well as resentment that such statements should have been made, or in any way believed, without his having had an opportunity of confuting them. He declared that he had put himself upon the most friendly terms with Omer Pasha, and had treated him with the utmost frankness and consideration. Far from wishing to interfere with his plans, he had, as soon as Omer Pasha expressed an intention of moving into Bessarabia and stated that he should require to occupy Ibraila and Galatz, at once replied that he should not offer any impediment, although it would of course be some inconvenience to his troops, but that he must have the sanction of his Government, and would apply for it immediately by telegraph. He received the answer, ordering him to accede to Omer Pasha's desire in the shortest possible time (four or five days), and communicated it to Omer Pasha immediately; and they agreed together in the most amicable manner, that instead of dividing the garrisons, it would be better for one army to occupy Galatz, while the other was at Ibraila, and Omer Pasha having expressed his desire to occupy Ibraila, General Hess immediately acceded.

Omer Pasha afterwards told General Hess that he should require to occupy Jassy also; and General Hess replied, that he regretted that he had not mentioned this before, as he would have asked the authorization of his Government to give up Jassy at the same time as the other garrisons, but added that he would lose no time in writing to Vienna to obtain it. Omer Pasha said he would think about it—he believed it would be too late; and General Hess said he saw then that he was not sincere, that he was convinced he had no intention of going into Bessarabia, and was disappointed that General Hess did not make more difficulties, which would be an excuse for him. But he appeared quite satisfied,

and gave no indication whatsoever of disagreement or annoyance at anything said by General Hess. On the contrary, he asked the latter to give him his advice (militarily) upon the expedition to Bessarabia. General Hess told him he would give him his opinion as a general officer of some experience, but he must remember it was not advice. If he ventured to give him advice, it would be to put himself entirely "à la disposition des Généraux Raglan et St. Arnaud," as the surest means of serving the common cause. With regard to his entering Bessarabia, he gave him some military reasons (especially the great inferiority of his cavalry to that of the Russians) why he thought the undertaking a hazardous one, until he should have completely cleared the Dobrudscha and the three fortresses held by the Russians on the right of the Danube.

The next day Omer Pasha told him not to write to Vienna about Jassy, as he had decided that it was too late to make his movement. They continued to be on the best terms, and General Hess had not till then had the least idea that any complaint had been made against him.

W.

No. 364.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 6.)

(No. 610.)

Therapia, October 23, 1854.

My Lord,

THE frontiers of Turkey, near Scutari, having been disturbed by incursions from Montenegro, the Porte has resolved on applying to Austria for assistance. It does not appear that there is any urgent necessity for the measure. The Montenegrins have been hitherto repulsed. But, on the other hand, their attacks may be renewed; they find sympathy with a portion of the neighbouring population, and there are subjects of dissension in that quarter which might be made to operate in their favour.

Inclosed herewith is a translated copy of a note prepared by Reshid Pasha for transmission to the Austrian Internuncio. Your Lordship will learn from its contents the motives which have determined the Porte to apply for assistance, the limitations which accompany the request, and the manner in which the Porte proposes that assistance should be given.

The occupation of Montenegro by Austrian troops would be dependent in point of time on circumstances of which the Porte reserves the appreciation for itself. Such an occupation ought in reason to operate to the exclusion of Russian influence; it would secure the Turkish frontier from disturbance on that side; and, even if it were continued beyond the intended term, I question whether any well-established right of the Porte would be thereby violated.

These considerations have weighed with me in deciding not to offer any opposition to the proposed measure without receiving instructions from your Lordship to that effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 364.

Reshid Pasha to Baron Bruck.

(Translation.)

YOUR Excellency having stated, in a note dated the 4th May, 1854, that if the Montenegrins intended joining the revolutionary movement which took place at that time on the frontiers of Greece, the Austrian Government was fully resolved to prevent such intention being carried into effect; in my note dated the 21st of Shaban, I informed your Excellency that, if any revolutionary movement took place on the part of Montenegro, the Sublime Porte agreed that the Austrian troops should enter that country.

By the frequent intelligence received latterly from Scobra, the Monte-

negrins, without any provocation whatever on our side, make frequent predatory incursions on Shurzin, and the towns and villages in that neighbourhood. Although the military force in that quarter is employed in repelling these revolutionary aggressions, they would be doubly coerced if the Austrian Government were to march a sufficient force into Montenegro, to remain there until the Porte was satisfied that the refractory proceedings on the part of those inhabitants had ceased, and then to withdraw. This measure would have the effect of promptly removing this cause of embarrassment; and it would be gratifying to the Sublime Porte, if the Austrian Government were to adhere to its former intention of sending a suitable armed force (into that country).

I have His Imperial Majesty's orders to request your Excellency to make this known at Vienna.

No. 365.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 615.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1854.*

MY latest advices from the Crimea are of the 19th; and from the squadron, off Katscha, of the 21st instant. It is to be hoped that later accounts will be received before the departure of the messenger. Even in that case it is probable, however, that they will not come to my knowledge so soon. I am, unfortunately, exposed to the frequent disappointment of seeing vessels, dispatched from the scene of action, pass down the Bosphorus without communicating with Her Majesty's Embassy, though it is situated within thirty yards of the line of passage.

The fire of the allied batteries had undergone a certain degree of interruption on the side of the French lines, owing to more than one explosion there; and the consequence had been a concentration of the Russian fire on our trenches, with very much less effect, providentially, than the terrific appearance had led those who witnessed it to apprehend.

According to general expectation, an assault has taken place by this time; but, if such be the case, its result is not yet come to our knowledge.

The French batteries, with the addition of two fresh ones, had reopened their fire on the 19th, after a whole day's unavoidable silence; but, owing to the hazy state of the atmosphere, the effect produced by their fire had not been ascertained.

I have reason to believe, on good naval authority, though not official, that the squadrons are intended to be called into action again on the occasion of an assault by the land forces. On the 21st instant the "Agamemnon" was with the British fleet off Katscha.

Her Majesty's ships "Albion" and "Arethusa" are already in the Arsenal at Constantinople. The result of close examination was an impression that the repairs might be completed without taking the vessels into dock, which, as avoiding delay, is to be desired.

Since writing what precedes, I learn officially from Rear-Admiral Boxer, that the "Arethusa" is "found to be so rotten" as to necessitate her going to Malta; and that there is reason to hope, that the "Albion" may be repaired "alongside the wharf, at the Arsenal."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 366.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 616.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1854.*

I HAVE reason to believe that up to the latest dates from the Crimea a great want of reinforcements continued to be felt by the allied armies.

It is satisfactory, therefore, to know that fresh detachments from France arrive, and that Rear-Admiral Boxer is able to accelerate their passage by means of the steam force at his disposal. He writes me word to-day that application having been made to him for the conveyance of 1,000 men, arrived here from France, he is able to comply with the request.

He had sent up about the same number of men from the sick depôt to Lord Raglan, with the expectation of adding 500 or 600 in two or three days.

With respect to Turkish reinforcements, Lord Raglan has under his command 4,400 Infantry and 300 Artillery, all young and promising soldiers. He has dispatched a steam force for the detachment awaiting his orders at Batoum. The battalions from Volo may be expected from day to day. Six thousand men, under Omer Pasha's command, are announced by Colonel Simmons as ready for conveyance from Varna to the Crimea, as soon as Lord Raglan's pleasure is known. More may be spared hereafter, if Omer Pasha adheres to his intention of regarding the campaign as terminated on the Danube.

The Seraskier has promised, at my instance, to do whatever depends upon him to prepare a further reinforcement here, and the execution of this promise may be facilitated by the arrival of the troops from Egypt, about 2,500 of whom have reached Constantinople.

To complete the information on this subject I inclose herewith, in copy, my last despatch from Colonel Neale, by which your Lordship will perceive that the full complement of 6,000 men had not reached Varna at the period of its date.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 366.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, October 21, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that about 2,500 Turkish Infantry arrived in Varna from Shumla, and now form a portion of this garrison. The whole number of Turkish troops at present here amount to 4,500, of whom 1,000 Artillery, and the remainder Infantry. In the neighbourhood of Varna are also two regiments of Turkish Cavalry.

The French troops still here consist of about 2,000 Artillery and Infantry, and 600 Hussars, exclusive of all arms sick in hospital.

The British depôt numbers about 1,000 men, of whom 250 sick in hospital. This depôt will, I am informed, be broken up as soon as the men are sufficiently convalescent and transports available.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 367.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 3, 1854.*

AFTER repeated unsuccessful attempts to see Baron Manteuffel during the last week, I called to-day on his Excellency by appointment.

I commenced by stating that on the first announcement of the Russian loan Lord Bloomfield had, by your Lordship's instructions, expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it would not be allowed to be quoted officially on the Prussian market, and that Russia should not be assisted by these means in carrying on war against Great Britain.

I informed his Excellency that the loan was now not only quoted in the Exchange list, but that its quotation was daily inserted in the "Staats Anzeiger." I then read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 72 of the 24th ultimo.

His Excellency first remarked to me that he had already been informed that I was about to make a communication on this subject, and observed with some sarcasm that he was surprised that this intelligence should have reached him previous to my communication.

I replied to his Excellency that I regretted to hear this observation; but that previous to making this communication I had been anxious to make certain confidential inquiries as to the loan in question; that I was ignorant of the source from whence he derived his information, and I could not be responsible for rumours which might reach him by side channels. I informed him that I had conversed on the subject with the French Minister, with whom his Excellency must be aware I was on terms of the most intimate cordiality; and I further stated to his Excellency that I had made three unsuccessful attempts to see him during the past week.

After this explanation his Excellency reverted to the question of the loan, stating that the Prussian Government had no interest in publishing the loan, but on the contrary could only view it as being prejudicial to the Prussian funds.

He expressed it as his conviction that the quotation of the loan to which I referred was not the one which the Russian Government had contracted since the commencement of the war; and he further denied that any transactions of moment had taken place in it at Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 368.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 151.)
Berlin, November 3, 1854.

My Lord,

AFTER the conversation which I had with Baron Manteuffel to-day with respect to the Russian loan, as reported to your Lordship in my previous despatch, his Excellency touched on some general topics with respect to the relations between England and this country. He remarked that the public opinion of another country was no reason why Prussia should be forced to pursue a policy in accordance with it. He referred, in strong terms, to the article of the "Times;" adding that, however he regretted the language, personally for himself he cared not what the press said. He stated that it could not be supposed that the King would dismiss General Gerlach and the members of that party, as was the system in England; for it must not be forgotten that the direction of affairs here was in the hands of the King, and not, as in England, in those of the Ministers. He referred to reports of blockading Prussian ports; when he remarked, that however unfortunate and disastrous those measures would be, they must be borne. He expressed, in vague terms, that if hopes were entertained of a division between Austria and Prussia, they were illusory; and he further stated (as if to invite a discussion), that it had been incorrectly surmised that the invitation which the Prussian Government had lately addressed to St. Petersburgh, had been instigated by Baron Budberg.

I expressed myself as unwilling to enter into any discussion with his Excellency on these topics, as I felt that it could tend to no advantage. I said, however, that he must not be surprised if public opinion in England was extremely irritated against Prussia; for he must recollect, that there was scarcely a family in Great Britain who was not now thrown into mourning by the losses incurred in the Crimea, and that it was naturally felt that if Prussia had cordially and heartily joined the Western Powers, whose cause she had declared to be just, the war might possibly have been wholly prevented, or, at least, that it would have been of short duration. I stated to his Excellency, that England and France were determined to carry on the war with vigour, and not to lay down their arms until the conclusion of an honourable and durable peace.

Although his Excellency, during this interview, conversed with calmness and composure, I could evidently perceive symptoms of anxiety and alarm at the critical relations of this country with the Western Powers. He appeared more anxious than I have usually found him to invite a discussion, and he evidently referred to the invitation transmitted to St. Petersburgh for the purpose of extracting some observations or reply from me in return; but I allowed it to pass in silence, refraining from addressing to his Excellency any remarks whatever on that subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 369.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 152.)
Berlin, November 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the inclosed analysis of a despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, dated the 23rd ultimo, recommending to the Imperial Cabinet the acceptation of the four points as the bases of peace.

This paper, which I have received from a confidential source, embodies, I am informed, the essential points of the despatch referred to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 369.

Analysis of a Despatch from Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther.

Le 23 Octobre, 1854.

M. DE PFORDTEN est en ce moment à Berlin, dans le but d'opérer un rapprochement entre nous et l'Autriche; nous ne demandons pas mieux que de nous entendre avec le Cabinet de Vienne. Je vous transmets copie des dernières communications qui m'ont été faites par le Comte Esterhazy, non pas que vous les communiquiez à M. de Nesselrode, mais pour votre information personnelle.

Insistez auprès du Gouvernement Russe pour qu'il prenne l'initiative de la paix en acceptant les quatre points, et pour qu'il oublie les ressentiments contre l'Autriche. C'est le seul moyen de conjurer une guerre dont la portée serait incalculable et dans laquelle la Prusse ne pourrait prêter aucune assistance à la Russie. Que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'ajoute aucune créance aux assurances que certains Etats Allemands pourraient lui donner; tous, ils marcheront avec l'Autriche. Il importe qu'on renonce aux illusions qu'on pourrait se faire à cet égard et que les diplomates Russes s'entretiennent que trop volontiers.

No. 370.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 154.)

Berlin, November 3, 1854.

My Lord.

AS I am not aware whether your Lordship may have received from other quarters a copy of the instructions addressed by the Austrian Government to Baron Prokesch, and inclosed in the Austrian despatch of the 23rd ultimo, addressed to Count Esterhazy, the Austrian Special Envoy at this Court, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith an analysis of that document.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 370.

Analysis of Instructions addressed to Baron Prokesch.

Vienne, le 23 *Octobre*, 1854.

M. DE BUOL, dans les instructions qu'il adresse à M. de Prokesch, se propose pour but d'engager la Confédération à sortir d'une position indécisive. Jouer un rôle actif, tel était le but de la Convention du 20 Avril, et non la neutralité. Nous espérons que la Prusse agira d'accord avec l'Autriche dans le sens du Traité; quoique nous n'ayons pas de certitude à cet égard, tout espoir n'est pas perdu. Si cependant il ne devait pas se réaliser, une scission en Allemagne deviendrait inévitable, et l'Autriche dans ce cas désirerait savoir si la Confédération Germanique dans son ensemble veut se mettre entièrement à l'écart et suspendre de fait les relations Fédérales.

Si la majorité de la Confédération ne se décidait pas en faveur de l'Autriche, l'Autriche en prendrait son parti. Le Cabinet de Vienne pense que pour valider une résolution la simple majorité suffira, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas d'une déclaration de guerre et que la Convention du 20 Avril a été adoptée à la simple majorité par une résolution du Conseil restreint.

On ne veut pas faire de nouvelles propositions. La Commission de la Diète qui est en possession de toutes les pièces fera son rapport.

La Commission ne devra pas perdre son temps à chercher des moyens terines, mais au contraire s'inspirer uniquement de la gravité de la situation, éviter les discussions juridiques et examiner l'esprit du Traité.

M. de Prokesch ne laissera pas sans protester, introduire dans le rapport de la Commission des assertions comme celles qui auraient pour but de prouver que l'Article Additionnel du Traité n'existe plus et qu'il a été suspendue par l'entrée des Autrichiens dans les Principautés, la Prusse et l'Autriche n'étant pas d'accord sur cette question. L'Article Additionnel est valable pour toute la durée de la guerre. Il fait partie intégrante du Traité, qui vis-à-vis de la Russie est déjà en voie d'exécution. La Russie d'ailleurs pourrait rentrer dans les Principautés, sa retraite n'ayant été opérée que par des raisons stratégiques.

Quant à la mobilisation et aux dispositions des contingents Fédéraux, il faudra avoir égard aux provinces Autrichiennes du Nord qui sont menacées davantage.

L'Autriche réclame l'adoption des quatre points parcequ'ils sont dans l'intérêt de l'Europe Centrale, quoiqu'ils n'aient qu'un caractère préliminaire.

On ne fera pas avancer l'œuvre de la paix en objectant que les bases de paix en question ne sont pas invariables et n'offrent pas la garantie que la France et l'Angleterre s'abstiendront de nouvelles exigences.

Jamais une Puissance belligérante ne donnera à son adversaire la certitude de pouvoir toujours compter sur certaines conditions de paix fixées d'avance, lui donnant ainsi tout intérêt à continuer une guerre dont il aurait tout les avantages sans les inconvénients.

Si la Russie avait adopté les quatre points au mois d'Août, le moment serait venu de discuter les conditions de paix définitives.

L'Autriche elle aussi s'est réservé, dans le cas où elle serait appelée à participer à la guerre, à poser ses propres conditions de paix, et la Confédération Germanique ne saurait renoncer à la même réserve. Si nous demandons à la Confédération d'accéder à notre position défensive, c'est en nous appuyant sur notre entrée dans les Principautés et sur l'adoption des quatre points. Nos propositions n'ont pas le but de nous fortifier pour l'offensive: nous n'appelons pas l'Allemagne à une guerre agressive contre la Russie—nous ne désirons pas une guerre pareille; à la face du monde nous indiquons à la Russie les moyens de l'éviter.

Seulement nous ne pouvons pas nous soumettre à prendre l'engagement de rester sur la défensive. Nous ne pouvons pas renoncer à la liberté d'agir en qualité de Grande Puissance indépendante, renfermer dans un certain cercle notre droit de paix et de guerre, fixer à l'avance des limites et un but à une guerre possible. La Confédération ne s'engagera pas plus que l'Autriche ne l'a fait d'imposer à la Russie les quatre points par voie agressive, mais elle devra se garder soigneusement d'exclure de ses résolutions futures l'éventualité de l'offensive.

La Confédération devra déclarer:

1. Qu'une attaque contre l'Autriche, soit contre le territoire de l'Empire, soit contre les armées dans les Principautés, imposera à l'Allemagne entière les obligations de soutenir l'Autriche de toutes ses forces.

2. Que la Confédération Germanique en qualité de Puissance Européenne reconnaît les quatre points dans leur contenu essentiel comme un but propre à assurer à l'Europe une situation garantie de paix et de droit qu'elle s'appropriera et maintiendra en qualité de Puissance Allemande le premier et le deuxième point.

3. Dans le cas d'agression imminente on en chargerait la Commission Militaire, en vertu du projet d'arrêté Fédéral du 20 Avril, de formuler sans délai les propositions nécessaires pour pouvoir employer les forces militaires de la Confédération partout où besoin serait. La Commission Politique recevrait des pleins pouvoirs afin de proposer la mobilisation et les dispositions des contingents aux lieux déterminés sur la réquisition qui lui en sera faite.

4. L'Autriche n'acceptera une résolution Fédérale qu'autant qu'elle contiendra ce qui précède. Si sa demande était rejetée il ne lui resterait plus qu'à renoncer à toute invitation ultérieure auprès de la Diète, qu'à décliner toute responsabilité pour les suites que cela amenerait, et qu'à reprendre son action indépendante de Grande Puissance.

L'Autriche espère cependant que le patriotisme de la Prusse et des autres Gouvernements, &c.

No. 371.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 156.)

Berlin, November 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM privately informed that an answer to the last Austrian communication brought by Count Esterhazy, was forwarded to Vienna by the Prussian Government on Monday night, the 30th instant, with instructions to Count Arnim to communicate it immediately to Count Buol. This was evidently to provide for its arrival at Vienna before that of M. Von der Pfordten, who left here on Tuesday for Dresden, and thus to prevent any appearance of his acting as mediator between the two Courts. I am informed that the tone and tenor of this communication is courteous and conciliatory, and evinces a desire to arrive at an amicable understanding with the Imperial Government.

This note is accompanied by a document containing various points which were drawn up between Baron Manteuffel, M. Von der Pfordten, and Baron Beust, to be submited to the Austrian Cabinet for their acceptation.

From the information I have received, the substance of the Prussian propositions is as follows:

1. Prussia consents to accept the four points, and desires that the German Confederation shall likewise accept them in the manner proposed by Austria—"comme une base à maintenir de tous les côtés."

2. Russia is likewise invited to accept the four points as the basis of peace.

3. If Russia should refuse to accept these four points, Austria can count upon the assistance of Germany in case of a conflict: "En tant que le conflit ne sera pas provoqué par une attaque venant d'elle."

4. If Russia should accept the four points, no summons will be addressed to Russia, and the Confederation will make no fresh demands on Russia: "Et ils resteront étrangers à toute nouvelle demande, à moins d'une résolution préalable prise entre eux."

(I have given these paragraphs in French, which I am led to understand are the exact translation from the original text.)

I am likewise informed that if Russia rejects the four points, a second Additional Article will be proposed by Prussia to the Convention of the 20th April, in the sense that all military offensive measures must be concerted and agreed upon in common.

Your Lordship will perceive that the whole drift of the endeavours of MM. Manteuffel, Von der Pfordten, and Beust, is to draw Austria into such an engagement as will prevent her from taking the offensive against Russia, and as will make her future action dependent upon the will and consent of the Diet.

M. Von der Pfordten before leaving this, is reported to have expressed his opinion that Austria would not accept these conditions, or take any engagement which would tie her hands and fetter her freedom of action, but he expressed a hope, that if Russia consented to accept the four points, Austria would then engage herself not to act offensively against her.

Your Lordship will further perceive that it is a principal object of the Prussian, Bavarian, and Saxon Ministers to appropriate the four points in such a manner as to prevent any additional demands from being exacted from Russia by the Western Powers.

There can be no doubt that the intention of the Bavarian and Saxon Ministers is to form of Germany a vast armed neutral Power, and for this purpose they will strive by every means in their power to detach Austria from any alliance with the Western Powers.

The language held by Count Esterhazy is most decided. He most positively declares that his Government will take no engagement which will fetter their freedom of action, and that they will give no assurance of not acting offensively against Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 372.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 622.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 28, 1854.*

I HAVE received no official intelligence from the Crimea since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship.

The captain of a French vessel which came in this morning, having left the coast on Thursday the 26th instant, reports that the Russians in considerable force had made a strong attack on the rear of the French position, near Sebastopol, the Turkish troops in station there having given way with a loss of two guns.

It appears that the Russians were subsequently repulsed. It is, moreover, stated that a regiment of British cavalry charging upon their retreat, had experienced a heavy loss. The siege is described as advancing steadily. The French lines had been worked to a distance of 400 mètres from the Russian batteries. The wandering nature of the Russian fire indicated a deficiency of artillerymen, and the necessity of supplying their loss by infantry. The town was greatly injured; the inhabitants were suffering severely; the scarcity of water was a

cruel addition to their miseries. Admiral Kornilof is reported to have been killed.

Your Lordship will understand that I cannot vouch for the correctness of these reports. True or false, the impression still prevails that the allied armies will finally succeed in carrying the place, though not perhaps without a second or even a third assault, owing to the nature of the ground, which, as it has been described to me, is highly favourable to the besieged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 373.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 623.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 28, 1854.*

CAPTAIN SLADE, of Her Majesty's Navy, Admiral in the Porte's service, was with the Ottoman squadron on the 17th instant, when the forts at the entrance of the harbour of Sebastopol were attacked by the allied fleets. Conceiving that his account of what took place under his own immediate observation might be read with interest by your Lordship, I do myself the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 373.

Rear-Admiral Slade to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Techrifiyé," Katscha Bay, Crimea, October 22, 1854.*

I WILL do myself the honour to acquaint you with the proceedings of the Ottoman squadron since the date of my last letter (October 14th, I think), reduced then to the "Mahmoudieh," the "Techrifiyé," and four steamers.

My notion that the allied fleets would have service to perform in cooperation with the allied armies proved correct. On the 15th October, in consequence of a proposal by the English and French Generals, the allied Admirals met at Chersonese to deliberate about making an attack on the out-defences of Sebastopol harbour, and having agreed on the principle, they left it to the Generals to decide if the attack should be made on the first day of the bombardment, or on a subsequent day of it, or if it should be deferred till the day of the assault. A plan of attack was drawn up by the French, whereby all the squadrons would act as one. I was not present at the conference although I much desired it, and I believe it would have been agreeable to the Admirals; but Ahmed Pasha has uniformly preferred going to them accompanied by his interpreter.

Next day Sir Edmund Lyons told me that Ahmed Pasha had objected to the post assigned to the Turkish ships, alleging the number of guns which he presumed would be bearing on it. That day another plan was made by Admiral Dundas, by which the fleet would act in two divisions; the English fleet approaching from the northward, the French fleet from the westward, both meeting in the centre line of the mouth of the harbour. As there seemed a possibility of the Turkish squadron being ignored by the French in any other arrangement, Admiral Dundas, having been spoken to thereon by some of the English captains, consented to unite it with the English fleet for the day's operations. He and Sir Edmund Lyons talked with me on the subject officially, and they proposed that the "Mahmoudieh," placed the fifth ship in the English line, should, with the "Albion" next ahead of her, anchor under Wasp Fort, a small fort on the cliff immediately north of the harbour, for the purpose of destroying it. No adequate idea was then entertained of its damaging capacity. I conveyed this proposition to Ahmed Pasha, who however declined to be one to attack the said fort, because he said its fire would be severe, and as the Porte had only one three-decker he ought not to risk her being destroyed. He ordered

his Flag Captain to go to the Admiral to express his dissent from that part of the plan, and he requested me to accompany him to express his wishes. Admiral Dundas courteously left his proceeding optional with him, and it was settled that the "Mahmoudieh" should proceed past Wasp Fort with the centre of the line; but the Admiral told me to desire him to write to Admiral Hamelin (then at Chersonese) to inform him of the proposed employment of the Turkish squadron, because as it had hitherto been acting exclusively with the French, he did not wish to give rise to any intrigues being drawn of a desire on his part to interfere with it. Ahmed Pasha objected to do this, on the plea that he feared to offend the French, and he requested me to beg Admiral Dundas to write instead,—which he declined to do. I told the Pasha that the French could not take offence; that he had a graceful motive to put forwards, viz., that the French fleet being most numerous he should reinforce the English fleet.

In the evening Admiral Hamelin arrived at Katscha Bay, and announced the attack for next day. He did not like Admiral Dundas' plan, which, I may be allowed to say, seems to have been the best; Admiral Dundas yielded it in consequence, and the original plan was reverted to.

Next morning, the 17th, Admiral Dundas told me that Ahmed Pasha had just sent an officer to tell him that he declined to go to the post assigned to him therein. I asked the Admiral what we should do; and he told me to go and consult with Admiral Hamelin; but before I could reach his ship she was under weigh and away. I went on board the "Mahmoudieh" and advised our weighing at once; then repaired to my ship and saw necessary arrangements made for weighing. Two hours passed away. The French ships had all left the anchorage. I then made a signal to suggest our getting under weigh, to which the answer was, "Wait a little longer." Soon afterwards we weighed. On opening the mouth of the harbour we saw two French ships already engaged with the southern fort, and other French ships, with the Admiral, nearing it; but the French ships which had been stationed at Chersonese were some miles to the westward, and as the Turkish ships were accustomed to the plan to follow the French, the "Mahmoudieh" steered a course as if intent on doing so, whereby she was increasing her distance from Sebastopol. Seeing this error of judgment, and that if persevered in it would be doubtful if we should get into action at all, I directed the captain of this ship, and the captain of the propelling steamer lashed alongside, to steer straight for the harbour's mouth. They remonstrated with me; it was not usage, they said to leave the flag ship; they had only that morning been warned to keep by her, and as if in corroboration of their words, at that moment a signal was made to that effect. I used such arguments as have weight with brave men; adding the expression of my conviction that our example would set on the "Mahmoudieh." I prevailed, and the ship's head was brought the right way. Still that deference to the inclinations of the Commander-in-chief, overlooking intermediate authority, which is so deep rooted in the East, and which has in many cases proved fatal, retarded our progress. Several times our engines were eased or stopped without my knowledge. I had to pass backwards and forwards repeatedly from my ship to the steamer and *vice versâ*, to keep us going in the right direction. I may safely say that a British officer has never been placed in a more painful position, and I am sure your Lordship will sympathise with my feelings then.

Meanwhile the "Mahmoudieh" had followed our example, and was coming after us, to my great joy, for I felt really as much interested in one ship as the other. When we came within range, shot passing over us and falling around us, our engines were again, at this critical moment, stopped without my knowledge, and the ship losing way became unmanœuvreable in the confined space obscured by dense smoke. Fortunately I observed an opening ahead, just wide enough for one ship to lie in, between two French line-of-battle ships engaged; we moved ahead into it, anchored ahead and stern, and opened our fire. The "Mahmoudieh" at the same time passed to the northward into the line of battle also. She anchored in the group of English three-deckers, but fouled the "Queen's" bower, thereby obliging her to weigh her anchors and seek another elsewhere, which I dare say caused unusual words to issue from the lips of Captain Mitchell. My conscience smote me on account of my berth, for a French line-of-battle ship following me had set her eye on it, and was thus cut out from active participation in the action, as other ships were, I hear, by arriving late. Once fairly placed in their line our Turks were at home; and the

roar of 2,000 pieces of cannon, ashore and afloat, was music to them. I cannot better evince the feelings of this ship's company than by repeating her Imam's words to me yesterday; he said, "the men are praying for you because of your having brought the ships into action." The officers have also expressed their thanks to me—they now feel the difference of self-estimation of ins and outs.

Connected with the late action, a circumstance worthy of remark is, that the chief damage sustained by the English ships has been by the fire of two small scarce-noticed earthen batteries, on the cliff north of Fort Constantine, and which are not included in the plan of defences of Sebastopol; and they received no damage in return, or very little. A third battery of the same kind is being added.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. SLADE.

P.S.—We hear that Admiral Nachimoff, who commanded the Russian squadron at Sinope, has been killed within the last few days by the fire from the allies' lines.

No. 374.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 624.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 28, 1854.*

THE Porte, embarrassed by the pressing demands of Count Coronini and Baron de Bruck for the recall of Dervish Pasha, and, though not altogether satisfied with the Commissioner's proceedings, unwilling to sacrifice him unjustly, has determined on a course which may remove a cause of inconvenient dissension without humiliating either the Government or its Agent. With this twofold purpose Reshid Pasha has prepared a note for the Internuncio, couched in corresponding terms. A copy of the intended communication is inclosed herewith. In concert with the French Chargé d'Affaires I have given my assent to the proposed note, after introducing some amendments. I hope it will have the desired effect with respect to Austria, and at the same time accelerate the dismissal of Prince Stirbey, whose continuance in the dignity of Hospodar cannot fail of being attended with much inconvenience and discredit to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 374.

Project of a Note from Reshid Pasha to Baron Bruck.

(Traduction.)

NOUS avons reçu de son Excellence Dervisch Pacha sa réponse à la dépêche qui lui a été écrite en conséquence des plaintes qui avaient été portées contre lui, réponse dont la substance suit :

Le principe adopté par le Pacha à l'égard de Stirbey a été puisé dans le mécontentement des principaux Boyars contre lui; il ne provenait d'aucune autre cause. Le Pacha n'a pas voulu s'écarter de l'esprit de ses instructions; mais ayant trouvé l'état des choses là bas différent de ce qu'on croyait, il a différé l'exécution de ses instructions jusqu'à ce qu'il eût reçu de nouveaux ordres. Lorsqu'il a reçu les dernières instructions, il n'a plus mis en avant la prétention que le point en contestation dans le proclamation du Général Hess fût contredit; mais il a travaillé à mettre en pratique ce qui avait été convenu ici avec l'Internonciature Impériale. Il n'a pas insisté, au point qu'on le dit, que la question du retour de Stirbey soit référée à Vienne.

Il dit que ses contestations avec le Général Coronini ont été causées par l'idée que de l'autre côté on ne montrait pas beaucoup d'égards pour les droits de l'autorité de la Sublime Porte, et par certains propos un peu durs qui

avaient été tenus. Il n'a pris aucune part ni à l'impression ni à la publication de la lettre de Mazhar Pacha.

D'après cela, on voit que les informations données de part et d'autre ne s'accordent pas; et les plaintes mises en avant n'offrent pas de justes motifs pour prononcer la révocation de Dervisch Pacha. Il est par conséquent devenu nécessaire de demander de nouvelles explications. Mais la mission du Pacha consistait en deux points principaux; savoir: 1. Le rétablissement de l'ancienne administration, ce qui a été fait; 2. L'enquête à faire sur la conduite passée de Stirbey. Or, comme il y a eu assez de temps pour faire cette enquête, et comme, supposé même que l'enquête ne soit pas complétement terminée, il ne faut que fort peu de jours pour l'accomplir, il est évident, comme pense la Sublime Porte d'après toutes ces considérations, que pour à présent un Commissaire en Valachie n'est plus nécessaire. Sauf donc s'il faut plus tard envoyer un Commissaire pour les deux Principautés, ou bien, s'il y a lieu d'après l'allure des affaires, un Commissaire dans chacune des deux Principautés, elle n'a pas l'intention de laisser Dervisch Pacha pour longtemps dans l'exercice de ses fonctions actuelles.

Si l'enquête que le Pacha a faite sur le compte de Stirbey n'est pas encore suffisante, il est de raison qu'il l'achève sans perte de temps, et qu'il en communique au Général Coronini le résultat; voilà ce que nous venons de lui écrire.

Quant à la résolution qui sera prise à l'égard de Stirbey, la Sublime Porte ne se laissera pas déterminer par l'opinion particulière de Dervisch Pacha. Sa résolution sera basée sur les faits authentiques que le Pacha citera, et sur les renseignements positifs qu'elle a pris et qu'elle prendra par d'autres intermédiaires aussi.

No. 374 *a*.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 625.) *Therapia, October 28, 1854.*

My Lord,

REFERRING to my despatch No. 599 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith M. Pisani's report of the expected communication addressed to me, and also to M. Benedetti, by Reshid Pasha, through our respective interpreters. A copy of the French version, as concerted between Reshid Pasha and the two Embassies, forming the communication addressed to M. Benedetti, is also inclosed for your Lordship's more perfect information.

The recent advices from Vienna go far to rectify the mistaken proceedings which had caused so much embarrassment and irritation at Bucharest; and the movements of the Turkish army, as well as those of the allied forces, in Wallachia and Moldavia, are for the present relieved, though rather tardily, from those impediments which appeared at one time to threaten a serious misunderstanding. I trust, however, that your Lordship will approve of my continuing to participate with the French Chargé d'Affaires in the completion of that overture, which, originating in his instructions from Paris, appeared to deserve my concurrence, as expressive of the wants and wishes of the Turkish Government, and calculated to give a more firm and permanent effect to the principles set forth in your Lordship's instructions. The form of Reshid Pasha's communication is that of a simple suggestion, put into shape; and it remains with Her Majesty's Government to accept, reject, or modify it according to their pleasure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 374 *a*.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, October 25, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Reshid Pasha requested me to acquaint your Excellency with the intentions of the Ottoman Government regarding the difficulties that had lately arisen in the Danubian Principalities.

The Porte attributes the conflicts which originated at Bucharest to the erroneous interpretation of an ill-defined and complex position; it earnestly wishes to prevent any such recurrence, and for that purpose desires, in concert with England, France, and Austria, to seek for an arrangement which, in defining the general attributions of the several foreign or native Agents, would at the same time reestablish between them the good understanding which should never have ceased to exist. This arrangement ought to be founded on certain principles resulting from the state of things themselves. Legal order being restored in the Principalities, the exclusive administration would be entrusted to the Hospodars, upon whom alone the Moldo-Wallachian functionaries would be dependent, and upon whom the task of giving them orders, and seeing to the execution of the existing administrative regulations, would also devolve. The Generals commanding the troops of occupation would then only have to provide for the wants of their armies, and their intercourse with the Hospodars would be circumscribed to that object; this being, however, the implied result of the Convention concluded between Turkey and Austria on the 14th of June.

It would be established that, during the present war, the allied, as well as the Ottoman armies, would be at liberty to occupy such points in the Principalities as would be considered of strategical importance for them to take possession of, and move without impediment wherever the exigency of war might call them, after giving due notice to the Commanders-in-chief of the other allied armies. The Porte, in remaining faithful to its declaration to respect the prerogatives granted to the Danubian Provinces, would, besides, maintain the full right, which it exercised during former occupations, of sending Commissioners on the spot to ascertain the position of affairs, and watch over the maintenance of order, or demand the cooperation of the three Principalities in the war it is now waging.

This arrangement, which might be recorded in a diplomatic Act, would reestablish the legitimate authority of the Hospodars in its full force, and assign to the Generals, in the exercise of their discretion, limits upon which the Porte and its allies have never ceased to be in perfect agreement, notwithstanding certain deviations on the part of some of their Agents. This measure could only bear a transitory character, and would be so described.

The final organization of the Principalities depending hereafter on an understanding between Turkey and the Powers parties to the note of the 8th of August, the exigencies of the juncture would thus be provided for; and disagreement, which might disturb the good harmony which it is so important to maintain amongst the different Agents of the allied Governments, would be forestalled.

In the opinion of the Ottoman Government, these general ideas should form the bases of an agreement; and Reshid Pasha hopes that your Excellency will be so good as to submit them to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, with the least possible delay.

In order to avoid any regretful procrastination, and in the hope that these proposals may be favourably received in London and Paris, his Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs addresses instructions to the Ottoman Minister at Vienna, authorizing him to concert with the Representatives of the two allied Courts in that capital, as well as with the Austrian Cabinet, on the subject of the present communication. He thinks, however, that some considerations, which are connected with the position of the Ottoman Government, as the principal interested, require that the diplomatic document, whose stipulations would be agreed to between the three Courts, should be concluded at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 374*a*.

Memorandum.

RECHID PACHA m'a chargé de vous faire part des intentions du Gouvernement Ottoman au sujet des difficultiés qui se sont élevées dernièrement dans les Principautés Danubiennes.

La Porte attribue les conflits qui ont pris leur origine à Bucharest à une interprétation erronée d'une situation complexe et mal définie; elle désire vivement en prévenir le retour, et dans ce but elle voudrait rechercher, de concert avec la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche, un arrangement qui, en déterminant les attributions générales des différents Agents indigènes ou étrangers, rétablirait entre eux une entente qui n'aurait jamais dû cesser d'exister. Cet arrangement devrait reposer sur certains principes qui résultent de l'état des choses elles-mêmes. L'ordre légal étant rétabli dans les Principautés, l'administration des deux Provinces resterait exclusivement confiée aux Hospodars, et les fonctionnaires Moldo-Valaques ne releveraient que d'eux. Il appartiendrait à eux seuls de leur donner des ordres et de veiller à l'entière exécution des réglements administratifs. Les Généraux commandant les troupes d'occupation n'auraient plus qu'à pourvoir aux besoins de leurs armées, et à entretenir avec les Hospodars des rapports qui se trouveraient circonscrits à cet objet. C'est ce qui résulte implicitement d'ailleurs de la Convention conclue le 14 Juin, entre la Turquie et l'Autriche. Il demeurerait établi que pendant la durée de la guerre actuelle les armées alliées, comme l'armée Ottomane, pourraient librement occuper dans les Principautés les points dont elles auraient un intérêt à prendre possession, et se porter sans obstacle partout où les appeleraient les nécessités de la guerre, après en avoir donné avis aux Commandants-en-chef des autres armées alliées. La Porte, en restant fidèle à sa déclaration de respecter les prérogatives qu'elle a octroyées aux Provinces Danubiennes, conserverait cependant la faculté qu'elle a exercée de plein droit durant les occupations antérieures d'envoyer sur les lieux des Commissaires pour s'assurer de la situation des choses et veiller au maintien de l'ordre, ou bien encore pour réclamer le concours des Principautés dans la guerre qu'elle soutient en ce moment.

Cet arrangement, qui pourrait être consigné dans un Acte diplomatique, rétablirait dans toute sa plénitude l'autorité légitime des Hospodars, et fixerait, à la latitude des Généraux, des limites sur lesquelles la Porte et ses alliés n'ont jamais cessé d'être en parfait accord, malgré certaines déviations de quelques Agents. Cette mesure ne pourrait avoir qu'un caractère transitoire, et il en serait fait mention.

L'organisation définitive des Principautés devant résulter plus tard d'un concert établi entre la Turquie et les Puissances signataires de la note du 8 Août, on pourvoirait ainsi aux nécessités du moment, et on préviendrait des froissements qui troublent le bon accord qu'il importe de maintenir entre les différents Agents des Gouvernements alliés.

Dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Ottoman, ces données générales devraient former l'objet d'une entente; et Réchid Pacha espère que vous voudrez bien les soumettre à l'appréciation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale dans le délai le plus court possible.

Pour éviter un retard regrettable, et dans la prévision que ces ouvertures pourraient être favorablement accueillies à Paris et à Londres, son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères adresse au Ministre Ottoman à Vienne des instructions qui l'autorisent à se concerter avec les Représentants des deux Cours alliées dans cette capitale, de même qu'avec le Cabinet d'Autriche, au sujet de la présente communication. Il pense toutefois que des considérations qui se rattachent à la position du Gouvernement Ottoman comme principal intéressé exigeraient que l'instrument diplomatique, dont les stipulations seraient arrêtées entre les trois Cours, fût conclu à Constantinople.

No. 375.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 348. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship, for your confidential information only, copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on the subject of the mission to Constantinople of Baron Dumont by General Coronini; and I have to instruct your Lordship to ask Count Buol whether Count Coronini, in demanding the recall of Dervish Pasha, was acting upon the instructions of his Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 376.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 350.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

I INCLOSE for your Lordship's information a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, respecting the character of the individuals composing the new Ministry in Wallachia.

Your Lordship will communicate this paper to Count Buol, as a proof, in addition to the many that exist, of the unfitness of Prince Stirbey for the office that he has most unfortunately been called upon to resume. Her Majesty's Government cannot see without regret and alarm that Wallachia under the Hospodar will be administered in a manner fatal to the hopes and the interests of the people of that Province, but entirely consistent with the interests of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government, however, can be no party to thus adding to the misfortunes which have befallen the Wallachian people, and to depriving them of the political and social improvements they were entitled to expect on being emancipated from the yoke of Russia; but Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that their opinions will be shared by the Government of the Emperor of Austria, and that a better state of things may without delay be established in Wallachia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 377.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 351.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, expressing the satisfaction with which he has learned that, in accordance with the proposal made by the Austrian Government, instructions have been sent to the French and English Consuls in the Principalities, to acquaint your Lordship and Baron Bourqueney with any differences between the Austrian civil or military authorities in those provinces, and the French and English or Ottoman functionaries, which may not be arranged upon the spot.

Such differences will then be arranged by the Austrian Cabinet, in conjunction with the English, French, and Ottoman Representatives at Vienna.

* No. 354.

Count Buol also incloses a copy of instructions which have been addressed to the Austrian Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy, informing them that the French and English Governments have acceded to the proposed reference of disputed matters to Vienna, and stating that in the belief that the Porte will also accede to the proposal, and will furnish Omer Pasha with similar instructions, orders have already been sent to the Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army of occupation to regulate his conduct accordingly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 378.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 352.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO on the 3rd instant read to me a despatch from Count Buol to Count C. Esterhazy, dated the 23d ultimo, in which, after expressing his satisfaction that Prussia should, in accordance with the wishes of Austria, have submitted the communication made by the latter to a careful examination, he proceeded to show that whatever may be the causes of the existing divergence of opinion between the two Powers, such divergence, and its possible consequences, can in no manner be ascribed to anything which Austria has done. His Excellency states it to be in no way the desire of Austria to fetter the independent decisions of Prussia as opposed to the independent measures taken by herself; for Austria had, in fact, taken care to secure for herself, both by the Treaty of April and by anterior engagements, the right of independent action, as well as the power of forming independent alliances, provided such action and such alliances should not be at variance with the provisions of the Treaty of April. Why should it, therefore, Count Buol asks, be made a matter of reproach to Austria that she should in certain cases have acted independently? Why is it not first ascertained whether she could have proceeded in any other way with a view to the carrying out the principles of the Treaty of April, and to the attainment of the objects she had in view?

Count Buol considers the Treaty with the Porte, and the present position of Austria in the Principalities, as only results necessarily proceeding from the Treaty of April. At the time this Treaty was concluded, Prussia did not require that if Russia should consent to evacuate the Principalities, Austria should in such case not cooperate with the adversaries of Russia. In fact, Count Buol argues, Prussia must have foreseen that the very reverse would be the case.

Count Buol further expresses himself unwilling to believe that the difference between Austria and Prussia is one of principle as to the bearing and extent of their reciprocal engagements. He rather considers that difference to arise from a divergence in her estimate of the bearing of the actual events and circumstances of the times; and Count Buol expresses the hope that as these events and circumstances assume a further development, this difference between confederate States will cease. Count Buol instances, in illustration of his argument, the circumstance that Prussia attributes to the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia a value to which Austria is unable to consider it entitled as a purely strategical measure. Prussia further considers that the declaration made by Russia of her intention to remain on the defensive, affords a security which Austria is unable to discover therein. Prussia sees no cause of alarm in the concentration of Russian forces in Poland. Austria, on the contrary, considers that concentration as involving a threat.

Count Buol finally informs Count Esterhazy that Austria still attaches the greatest value to the cooperation of Prussia at the Diet, and accordingly instructs him to use every effort to attain this end; and with this view, Count Buol furnishes Count Esterhazy with the draft of an instruction which his Excellency proposes to address to the Austrian Minister at the Diet, and directs him to

submit the same to M. de Manteuffel, with an assurance that the Austrian Government have no intention to dispatch it until they shall have discussed its contents with the Prussian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 379.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 353.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, inclosing a copy of a despatch from the latter to Baron Bruck, upon the subject of the differences which have arisen between the Austrian Commanders in the Principalities and Omer Pasha.

In his despatch to Count Colloredo, Count Buol states that, in consequence of these differences, the Porte had entered upon direct explanations with the Austrian Government, in order to come to a complete agreement as to the reciprocal right and duties of the Commanders of the armies which occupy the Principalities.

Count Buol expresses his sincere regret that this agreement should have been disturbed by misunderstandings, and expresses the hope that all cause for these misunderstandings will be entirely removed when the principles laid down in the instructions to Baron Bruck are taken as the rules for the guidance of both parties.

Count Buol declines to enter into the causes of the disagreements; he remarks, however, that it is not accurate to allege that Omer Pasha has been prevented by the Austrian Generals from making a diversion in Bessarabia.

In the despatch to Baron Bruck, Count Buol replies in detail to certain questions which the Porte had addressed to the Austrian Government with regard to the intentions of Austria, and the position of the Austrian troops in the Principalities.

In reply to the first question, whether Russia having rejected the last Austrian proposals, the Austrian troops would march with the Ottoman army against the enemy, or would remain inactive in the Principalities, Count Buol observes, that the Porte must have been aware that Austria had never engaged to compel Russia by force to accept the four points; and he cannot, therefore, conceal his surprise that such a question should be asked. By the Convention with the Porte of the 14th of June, Austria engaged to obtain the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian army, to reestablish the legal order of things in these Provinces, and to withdraw her troops from them as soon as peace should be concluded. This object has been completely accomplished, and a signal service thereby rendered to the cause of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Count Buol states that he has equal difficulty in finding a reason for the second question, namely, whether, in case the Russian army should attempt to recross the Pruth, the Austrian Government would oppose them, since the Austrian Government has repeatedly declared, in the most positive manner, that they looked upon the obligation to defend the Principalities against all hostile aggression as inherent in their engagement to occupy them; and it is precisely on this account that it is indispensable for the Austrian General to be entirely free as to his own movements, and also to be kept acquainted with the movements of the Anglo-French and Ottoman forces upon the territory occupied by the Imperial forces. The Austrian Commander-in-chief, therefore, whilst he has orders not to embarrass the operations of the allies, must insist upon their not acting without previous concert with him.

If it was thought necessary for the Anglo-French armies to enter the Principalties, Austria would have nothing to object to such a measure in principle, supposing there had been a previous concert upon this point with the Imperial General.

The Austrian Government is nevertheless of opinion that, in the interest of these Principalities themselves, it would be desirable to avoid too great an assemblage of troops of different nations in these Provinces.

The question as to the proclamation of the Imperial Commander-in-chief has already been arranged between Count Coronini and Dervish Pasha.

Lastly, as regards Prince Stirbey, Count Buol hopes that the instructions to the Ottoman Commissioner on this point, which have been communicated to the Austrian Government, will be strictly observed. If they act according to these instructions, and show to the Imperial authorities in the Principalities the regard and confidence which are due to them, the Ottoman Commissioner, and all other functionaries of the Porte, may be assured of perfect reciprocity on the part of the Austrians.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 380.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 354.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

I INCLOSE a précis of the instructions which Count Buol proposes to address to the Austrian Minister at the Diet, and which Count Colloredo read to me on the 3rd instant, as the inclosure in Count Buol's despatch to Count Esterhazy, the substance of which is contained in my despatch No. 352 of this day's date.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 380.

Précis of Instructions addressed to the Austrian Minister, President of the Diet of the Germanic Confederation.

THE Austrian Cabinet, convinced of the necessity that Germany should no longer persevere in its present state of indecision on Oriental affairs, instructs M. de Prokesch to urge the following considerations on the Diet:

There can be no doubt as to the object which Austria, as a federal State, had in view in adopting her course in these affairs. It was dictated not only by the wish that Germany should remain united, but likewise that it should take a decided and becoming part as a body politic for the defence of German interests. The leading principle of the Treaty concluded with Prussia and the other States of Germany was not to establish a neutrality for Germany, but to augment her influence in a great European conflict, and to strengthen the union of its several component Powers for the possible event of active measures.

It will depend on the decision of the Diet whether this principle will be carried out, or whether the Treaty shall become a dead letter.

Austria does not abandon the hope that Prussia, sensible of her engagements and of her duties as a German Power, will still decide to act with Austria. Should these hopes, however, be disappointed, a most lamentable schism will be imminent; and the question will arise whether the Confederation, irrespective of the decisions of separate States, will, in its aggregate, tacitly consent to the rejection of the demands made by Austria on the confederates. Austria would deeply lament any decision of such a kind, which, in fact, would amount to a practical suspension of the principle of confederation; but in the face of the dangers which threaten her would, nevertheless, be compelled to ascertain distinctly what she has to expect.

Austria considers that the fittest means for arriving at such a knowledge would be by calling for a report from the Committee of the Diet, to whom all the documents relative to the question have already been referred.

Austria must however premise that, inasmuch as she has already specified the minimum of what she considers necessary for the Confederation to do, the Committee would have to abstain from any endeavours to discover any middle course.

Austria thinks it unnecessary to discuss the question, how far she is already entitled by Treaty to expect what she seeks. The dignity and safety of Germany will be better consulted by grappling with the dangers of the position, and by counteracting them by every means at his disposal. The question of these engagements is, however, by no means unimportant. The Additional Article of the Treaty already contains the concurrence of the German States in the advance of Austria, as opposed to the strategical measures of Russia; measures which offer no security against a possible return of the Russian forces to the Principalities, but, on the contrary, involve rather a threat to Austria. And it cannot be expected that, in the event of the war taking a favourable turn for Russia, that Power will consider itself bound to act merely on the defensive.

Russia has, in fact, now directed the *élite* of her army as against Austria, and it is by no means sure that the latter will not shortly be exposed to attack.

The circumstance that Austria does not undertake to protect the territory of Russia against an attack of Turkey, or her allies, cannot invalidate her claim to support, as long as Austria confines herself to the defence of Turkish territory from attack.

It will, consequently, not only be necessary to obtain the assurance of such support, but likewise to arrange the manner in which such support is to be given.

Austria considers that any resolution of the Diet would be incommensurate with its interests and duties which should not place attack on the part of Russia on the Austrian forces in the Principalities on the same line with an attack of these troops in the Austrian States. As the occupation of the Principalities took place in conformity with the Treaty of April, and constitutes the principal guarantee for the safeguard of the interests of Germany, the Confederation should consider itself bound to unite with Austria in upholding that measure. But should that body even decide not to afford its assistance, except in the event of an attack on the Austrian States, even in that case a proper military preparation would be indispensable to meet such a contingency.

As regards the question of the guarantees for peace, Austria conceives that her proceedings ought to receive the unconditional approval of her confederates. Although the interpretation of the four points is capable of extension, it is yet undeniable that their tenour is in conformity with the interests of Central Europe. To require that they should be more clearly defined would be to look upon them not as preliminary bases, but as conditions of peace. Any more detailed definition of their bearing would, moreover, in accordance with the Vienna Protocol of the 9th of April, render a previous understanding with the Maritime Powers necessary.

To the objection, that the four points do not afford any security that England and France will not make new demands, Austria directs M. de Prokesch to observe, that in no case would a belligerent give to its adversary any assurance that such adversary might, at any time, obtain peace on certain prefixed conditions. The conditions of peace would depend on the events of war. Had Russia accepted the four points in August, it would now have been the time to discuss the definitive conditions of peace. Austria had, moreover, reserved to herself, on her part, the right, should she take part in the war, of producing her own conditions; and the Germanic Confederation would necessarily have to make a similar reservation.

Austria does not ask to be strengthened for aggressive operations. She does not call upon Germany to take part in an aggressive war against Russia. She does not desire to carry on such a war; and she affords Russia an opportunity of avoiding such a war. But Austria cannot incur the obligation of remaining on the defensive, and cannot renounce the right of acting as an independent Great Power. She cannot confine her rights of peace and war within fixed limits, or determine as to the duration or object of a possible war.

The Confederation will, on its part, be equally unable to submit to such a restriction.

In the opinion of Austria, the résolution of the Diet ought to be so framed as to strengthen her in her endeavours to carry the specified bases of peace; and ought further to adopt specially as its own, the two points as to the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, and the cessation of the Russian Protectorate, as the indispensable groundwork of a future peace.

In accordance with the above considerations the Austrian Minister is directed to endeavour:

1. That the Diet should declare that an attack on Austria, whether on its territory or in the Principalities, would oblige the Confederation to come to her assistance.

2. That the Diet recognizes the four points as appropriate bases for peace; and adopts, more especially, the two first, as bearing on the interests of Germany.

3. That the Diet should take measures to carry into effect the necessary military preparations.

Finally, the Austrian Cabinet informs M. de Prokesch that, should a resolution in conformity with the above not be adopted, nothing would be left for Austria but to declare that, while she renounced all responsibility as to the consequences, she would abstain from making any further proposition to the Confederation, and would confine herself to the exercise of her rights as one of the independent Great Powers of Europe.

No. 381.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship the project of a Treaty with Austria which has been agreed upon by Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French; and I have to instruct you to submit the same to Count Buol, as the counter-proposal of the British and French Governments to the one which the Austrian Government would have been prepared to conclude.

A duplicate copy of the present project has been sent to the Baron de Bourqueney.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 381.

Project of Treaty proposed to the Austrian Government by the British and French Governments.

SA Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animés du désir de mettre fin le plutôt possible à la guerre actuelle par le rétablissement de la paix générale sur des bases solides donnant à l'Europe entière toute garantie contre le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos; convaincus que rien ne serait plus propre à assurer ce résultat que l'union complet de leurs efforts jusqu'à l'entière réalisation du but commun qu'elles se sont proposé; et reconnaissant en conséquence la nécessité de s'entendre aujourd'hui sur leur position respectif et les prévisions de l'avenir, ont résolu de conclure entr'elles un Traité d'Alliance, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,

Lesquels s'étant communiqués leurs pleins-pouvoirs, et les ayant trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêtés et signés les Articles suivants:

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes rappellent les déclarations contenues dans les Protocoles du et dans les notes échangées le 8 Août dernier, et comme elles se sont réservé le droit de proposer selon les circonstances telles conditions qu'elles pourraient juger nécessaires dans un intérêt Européen, elles s'obligent mutuellement et réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun.

ARTICLE II.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche ayant déjà fait occuper par ses troupes, en vertu du Traité conclu avec la Sublime Porte, les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, ayant également signé le avec la Sublime Porte, un Traité que les autorise à diriger leurs forces sur tous les points de l'Empire Ottoman qui seront à leur convenance, et Sa Majesté le Sultan enfin pouvant toujours en vertu de ses droits de souveraineté aviser comme elle l'entend à la défense de ses frontières, il sera formée à Vienne entre les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne, une Commission, à laquelle la Turquie sera invité à adjoindre aussi un Plénipotentiaire, et qui sera chargée d'examiner et de régler toutes les questions se rapportant soit à l'état exceptionnel et provisoire dans lequel se trouvent les dites Principautés, soit au libre passage des diverses armées sur leur territoire.

ARTICLE III.

Les hostilités venant à éclater entre l'Autriche et la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, se promettent mutuellement leur alliance offensive et défensive dans la guerre actuelle, et employeront à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre, des forces de terre et de mer dont le nombre, la qualité, et la destination seront, s'il y a lieu, déterminées par des arrangements subséquents.

ARTICLE IV.

Dans le cas prévu par l'Article précédant, les Hautes Parties Contractantes se promettent réciproquement de n'accueillir de la part de la Cour Impériale de Russie, sans s'en être entendues entre'elles, aucune ouverture ni aucune proposition tendante à la cessation des hostilités.

ARTICLE V.

Dans le cas où la paix n'aurait pas pu se rétablir avec la Cour Impériale de Russie au mois d'Avril prochain sur les bases indiquées dans l'Article I de la présente Convention, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de se concerter de nouveau sur les moyens les plus efficaces d'atteindre le but de leur alliance.

ARTICLE VI.

L'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne, porteront ensemble le présent Traité à la connaissance de la Cour de Prussie et recevront avec empressement son adhésion dans le cas où elle engagerait sa coopération à l'accomplissement de l'œuvre commun.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié, et les ratifications échangées à Vienne dans le délai de quinze jours.

En foi de quoi, &c.

No. 382.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 667.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 599 of the 19th ultimo, in which you report the communication made to you by the French Chargé d'Affaires, respecting a proposed special agreement by which the several positions of the parties now called upon to take an immediate interest in the affairs of the Principalities should be regulated.

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government hope that the objects contemplated by the French Government will be better secured by the Mixed Commission established at Vienna, which will constantly watch over the proceedings in the Principalities, and receive authentic reports respecting them, than by a formal instrument which could not embrace all contingencies, and would be liable to constant evasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 383.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 668.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1854.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Secretary of State for the War Department the two despatches from Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan, of which copies were inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 597 of the 16th ultimo.

I now inclose a copy of a letter which I have received from the War Department, from which your Excellency will perceive that the Secretary of State for the War Department is desirous that a representation should be made to the Turkish Government on the subject of the present inefficient state of the Turkish armies.

You will furnish a copy of this paper to Reshid Pasha, and you will again renew your remonstrances on this point, and express the deep regret and displeasure of Her Majesty's Government that such perpetual complaints should be rendered necessary by the neglect of the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 384.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 1,333.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 7, 1854.*

REPORTS received this morning from Bucharest state that the Russians have finally evacuated the Dobrudscha, and withdrawn their garrisons from the towns on the right bank of the Danube which had remained occupied by them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 385.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 689.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1854.*

YOUR Excellency will have learnt from the correspondence of Colonel Williams the peculations and frauds on the part of the Mushir, and his immediate chiefs, which have been attended with such disastrous consequences as regards the efficiency of the Turkish army at Kars.

I have now to instruct your Excellency to demand of the Porte the punishment of Zarif Pasha, and his two Feriks, Kerim Pasha and Veli Pasha, by whom these frauds and deceptions have been carried on, if the Porte means to attempt the restoration of discipline in the unfortunate army at Kars.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 386.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 690.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1854.*

I INCLOSE herewith for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter from the War Department, from which you will perceive that the Duke of Newcastle is of opinion that, adverting to a contemplated campaign next year in Asia, it will be found almost an impossibility for the English and French forces to cooperate with an army in the state in which Colonel Williams represents the Turkish army to be, unless a complete change of system be effected.

I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate this paper to the Turkish Government, and to state to them that the reflections therein embodied have naturally suggested themselves to the mind of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War on reading the trustworthy reports of Colonel Williams as to the state to which disgraceful neglect and peculation have reduced the army at Kars.

It is important that the arrangement respecting the hospitals at Kars and at Erzeroom which the Duke of Newcastle offers in the concluding paragraph of this letter should be accepted by the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 387.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1,339.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 9, 1854.*

MARSHAL VAILLANT has received, by telegraph, an answer to the letter which I informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 1,326 of the 4th instant, he had addressed to Omer Pasha in the hopes of inducing him to menace the Russian army on the Pruth.

Omer Pasha, while expressing the pleasure it gives him to enter into personal communication with the Marshal, excuses himself from an advance upon the Pruth on account of the lateness of the season, and the superior forces which he should find opposed to him.

He estimates the Russian corps in Bessarabia at 91,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 388.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1,341. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 9, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this morning a confidential despatch from Berlin, dated the 6th instant, stating that Count Arnim had reported to his Government that the propositions which he had been charged to make to Count Buol had been courteously received, but that his interview with the Emperor had been marked by great coldness on the part of His Majesty, who had not touched on any political question.

Count Buol is reported to have expressed himself in favourable terms towards an understanding with Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 389.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1,347.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 9, 1854.*

THE advices received yesterday by the French Government from Berlin mention the confident hope entertained there that the Emperor of Russia may at length yield to the reiterated recommendations of the Prussian Government, and accept the four points as a basis of negotiation for peace with the Western Powers.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not doubt that under such an eventuality the Prussian Cabinet will call upon the Western Powers to suspend all further hostilities, since the cause for which these hostilities were undertaken will, in the opinion of that Cabinet, cease to exist. It is not altogether impossible, his Excellency thinks, that Austria may take a similar view, and support the demand of Prussia. He is, therefore, extremely desirous that the Cabinets of London and Paris should be prepared for such an eventuality, and be ready, through a previous interchange of opinions, to meet at once any demand of the kind which may be made, by language which shall show that there is no divergence of views between them.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assumes that the action of the two Powers is diplomatically and morally unfettered: he argues that they have always reserved to themselves entire liberty to diminish or to reinforce the obligations contained in the four points, and to insist on any other conditions which the progress of the war might render expedient or necessary.

France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, had even gone further, for in her communications with Austria in respect to the four points, he had pointed out that it might become as necessary to curb the power of Russia in the north as in the east, and that the allied Powers might determine on requiring an indemnity for the expenses of the war in which they were engaged.

Furthermore, the two Governments had declared that the simple acceptance of the four points by Russia would not be sufficient to put a stop to hostilities; that war might be carried on while negotiations were pending; and that nothing like an armistice could be thought of until the preliminaries of peace had been signed. It was clear, then, that Great Britain and France were free to act as their interests pointed out, although Russia might accept the four points, and express her willingness to negotiate a peace upon the basis of them; and the question which remained for them to decide, and on which he desired to consult your Lordship was, what course should be pursued by the two Governments should an attempt be made to open negotiations on the basis of the four points.

Now, although the two Governments had taken care to secure to themselves entire liberty of action, this was a fact not known to all the world, and a crude refusal to treat, though justifiable in reality, would be considered by Russia, and perhaps by Austria, as proving that we had other views than those which we had in general put forward. Germany also would take the alarm, and we should find ourselves to be the objects of suspicion and distrust.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought, therefore, that the two Governments should (if Russia expressed herself willing to treat upon the four points) agree to name Plenipotentiaries, but declare at the same time that hostilities would be continued until the preliminaries of peace had been signed, and that the allies would now have other conditions to make in addition to those, the acceptance of which would at an earlier period have satisfied them.

If Her Majesty's Government agree to this course, it might be advisable to examine, not only in what those other conditions should consist, but in what the guarantees for the future, alluded to in the four points, should be sought.

With regard to the first of these questions, he seemed to think that, considering the gigantic plans which it was evident Russia entertained in the Baltic, and which, had they been carried out in the Islands of Aland, would have made her mistress of the north of Europe, the Treaty of Peace should contain an engagement that no fortifications were to be erected on those islands. M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked that such a stipulation could not but be pleasing both to Sweden and Denmark, and even to Prussia.

The French Government seems bent on demanding indemnities for the expenses of the war.

With regard to the guarantees to be obtained through the four points, M. Drouyn de Lhuys is of opinion that Russia should engage to erect no more fortifications at Sebastopol, or on the coasts of the Black Sea, such works not being required for purposes of defence.

Furthermore, the maritime Powers should bind themselves by Treaty never to have above a certain force in the Black Sea, such force to be neither menacing to Russia, nor dangerous to Turkey.

In order to exercise a proper control over the actions of Russia, the English and French Governments should have a right of establishing Consuls at Sebastopol, Nicolaev, and such other points in the Russian dominions as they might judge advisable.

These were the points which M. Drouyn de Lhuys considered offered the greatest difficulties, and on which he thought an exchange of opinions between the two Governments desirable. The solution of the future condition of the Principalities, and the navigation of the Danube, did not regard them alone, and must be considered in conjunction with other Powers.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his intention of writing in this sense to Count Walewski at an early day, having, he said, received the Emperor's orders so to do.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 390.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1,348.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 9, 1854.*

M. DE MOUSTIER, in a despatch dated the 5th instant, gives an interesting account of a conversation which he had just had with M. de Manteuffel, who had endeavoured to persuade him that the Western Powers ought to be ready to make a peace if Russia accepted, as he confidently expected, the four points as a basis of negotiation. M. de Moustier represents M. de Manteuffel as arguing a point in which he felt he was in the wrong. He says further, that the alienation of England has made a great impression on the King, who, at heart, loves England more than any other country, and that he will probably endeavour by writing to the Queen to recover Her Majesty's friendship. M. de Moustier adds, that large reinforcements are being directed towards the Rhine, but that the French Government need be under no alarm of its being a measure dictated by apprehension of an attack from France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 391.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 318. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, November 4, 1854.*

COUNT ERNEST MOLTKE, the Secretary of the Danish Legation in Russia, has arrived here, having left St. Petersburgh on the 24th ultimo. He has been good enough to call upon me, and I venture to report to your Lordship the account which I have received from him of the state of public feeling at St. Petersburgh, and the opinions which he expressed on the state of affairs there, in the hope that they may not prove uninteresting to your Lordship.

He represented the news of the battle of the Alma to have produced much depression upon all ranks, and particularly upon the Emperor himself, who, in common with the public, is now much affected by the intelligence from the army, his spirits rising or falling according to the character of the last despatches. When Count Moltke left, the general feeling was hopeful, and it was believed that the Crimea was safe; that Sebastopol and the fleet might probably be destroyed, but that the allies would not be able to establish themselves permanently in the country, or even within the walls of the fortress. He also said that Prince Menchikoff had instructions to sink all the fleet if he despaired of a successful resistance.

I asked what effect he thought the fall of the fortress would have upon the public and the Emperor.

He said it would at first cause exasperation, and a more obstinate determination to prosecute the war, but that a few weeks, he believed, would bring about a reaction, and that despondency would eventually be the prevailing sentiment among all classes.

He said that the Government had entirely failed in their endeavours to excite the feeling which had existed in 1812, and that whenever a disaster occurred, a disposition was evinced to consider the Emperor as its cause, not so much however from his having been the author of the war, as from his having been deficient in talent and energy in conducting it. While such were the feelings of the people, he said, the Emperor appeared also to have lost the firmness of character which he was formerly supposed to possess. He was much aged, and had felt so keenly the disasters which had already attended his arms, that it would excite no astonishment if he did not survive the effect of such a blow as the complete triumph of the allies in the Crimea. The fall of

Bomarsund had produced a deep impression upon him, as he had received a letter from General Bodisco, a few days previously to the intelligence reaching St. Petersburgh, stating that "he could die but would never surrender;" an incident which, taken with many others of a similar tendency, has led him to mistrust every one around him, and to lose confidence in all those in whose zeal and devotion he had formerly trusted.

Count Moltke said that the war had not produced so great an effect on the prices of commodities as might have been expected, but that the higher classes made no secret of the falling off which had taken place in their incomes; while it was generally acknowledged that the Government would be seriously embarrassed to find the funds necessary for prosecuting the war next year, the issue of paper having been carried as far as it was possible to do so.

Count Nesselrode however, appears to take a more favourable view of the future than others, and assures every one that peace will be restored in the course of the winter. As I asked whether the Chancellor was equally communicative as to the means by which this desirable object was to be effected, the Count replied that he believed the Emperor would not make any great objection to two of the guarantees demanded by the allies, namely, the abandonment of the protectorate in the Principalities, and of his claim to that of the Greek Christians in Turkey; but that he saw no probability of His Imperial Majesty ever consenting to arrangements involving a cession of territory—a condition which would not even be easily obtained in the event of His Imperial Majesty's death, as the Hereditary Grand Duke had lately affected great ardour for the prosecution of the war, and for the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire.

On my referring to the visit of the English fleet to Cronstadt, Count Moltke said that its appearance had created great alarm in St. Petersburgh, and that it had been generally believed that Sir Charles Napier would have contrived, by attacking the forts in succession, to get sufficiently near to destroy the Russian fleet and the arsenal of Cronstadt. He did not speak positively on the subject, but he believed the masonry at Cronstadt to be of the same description as that of Bomarsund; and he assured me that from the nature of the foundation of Fort Menchikoff, the whole edifice shakes when the guns are fired. He also said that on the submarine mines being inspected in June, it was found necessary to replace many of them which had suffered and been rendered ineffective from two months' immersion in the water.

With regard to the higher classes, Count Moltke said, as I have already mentioned, that their opinions are unsteady, being influenced by the favourable or unfavourable incidents of the day, and that they have ceased to see much of the Diplomatic body, all foreigners being more or less objects of suspicion to them.

The English Government and people are the subjects of much obloquy, but the national hatred is principally directed against Austria, the most opprobrious epithets being applied to the conduct of that Power.

I ought to add, however, that Count Moltke fully confirms the reports which have already reached your Lordship of the admiration which Her Majesty's troops at Alma excited among the Russian officers who were opposed to them.

I asked what position Baron Werther, the new Prussian Minister, occupied in society, and what language he held respecting the present state of affairs in Germany. Count Moltke said that he was extremely prudent in the expression of his opinions, but though he was made much of by the Imperial family and the Court, it was well known that he and Count Munster, who may be considered the representative at St. Petersburgh of the Russian party in Prussia, disagreed in their views of public affairs, and acted in direct opposition to each other.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 392.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 319. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, November 5, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 118 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to add, that a gentleman mentioned to me this morning that Count Moltke, during the two days which he spent at Copenhagen before proceeding to the country, had generally spoken of the war as being extremely unpopular at St. Petersburgh.

My French colleague, also, to whom I communicated the information which I have reported to your Lordship in my above-mentioned despatch, has since obtained from a friend of Count Moltke a complete confirmation of all his statements to me, and some further particulars which may not be unworthy of your Lordship's notice.

The Count is said to have represented the Emperor as spending much of his time in the inspection of recruits, and occupying himself even with such details as fixing on the shoulders of the men the number of the regiments to which they are appointed. He also appears to have said that many members of the nobility openly show their dissatisfaction with the war, and declare "that Russia is large enough, and does not require to aggrandize herself by seeking influence in Turkey;" and he expressed an opinion that the higher orders generally would be indisposed to make further sacrifices for the maintenance of the war, if the disasters which have hitherto attended the Russian arms were not soon retrieved by some important successes.

The clergy likewise were described by him as being no longer willing to place funds at the disposal of the Emperor.

With regard to the feeling prevalent at St. Petersburgh, when Count Moltke left, that the Crimea was safe, he appears to have added to his friend, that Count Esterhazy had expressed in his presence a conviction that if Sebastopol did not fall now, the Emperor would strain every nerve to make it unassailable in the spring, and that His Imperial Majesty would, if necessary, contrive to throw 200,000 men into the Peninsula in the course of the winter.

M. de Botezac's informant understood, from what he learnt from Count Moltke, that there was a disposition to make the Emperor alone responsible for the war; but as I particularly inquired of the Count what he meant by using this expression to me, I still think I was correct in stating that it is not so much the war itself, as the manner in which it has been conducted, that is exposing His Imperial Majesty to the criticism of his subjects.

I ought to add that this information appears to have been communicated by Count Moltke to M. de Bluhme, and that his Excellency expressed some surprise that he should never have heard anything of the kind from Baron Plessen—a statement which I think very probable, as M. de Bluhme, in reply to the inquiries which I have from time to time made of him as to the nature of his reports from St. Petersburgh, has always assured me that Baron Plessen appeared to consider it imprudent under present circumstances to write much respecting the state of affairs in that capital. His Excellency may possibly now, if he places credit in M. de Moltke's report, attribute the Danish Minister's silence to some other cause. Baron Plessen has received much kindness from Count Nesselrode, is a great favourite in Russian society, and may not therefore be disposed to see matters in so unfavourable a light as Count Moltke has done.

It was understood at the time of Count Moltke's departure, that at the earnest entreaties of the Empress, orders had been sent to the young Grand Dukes to return from the South and to join the Hereditary Grand Duke at Warsaw.

M. de Moltke seems also to be of opinion that the Grand Duke Constantine has shown himself to be so self-willed since the commencement of the war, that he does not enjoy so much of His Imperial Majesty's favour as the Hereditary Grand Duke.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 393.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 606.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 20, 1854.*

I HAVE this moment received the despatch of which copy is herewith inclosed, from Vice-Admiral Dundas.

It relates to the attack of the combined squadrons on a part of the fortifications of Sebastopol, in cooperation with the bombardment of the land forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 393.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off the Katscha, October 18, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the allied siege batteries opened fire yesterday morning at half-past 6 against the Russian works with great effect, and small loss. About half-past 1 in the afternoon the allied fleets, at the request of the General commanding, opened fire on the sea defences of Sebastopol, and continued the action until half-past 6 P.M.

We cannot ascertain the exact damage sustained by the enemy, but it must be considerable. In the English fleet we have had 45 killed and 268 wounded; but the ships, with the exception of the "Albion" and "Arethusa," which I shall send to Constantinople to repair, will be ready for sea in twenty-four hours.

The siege batteries are still firing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 394.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 11, 1·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 10, 1854.*

A DESPATCH has been received here by the editor of the "Post" newspaper, and by the Minister of the Interior, from Czernowitz, dated the 9th, but from a private source, and therefore requiring confirmation. It states that "a violent attack having been made upon Sebastopol on the 5th, the conflagration being so extensive that Prince Menchikoff had asked for suspension of hostilities, which Lord Raglan has refused." It ends, "The allies were in the advantage."

Such news having been received here, I transmit it without having been able to ascertain further confirmation of it.

No. 395.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 628.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 30, 1854.*

I AVAIL myself of the messenger to forward to your Lordship two despatches of the 28th instant from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, the one transmitting copy of a letter to Lord Raglan, the other giving information of the number of Russians remaining in the Dobrudscha and in its immediate neighbourhood on the left bank of the Danube.

The letter to Lord Raglan informs him that 8,000 Turkish infantry, and two batteries of field artillery, are held at his Lordship's disposal by order of Omer Pasha.

Your Lordship will observe that the Russians in the Dobrudscha are described as not exceeding about 8,000 men of all arms, and that the garrisons of Varna and Pravadi are to be replaced by troops from Shumla in the event of Lord Raglan's accepting the offer made to him by the Turkish Commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 395.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, October 28, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith for the information of your Lordship, the copy of a communication which I have addressed to Lord Raglan, respecting a Turkish contingent of 8,000 men, which is at the disposal of his Lordship, should he deem it desirable that they should proceed to the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 395.

Consul Neale to General Lord Raglan.

My Lord, *Varna, October 26, 1854.*

ISLAM PASHA, the Military Governor of Varna, called upon me this morning, and communicated to me that he had received orders from Omer Pasha to hold in readiness for immediate embarkation, should such be required, the whole of the Turkish Infantry now stationed at Varna and at Pravadi.

Islam Pasha stated that the number and distribution of the troops referred to was as follows:—In Varna 9 battalions, 5,820 men; in Pravadi 4 battalions, 2,500 men; total, 8,320; with three batteries of field artillery.

The Pasha, therefore, stated that he was prepared to embark those troops for the Crimea without further reference to Omer Pasha, and requested I would inform your Lordship that, in case you should deem it desirable that these troops should proceed to the Crimea, they would be ordered immediately to embark by such transports as may be provided for them.

The Pasha further informs me that, in the event of their so embarking, Omer Pasha had directed that an equal number of troops should be directed to supply their place in Varna from Shumla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 395.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, October 28, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I have been placed in possession of the following information respecting the number of the Russian forces in the Dobrudscha, by a British-protected subject, named Giovanni Anino, who left Toultcha on the 14th instant.

M. Anino states that he left Toultcha in company with Mr. Charles O'Connell, a British subject, who has been for a considerable period settled in Toultcha as a ship chandler, and with whom he was in partnership. He states that they experienced much difficulty in obtaining permission to leave Toultcha; but having eventually reached Zatoka, opposite Galatz, they succeeded in crossing to the latter place by bribing the Cossack guard at Zatoka.

I questioned M. Anino particularly respecting the Russians in the Dobrudscha, and he assures me that, when he left, the following was the number and distribution of the troops still remaining there.

Toultcha.—The Commandant and Staff, with a few Cossacks.

Babadagh.—About 2,700 Infantry (chiefly composed of Greek and Bulgarian volunteers), and 800 Cossacks.

Isaktcha.—3,000 Infantry, and 17 gun-boats in the river protecting the bridge.

Matchin.—2,000 Infantry.

M. Anino very positively states that the foregoing are the whole of the Russian troops in the Dobrudscha. Up to the 15th of September, however, he states that there were upwards of 15,000 men in Toultcha, but that they crossed the Danube and proceeded to Ismail about that period.

M. Anino also assures me that the Russian batteries in Toultcha have all been dismantled.

According to the best information M. Anino possessed, the Russian troops stationed between Ismail, Tchatal, and Reni, amounted to about 30,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 396.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 631.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 30, 1854.*

I AM informed by a message from Reshid Pasha that Baron de Bruck has sent him a printed paper, in German, purporting, as the interpreter stated, that the Austrian Government had declared the port of Cattaro to be a military port. His Highness was at the same time requested to sign a paper, drawn up beforehand in French, in acknowledgment of the said notification and its contents. The Pasha, unwilling to sign as proposed, made the best excuses he could, and the matter lies open for another day. He expressed to M. Pisani a suspicion that the intention of Austria, in declaring Cattaro to be a military port, is to comprise the Turkish issues of Kleck and Sutorina, with the view of excluding British trade from those channels of intercourse, as had been avowed on a former occasion, by denying the right of the Porte to any power over them.

The question thus raised is not unworthy of attention; and the Porte, which looks upon the Austrian proposition as a snare, is not likely to give into it without a knowledge of your Lordship's opinion, of which I beg to be apprised at a convenient season.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 397.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 632.)

Therapia, October 30, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH a view to your Lordship's more complete information I forward herewith, in translation, a copy of Arif Effendi's official report to Reshid Pasha, respecting his communications with Count Buol, the Earl of Westmorland, and Baron de Bourqueney, on the late unfortunate differences in Wallachia between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities.

The memorandum of points mentioned therein by the Turkish Ambassador, has not been communicated to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 397.

Arif Effendi to Reshid Pasha.

October 17, 1854.

(Translation.)

I HAD the honour to receive, on the 14th instant, your Highness' despatch dated the 4th (with its inclosures), setting forth the views of the Sublime Porte respecting the pretension of the Austrian authorities in the Principalities to oppose the forward movement of the Ottoman troops. The courier from Belgrade, with these despatches, brought despatches also for the French and English Ambassadors, which I sent them without delay.

I had the honour to state in my last report that the Austrian Government had written to Bucharest, condemning the proceedings of the Austrian Generals respecting the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the Principalities. This new opposition gave me great surprise under the circumstances, as it would only complicate matters in the eyes of the Porte, and shake the confidence placed by us in the integrity and good faith of Austrian policy. Thinking that the despatches received by the English and French Ambassadors might have reference to this subject, I had an interview with their Excellencies, and they were equally astonished and surprised.

However, as Austria has no right, either by Treaty or the rule of reason, to prevent the movement of the Imperial army, which is free to act as it pleases in this manner, I waited yesterday on Count Buol, and spoke to him in a frank and suitable manner. I explained to him, one by one, the questions set forth in your Highness' instructions, and the position which had been thus created; and I told his Excellency that by calling the Government of Austria to give an explanation on the subjects, there was no want of confidence implied on the part of the Sublime Porte, but that the only object was to remove all causes of present or prospective difficulties between the two Governments. A prolonged discussion hereupon ensued, and Count Buol at last admitted that the Sultan's forces were entirely free to act in all things as they pleased, and that no one could have a right to prevent them from so acting. His Excellency said that Omer Pasha having stated that it would be necessary for the Ottoman troops to enter Bessarabia from Ibraila and Galatz, the Austrian Government had at once assented; and that if, in a military point of view, any other movement were considered as being more advantageous, Omer Pasha would, in the first place, discuss the subject frankly with the Austrian Generals, in order that suitable dispositions might be made with reference to the Austrian forces in that quarter, and then proceed to move, as a matter of course, without any opposition whatever being made on the part of the Austrian Generals. In further proof of Austria's having no right to make any such opposition, Count Buol assured me that the Austrian Generals had not opposed the advance of the Ottoman forces, but that, as there was no fear of the return of the Russians into the Principalities, owing to the presence of the Austrian army, Count Coronini had frankly expressed the opinion to Omer Pasha that it would have been more advantageous for the Ottoman troops to proceed to assist in the conquest of the Crimea, rather than remain inoperative in Wallachia; but that not having sufficiently conveyed his real meaning respecting this suggestion, he, the Count, would condemn this proceeding on the General's part.

The conversation then turned on the entry of the allied forces into the Principalities. Count Buol observed, laughing, how useless it was to assemble so many troops on one point. I replied that it was not meant by the Sublime Porte, in bringing forward this question, that the allied forces were going to enter the Principalities now; but that it wanted to know whether, when it appeared necessary that they should enter, Austria would have anything to say against it. The Count stated that in that case Austria would not oppose it, and that point is thus settled.

Another question under discussion was the Proclamation. In pursuance of my instructions, I represented in firm language to Count Buol the necessity of sending orders to the Austrian Commander-in-chief, in order to endeavour to remove the bad impressions caused by this subject. The Count replied that a draft had been lately drawn up at Bucharest between Count Coronini and the Ottoman authorities, and sent to Constantinople; that some modifications had been made in it by the Porte, and the project had been sent back; and that, therefore, there was an end of that question now.

The Count expressed his deep and sincere regret at the occurrence of so many misunderstandings at Bucharest, arising out of a want of harmony and cordiality between the respective Agents; and his Excellency complained somewhat of Dervish Pasha having proceeded beyond his instructions, and of Stirbey having been proclaimed a traitor to his Government at Bucharest, after Stirbey had been sent there as Vogrode, in pursuance of the decision previously come to between the Porte and Austria. The answer to this was to be found in your Highness' despatches, and I caused the paragraph containing it to be again translated on the spot; and I replied that the Sublime Porte was extremely desirous that all matters should be arranged in a manner conformable with the alliance between the two countries; and that if the Agents on the other side acted in conformity with the views and wishes of their Government, I had no doubt that everything would go on smoothly in the Senate. The Count, on his part, expressed the earnest hope that no such misunderstandings would arise in future between the two Courts.

With respect to the deposal of Prince Stirbey, as set forth in your Highness' despatches, and which I look upon in the light of an instruction, I was careful only to read to Count Buol that passage of your Highness' despatch having reference to that subject, not considering it, in my humble judgment, suitable to communicate to his Excellency at once all the delicate matters (contained in it), and especially those involving a personal complaint against him. But an opportunity having arisen in the course of conversation, I stated that Prince Stirbey's appointment was only a temporary one, and proceeded no further this time. Having entered largely into discussion with Count Buol on these subjects, as above related, I could not obtain separate answers from him on each point, and the Count therefore requested that the several points should be committed to writing, and said that if I would communicate them to him he would give me written replies, which would be the better course to pursue. Although I had no authority for doing so, yet, as the Count repeated his request in the most friendly manner, and the English and French Ambassadors said that there was no objection to my sending in the points in question in writing, I drew up a sort of memorandum in French from your Highness' despatches, and gave it to the Count. I inclose a copy of it herewith.

As the Ambassadors of England and France were requested in their despatches from Constantinople to assist me in this matter, and having seen Count Buol after me, he held the same language to them as he did to me about the military movements; that is, that the Sultan's troops in the Principalities were

quite free, and were at liberty to advance by the route of Galatz and Ibraila, and that no opposition would be made to their moving from any other point which they might consider expedient: but, that if they chose a route different from Galatz or Ibraila, the Austrian General in that quarter must be apprized thereof in the first place, in order that he might make his necessary arrangements; that Omer Pasha must, however, communicate frankly on the subject with the Austrian Generals. Count Buol also told them that he would give me the requisite written reply to the other points in question according to the statement made to me by their Excellencies. I, on my part, told them succinctly what had passed between me and the Count.

As it was decided that I should see Count Buol again to-day, it was settled with the English and French Ambassadors that they should meet me at this Embassy to look over the written answers to be sent to me, supposing they were prepared, and in order that the despatches from their Excellencies to the Consuls at Bucharest, concerning the military movements, should be drawn up in the same sense as those from me to Omer Pasha, and that we should draw up the drafts of them in concert. Their Excellencies, therefore, came to this Embassy, after my interview with Count Buol, and we drew up together the despatch to be sent by me, and which I telegraphed immediately to Omer Pasha. Copy is herewith inclosed for your Highness' information.

Although the other points have been thus brought to a settlement through this Embassy under your Highness' guidance, the Ambassadors having had an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs after me on their subject and communicated to me, briefly, the result of it, they requested me to give them a *précis* of this despatch to your Highness, which I complied with. I had above stated having had another interview with Count Buol to-day. On that occasion his Excellency opened the conversation by saying, I have received your memorandum, but I have not had time to read it: but I tell you beforehand that you will be satisfied with the replies which I am going to give. I am going to send them to Baron Bruck to come to the Porte. At a delicate "and important period like the present it is of the utmost consequence that a perfect alliance and concord should exist between the four Governments, and I will write separately to Baron Bruck on that subject." His Excellency continued to state that the occasional occurrence of these misunderstandings at Bucharest arose out of a want of concord between the respective Agents in questions of difficulty, and that in order to prevent their recurrence they should refer to Vienna on all difficult points, that is, Count Coronini should write to his Excellency, and the Ottoman Agents should refer to this Embassy, and that it would be better to discuss and settle matters here; and that I should write on the subject to Omer Pasha and to Dervish Pasha. I observed to him that I should receive authorization from Constantinople for such an arrangement, and report in the first instance to your Highness. Our interview thus ended.

Baron de Bruck and Lord Westmorland told me that Count Buol had communicated this matter to them the day before, and that they had reported it to their Governments. If, said they, this arrangement is made, important matters of the nature in question arising at Bucharest would necessarily be settled at Vienna between them, Count Buol and myself acting in concert, which would be highly advantageous and facilitate things.

No. 398.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 635. Confidential.)

Therapia, October 30, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM informed by Reshid Pasha in confidence that although Baron de Bruck had expressed a strong wish that he should be invited by note to contribute to the repression of the Montenegrins, now that his Excellency has received

the official note drawn up in consequence and presented to him he makes a variety of objections, seeking to prove that the Montenegrins have acted under a provocation given to them by the Turkish authorities, and intimating that the Imperial forces cannot therefore proceed against them with any degree of justice or propriety.

I am not in a position to fathom the meaning of this apparent change, and state it to your Lordship as one among passing circumstances which may guide the judgment in appreciating the conduct and divining the intentions of the Austrian Cabinet with respect to Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 399.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 638.)

Therapia, October 30, 1854.

My Lord,

I DIRECTED M. Pisani to read your despatch No. 601 of the 9th instant to Reshid Pasha, and I have now the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of M. Pisani's report of what passed on the occasion.

Reshid Pasha only states the truth when he asserts that the French and English Embassies were consulted as to the return of the Hospodars. I, for one, have no wish to conceal the part which I took in the matter. It is already, indeed, known to your Lordship. I was adverse to Prince Stirbey's reinstatement on account of his misconduct last year; but the peremptory expectation of that arrangement, declared by Count Buol in his instruction to the Internuncio, could not with prudence be overlooked under the circumstances of the moment. I was therefore constrained to modify my opinion so far as to assent, however reluctantly, to the return of Prince Stirbey, provided his conduct were submitted to inquiry afterwards, and his permanent reinstatement made to depend on the result.

Judging from appearances, I believe the real state of the case to have been this. Austria took advantage of her position to assume a very determined tone; the Porte, as usual, was inclined to temporize; and I was not sufficiently certain of the views of Her Majesty's Government to venture on the responsibility of advising a more decided refusal of Count Buol's demand.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 399.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Péra, October 25, 1854.

My Lord,

IN conformity with your Excellency's directions I read and explained to Reshid Pasha Lord Clarendon's despatch No. 601 of the 9th of October, relative to the return of the Hospodars, omitting, however, the words cancelled in pencil.

His Highness said in reply that he cannot comprehend what his Lordship states respecting the conduct of the Porte with regard to the return of the Hospodars. The Porte, added he, as your Excellency is well aware, had not

acted of its own accord, but in concert with the two Embassies, which are thoroughly acquainted with what passed between his Highness and the Internuncio. If, indeed, the despatch of his Lordship had arrived some time ago, it would certainly have encouraged the Porte to resist the Austrian representations.

The Porte has no wish whatever to protect the Hospodars at all; on the contrary, it hopes that the results of the inquiry will be unfavourable to them, and enable it to remove them from the head of the Administration. The instructions to be addressed to Dervish Pasha, are before your Excellency.

In reference to what Lord Clarendon states respecting the instructions sent to Dervish Pasha from Constantinople, and not communicated to the General-issimo, Reshid Pasha observed that his Lordship has been misinformed, because the said instructions were brought to the knowledge of Omer Pasha. But supposing, said his Highness, that such was the case, there is no irregularity in the proceeding, as the Porte wrote to Dervish Pasha, who is the acknowledged Commissioner of the Porte, entrusted exclusively with the affairs of the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 400.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 539. Confidential.)

Therapia, October 31, 1854.

My Lord,

THE absence of official advices from the Crimea may excuse me for sending, inclosed herewith, to your Lordship a narrative of the late occurrences near Sebastopol, extracted from a private letter which I have only this moment received. Though I do not feel at liberty to mention my correspondent's name, I rely implicitly on his character for that correctness which is essential, and also for his access to the best sources of information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 400.

Extract from a Private Letter, dated October 27, 1854.

WE are busily employed, and it will need the best energies of all to terminate our operations with success. Circumstances required that our attack should be made on the south side instead of on the north, which I always thought would have given us less trouble, and a less extensive base to work upon. When I tell you that, at present from our extreme right before Sebastopol to the extreme left of the French, resting upon the sea, the distance is not under eight miles, you can judge of the difficulties we have to contend with in resisting attacks from the fortress.

Added to our position of besiegers, we have now sustained a spirited attack upon Balaklava by a Russian force of 15,000 Infantry, and 3,000 Cavalry, with many guns. This occurred on the 25th, and I grieve to say has been attended with very serious loss to our Light Brigade of Cavalry.

Balaklava was defended by a force consisting of 1,200 Marines and one regiment (93rd) of Infantry, along a front of three miles; beyond which lies a plain from one and a-half to two miles in extent, rising to a low crest of hills, upon which we had placed five redoubts (open works) and a few guns. In these, to defend them, were placed 5,000 Turks, distributed along the height. On the advance of a strong Russian force of Cavalry, our Turkish friends took to their heels and fell

back on the 93rd, who were formed in line with a Turkish battalion on either flank. The Russians advanced upon the 93rd, who were deserted by their friends on both flanks, and thus left alone to meet the Russians; they stood firm as a rock, received them in line, and gave them such a volley as made the Russians retreat. Upon this our Heavy Cavalry made a most brilliant charge, and quite successful, as the enemy began to retire on all points. Now comes the sad part of the affair: Our brigade of Light Cavalry was upon our left—orders were sent to them to "follow the enemy," hanging upon his flank and rear, so as to take advantage to charge. This order was either misunderstood, or delivered incorrectly, by poor Captain Nolan; and the Light Cavalry made a most gallant but disastrous charge through three lines of the Russian force, and passed a battery of seven guns, cutting down all the gunners. To return was another thing; and out of between 600 and 700 men who charged, only 180 came back; a few stragglers came in the following day—about 120; so that our loss is upwards of 350 to 400 Cavalry and some guns, which the Turks had charge of, on the heights.

Captain Nolan and young Charteris were killed, a great many officers missing or prisoners, but I do not know the exact details.

On the 26th the Russians made a sortie from the town with 3,000 Infantry and six guns, upon our right. They were met by the 2nd and 1st Divisions, supported by the Light Division and twenty-four guns, which sent the enemy down the hill faster than he came up. Their loss was severe; 500 killed, and 300 we took prisoners—2 officers among them. Our loss was 1 killed and 10 wounded. Lord Dunkellin was made prisoner on the 22nd; the officer who had taken him was made prisoner on the 26th. Gortchakoff, they told us, was wounded.

It had been once a question of our giving up Balaklava, but I am happy to say that instead of that we are strengthening our defences there, and have sent 400 more seamen on shore to assist. We are very short of troops to defend our besieging position, and that of Balaklava, which is the point from whence provisions, ammunition, &c., are sent to the army.

And now a word about the sea attack of the 17th, which, I fear, did little permanent mischief to the batteries on shore. It was difficult to squeeze twenty-four ships of the line into the small space from which a real effective fire would be poured upon the batteries. What was possible was done most gallantly by Sir E. Lyons, supported by the "Sanspareil," "Albion," "London," and, later in the day, by the "Bellerophon" and "Rodney," which last ship grounded immediately ahead of the "Agamemnon." Our loss was severe—45 killed and 264 wounded; many have died since. The ships were a good deal knocked about, but are now all patched and ready for work again. Some of the French ships were a good deal struck; the "Ville de Paris" (Admiral Hamelin) had three shells exploded under the poop, which blew it almost off, and killed and wounded his four aides-de-camp. Their loss is estimated to have been 40 killed and 200 wounded.

I hope that we are not far from seeing Sebastopol fall. It must be done by assault or not at all. I think that both armies are in good spirits, and feel that the bayonet is the only weapon to open a passage for them. It may happen any day, I think, after this.

Our casualties in the trenches have been few, considering that we have been ten days firing at them. Their fire does not cease, and when we knock over a gun it is soon replaced.

I see Lord Raglan constantly; he is well and in good spirits, although much grieved at the issue of the affair on the 25th instant.

The weather continues to be beautiful, and the Russians kindly permit us to get water from the Katcha. Eupatoria is still in our hands, but I understand there is a Russian force of 4,000 or 5,000 men outside, and they have driven in the Tatars from the neighbourhood.

No. 401.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 13, 2·15 A.M.)

Vienna, November 12, 1854, 7·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL has just communicated to me the following telegraphic despatch from the Austrian Agent at Bucharest, dated 10th November:

"On the 6th, the Russians attacked the English position before Sebastopol with very superior forces. Lord Raglan immediately brought up the Guards, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions of his troops. He was later reinforced by the division, and other French troops, under the personal command of Canrobert. The battle lasted from daybreak till late in the afternoon, with great severity. The Russians at length retired, leaving many dead and several hundred prisoners. The English report stated the loss to have been very great on both sides, but that of the Russians to have been greater than theirs. General Sir George Brown, Major-General Bentinck, Brigadiers Adam, Buller, and Torrens, were wounded."

No. 402.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 414.)

Vienna, November 8, 1854.

My Lord,

M. VON DER PFORDTEN arrived in Vienna from Berlin on Wednesday last. He has been very courteously received by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, and by Count Buol and the Ministers; but he has had no success whatever in the principal object of his mission, which was to give his support to the Prussian propositions which had been delivered to Count Buol by Count Arnim the day before his arrival.

The answer to these propositions will be forwarded to Berlin to-morrow; but I believe it will only contain a courteous expression of the adherence of the Austrian Government to the statements and declarations upon the Eastern question, which they have already been called upon to make to the Cabinet of Berlin.

M. Von der Pfordten arrived here without any instructions as to the line his Government intended to adopt at Frankfort. He returns to Munich for the purpose of explaining to His Majesty the King the result of his communications both in Berlin and Vienna, and of receiving from him the instructions he may decide upon giving for the future conduct of his Minister at Frankfort, when the Austrian proposals will be brought before the Diet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 403.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 417.)

Vienna, November 8, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL has informed me that Omer Pasha has announced to General Hess that he has now the intention of undertaking an offensive movement against the Russian army in Bessarabia, and that, for this purpose, he has already advanced a part of his forces to Fokschani, and that he will require the free passage for his troops through Galatz, and as far north as Fornioze, on the Pruth. General Hess has immediately forwarded the orders to the general

officer in command at Galatz to conform to the wishes of Omer Pasha, and to withdraw for the present the Austrian garrison from Galatz, so that the Turkish troops may meet with no difficulties in passing through that place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 404.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 422.)

Vienna, November 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to an article in the "Allgemeine Zeitung," in illustration of the treatment which Austrian commerce on the Danube has experienced at the hands of the Russians, as the statements it contains give a correct idea of the facts of the case.

The article in question begins by quoting a statement from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," to the effect that "although the hostilities between the Russians and Turks had to a certain extent inconvenienced the navigation of the Danube, yet that it had met with every facility on the part of the Russians compatible with the requirements of military operations; that friendly explanations on the subject had passed between the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh and Vienna; and that in accordance with the Emperor's orders, the Russian Commanders had always as much as possible protected the interests of Austrian commerce and navigation, as their proclamations could show."

In refutation of this statement, the writer observes that "although it was well known that when Russia declared war with Turkey, her Generals gave the assurance that the commerce of neutrals, and more especially the exportation of corn to Austria, would not be interfered with, yet that in direct contradiction to this, Prince Paskiewitch proceeded to prohibit all exportation of corn down the Danube, closed the non-Russian ports of Galatz and Ibraila, where six millions of Austrian property in corn (destined for the ports of the Adriatic, and which therefore could not be transported up the Danube) was stored, and to complete the total destruction of all liberty of commerce, and the abrogation of all international rights, proceeded to block up the Sulina mouths. It was in this manner that the proclamations were attended to.

"The friendly explanations," adverted to by the Russian paper, ended by Count Esterhazy, in a note dated May the 8th, complaining of the injury done to Austrian and German commerce, and on the 14th by expressly reserving to Austria the right to demand at the proper time compensation for the losses sustained by the forcible interruption of the navigation of the Danube. The permission to continue the navigation was a pure illusion, as it was clogged by the condition not to touch the right bank of the Danube—a condition which any one acquainted with the conformation of the river and its banks in the Principalities knows it would be impossible to observe; and consequently the navigation of the Danube had to be given up *de facto* until the Russians chose "on pure strategical grounds" to evacuate the Principalities. Indeed, how could neutral ships navigate a river where they were fired upon by a Russian battery, the commander of which alleged in excuse that he did not know the Austrian flag; and that on the Danube, on which the Austrian flag is the predominant one. Such was "the peculiar protection of the interests of the Danubian navigation," of which the Russian journal speaks. It extended, however, to the commerce of neutrals beyond the Danube.

In contradiction to the assurances above adverted to an Imperial Decree of the 12th of February prohibited the exportation of corn from the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff. Urgent application was made that what had already been bought by the Austrians in these ports might be allowed to be removed: this was not granted, but a promise was given that it would be repurchased by the Russians. A small proportion was accordingly repurchased at Odessa, but by far the greater portion remained unsold, and was yet not allowed to be removed, by which the greatest injury was caused to many Austrian

houses, and a marked influence was produced upon the high prices of bread under which Austria and Germany are now suffering.

But the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" declares all this to be indifferent to Germany, and says that to attack Russia, "serait vraiment tirer un coup d'épée pour enfoncer une porte ouverte." To which we answer that the door remains barred as long as Russia can command the key.

Unfortunately, the "St. Petersburg Gazette" does not seem to apprehend that we shall "tirer l'épée" to force it open; hitherto it has been right, but now Austria is on the watch upon her eastern frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 405.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 157.)
My Lord, *Berlin, November 10, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that Baron Brunnow, late Russian Envoy in London, has arrived here on his way to St. Petersburgh, having received an Imperial summons to repair to that capital.

Baron Manteuffel informed me that he had called upon him and had expressed a wish to see the King. Baron Manteuffel inquired whether he was charged with any commission, to which he replied in the negative, remarking that he was now "un diplomat déchu."

It is surmised that he has been specially called to St. Petersburgh to give the aid of his counsels in the consideration of the four guarantees.

I observed to Baron Manteuffel that I had understood that Baron Brunnow had incurred the Imperial displeasure and was in disgrace. Baron Manteuffel replied that he believed that this had not been as much the case with him as with M. de Kisseleff, as Baron Brunnow is reported to have been always opposed to the mission of Prince Menchikoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 406.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 160.)
My Lord, *Berlin, November 10, 1854.*

TWO telegraphic despatches have been received by the Government here from Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, expressing an opinion that the Emperor of Russia was disposed for peace and inclined to accept the four guarantees lately again submitted to him by the Prussian Cabinet.

The messenger arrived this morning from St. Petersburgh, bringing the text of the answer of the Imperial Cabinet to the Prussian note of the 22nd ultimo.

From all I can learn it is my impression that the Emperor has only consented to take the four points into discussion which, as your Lordship will recollect, he imperiously refused to do when they were submitted to him by Austria and Prussia.

There is a wide difference between the pure and simple acceptation of the four points and the mere consent to take them into discussion. The one involves a certain binding engagement. The other is but a palpable excuse in order to gain delay and to keep Germany in suspense.

With reference to these four points I am likewise secretly informed that some three weeks ago Baron Budberg communicated to Baron Manteuffel a paper drawn up by Count Nesselrode, in which particular reference was made

to these points, and which I am inclined to believe first prompted the Prussian Government to address a second invitation to the Emperor to counsel their acceptation.

In treating the first point respecting the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, Count Nesselrode in his *exposé* is stated to have expressed that this subject had always engaged the attention and solicitude of his Government, and that they were ready to make the largest concessions in this sense.

With respect to the Protectorate of the Principalities, Count Nesselrode said that it had always been a great charge to Russia, and that the Imperial Government would be happy to be relieved of it, and that it should be equally shared with the other Powers. But he also put forth two conditions on transferring these Provinces to the collective Protectorate of the European Powers:

1st. That a guarantee should be given for the protection of the Christians.

2nd. That the Provinces should not be allowed to serve as an asylum for political or other refugees.

On the other two points no observations were offered on, although he it recollected that the one relating to the Protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey was the primeval origin of the war.

Although I have not seen the *exposé* to which I allude, I have every reason to believe that the statements here given with respect to it is correct, and I have thought them of sufficient interest to bring to your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 407.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 161.)
My Lord, *Berlin, November 10, 1854.*

SINCE writing my previous despatch, I am informed privately that the Russian Government have consented (in reply to the Prussian invitation of the 22nd ultimo), to take the four points into discussion, and to open negotiations upon their basis.

It is stated that they will not address themselves to the Austrian Government as the medium of communicating with the Western Powers, as that Cabinet has taken so hostile an attitude towards Russia; but they will place the matter in the hands of His Prussian Majesty.

As this communication only arrived this morning from St. Petersburgh, no resolution has been yet taken by this Government with respect to it.

It is my duty to inform your Lordship that my information is derived from a private and secret source, and that Baron Manteuffel made no observations to me whatever on this subject at the interview I had with his Excellency this morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 408.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 358. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 14, 1854.*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship, for your confidential information, copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on the disinclination manifested by the Austrian Internuncio to contribute to the repression of the Montenegrins, and I have to instruct your Lordship to make inquiries upon the subject.

* No. 398.

Her Majesty's Government trust that M. de Bruck has in this matter again been acting without instructions, or exceeding those which have been addressed to him; but he seems to lose no occasion for creating embarrassment to the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 409.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 364.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1854.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople as to the declaration of the Austrian Government that the port of Cattaro is to be a military port; and I have to instruct your Lordship to endeavour to ascertain how far the suspicions entertained by the Porte that this proposal involves some scheme upon Kleck is well founded, and what are the pretensions of Austria upon Kleck and Sutorina.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 410.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 1,372. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, November* 14, 1854.

I ASKED M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the course of conversation this morning whether he did not mean to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the fact, that it appeared by General Canrobert's report of the battle of the 5th instant, that no less than three divisions of the Russian army had joined Prince Menschikoff from the Danube.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he had made representations on this subject to the Austrian Cabinet until he was tired of it. He read me a despatch to M. de Bourqueney, dated the 6th instant, and he gave me the account of a conversation which he had had no later than yesterday with M. de Hübner, in both of which he stated that he must consider Austria responsible for the reinforcements which had reached the Crimea from the Danube. He did not wish to impute ungenerous motives to Austria, but the fact was, that by the way in which she had occupied the Principalities, she had been the cause of freeing 40,000 Russian soldiers, who were now engaged in combating the allied armies. He must add that the Emperor was exceedingly put out (contrarié) by what had happened, and the French nation as much irritated. What, moreover, would be the effect on the allied Commanders-in-chief in the Crimea when they found the Russian forces reinforced by troops whose departure from the Principalities the conduct of Austria had rendered easy?

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 411.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 644.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November* 4, 1854.

I HAVE already given full information to your Lordship of the several detachments of Turkish infantry and artillerymen sent at my request by the Turkish Government to Her Majesty's army in the Crimea, and placed under

* No. 393.

the exclusive command of Lord Raglan. I have also stated, in one of my previous despatches, that 8,000 men were ready at Varna for conveyance to the same destination, on learning that the British General was prepared to receive them.

I have now to add that Lord Raglan has declined, for the present, any further addition to the Turkish forces under his command, beyond those which had arrived from here, or from Batoum, and those which were expected from Volo, amounting altogether to about 10,000, or it might be 11,000 men, half only of the latter detachment having hitherto passed up the Bosphorus.

Lord Raglan, as he has given me to understand, is unwilling to weaken Omer Pasha's army under present circumstances, and prefers its being employed in driving the remainder of the Russian forces out of the Dobrudscha, and clearing the right bank of the Danube down to the sea.

I have communicated his Lordship's view in this respect to the Ottoman Cabinet, and I am informed that suitable instructions will be forthwith given to Omer Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 412.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 647.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November* 5, 1854.

OUR advices from Balaklava and before Sebastopol come down to the 3rd instant. It appears that nothing remarkable had taken place subsequently to the 26th ultimo. The batteries kept up their fire, with more or less effect; and the French approaches, reinforced by new batteries, were gradually advancing towards the outward defences of the town. I presume that despatches are forwarded by the messenger from Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas. Those from General Rose, which pass through my hands under flying-seal, will convey to your Lordship a general idea of the state and progress of the operations.

I collect, in general, that the prevailing expectation is in favour of an early and successful assault, to be made, in all probability, from the French extremity of the lines. Your Lordship must, I fear, be prepared for a desperate resistance on the part of the Russians; and the allied forces may have to deal with a Russian army in the field, at the same time that they are engaged in overcoming the resistance at Sebastopol.

I learn from a naval officer, who came in from Balaklava this morning, that the late violent gales from the north were not attended with any damage or danger to the squadrons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 413.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 649. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November* 5, 1854.

THE present condition and future prospects of the Danubian Principalities are of so much interest to those who exercise any degree of influence over the course of events in this quarter, that I offer no excuse for bringing to your Lordship's notice the accompanying letter, addressed to me by Prince Constantine Ghika, of Wallachia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 413.

Prince Ghika to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Confidentielle.) *Le 19 Octobre*, 1854.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

DANS les circonstances critiques où se trouve mon pays, permettez-moi de faire un nouvel appel à votre Excellence, et de vous supplier d'employer la haute et juste influence que vous exercez dans l'Empire Ottoman pour faire disparaître, ou au moins atténuer, les maux qui nous accablent. Comment supposer qu'après les victoires des Turcs, la retraite des Russes et l'audacieuse expédition de Crimée, nous aurions encore à Bucharest un Gouvernement composé d'hommes dévoués à la Russie; comment supposer aussi que le Prince Stirbey, dont la conduite politique a été si ouvertement favorable aux Russes, serait réintégré, et signalerait son retour par des nominations qui blessent l'opinion publique, et des destitutions qui l'indignent. C'est pourtant là le spectacle attristant que nous avons sur les yeux.

Dès son retour, le Prince Stirbey m'avait offert la Présidence du Conseil des Ministres sans portefeuille, mais j'avais répondu qu'avant d'accepter je voulais connaître les hommes qui devaient composer ce Conseil. Quelques jours après, et sans que le Prince m'eut de nouveau entretenu de ce sujet, le Commissaire Ottoman me fit savoir que ma nomination était décidée. Je crus devoir alors, M. l'Ambassadeur, écrire à Dervisch Pacha la lettre dont votre Excellence trouvera ci-jointe une copie. Cette lettre convaincra j'espère l'Angleterre et la France qu'il y a en Valachie un parti national dont elles peuvent disposer.

Je joins également à cette lettre, M. l'Ambassadeur, copie d'une déclaration que j'ai remise entre les mains de Dervisch Pacha lors de son arrivée à Bucharest. Le Commissaire Ottoman se montrait alors animé des meilleures intentions à l'égard de mon pays, et écoutait volontiers les hommes connus par leur patriotisme et leur dévouement au Sultan; il les encourageait. [? passage omitted] les dénis de justice, les dilapidations de l'ancienne administration, et à lui faire connaître les actes qui prouvaient le dévouement du Prince Stirbey aux Russes, et sa culpabilité envers la Porte. Depuis lors le langage de Dervisch Pacha n'est plus le même, et sans vouloir et sans pouvoir nous prononcer sur son compte, nous avons cessé d'avoir la même confiance.

C'est sur votre Excellence, M. l'Ambassadeur, que nous comptons toujours le plus pour l'amélioration du sort de notre malheureux pays, et c'est pénétré de ce sentiment que je vous renouvelle, &c.

Le Grand Ban,
(Signé) PRINCE CONSTANTIN GHIKA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 413.

Prince Ghika to Dervish Pasha.

M. le Commissaire Extraordinaire, *Bucharest, le 4/16 Octobre*, 1854.

SON Altesse le Prince Stirbey m'ayant proposé dès les premiers jours de son retour à Bucharest la place de Président du Conseil des Ministres sans portefeuille, j'ai mis pour condition de mon acceptation que le Prince me ferait connaître les hommes qui devaient composer ce Conseil, mon intention étant de n'entrer aux affaires que si ma présence pouvait y être utile à mon pays. Ce but, le seul que je me suis proposé toute ma vie, ne saurait être atteint que si le Prince confie l'administration à des hommes connus par leur désintéressement, leur patriotisme et leur fidélité éprouvée au Trône du Sultan notre auguste Suzerain. Depuis lors, M. le Commissaire Extraordinaire, son Altesse ne m'a fait aucune communication, et ce n'est que par votre Excellence que j'ai appris que le Prince persistait dans la même intention de me confier le poste de Président du Conseil Administratif.

Dans les circonstances difficiles où se trouve mon pays, je suis prêt à consacrer de toutes les forces de mon patriotisme à l'établissement d'un état des choses

meilleur que celui que la valeur des troupes Ottomanes a si puissamment contribué à faire disparaître; mais votre Excellence a trop à cœur les intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman pour ne pas trouver justes les conditions que je mets à mon acceptation et qui peuvent se résumer en quelques mots:

1. Mettre à la tête des différents Départements Ministériels des hommes qui jouissent à juste titre de la confiance de la Sublime Porte.

2. Rendre les Chefs des Départements responsables des actes émanés de leur Ministères respectifs.

3. Veiller scrupuleusement à l'exécution des lois existantes; jusqu'à ce que les circonstances permettent la convocation d'une Assemblée Nationale extraordinaire basée sur les anciens droits et immunités du pays—époque à laquelle on pourra, avec le concours de la Sublime Porte et de ses alliés, établir une meilleure réorganisation intérieure.

4. Créer en Valachie, dans le plus bref délai, une force militaire nationale qui puisse prendre part aux efforts glorieux des armées de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et de ses alliés, pour le défense de notre territoire et le rétablissement d'une paix solide.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Ban,
(Signé) PRINCE CONSTANTIN GHIKA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 413.

Prince Ghika to Reshid Pasha.

Bucharest, le 25 Septembre, 1854.

POUR satisfaire à un ordre exprès de son Excellence le Commissaire Impérial Ottoman, Dervisch Pacha, j'ai l'honneur de remettre entre ses mains ma déposition comme suit:

Le Prince Stirbey ayant reçu la lettre de son Altesse Réchid Pacha, qui lui enjoignait de quitter le pays, fit convoquer extraordinairement le Divan institué depuis le Traité de Balta-Liman pour provoquer une opinion de cette assemblée sur la circonstance.

Quelques jours avant la réunion, M. Tsanides, dont je n'étais pas habitué à recevoir les visites, se présenta chez moi et me dit que M. Khaltchinsky entendait que l'adresse qui serait présentée au Divan, fut adoptée, sous peine, pour ceux qui feraient opposition, d'en courir les conséquences les plus graves.

A la séance, le Secrétaire d'Etat, M. Jean Mano, lut la lettre de son Altesse Réchid Pacha au Prince Stirbey; puis feu Georges Philippesco, Président du Conseil des Ministres, invita les Membres du Divan à faire une adresse au Prince pour le supplier de ne pas quitter le pays, et désigna plusieurs membres soi-disant pour rédiger cette adresse. Je fus un des membres chargés de cette réduction; nous passâmes dans une chambre séparée pour délibérer.

Là, M. le Secrétaire d'Etat, Jean Mano, nous lut la minute de l'adresse préparée d'avance. Sur le phrase qui termine l'adresse, "L'unique but que Sa Majesté le Sultan s'est toujours proposé, et auquel tend incessamment la paternelle sollicitude des deux hautes Cours Suzeraine et Protectrice," je fis observer qu'il était inutile de faire mention de la Cour Protectrice, qui se trouvait en guerre ouverte avec la Turquie; le Secrétaire d'Etat répondit péremptoirement, "On ne doit rien changer à la réduction; elle est très bien combinée, et c'est moi qui, de concert avec le Consul-Général de Russie, ai ajouté cette phrase afin de rappeler aux Turcs qu'ils ne sont pas seuls à décider de nous."

Le Réglement Organique prescrit, que si la majorité accepte une proposition, la minorité est tenue de la signer avec tous les membres; conséquemment l'adresse fut signée par tous dans un morne silence.

Le Ban,
(Signé) PRINCE CONSTANTIN GHIKA.

No. 414.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 650.)

Therapia, November 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a despatch addressed to Baron de Bruck by Count Buol, communicated by the latter to Arif Effendi, and transmitted by his Excellency to Reshid Pasha.

It relates to the points of difference which have lately arisen between the Austrian and Turkish authorities in Wallachia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 414.

Count Buol to Baron Bruck.

Vienne, le 23 Octobre, 1854.

PAR suite de quelques difficultés qui ont surgi entre le Serdar Omer Pacha et le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée d'occupation Autrichienne dans les Principautés du Danube relativement aux mouvements des troupes respectives, Arif Effendi, Ambassadeur du Sultan près la Cour Impériale, a reçu de son Gouvernement l'ordre de demander, sur l'attitude de l'Autriche et sur la tâche assignée à ses troupes dans les Principautés, différentes questions dont votre Excellence trouvera le précis dans la pièce ci-jointe en copie, qui, en suite du désir que je lui en avais témoigné, m'a été remise par le dit Ambassadeur.

Bien que le motif qui a déterminé cette démarche du Cabinet Ottoman ait été écarté dans l'entretemps par l'ordre expédié au Commandant-en-chef Impérial de ne gêner en aucune façon les opérations de l'armée d'Omer Pacha, et que les communications récentes que vous avez été chargé, M. le Baron, de faire à la Sublime Porte, n'aient pu laisser le moindre doute sur la ligne politique suivie par l'Autriche dans la grave conjoncture du moment, nous n'en jugeons pas moins nécessaire d'exprimer avec une entière franchise notre pensée sur les questions qui nous sont adressées par la Porte.

On nous demande en premier lieu si, puisque la Russie a rejeté nos dernières propositions, nos troupes marcheraient avec l'armée Ottomane contre l'ennemi, ou si elles resteraient inactives dans les Principautés?

Le Ministère Ottoman ayant été informé par nous de la teneur des ouvertures que nous avons adressées en dernier lieu à la Cour de Russie, et ne pouvant en outre ignorer que jamais nous n'avons pris l'engagement d'obtenir l'assentiment de cette Cour aux quatre points connus par l'emploi de la force, nous ne pouvons dissimuler notre surprise de nous voir adressée aujourd'hui une demande de cette nature. Par la Convention signée avec la Porte le 14 Juin nous nous sommes engagés à obtenir l'évacuation des Principautés par l'armée Russe, à y rétablir l'ordre légal et à en retirer nos troupes dès que la paix serait conclue. Nous croyons que le but de cette Convention a été rempli dans le sens le plus complet, et nous avons la conscience d'avoir par là rendu un service signalé à la cause de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais nous le répétons, ni dans cette transaction, ni dans un acte postérieur quelconque, nous n'avons pris d'engagement qui pût justifier la supposition susénoncé.

Nous avons une égale peine à nous rendre compte de la seconde demande qui nous est adressée par la Porte, à savoir si, dans le cas où l'armée Russe voudrait tenter de repasser le Pruth, l'armée Autrichienne s'y opposerait, puisqu'à différentes reprises nous avons déclaré de la manière la plus positive que nous regardions comme inhérente à notre engagement d'occuper temporairement les Principautés l'obligation de les défendre, le cas échéant, contre toute agression ennemie.

Or, c'est précisément à cause de la grave responsabilité qui pèse à cet égard sur le Commandant Autrichien qu'il lui est indispensable de pouvoir disposer

d'une liberté entière de mouvements, et que de plus il lui est nécessaire d'être tenu au courant de ceux qu'effectueraient les forces Ottomanes ou Anglo-Françaises sur le territoire occupé par les troupes Impériales. Ainsi le Général-en-chef Autrichien, s'il a l'ordre de ne point gêner les opérations des autres armées amies, doit insister pour que celles-ci n'agissent pas sans entente préalable avec lui.

Il résulte de ce qui précède, et que nous avons d'ailleurs déclaré tant à Constantinople qu'à Paris et à Londres, que si les armées Anglo-Françaises jugeaient nécessaire d'entrer dans les Principautés, l'Autriche ne saurait y objecter en principe, en supposant que le concert préalable eût eu lieu à cet égard avec le Commandant Impérial. Toutefois nous sommes d'avis que dans l'intérêt de ces pays déjà si rudement éprouvés par les événements de la guerre, l'on devrait tâcher d'y éviter autant que possible une trop grande agglomération de troupes de différentes nationalités, laquelle non seulement achèverait de les épuiser, mais pourrait aussi donner lieu à d'autres regrettables inconvénients. Nous aimons à croire que notre pensée à cet égard se rencontrera avec celle de la Sublime Porte et de ses alliés.

Si ces explications, que votre Excellence voudra bien donner dans la forme la plus amicale, sont de nature à convaincre de plus en plus le Gouvernement Ottoman de la sincérité et de la bienveillance de nos intentions, celui-ci devra convenir de son côté combien il est nécessaire de tenir compte au Commandant Impérial dans les Principautés de l'importance de la tâche qu'il a à remplir, et de prendre par conséquent en juste considération les conditions qui seules peuvent en assurer le succès.

Il ne reste à ajouter, quant au passage de la note verbale qui concerne la proclamation du Général-en-chef de l'armée Impériale, que ce point se trouve réglé depuis entre le Lieutenant-Général Comte Coronini et Dervisch Pacha, ainsi que la Porte n'aura pas tardé à en être informée. Pour ce qui est enfin du Prince Stirbey, nous espérons que tout Commissaire Ottoman, honoré de la confiance de la Porte, se conformera entièrement aux instructions relatives à cet objet qui nous ont été communiquées par l'organe de votre Excellence. En agissant ainsi et en témoignant aux autorités de Sa Majesté l'Empereur dans les Principautés les égards et la confiance qui leur sont dûs, ce Commissaire, ainsi que les autres fonctionnaires militaires de la Sublime Porte, pourront être assurés d'une parfaite réciprocité de leur part, et dans ce cas rien sans doute ne viendra troubler la bonne harmonie qui subsiste entre les deux Gouvernements.

Veuillez, M. le Baron, donner à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères lecture et copie de la présente dépêche, que j'ai d'ailleurs déjà communiquée confidentiellement à Arif Effendi, et recevez, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 414.

Minutes of a Verbal Communication made by Arif-Effendi to Count Buol.

DANS la dépêche adressé à l'Ambassadeur de la Porte à Vienne, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan exprime les regrets qu'a éprouvés le Gouvernement Ottoman de ce que le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée Autrichienne ait empêché l'armée Ottomane de se porter en avant, ainsi que c'avait été arrêté entre Omer Pacha, M. de St. Arnaud, et Lord Raglan. D'après l'opposition faite par le Général-en-chef Autrichien, il semblerait que les troupes Autrichiennes, en occupant la ligne du Pruth, se sont interposées comme une barrière entre les deux armées Ottomane et Russe, ce qui est contraire à la Convention conclue entre l'Autriche et la Porte, dont la teneur se rattache purement et simplement à l'entrée des troupes Autrichiennes dans les Principautés, et au rétablissement de l'ancien régime. Il paraîtrait même que l'armée Autrichienne opposerait aussi des difficultés aux armées alliées, non seulement si celles-ci voulaient entrer dans les Principautés, mais aussi si de là elles voulaient se porter en avant; tandis qu'il est évident que par le Traité d'Alliance conclu entre la Porte, l'Angleterre, et la France, les troupes des deux dernières Puissances ont le droit de se diriger sur un point quelconque de l'Empire Ottoman, et par conséquent aussi de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, qui font parties intégrantes des domaines du Sultan. Ces réflexions, et la

nécessité de laisser au Commandant de l'armée Ottomane la pleine liberté de diriger les mouvements de son armée, indépendamment des vues du Général-en-chef Autrichien, aussi longtemps que l'Autriche ne prend pas une part active à la guerre actuelle; enfin, l'urgence qu'il y a dans un moment si critique à sortir de l'incertitude pour savoir à quoi chacun doit s'en tenir afin de pouvoir agir en conséquence; toutes ces considérations portent le Cabinet Ottoman à inviter son Ambassadeur à adresser au Cabinet de Vienne les questions suivantes:

Comme la Russie a rejeté les dernières propositions faites par l'Autriche, les circonstances exigent à ce qu'on sache si les armées Autrichiennes qui sont dans les Principautés marcheront avec l'armée Ottomane contre l'ennemi? Ou si, dans le cas contraire, elles se contenteront à rester inactives dans les Principautés? Et si telle est leur intention, et que l'armée Russe se permettait de repasser le Pruth, l'armée Autrichienne s'y opposera-t-elle les armes à la main? Et si, dans un cas donné, le Général-en-chef Ottoman trouvait avantageux de faire avancer ses troupes pour attaquer l'ennemi, et que ce projet ne s'accordât pas avec les vues du Général-en-chef Autrichien, celui-ci resterait-il en simple spectateur, ou bien irait-il jusqu'à empêcher une collision en employant la force? Et comme il est évident que si les armées Anglo-Françaises trouvaient convenable d'entrer dans les Principautés, la Porte ne s'y opposerait pas, l'Autriche aurait-elle quelque objection à y faire?

Comme la Porte trouve qu'il est nécessaire pour elle d'être renseignée avec précision sur tous ces points, elle a engagé son Ambassadeur à prendre à M. de Buol des éclaircissements précis sur tous ces détails, et à les transmettre à Constantinople le plus tôt possible.

Quant à la proclamation et aux affaires qui concernent le Prince Stirbey, le Gouvernement Ottoman a vu avec peine les difficultés qui en sont résultées. La réinstallation du Prince Stirbey étant provisoire, le Gouvernement Ottoman dans sa susdite dépêche n'entre pas en de plus grands détails sur cet objet, mais pour effacer la sensation désagréable qu'a produit l'article en question de la proclamation, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte désirerait que le Comte Buol écrivit au Général-en-chef de l'armée Impériale et Royale de trouver pour cette affaire un arrangement convenable.

Enfin, en se référant aux copies des dépêches adressées par la Porte à Dervisch Pacha, le Ministre Ottoman fait observer qu'il a donné à ce fonctionnaire l'ordre de se conformer strictement à ses instructions et aux Traités en vigueur, et comme les Ministres du Sultan ont la ferme conviction que le Général-en-chef Autrichien de son côté usera dans toute circonstance des mêmes bons procédés, il se berce dans l'espoir que rien ne viendra troubler la bonne harmonie qui règne si heureusement entre les deux Gouvernements.

No. 415.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 1,391.)

Paris, November 17, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received reports from Belgrade relative to the inimical attitude which the Prince of Servia has taken towards the Western Powers, similar to those to which your Lordship alludes in your despatch No. 1,110 of the 14th instant; and he has spoken several times upon the subject to the Servian Agent.

That gentleman is no longer here, or I should have acquitted myself of your Lordship's instructions regarding him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 416.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 426.)

Vienna, November 15, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 329, marked Confidential, of the 17th October, I have to state that I received a private letter from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of the 3rd instant, in which he informs me that the Porte had sent an express to their Ambassador in Vienna, with instructions from Reshid Pasha to propose a diplomatic instrument for fixing the position of the various authorities in the Principalities, and preventing mistakes and quarrels for the future.

Immediately after I had received this letter the Turkish Ambassador called upon me, and, having explained the nature of the instruction he had received, I stated to him that he might rely upon my support in anything which, on the present occasion, he might determine upon in obedience to his instructions; he replied, that having yesterday seen M. de Bourqueney, he had been recommended by him, in consequence of the arrangement which had already been made with regard to the Principalities, not to bring the question now officially before Count Buol, but to apprise him of it privately, and then to refer to his Government to know whether, considering that an arrangement upon this subject had already been made and consented to by the allied Governments, the Turkish Ministers thought it would be necessary to push the new proposals any further, or to allow them to drop.

The Ambassador then told me he was inclined to follow this advice; and I told him that he must be the best judge of what his Government might desire, and that, as the original proposition offered to him came from M. Benedetti, it was most natural that M. de Bourqueney should be the person to afford him the advice he required.

The Ambassador then stated that he should privately inform Count Buol of the nature of the instructions he had received; but that he should refer, with regard to them, to his Government for further orders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—I have acquainted Lord Stratford with the result of my communications with the Turkish Ambassador.

W.

No. 417.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 428.)

Vienna, November 15, 1854.

My Lord,

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 350 of the 7th instant, and placed in his hands the list of the persons composing the new Ministry in Wallachia appointed by Prince Stirbey. Count Buol said that as far as he was informed with respect to those persons, he was inclined to believe that three or four of them were not very judicious appointments; but he was told that in general they were persons of respectable character. With regard to their Russian inclinations, Count Buol said that he believed their sentiments to depend very much on the position which Russia occupied in the Principalities, and as her influence there was not likely to be considerable for the future, he thought that such tendencies would very quickly disappear.

With reference to the present position of affairs in the Principalities, Count Buol said that it was for the special object of taking it into consideration, and applying such remedies and improvements as might appear advantageous, that he had recommended the Assembly at Vienna of the Board composed of the

Representatives of Turkey, England, France, and Austria, and he trusted that their efforts would prove successful in establishing harmony and good government in the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 418.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 20.*)

(No. 429.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 15, 1854.*

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 348 of the 7th instant, and marked Confidential, I have to state that I inquired of Count Buol whether Count Coronini in demanding the recall of Dervish Pasha was acting upon instructions from his Government.

Count Buol replied that he had issued no instructions to that effect; but he had looked upon the conduct which Dervish Pasha had maintained in the Principalities as subject to animadversion, and he was aware that this opinion was shared by Reshid Pasha, and he also believed that the general proceedings of Dervish Pasha had not been approved by Lord Stratford.

Count Buol, however, stated that he had since learnt that Dervish Pasha had become more conciliatory in the manner in which he carried out his duties, and he also understood that Prince Stirbey, who had complained of his proceedings upon his arrival at Bucharest, was not disinclined to his retaining his situation. Count Buol expressed his hope that such was the case, as his great object was the establishment of harmony and good understanding between the official authorities employed by the different Governments in the Principalities, where questions of difference must necessarily arise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 419.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 20.*)

(No. 432. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 15, 1854.*

I HAVE already announced to your Lordship by telegraph, on the 13th instant, that M. de Bourqueney and myself attended a meeting at Count Buol's at which we presented to his Excellency the project of an Offensive and Defensive Treaty between the three Powers, which we had received from our respective Governments.

I have now the honour of inclosing for your Lordship's consideration a copy of the draft of this Treaty, in the form in which, after the discussions which took place, Count Buol has himself drawn it up.

Your Lordship will observe that the first advantage which the Austrian Government has taken of the entire freedom of action which they have maintained in their late discussions with the Government of Prussia and the States of Germany, has been to make to the English and French Governments the declaration of the conduct which they are determined to adopt, and which they consider the present position of affairs no longer will allow them to postpone.

Count Colloredo is instructed to communicate to your Lordship, as M. de Hübner is directed to place before M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the despatch by which Count Buol announces the definitive determination of the Imperial Government; and at the same time those Ministers will submit the project of Treaty to which I have above alluded.

The resolutions of the Imperial Government may be *résumés* in the following manner:

The Austrian Government consults with those of England and France as to the immediate objects of the war, the progress of which tends to bring them nearer to those Powers, but without considering themselves in any way entitled to limit the conditions which our Governments may consider themselves called upon to fix for the re-establishment of peace.

The Austrian Government ask of those Powers, their allies, to point out the conditions which, according to their views, would now render the re-establishment of peace possible. Before taking up arms the Austrian Government desire to know upon what conditions they may expect to be able to lay them down. But they clearly admit that the prolongation of the war would annul the basis which had been discussed between the three Powers, and established by the notes of the 8th of August. They consider that the terms of peace must vary with the duration of the war.

These communications once exchanged between the three Governments, Austria will sign with England and France the Offensive and Defensive Treaty now proposed, and immediately afterwards, without mission from any of the parties engaged in the Treaty, in her own name alone, and, in consideration of the interests of the Empire which can no longer accept the prolongation of the present state of tension, she will transmit to St. Petersburgh her final demands and summons.

Upon their rejection by the Russian Government, Austria will break off her diplomatic relations with that Government, and the Treaty of Alliance fixes the date of the 1st of January, 1855, for the definitive settlement of the military arrangements and the cooperation and distribution of the respective forces for the ensuing campaign.

Count Buol stated that he considered it necessary to make a communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as marking the date of the final resolution of Austria in passing from the menacing attitude she has hitherto maintained to that of belligerent, and I do not believe that any effort would have induced him to have abandoned this mode of proceeding. It is considered by the Austrian Government as the fulfilment of their efforts for the attainment of peace and the justification of their appeal to arms; and Baron Bourqueney and myself were satisfied that any attempt to avoid the embarrassment these previous communications may occasion to our Governments would certainly have been without success.

I distinctly pointed out, however, to Count Buol that no question could be addressed to our Governments upon the conditions of peace, without a simultaneous engagement on his part to bind his Government by the signature of an offensive and defensive alliance, and that the completion of this Treaty could in no way be made dependent upon the Russian reply to the Austrian summons, and that the signature should take place according to the form which had been agreed upon.

With respect to the modifications which have been introduced in the project of Treaty, as it was transmitted to M. de Bourqueney and myself, Count Buol has adopted a form in Article II relative to the Principalities, which has the advantage of placing the duties of Austria in connection with the means by which she would be enabled to carry them out, while our rights in the Principalities are expressly defined, and the freedom of the movements of the troops of England, of France, and of Turkey, is distinctly established.

The most important modification, however, which has been introduced, is the substitution of the date of the end of the year for that of the 1st of April, for entering upon the deliberation without delay of the most effective means of obtaining the objects of the alliance, and the Secret Article, which fixes for the beginning of next year the conclusion of the military arrangements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 419.

Project of Treaty between Austria, France, and Great Britain, as revised at Vienna.

As originally proposed.

As amended by Count Buol.

SA Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, animées du désir de mettre fin le plutôt possible à la guerre actuelle par le rétablissement de la paix générale sur des bases solides donnant à l'Europe entière toute garantie contre le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos; convaincues que rien ne serait plus propre à assurer ce résultat que l'union complète de leurs efforts jusqu'à l'entière réalisation du but commun qu'elles se sont proposé, et reconnaissant en conséquence la nécessité de s'entendre aujourd'hui sur leurs positions respectives et les prévisions de l'avenir, ont résolu de conclure entre elles un Traité d'Alliance, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français,

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande,

Lesquels s'étant communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, et les ayant trouvé en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivants :

ARTICLE I.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes rappelent les déclarations contenues dans les Protocoles du , du , du , et dans les notes échangées le 8 Août dernière, et comme elles se sont réservé le droit de proposer, selon les circonstances, telles conditions qu'elles pourraient juger nécessaires dans un intérêt Européen, elles s'obligent mutuellement et réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun.

ARTICLE II.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche ayant fait occuper par ses troupes, en vertu du Traité conclu le avec la Sublime Porte, les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, *il s'engage* à défendre la frontière des dites Principautés contre tout retour des forces

où il s'est engagé

As originally proposed.

As amended by Count Buol.

not originally suggested.

Russes; *les troupes Autrichiennes occuperont à cet effet les positions nécessaires pour garantir ces Principautés contre toute attaque.*

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, ayant également signé le , avec la Sublime Porte, un Traité qui les autorise à diriger leurs forces sur tous les points de l'Empire Ottoman, *l'occupation sus-mentionnée ne saurait porter préjudice aux libres mouvements des troupes Anglo-Françaises ou Ottomanes sur ces mêmes territoires contre les forces militaires ou la territoire de la Russie.*

qui seront à leur convenance; et Sa Majesté le Sultan, enfin, pouvant toujours, en vertu de ses droits de souveraineté, aviser comme il l'entend à la défense de ses frontières, il, &c.

Il sera formé à Vienne entre les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne, une Commission à laquelle la Turquie sera invitée à adjoindre aussi un Plénipotentiaire, et qui sera chargée d'examiner et de régler toutes les questions se rapportant soit à l'état exceptionnel et provisoire dans lequel se trouvent les dites Principautés, soit au libre passage des diverses armées sur leur territoire.

ARTICLE III.

Les hostilités venant à éclater entre l'Autriche et la Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, se promettent mutuellement leur alliance, offensive et défensive, dans la guerre actuelle, et emploieront à cet effet, selon les nécessités de la guerre, des forces de terre et de mer dont le nombre, la qualité et la destination seront, s'il y a lieu, déterminés par des arrangements subséquents.

ARTICLE IV.

Dans le cas prévu par l'Article précédant les Hautes Parties Contractantes se promettent réciproquement de n'accueillir de la part de la Cour Impériale de Russie, sans s'en être entendues entre elles, aucune ouverture ni aucune proposition tendant à la cessation des hostilités.

ARTICLE V.

Dans le cas où la paix n'aurait pas pu se rétablir avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant le mois d'Avril prochain sur les bases indiquées dans l'Article I

ARTICLE V.

Dans le cas où le rétablissement de la paix générale sur les bases indiquées dans l'Article I ne serait point assuré dans le cours de la présente année, Sa

As originally proposed.	*As amended by Count Buol.*
de la présente Convention, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de procéder sans plus de retard aux arrangements particuliers dont il est parlé dans l'Article III.	Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, délibéreront sans retard sur les moyens efficaces pour obtenir l'objet de leur alliance.
	ARTICLE VI.
	L'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne porteront ensemble le présent Traité à la connaissance de la Cour de Prusse, et recevront avec empressement son adhésion dans le cas où elle engagerait sa coopération à l'accomplissement de l'œuvre commune. Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les ratifications échangées à Vienne dans le délai de quinze jours. En foi de quoi, &c.
Secret Article not in original Project.	ARTICLE SECRET.
	Dans le cas prévu par l'Article V il est entendu que l'on procéderait immédiatement à la conclusion des arrangements prévus dans l'Article III du Traité. Cet Article aura la même force et valeur que si il était textuellement inséré dans le Traité patent de ce jour.

No. 420.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 166.)

Berlin, November 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Russian loan of 1854 has been forbidden, by official authority, to be quoted in the Prussian "Gazette," as well as in the printed list of the Exchange. I am informed that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at this Court, has expressed great displeasure at this measure.

Baron Manteuffel told me this morning that he had learnt that transactions had taken place in this loan in Berlin, but that all the shares had been purchased up by Baron Stughtz (the eminent Russian banker who lately passed through Berlin) at the price of 84, whereas they had been originally issued at 87.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 421.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 168.)

Berlin, November 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I WAITED upon Baron Manteuffel this morning and, after some preliminary conversation, I inquired of his Excellency whether the last communication from Austria had given satisfaction. His Excellency said that it had not essentially differed from what he had expected; and he gave me to understand, that an arrangement would be come to with the Imperial Government. He said there were some few points to be agreed upon, but that it was his ardent desire, and his conviction, that the two Governments would finally agree as to the course to be pursued.

I then asked whether I might understand that a collective communication would be made to the Diet by the two Governments; he replied that it would be an identical (identique) one.

I am privately informed that the Prussian answer to the last Austrian note was forwarded this evening to Vienna; that it is most conciliatory and courteous; and that, while it expresses a general acceptation of the Austrian views, it proposes certain modifications which relate more to form than to any important changes in the instruction to be addressed to their respective Ministers at the Diet.

On this subject, however, I can only report to your Lordship the information which has reached me from a private source.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 422.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 170.)

Berlin, November 17, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT ESTERHAZY, the Austrian Special Envoy at this Court, communicated on Sunday last to Baron Manteuffel the answer of the Austrian Cabinet to the last Prussian note, with a copy of the instructions to be addressed to Baron Prokesch, and also a copy of a confidential despatch addressed to him by Count Buol.

I have not yet seen these documents, but I am informed that their substance is as follows:

Austria desires to suppress the phrase, "à maintenir de tous les côtés," with reference to the acceptation of the four points. She wishes that the Diet shall declare their readiness to afford their aid without making it dependent on any question which might be raised by the Committee of the Diet. Austria will communicate with Prussia and her allies previously to taking the offensive.

But Austria reserves her liberty of action if the Western Powers should refuse to enter into negotiations on the four points. She will contract no obligatory engagements having for object their extension. On the contrary, she will use her best endeavours to support the four points.

A simple assurance given by Russia of a desire to enter into negotiations on the four points, offers no sufficient guarantee for Austria. Russia must declare her acceptation of them in the most precise and positive manner, and the conclusion of peace ought to follow immediately.

The Emperor of Austria cordially desires that the confidential communication lately made by the Cabinet of Berlin to the Government of Russia may be attended with success. If they should be fruitless, His Imperial Majesty does not doubt of the assistance of Prussia in that contingency.

Austria reserves to herself, under all circumstances, to confer with the Western Powers with respect to the answer from St. Petersburgh, and to learn their views before she takes any decision. She cannot guarantee that the Western Powers will not extend the conditions of peace, as she herself has reserved the right of making her own conditions in case of war. She cannot accept a forced neutrality: on this subject she has fully expressed her views in her note of the 8th August.

She has given very wide instructions to M. de Prokesch: she hopes that Prussia, on her part, will do the same.

Austria points out certain passages which might be omitted in the proposition to the Diet. For instance, it would not be necessary to say, "when the Austrian territory shall be in danger;" it might be said, "when the Confederation shall be in danger."

In the confidential despatch of Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, it is stated that it is superfluous to add another Additional Article to the Treaty of Berlin, as that Convention will suffice for the purpose required. The Austrian Cabinet will be satisfied with the confidential communications of the different Governments.

The instructions to Baron Prokesch, to which reference is made at the commencement of this despatch, are the same as those of which your Lordship is already in possession.

Count Esterhazy has informed me that these instructions will be sent to Baron Prokesch, with directions to communicate and concert, if possible, with M. de Bismark Schönhausen. If the latter should propose any unimportant modifications, Baron Prokesch will apply to Vienna for further instructions; but that if M. de Bismark refuses his cooperation, Austria will then take the course she has decided upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 423.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 171.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 17, 1854.

THE Russian Minister, Baron Budberg, and the members of the Russian Legation here, were unable to repress the exultation in which they confidently indulged that a signal victory would be shortly obtained by Prince Menchikoff over the allied armies in the Crimea. Baron Budberg expressed loudly on Sunday last his conviction that the English and French armies would be driven from the plateau before Sebastopol, and that there was no longer any danger to be feared for the fortress.

On the evening of Sunday, Baron Budberg hastened to the Minister President to communicate a despatch he had received through St. Petersburgh from Prince Menchikoff, stating that two sorties had been made on the 5th from Sebastopol; that they had been most successful, and that an assault had been made by the French on the town, but vigorously repulsed.

Your Lordship may imagine how completely disconcerted the Russian party were, on the arrival here of General Canrobert's telegraphic despatch on the following Monday; for they had fully hoped to gull the public for a certain time with their false reports. As a last resource, they even denied the authenticity of General Canrobert's despatch, saying that it had been fabricated at Paris.

I am informed by a person who sees the original telegraphic despatches which arrive at the Russian Legation, that they are never published as they are received, and frequently are in direct contradiction to the original intelligence.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in original and in translation, an article which appeared in the official Prussian paper (the "Correspondenz") written clearly under the impression that the siege of Sebastopol would be raised, intending to prove that the military honour of neither party was at stake, and that negotiations for peace might be resumed. As this article was evidently written under Ministerial inspiration, I have thought it of sufficient interest to bring to your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 423.

Extract from the "Preussische Correspondenz."

(Translation.)

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

SEVERAL papers are discussing the question, what influence the fall of Sebastopol will have on the diplomatic negotiations; and, according to their point of view, declare the success or failure of the expedition to be fatal to the hopes

of peace, as it would be a point of honour for the vanquished party to continue the war. This discussion is futile, as the disputing parties are probably not aware of the intentions of the different Governments, and also forget that other things, besides the siege of Sebastopol, come into consideration; and, above all, because their arguments are too partial. If, indeed, the military honour of the belligerent Powers was so closely concerned in the expedition, then a decision would make it impossible for one of the parties to commence negotiations of peace.

Fortunately, the facts are different. The bloody events in the Crimea have given a favourable turn to the state of things. The daring and vast expedition against Sebastopol, whatever may be its result, will always form a bright episode in the military annals of England and France. The Battle of the Alma has vindicated the military fame of the allies; and the political position of the Western Powers is rendered more free and independent, because they have now given effect to their alliance with the Porte and carried the war into the enemy's territory. The deeds of the Russians are also worthy of honourable mention; and even the fall of Sebastopol will not erase the fact that the Russian forces have fought well against the chosen troops of England and France.

The point of honour, therefore, will not be affected on either side by the final fate of Sebastopol, and it is not in contradiction to eventual negotiations of peace. The question is, on what basis they could be carried on so as not to appear at once hopeless. Certainly not on one which is simply dependent on the fortunes of war, and which every casual event would change; for then the end of the struggle is only to be expected after the complete exhaustion of the mighty nations opposed to each other. On the other hand, the conditions of peace which were proposed a few months ago by the Western Cabinets, which Austria accepted in a binding manner, and which Prussia has repeatedly supported, are worthy of general attention. We cannot believe that the Porte and her allies, either by a partial success or by a momentary misfortune, could be brought to enter into the strange plan of a change of all the territorial arrangements of Europe, and to give up a programme which, in essence, affords good securities for a durable peace in the East. On the other hand, we have reason to believe that also the Russian Cabinet would at present be found more inclined to negotiate on proposals which they previously rejected, principally on grounds of formality. We are far from explaining this readiness as arising out of a real exhaustion or discouragement of Russia; but we see in it the proof that they have come to a conviction in St. Petersburgh, how unavoidable the basis proposed in the four points has become for an attempt to mediate, and how much, not only the attitude of the Western Powers, but also the position of the whole of Germany, depends on an agreement on this subject.

The first result of the siege of Sebastopol appears to be only of secondary importance in the state of things which we have alluded to above, and the immense sacrifices which the conflict has entailed and will entail on both parties, will impart weight to the exhortation, that a solution of the question at issue will be attained more easily on the field of diplomacy than by arms.

No. 424.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 172.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 17, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 162 of the 10th instant, in which I forwarded to your Lordship an estimate of the Russian forces in the Crimea, I now beg to inclose a more detailed statement of the troops under the command of Prince Menchikoff, with the name and number of each regiment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 424.

Estimate of the Forces under the command of Prince Menchikoff, supposing the 10th and 11th Divisions to have effected their junction.

4me CORPS. DANNENBERG.

Infanterie.

Divisions.	Brigades.	Régiments.	Bataillons.	Hommes.	Observations.
10me. Semonoff	1er	Ykaterinburg 19 ligne	4	2,600	L'état normal des bataillons est de 1,034 hommes, mais il est admis même par les Russes que l'effective moyen ne dépasse pas 700. Plusieurs régiments de ce corps, qui vient de faire les campagnes du Danube, furent réduits à 400 hommes par bataillon.
		Tobolsk .. 20 „	4	2,800	
	2me	Tomsk .. 19 léger	4	2,800	
		Kolhwan .. 20 „	4	2,800	
11me Pauloff ..	1er	Selenginsk .. 21 ligne	4	2,800	
		Yakutsk .. 22 „	4	2,800	
	2me	Ochotsk .. 21 léger	4	2,800	
		Kamchatzka 22 „	4	2,800	
12me. Liprandi ..	1er Jemjakin	Asoff .. 23 ligne	4	2,800	
		Dnieper .. 24 „	4	2,800	
	2me Lewitzki	Ukrain .. 23 léger	4	2,800	
		Odessa .. 24 „	4	2,800	
		Chasseurs Carabiniers ..	1	700	
			49	34,300	

Cavalerie.

Division.	Brigades.	Régiments.	Escadrons.	Chevaux.
4me. Nierod ..	1er	9 Lanciers Bug ..	8	900
		10 „ Odessa ..	8	900
	2me	9 Houssards Ashtirsk ..	8	900
		10 „ Alexandroff	8	900
			32	3,600

Artillerie. Génie. Train.

Une division composée de 4 brigades, formant 14 batteries à 10 pièces = 140 pièces.

Artilleurs	3,200	
Génie	800	avec 36 pontons.
Train	800	
	4,800	

Récapitulation du 4me Corps.

Infanterie	34,300
Cavalerie	3,600
Artilleurs	3,200
Génie, Train	1,600
Total	41,700

5me CORPS.

Infanterie.

Divisions.	Brigades.	Régiments.	Bataillons.	Hommes.
14me. Möller II	1er	Volhynia .. 27 ligne	4	2,800
		Minsk .. 28 „	4	2,800
	Brigade de Réserve	2 Régiments	8	5,600
			16	11,200

Artillerie.

Une brigade à 4 batteries, avec 40 pièces et 900 hommes.

Récapitulation du 5me Corps.

Infanterie	11,200
Artilleurs	900
Total	12,100

6me CORPS. GORTCHAKOFF II.

Infanterie.

Divisions.	Brigades.	Régiments.	Bataillons.	Hommes.	Observations.
16me. Kwitinsky.	1er	Wladimir .. 31 ligne	4	2,400	Ces deux divisions ont perdu plus de 2,500 hommes à la bataille de l'Alma: ainsi il est impossible que les bataillons aient plus de 600 hommes.
		Sudalski .. 32 „	4	2,400	
	2me	Uglitski .. 31 léger	4	2,400	
		Kasan .. 32 „	4	2,400	
17me. Kirjakoff ..	1er	Moscow .. 33 ligne	4	2,400	
		Butirsk .. 34 „	4	2,400	
	2me	Borodino .. 33 léger	4	2,400	
		Tarutin .. 34 „	4	2,400	
		Carabiniers ..	1	700	
			33	19,900	

Cavalerie.

Brigade.	Régiments.	Escadrons.	Chevaux.
2me	11 Houssards Kieff ..	8	900
	12 „ Ingermanland	8	900
		16	1,800

Artillerie. Génie. Train.

2⅔ Brigades à 4 batteries = 100 pièces.

Artilleurs	2,200
Génie	600
Train	600
	3,400

Récapitulation du 6me Corps.

Infanterie	..	..	19,900
Cavalerie	..	..	1,800
Artilleurs	..	..	3,250
Génie, Train	..	..	1,550
Total	..	..	25,500

Cavalerie dite de "Réserve."

	Brigades.	Régiments.	Escadrons.	Chevaux.
Division de Lanciers .. Lieut.-Général Korff	1er	Archi-Duc Léopold	8	900
		Archangel .. .	8	900
	2me	Novgorod	8	900
		Grande Duchesse Michaelowna .	8	900
			32	3,600

Cavalerie dite de "Lanciers Combinés."

	Régiments.		Escadrons.	Chevaux.
1 Brigade..	1er	.. ..	8	900
	2me	.. ..	8	900
			16	1,800

Récapitulation.

Division de Réserve	..	..	3,600
Brigade combinée. .	..	..	1,800
Total	..	..	5,400

Récapitulation Général.

	Bataillons.	Hommes.	Sabres.	Artilleurs, &c.	Total.
4me Corps	49	34,000	3,600	4,800	42,400
5me Corps	16	11,200	..	900	12,100
6me Corps	33	19,200	1,800	3,400	24,400
Cavalerie de Réserve et Combinée.	..	..	5,400	..	5,400
Soldats de la Marine	..	5,600	..	..	5,600
Carabiniers de la Mer Noire* ..	..	750	..	..	750
Régiments de Cosaques†	..	..	4,800	..	4,800
Total	..	..	..	..	95,450

* Dits *Tcherna-Morie*. Ce bataillon vient d'arriver de l'Abasie.
† Y compris une demi-escadron du Tutars de la Garde.

Infanterie de Terre et de la Marine	..	70,750
Cavalerie Régulière et Cosaques ..	..	15,600
Artilleurs	..	6,300
Génie, Train, &c.	..	2,800
Total Général ..	..	95,450 avec 280 bouches à feu.

Nota.—On ne peut connaître le nombre de Cosaques qu'approximativement.

Il paraît que le service journalier des défenses de la place demande 30 bataillons et un tiers des Artilleurs des batteries de campagne.

No. 425.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 20.*)

(No. 173. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I STATED to your Lordship in my despatch No. 160 of November 10, that the text of the official answer of the Imperial Cabinet to the Prussian note of the 22nd ultimo, had been received by this Government. I am now informed that the reply (which will be forwarded by the Russian Minister at this Court) has not yet been received, and that the intelligence to which I referred solely related to communications received from Baron Werther, who has only expressed his own opinion that the Emperor was disposed to accept the four points.

I have been secretly informed to-day, however, that this Government is in receipt of indirect but positive information that the Emperor Nicholas will consent to accept the four points, and that Prussia will be charged to submit them to the Western Powers.

I am also given to understand that the Government here are very much embarrassed to know how to execute this commission, and in what manner to convey the acceptation of the Emperor of Russia to the allied Governments.

On this subject I would venture to submit two observations to your Lordship.

First. Prussia is very interested, as well as Russia, to prevent at this moment any aggressive action of Austria, and she will gladly catch at any means afforded her to restrain a common hostile attitude on the part of Germany against Russia.

Secondly. Prussia in her present isolated position will be anxious to secure herself a part and a position in any conferences or negotiations which might take place consequent on an acceptation of the four points by Russia. She will seek thereby to re-enter the European concert, and will avail herself of these means to prevent her exclusion at the conclusion of peace.

I have likewise some suspicion that secret promises have been given by the King of Prussia to the Emperor Nicholas, that in the event of his acceptation, Prussia will do her utmost to further and promote his views on the resumption of negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 426.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 22.*)

(No. 653.)

Therapia, November 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE this evening forwarded to Bucharest by express, for transmission by telegraph to your Lordship, a message in the following words:

"D'après les renseignements recueillis ouralement des officiers de bâtiments arrivés aujourd'hui de la Crimée et portant un nombre considérable de blessés, les Russes ont attaqué de nouveau en force nos positions devant Sébastopol.

Il paraît que l'attaque fut des plus sérieuses et que l'ennemi avant d'être repoussé a essuyé de fort graves pertes, en causant malheureusement à l'armée de Sa Majesté une perte de beaucoup moindre à la vérité, mais néanmoins très-sensible."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 427.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 22.)

(No. 654.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 10, 1854.

I RECEIVED last night from Reshid Pasha the two papers inclosed in copy herewith, one purporting to be a despatch addressed to that Minister by the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, the other a translated instruction from your Lordship to Her Majesty's Agents and Consuls in Wallachia and Moldavia.

I learn from this communication that, acting in concert with the French Cabinet, your Lordship purposes that all differences arising between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities, whether civil or military, in the two Principalities, shall henceforth be referred to Vienna, and submitted to the deliberation of a Commission composed of Count Buol, who will naturally preside, and of the English, French, and Turkish Representatives there.

Copy of M. Pisani's report, communicating the papers in question, is also inclosed herewith. It appears from the language held to M. Pisani by Reshid Pasha, that his Highness views with regret the measure thus announced, and not the less so because it has the appearance of being already definitively adopted.

No official instruction has hitherto reached me on this subject. I feel myself, therefore, at liberty, as indeed it is my duty, to remark that the Porte, alive to the captious proceedings of the Austrian authorities at Bucharest, informed of the overweening spirit exhibited on many occasions by the officers and soldiers under their command, and not unreasonably mistrustful of the policy of the Austrian Cabinet, when viewed through the medium of those proceedings, which, as there is strong reason to apprehend, have enabled the Russians to obtain reinforcements productive of a most heavy loss of life to the allies before Sebastopol, can hardly be expected to adopt the declared measure with confidence and satisfaction. Should Arif Effendi be instructed, as he probably will be, in the sense prescribed by the Earl of Westmorland under your Lordship's instructions, the Porte's compliance may be fairly interpreted as an act of submissive deference to the two belligerent Governments who have so just a claim to her respect and gratitude. It can hardly fail of occurring to the Turkish Ministers, as I confess it does to me, that the differences to be adjudged at Vienna, relate to matters which immediately concern a portion of the Sultan's dominions, and take place within the circuit of his sovereign jurisdiction.

Even with respect to Her Majesty's Embassy, the proposed course of proceeding is new and anomalous. Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities have been hitherto in the habit of reporting to the British Representative at Constantinople, as being the capital of that Empire, of which the Principalities form an integral part; and, with the general sanction of your Lordship's office, they are liable to be called upon to act under his direct instructions. I know not how far it may be intended to continue any relations at all of this kind between the Turkish capital and the Turkish provinces north of the Danube; but it is evident, respecting that class of questions now referred to Vienna, that the innovation is complete.

In conclusion, your Lordship need hardly be reminded that hitherto the difficulties which it is proposed to remove by submitting them to a collective arbitration at Vienna, have not arisen so much out of contradictions between the Turkish Government and its Agents, as from the inconsistency which has so remarkably prevailed on certain important points between the assurances of the Austrian Cabinet and the pretensions of the Austrian officers in Wallachia.

Unhappily, too, for our impressions on the subject, these embarrassing

discrepancies have been allowed to subsist at a time when they tended manifestly to impede the operations of the Turkish army, and to afford the Russians an advantage from which they appear to have derived no little profit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 427.

Arif Effendi to Reshid Pasha.

(Traduction.) *Vienne, le* 30 *Octobre*, 1854.

J'AI déjà, comme votre Altesse sait, informé la Sublime Porte que dernièrement le Comte Buol nous a dit, aux Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France et à moi, que le recours à Vienne, par les autorités dans les questions difficiles qui surviendront désormais dans les deux Principautés, sera un moyen propre à faciliter les affaires. J'ai marqué aussi que les Ambassadeurs ont transmis cette communication à leurs Cours.

Le Cabinet Anglais et Français ont approuvé et accepté l'objet de la communication, et les deux Ambassadeurs ont été chargés d'agir en conséquence.

Hier Lord Westmorland m'a informé que lui et le Baron Bourqueney ont reçu des instructions à transmettre aux Consuls en Valachie et en Moldavie, et qu'il a reçu du Comte Buol copie des instructions à expédier aux autorités Autrichiennes dans les deux Principautés afin qu'elles soient identiques avec celles qui sont adressées au Consuls d'Angleterre, et qui sont arrivés ici. Lord Westmorland m'a dit aussi, que dans la journée même je devais informer la Sublime Porte de ce dont il s'agit, afin que, sans perte de temps, elle envoye les instructions nécessaires et à l'Ambassade Ottomane et aux autorités Ottomanes dans les deux Principautés; et il a ajouté que son Excellence le Comte Buol allait me faire une communication sur cette question dans la journée d'hier.

Mais comme j'étais indisposé depuis quelques jours je n'ai pas pu avoir une entrevue avec le Comte. J'ai conséquemment envoyé le premier drogman de l'Ambassade pour savoir ce qui en est. Le Comte m'a fait dire alors, ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, que les deux Cours susmentionnés ont donné leur pleine adhésion à la mesure; qu'il allait dans la journée même me la communiquer; et que la résolution qui a été prise est, sous tous les rapports, avantageuse à la Sublime Porte, et aura pour effet la prompte solution des affaires. Son Excellence m'a aussi pressé d'informer votre Altesse de ce qui a été fait.

Je vous envoie copie des instructions dont j'ai parlé plus haut, et que Lord Westmorland m'a remise. Votre Altesse en prendra connaissance et donnera ses ordres.

(Signé) MEHEMED ARIF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 427.

Instructions addressed by the Earl of Clarendon to Her Majesty's Agents in the Principalities.

(Traduction.) *Le* 14 *Octobre*, 1854.

Monsieur,

POUR prévenir le renouvellement des malheureux différends et des aigres discussions qui ont récemment eu lieu dans les Principautés, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Apostolique et Impériale a proposé, et cette proposition a été agréée par les Gouvernements de leurs Majestés la Reine d'Angleterre et l'Empereur des Français, que toutes disputes qui viendraient à surgir entre les autorités civiles ou militaires Autrichiennes et les autorités Ottomanes, ou entre ces premières et les Agents des Puissances alliées, seraient dorénavant remises à Vienne pour y être résolues.

Vous ferez, donc, parvenir dès à présent à M. le Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique à Vienne toute question ou différend qui n'admettrait pas de solution sur les lieux mêmes, en fournissant en même temps à sa Seigneurie les renseignements les plus exacts sur chaque cas.

Ces questions seront soumises à l'examen de MM. les Comtes de Buol et de Westmorland, de M. de Bourqueney et de l'Ambassadeur Ottoman, et traitées de manière à produire une action identique. La décision de MM. les Représentants des quatre Puissances vous sera alors communiquée.

Vous ne ferez parvenir aucune question à Lord Westmorland sans que vous vous soyiez premièrement abouché avec votre collègue de France et avec le Commissaire Ottoman.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 427.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, November 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit your Excellency a translation of Arif Effendi's despatch, and a copy of its inclosure, received to-day by Reshid Pasha. His Highness is not at all pleased with it, and sees with great concern that the step taken by the Cabinets of England and France appears to be a *fait accompli*.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 428.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 657.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 10, 1854.*

IN consequence of my representations, founded principally on Lord Raglan's view of the matter, instructions are prepared at the Porte, directing Omer Pasha to postpone his intention of visiting the capital, and to employ the forces at his disposal, according as circumstances may in his judgment permit, to clear the Dobrudscha of Russians, and generally to relieve the whole of the right bank of the Danube from their presence.

Copy of the draft of instructions is confidentially inclosed herewith in translation for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 428.

The Grand Vizier to Omer Pasha.

(Translation.) *November 8, 1854.*

IN pursuance of the request contained in your Highness' despatch to the Seraskier Pasha for temporary leave of absence to come to Constantinople in order to lay your homage at the foot of the Throne, and to avail yourself of the opportunity for talking over some necessary points, the subject was brought before a Council of the Cabinet. It is desired that His Majesty the Sultan should condescend to grant your Highness' request, as we shall reap the advantages of acquiring information by your temporary presence here; and more especially as by all your statements you are to combine your departure from thence with the happy termination of the operations against the Crimea.

But it must be taken into consideration that as the Russian forces are still present at Toultcha, Matchin, Ibraila, and the Ottoman troops on the Danube are scattered in winter quarters, and are not assembled in force on any one point, it would not only be very prejudicial under existing circumstances if the Russian Commanders were to take advantage of your Highness' temporary

absence from the army to make an aggression on this side of the river, but it would also produce a very bad effect on the public mind in Bulgaria. It would, moreover, be highly advantageous if the Russians were driven from the banks of the Danube, and if their flotilla on that river was destroyed, and the navigation freed. This is strongly recommended by the allied Powers, and it is deemed natural that it should be entrusted to your Highness' care and judgment for being carried into execution, if practicable at this season. On these grounds it is His Majesty's commands that your Highness should be instructed to state in the first place to the Porte if there be any considerations overruling the objections which may exist against your quitting that place, and whether security prevails in all quarters, and that the Royal pleasure should be there conveyed to you.

Your Highness is well competent to appreciate the grave importance of the duties of your position; and it is therefore considered enough to state, that no doubt is entertained that all your views and measures are based upon safe and proper grounds; that more especially the force prepared by you for upholding the sovereign rights and independence of the Porte is in a state of complete efficiency for taking the field; and that you will duly weigh your temporary absence with reference to the details and execution of the operations to be performed under your presence by the Imperial army, towards which all eyes are directed.

Lord Raglan has specially represented the necessity of measures being taken for driving the Russians out of Toultcha, Matchin, and Ibraila; and it is also reported that reinforcements have been lately sent in that direction. It would then be highly advantageous that the Russians in that neighbourhood should be repulsed, and that the right bank of the Danube, at all events, should be thoroughly cleared. This operation is confided to your zeal, if it be possible to undertake it at this season.

No. 429.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 660.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 10, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith is a translated copy of the Porte's instruction to Arif Effendi, with reference to the communications which had taken place between his Highness, the French Chargé d'Affaires and myself, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 625 of the 28th of October.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 429.

Instructions addressed to Arif Effendi.

(Translation.)

SINCE the entry into Wallachia of the Ottoman and the Austrian forces great dissensions have arisen between the Agents of those Powers at Bucharest, and it appears requisite that measures should be taken under these circumstances for framing regulations for defining the special duties of the Agents of all parties and of the Princes of those provinces, and for securing constant harmony and good understanding between them, as for preventing the recurrence of all discussions and difficulties in future. The English and French Embassies at this place have therefore come to a joint decision with the Porte on the points which it would appear necessary to establish and define between the Sublime Porte, Great Britain, France, and Austria, respecting the two Principalities; the assistance for prosecuting the war to be afforded by those provinces, as well as by Servia, if necessary, being comprised in that decision; and the chief interpreters of the two Embassies having addressed a report to their respective chiefs

on these points, copies of which have been communicated to this Government, they are inclosed herewith in translation for your Excellency's information.

It would appear impossible that dissensions should not arise, so long as the special duties of the respective Agents are not defined. The evacuation which, according to Treaty concluded with Austria in April last, was the object of the entry of the Austrian forces into the Principalities, and the restoration of tranquillity in conjunction with the Ottoman forces, having both been accomplished; that is, Russia having evacuated the two Principalities, and the legal administration being established in Wallachia, which is restored to its former position; and as the Prince of Moldavia is about to return, and the old administration will be re-established, the Austrian Commanders have no longer any duties to exercise in the affairs of these provinces. Under these circumstances it is very essential that the duties of the respective Agents should be fundamentally established, and all dissensions between them obviated, and the measures contained in the report are calculated to conciliate these objects; you will therefore, on the information derived from the inclosed papers confer largely on the subject, in a confidential manner, with the English and French Ambassadors at Vienna, and afterwards have a conference with the Austrian Minister, guiding yourself by what they say to you, and reporting the result here.

Such are the instructions which are given to you by His Imperial Majesty's orders.

The fundamental points of the decision which has been taken will be seen in the inclosed papers, and the delicacy and importance of the question itself will be gathered from them as well as from what is stated above. Your Excellency, who in truth conducts the affairs of your mission with so much judgment and ability, will enter upon this subject in conformity with the points discussed and with the spirit of the papers transmitted to you, and report the result of your conference. It will be proper for you to communicate copy of them to the Austrian Cabinet.

No. 430.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 22.*)

(No 1,403.)

Paris, November 20, 1854.

My Lord,

LATE on Friday evening the Austrian Envoy made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the communication which his Excellency had been led to expect would shortly arrive from Vienna, having for its object to explain the course which, under present circumstances, the Austrian Cabinet proposed to follow with respect to the Eastern question.

From the account which M. de Bourqueney had given previously of the nature of the overture to be made, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was disposed to receive it favourably; and I was not surprised, on visiting his Excellency yesterday afternoon, to find him most anxious to turn what he termed the good dispositions of Austria to account.

His Excellency commenced by giving me to read the inclosed paper, which is a summary of the communication made to him by M. de Hübner. He then said that he had taken the Emperor's orders, and that His Majesty, although he did not feel confident that much success would attend the proceeding, was of opinion that the sincerity of Austria should be put to the test. If she was really willing to enter into an alliance with the Western Powers, the latter could afford to make some sacrifice to ensure it. At all events such an answer should be returned as would prevent the Austrian Government from asserting that all her proposals for an alliance were rejected. The Emperor had weighed the advantages and disadvantages of making the explanations which Austria requested. There were, no doubt, objections to giving any declaration at the present moment respecting the conditions on which the belligerent Powers might insist, in case Russia should consent to treat for peace; but on the other hand, this might be done with such reservations as would leave the allies completely free for the future, while the advantage which their cause must derive

from every step taken by Austria tending to separate her policy from Russia, was too great to be overlooked or over-estimated.

As the inclosed paper contains the summary of M. de Hübner's communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and as your Lordship will moreover have received a similar communication from Count Colloredo, I need not enter into any details respecting the proposal of Austria, but will confine myself to stating the answer which M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes to return to Vienna. It is to the following purport:

The Governments of France and England can have nothing to do with the summons which Austria proposes to address to Russia. In their opinion it will be met by a refusal, or a mystification (une mystification). But that is the affair of Austria.

The two Governments are willing to take the four Articles of the note of the 8th of August as a starting point for negotiations, but they reserve to themselves the right of proposing, in the course of the negotiations, any further conditions they may think advisable. They see with satisfaction that Austria admits this right, and they are not disposed to abuse it by asking conditions inapplicable to the present state of events. They have no intention at present of proposing any territorial changes, but they cannot bind themselves upon this point. Should events render any change of the kind necessary, if Austria allies herself to the Western Powers, she would naturally have a voice in the discussion of those changes.

Such, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, was the tenor of the answer which the Emperor proposed to make to the Austrian proposition, and which he hoped would meet with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government. Count Walewski would be instructed to speak in this sense to your Lordship.

There could be no danger, M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought, in adopting this course. It would secure the immediate signature of the Treaty by Austria, if she was sincere, and it would in fact bind the allies to nothing. They were still at liberty to give their own interpretation of the four points. If Russia agreed to that interpretation, they were not debarred from putting forward any other stipulations they might think necessary, and should Russia be reduced to accepting them, the allied armies might remain in the Crimea until the conditions of peace were fulfilled.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that the analysis which he had read to me was very obscure, and I thought contained contradictions. However, these might probably be cleared up. It seemed to me that Austria would never have made this proposition without knowing already that Russia was willing to accept the four points; and Count Buol probably wanted to ascertain on what further conditions the two Governments would insist. He had tried to obtain this information before, and had failed, and he now returned to the charge in another form. Certainly it would be a great advantage to obtain the signature of the Treaty; and if it could be procured in the manner suggested by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I did not see, speaking for myself personally, any serious objection to it. M. Drouyn de Lhuys must, however, bear well in mind, that Her Majesty's Government would be no party to the summons to be sent to St. Petersburgh, nor would they consent to an armistice before the signature of the preliminaries of peace, though Count Buol, in the summons to be addressed to Russia, appeared to combine the opening of negotiations with an armistice.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that he felt as strongly on those points as could Her Majesty's Government, and that in the propositions made on the part of Austria to the allies, there was no question of an armistice.

I believe it to be M. Drouyn de Lhuys' intention to send to Count Walewski the text of the answer which he proposes to address to M. de Bourqueney, when your Lordship will be able to see whether the points to which I have adverted, and others which may strike Her Majesty's Government, have been sufficiently attended to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 430.

Analysis of two Despatches communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by M. de Hübner.

LA première dépêche, 13 Novembre.—Au moment d'unir plus complétement avec les Puissances Occidentales, la Cour de Vienne tient à s'expliquer très franchement sur la situation. L'Empereur se rend parfaitement compte des éventualités qui pourront le forcer à prendre une part active à la guerre, mais sa conscience l'oblige à épuiser jusqu'aux dernières chances d'épargner cette calamité à ses Etats.

Si d'ici au printems la Russie persiste à ne pas se prêter à la conclusion d'une paix telle que nous le voulons tous, ou si, par sa faute, des négociations entamées viennent à échouer, le parti de l'Empereur est pris irrévocablement; mais il compte sur la modération des Puissances Occidentales, et sur leur sincère désir de voir rétablir la paix, comme il est convaincu que pour le cas où Sa Majesté Impériale devra prendre part à la guerre, elles voudront bien s'entendre avec lui en temps utile sur les mesures militaires à prendre en commun.

Voici la marche que la Cour de Vienne compte suivre.

Si la récente démarche de la Prusse échoue, elle adressera une sommation au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, afin de le mettre en demeure de déclarer s'il veut, oui ou non, consentir à une armistice et entrer en négociation de paix sur la base des quatre principes, qu'il devra accepter sans réserve et sans condition. Le refus de la Russie aura pour conséquence immédiate la rupture des relations diplomatiques. L'Autriche fera cette démarche seule ou avec ses Confédérés Allemands, pourvu que ceux-ci se soient engagés d'avance à rompre également leurs relations diplomatiques en cas de refus de la Cour de Russie. La signature de la Convention avec les Puissances maritimes pourrait coïncider avec la sommation. En toute hypothèse l'Autriche maintiendra son union avec les Cours Occidentales aussi longtemps que les quatre points n'auront pas été complétement obtenus. En retour de la confiance qu'elle témoigne, elle désirerait obtenir des explications rassurantes sur les points suivants:

Si la Russie consent à traiter sur les quatre bases convenus, la France et l'Angleterre sont-elles également prêtes à traiter sans mettre de nouvelles conditions à l'ouverture des négociations? Il est bien entendu que l'Autriche en adressant cette question ne prétend pas imposer aux deux pays qui ont fait tant de sacrifices les conditions de paix qu'elles auront en définitive à mettre en avant, et qui naturellement, dans une certaine mesure, doivent dépendre des éventualités de la guerre. Ce que désire le Cabinet Impérial, c'est d'obtenir d'avance la certitude que, dans le cours de la négociation, ces Puissances n'ont pas l'intention de présenter des conditions de nature à la faire échouer dès l'abord, et à rendre l'acceptation impossible pour la partie adverse. Enfin, que dans la phase actuelle il ne soit pas question de révivements territoriques, et que, lors même que des changements peu essentiels de cette nature seraient proposés, ils formeraient l'objet d'une entente préalable avec l'Autriche, qui de son côté s'engagerait à insister pour que le sens des quatre garanties soit déterminé dans l'intérêt de l'équilibre Européen et dans l'esprit de ses Actes diplomatiques.

Quant à l'appréciation des conditions de paix qui pourront être présentées en dehors des quatre garanties, elle se réserve sa liberté; mais son influence s'exercera toujours dans le même esprit.

Si la guerre générale venait à éclater au printems prochain, l'Autriche se concerterait avec les Puissances maritimes sur de nouvelles bases de paix, dans le sens des notes du 8 Août (en la réservant pour ce cas la faculté de proposer des conditions additionnelles).

La sommation à la Russie sera rédigée de manière à ne permettre aucune équivoque, aucune retard, aucune réponse ambigue ou insidieuse.

La deuxième dépêche, même jour, contient le Projet de Traité et se termine par ces mots:

"Dès que le Cabinet Impérial sera informé de l'accueil qu'auront rencontré les ouvertures indiquées dans la dépêche précédant, il est prêt à procéder à la signature du Traité."

No. 431.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 1,409.)

Paris, November 21, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me this morning that he had seen with pain, that the English and French officers who were at Omer Pasha's head-quarters did not draw well together (I use his Excellency's expression). While Colonel Simmons and Mr. Colquhoun saw each other frequently, and were agreed as to the advice to be offered to Omer Pasha, Colonel Dieu and M. Poujade had but few relations with each other; and although they were all personally well together, there was no unity of action among them. He was about to send the most positive orders to Colonel Dieu and to M. Poujade, to offer no advice whatever to Omer Pasha to which their British colleagues did not consent; and he requested your Lordship to take the same step with regard to Her Majesty's Agents.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he attributed this want of concert to any acts of the British Agents, and he replied distinctly in the negative.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 432.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 1,411. Confidential.)

Paris, November 21, 1854.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Lordship's confidential despatch No. 1,414 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not received any confirmation of the statement made by his Excellency to me some time back, to the effect that a letter had been written by Reshid Pasha to Count Coronini, authorizing him to invite Prince Stirbey to return to Wallachia, nor can his Excellency, after inquiring, now tell me from whom the information respecting this letter was received.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 433.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 371.)

Foreign Office, November 22, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO read to me on the 20th a despatch from Count Buol, stating that Count Colloredo's reports had prepared his Excellency for the communication which your Lordship was directed to make to him by my despatch No. 333 of the 20th ultimo. Count Buol infers from the communication, and from a similar one made to him by M. de Bourqueney, that the Governments of England and France are as alive as is that of Austria to the importance of affording, by a diplomatic Act, a common sanction to the course of action which Austria had traced out for herself; and Count Buol considers the objections made to the first project of Treaty proposed by him more as objections to its form and its details than to its principle. In admitting to a certain extent the force of the observations made with respect to the idea of defining in new Conferences the bearing and limits of the four guarantees required of Russia, Count Buol remarks that the adoption of this provision would have been of use in determining the position of Prussia, and would have afforded to that

Power an opportunity of giving its adhesion more frankly to the principles already morally acknowledged by it in the Vienna Protocol.

The Emperor of Austria, Count Buol further states, is far from deceiving himself as to the possible events which may compel him to take an active part in the war; but His Majesty considers that he owes it to his conscience, and to his people, to use every effort to save Europe from an increase of its present calamities. Should Russia persist in the spring in its refusal to agree to that solid peace which all desire, or should the negotiations once commenced be broken off by the fault of Russia, the Emperor is irrevocably resolved as to the course he will pursue.

On the other hand, Count Buol represents the Emperor as placing too much confidence in the moderation of the maritime Powers not to be persuaded that they share his desire for peace, and should unfortunately all other means have failed, that they will concert with him as to the measures to be taken by their united force towards the attainment of this end.

Should the step taken at St. Petersburgh by the Court of Berlin, of which Count Buol supposes Her Majesty's Government to have cognizance, fail, the Emperor intends to make a last appeal to the Emperor of Russia. The object of this appeal, grounded as it would be on the great interest which Austria has to see a strife ended which imposes such enormous sacrifices upon her, would be to place the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in a position to declare whether it will, or will not, consent to an armistice, and to enter into negotiation on the basis of the acceptance, without reserve or condition, of the four principles laid down.

This step Count Buol states that Austria is ready to take, either singly or conjointly with her German confederates, if they will consent to follow the same course as Austria, and to cause the refusal of Russia to be followed by the immediate rupture of diplomatic relations. The moment of such an eventual refusal would be the one at which Austria would be ready to concert with the Cabinets of London and Paris as to the plan of the campaign, and as to such other arrangements as might still be necessary.

The Austrian Government on the other hand, Count Buol proceeds to state, expect from the English Government assurances on the following points:

Should Russia consent to treat on the bases agreed upon, will England and France on their part agree, without adding new conditions, to the opening of negotiations?

Count Buol states that Austria is far from wishing to prescribe to the Powers who have made such great sacrifices, the conditions of peace which they should definitively demand, and which must depend, to a certain extent, upon the contingencies of the war.

Austria, nevertheless, considers it of the greatest importance to obtain, beforehand, the certainty that these Powers do not intend to bring forward, in the course of these negotiations, demands of a nature calculated to insure their rejection, and to render the consent of the adverse party to a peace almost an impossibility: in fact, that, in the present position of affairs, there shall be no question of territorial changes, and that even modifications of actual possession shall not be proposed without previous consultation.

Austria, on the other hand, is ready to engage herself to insist that the sense of the four guarantees shall be determined in the interest of the European balance of power, and in the spirit of the diplomatic Acts to which she has been a party.

Finally, Count Buol engages that Austria, whilst fully reserving to herself her right to judge of the conditions of peace which may be brought forward, will not cease to exert her influence in the same spirit which has constantly guided her through all the phases of this long complication.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 434.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 372.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 22, 1854.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that Baron Bourqueney and your Lordship had communicated to him the project of Treaty with Austria agreed upon by Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French.

Count Buol remarks upon Article V, that to fix at this moment in a public Act the precise date at which Austria should conclude with the belligerent Powers all the arrangements for her active participation in the war, if peace should not previously be concluded, would be, in his opinion, to provoke Russia to anticipate the arrival of the period so fixed, by taking the initiative against Austria, either at once, or whenever she may think it most for her advantage.

Count Buol considers it, therefore, better that this stipulation should be a Separate and Secret Article, a draft of which is transmitted.

On the other hand, Count Buol proposes to modify Article V by fixing the end of the year, if it should not then be certain that peace will be speedily concluded, as the period for the mutual understanding with regard to the military arrangements, in case of Austria engaging in the war, instead of the month of April, which Count Buol thinks too distant for the objects intended.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 435.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 373.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 22, 1854.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 432 has been received and laid before the Queen.

Count Colloredo yesterday communicated to me the project of a Treaty which Austria is prepared to sign with England and France, and he read to me a despatch from Count Buol announcing the course which the Cabinet of Vienna proposes to adopt. I have recorded the substance of that despatch in my No. 371 of this day's date.

Count Buol is well aware of the value and importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to the alliance of Austria, and you will assure his Excellency that the prospect which now presents itself of her active cooperation in a contest upon which the future destiny of Europe may depend, and which vitally affects the best interests of Austria, is the cause of sincere satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government.

Your Lordship states that the Austrian Government desires to know, and Count Buol in his despatch to Count Colloredo also inquires, what are the immediate objects of the war, the progress of which tends to unite Austria with the maritime Powers, and what are the conditions upon which England and France would now consider the re-establishment of peace to be possible, and it is both prudent and reasonable that Austria before taking up arms should desire to know upon what conditions she may expect to lay them down; but as England and France, when they took up arms to defend the threatened independence of Turkey, entered into no engagement with each other as to the terms on which they would consent to make peace with Russia, and as Count Buol frankly admits that the prolongation of the war would annul the bases which have been agreed to between the three Powers, and that the terms of peace must vary with the events of war, his Excellency will doubtless also admit the difficulty of giving a definite answer to his inquiry.

Her Majesty's Government, however, have no wish for concealment. Their policy is disinterested, and their objects are those which concern Austria even

more deeply than England and France, who, having exerted and exhausted every effort to maintain peace, were under the necessity of declaring war against a Power which menaced the existence of the Ottoman Empire; which forcibly occupied a large portion of the Sultan's territory; and converting into dependencies of its own the countries bordering on the Black Sea, seriously endangered the balance of power in Europe.

Russia assumed a supremacy over the whole Greek Church, and based upon it a political protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, in virtue of Treaties obtained by violence, and worded with intentional ambiguity.

Russia has injured European commerce in the Black Sea, by obstructing the navigation of the Danube. Russia has erected a stupendous naval and military establishment at Sebastopol, and possesses a powerful fleet, which, not being required to protect her commerce, or to guard against an enemy, can only be intended for purposes of aggression. Russia has gradually transferred from Turkey to herself the allegiance of the Danubian Provinces; and on the eastern shores of the Black Sea she seeks constantly to extend her power and influence. Such a state of things cannot exist without danger to the independence of Europe; and no peace can be solid or lasting that is not founded upon effectual guarantees against its recurrence.

Regarding such guarantees as are contained in the four conditions of the notes of the 8th of August, Her Majesty's Government would not be indisposed to enter upon negotiations on this basis, reserving to themselves the right to discuss their practical application, and to propose such further conditions as the events of war may render necessary, in the same way that Austria has reserved to herself a similar right in the event of hostilities occurring between her and Russia.

Upon the question of territorial changes, if any such should hereafter arise, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to confer with the Governments of Austria and France, as the union which will then exist between the three Powers by the proposed Treaty will impose upon them the obligation of frankly communicating their intentions to each other.

Her Majesty's Government learn with regret that it is the determination of the Austrian Government to make a further appeal to Russia, which they apprehend will either be fruitless, or be met with evasion for the purpose of defeating the objects which the three Powers have in view, but your Lordship will distinctly inform Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government desire no such communication, and can be no parties to it; and that even if the Emperor of Russia were to consent without reserve to negotiate upon the terms proposed, it must be understood that the allied Powers are not thereby in any way bound to agree to a suspension of arms during the progress of negotiations.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and inform his Excellency that you are empowered to sign the Treaty of which the project was communicated to me by Count Colloredo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 436.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 1,416.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 22, 1854.*

THE French Agent reports from Bucharest, under date of the 17th instant, that the 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Infantry divisions of the 2nd and 3rd corps of the Russian forces had left for the Crimea.

The three brigades of the 5th corps, which were upon the Danube, set out on the 3rd for the Dniester.

Twenty-two thousand Russians remained on the Lower Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 437.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 1,418.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 22, 1854.*

THE French Government has received reports from Jassy of the 12th instant. They represent Prince Gortchakoff to have declared, that if the Turks pass the Sereth he will reenter Moldavia. Under such circumstances there must be an early collision with the Austrian troops, whom the French Agent asserts to be tired of their inactivity and clamorous for war.

Prince Gortchakoff's forces are computed at 30,000 men; but the French Agent thinks that they do not number above 20,000. This intelligence tallies with that received from Bucharest, to which I allude in another despatch. There were no longer any Russians in the Dobrudscha.

The Turks have been well received in Moldavia. A much better welcome has been given to them than to the Austrians. Prince Ghika had arrived, and met with a good reception from the Moldavians; and Dervish Pasha, having declared that there was no proof of his having favoured the Russians, was about to be reinstated as Hospodar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 438.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul-General Colquhoun.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 23, 1854.*

I HAVE to state to you that the French Government, being desirous to insure the most complete cooperation and unity of action between their Agents in Wallachia and those of Her Majesty's Government, have informed me, through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, that the most positive orders would be sent to Colonel Dieu, and to M. Poujade, to offer no advice whatever to Omer Pasha to which you and Colonel Simmons do not consent.

I have therefore to desire that you will, on your side, do your utmost to cooperate with Colonel Dieu and M. Poujade, as Her Majesty's Government would desire that the representations which it may be expedient to make at the head-quarters of Omer Pasha, should be the result of a perfect understanding between the British and French Agents concerned.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 439.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,143.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 24, 1854.*

"I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 1,409 of the 21st instant, that I have suggested to the Duke of Newcastle, that instructions should be given to Colonel Simmons to insure the most complete cooperation and unity of action between the British and French Agents in Wallachia; and I inclose for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest upon the same subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 438.

No. 440.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Munich, November 20, 1854.*

M. VON DER PFORDTEN has arrived here from Hohenschwangau, whither he had proceeded on the day following his return from Vienna, for the purpose of laying before the King the results of his double mission to that, and to the Prussian capital.

Little has, as yet, transpired as to the real position of the different German States towards one another, but that little indicates a much stronger desire to come to a common understanding on this Eastern policy than has hitherto marked their conduct; and I am told that the latest accounts, from Berlin in particular, afford fair ground for hope that the difference of opinion between the two principal Federal Powers, which has until now caused so much hesitation and delay, is about to disappear, and that they are in fact on the point of coming to an agreement as to the terms and nature of the communication to be made to the Diet of Frankfort.

As I have reason to believe that M. Von der Pfordten was unable to obtain from the Cabinet of Vienna any very essential concessions, I must presume that that communication will differ but little in substance from the despatch addressed by the Imperial Cabinet to the President of the Diet a few weeks ago, and that consequently it will be called upon to declare that an attack upon Austria, whether within her own frontiers or against her troops in the Danubian Principalities, would impose on the whole of Germany the duty of aiding her by every means in its power; that the Germanic Confederation, as an European Power, recognizes the four preliminary points in substance, as calculated to serve as the basis of a peace which shall secure the rights of Europe, and as a German Power especially, identify itself with and hold to the first point; and that lastly, it should admit the existence of the danger of attack, and accordingly instruct the Military Commission, in virtue of the Convention of the 20th of April, to make such preparations as would, upon the demand being made, render possible the immediate employment of the forces of the Confederation; whilst, at the same time, the Political Committee should be authorized, in the event of their services being required, to propose in the proper quarter that the contingents should be actually called out, and placed in those positions which might be designated. Upon the nature of the support to be given to these propositions mainly turn the negotiations which are at this moment actively carried on between all the German Cabinets, and everything I hear on the subject leads me to conclude that an understanding upon them, or something nearly approaching it, is not far distant. Up to the present time, however, this Government has not formally signified its intention to adhere unconditionally to the policy of Austria on the Eastern question; but I cannot suppose that this important act will be much longer delayed, if my faith is to be put in the language of M. Von der Pfordten, who appears to have been so thoroughly converted at Vienna—whether from conviction or apprehension I will not stop to examine—that he now holds the pure and simple acceptance of the four points by Russia to be the unalterable groundwork of any arrangement to be entered into with her on the part of the Confederation.

Now, if it were possible at once to take advantage of the existing favourable dispositions of most of the minor German Cabinets, and have the question instantly brought before the Diet, some expectation might be reasonably indulged in that the demands of Austria would be acceded to without much further discussion; but if the negotiations between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin be protracted until the answer of the Emperor of Russia to the last Prussian appeal, which will in all probability be susceptible of more than one interpretation, shall reach Berlin, it can scarcely be doubted, I think, that the Russian party, as well there as in other parts of Germany, will make fresh and strenuous efforts once more to fan those embers of jealousy which appear to be inextinguishable on both sides, and thereby occasion much further delay, if not a final severance of opinion.

I have not myself had an opportunity of speaking with M. Von der Pfordten, but his language, as reported above, was held in a conversation with one of my German colleagues, by whom it was shortly after repeated to me as exhibiting a remarkable change in his views, and which, although as far as it goes it may be considered satisfactory, does not suffice to dispel the doubts I have never ceased to entertain as to the cordiality of the hoped for agreement among themselves, or as to the assistance which the German Powers might be disposed to afford to England and France in the present struggle.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 441.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 435.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 22, 1854.*

I INQUIRED of Count Buol whether the declaration of the Austrian Government that the port of Cattaro is to be a military port involved any change in the position of Kleck, which was upon the Turkish territory.

Count Buol told me that it made no change whatever as to the position of that place; that it in no way touched upon the question which had been mooted at the time of the arrangement come to between General Leiningen and the Turkish Government in 1853, and reported in my despatch No. 102 of the 2nd of March, 1853, to your Lordship, according to which the Porte engages not to make any change in the existing arrangements as to the strips of land of Kleck and Sutorina except by mutual and amicable agreement.

With respect to the pretension of Austria regarding the position of Kleck and Sutorina, they are the same as those described in my despatch No. 203 of the 4th of October, 1852, addressed to the Earl of Malmesbury, which incloses a memoir upon this subject, accompanied by a map.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 442.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 437.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 22, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has received no further communication upon the subject of the telegraphic intelligence from St. Petersburgh announcing that the Emperor Nicholas would accept the four conditions as a basis of negotiation for peace, and which I transmitted to your Lordship in my telegraphic message of the 20th instant.

The Prussian Government have announced that they have received the same communication through Baron Budberg, but Count Buol remarked upon this intelligence that it was impossible to attach any serious importance to it until the form in which it was expressed, and the conditions by which it might be accompanied were made known. Count Buol stated that this proceeding on the part of Russia only made him the more anxious for the receipt of your Lordship's answers to the Treaty and the communications he had submitted to you through Count Colloredo.

With respect to the questions which had arisen between the Austrian Government and that of Prussia as to the communications to be made to the Diet of Frankfort upon the affairs of the East, Count Buol stated that the Prussian Cabinet had agreed to the Austrian proposition, so that the two Governments would go the States of the Confederation with a similar proposal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 443.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.

(No. 440.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 22, 1854.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 358 of the 14th instant, I asked Count Buol whether any wish had been expressed by the Turkish Government that Austria should contribute to the repression of the Montenegrins, and whether there would be any objection on his part to fulfil this wish if it should be found to be desirable so to do. Count Buol stated that he had no reason to oppose this wish, except from the principle that it was not desirable to occupy the territory of a neighbouring State without a proved necessity for such a measure. He believed that, in some of the late transactions upon the Turkish and Montenegrin frontiers, there had been faults committed on both sides; and, for his own part, he had not failed to point out continually to the Prince of Montenegro the expediency of his remaining on good terms with the Government of the Porte. The Austrian Government, he said, had lately furnished the Pasha of Scutari with some ammunition, which he required; and, from recent reports which he had received from those countries, he was in hopes that the disturbances which had existed on their frontiers had now ceased.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 444.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 472.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 24, 1854.

I PAID my first visit, since my return, to Baron Manteuffel this day. His Excellency appeared but little disposed to give any information which could enlighten me on the various negotiations said to be pending at Berlin, and seemed desirous to give as few details as possible respecting these affairs, and evidently expected that I had been charged with communications which would force Prussia to take some decision. He was, therefore, greatly relieved when he found that I had as little to say to him on public affairs as he had to communicate to me.

I asked his Excellency if it were true that Prussia and Austria had agreed as to the terms in which their next communications on the Eastern question would be made to the Diet at Frankfort: he replied that it was so. Baron Manteuffel remarked, with reference to the four points which Russia is said now accept as the basis for negotiation, that he thought something was to be done with them, and that Count Buol had communicated them to your Lordship. His Excellency said nothing more on the subject, seeming to feel that it was useless for him to urge the matter on the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

We conversed on the war in the Crimea. The Prussian Minister spoke of the hardships to which the British army were exposed, and expressed the highest admiration of their conduct; he alluded to the privations they had so cheerfully undergone; he spoke of the gallantry of their conduct in unmistakeable terms: when I said that England was truly proud of the brave men who had gone to fight her battles in so just a cause, and that I could assure him it had been no small satisfaction to me, in leaving England a few days ago, to learn that my country fully appreciated the conduct of our soldiers, and that the rapidity with which the recruiting was going on, proved that there would be no want of men to fight our battles and to insure the success of our arms. I then asked his Excellency whether Prussia intended to continue in her passive condition; that I presumed it could not be, for I was told that the Government was about to

propose to the Chambers, at the opening of the sessions next week, the realisation of the other half of the loan for the mobilisation of part of the army.

His Excellency replied that it was true that this money would be asked for, but he added that the King continued to be as averse to war as ever, and that His Majesty had but lately observed that he felt the greatest repugnance to take arms against Russia, as a campaign would of necessity commence in Poland, where friends and foes would be mixed together in undistinguishable masses.

From all that fell from Baron Manteuffel in the course of this conversation it is clear that the opinions of this Court have not undergone the least change, and, indeed, I regret to hear that the language of persons about the Palace is as favourable to Russia as it ever has been.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 445.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 473.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 24, 1854.

WITH reference to Lord Augustus Loftus' despatch No. 172 of the 17th instant, inclosing a detailed statement of the Russian forces under the command of Prince Menchikoff in the Crimea, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith an estimate of the Russian Infantry engaged on the 5th of November, at the battle of Inkerman, specifying the names of the several regiments, brigades, divisions, &c; as also the troops which formed the corps of demonstration, under General Liprandi, upon the British right, and the troops which were simultaneously engaged in the sortie on the French lines. These statements have been drawn up with great care, and are compiled from the Russian official reports and other public documents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 445.

Detail of Russian Infantry brought forward on the 5th November, as shown by Russian official and other documents.

No. 1.—GRAND ATTACK UNDER DANNENBERG.

4th Corps.

		Regiments.		Battalions.	Men.
10th Division Soimonoff	1st Brigade..	Ykaterinenburg	19 line	4	2,800
	2nd Brigade.	Tomsk ..	19 light	4	2,800
		Koliwan ..	20 "	4	2,800
11th Division Pauloff	1st Brigade..	Selinginsk ..	21 line	4	2,800
		Yakutsk ..	22 "	4	2,800
	2nd Brigade.	Ochotsk ..	21 light	4	2,800
		4th Rifles ..		1	700
				25	17,500

6th Corps.

		Regiments.	Battalions.	Men.
16th Division Kwitsinsky	1st Brigade	Wladimir .. 31 line	4	2,800
		Susdal .. 32 „	4	2,800
	2nd Brigade	Uglitz .. 31 light	4	2,800
17th Division Kirjakoff	1st Brigade	Butirsk .. 34 line	4	2,800
	2nd Brigade	Borodino .. 33 light	4	2,800
		Tarutin .. 34 „	4	2,800
		6th Rifles	1	700
		6th Sappers	1	400
			25½	17,500

No. 2.—In Reserve.

			Battalions.	Men.
Belonging to 10th Division ..	Tobolsk 20 line ..		4 ..	2,800
„ 11th Division ..	Kamchatzka 22 light ..		4 ..	2,800
„ 16th Division ..	Kasan 32 „ ..		4 ..	2,800
„ 13th Division ..	Reserve Battalions ..		4 ..	2,800
			16	11,200

Recapitulation.

4th Corps ..	25 Battalions ..	17,500	Bayonets.	
6th Corps ..	25½ „ ..	17,900	„	
Reserve ..	16 „ ..	11,200	„	
		46,600	„	

Note.—The 33rd (Moscow) line, of 1st Brigade, 17th Division, was detached to strengthen Liprandi's Division, under Gortchakoff, on the extreme Russian left.

Battalions are averaged according to the Russians, although it is notorious that the general effective average cannot and does not exceed 600.

The 18th Division, 6th Corps, is in Asia Minor.

No. 3.—Sortie from Bastion No. 6.

		Regiments.	Battalions.	Men.
5th Corps 14th Division	1st Brigade..	Volhynia .. 27 line	4	2,800
		Minsk* .. 28 „	4	2,800
			8	5,600

* The sortie was made by the 28th, with 27th in reserve.

No. 4.—Demonstration upon British right.

		Regiments.	Battalions.	Men.
12th Division Liprandi	1st Brigade..	Azoff .. 23 line	4	2,800
		Dnieper .. 24 „	4	2,800
	2nd Brigade	Ukrain .. 23 light	4	2,800
		Odessa .. 24 „	4	2,800
		Moscow* .. 33 line	4	2,800
		Tchernamor Rifles ..	1	700
			21	14,700

* Detached from 1st Brigade, 17th Division.

General Recapitulation.

	Men.	Battalions.
No. 1.—Grand Attack ..	35,400 ..	50½
No. 2.—Reserve	11,200 ..	16
No. 3.—Sortie and Reserve ..	5,600 ..	8
No. 4.—Demonstration ..	14,700 ..	21
	66,900	95½

Thus leaving only 4 Battalions reserves of 13th Division, 3 Battalions of Marines, and 2½ Sappers, or 1-½ Battalions of 110, not brought forward.

No. 446.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 27.*)

(No. 474.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 24, 1854.*

A COMMUNICATION has been made by Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at this Court, to Baron Manteuffel, of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, conveying the reply of the Imperial Cabinet to the Prussian despatch of the 22nd ultimo. I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship an extract of this document, in which the four conditions are laid down which the Russian Cabinet are ready to accept as the basis of negotiations.

In terminating the despatch to Baron Budberg, I am informed, from a private source, that Count Nesselrode states that Russia has been induced to make these large concessions in furtherance of the wishes and interests of Germany, in whose welfare she feels so great a solicitude. Russia trusts that Germany will oppose any further extension of demands that might be made on her; and she likewise expects that Germany will maintain a perfect neutrality. It is vaguely hinted that Russia has been induced to this pacific course by a wish to preserve those relations with the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin which are so necessary to the peace and welfare of Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 446.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

Extrait de la dépêche du Comte Nesselrode à M. de Budberg, en date du $\frac{25 \text{ Octobre}}{6 \text{ Novembre}}$ 1854, et renfermant les bases de paix que la Russie consent à accepter:

1. GARANTIE commune par les Cinq Puissances des droits religieux et civiles des populations Chrétiennes de l'Empire Ottoman, sans distinction de culte.

2. Protectorat de Principautés exercé en commune par les Cinq Puissances aux mêmes conditions que nos Traités avec la Porte ont stipulées en leur faveur.

3. Révision du Traité de 1841. La Russie ne s'opposera pas à son abolition, si le Sultan, principale partie intéressée, y consent.

4. Liberté de la navigation sur le Danube, qui existe de droit et que la Russie n'a jamais eu l'intention d'entraver.

No. 447.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 668.)

Therapia, November 13, 1854.

My Lord,

I LEARN from your Lordship's despatch No. 645 of the 26th ultimo, that all cause of difference between the Austrian and Turkish authorities in Wallachia is removed by instructions issuing from the Austrian Government, and "the establishment of a Mixed Commission at Vienna, to which all questions in dispute will be referred."

Before I had the honour of being made officially acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government in that respect, I stated to your Lordship the impression which Reshid Pasha had derived from the arrangement in question, and I took the liberty of submitting some remarks which occurred to me on the same subject. In referring to the despatch which contains these remarks, I have only to express a hope that the measure may work in a manner to correspond with your Lordship's expectations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 448.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 672. Confidential.)

Therapia, November 15, 1854.

My Lord,

AS it is possible that Baron de Bruck may have complained to his Government, in the same sense in which he appears to have complained to Reshid Pasha, I deem it advisable to put your Lordship in possession of the accompanying report from M. Pisani, according to which it appears that the Internuncio has, of late, been little satisfied with the state of diplomatic relations subsisting between himself and the Turkish Minister, though it may be hoped that his unfavourable impressions are now removed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 448.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Confidential.)

Pera, November 14, 1854.

My Lord,

RESHID PASHA informed me that Baron de Bruck complains that the Porte, in all matters connected with the Principalities, takes the advice of the British and French Embassies, and that he (Baron de Bruck) is the last to be apprised of what is going on, and when it is too late to be able to express an opinion.

Reshid Pasha said in reply that it was not the case, and assured him that if any matter of consequence were to arise, he would concert with the Representatives of all three Powers, and take their advice as to the best mode of proceeding. This answer appeared to satisfy the Internuncio.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 449.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 674.)

Therapia, November 15, 1854.

My Lord,

I AVAIL myself of the present opportunity to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, translated copies of despatches addressed to the Porte by Omer Pasha and Dervish Pasha, respectively, under the date of the 21st ultimo. They were communicated to me by the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 449.

Dervish Pasha to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.)

October 21, 1854.

I HAVE already reported Prince Stirbey's arrival at Bucharest. The moment he arrived he proceeded to devise the appointment of the Ministry, and broached the subject to me in order to feel his way.

Having considered that if he appointed Ministers faithful to the interests of the Porte, the Porte would be able to carry into better effect hereafter anything now in contemplation with respect to this province, while it would be promotive of its prosperity, I commenced by stating that if he appointed Ministers from among the adherents of the Porte, he would confirm his devotion to the Porte, and would create a favourable change in public opinion with respect to himself; and I gave him some advice on the subject. But the Prince, nevertheless, made frivolous excuses with reference to the individuals put forward by me—that some were incompetent, from want of sufficient capacity, to fill office; and that others were not of sufficient rank to hold high office.

I inclose a list, to your Highness, of individuals, with notes to each name, by which it will appear that the Prince accepted only two of the persons put forward by me, and made the other selections and appointments himself. I inclose likewise a return, drawn up in French, of the individuals proposed by me; of those whom the Prince was desirous of appointing; and of those whom he has now appointed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 449.

List of the Candidates for the Ministry at Bucharest.

1. PRINCE CONSTANTIN GHIKA, fils aîné du feu Prince Grégoire Ghika.—Homme intégre et très honnête; très peu d'instruction et esprit étroit; cœur excellant; anti-Russe, déclaré bon patriote, et dévoué par principe et par conviction à la Turquie; capacité médiocre, et très peu de pénétration dans les affaires politiques et pratiques.

2. Alexandre Aristide Ghika.—Instruit et intelligent; honnête homme; bon patriote; dévoué à son pays et à la Turquie; ennemi ouvertement déclaré de la Russie, dont il a constamment combattu les tendances; caractère ferme et

décidé. Quant à son intégrité, elle est souvent en défaut à cause du jeu qui lui a fait engager ses biens.

3. Nicolas Balliano.—Très peu d'instruction ; intelligence médiocre ; très peu de capacité aux affaires publiques ; mais il est un des hommes les plus intégres du pays ; il entend mieux les affaires commerciales. Sa couleur politique est dessinée anti-Russe déclaré. Il ne sait jamais laissé intimider. Avant toute il aime son pays ; avec une plus grande capacité, il servirait mieux ses intérêts.

4. Alexandre Constantin Cretzoulesco.—Une des plus anciénnes familles du puys ; ancien militaire et haut fonctionnaire ; très instruit, honnête, et plein de probité, intégre, et sans tache ; ennemi des Russes, et aimant son pays pardessus tout ; moralité irréprochable ; ami du progrès et ennemi acharné du système actuel. Comme Procureur à la Cour des Juges, ne pouvant lutter contre l'arbitraire et l'injustice flagrante qui se fesait sous les yeux, il se démis de ses fonctions et rentra dans la vie primée. Il a quitté le pays depuis plus d'un an et se trouve à l'étranger.

5. Nicolas Cretzoulesco.—Docteur en Médécine ; très instruit ; esprit juste ; beaucoup de lucidité dans les affaires politiques ; très honnête ; anti-Russe, comme tout bon patriote. Il est attaché à la Turquie ; capable de faire tout pour servir les intérêts du pays ; homme du progrès, et ennemi du système actuel. Sa vie privée et publique irréprochable.

6. Jean Carussiniano.—Homme d'une grande instruction et capacité ; sous le Prince Ghika, il était le chef de l'opposition dans l'Assemblée Générale du pays. Bon patriote, progressiste, libéral, aimé de tous. Il était indigné de voir toutes les injustices, le vol et les abus qui se commettaient dans le pays, sacrifiant jusqu'à sa fortune pour servir sa patrie, combattant l'influence Russe par tout ses moyens, ennemi du système de corruption et des tendances Russes. Après avoir fait une opposition éclatante dans l'Assemblée en 1837, pour faire rejeter l'intercalation d'un Article dans le Réglement Organique, par lequel la Russie enlevait au pays son droit d'autonomie, il quitta le pays et alla à Constantinople, à Paris, et à Londres, pour plaider la cause de sa patrie. A son retour dans le pays il fut relégué dans une prison d'État par ordre Impériale, et après tant de souffrances qu'il a eu à endurer, la liberté lui fut rendue à condition qu'il se tiendrait à l'écart. Il a dû manager ensuite la Russie. Après tant d'échecs, déçu dans toutes les espérances, désappointé, il a cru voir tout espoir perdu par son pays. L'indifférence de la Turquie, de la France, et de l'Angleterre, d'alors lui faisait voir le pays tôt ou tard tomber entre les mains de la Russie.

Lors du mouvement de 1848, s'il n'a pas applaudi aux espérances du peuple c'est qu'il croyait d'après son idée fixe voir arriver l'heure fatale de la domination Russe. Il accepta néanmoins le Ministère de la Justice des mains du Gouvernement Provisoire. Il fut accusé plus tard d'être partisan secret de la Russie, mais cette idée est restée à l'état de problème.

N'ayant pas assez de confiance ni de foi dans la sincérité de la Turquie, il croyait que cette Puissance dans sa prépondérance mirait les droits et les privilèges des Roumains pour établir un Pachalik dans le pays ; cette appréhension lui a suggéré l'idée de devenir anti-Turc. Tout ce revivement d'idées et de principes n'étant dû qu'au grand intérêt qu'il portait à son pays, et nullement à ses intérêts personnels, ni à un attachement à la Russie. Homme probe, intégre, très honnête, il pourrait servir honorablement son pays, une fois qu'il verrait une bonne chance pour sa patrie.

Son défaut est l'indolence et le peu d'énergie qu'il met dans le rouage des affaires.

7. Jean Philipesco (surnommé Castatu.)—Anti-Russe. Il laisse parfois entrevoir des dispositions patriotiques, quoique partisan du régime actuel ; néanmoins il est à croire qu'il ne s'opposera pas à l'amélioration de l'état du pays. Peu d'instruction, mais beaucoup de pratique dans les affaires et connaissant le rouage de l'administration. Homme d'énergie et de courage, sans que l'intimidation puisse l'effrayer. Il est d'une intégrité médiocre.

8. Jean Cantacuzène.—Jeune homme très instruit, esprit juste, mais inflexible dans ses écarts ; caractère ferme, fonctionnaire intégre, sa vie privée et publique irréprochable et parfaite. Quant à ses opinions politiques, les qualités qu'il possède et l'amour du pays lui feront voir la voie qu'il devra suivre, et qu'il a fait fausse route en suivant la doctrine de son beau-père Mavros.

9. Jean Mano.—Avec très peu d'instruction et beaucoup d'intelligence, il a appris une grande aptitude dans les affaires, beaucoup d'adresse et de capacité et peu de droiteur. Sous le Prince Ghika dans les différentes fonctions qu'il a remplies, il a fait preuve de beaucoup d'énergie et de capacité et de peu d'intégrité. Partisan chaud du système corrupteur, il l'a soutenu avec acharnement par les abus qu'il faisait. Sous le Prince Bibesco, comme Préfet de Police, il n'a fit qu'attirer sur lui la haine et le ressentiment de tous les habitants ; quant aux abus qu'il faisait sans crainte et sans aucun remord on ne saurait l'accuser d'avoir su en profiter sous un tel régime, qu'il ne cessera jamais de défendre, attendu qu'il rentre parfaitement dans les habitudes et les mœurs du parti des vieux Boyars et de leur clientelle.

Lors du mouvement de 1848, sa propre conscience lui ayant dit qu'il devait se sauver de la capitale pour échapper à la vengeance du peuple, il se dirigea vers Giurgevo pour de là s'embarquer pour Vienne. S'il avait cru éviter le courroux des habitants de Bucharest, qui d'ailleurs se montrèrent très sages et nullement vindicatifs, il n'en fut pas de même de quelques misérables habitants de Giurgevo qui le maltraitèrent d'une manière ignoble. Sous le Prince Stirbey, comme Secrétaire d'Etat, il a continué son système d'arbitraire et de tout ce qui s'ensuit. Avec beaucoup d'habilité et de ruse, il a joué un rôle peu digne. Quoique partisan chaud de la Russie, il a eu l'habilité après l'occupation de faire une opposition soudaine aux Russes. Après avoir servi et blâmé tous les Princes qui ont régné, aujourd'hui il sert et appuie le Prince Stirbey et a travaillé par tous les moyens pour son rappel. Sa devise politique est celle de tous les conservateurs du système en vigueur—s'attacher fortement à la Puissance qui lui conserve le système actuel et se mettre sous sa protection.

10. Jean Bibesco.—Sous son frère Prince Bibesco il fut Administrateur à Craïova ; sous Stirbey, Ministre des Cultes. Intelligence dérangée ; opinion politique celle de ses frères ; sa moralité domestique n'est pas irréprochable ; grand dissipateur, il a dû chercher à refaire sa fortune par les moyens auxquels tous les hauts fonctionnaires influens et couvert de l'impunité ont recours.

11. Jean Golesco.—Homme très corrompu et la haute de la famille Golesco ; sans instruction et caractère ; il est capable de faire l'injustice la plus flagrante pour une petite somme d'argent et il est connu pour tel. Quant à ses opinions politiques il a des affections pour celui qui se chargera de défendre à tout prix et à conserver le système de corruption qui lui convient parfaitement et de la haine contre quiconque voudra le lui ravir.

12. Jean Alexandre Philipesco.—Très honnête dans sa vie privée. Homme assez instruit, mais d'un esprit obtus ; dévoué à la Russie pour arriver à l'Hospodarat. Dans les derniers temps il a sacrifié sa probité et son caractère et il est prêt à trahir son pays pour arriver à son but. Dans les affaires politiques peu de lucidité, au judiciaire peu d'aptitude ; considéré comme homme d'Etat il est très médiocre.

13. Alexandre Slajino (gendre de Stirbey).—Ancien Administrateur et Chef de Police ; instruction médiocre, mais d'une grande intelligence et beaucoup d'esprit. Couleur politique celle du caméléon ; moralité et conduite privée très blamable. Dans ses fonctions d'Administrateur et de Chef de Police il n'a pas été intégre. Il s'était créée une belle fortune ; mais joueur plus tard il courait à sa ruine. Détourné de ses mauvaises habitudes et de l'influence de son beau-frère, il sera un homme de progrès et s'attachera au bien du pays.

14. Jean Obétélechano.—Point d'instruction, point de capacité, ni pratique ; homme du monde et de la haute classe par suite des richesses acquises dans les entreprises et dans le jeu de hasard ; sans principes ni idées arrêtées ; Russe par

entraînement et sans conviction. Quant à son intégrité, à son honnêteté politiques, elles n'ont pas été assez mises à l'épreuve.

15. Constintin Cheresco.—Russe par conviction et par instinct. Ayant pris service dans sa jeunesse dans l'armée Russe, il n'a pas cessé depuis à être sincèrement attaché à leur politique et à seconder leurs vues hostiles à sa patrie. Point d'instruction; capacité nulle; ancienne connaissance militaire. C'est Sous-Adjudant du Colonel Garbaski, qui a toujours travaillé dans le Ministère dans le sens Russe, et d'après les inspirations du Consul Russe. Il contribua beaucoup de son crédit comme Ministre et comme Chef de la Milice à faire incorporer les troupes Roumaines dans l'armée Russe; il ne cessait pas d'insister les officiers à servir sous les ordres des Russes et même officiellement. Il a forcé les plus dociles à aller prendre du service dans la légion Greco-Slave.

16. Prince Demètre Ghika.—Conseiller à la Cour d'Appel; instruction superficielle; homme d'esprit et d'intelligence, mais point de connaissances spéciales; caractère ferme, et homme de principe et d'honneur, quand l'ambition et une arrière pensée ne lui font pas faire fausse route. Il s'est toujours déclaré ennemi du système actuel et des tendances Russes; comme tous les bons patriotes, il a continuellement combattu le parti Russe. Très fier de sa naissance il aimerait mieux faire cause commun avec sa classe que de transiger avec le parti national. Cependant il n'a jamais trahi les intérêts ni aucun de son pays et s'est montré jusqu'ici partisan de la Turquie. Entraîné par la passion du jeu depuis trois ans il a entraîné sa fortune, et comme il a contracté des dettes il ne sera pas loin de sa ruine. Il s'ensuit que son intégrité ne sera pas de longue durée.

Inclosure 3 in No. 449.

Dervish Pasha's Notes on the Return of Ministers.

(Translation.)

1. I PROPOSED him for Minister of the Interior, but Prince Stirbey disapproved, and promised to appoint him President of the Ministry.

2. I proposed him for Director of the Interior, but Prince Stirbey rejected him. He is somewhat hostile to the Prince, who therefore is inimical to him.

3. Proposed by me to be Minister of Finance, and accepted and appointed by Prince Stirbey.

3. Proposed by me to be President of the Military Department, and rejected by Prince Stirbey.

5. Proposed by me to be Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and not accepted by Prince Stirbey, who appointed him Director of the Interior.

6. Proposed by me to be Minister of Public Worship, and accepted by Prince Stirbey, who appointed him.

7. Was formerly Minister of Finance. Prince Stirbey was desirous of appointing him Minister of the Interior, and as I did not oppose it he was named.

8. Son of Cantacuzène, ex-Minister of Finance; held the office of Vice-Minister of Justice, and has been now destituted.

9. Ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prince Stirbey pressed his re-appointment, but he desisted on my not accepting him.

10. Prince Stirbey's brother, and wanted employment in the Ministry; but on its being represented to Prince Stirbey that he was a bad man, and that it would not be suitable under existing circumstances to employ him, because he was his brother, the matter dropped.

11. Prince Stirbey very much pressed his being appointed Minister of Justice, but desisted on my not accepting him.

12. Ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prince Stirbey wanted to appoint him Minister of Justice, and as there is not another suitable person at present, I was under the necessity of agreeing to his nomination.

13. Prince Stirbey wished to appoint him Minister for Foreign Affairs, and although I did not quite agree, he was named.

14. Was "Contrôleur," and has been again confirmed in that appointment. It is not proper that this man should continue to hold that office.

15. Was President of the War Department, and has been now confirmed. Neither should this man continue to hold that office.

16. Proposed by us as "Contrôleur," and rejected by Prince Stirbey.

Inclosure 4 in No. 449.

Dervish Pasha to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) *October* 21, 1854.

I INCLOSE to your Highness the copy of a memorandum drawn up by Count Coronini, and sent to the Commission, composed of Austrian officers and Boyars, for making the necessary arrangements for lodging and supplying the Austrian forces in the Principalities, in order that it might be discussed therein. It will appear by that memorandum that it is demanded that the lodgings, stabling, candles, wood, hay, beds and bedding, and other furniture, &c., required for the Austrian soldiers, officers, and horses, should be supplied gratis by the inhabitants. Although this question has not been decided yet, the demand is in opposition to the proclamation just issued by me, and will cause a commotion among the inhabitants. I will continue to keep your Highness informed on this subject, having stated thus much for your information.

Inclosure 5 in No. 449.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Translation.) *October* 21, 1854.

AS most of the Wallachian authorities—perhaps all of them—are Russian partisans and traitors to the Porte, Dervish Pasha sought to change them through Prince Stirbey, and having approved of some of the men in office at Bucharest, they were appointed. The Prince, disregarding the Pasha's opinion, appointed others conformably with his own, and made changes. Some were confirmed in office, and however much the Pasha endeavoured to have them changed, it was decided that they should be confirmed in office, as there were no other suitable persons to take their place. Dervish Pasha reported me the above information, and added, that out of respect to Prince Stirbey, and not to give him cause of offence, he had approved of the appointment of his brother-in-law, as "Postelnik" for Affairs. It would have been more appropriate if all the appointments had been made with the Pasha's sanction; he states that the "Ispetar Herisco," the Head of Police, and the Comptroller Otodelasiaus, who were confirmed in office, being notoriously Russian partizans, it was highly expedient that they should be dismissed, and would be also advantageous to the Prince. Dervish Pasha went again to the Prince, and spoke to him on the subject, and Stirbey called on me yesterday, and opened the conversation by saying that he begged I would not be hostile to him, but be his sincere friend. I said, if the Prince would change the Ministers who surrounded him, and those in the districts who were known partizans of Russia, and appoint honest men and well-wishers to the Porte in their place, I would be his best friend, but if he confirmed them in office I could not be friendly towards him.

The Prince replied, "Yes, the Ministers have been changed, but as there was no one fit to fill the office of 'Spathar,' Head of Police and Contrôleur, who have been confirmed, you choose some one, and we will change them."

I proposed that as there was no one capable of filling the office of Head of the Police, that as it would not be suitable unless all those who came forward from among the army could be distinguished from each other, and that none of them could be appointed, as they were avowed Russian partisans, his son in Paris being young, with the rank of Colonel, belonging to no party, acquainted with the high position which the Porte held in European estimation, should be

appointed to the office in question to begin with; and if he acted judiciously, and conducted himself faithfully and zealously towards the Porte, he would, I hoped, endeavour to get promoted.

The Prince replied that his son knew that all he possessed was acquired under the auspices of His Majesty, and he hoped his son would render good service to the Porte; but that he was sent to Paris for the sole purpose of being educated, that it required another half-year to complete that object, that it would not be proper to interrupt his studies, and that he could not therefore permit him to return from Paris at present.

I observed to the Prince that I was of the same opinion, but that it was not requisite to recall his son now, that the place might be held by deputy.

The Prince returned an unfavourable answer. Having appointed one of the Colonels of the Wallachian Militia to be "Vice-Postelnik" for Affairs, however unworthy to fill that office, he may be said to be the best of the lot, that is, he has done less mischief than the others, and I therefore assented to his appointment. The Controleur Otodelashus is a very bad man, but this does not exactly come under my competency. Dervish Pasha is, moreover, conducting matters very ably, and these things can be looked to later without entering now into trivial discussions. Our dispute was therefore brought to a close here, and we shall by degrees come to the settlement of more important matters still.

With reference to my despatch of the 28th September, and to your Highness' reply, requiring the enrolment and services of a body of Wallachian volunteers, I discussed the means of carrying this into operation with the Prince. He observed that, if the volunteers were to be enrolled now, it would require a long time to assemble and drill them properly.

I replied that the real object of the Porte, in incurring the burden of this war against Russia, was to save the two Principalities from Russian occupation and secure the repose of the people; that it was clear that this object was attained, and that as the people, sensible of the humane and upright rule of their legitimate Sovereign, were anxious to show their devotion and tender their services to the Porte, he, the Prince, ought also to evince his attachment and zeal in this matter. I said, if other troops were levied, the Wallachian militia, who had completed their period of service, might be called under arms, and that, by adding them to the 5,000 troops now under arms, it would constitute a body of 10,000 men; that is, twelve battalions of Infantry, and two regiments of Cavalry, forming one division. That I would then ask the Porte to grant me a battery of Horse Artillery and two of Foot Artillery; that the "Dorobacey" and a body of select police could look to internal order, and the division in question be employed wherever the Porte thought proper.

The Prince agreed to this plan, and we both decided that it should be so. With reference to the clothing, arms, and other necessaries for the troops to be so called under arms, and for other incidental expenses, it was agreed that the monasteries here, which possess enormous wealth and revenues, should contribute to their assistance. It was also thought desirable that some of the sons of the nobility who were volunteers should be joined to the army with the rank of Ensign and Captain, which was approved by me.

If this scheme meet with your Highness' approbation, and His Majesty the Sultan's sanction; if Prince Stirbey keeps to his word, and has not been deceiving me with idle talk, and holds firm to the execution of the project, it might be undertaken in due time, and completed in early spring. I request to have your Highness' orders with reference to discussing the raising of a similar division in Moldavia with those authorities.

If His Majesty approves of these two divisions being raised and organized, they might be united to a division of Ottoman troops, and placed all three under the command of a Mushir at one place, and employed wherever required.

Although Abdi Pasha, ex-Mushir of the army of Anatolia, was not considered fitting for that command, the disorders which ensued there arose rather out of a want of harmony among the subordinate officers, than out of any ignorance on the part of Abdi Pasha. There is nothing to be said against him as an officer and engineer, and he might be advantageously employed. If His Majesty approved of it, the three divisions in question might be placed under Abdi Pasha's command, and attached to my army.

No. 450.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 28.*)

(No. 677.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 15, 1854.*

KNOWING the extreme importance which your Lordship attaches to the reinstatement of the Turkish army at Kars, I make no apology for transmitting the papers inclosed herewith, which I drew up myself from Colonel Williams' voluminous despatches, and submitted to the Turkish Ministers, with an instruction to M. Pisani, recommending the whole of that officer's demands and suggestions to their most serious and immediate attention.

Later portions of the same correspondence have been conveyed in a similar form and with similar recommendations to the Seraskier Pasha and his colleagues.

I am assured by M. Pisani that, on the side of the Turkish Ministers, there is every appearance of a sincere intention to comply with my demands. As soon as I am satisfied that the supplies are actually sent, and orders corresponding with the suggestions of Colonel Williams issued in stringent terms, I shall not fail to apprize your Lordship of so gratifying a result.

The subject being now relieved of much superfluous and exaggerated matter, the course is made clearer to Turkish apprehension; and I trust that the experience of last year, which certainly was painful enough in its most reduced proportions, will have its effect in contributing to the success of my endeavours, grounded on the strenuous exertions of Colonel Williams, and aided by the pecuniary supplies derived from the loan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 450.

Memorandum respecting the State of the Turkish Army at Kars.

September and October 1854.

Infantry.

In the muster-roll as given by the Generals of Division, the numbers fictitiously put down are—

1st Division	9,662	men & officers
2nd Division	8,243	,,
Reserve	4,669	,,
Total	22,574	,,

Men.—Disposable number in camp:

Regulars	7,200
Redif	3,400
	10,600
Add men off duty, sick	2,000
Encamped about an hour from Kars	2,000
Total	14,600

The 10,600 proved on "close inspection" of a healthy and soldier-like mien.

Arms.—The general appearance of the fire-arms and bayonets good; the greater part found on inspection to be in good order; mostly flints, but seven battalions with detonators, and three of Chasseurs with Minié rifles.

Accoutrements.—Pouches worn and leaky; black leather pouches, and bayonet-belts also much worn.

Wanted.—5,000 new pouches; 8,000 black leather ditto; 8,000 bayonet belts.

Wanted.—10,000 knapsacks, to be made at Constantinople; 20,000 pairs of shoes; 20,000 pairs of stockings; a quantity of shirts and drawers; 1,000 [qu. 10,000] tin cases.

In two divisions (Veli Pasha and Kerim Pasha), younger and more experienced officers wanted in their place.

Necessary to be put an end to.

Wanted.—2,000,000 of cartridges of each kind, according to the patterns transmitted.

Ammunition.—The soldier in action carries 60 rounds. The reserve in magazine amounts to 3,045,000 rounds.

Clothing.—Bad; ragged and threadbare. No cloth trousers for parade. No shoes and stockings fit for the climate in winter. Great want of shirts, drawers, and knapsacks. The latter which exist are cumbrous and embarrassing to the soldier. Tin cases few and worn.

Provisions.—Subsisted from hand to mouth. Only three days' subsistence in magazine.

General Officers.—The general officers incapable, and not trustworthy. They connive at the peculations so generally practised.

Drills.—Drilling most shamefully neglected.

Intrigues of Turkish and Polish officers. Much evil in consequence.

Bullets.—The percussion muskets in use carry a smaller ball than the rest of the arms, and the balls are wanting. Conical balls for the Chasseurs are also scarce. Specimens of both sent (see them).

Cavalry.

Represented at the inspection by Colonel Williams as four regiments, composed of 2,222 men, and 2,212 horses, when in fact there were six regiments, composed, as counted on the spot, of only 1,568 men.

Numbers.—Regulars at head-quarters, 2,168; attached to artillery, 250. Total 2,418. Of whom 250 are dismounted.

Clothes and Accoutrements.—In a wretched plight as to clothing and accoutrements.

Horses.—Horses small, and in bad condition, but active, though very weak. Only one oke of barley given instead of three, and latterly two.

Saddlery and shabraes very bad.

Swords.—Short and inefficient. Carbines short and bad, and supported by the right hand, so as to prevent the use of the sword.

General Officers, &c.—The General Officers and Colonels ought to be removed, particularly Hussein, Ahmet, and Mustapha Pashas.

Wanted.—5,000 cloaks, 5,000 pairs of boots, and 5,000 valises.

Wanted.—5,000 sabres like those used by the British Light Cavalry; 5,000 carabines, like the same in British service.

Wanted.—Substitutes for Hussein Pasha, Ahmet Pasha, and Mustapha Pasha.

Artillery.

Generally efficient.

Guns.—6 batteries of Horse Artillery, 36 guns, of which 5 batteries 5-pounders, 1 battery 15-pounders, howitzers. 7 batteries of Foot Artillery, 42 guns; of which 5 batteries 9-pounders
1 ditto 12 ditto
1 ditto 24 ditto, howitzers.
6 mountain guns, 12-pounders; in all, 84 guns.

In tolerable working condition.

Horses.—6 horses to each gun and waggon, 8 ditto to heavier guns, with the gun detachments of the Horse Artillery; in all, 1,962 horses.

Wanted.—500 well-drilled Artillerymen from here; 168 pair of horses from Constantinople. Horses are cheated of their provender, receiving only 2 to 3 okes a-day, while 4 okes are charged by the officers.

Men.—Batteries manned by 1,822 men, 450 of whom taken from the Cavalry and Redif. Artillerymen only 1,372. No reserve horses; each gun should have a pair, fully harnessed.

Ammunition.—80 rounds for heavy, 120 ditto for light guns, now there. Reserved in magazine, enough for 400 each gun, including the preceding numbers already in the limbers and waggons.

Harness.—Wants repairing, but its state does credit to Tahir Pasha.

Wanted.—4,000 pairs of boots, with spurs attached; 4,000 pairs of stockings; besides the usual winter clothing.

Clothing.—In a wretched state. No cloth trousers, nor boots fit to appear in.

Tahir Pasha.—Speaking in high terms of him. It was owing to him that the Russians suffered loss at Kooruk Dereh.

Siege Guns.—12 siege guns arrived, 400 rounds for each, some of which at Erzeroom. 250 rounds of shot and shell for the field-pieces, guns, and howitzers respectively; also 50 rounds of case-shot per gun; 10 ditto of carcasses. A large quantity of powder in the fortress. Stores damp.

Magazines.—Good, except at the entrance, which is dangerous. The ammunition well packed up. Small stores in good order.

Forts and Defences.—Not amiss; but requiring one or two eminences to be crowned with field-works. Looks to the Mushir for this.

Accommodations.—Kars cannot accommodate more than 10,000 within its walls, so as to avoid danger from disease. It would be very desirable to have European officers for overlooking the drills and sanitary arrangements during the winter. No attention paid by the Turks to practice in ball-firing; a most essential thing.

Wanted.—One officer of our Artillery; one officer of Engineers; one Rifle officer.

Tents and Kitchens.—Men much neglected as to their comforts. The great copper cauldrons dangerous from want of tinning. Butter rancid and

Wanted,—A medical staff, with authority to take the direction of the hospitals, under firman.

An ample supply of medicines, fireplaces for warmth and ventilation.

Improvement in the bread.

musty—as bad as possible—though used for *pilaff*.

Represented to the Mushir, who, for the first time, sent officers to inspect and rectify these crying evils. The Mushir never has inspected the place himself.

Accommodations in Kars.—Room for the numbers in general, sufficient for the Artillery divisions; but the filth of the town, and the squalid and diseased state of the inhabitants, whose tenements are to be occupied, they being obliged from necessity, though many sick of typhus, to turn out, quite appalling.

Representations made to the Mushir.

Military Hospitals.—In many respects better than could have been expected. Deficient in management, medicines, and fire-places.

[See Dr. Sandwith's Report, inclosed with Colonel William's No. 18.]

Bashi Bazouks.—Still under arms about 800; though Zarif Mustapha Pasha reckons them at 1,500.

Their conduct has not been exaggerated in point of atrocity. Their muster-roll is a continued source of peculation and profit to the Mushir and their chiefs. The number once borne on the muster-roll was 10,000; never, in truth, more than 6,000.

Résumé of the actual numbers of the army of Kars; called 40,000 men.

Infantry - -	14,600	horses.
Cavalry - -	1,568	2,212
Artillery - -	1,372	1,962
Total - -	17,540	4,174
Irregulars or Bashi Bozouks - -	800	
Grand Total -	18,340	

Considerably under 20,000 men, and not amounting to half the originally stated number.

Zarif Mustapha Pasha.—Censured in strong terms, in common with the two Generals of Division, Kerim Pasha and Vely Pasha, as having committed enormous frauds, worthy of severe punishment.

Considering the negligence and frauds of the Pasha, it is the more surprising that he should have decided in giving battle to the Russians in the open field, with small numbers and diminished strength, the Russians being so superior in discipline; as shown on the part of the Infantry in sustaining a terrible and destructive fire, and on that of the Cavalry in

riding down and destroying all that opposed it.

Harvest.—Greatly damaged by frost and hail. Supplies to be obtained from a distance. Has applied to the Pasha of Erzeroom.

The troops are 22, 18, and 15 months in arrear of pay.

No purchase of small comforts and necessaries, such even as tobacco, to be made by the soldiers. The Redifs can send nothing to their families.

Desertion in consequence frequent.

Maimed soldiers, wounded in battle, begging their bread. Common humanity require that they should be pensioned. Surely the Sultan's well-known munificence will step in to their relief. An Imperial firman to that effect would do wonders for the next campaign.

The Pashas allow soldiers to unroof the houses for timber to burn rather than seek it in the woods which abound.

From this and other causes the distresses of the peasantry are great, and require attention and relief.

Of what little money has been sent to the army much would seem not to have reached it. What did reach it was almost entirely paper, causing great inconvenience and loss to the soldiers, and also inconvenience to the shopkeeper, so great as to induce him sometimes to close his shop.

By retaining the specie, and issuing paper, the Civil Administration gains at the expense of the army, and the consequences may well be conceived.

The paper is at 20 per cent. discount.

12,000 great coats, which had belonged to deceased men, made away with.

The Mushir and other principal officers reap this hoard of death.

Officers.—Drunkenness prevails to a great degree among those of higher rank.

It is most important for the state and safety of the army, that this vice should be stopped.

Cowardice was shown on the field of battle by many.

Kadri Bey, and

Koord Mustafa Bey, fled at Koorook Dereh, with their whole staff, at the first onset. The consequence was, that more than two-thirds of each of their regiments were taken prisoners, and sent into Russia.

Those who are most strongly recommended for their good conduct are:

Wanted:—

1. To pay up the arrears.
2. To pay up in specie.
3. To furnish meat, &c., by the Commissariat, and not by the Colonels, who make a trade of it.
4. More control over the baking department, in which the bread is adulterated, ill-made, and ill-baked, causing defeat by illness and weakness.
5. Great coats.

6th Arabistan Regiment.
5th Anatolian Regiment.

Arabistan Artillery.	Tahir Pasha,
Colonel 1st Regiment of Arabistan Infantry.	Hussein Bey,
Colonel 6th Regiment Anatolian Rediff.	Zakarieh Bey,
Lieutenant-Colonel Anatolian Artillery.	Ibrahim Bey.

Two additional and fuller lists are attached to this précis.

No. 451.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1,425.)

Paris, November 27, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1,142 of the 23rd instant, inclosing copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the means proposed by the Porte for preventing future disagreements in regard to the administration of the Principalities, and to the proceedings of the Commanders of the Austrian and Turkish troops, and desiring me to ascertain what instructions the French Government proposed to give upon the subject, I have the honour to state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys coincides in the opinion expressed by your Lordship in the same despatch that the Commissioners at Vienna should not be unduly interfered with.

His Excellency proposes instructing M. Benedetti to inform the Porte that they have mistaken the objects which the three Governments had in view in desiring to establish, in concert with the Ottoman Government, a Commission or Board at Vienna; that there was no intention of discussing any question concerning the sovereignty of the Sultan, or the administration of the Principalities; nor, indeed, any other desire but that of facilitating the operations of the war by rectifying any misunderstandings that might arise between the Generals commanding the Austrian and Ottoman forces, and that this could be more easily accomplished at Vienna than at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 452.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 382.)

Foreign Office, November 28, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Baron de Bruck, respecting the position of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the causes of complaint which the Porte has against them.

Count Buol states that he is far from intending to advocate the cause of those Princes, and he declares that Austria has no other wish than to see the administration of the Principalities confided to men of ability who are worthy of the Sultan's confidence; but his Excellency expresses a hope that the proceedings against Prince Stirbey will be conducted in a spirit of justice and impartiality, and that the report of the Turkish Commissioner will be communicated to the Austrian Government.

Count Buol further expresses a hope, that if upon this subject, as well as upon other questions concerning the affairs of the Principalities, an agreement cannot be obtained at Constantinople, the Porte will not object to refer them to the Commission at Vienna.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, and again told him my reasons for thinking that the return of Prince Stirbey to his former government was an unfortunate event for the Principalities, and I took the liberty of strongly recommending that he should not be upheld by the Austrian Government, if the report of the Turkish Commissioner was adverse to him.

I said that all matters connected with the Austrian occupation of the Principalities and the requirements of the Austrian army, might with advantage be referred to the Commissioners at Vienna; but that the case was different when a question arose so nearly affecting the sovereign rights of the Sultan as the deposition of a Hospodar and the appointment of his successor, and that a settlement of such questions elsewhere than at Constantinople could not be attempted without impairing the power and lowering the dignity of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 453.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 755.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 677 of the 15th instant, in which you report the steps taken by you to call the attention of the Porte to the suggestions offered by Colonel Williams for the improvement of the Turkish army at Kars.

I have to state to you that I approve of your proceedings in this matter, and that Her Majesty's Government hope that measures will be taken for at length abandoning the systematic neglect with which the army at Kars has been treated, and of which up to this moment no explanation has been received by Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government place entire confidence in the reports of Colonel Williams, and when they find that the most shameless robbery existed in every department; that the soldiers were deprived of their proper rations, because their officers cheated them; that even on the 25th of October, the authorities at Erzeroom were issuing daily 33,000 rations for a force that does not exceed 14,000 men; that the hospitals were generally in a miserable condition, the medicines of the worst or most useless kind, the surgeons who knew something of their profession rejected for men who knew nothing of it, but had bought their places; that Zarif Pasha is now leaving his command gorged with plunder; that habitual and notorious drunkenness prevailed amongst the officers to such an extent as to invite the enemy to surprise the army; that the soldiers were without proper clothing or shoes; that the cauldrons in which their food was cooked were in such a state as to render it poisonous; that the muster-rolls exceeded greatly, often one half, the numbers really present; and lastly, when there is reason to believe that nearly 18,000 men perished last year through the want of ordinary care and precautions, Her Majesty's Government cannot consider that there has been any superfluous or exaggerated matter in the reports which have reached them during the last twelve months, and respecting which they have so often and ineffectually remonstrated with the Turkish Government.

I am, &c

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 454.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 97.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, November 13, 1854.*

MY despatch No. 93 was hardly written when I received a summons to meet Omer Pasha yesterday at the French residence. I found his Highness and Colonel Dieu, the French Commissioner, already there.

His Highness was much agitated, and communicated to me a letter he had just received from Count Coronini from Jassy, wherein the Austrian General claims to circumscribe the movement of the Pasha to within a given rayon. I informed the Pasha that it was necessary I should be made acquainted with his letter to Count Coronini, and he accordingly last night he forwarded to me the inclosed copy of his letter. Your Lordship will also find annexed copy of Count Coronini's reply.

By yesterday's telegraph the Pasha requested M. Poujade to forward to Marshal Vaillant these documents, and the French Agent and myself by same opportunity sent them to Vienna with a request to our respective Ministers to forward them to Paris and London. There is a slight circumstance attending this letter of the Austrian General, to which Omer Pasha called the attention of the Agents. Marshal Vaillant's letter to Omer Pasha, inclosed in my No. 89, was of course communicated to the Vienna Cabinet. An aide-de-camp of Baron Hess arrived here with despatches for Count Coronini six days ago; the Count being at Jassy the courier followed him: thence Omer Pasha deduced that the instructions which he quotes "qui venaient de lui arriver dans le moment même" must have emanated from Vienna. I abstain from further remarks on this subject; meantime the bad weather having set in the very day of the move eastward of the troops, they had received orders to halt were they were—a halt which will now be indefinitely prolonged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 454.

Omer Pasha to Count Coronini.

(Traduction.)

Excellence, *Bucharest, le 6 Novembre, 1854.*

L'ARMEE Impériale Ottomane placée sous mon commandement est en mouvement et prendra position en Moldávie, où elle commencera ses opérations offensives contre le Pruth.

Comme une partie de cette armée sera dirigée en plusieurs colonnes par Buséo et Foxchani, je m'empresse de prier humblement votre Excellence de vouloir bien prendre les mesures nécessaires, afin que sur ces points où nos troupes sont cantonnées, les maisons et les écuries nécessaires soient mises à la disposition des colonnes en marche, qui se composent de deux bataillons d'Infanterie, avec une batterie de six canons.

Inclosure 2 in No. 454.

Count Coronini to Omer Pasha.

(Traduction.) *Jassy, le 9 Novembre, 1854.*

EN réponse à la note de votre Excellence du 6 Novembre, concernant les mouvements projetés de l'armée Impériale Ottomane placée sous ses ordres, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer à votre Excellence, qu'en ce qui concerne les opérations contre les Russes, au delà du Pruth, je ne suis pas autorisé à céder d'autre espace aux troupes Ottomanes que celui qui s'étend de Maximent, par Kornin, à Formosa, sur le Pruth.

Si votre Excellence demandait plus que je ne suis autorisé à concéder, j'ai l'honneur de la prier (d'après les instructions qui viennent de m'arriver dans le moment même), de s'adresser préalablement dans ce cas par une note officielle à l'Ambassade Impériale Ottomane à Vienne.

(Signé) CORONINI.

No. 455.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 438.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 22, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the receipt of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 21st instant, I immediately transmitted the numbers it contained for Lord Stratford to M. Fonblanque, with orders to forward them by Tatar to Constantinople.

I have the honour of transmitting herewith copies of the telegraphic despatches which I have addressed to your Lordship in the course of the week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 455.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 16, 1854.*

WE received by a telegraphic message this morning the letters of Omer Pasha and Count Coronini of the 6th and 9th instant, as to the movements of the Turkish troops towards Bessarabia. Although they were transmitted to us without any remark by the Consul-General Mr. Colquhoun, M. de Bourqueney and myself immediately waited upon Count Buol to inquire of him what was meant by the expressions of Count Coronini, which appeared to indicate that the road to Foxchani had been refused to Omer Pasha.

Count Buol assured us that that road not only had not been refused to the Ottoman troops, but that a telegraphic despatch just arrived announced that those troops, to the number of 10,000 men, were traversing Foxchani.

As to the terms of the letters of Count Coronini they were only the repetition of the instructions sent from Vienna, which had recorded the adherence of the Austrian Government to the original demands of Omer Pasha, and which for all further reclamation indicated the Commission of Vienna as the authority to be referred to. Omer Pasha has addressed no complaint to his Ambassador.

Inclosure 2 in No. 455.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 20, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has received a communication this day from Count Esterhazy from St. Petersburgh of the 17th, by telegraph, which announces that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh accepts the four guarantees as a basis of negotiation. This communication was immediately sent to Count Colloredo by Count Buol, who was anxious that you should not remain uninformed of this news from himself, although he does not attach much importance to it. Count Buol stated distinctly that he did not consider this communication ought in any way to interrupt the negotiations proceeding between our Governments.

No. 456.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 440.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 22, 1854.*

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 358 of the 14th instant, I asked Count Buol whether any wish had been expressed by the Turkish Government that Austria should contribute to the repression of the Montenegrins, and whether there would be any objection on his part to fulfil this wish if it should be found to be desirable so to do. Count Buol stated that he had no reason to oppose this wish, except from the principle that it was not desirable to occupy the territory of a neighbouring State without a proved necessity for such a measure. He believed that in some of the late transactions upon the Turkish and Montenegrine frontiers, there had been faults committed on both sides, and for his own part he had not failed to point out continually to the Prince of Montenegro the expediency of his remaining on good terms with the Government of the Porte. The Austrian Government, he said, had lately furnished the Pasha of Scutari with some ammunition which he required, and from the recent reports which he had received from those countries he was in hopes that the disturbances which had existed on their frontiers had now ceased.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 457.

Brigadier-General Du Plat to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 18, 1854.*

THE so oft reported "retreat behind the Pilica" on the part of the Russian troops stationed in the Kingdom of Poland, which supposed fact has, for some time past, played so prominent a part in the journalistic argumentations upon the real present state of the political relations between the Courts of Austria and Russia; that supposed fact, I say, is looked upon by military men here as of no real military importance, even if it were certain that it had taken place, the less so, as not the slightest intimation has ever been given of any corresponding retreat from the Austrian frontier on the left of the Russian position, between the Vistula and the Bug. But, I believe, the fact is, no retrograde movement whatsoever on the part of the Russians has been made.

In the official statement of the distribution and strength of the Russian forces

generally, which has been recently given to me, and of which I sent your Lordship (in my letter No. 9 of the 15th instant) a partial abstract relating to the Crimea, the force under Paskiewitch's command is mentioned at 180,214 men, with 572 guns, including 35,400 men and 56 guns newly formed reserves: 17,304 men, with 64 guns, of this total force are stationed in the Baltic Provinces, leaving in the Kingdom of Poland Proper, for active operations, 120,810 men, with 366 guns; 28,710 men, with 100 pieces of Artillery, form the centre of the present dislocation of this force, with head-quarters at Warsaw; 27,800 men, with 96 guns, form the left wing between the Bug and the Pilica, with the head-quarters at Lublin; and 28,900 men, with 104 guns, the right of this position between the Vistula and the Prussian frontiers, with head-quarters at Radom, a town still considerably in advance of the Pilica towards the Austrian frontier; and the accompanying very detailed exposition of the distribution of every part of the whole force will show that the extreme advanced Russian outposts towards the most vulnerable part of the Austrian frontier are still at Olkutz, Michalowice, and Czentochow. In short, the only real symptoms of a desire on the part of Russia to assume a less menacing attitude towards Austria is the halt of the Guards on their march, although the Emperor had so ostentatiously informed Count Esterhazy that these troops "furent expédiés à l'adresse directe de l'Autriche."

The extreme minuteness of the details given in the Austrian statement induces me to believe that they have excellent sources of information on the subject of the real strength of the Russian army, at least in such parts as come in contact with their own frontiers; nor is it surprising that such should be the case, considering the great stake the Austrians themselves now have in the question, and the comparative facility they possess, through the similarity of the idioms spoken by the inhabitants of the limitroph provinces of the two States for acquiring such information.

I beg leave, therefore, to point out to your Lordship on this occasion that the strength of the Guards destined for Poland is stated at only 28,780 men, with 104 guns; whereas, in almost every other report emanating from continental authorities, I have seen it estimated at nearly double, nay, in some, at almost three times that amount.

Including these Guards at the figure just stated, and the troops, principally Cavalry, amounting to 5,440 men, with 16 guns, in Volhynia near Sutzk; besides the force in Podolia of 7,880 men, with 32 guns (all of which your Lordship will find detailed with great precision in my inclosure), the total force of Paskiewitch amounts to 180,214 men, with 572 guns. The whole of the reserves, I perceive, is allotted to the fortresses, and these troops cannot, therefore, be supposed to be in a very effective state. Moreover, I observe, that such garrisons are sent back as far as Bobowick and Vilna, and that, therefore, this very great position of Paskiewitch's present army is not very available for aggressive purposes. It is also of great importance to our own and our allies' interests in the Crimea, and in the south of Russia generally, to know that Paskiewitch has declared he cannot spare a single man if he is to be expected successfully to maintain his position against the preparations and demonstrations which Austria has already effected along the whole line of the Russian frontier.

In another part of the repeatedly mentioned Austrian statement of the Russian forces, it appears also that Count Ostensacken (with his head-quarters at Kicheneff) has in Bessarabia 44,720 men, with 120 guns, composed of the 6th, 8th, and 9th Divisions of Infantry, the 4th Light Cavalry Division, and of the battalion of Sappers and of Sharpshooters belonging to his own corps, besides three pulks of Cossacks. Further it is mentioned that General Lüders on the Lower Danube, with head-quarters at Ismail, has the 7th, 10th, and 15th Divisions of Infantry, the 3rd and 5th Light Cavalry Divisions, the 5th Sharpshooters and 5th Sapper battalions, besides eight pulks of Cossacks, under his command, and composing a force of 50,240 men, with 180 pieces of Artillery.

The numbers of these Divisions, and numbers of those (11th, 12th, and 14th,) which have been lately sent to the Crimea, comprises the whole strength of the army formerly assembled along the Danube and the Principalities under the command of Gortchakoff and Paskiewitch, except the 13th Division, which has been from the beginning in the Caucasus; and as it is known that the 12th Division (Liprandi's), the 10th Division (Lüders' corps), as may be inferred from the death of its Commander, General Solmonoff, have already taken part in the

contest against us, nay, that even a part of the 15th Division, under General Engelhardt, has already been brought against the allies in those parts, and that at least one half of the 7th Division, General Uschakoff, is detained in the small fortresses on the Lower Danube, it is not likely that any more important reinforcements can be sent by the Russians to the Crimea further to increase the difficulties of the final success of the allied arms in the Tauride Peninsula, as I ventured to express in my last despatch.

I am, indeed, in hopes that such parts of the 11th and of the 14th Divisions as I mentioned being still at great distances from that scene of action must have received counter orders, or have been otherwise impeded from prosecuting their march.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GUST. DU PLAT.

P.S.—The Russian official account of the battle of Balaklava of the 5th instant, distinctly states the presence of General von Dannenberg, as commanding in that sanguinary action, and enumerates the three Divisions (10th, 11th, and Liprandi's 12th Division). It is evident, therefore, that the whole of the 4th corps d'armée, with the exception of its Division of Light Cavalry, which appears is attached to the immediate command of Ostensacken in Bessarabia, has already been brought into action against the allies.

G. DU P.

Inclosure in No. 457.

Exposition of the Russian Forces under the command of Field-Marshal Paskiewitch; according to information derived from Austrian official sources, dated end of October, 1854.

	Men.	Guns.
These forces consist of two grand and distinct descriptions of troops. (I.) Troops fit for active service are comprised of 2 Divisions of the Corps d'Armée of Grenadiers; of the whole of the 1st Corps d'Armée; of the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 2nd Corps d'Armée; of 8 Regiments of the 1st Corps of Cavalry Reserve; also of 8 Pulks of Don Cossacks, with 2 Cossack batteries; 6 troops of Irregular Light Horse (Circassians); and of 8 troops of the Cossacks of the Guard, with 4 guns; giving a total of	144,814	516
Add to these (II.) as a "Reserve," the Reserve Brigades of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions; the 1st Sapper Reserve Battalion; and also the 1st and 2nd Don Reserve Battalions	35,400	56
Total	180,214	572

Of the above there are stationed in the—

A.—*Province of Curland*, 17,304 men, 64 guns.

	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
1. Of the 2nd Infantry Division,						
At Riga, Infantry Regiment "Prince of Prussia"	3,470	12				
" The Light Infantry Regiment "Reval"	3,460	12				
At Mitau, Light Infantry Regiment "Esthonia"	3,400	12				
At Dünaburg, Infantry Regiment "Prince Charles of Prussia"	3,400	12				
			13,600	48		
2. At Telsch and Tauroggen, of the 1st Light Cavalry Division, the Lancer Brigade	2,120	8				
At Mitau, Hasenjoorth, and Rutzau, the Hussar Brigade of Major-General Weiss	2,120	8				
			4,240	16		
3. At various points of the Coast, the 44th Pulk of Don Cossacks,			600	0		
					17,304	64

B.—*In the Kingdom of Poland, with Head-Quarters at Warsaw*, 120,810 men, 356 guns.

I. Corps for active operations.

	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
(a.) The Centre. Head-Quarters at Warsaw:—				
1. In Warsaw, the 1st Brigade of 2nd Grenadier Division, at 3 battalions of 800 each with 2 batteries of 12 guns = 5,200 men, 24 guns; the Grenadier Sapper Battalion, 800; No. 3 Pulk of Don Cossacks, 600; the Provisional Don Cossack Instructional Regiment, 600; the Don Cossack Horse Artillery Battery No. 1, 200 men, 8 guns; 1 Division of the Provisional Caucasian Irregular Regiment, 300	7,700	32		
2. At Lowicz, the 2nd Brigade of 2nd Grenadier Division	5,000	12		
3. At Plotzk, the 3rd Grenadier Division	10,000	36		
4. At Lenschitz, Kutno, Konin, and Sieradz, 7th Light Cavalry Division, 3,840; and at Kolo, the 7th Horse Artillery Brigade, 400 men, 16 guns	4,240	16		
5. At Sochatschew, the Division of Trans-Caucasian Musulmans	300	0		
6. At Platschina, the 2nd Division of the Regiment of Life-Guard Cossacks, 600; and the 3rd Division of the Don Cossack Life-Guard Battery, 70 men, 4 guns	670	4		
7. At Mogielnica, the 1st and 3rd Division of the Atamanki Cossack Regiment	600	0		
			28,710	100
(b.) The Right Wing, in the Government of Radom:—				
1. In Przedborg on the Pilica, the 1st Infantry Division	12,600	48		
2. In Radom, the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, 6,400 men, 24 guns; of the 1st Sapper Battalion, 800	7,200	24		
3. In Skalmierz, of the 1st Sapper Battalion	800	0		
4. In Kielce, the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, 6,400 men, 24 guns, of which 1 Regiment is in Sandomirz; the Don Cossack Regiment No. 8, 600; with the Don Cossack Horse-Artillery Battery No. 8, 200 men, 8 guns	7,200	32		
5. In Kalisch, of the Irregular Brigade of Trans-Caucasian Musulmans, the Division	300	0		
6. In Czentochow, Olkusz, and Michaelowice, 1 Pulk of Don Cossacks, No. 24				
			28,000	104
(c.) The Left Wing in the Government of Lublin:—				
1. In Lublin, the 4th Infantry Division, 12,800 men, 48 guns; in Opole, 2 Battalions of Sharpshooters, 300	13,100	48		
2. In Krasnistow, the 5th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade in Bilgorai	12,800	48		
3. In Ivangorod, 2 Battalions of Sappers, 800; and in Tomaschew, the Pulk of Cossacks No. 14, 600	1,400	0		
			27,800	96

II. Reserve Forces in the Fortresses.

1. In Warsaw, 4 Reserve Battalions of the 5th Infantry Division, 3,600 men, 8 guns; the Reserve Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division, 6,800 men, 8 guns; and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Don Cossack Reserve, 400 men, 16 guns	10,800	32				
2. In Nowogiorgiewsk, 4 Reserve Battalions of the 6th Reserve Brigade, 3,400; the 1st Reserve Sapper Battalion, 800	4,200	0				
3. In Brzese-Litewski and Ivangorod, the Reserve Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division	6,800	8				
4. In Zamosc, the Reserve Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division	6,800	8				
5. In Bobruisk and Wilna, the Reserve Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division	6,800	8				
			35,400	56		
					120,810	356

C.—*In Volhynia*, 5,440 men, 16 guns.

1. In Sutzk, Horochow, Parschin, and Milzatin, the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Light Cavalry Division; the Regiment of Hussars "Archduke Charles Lewis," 960; and at Dubienko, the Horse-Artillery Battery No. 4, 200 men, 8 guns			1,160	8		
The Hussar Regiment "Olga Nicolajewna," 960; Staffin Wladimirz and in Molniki			960	0		
2. The 1st Brigade with the 3rd Battery is still in the Government of Lublin, at Krasnystow			2,120	8		
3. In Krzemenice and Radziwillow, the 51st Pulk of Cossacks; and in Druskopol and Porjelsk, on the Bug, another Pulk of Cossacks			1,200	0		
			5,440	16		

	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
D.—*In Podolia* (the 1st Corps, Cuirassiers, of Cavalry Reserve, with exception of the Reserve Lancer Division, which is in the Crimea), 7,880 men, 32 guns.				
1. In Proskurow, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Cuirassier Division (at 135 per squadron); with the 16th Light Horse-Artillery Battery, 200 men, 8 guns	1,620	8		
2. In Nowaja, Uschitza, and Lytniewetz, the 1st Brigade of Cuirassiers; with the 15th Cossack Horse-Artillery Battery, 200 men, 8 guns ..	1,820	8		
3. In Mohilew, the 2nd Cuirassier Division; with the 17th Cossack Horse-Artillery Battery, and 18th Light Horse-Artillery Battery.	3,640	16		
4. On the Zbrutsch, at Huken, Krykow, Schydlowice, and Kuzmenezik, the 19th Pulk of Don Cossacks	600	0		
			7,880	32
E.—*On the March, of the Corps of Guards*, 28,780 men, 104 guns.				
According to the best information possessed these troops are to be distributed as follows; the 1st Infantry Division at Suwalki; the 2nd at Wilna, in Lithuania; and the 1st Light Cavalry Division of the Guards at Slonim, in the Government of Grodno.				
1. The 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions of the Guards, at 3 Battalions of 850 men per Regiment; with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Pioneer; 4th and 5th Light Batteries, at 200 men, 12 guns; the Battalion of Sappers, and the Battalion of Sharpshooters, at 800	21,600	72		
2. The Division of Cuirassiers, 24 squadrons at 120 = 2,880; with the Mounted Pioneers, and the Light Battery of Artillery No. 1, 500 men, 16 guns; and the Mounted Pioneer Division of the Life-Guards, 300	3,780	16		
3. The 1st Light Cavalry Division of the Guards, 18 squadrons at 120 = 2,160; with the Light Horse-Artillery Battery No. 2, of the Life-Guards, and the Don Cossack Battery of Life-Guards, 500 men, 16 guns	2,700	16		
4. The Czernamorie Division of Life-Guards, 400; and the Ural Cossack Division of Life-Guards, 400; with the squadron of Crim-Tartar Life-Guards, 100	700	0		
			28,780	104
Consequently, Total of Troops for Active Operations and Reserves at the end of October (dated 14th November), 1854			180,214	572

Vienna, November 18, 1854.

No. 458.

Captain Conyers to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 11.)

Vienna, November 24, 1854.

My Lord,

BY desire of Brigadier-General Du Plat, and in reference to his letter No. 10 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to forward for your Lordship's information, the accompanying farther detail of the Russian forces in the Crimea, which has just been received from Field-Marshal Baron Hess.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES E. CONYERS.

Inclosure in No. 458.

Further Details relative to the Russian Forces in the Crimea, according to Information derived from Austrian Official Sources.

ACCORDING to the latest to be relied upon information, the 10th Infantry Division (10,000 men, and 48 guns), under the command of Lieutenant-General Soimonoff, who has been killed, forms part of the army in the Crimea. On the other hand, of the 14th Infantry Division, the 1st Brigade, 5,000 men and 24 guns, is the only one present in the Crimea, and this latter force is in Sebastopol.

No. 459.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 442.)

Vienna, November 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE this moment received the "Oesterreichische Correspondenz," which announces that an additional article to the Treaty between Austria and Prussia has been signed by Count Buol and Count Arnim, by which it is hoped that the differences existing in Germany upon the great European question may be allayed.

I have but one moment to catch the post, and am therefore forced to send this announcement in original, and without translation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 459.

Extract from the "Oesterreichesche Correspondenz" of November 26, 1854.

WE are in a position to communicate with the liveliest satisfaction, that the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Buol, has this moment (2 o'clock P.M.) signed, with the Royal Prussian Minister, Count Arnim, an Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th of April. This affords us the certainty that in addition to the complete understanding thus established between the two great German Powers as to their federal action, the impending decision of the Diet will be adopted by a majority bordering on unanimity, and that the influence of united Germany in the great European question now pending, will then have been secured and preserved.

No. 460.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 29, 9·15 A.M.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 28, 1854.*

THE French Ambassador had audience this day of the Emperor of Austria, to deliver a letter from the French Emperor. He informs me that His Imperial Majesty expressed great satisfaction at the cordial union that prevailed between the two Sovereigns. The French Ambassador replied by expressing the hope that the union of the two Courts was now about to be cemented by an act of the greatest importance. The Emperor of Austria assured him that he did not foresee anything likely to obstruct the conclusion of the alliance. The French Ambassador immediately afterwards repeated the conversation he had had with the Emperor to Count Buol, and from what passed between them [as well as from what] passed yesterday between myself and Count Buol, it does not appear that any obstruction is now likely to be opposed to the signature of the Treaty.

No. 461.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 29.*)

(No. 1,429.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 28, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a telegraphic despatch of the 24th instant, from Bucharest, announcing that the allied Commanders in the Crimea had written to request Omer Pasha to send 20,000 of his best troops to Varna, to hold themselves in readiness to embark for the Crimea. Under these circumstances M. Poujade inquires whether he is to support this demand, or to continue to engage Omer Pasha to advance towards the Pruth. He alludes, at the same time, to fresh difficulties raised by Generals Coronini and Augustini to the advance of the Ottoman army, force even having been talked of to prevent it. In transmitting this despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, M. de Bourqueney adds, that whatever decision the French Government may take, he hopes that it will not be influenced by the supposed hostility of the Austrian Generals to the advance of Omer Pasha's army, for that he can affirm that the road of Fokschani is open to the Ottoman troops.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has written to M. Poujade to state that the wishes of the Commanders in the Crimea must first be complied with, but that he does not see why Omer Pasha, after detaching 20,000 men for service in the Crimea, should not threaten the Russians on the Pruth with the remainder of his army, so as to induce the Russians, if possible, to cross the river, and involve themselves in hostilities with the Austrians, and he directs M. Poujade to keep this object always in view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY

No. 462.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 29.*)

(No. 1,430. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 28, 1854.*

AN Attaché in the Neapolitan Diplomatic service, whose name I have not yet learnt, has been transferred from St. Petersburgh to Paris, and having left the former of these capitals on the 13th instant, arrived here a few days ago.

It appears that before leaving St. Petersburgh this gentleman saw Count Nesselrode, who said to him that upon his arrival at Paris he would probably be questioned as to the sentiments and intentions of the Russian Government; that he might answer that Russia did not know why she was at war with France; that she was quite ready to make peace upon honourable conditions; that this could not be difficult if France was not bent on humiliating Russia; and that the events in the Crimea must have proved to France, that if such was her object it was not to be attained. If, however, it was the four points that France required, Count Nesselrode had no objection to accept them as the "point de départ" for negotiations for peace. The Russian Government had never objected to the points themselves, but to the manner in which they had been placed before them, which had until now rendered their acceptance impossible. Winter was now about to set in; a period of two months would elapse during which all military operations between the belligerents would from the nature of the climate become impossible. Count Nesselrode did not see why these two months should not be devoted to negotiations for peace.

M. Antonini, the Neapolitan Minister, thought proper to place this statement of Count Nesselrode before M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the form of a memorandum, and to press him for an answer upon it.

His Excellency stated to M. Antonini this morning, that although he had not been able to take the Emperor's orders, he might at once reply that this was not the first attempt made by the Russian Government to engage France in a separate negotiation to terminate the Eastern question, but that it would be well for Count Nesselrode to understand that any overtures for peace which he might think it expedient to make must be addressed simultaneously to the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Turkey; that any such overtures, however, to command success, must be far more explicit than that now made; and that he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) was convinced that the whole object of the Russian Government in making it was to gain time, and prevent the continuation of hostilities while the state of the roads in Russia rendered the passage of troops and ammunition difficult.

I said to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I saw from his answer that he considered the Neapolitan Minister to have been authorized to make a communication on the part of the Russian Government, and I inquired whether M. Antonini had stated as much.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that Count Nesselrode had certainly intended that his language should be brought to the knowledge of the Imperial Government, since he had added that he should write in the same sense to his son-in-law, M. de Seebach, who, your Lordship is aware, is Saxon Minister in Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 463.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,165.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,430, marked Confidential, of the 28th instant, on the subject of the overtures made to the French Government by Count Nesselrode, through the Neapolitan Ambassador at Paris; and I have to instruct your Excellency to thank M. Drouyn de Lhuys for making known to your Excellency this communication, which can only be looked upon as one of the periodical and underhand attempts of Russia to dissolve or weaken the alliance between France and England, by assuming that France is not hearty in the prosecution of the war, and that the interests of the two countries are not identical.

Her Majesty's Government feel that any expression of their complete confidence in the failure of all such attempts, come from what quarter they may, would be superfluous.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 464.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,166.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 1,429 of the 28th instant, relative to the instructions given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Representative at Constantinople, respecting the contemplated movements of Omer Pasha's troops in the Crimea and the Principalities, I have to instruct you to inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government concur in these instructions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 465.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul-General Colquhoun.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1854.*

I HAVE to instruct you to urge Omer Pasha to comply with any requisition he receives from the Commander-in-chief in the Crimea.

It would be advisable for the Pasha to harass the Russians and induce them to return to Moldavia, and thus engage in hostilities with Austria.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 466.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 441.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 26, 1854.*

YOUR Lordship will have learnt by my telegraphic despatch of this day, that a meeting took place yesterday evening at Count Buol's, upon the report made by the French Consul at Bucharest of the conduct of General Augustini. I will now give your Lordship a more detailed account of what took place.

Count Buol, after inquiring of the Turkish Ambassador if any complaint had reached him from Omer Pasha, and, being answered in the negative, asked General Hess if he had any reason for believing that General Augustini had (as reported by M. Poujade) addressed a letter to Omer Pasha refusing to permit the Turkish troops to pass the Sereth, and even threatening to oppose the attempt to do so.

General Hess replied that he had not heard of such a letter, and that it appeared to him that it could not have been written, for, in the first place, he had notice that the Turkish troops had passed the Sereth; next, the orders he had transmitted to Count Coronini were, to give up the whole country from Galatz to Formosa for the offensive operations Omer Pasha had announced his intention of undertaking against Bessarabia. Consequently, General Augustini's interference would be in direct opposition to those orders; and, thirdly, he (General Hess) had just received a report from Count Coronini, announcing that he had been in communication with Omer Pasha as to his passage through Formosa and his advance upon the Pruth, between the mouth of that river and Formosa. General Hess detailed the orders he had given to Count Coronini, and stated that he conceived that by the arrangements he had made, as to the passage into Bessarabia, he had met every wish Omer Pasha had expressed, namely, to have a free passage from Ibraila through Galatz to the Pruth. He added, that should Omer Pasha wish now to enter Bessarabia on any other point, and would transmit his wish through the Ambassador in Vienna, he (General Hess) would make such arrangements for his own troops as would be required to facilitate it. The Turkish Ambassador stated he had not received any notice of a desire of Omer Pasha's to that effect.

Baron Bourqueney and myself both represented that if such a letter as M. Poujade reported had been written by an Austrian Commander, it was in direct opposition to all which had been repeatedly declared to us by Count Buol, and which we had in full confidence and on his authority transmitted to our Governments. We therefore accepted the assurances now given by himself and General Hess, and I most strongly urged the censure which should mark the conduct of any Austrian officer using language for which he could not have received any authorization. I also took the opportunity of animadverting upon the letter by which Count Coronini announced to Omer Pasha the arrangements proposed by General Hess for the attack on Bessarabia, of which I had seen a copy. I stated that I could not but regret the tone in which it was written, which was anything but conciliatory, and I warmly urged the necessity of instructing all the Austrian Generals to use in their communications with Omer Pasha more courteous language, and to conform themselves to the spirit of friendly cooperation which existed between the four Governments and which characterized our present meeting.

It was then decided that General Hess should transmit M. Poujade's report to General Augustini, and should it appear that it was grounded on fact, we need not doubt its complete disavowal by the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 467.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 385.)

Foreign Office, November 30, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Baron de Bruck respecting the position of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the causes of complaint which the Porte has against them.

Count Buol states that he is far from intending to advocate the cause of those Princes, and he declares that Austria has no other wish than to see the administration of the Principalities confided to men of ability who are worthy of the Sultan's confidence; but his Excellency expresses a hope that the proceedings against Prince Stirbey will be conducted in a spirit of justice and impartiality, and that the report of the Turkish Commissioner will be communicated to the Austrian Government.

Count Buol further expresses a hope that if upon this subject, as well as upon other questions concerning the affairs of the Principalities, an agreement cannot be obtained at Constantinople, the Porte will not object to refer them to the Commission at Vienna.

I thanked Count Colloredo for this communication, and again told him my reasons for thinking that the return of Prince Stirbey to his former government was an unfortunate event for the Principality, and I took the liberty of strongly recommending that he should not be upheld by the Austrian Government, if the report of the Turkish Commissioner was adverse to him. I said that all matters connected with the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, and the requirements of the Austrian army might with advantage be referred to the Commission at Vienna; but that the case was different when a question arose so nearly affecting the sovereign rights of the Sultan as the deposition of a Hospodar and the appointment of his successor, and that a settlement of such questions elsewhere than at Constantinople could not be attempted without impairing the power and lowering the dignity of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 468.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 388.)

Foreign Office, November 30, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE read to Count Colloredo my despatch No. 373 to your Lordship, in answer to the inquiry of Count Buol respecting the objects of the war, and the conditions on which England and France would agree to the reestablishment of peace with Russia; and I requested him to convey, in distinct terms, to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government could neither directly nor indirectly be parties to any communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; but that if the Austrian Government, acting for itself and upon its own responsibility, thought fit again to propose the four bases to Russia, and, in the event of their being accepted, to invite England and France to enter upon negotiations, Her Majesty's Government would have a right, and I felt sure Count Buol would not contest that right, to be clearly informed in what sense they had been accepted. Her Majesty's Government, I said, cannot consent to enter upon any negotiation without having reasonable grounds to expect that it will lead to the just and honourable peace which is the object of the war. England and France, having no exclusive objects in view, and having taken up arms in

defence of European interests, will not lay them down until they obtain guarantees that shall guard, as far as human foresight can guard, against a recurrence of the events that have led to the present war; and Her Majesty's Government accordingly can have no concealment as to the guarantees which they consider indispensable to peace, reserving to themselves the unfettered right of proposing such further conditions as the events of war may render necessary. The same scrupulous good faith will be observed by Her Majesty's Government towards the enemy as towards the allies of England; and the Emperor of Russia shall not have it in his power to say that he has entered upon negotiation upon a misapprehension of the intentions of England and France, or the true character of the conditions upon which they are determined to insist.

Count Buol, on the other hand, I said, could not wish to enter upon a negotiation that might be abruptly terminated in an hour by irreconcileable differences between the negotiators, and it would therefore be for his Excellency, in the communications that he might see fit to hold with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, not alone to ascertain how the four bases are understood by the Emperor of Russia, but also clearly and distinctly to explain the interpretation given to them by England and France. If that interpretation is admitted *bonâ fide* and without reserve by Russia, and an assurance to that effect can be given by Count Buol, then the objections entertained by Her Majesty's Government against negotiation at this moment, will be removed; always, however, with the understanding that Her Majesty's Government is not bound to consent to an armistice during any negotiations that may take place.

I subsequently in general terms discussed with Count Colloredo the construction put upon the four bases by Her Majesty's Government, which, as we had every reason to believe, was in harmony with that given to them also by the Cabinet of Vienna; but in order to obviate future misunderstanding upon points of grave importance, I shall now in a more precise form place on record the intentions with which Her Majesty's Government on the 8th of August exchanged notes with the Austrian Government, and the meaning which they attach to the four bases as the starting points of negotiation; and this course becomes the more necessary, as since my despatch No. 373 was written, Her Majesty's Government have learnt that the bases have been accepted by Russia.

The policy of Austria, England, and France, as announced in these notes, is to attach the existence of the Ottoman Empire to the general equilibrium of Europe; and they accordingly declare their opinion, that relations cannot be reestablished between the Sublime Porte and the Imperial Court of Russia on solid and durable bases, unless—

First. The Protectorate hitherto exercised by the Imperial Court of Russia over the Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, shall cease for the future; and the privileges granted by the Sultans to these provinces dependent on their Empire be placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers, in virtue of an arrangement to be concluded with the Sublime Porte, and of which the dispositions should, at the same time, regulate all questions of detail.

The guarantee of the Powers, which it is proposed to substitute for the Protectorate of Russia in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, differs widely from the system under which those provinces have of late years suffered. The object is to guarantee the privileges which have been granted to them by the Sultans, together with other rights which it may be desirable to extend to them; and this object is European, and is sought for in the same spirit that dictated the notes of August 8; for it is manifestly a European interest to create upon the Danube a barrier against Russian encroachments: but it is not by foreign Protectorates, it is not by a renewal of the Treaties of Jassy, Bucharest, Ackerman, and Adrianople, that Governments possessing freedom of action can be established, or the Pruth again become the boundary of Russia, instead of the Danube, to which of late years her power and influence have in reality been extended.

Secondly. Unless the navigation of the Danube to its mouths be freed from all obstacle, and subjected to the application of the principles recorded in the Acts of the Congress of Vienna.

Experience has shown to what obstructive purposes Russia has turned her possession of the mouths of the Danube; and the free navigation of that river will best be secured by a general Treaty, and the creation of some authority

invested with power for the effectual removal of the obstacles that have purposely been allowed to accumulate.

Thirdly. Unless the Treaty of 1841 be revised in concert by all the High Contracting Parties in the interest of European equilibrium.

The object is to give effect to the policy of the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841, which is recorded in its preamble, and thereby to carry out the intentions announced in the notes of August 8, to attach the existence of the Ottoman Empire to the general system of Europe. It is intended that the maritime preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea shall cease; that political and commercial agents shall there, as elsewhere, be established; and that the vast military and naval establishments of Russia, which could only be required for purposes of aggression, shall no longer endanger the existence of Turkey nor menace the peace of Europe.

Fourthly. Unless Russia abandons her claim to exercise an official Protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, to whatever rite they may belong; and Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, mutually concur to obtain, by the initiation of the Ottoman Government, the recognition, establishment, and observance of the religious privileges of the several Christian communities, and turn to account, for the common interest, the generous intentions manifested by His Majesty the Sultan, without injury to his dignity or the independence of his Crown.

The intention of the three Powers is clearly expressed in this Article, and requires no further elucidation; but in order to give full effect to it Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, as all Treaties between Russia and the Porte have been annulled by war, the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, and of other Treaties inconsistent with these bases, must not be renewed. It was by giving to the Treaty of Kainardji an interpretation that it did not bear, that the Emperor of Russia claimed a right of Protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Porte that no Sovereign could submit to without a complete abdication of his independence; a pretension which, as is well known, would have enabled the Emperor of Russia to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects in temporal as in spiritual affairs, to arrest the progress of improvement, and in effect to exercise a power in the Sultan's dominions which the Sultan himself does not possess.

The Sultan has already given proofs of his enlightened desire to meet the views of the Christian Powers, and it will be their duty to aid him by their counsels, to procure the redress of acknowledged wrongs, and to prepare the way for a system which shall place under the same laws the people of different origin and creeds who now co-exist in Turkey.

Having now explained the manner in which the bases of negotiation contained in the notes of the 8th of August are regarded by Her Majesty's Government, it only remains for me to add that Her Majesty's Government have every reason to believe that their views are in accordance with those of the Cabinet of Vienna; and it will be to them a cause of much satisfaction if, on reading this despatch to Count Buol, your Lordship should find that there do not exist any important points of difference between the two Governments.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 469.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 389.)

Foreign Office, November 30, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 26th instant, and Mr. Colquhoun's despatch No. 97, which passed through your Lordship's hands under flying seal, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with pain and surprise that a determination to obstruct the movements of the Turkish army appears to exist on the part of the Austrian Generals. Explanations have been repeatedly asked of the Austrian Government, assurances have been received that no such intention existed, and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that orders in conformity with such assurances were duly sent, although they appear to have been invariably disregarded.

The question, however, is one of serious importance, and it must be definitively solved, for it not only involves the good faith of Austria, but effects the operations of the allies in the Crimea.

The army of Omer Pasha has for several months remained inactive, and it was the desire of the Porte, of the English and French Governments, and of the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces, that a diversion should be made by the Turkish army, and that an offensive movement towards Bessarabia should serve to check the sending of the reinforcements which the Russians have poured into the Crimea; but so far from this movement having been assisted, as it was natural to expect, by the Austrian Generals while occupying a portion of the Sultan's territory, and bound by Treaty to defend it against the Sultan's enemy, it has been absolutely prevented; and so lately as the 9th instant, General Coronini informed Omer Pasha, when about to cross the Pruth, that he was not authorized to let the Turkish troops pass beyond a proscribed limit, while more recently General Augustini is said to have forbidden their advance beyond the Sereth. A signal service has thus been rendered to the Emperor of Russia by the Austrian Government, and a disservice has been done to the allies that is hardly to be distinguished from an act of overt hostility.

The possibility of such a course being adopted by Austria, was foreseen by Her Majesty's Government, and stated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 301, and it was distinctly disavowed by the Austrian Government, as reported in your despatch No. 362; and Her Majesty's Government have now therefore an additional claim to ask for a frank explanation of the intentions of Austria. Your Lordship will therefore request Count Buol to state on what ground and by virtue of what right the movements of the Turkish army have been obstructed, whether precise orders will be given to the Austrian Generals not in any way to interfere with the operations of Omer Pasha, and whether the General who disobeys these orders will be immediately recalled.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—Since the above was written, I have received your Lordship's despatch No. 441; and whilst Her Majesty's Government learn from it with satisfaction that if it should appear that General Augustini has acted in the manner reported, he will be entirely disavowed by the Austrian Government, they think it right that their opinion on this subject should be made known to the Austrian Government, in order that effectual measures may be taken to prevent the recurrence of such acts on the part of Austrian officers in future. C.

No. 470.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 30.)

(No. 480. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 28, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has just mentioned to me, in strict confidence, that he had this day received intelligence from St. Petersburgh that the Emperor of Russia, on learning that Count Buol did not consider the four points submitted by Count Nesselrode in a despatch, an extract of which was forwarded in my No. 474 of the 24th instant, upon which His Imperial Majesty proposes to treat for peace, were worded in a manner which would render them acceptable to the Western Powers, had now directed instructions to be addressed to Prince Gortchakoff at Vienna to the effect that His Imperial Majesty would accept the very terms which been agreed upon in the notes exchanged on the 8th of August. His Excellency said that he also had made representations in the same sense as Count Buol appears to have done, when Baron Budberg communicated his instructions to him, and that he hoped his language to the Russian Minister had likewise contributed to the altered tone of the Russian Government. He asked me whether I thought Her Majesty's Government would now be disposed to negotiate on that basis, and I replied that it was impossible for me to give any opinion on the subject; that after the vast sacrifices which we had made since the war commenced, he must not be surprised if our demands would be increased; that it was not reasonable to suppose that we should be satisfied now by obtaining what had been peremptorily rejected several months ago.

His Excellency then spoke of the desire which all parties must entertain to see peace re-established, and he expressed the hope that the present disposition of the Emperor of Russia would be turned to good account.

In reporting to your Lordship what has just passed between Baron Manteuffel and myself, I cannot refrain from observing that this sudden change which appears to have come over the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh must either be the result of the disastrous effects which the war has already produced on the mind of the Emperor Nicholas, or that His Imperial Majesty has become aware of the altered feelings towards him of the German Governments, and that he now seeks a way to prevent their entire defection from his cause. He may have other and still more important objects in view. He may wish to show the German Governments that he is willing to make peace on the terms which they had themselves agreed to accept, and to induce them, if possible, to declare that they were satisfied with this overture, and that they would not accord their support to further demands that might be made by the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 471.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 30.)

(No. 481. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 29, 1854.

My Lord,

HAVING had occasion to call this evening on Baron Manteuffel, I inquired of his Excellency if the Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th April, which had been signed at Vienna on the 26th instant, would soon be made known. He replied that he should be happy to communicate it to me confidentially, and he gave me a copy of it, which I have the honour to inclose in original and translation.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Prussian Government has, after much negotiation and delay, been persuaded to adopt the views of Austria on the subject, and that it at last recognizes the necessity of pledging itself to support Austria in the event of her armies in the Danubian Principalities being exposed to attack from Russia.

I may also observe that this Additional Article contains the two points for which Austria has been long striving to obtain the concert of Prussia; viz., the acceptation of the four points as the basis for future negotiations of peace; and, secondly, the promise of succour if her armies were attacked in the Principalities.

No reference is made to the event of Austria taking the offensive, nor has Prussia renewed her desire that Austria should bind herself not to exceed the demands made on Russia in the four points.

The concessions, therefore, made by Austria, to Prussia are of a real and substantial nature; whereas Austria has merely ceded, in a matter of form, in agreeing to a second Additional Article to the Convention of the 20th April, in lieu of a simple exchange of confidential notes.

This matter of form is, however, of some importance to Prussia, more particularly at this moment, on the approaching meeting of the Chambers. The signature of an Additional Article to the Treaty places her on a more equal footing with Austria, and it bears to the public eye the character of a spontaneous and voluntary act, rather than what it really is, that of a forced concession to Austria.

The complete understanding which is now established between the two great German Powers will insure the immediate adoption, by the whole of Germany, of the policy of Austria and Prussia.

Baron Manteuffel informed me further, that he had forwarded instructions, by telegraph, to M. de Bismarck-Schönhausen, at Frankfort, to communicate this Additional Article to the Diet, and to invite its adherence to the principles laid down in it, adding that this would probably be done at the next sitting of the Diet, on Thursday next.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 471.

Project of Additional Article to the Treaty of April 20, 1854, *between Austria and Prussia.*

(Translation.)

THE state of European affairs daily becoming more menacing, has induced the Courts of Berlin and Vienna to take into more immediate consideration the necessity of an agreement in completion of the stipulations of the Treaty of April 20, 1854. The Sovereigns concur in the conviction that it is, above all, necessary for the participators of the alliance extended by the Décree of the Diet of July 24, to bring about in common the acceptation of a basis which they consider suitable for future negotiations of peace. They recognize this basis in the four preliminary points, for the acceptation of which Austria and Prussia have already addressed themselves to the Imperial Court of Russia, and will therefore do their best to give effect to this basis. Though on this rests the hope of paving the way to a pacific solution, still the serious state of Europe in general, and the necessity of pursuing with effect the object of the peace in view, demand the security of an united action on the part of all Germany. Guided by this idea and appreciating the dangers which an attack on the Austrian troops, not only by an invasion of the Imperial territory, but also by an attack in the Danubian Principalities, could cause to Germany, His Majesty the King of Prussia hereby enters into an engagement with his august ally the Emperor of Austria, respecting a common defence even in the latter case, and confidently trusts that a similar readiness to accept the present Additional Article will be evinced by the other German allies, and, if necessary, that they will carry the same into effect.

No. 472.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 1, 9 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November* 29, 1854.

COUNT BUOL authorizes me to declare, that you may consider the Treaty as completely agreed to. The signature will take place when all the necessary documents are got ready. Count Buol has communicated most confidentially to the Cabinet of Berlin, the intention of the Cabinet of Vienna to sign this document, to which they will be invited to become a party. But no objection on their part will arrest or change the decision taken at Vienna. Count Buol wishes, till the signature has taken place, the present announcement should be considered quite confidential.

No. 473.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 1,433.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 30, 1854.

BY a despatch dated the 27th instant, Count Buol expresses to M. de Hübner the desire that in the Treaty to be concluded between the three Powers, instead of a general reference being made to the Protocols signed at Vienna, the two last should alone be referred to. Count Buol states as a reason that the first Protocols contain expressions laudatory of Russia, a reference to which under present circumstances would not be suitable.

Convinced that your Lordship would not object to this alteration, M. Drouyn de Lhuys at once signified his assent to it by telegraph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 474.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 681. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 18, 1854.

THE Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's army in the Crimea, after consulting with General Canrobert, has requested my intervention to obtain from the Porte a corps of 20,000 men, to be detached from the Turkish forces on the Danube, and conveyed to Eupatoria, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favour of the allied troops besieging Sebastopol. Lord Raglan wishes that the expedition should be formed of those troops which faced the Russians with success, and, if possible, that Omer Pasha should command them in person. The means of transport would have to be supplied by the allies, and Lord Raglan gives me to understand, on communication with Sir Edmund Lyons, that means would not be wanting for that purpose.

Conceiving that such a proposal, brought forward now, must originate in a sense of paramount necessity, founded on the position of the allied armies, and the additional reinforcements expected by the enemy, I have not hesitated to bring it confidentially under the consideration of the Turkish Ministers. I saw Reshid Pasha in private to-day, and the result of our interview was a complete adoption on his part of the proposed plan.

We talked over the several most obvious objections which might be opposed to its execution, and it appeared that, as Austria is pledged to oppose the return of any Russian force into the Principalities, and as Prussia has engaged to second that Power in case a Russian army should attempt to cross the Balkan, Turkey would be exposed to no greater danger than an incursion by the Dobrudscha into Bulgaria, and an attempt to surprise some of the fortified

positions in that province, not easy at any time, and still less so in the winter season.

Supposing the expedition to take place with Omer Pasha at its head, the remaining portion of the Turkish army in Europe would be put under the temporary command of Ismail Pasha, aided by the advice of two experienced officers from the allied armies; and Ismail Pasha's substitute at Kars would, in the same manner, have the benefit of similar assistance from Colonel Williams, who is about to receive the rank of General of Division in the Turkish service.

It was distinctly understood between Reshid Pasha and me, that the proposed project should be considered as altogether confidential; that it should be submitted in that character at once to his leading colleagues; and that, after being accepted by them, it should be made the object of an official, but secret, application on the part of the French Chargé d'Affaires and myself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 475.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 684.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 20, 1854.

ON the night of the 18th instant Mr. Pisani reported to me, in a secret form, that the Cabinet Council had deliberated on the proposal confided by me to Reshid Pasha in the morning, and that the Porte was in consequence ready to send 20,000 men to Eupatoria, under the command of Omer Pasha; that Ismail Pasha would take the command on the Danube during his Highness's absence; that he would be temporarily replaced at Kars in the manner I have already stated elsewhere; that the troops under Ismail Pasha would be encamped in Bulgaria, for the defence of that country, after leaving a portion of the army at Bucharest, and another portion of it in Galatz or Ibraila; and, finally, that the Porte would look exclusively to the allies for means of transporting the expeditionary troops to the Crimea, together with at least six months' provisions.

This decision is understood to be confidential, awaiting a joint communication in the same sense from the two Embassies.

I have in consequence directed a confidential overture to be made to M. Benedetti, but it is hardly possible for me to know his reply before the departure of the messenger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 476.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 685.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 20, 1854.

I AVAILED myself of the interview which I had with Reshid Pasha the day before yesterday, to inquire whether the Porte would object to the passage through Egypt of some British regiments from India, and I have now the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the Porte consents to their passage.

I shall take the earliest opportunity to inform Mr. Bruce of this consent, not doubting that he will be able to obtain a full acquiescence in its object from the Pasha of Egypt.

I shall also take care to have the Porte's compliance with our wishes signified in a suitable manner to his Highness without loss of time.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 477.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 686.)

Therapia, November 20, 1854.

My Lord,

OMER PASHA had complied with the request conveyed to him from Marshal Vaillant, as to an advance of his army towards the Pruth, and the Porte was prepared to sanction the proposed operation.

It appears, however, that Count Coronini, on receiving a notification of the plan from Omer Pasha, made difficulties as to that part of it which would have brought two battalions and a battery of six guns, belonging to the Turkish army, into contact with his cantonments, and that the Ottoman Generalissimo has, in consequence, announced his intention of desisting from the execution of his plan, and of putting his army without more ado into winter quarters.

The impression at the Porte would seem to be, that Omer Pasha has adopted a hasty resolution in this instance. Whether that be the case or not, his Highness is more free to act upon Lord Raglan's suggestion than if he had embarked in a forward movement against the Russians in Bessarabia.

Inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information are copies, in translation, of the correspondence between Count Coronini and Omer Pasha, together with a despatch from the latter to his Government.

The correspondence which had previously taken place between Marshal Vaillant and Omer Pasha, having been forwarded to your Lordship from Bucharest, I omit the repetition of it here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 477.

Count Coronini to Omer Pasha.

(Translation.)

Jassy, November 5, 1854.

Excellency,

ON my arrival here I learnt, with pleasure, that a perfect understanding has existed between the Turkish General in Ibraila and the Austrian General in Galatz.

As I already had the honour of informing you, by word of mouth, on our part no obstacle will be placed in the way of any operation contemplated by your Excellency for moving your army towards the Pruth. I am only desirous of knowing the route which you intend to follow, so as to apprise my Generals of it, and thus avoid crossing the positions which we have already taken up, and to remain within the limits prescribed between your Excellency and Baron Hess. For instance, a short time ago Nam.

Inclosure 2 in No. 477.

Omer Pasha to Count Coronini, November 6, 1854.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 454.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 477.

Count Coronini to Omer Pasha, November 9, 1854.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 454.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 477.

Omer Pasha to the Serashier.

(Translation.)

November 13, 1854.

I HAVE already addressed a detailed report to your Excellency, inclosing copies of the telegraphic despatches from the Minister of War in Paris to the French Ambassador at Vienna, and from thence to this place, respecting the desire of the Emperor Napoleon in favour of a forward movement of the Turkish army, and I stated that I had taken the necessary steps for this purpose.

Your Excellency is aware that in consequence of the correspondence which took place respecting the obstacles interposed by the Austrians to the advance of the Imperial army, the subject was represented to the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna; and I received firstly a telegraphic message, and afterwards a despatch from the Ambassador, stating, that in the event of any further difficulties or opposition, I was, by the Grand Vizier's, as well as your Excellency's, directions, to act according to the instructions sent from the Embassy at Vienna, and that there would be no further obstacles to my operations; but that if the army was to be moved beyond Ibraila or Galatz, the Austrian Commander-in-chief was to be apprized thereof, in order that he might take his own measures. I therefore took my measures on this occasion in pursuance of the communications from the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna; and Count Coronini being at Jassy on the occasion of Prince Ghika's imminent arrival at that place, I informed his Excellency of the movement of my troops. In the meantime, I received a despatch from the Count, written before the receipt of my communication to his Excellency, requesting to be informed, in the first place, with respect to my movements, in the event of an advance on my part being necessary. There was no opposition made to my movement in this despatch; but it was simply inquired what part I intended to move from. The despatch, however, sent in answer to my late one, is of a different tenour from the first, and sets a limit to the movements of my army. In that despatch special limits are laid down for the movements of the Imperial army, and he states that he has no authority for granting me any further latitude for my movements, and that in the event of my requiring it, reference must be made to the Embassy at Vienna. I think that the contradiction which appears in the tenour of the two despatches is the result of fresh instructions from Vienna, because the son of Bibescon, an Austrian officer who arrived here very lately from Vienna, left this to join General Coronini at Jassy. The country to which my movements are limited, in the despatch in question, is swampy, lying on the banks of the Pruth and the Danube, with neither wood, so necessary in winter, nor villages to quarter the troops in. It is, moreover, on the left bank of the Pruth, and has been much strengthened by the Russians. Part of it, on the right bank, extending over five or six miles, is a pure marsh, without any villages, and it is impossible to move an army on it. This proposition is tantamount simply to leading us into the position which the Russians would like best to see us in. The Austrians knew that we were not so stupid as to be blind to the great injury [which would have accrued to the army], and the proposal was made in order to prevent our moving, to deceive us, and to gain time.

This is the third time that they have prevented the Turkish army from marching. In the first instance we moved at their own request, but when we reached the Yalonitza river they would not consent to our going beyond. Secondly, seven days after the arrival at Vienna of the rejection of the four articles by Russia, Count Coronini, in a despatch which I inclosed at the time to your Excellency, was altogether against our moving. This is the third time. Independently of the fatigue to which the army has been put on each of these occasions, a considerable expense has been incurred for provisions, transport, &c., and as Russia has been all the time pouring reinforcements into the Crimea from Bessarabia, the advantage expected from our movements has been sacrificed.

There are, thus, three courses open for me to follow. The one is, to do what the Austrians propose; the second, to disregard what they say altogether, and to carry our own operations into effect; and the third, to give up all idea of advancing, and march the army back to its original position. The first course would be to move the troops into a swampy country without any shelter, for no

object whatever, and to its utter destruction. If the second course be followed, it may affect political considerations, or it may not. It is clear that to adopt the third would be against the wishes of the allies. In this dilemma, I know not what course to follow. I must therefore keep the army together as well as I can in its present position, look to its comfort, and suspend any movement until I receive fresh instructions from your Excellency. I have sent off telegraphic messages on the subject to our Embassies at Paris and London, and I inclose the correspondence which has taken place with General Coronini. I beg to receive early instructions for my guidance.

While on my way some time ago with the army to Bucharest, I ascertained that the Boyards who were in the service of Russia were about to disperse and fly. I therefore notified to them that, however culpable, they would receive the Sultan's pardon, and I issued a proclamation calling upon the people to return to their homes. Most of the Boyards thus remained, and a few fled, but are now coming back of their own accord. Among these are Colonel Salamon and Goloresco, who have been for a very long period in the Russian service, and who have committed endless acts of violence, oppression, and cruelty against the people, and are open enemies to the Empire. It would be dangerous for them to remain here; and as they disregarded and rejected the royal clemency extended to them, I am about to address Prince Stirbey in order that they should not, under these circumstances, be received and allowed to stay; but I beg at the same time that the Grand Vizier may issue his orders on the subject.

It is reported that up to this date, the Russians have sent into the Crimea from Bessarabia, the 10th, the 11th, and the 12th Divisions, with the Division of Mounted Dragoons. Besides these, the 6th Division turned off to the Crimea, while on its way to Bessarabia.

No. 478.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 2.*)

(No. 692.)

Therapia, November 20, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information, is a translated copy of the report in which the long pending inquiry into the cause of the disaster at Sinope has finally issued.

I have not time to offer any remarks upon this judicial paper by the present opportunity. I observe that an attempt is made in its opening pages to account for the delays which have attended the prosecution of the inquiry from first to last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 478.

Report.

November 6, 1854.

(Translation.)

(An Imperial Rescript has been issued in conformity herewith.)

ON the examination and trial of his Excellency Mahmoud Pasha and the other naval authorities, relative to the catastrophe of Sinope, being submitted to His Imperial Majesty, a Royal Order was issued for their fresh examination, and the detailed report of the Supreme Council on the discussions had respecting that occurrence, as well as upon other points, has been brought several times before a special meeting of the Cabinet. In bringing Mahmoud Pasha to trial, and confronting him with the other naval authorities, the point sought to be investigated into and established was the *bonâ fide* cause and origin of the catastrophe in question. Other points bearing on this subject were not proved, and an inquiry was therefore entered into of the causes of the lamentable occurrence at Sinope. The following is the *résumé* of the discussions had.

It is still in recollection that about the period when war was going to be declared against Russia, the idea was entertained of adopting the precautionary measure of sending some light ships to cruize off the entrance of the Bosphorus. When war was subsequently declared, it was reported that some Russian vessels were cruizing off Heraclea and Amaseri, and threatening the merchant steamers; and some more vessels were added to the first, and sent to show themselves and cruize off the Bosphorus as guard-ships. In the event of their falling in with the Russians they were to engage them, if they thought themselves a match for the enemy; otherwise, they were to avoid danger by flight. Such were the measures which were discussed in Council, and communicated to Mahmoud Pasha. It would have been like courting danger for these vessels to have undertaken an extensive ordinary cruize in the Black Sea, and more so for the squadron to go into port in time of war, and remain there; and permission was never granted for them to enter a port like Sinope, insufficiently fortified against an enemy—a circumstance corroborated by Mahmoud Pasha throughout his examination.

His Excellency declares that he never gave instructions, either written or verbal, to the captains of the vessels sent to sea, to go and lie in the port of Sinope; and that he is willing to undergo any degree of punishment on the production of any such instructions from him; that their orders were to sail out of the Bosphorus and cruize off the coast; to engage any Russian vessel which they thought they could beat, and to return into the Bosphorus when pressed by weather or want of supplies; and that he gave them a short instruction to the foregoing effect. The naval commanders likewise stated, and it would appear also from the record of the despatches previously addressed by Mahmoud Pasha to Hussein Pasha, who was killed at Sinope, and to Osman Pasha, who was carried prisoner into Russia, that they were authorized by the orders and instructions given to them to go into Sinope, if it were expedient.

On the occasion of a flotilla, like that in question, going to sea, the same form and rule is observed, with respect to its fundamental operations, as with regard to those of the Imperial army: namely, a written instruction is, in the first place, drawn up, discussed in the Cabinet, and then issued, if sanctioned by His Imperial Majesty. But Mahmoud Pasha did not observe this course, and it is considered that he was wanting in having issued instructions on this subject *de proprio motu*, without any record thereof being made in the registers of the Admiralty. But although he was somewhat culpable in this respect, neither Osman nor Hussein Pashas, with whom it would be necessary to confront him, were forthcoming; neither are the instructions drawn up and issued to them, or the record thereof, in existence; and it is thus impossible to establish how far he is culpable. It would require the presence of Osman Pasha and the production of the original instructions to establish the real facts of the case, and complete the trial: but Osman Pasha's return depends upon the conclusion of the present war, and it appears suitable and conformable with the justice of His Imperial Majesty that the completion of Mahmoud Pasha's trial and his sentence should be deferred until that period.

It must be observed, however, that the order for returning into the Bosphorus for watering, &c., as above set forth, rests on a verbal assertion, while it appears on record that authority was granted for entering the port of Sinope in case of expediency, which was the origin of the catastrophe. Any further dilatoriness in punishing this clear and palpable fault would appear wrong and unbecoming in the eyes of the world. When, on the happy solution of the present question, Osman Pasha returns, further inquiries can be made, and the trial brought to a conclusion, and a heavy punishment awarded; or not, according to the result. In the meanwhile, Mahmoud Pasha might be exiled to Boli, without assigning any term, in punishment of the wilfulness and neglect of which he stands convicted.

As it would be inconsistent with the merciful disposition of His Imperial Majesty that the Pasha's family should be reduced to want by depriving him now of his salary, which was previously conferred to enable him to maintain his family, it has been considered by the Cabinet that the salary in question might continue to be issued in the name of his family.

The subject is therefore submitted for His Imperial Majesty's commands, together with the accompanying report.

No. 479.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 766.)

Foreign Office, December 2, 1854.

My Lord,

MR. CONSUL-GENERAL COLQUHOUN in a telegraphic despatch dated the 26th ultimo, informed me that he had been instructed by Omer Pasha to ask the opinion of Her Majesty's Government as to a request made to him by the Commander-in-chief of the allied forces in the Crimea, that he should accompany in person the Turkish reinforcements to be dispatched to the Crimea.

I have stated to Mr. Colquhoun that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government is, that Omer Pasha should comply with the requisition of the allied Commanders.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 480.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,178.)

Foreign Office, December 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,433 of the 30th ultimo, stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had agreed to the wish expressed by Count Buol, that the two last Protocols signed at Vienna should be alone mentioned in the proposed Treaty between Austria, France, and Great Britain. And I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that Her Majesty's Government likewise concur in the alteration suggested by Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 481.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 3, 3·50 P.M.)

Vienna, December 2, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE just signed the Treaty in conjunction with Count Buol and French Ambassador. As I should have no opportunity of sending it till the departure of the regular messenger on Wednesday, I shall forward it immediately by Mr. Fane.

No. 482.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 768.)

Foreign Office, December 4, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 704 of the 14th ultimo, directing you to report on the probability of the Porte being induced to accept an offer from the British Government to take into their service, during the present war, a division of Turkish troops, Her Majesty's Government have formed so decided an opinion on the great advantages which might result, not only to the common cause in which they are now engaged with their allies, but also to the Porte individually after the conclusion of the war, from the adoption of such a measure, that they desire without any further delay to make the Turkish Government acquainted with their wishes on the subject.

Her Majesty's Government do not conceal from themselves that the Porte

has hitherto evinced an unreasonable reluctance to take full advantage of the profferred services of European officers, and has preferred to allow its armies to go to ruin rather than subject its soldiery to the control of the officers of other Powers, and its Generals to the supervision which might serve to bring before the Sultan, in a light too strong to be disregarded, the incompetency, to say the least of it, of the Commanders to whom His Highness has entrusted his armies. Her Majesty's Government are also fully aware that Omer Pasha, not long ago, expressed himself in regard to the employment of European officers in the Sultan's service, in terms which they are unwilling to characterize.

But your Excellency will perceive from Major-General Cannon's letter, of which I inclose a copy, that Omer Pasha's sentiments in this respect have entirely changed, and that he is now as desirous for such assistance, for the conduct and organization of the troops under his command, as he was previously averse to accept it.

The proposal, however, which your Excellency will have to submit to the Porte, involves an arrangement different from any which have hitherto been brought under its notice. The Porte has already consented to the enrolment, under Colonel Beatson's orders, of the Bashi-Bozouks, to be attached as an Irregular Corps to the British army.

Her Majesty's Government now desire to take into the British service, during the present war, a portion of the regular Turkish army, to be organized, disciplined, and commanded by British officers, and to be armed, clothed, paid and fed by the British Government. The Porte may not be aware that this system was adopted, to a great extent, during the last war in which this country was engaged, when it was applied to the troops of Portugal, a part of the officers of each Portuguese regiment being English; and the success of the experiment at that time renders it probable that a similar success will attend the adoption of the same measure with regard to Turkish troops. The example of Portugal, in placing her troops under the orders of British officers, may serve to satisfy the Porte that there would be nothing in the proposed scheme derogatory to the dignity or independence of Turkey; and as regards any religious scruples which may be alleged against subjecting Mahomedans to the control of Christian officers, your Excellency may, it is to be hoped, easily dispel them by calling attention to the practice of the British Government in India, where Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Sikhs, are indiscriminately enrolled in the ranks of the British army, and commanded by British officers, and where the religious feelings and opinions of each particular sect are as scrupulously regarded by their Christian officers as they could be if no such control was exercised over them. As is the case with regard to the Mahomedans serving in British regiments in India, so would it be with regard to the Turkish soldiery whom Her Majesty's Government are desirous of engaging in their service.

By far the greater part of the officers in each regiment would necessarily be Turks. If there were any comforts or observances which might not be deemed necessary for British troops, and therefore escape the attention of British officers, the requirements of the Turkish soldiery would be made known to the British officers in command by the Turkish soldiers: and, if made known, the Porte may feel sure that they would be instantly attended to.

Her Majesty's Government hope, therefore, when the matter is fairly brought before the Turkish Government, the offer which your Excellency is instructed to make to the Porte will be thankfully accepted; and it will be proper that your Excellency should point out to the Porte that the benefit which it will derive from the proposed arrangement will not be confined to the present war. It may certainly be expected that a salutary influence will be exerted over the whole Turkish army by the spectacle of a Turkish contingent, in British pay, acting in honourable emulation with their European comrades, and earning for itself that honourable distinction which effective organization and proper discipline can alone secure for an army; but, beyond this, when the war shall be brought to a close, and the Turkish contingent be restored to the Turkish army, the Porte will possess a body of well-disciplined troops, to whose model it may adapt the bulk of the Turkish army, and, above all, a number of well-instructed Turkish officers, who, having served with British officers, will be able to turn to good account, for the Sultan's service, the experience which they will have thus acquired of the mode in which troops can be rendered really effective.

Her Majesty's Government would wish in the first instance at least to offer

to undertake the organization, in the manner I have stated, of a portion of the Sultan's troops, who are now composed exclusively of Mahomedans. But if the religious feelings should still be too strong at Constantinople to admit of this being done, Her Majesty's Government would not be unwilling to make the experiment of enrolling a sufficient number of the Christian subjects of the Porte on the same terms.

The Porte would unquestionably derive a great accession of strength, both now and hereafter, for the Turkish Empire, if it would consent to break down the barrier which has hitherto been opposed to the employment of the Christian subjects of the Sultan in its armies.

Her Majesty's Government have, however, no wish to urge this point at the present moment, though they would wish to throw it out for the consideration of the Porte at a moment when the whole physical strength of the Turkish Empire should be exerted to create for itself a stable position in the political world. Her Majesty's Government are aware that the prejudices of centuries are difficult to eradicate, but they are so sensible of the importance of an efficient organization of a portion at least of the force of the Turkish Empire, that they cannot abstain from suggesting that the Sultan, if he will not place at their disposal a portion of his Mahomedan subjects, may at all events consent to the enrolment of a sufficient number of his Christian subjects to assist in the defence of the Turkish Empire.

I have only to add that your Excellency cannot too strongly impress upon the Porte the necessity of coming to an early decision on this subject. The winter season cannot be better employed than in preparing for the next campaign; and Her Majesty's Government have little doubt that if the Porte should promptly accept the offer now made to it, a Turkish force may be organized so as to be ready to take part in the active operations against the common enemy, for which the return of spring will afford the opportunity.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 483.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 769.)

Foreign Office, December 4, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received from Colonel Williams a copy of a despatch which he addressed to your Excellency on the 4th of November, respecting the bad feelings entertained towards him by Shukri Pasha, the new Reis of the Turkish army at Kars; and with reference to that despatch I have to observe to your Excellency, that if Colonel Williams is not properly supported by the Porte, we must expect a recurrence of disgraceful events with the army of Kars. It is to be hoped that the rank obtained for Colonel Williams by your Excellency will ensure his having some authority, and that he will be treated with respect; but it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that his services should be officially acknowledged by the Porte for the information of the army at Kars.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 484.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 443.)

Vienna, November 28, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 442 of the 26th instant, inclosing the official announcement in the Austrian "Correspondenz" of the Additional Article to the Convention between Austria and Prussia, I have now the honour to report to your Lordship that Count Buol announced to me the signature of this document, the purport of which he had already explained to me, and which he considers as

securing all the objects for which the Austrian Government have so long been in negociation with that of Prussia.

As explanatory of this measure, I inclose the translated extract of an article from the semi-official journal, the "Oest. Deutsche Post," describing the objects with which the Article in question was drawn up and signed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 484.

Extract from the "Oest. Deutsche Post Gazette" of November 28, 1854.

(Translation.)

THE Treaty concluded yesterday between Austria and Prussia, is one of the most fortunate events at this critical moment. We were on the brink of a great danger. A split in Germany would have carried the Eastern question far beyond its original dimensions; the war would have been brought into the heart of Germany and would have destroyed all the sources whence flow its wealth, its culture, and its unity.

This threatened peril has now been averted, thanks to the firmness which the Austrian Cabinet has united with an inexhaustible patience, and thanks also to the better counsels which have at length prevailed in Berlin.

We were not wrong when we prophesied that Austria would not prove obstinate in matters of form, as long as they did not affect the spirit of her demands, the chief objects of her efforts. The Vienna Cabinet has willingly made the concession that the co-operation of Prussia and of the other members of the German Confederation should be defined in a new, additional Article to the Treaty of April.

Prussia has bound herself to make, in common with Austria, the following proposals to the Confederation:—1. That the four points should be taken as grounds for negotiations of peace. 2. That not only an attack on the Austrian territory, but also any attack on the Austrian troops on this side the Pruth, should bind the Confederation to defend Austria. 3. That the Confederation should desire the Military Commission to commence the eventual preparations for war.

We hear that a sitting of the Diet is appointed for the 30th instant, at which it is hoped that the Committee, which has been provided with all the documents concerning this question, will be able to make its report. In this case, the common proposal of the two great Powers would be made in this sitting. There can be no doubt as to the result. Most of the smaller States, especially the Thuringian Duchies, have long ago expressed their desire for the strongest support being given to Austria, and the consent of Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover is no longer doubtful. . . . .

Russia's position towards Europe is now, therefore, as follows:—

France and England, being engaged in active warfare with her, will no longer content themselves with the four points established in August.

Austria, who is perfectly prepared to go to war, still considers the four points sufficient, but has given the well-known declaration, that in the event of her finding herself obliged to take an active part in the war, she reserves to herself the right to put forward further special demands.

Prussia, who has hitherto only given her moral support to the four points, has now fully appropriated these four demands as bases of peace, and the same course is about to be taken by the Confederation. Austria has therefore the merit of having brought the views of Prussia and the Confederation, on the chief question, in accordance with those of the Western Powers.

No. 485.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 76.)

Munich, November 28, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM bound to confess that I approach with infinite repugnance the unprofitable subject of the jealousies and intrigues which in these countries are dignified with the name "policy," and I shall in consequence confine myself to a simple narration of the effect produced and the hopes aroused here, as far as I am capable of comprehending them, by the simultaneous arrival of the news of the agreement of Austria and Prussia on the Eastern question, and the acceptance by Russia of the four points which were laid down in the Vienna Protocol of the 8th of August as the basis of future negotiations.

With respect to the first of these events, I may be permitted to express my apprehension that when the discussions to which the latter will give rise shall commence, the supposed cordiality of the understanding just arrived at will be put to a severe test, for it is impossible to conceive that the embarrassments caused by the Prussian Government are, even in part, to be explained by the miserable feelings of jealousy of Austria to which it is now sought to attribute them. However, such as it is, the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs takes no small credit to himself for having in a great degree contributed to bring it about, and in a recent conversation he avowed that the German portion of the question was, for the minor States, of immeasurably greater importance than the rest. To this I replied that I could not assent, inasmuch as if a convulsion, which should be violent enough to overthrow the existing European superstructure, should occur, there would, in my opinion, be but small chance that purely German interests, as he sought to explain them, would withstand the shock. Baron von der Pfordten seemed to be so deeply impressed with the notion that this new-born union of Germany would produce such immense effect on the minds of the belligerent parties, and especially on the Emperor of Russia, that I felt myself justified in refreshing his memory by an allusion to the confidential conversations of His Imperial Majesty with Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh. He dwelt with the most self-satisfied confidence as to its results, on the prospects of peace opened to Europe by the recent acceptance of the four points by the Czar, and though he appeared to wish to elicit from me an opinion as to whether the British and French Governments would be prepared to adhere to them still, I thought I could discover that his satisfaction proceeded much more from the hope that the new turn thus given to the question would afford some loophole by which Austria, and consequently Germany, would be able to escape from a closer alliance with the Western Powers, and from any participation in the war against Russia.

I told M. von der Pfordten that I entirely concurred with him in all he said about the blessings of peace, and that I was sure Her Majesty's Government would be at all times ready to enter into any negotiations which would offer a fair prospect of a lasting and honourable termination of the deplorable struggle now going on, and which England and France had been driven to undertake, against their wish, in defence of a great European principle which had been trodden under foot by the Emperor of Russia. I said that until I had seen the terms in which the acceptance of the four points was couched, I could not venture any judgment as to their proving satisfactory to the allied Governments, nor could I take upon myself to pronounce whether they still considered themselves bound by them; for I reminded him that at the time when they were put forward they were described as the minimum of the conditions to be imposed upon Russia, and I added that I saw no reason at any rate to demand less, whilst the results already attained might, I thought, fairly justify us in claiming more. Baron von der Pfordten here interposed the observation, that at all events, from the manner in which they had been originally put forward, they must be deemed to constitute the essential conditions of peace. Having perceived, as it struck me in the course of our interview, that his Excellency interpreted the acceptance of the four points as necessarily involving a discussion on them, I endeavoured to show that the Protocol of the 8th of August did not warrant any such construction,

since it was therein distinctly stated, that unless the preliminaries enumerated in it were unconditionally accepted, peace could not be concluded at all, and the parties to it had actually bound themselves not even to negotiate upon any other basis. "In order to gain time for the examination of them, your first step must," I said, "be to attempt to obtain cessation of hostilities, but the events that may from day to day arise out of the continuance of them may possibly so alter the relative positions of the belligerents so as to defy all calculation; and is it likely," I asked, "that England and France would consent to pause in the course they are pursuing, upon no better security than vague and probably insincere propositions for negotiations that would have to be conducted in conjunction with Governments which, up to the present time, have shown but little zeal in the cause of right and justice, as understood by the Western Powers?" I was induced to speak thus because, in a preceding conversation, Baron von der Pfordten had recurred to the subject of the joint protectorate of five Great Powers over the Christian subjects of the Porte, and hinted that a modification in that sense might be introduced into the fourth point; and upon my observation that any protectorate of this nature would amount to a direct encroachment upon the independence of the Sultan, his Excellency thought proper to ridicule the fiction that his Highness was any longer an independent Sovereign.

I will not detain your Lordship with a comparison between the language now held by M. von der Pfordten in reference to the four points, and his views as expounded in his famous memorandum presented to the Bamberg Conference, for the two appear to me altogether irreconcileable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 486.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 452.)

Vienna, November 29, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's directions I proceeded on the 27th instant, in company with Baron Bourqueney to read to Count Buol your despatch No. 373 of the 22nd instant, and to announce to him that I was empowered to sign the Treaty, the project of which had been communicated to you by Count Colloredo.

Baron Bourqueney, by the direction of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, made to Count Buol a similar communication. Count Buol received with the most anxious attention the statements contained in the two despatches which accompanied the authorisation from our Governments to sign the Treaty, and immediately expressed his intention to take the orders of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor with regard to them, and his belief that the language of those despatches would be considered satisfactory to His Majesty, and that he should receive instructions to proceed with Baron Bourqueney and myself to the signature of the Treaty.

I have the honour now to report to your Lordship that I have this day received from Count Buol the announcement that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor has authorised him to sign this Treaty, and that as soon as the official copies are prepared, and his own full powers have been made out, he will be ready to proceed to the accomplishment of the orders he has received.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 487.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 4.*)

(No. 484.)

Berlin, December 1, 1854.

My Lord,

SINCE writing my despatch No. 474 of the 24th ultimo, in which I forwarded an extract of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Budberg of the 6th ultimo, containing the four points which Russia was ready to accept as the basis of negotiation for peace, I have obtained a copy of this despatch *in extenso*, and have the honour to inclose it herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 487.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{23 \text{ Octobre}}{4 \text{ Novembre}}$ 1854.

LES informations que nous recevons de différents côtés nous prouvent que dans le moment actuel les Gouvernements Allemands sont à peu près tous préoccupés d'une seule et même crainte, celle de voir, à l'occasion de l'affaire d'Orient, éclater une scission entre les deux Grandes Puissances Allemandes qui pourrait mettre en danger la tranquillité de la patrie commune et l'existence même de la Confédération Germanique. Fidèle à la politique qu'il a suivie dès l'origine de cette déplorable complication et désirant en circonscrire les conséquences désastreuses dans les plus étroites limites possibles, l'Empereur notre auguste Maître a voulu dans la présente conjoncture, et autant qu'il peut dépendre de lui, préserver l'Allemagne des fléaux dont elle serait menacée dans une semblable éventualité.

En conséquence vous êtes, M. le Baron, autorisé à déclarer au Cabinet Prussien que l'Empereur est disposé à prendre part à des négociations qui auraient pour but le rétablissement de la paix et auxquelles les quatre propositions ci-dessous indiquées serviraient de point de départ, telles qu'elles sont formulées ci-dessous, savoir:

1. Garantie commune par les cinq Puissances des droits religieux et civils des populations Chrétiennes de l'Empire Ottoman sans distinction du culte.

2. Protectorat des Principautés exercé en commun par les cinq Puissances aux mêmes conditions que nos Traités avec la Porte ont stipulées en leur faveur.

3. Révision du Traité de 1841. La Russie ne s'opposera pas à son abolition, si le Sultan, principale partie intéressée, y consent.

4. Liberté de la navigation du Danube, qui existe de droit et que la Russie n'a jamais eu l'intention d'entraver.

Cette détermination est fondée comme de raison sur la supposition que les Puissances Occidentales rempliront fidèlement l'engagement qu'elles ont contracté à la face de l'Europe, d'assurer l'avenir des populations Chrétiennes de l'Empire Ottoman, que leurs droits religieux et civils seront placés désormais sous la garantie de toutes les Puissances, et qu'ainsi le principal but que la Russie a en vue dans la guerre actuelle aura été atteint.

Si les sentiments qui ont dicté à Sa Majesté l'Empereur la présente déclaration, sont appréciés en Allemagne, comme nous devons le supposer, nous croyons pouvoir nous livrer à l'espoir que la Confédération réunie sur le même terrain, et entièrement rassurée sur les intérêts Allemands engagés dans la question, mettra à profit son unanimité pour peser dans la balance de l'Europe en faveur d'une paix dont l'Autriche et la Prusse nous ont présenté spontanément dans les quatre points, une base qui les satisferait complétement.

Si, au contraire, on voulait se servir de cette union, maintenue encore une fois par les soins de la Russie, pour mettre en avant de nouvelles conditions, incompatibles pour le fond comme pour la forme avec sa dignité, l'Empereur ne

doute pas que les Etats de la Confédération ne repoussent de semblables prétentions, de quelque côté qu'elles viennent, comme contraires aux sentiments de loyauté dont ils sont animés, ainsi qu'aux vrais intérêts de l'Allemagne. C'est une neutralité soutenue avec fermeté et persévérance, telle qu'elle a été proclamée dès l'origine de la lutte, que l'Empereur croit devoir lui demander en toute justice, en retour de la déférence avec laquelle il a accueilli les vœux qui lui ont été adressés dans son nom.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 488.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 4.*)

(No. 485. Confidential.)

Berlin, December 1, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my No. 480 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I saw Baron Manteuffel this evening, and inquired of his Excellency, if he had anything to add to the intelligence which he had communicated to me at our last interview, respecting the acceptation by the Emperor of Russia of the four points contained in the Notes exchanged on the 8th of August between the allies, as the basis of a negotiation for peace. The President of the Council replied that he had heard nothing further on the subject. He explained, however, that this news had reached him by telegraph from Baron Werther at St. Petersburgh; that a communication in the same sense was to have been made to Prince Gortchakoff, but that he was still without any written communication; and that he had received nothing on the subject since we last met, either from Count Buol or from Count Arnim.

In the meantime I must not omit to mention that this Government have been proclaiming, through their organs, that the Emperor of Russia has made this concession out of consideration for Germany, and that, through the influence of Prussia, the period for the restoration of peace may be at hand.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 489.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 4.*)

(No. 486. Confidential.)

Berlin, December 1, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT GEORGE ESTERHAZY received instructions from Vienna this morning, to communicate confidentially to the Prussian Government the substance of the Treaty which Austria is about to conclude with England and France, with a view to re-establish the general peace. The Austrian Minister had an interview this afternoon with Baron Manteuffel, and has just informed me that, in conformity with his instructions, he read to his Excellency a paper in which the main points of the Treaty were enumerated, adding that a *rapprochement* had taken place between his Government and the Western Powers, and that the terms of a Treaty had been agreed upon, but that before signing it, his Government wished to know if Prussia would not also become a party to the transaction, and thus resume her position with the Powers.

Count Esterhazy observed to me that Baron Manteuffel received the communication apparently without surprise, replying that he would take the King's orders on the subject, and inform him of the result. He requested to be allowed to keep the memorandum, but this Count Esterhazy declined doing, having been especially instructed not to leave the paper out of his hands, upon which the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs took notes of its contents, and has promised to give an early answer. Count Esterhazy added that if the King were disposed to join in this transaction, he would immediately request Count

Buol to postpone the signature of the Treaty for a few days; but that no time should be lost, for the object in view was so important that the Austrian Cabinet could not agree to any lengthened delay.

Count Esterhazy hopes to see Baron Manteuffel again to-morrow, and has proposed to wait upon the King with the memorandum, if His Majesty should deem it advisable, or that by so doing the negotiation could be advanced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 490.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1854.

DO not give Count Buol a copy of my despatch No. 388 of November 30.

No. 491.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,194.) *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1854.

My Lord,

ON the 2nd instant Count Walewski informed me that a proposal had been formally made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by M. Hübner, that the Austrian possessions in Italy should be guaranteed by France, and his Excellency then confidentially read to me the draft of a Convention for that purpose, which the Government of the Emperor was prepared to sign with Austria as soon as the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the subject was ascertained.

Count Walewski said that this proposal had occasioned much embarrassment to his Government, who admitted, however, that Austria was fairly entitled to make the demand, as the Emperor had some months ago told M. Hübner, that if Austria took part with Russia she must be prepared for the uncompromising hostility of France, but that if she joined with France against Russia she might rely upon the active aid of France in any quarter where she might be attacked, or find herself exposed to danger, and the French Government were further of opinion that if Austria declared war against Russia it would be for the interest of the Western Powers that her attention should not be distracted, nor her forces divided, by insurrectionary movements in Italy; and that if France altogether declined the proposed engagement her good faith and her intentions might be liable to suspicion, and the knowledge that she had so declined might serve to excite the movement that Austria so much dreaded.

Count Walewski added that an exchange of notes might have been sufficient for the purpose, but that the form of Convention had been preferred as likely to be more agreeable to Austria, and also, that it gave greater facility for making the assistance of France conditional on the signing of the Tripartite Treaty and the active co-operation of Austria in the war.

Count Walewski concluded by saying, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought he had best consulted the wishes of Her Majesty's Government by avoiding all reference to England in his communication with M. Hübner on this subject, and by not inviting Her Majesty's Government to take part in the Convention.

I requested Count Walewski to convey to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for not having imposed upon them the necessity of declining to become party to any such arrangement; but the Government of the Emperor having determined on grounds they thought sufficient to agree to it, they appeared, I said, to have given effect to their decision with caution, and as the Convention involved the previous signature of the

Tripartite Treaty, it entailed no obligation on France, beyond using her influence to prevent attempts against the territorial integrity of Italy, unless Austria was engaged in hostilities with Russia, its duration would terminate with the war, and France only engaged to employ the force that was already stationed in Italy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 492.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 397. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to instruct your Lordship to endeavour to ascertain the truth of a report which has reached Her Majesty's Government, namely, that if in consequence of the intended operations of Omer Pasha in Bessarabia the Russians should recross the Pruth, the Austrian troops, in order to avoid the possibility of a collision with them, are instructed to make a retrograde movement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 493.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December* 5, 1854.

A COPY of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance signed last week at Vienna has been received by the Austrian Minister, with directions to communicate it to the Prussian Government whenever his English and French colleagues are furnished with instructions to the same effect. Count Esterhazy has informed me that he believes Baron Manteuffel to be desirous that Prussia should accede to this Treaty. He thinks the King of Prussia is not unfavourably disposed.

No. 494.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 453.) *Vienna, December* 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of announcing to your Lordship that, according to appointment, I waited this day at 12 o'clock upon Count Buol, in company with the French Minister, Baron de Bourqueney.

Count Buol stated that the object for which he had called us together being the signature of the Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance to which the three Governments had given their assent, he proposed that we should at once proceed to the exchange of our full powers, afterwards to the simultaneous examination of each of the copies of the Treaty, and then to its completion by our signatures.

These recommendations having been carried into effect, the full powers having been found correct, and the three copies identical, the Treaty was signed; and I have now the honour of inclosing the original, which I transmit to your Lordship by my son Mr. Julian Fane, who will be able to give to your Lordship any further information with regard to the completion of this transaction which you may require.

Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney, and myself, congratulated ourselves upon

the completion of this important act, and I cannot but request your Lordship to accept my congratulations upon the fulfilment which has been thus obtained of your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

Inclosure 1 in No. 494.

Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and France. Signed December 2, 1854.

[See Parliamentary Paper, presented to both Houses, December 1854.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 494.

Secret Article to the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and France.

ARTICLE SECRET.

DANS le cas prévu par l'Article V du Traité patent de ce jour, il est entendu que l'on procéderait immédiatement à la conclusion des arrangemens prévus dans l'Article III.

Cet Article aura la même force et valeur que s'il était textuellement inséré dans le Traité patent de ce jour.

Fait à Vienne, le 2 Décembre, 1854.

WESTMORLAND. (L.S.) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN. (L.S.) BOURQUENEY. (L.S.)

No. 495.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 454.) *Vienna, December 2, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship the copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest, and also to Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy, inclosing for their information the copy of a memorandum which was drawn up and agreed to by Count Buol, the Turkish Ambassador, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, at our meeting on the 1st instant, and which document has been transmitted by Count Buol to the Austrian military authorities, as setting forth the principles upon which their conduct in the Principalities is henceforth to be regulated.

The Turkish Ambassador undertook to forward this document to Constantinople and to Omer Pasha, and Baron Bourqueney and I engaged to transmit it to our Agents in the Principalities, as well as to our respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 495.

The Earl of Westmorland to Her Majesty's Consuls in Wallachia and Moldavia.

Vienna, December 1, 1854.

Sir,

COUNT BUOL requested Baron Bourqueney, the Turkish Ambassador, and myself, to call upon him yesterday; he laid before us some statements as to the acts of severity in the Principalities, committed by the military authorities

without the participation of the civil administration, which he thought the Representatives of the Four Powers at the present meeting would do well to take cognizance of, both in order to avoid misunderstandings and to establish the principles according to which such interference should hereafter be regulated.

I inclose you a memorandum which was drawn up and agreed to by the Ministers above-named, and which has been transmitted to the Austrian military authorities by Count Buol for their observance, and the Turkish Ambassador, although not having received the full powers from the Porte, undertook to transmit it to his Government and to Omer Pasha, and Baron Bourqueney and myself have in like manner engaged to forward it to our respective Governments, as well as to yourself and M. de Poujade, as setting forth the principles upon which we have agreed that the questions brought under discussion at our meeting should be regulated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 495.

Memorandum.

LORSQUE les Principautés Danubiennes recevront leur organisation définitive les privilèges accordés par les Sultans à ces provinces dépendantes de leur Empire, et dont la Sublime Porte n'a jamais cessé de se montrer disposée à respecter le maintien, seront placées sous la garantie collective des Puissances.

Dans l'état provisoire actuel et pendant la continuation de la guerre, ces principes généraux subissent nécessairement des modifications qu'il importe d'établir dans l'intérêt de la guerre en les rattachant toutefois, autant que faire se peut, à l'esprit de la stipulation qui précède.

En thèse général les chefs de corps Ottomans devront jouer de la pleine liberté d'écarter du territoire qu'ils occupent, ou de saisir les individus dont la présence compromettrait la sûreté de leurs mouvements militaires, sans en référer au Gouvernement local, mais toutefois en ayant soin de mettre le plus tôt possible sous ses yeux l'évidence d'une culpabilité qui pourrait entraîner des peines plus sévères.

Les chefs des corps Autrichiens jouiront de la même faculté sur le territoire qu'ils occupent.

Si l'autorité militaire Ottomane, sur le territoire occupé par les troupes Autrichiennes, avait à signaler comme dangereuse pour la sûreté publique ou pour la suzeraineté de la Porte la présence de certains individus, elle devrait fournir les éléments de ces soupçons aux Commandants des dites troupes, lesquels auraient à se prêter avec empressement à l'invitation de les éloigner; si on ne parvenait pas à se mettre d'accord, la question serait renvoyée à l'autorité du pays, qui prononcerait dans les limites de ses droits sur la contestation pendante.

Quant aux châtiments provoqués contre des citoyens Moldo-Valaques par des chefs de corps, pour tout ce qui ne touche pas aux exigences de la position militaire il est à désirer qu'il en soit référé à l'autorité civile, et qu'aucun acte n'ait lieu sans sa participation.

No. 496.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 455.) *Vienna, December 2, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter addressed by Omer Pasha to Marshal Vaillant, inclosing a copy of his reply to the communications he had received from the allied Generals Commanding-in-chief in the

Crimea, in which he announces his perfect readiness to proceed with his army to join them in that country at their request.

These documents have been communicated to me by Baron Bourqueney.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 496.

Omer Pasha to Marshal Vaillant.

Le 28 Novembre, 1854.

JE vous transmets copie de la réponse faite aux Généraux en-chef en Crimée. J'ai cru devoir leur proposer l'envoi de l'armée Ottomane comme de la force la plus proche qui pourrait y arriver avant les renforts de France et peut-être avant les forces que l'ennemi dirige sur la Crimée. Je vous prie de faire connaître cet état de choses à Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 496.

Omer Pasha to Generals Lord Raglan and Canrobert.

Le 27 Novembre, 1854.

PAR un lettre du 25 j'ai eu l'honneur de vous faire savoir que je transmettais à Paris un double de la dépêche que vous m'avez adressée le 20, pour me faire connaître la situation des choses en Crimée et me demander de m'y transporter en personne dans le cas où les troupes Ottomanes atteindraient un effectif considérable. La réponse de Paris ne m'est pas encore arrivée; je ne sais donc si d'après le contenu de votre dépêche Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français se decide où non à modifier son opinion au sujet d'un mouvement en Bessarabie. Dans le cas où vos Excellences penseraient qu'il est urgent de leur envoyer des renforts, je les prierais de me faire savoir par la voie la plus prompte si, quels que soient les termes de la réponse de Paris, je ne dois pas d'abord, pour satisfaire à des besoins pressants, suspendre tout mouvement sur le Pruth et vous conduire moi-même les troupes que vous m'avez demandées. L'ennemi fait filer vers la Crimée de la Bessarabie quatre nouvelles divisions; par conséquent une diversion faite par mon armée de ce côté serait sans résultat militaire: de plus, vous n'apprenez que les Russes se sont fortifiés devant vous pour attendre de nouveau renforts et recommencer la lutte après leur arrivée. Mon opinion est donc, que toute opération cessant dans les Principautés on doit se renforcer le plus possible en Crimée. Je vois du reste que cette manière de voir est en analogie avec la vôtre. Dans le cas où vos Excellences désireraient recevoir de suite ces nouveaux renforts, qui arriveraient naturellement bien plus promptement que ceux qui pourraient être envoyés de France je les prierais de prendre les facilités nécessaires à leur embarquement. Les renforts dont je pourrais disposer s'élèvent, indépendamment des 10 bataillons déjà envoyés, à 11 bataillons avec 10 batteries et de la Cavalerie.

(Signé) OMER.

No. 497.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

No. 1,159.) *Paris, December 4*, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received on Saturday night by telegraph, the intelligence that the Treaty between Austria, France, and Great Britain, for regulating the future combined action of the three Powers in the Eastern question, had been signed in the afternoon of that day at Vienna. By a coincidence which the French Minister at Vienna appears to think was no

altogether the effect of chance, it was the 2nd of December which witnessed the signature of this document.

The news of it was published in the "Moniteur" of yesterday morning. It made a most favourable impression upon the public.

It is not easy to ascertain what results the French Government await from it, but I am inclined to think that they rejoice at the success which has at length crowned their persevering efforts to arrive at a Treaty between the three Powers, rather because they consider that such a Treaty widens the breach between Austria and Russia, than because they expect that it will lead to the active cooperation of the Austrian forces against those of the Czar.

I am confirmed in this opinion, after being made acquainted with M. Drouyn de Lhuys' confidential despatch to M. de Bourqueney of the 22nd ultimo, in which the meaning attached by the French Government to the four points is summarily laid down, but the contents of which were not to be communicated to Count Buol until after the signature of the Treaty.

Your Lordship will, I feel sure, excuse me, if I profit by this opportunity again to press upon Her Majesty's Government the prudence of coming to some distinct understanding with the French Government upon the guarantees to be required of Russia. In your Lordship's second despatch to Lord Westmorland, inclosed in your No. 1,184 of the 2nd instant, it appears to me that these guarantees are laid down with sufficient explicitness upon three out of the four points; but there remains one, and that the most important and difficult of all, on which your Lordship has necessarily been more reserved—I allude to the guarantees to be taken to ensure the cessation of the maritime preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea.

If it is true that Russia, whatever may be her reasons, has accepted the four points without reserve as a basis of negotiation for peace, it is not impossible that the same reasons may induce her to go further and accept the extended sense given to them in the said despatch to Lord Westmorland, and the Governments of England and France will then be called upon to state in detail the measures which they propose for assuring the independence and freedom of the Black Sea.

At this moment, as far as I can judge from the confidential communications which I have at different times had with the Emperor and with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I see no reason to doubt that they would accept any propositions Her Majesty's Government might make to them,—that they would be prepared, for instance, to insist on razing the fortifications of Sebastopol, and of the Russian fortresses on the eastern coast of the Black Sea; to take measures for preventing their restablishment, or the establishment of a great Russian arsenal at any other point; to restrict the number of Russian ships of war hereafter to be employed in the Black Sea, and to demand an unlimited right to appoint Consular Agents wherever they may now, or hereafter, think it desirable; but I do not feel so confident, if Austria was to object to any of these points, before some agreement to abide by them had been made between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor, that, with the desire which His Imperial Majesty has to maintain good relations with Austria, we might not find him waver. I cannot too often invite your Lordship's attention to the fact that the Emperor has, in his dealings with Austria, two objects in view,—the one to obtain, if possible, her military cooperation in the war with Russia; the other, by separating her from Russia, to put an end to the northern coalition, the main object of which, since 1815, has been to hold France in check. I am persuaded that events might arise which would make the Emperor still more anxious upon this latter point than he is even now, and that he would make sacrifices to ensure it; and I should be glad to feel assured that British interests would never be involved in these sacrifices.

Neither, my Lord, is the feeling in France, with regard to this war, such as would warrant us to neglect any opportunity of binding the French Government to our policy. The zeal of it is too far from France ever to render it popular. A momentary enthusiasm was created by the victory of Alma, but it has subsided. I know, upon unquestionable authority, that the number of young men taken from their families is beginning to excite observations in the departments. The Legislative Body has been convoked two months earlier than usual, in order to provide funds for the increased expenditure caused by the war. When a war is

popular, such burdens are borne, if not with pleasure, at all events with resignation; not so, when the contrary is the case.

I cannot feel that this new alliance with Austria has strengthened that which previously existed between France and England, and I am much mistaken if one of the objects of Austria is not to weaken the latter. Without then feeling any immediate anxiety, or wishing to inspire any in Her Majesty's Government, I yet venture to think that it would be prudent to profit by the present favourable moment, and that Her Majesty's Government should endeavour to pledge the French Government to the course to be pursued in common, before Austria is admitted further into the counsels of the two Governments. M. Drouyn de Lhuys is quite ready to enter into a confidential exchange of opinions on the subject.

I had written thus far when I received your Lordship's authorisation to communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the despatch to Lord Westmorland to which I have alluded above. His Excellency, in passing a high encomium on its contents, in which, he said, he entirely agreed, expressed some regret that your Lordship should have allowed Lord Westmorland to give a copy of it to Count Buol. He observed that the object of the Maritime Powers should be to engage Austria to take the lead in developing the three points which were of nearest interest to her, in order that she might have less right to dispute the pretensions of England and France, to whom the fourth point—namely, the revision of the Treaty of 1841—was of paramount importance. But in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Westmorland the contrary course had been adopted. The three points which chiefly interested Austria and Germany were explained in so full a manner, that they might serve as the text for the preliminaries of peace, while the guarantees to be demanded for the limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea were left almost in their pristine vagueness. His instructions to M. de Bourqueney were, it was true, equally explicit upon the same three points, and vague upon the fourth, but he had expressly stated to M. de Bourqueney that those instructions were merely intended as a guide for his language in conversation with Count Buol, and were on no account to be officially communicated to that Minister. His reasons for this reserve were, first, as he had said before, to excite Austria to put forward the most stringent conditions on those points which concerned her, and thus to make it more difficult for her to counteract the Western Powers on the point which interested them. Secondly, if Austria was furnished with copies of those despatches, she might communicate them to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and a bad impression might be created in Europe, if Russia accepted the terms of the two Powers as signed by themselves, and peace was afterwards rendered impossible by what Austria and Germany might declare to be the undue pretensions of the Maritime Powers to cripple the naval means of Russia. Moreover, it would be difficult, M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought, to refuse a suspension of hostilities, if Russia agreed without reserve to terms so distinctly set forth, on condition of hostilities being suspended. For these reasons his Excellency was most desirous that as little as possible should pass in writing between the Western Powers and Austria, until the future intentions of the latter were more clearly developed.

I venture to think that your Lordship will consider M. Drouyn de Lhuys' observations as worthy of your consideration. They led naturally with me to a further conversation respecting the nature of the guarantees to be demanded of Russia in the Black Sea, and that conversation confirmed me in the opinion that the two Governments should come to an early understanding on this very important matter. M. Drouyn de Lhuys repeated that he did not think that we could be satisfied with less than what I have specified in the former part of this despatch. With regard to anything that we might ask in addition to the four points, his Excellency said that it would probably have reference to the Baltic, and to the limitation of Russian power in the north.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 498.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 7, 11·30 A.M.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 6, 1854.*

THE Turkish General received yesterday from Paris reply [false numbers] to the French Minister [omission] War of the 28th ultimo, advising his immediate movement towards the Crimea; he is consequently preparing, and will send 35,000 men to Varna, and will proceed thither himself next week. He is very uneasy about the terms of the Treaty of the 2nd instant.

No. 499.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 402.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 453, inclosing the Treaty between Austria, England, and France, which was signed on the 2nd instant, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have learned the signature of that Treaty with much satisfaction, and earnestly hope that it may lead to the happy results which an intimate alliance between the three Powers is calculated to produce at this moment.

I have the pleasure to convey to your Lordship the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government for your conduct in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 500.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 403.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1854.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship the Queen's ratifications, under the Great Seal, of the Treaty and Secret Article signed by your Lordship with Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney on the 2nd instant; and I am to desire that you will exchange the same against similar instruments ratified by the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of the French respectively.

I also transmit to your Lordship certificates to be signed by you and the Austrian and French Plenipotentiaries; on the exchange of the ratifications you will return these certificates to me at the same time that you send home the Austrian and French ratifications.

Your Lordship will acquaint me by the electric telegraph when the exchange of the ratifications has taken place.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 501.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 404.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1854.*

I HAVE remarked that in the reference which is made in Article II of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, to the Treaty concluded between Great Britain, France, and Turkey, relative to military aid to be given to the latter Power, the date of that Treaty is stated to be the 10th of April instead of the

12th of March, which is the correct date. The 10th of April is the date of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and France which was signed at London.

The error has been corrected in Her Majesty's ratifications, which are transmitted to you in my despatch No. 403 of this date; and your Lordship will take care that it is corrected also in the ratifications of the other Powers.

A printed copy of each of the two Treaties in question is inclosed for your Lordship's information.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 502.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1,464.)
Paris, December 6, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER has received instructions from his Government to observe to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that the Treaty of the 2nd instant stipulates that the adherence of the Prussian Government should be asked to it, and to inquire in what form the French Government proposes to make the communication to the Cabinet of Berlin. I asked his Excellency what answers he had given to M. de Hübner. He said that until he had consulted Her Majesty's Government he should give none, but that he supposed the communication must be made. I said that perhaps the best course to take would be to request Count Buol to make the communication, and to instruct the Representatives of England and France at Berlin to support it. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has no objection to this course.

M. de Hübner told him at the same time, that Count Buol had received an official announcement from Prince Gortchakoff that the Emperor of Russia accepted, without observation or condition, the four points, as the basis of a negotiation for peace. Count Buol made this communication to the allied Powers, in order that they might determine what steps they would take in consequence.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is of opinion that Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor must come to an immediate understanding as to the conditions they intend to demand; that these conditions should then be sent to the Austrian Government, with a declaration that unless they are accepted by Russia without reserve, and at once, the allies will not enter into negotiations.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys will to-morrow place on paper his ideas as to what these conditions should be, and will send them to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship.

They appear to agree generally with what I had the honour to state on this subject in my despatch No. 1,459 of the 4th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 503.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1,465.)
Paris, December 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as desired by your Lordship's despatch No. 1,189 of the 4th instant, the instructions sent on the 2nd instant, to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces in the Black Sea, on the subject of the blockade of the Russian ports in that sea by vessels in Her Majesty's squadron, without the cooperation of the French.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is very anxious that the declaration of blockade should be made in the name of the two Governments, although circumstances may prevent the French Admiral from detaching any blockading vessels from his

squadron at the present moment. I am not sufficiently versed with maritime law to know whether this can be done, that is, whether the British fleet can act in the name of both Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 504.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 774.)
Foreign Office, December 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a Treaty and of a Secret Article annexed thereto,* which were signed on the 2nd instant at Vienna, by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, and Great Britain.

Her Majesty's ratifications of this Treaty were sent to Vienna yesterday evening.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 505.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 775.)
Foreign Office, December 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 654 of the 10th of November, containing an elaborate protest against the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, that differences arising between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities in the Principalities should be referred to a Commission at Vienna; but as your Excellency in this despatch has omitted to notice certain important facts, and as you appear to misapprehend the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, it is necessary that I should state upon what grounds Her Majesty's Government were induced to assent to the establishment of the Commission.

Your Excellency states that the differences to be adjudged at Vienna relate to matters which immediately concern a portion of the Sultan's dominions, and take place within the circuit of his sovereign jurisdiction; and this is literally true, though it would be practically incorrect to affirm that the Moldo-Wallachian provinces resemble those other portions of the Turkish territory over which the Sultan exercises sovereign jurisdiction. Unfortunately, no Turk has been able, since the year 1829, to reside in those provinces, nor could the Sultan ever establish there, as in Servia, a Turkish garrison; and those provinces are now, in virtue of a Convention with the Porte, occupied by an Austrian army, bound to resist the return of the Russians, which the unaided forces of the Sultan would be incapable of accomplishing. By that Convention, it was stipulated that the legal state of things, such as it resulted from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte, in regard to the administration of the Principalities, should be re-established there by common agreement between the Emperor of Austria and the Turkish Government, and that all demands relating to the requirements of the service on which the Austrian troops were to be employed, should be complied with.

Differences, as might be expected, arose between the Austrian and Turkish Agents: some were probably created, some were certainly aggravated by the Turkish Commissioner, whose unscrupulous character is but too well known to Her Majesty's Government. The man who, while engaged with the British Commissioners in fixing the boundary between Turkey and Persia, in order to secure peaceful relations between the two countries, forcibly seized upon Kotoor, was the last person whom the Porte should have sent upon a delicate and difficult mission to the Principalities. Your Excellency could not have been aware of the intention to appoint Dervish Pasha, or you would doubtless have protested against it; and by making such an appointment without your

* See Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 494.

knowledge, the Porte has shown its disregard for the opinion of Her Majesty's Government with respect to Dervish Pasha.

Differences however arose, and from the very first moment, between the Austrian and Ottoman authorities; they were referred to Constantinople, and what was the result? I find in your Excellency's despatch No. 515 of the 14th of September, that two days before M. Benedetti and yourself had a discussion with Baron Bruck respecting the discussions which had arisen between the Turkish and Austrian authorities at Bucharest, and that Baron Bruck persisted in maintaining opinions opposed to those of yourself and your French colleague; and in the same despatch, there is a statement which bears more particularly on the point which has given rise to your despatch to which I am now replying, namely, that Reshid Pasha himself, with a view to remove existing difficulties, and conciliate the conflicting opinions exhibited in a conference between Baron Bruck, Reshid Pasha, M. Benedetti, and yourself, proposed that the question respecting the invitation to Prince Stirbey to return, then under discussion, should be submitted to Count Buol, Lord Westmorland, and M. de Bourqueney, and that Baron Bruck was indisposed to accept this proposal, and that you were finally obliged to leave this meeting with the expression of a hope that he would be able to take a more favourable view of it on further deliberation with Reshid Pasha alone.

In your despatch, No. 547 of September 27, you stated that Baron Bruck deprecated every movement that might compromise the pacific attitude of Austria, and that he sided with the Austrian Generals in restraining the movements of the Turkish army.

In your despatch No. 565 of October 5, your Excellency gives an account of Baron Bruck having intimated to the Porte that a forward movement of the Turkish army in Wallachia would be resented, and perhaps even resisted by the Austrian General, and of his having shown himself inaccessible to the arguments which you and M. Benedetti urged upon him, in a discussion in which you took part, in consequence of the request of Reshid Pasha that you and M. Benedetti would join him in conferring with the irritated Minister, and endeavouring to bring the pending differences to a more comfortable issue.

The whole tenour, indeed, of your Excellency's observations in regard to the intercourse between Baron Bruck and the Turkish Government on these matters, shows that no suitable solution of the matters in discussion could be looked for so long as the conduct of the discussion was confided to Baron Bruck as the Representative of Austria.

Your Excellency states that the difficulties which it is proposed to remove by submitting them to a collective arbitration at Vienna, have not arisen so much out of contradictions between the Turkish Government and its Agents, as from the inconsistency which has so remarkably prevailed on certain important points between the assurances of the Austrian Cabinet and the pretensions of the Austrian officers in Wallachia; but nowhere has this inconsistency been more marked than in the Internuncio's conduct: and in answer to the remonstrances founded upon your Excellency's representations, which were addressed to the Austrian Cabinet, Her Majesty's Government were informed that Baron Bruck had exceeded his instructions. It was not therefore to Baron Bruck that his Government was likely to delegate the power of settling matters connected with the Austrian army, nor would he have been able to put an end to the captious proceedings of the Austrian authorities at Bucharest, or the overweening spirit exhibited on many occasions by the officers and soldiers under their command, and to which your Lordship says that the Porte was alive. It was, however, because the Porte had just ground for complaint in these matters that Her Majesty's Government desired to see all such questions brought before a tribunal capable of adjudicating upon them. At Vienna, the influence of the English and French Governments can be brought to bear upon questions transmitted there by telegraph from the Principalities. By the same means they can be consulted in a few hours; and questions upon which delay might have been fatal, and which might take days and weeks to refer to Constantinople, where they would form the subject of angry dispute, but not of settlement, may now be disposed of at once, and the answer made known by telegraph to the parties concerned.

I inclose a copy of a despatch from Lord Westmorland, No. 411 of November 26, respecting an alleged obstruction by General Augustin to the movements of Omer Pasha. This arose on the 21st of November. Your Excellency will see how the matter was dealt with on the 25th of November,

and I leave it to your Excellency to judge in what state the matter would now be if it had been referred for decision to Constantinople. Long delay might have suited the habits of the Porte, its dignity might have been flattered by issuing orders that the Austrian Generals would probably have disregarded, but its real interests would have suffered; and it was to promote them and to protect the Turkish authorities against injustice and undue interference that Her Majesty's Government agreed to a Commission, to which the Austrian authorities will, it is to be hoped, defer, when aware that all their actions on the spot are watched by the Agents of England and France, whose reports will be sustained by the Ministers of England and France at Vienna.

Your Excellency states, that even with respect to Her Majesty's Embassy the proposed course of proceeding is new and anomalous, as Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities have been hitherto in the habit of reporting to the British Representative at Constantinople, and that you know not how far it may be intended to continue any relations at all of this kind between the Turkish capital and the Turkish provinces north of the Danube. The course of proceeding is undoubtedly new, because it has reference to a state of things that never before existed; but I am at a loss to understand what constitutes the anomaly of Her Majesty's Government instructing Her Majesty's Consuls to perform certain duties that are thought necessary for the public service. It will be the duty of the Consuls to keep your Excellency informed as heretofore of all that passes in the Principalities, as well as of the communications they may make to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, and I have to inform your Excellency that there is no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to make any change in the relations between Her Majesty's Embassy and the Consuls in the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 506.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 7, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL received with the greatest satisfaction the information respecting the ratification of the Treaty which I received by telegraph to-day, and accordingly he suggests, that as he shall immediately send the ratified Treaty to the Porte, your Lordship might think proper to instruct the French Ambassador and myself to forward at the same time a copy of the Treaty to our respective Ambassadors at Constantinople.

No. 507.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 156.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 4, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL mentioned to me that he had proposed to the French Government that a Convention, or an Act of a similar nature, should be agreed to by France with Austria, by which the military forces of the two countries, at present occupying different provinces of Italy, should, in case the two parties were engaged in war, cooperate for the maintenance of the public tranquillity and territorial integrity of the Italian States. He said he believed there would be no difficulty in coming to an understanding respecting such a document on the part of the French Government, and he only mentioned it to me in the confidence which he felt due to the British Government, who, having no troops in occupation of any part of those countries, could not be called upon to take part in such an arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 508.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 458.)
My Lord, *Vienna, December 6, 1854.*

THERE can be no doubt of the construction put upon the four bases by Her Majesty's Government being in harmony with that given to them by the Cabinet of Vienna, as my letter of the 2nd December, stating Count Buol's adhesion to each different clause expounded in your Lordship's letter to me of the 22nd November, was read by me to Count Buol, and approved by him before transmitting it to you. I have this day read to him your Lordship's despatch, No. 388, which I received last night, and in going carefully through the explanation your Lordship gives of the meaning Her Majesty's Government attaches to the four bases, one by one, I find that Count Buol unreservedly agrees to the first clause, relating to the Protectorate of the Principalities; also to the second, respecting the navigation of the Danube; also to the revision of the Treaty of 1841, and to the general view of reducing the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and fourthly, as to the cessation of the official protectorate of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Porte, which she interpreted the Treaties of Kainardji, &c., as assuring to her.

These four bases having now been spontaneously accepted by the Emperor of Russia, without any fresh proposal from the Austrian Government, without any question of an armistice, and the three Powers completely understanding and agreeing in the interpretation of each Article as your Lordship explains it, Count Buol conceives that as no stoppage of the war is to result from entering into negotiation, it will be more advisable to bring Russia to state her adhesion to, or divergence from, the views and determinations of the three Powers to their Representatives, united to discuss them with her, than that Austria should undertake single-handed to enter into negotiation with her to elicit the definition of her understanding of the bases which she accepts, "purcs et simples," for such a separate negotiation single-handed would really be the negotiation for peace.

If the Emperor of Russia should think it advantageous to act with bad faith, he could gain no object by it, as the progress of the war would meet with no interruption from the fact of negotiations having commenced, and he would only make manifest his attempt to impose upon the united Powers to his own detriment.

Count Buol enters entirely into your Lordship's feeling of the difficulties of negotiating at a moment when the best blood in England has been poured forth in torrents, and he is quite aware that at such a moment no English Minister would consent to an inglorious peace; but all wars must end, after a great sacrifice of men, and a glorious peace, which is the object of war, can only be obtained by negotiation, and that negotiation, as it is now proposed, would be unfettered by any armistice or any interruption of the war. If Count Buol recommends negotiation it is with the view to a glorious peace; if it is not undertaken now it must be so at some future time, and certainly the terms required by the four bases, even if unexplained to mean more than their natural interpretation would warrant, are a most severe humiliation to Russia, who would lose by them all and every object for which she engaged in the war, and would make great sacrifices besides.

These are, as accurately as I can state them, the opinions and views expressed by Count Buol to me for your Lordship's information after I had read to him your able and detailed despatch of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 509.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1,472.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 8, 1854.*

I INQUIRED this afternoon what answer M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed to send to Count Buol's proposition, that the Representatives of England and France at Vienna should be authorised to send a copy of the Treaty of the 2nd instant to their colleagues at Constantinople.

His Excellency replied that no proposition of the kind had been made to him, but that he was of opinion that a communication of such importance ought to proceed from the Governments themselves, and not from their Agents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 510.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1,475.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 7, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a telegraphic despatch from M. de Moustier, stating that Count Esterhazy had invited the Prussian Government to adhere to the Treaty signed between Austria, England, and France, on the 2nd instant, and inquiring whether he was to support this invitation.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that as soon as the Governments of England and France had come to a decision upon this point, their Representatives at Berlin would receive instructions for their guidance.

After giving me this intelligence, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that since he had spoken to me on this subject yesterday, it had struck him that the Prussian Government might offer to adhere to the Treaty, and not to the Secret Article, which, he observed, would be placing Prussia in the position of having a voice in the deliberations for peace, without subjecting her in any way to the chances of war contemplated by the Treaty; that he had therefore instructed M. de Bourqueney, by telegraph, to state to Count Buol that Prussia must be asked to adhere to the Secret Article as well as to the Patent Articles of the Treaty, and that no reservation or condition of any sort would be permitted—she must adhere without observation, or not at all.

A despatch of the same tenour has been addressed by his Excellency to M. de Moustier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 511.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1,478.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 8, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, in alluding yesterday to a declaration which had been made by General Dabormida in the Sardinian Chambers, to the effect that Sardinia had no intention of taking any part in the Eastern war, observed that he greatly regretted this declaration, as he had not been without hopes that some of the secondary Powers of Europe, and Sardinia among them, might have been induced to adhere to the Treaty signed between Great Britain and France on the 10th of April last.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 512.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1,480.)
My Lord,

Paris, December 8, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this afternoon a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated the 4th instant, giving an account of the interview between Prince Gortchakoff and Count Buol, at which the latter informed the Prince of Austria having signed the Treaty of the 2nd instant. M. de Bourqueney adds some amusing particulars of the consternation into which the Representatives of the smaller German States had been thrown; but as this despatch has been, or will be sent to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship, and as I have but little time left to treat of more important parts of it, I must refer your Lordship to the French Ambassador for further details, which, however, are well worth your perusal. They certainly appear to exonerate Austria from all suspicion of any secret understanding with Russia.

To proceed to what is of more importance: it appears that after the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd instant, M. de Bourqueney read to Count Buol M. Drouyn de Lhuys' confidential despatch of the 22nd ultimo, respecting the nature of the guarantees to be demanded of Russia by the Western Powers.

M. de Buol made no remark upon the conditions themselves, but expressed an opinion that they must be matter of discussion; otherwise, he observed, the allies would be not negotiating for peace, but dictating terms of peace, and the burden of the negotiation would fall upon Austria alone.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that there was some weight in the objection raised by Austria, and he should wish, if possible, to meet it, without engaging in a negotiation which would end in no result. He thought that England and France should first agree on the exact nature of the guarantees to be required of Russia and he was employed in drawing up a paper on this subject); that when agreed, the two Governments should communicate the conditions to Austria and ask her adhesion. If that adhesion was given, Prince Gortchakoff might be asked whether he accepted them as the basis of negotiation. If he refused, no discussion would be engaged. If, on the other hand, Austria objected to any of the conditions, we might reasonably ask her how we could hope to make Russia accept conditions thought too severe by Austria, and what then would be the use of conferences?

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that I thought he had overlooked one essential point—that Prince Gortchakoff had indeed stated to Count Buol in an official note, that his Government accepted the four points recommended by Austria, but Russia had not expressed to the Western Powers a wish, or made an offer, to treat for peace; ought not this step to be insisted upon, and would it not be derogatory to the dignity of France and England to do more than they had already done, unless overtures for peace were made to them? I thought that the better course to pursue at the present moment would be, since Austria had communicated to the two Governments the correspondence with Prince Gortchakoff on this matter, to thank her simply for the communication.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, although agreeing, as soon as he heard me, that this should be the course followed, expressed a wish to be more frank and open with Austria, as to the conditions on which the Maritime Powers would consent to treat. I said that there could, I thought, be no difficulty in accompanying the short answer I had suggested by a confidential despatch, stating how impossible it was for the two Powers, after all that had occurred, to have the appearance of taking the initiative in negotiations for peace; that in fact matters stood thus—Russia did not ask to negotiate, France and England did not ask to negotiate; one or other must take the initiative. If Russia authorized Count Buol to express to the allies a desire on her part to treat for peace, well and good. The allies could reply on what terms they would treat; but nothing of the kind had been done, and the allies would place themselves in a very false position, if, on a simple declaration of Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol, that Russia accepted the four points, they offered (for it would be an offer if they made their conditions) to treat for peace. At the same time the allies assured Austria that

their intentions had not altered, and that they abided by all their former declarations.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, that he thought that the course which I had suggested should be pursued. That it was in conformity with the previous declarations of the allies, they having always refused to be parties to any offer of negotiation, and that, moreover, it would have the advantage of trying the sincerity of Russia in the desire which she had expressed for peace.

I have to ask your Lordship's indulgence for the extreme haste in which this despatch is written. I trust that I shall not have misrepresented the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on a matter of so much consequence, but I have taken great care to let M. Drouyn de Lhuys understand that I have no authority to treat this subject from your Lordship. In fact, it was only this afternoon that I became aware that Count Buol had not been specially authorized to make a communication from the Russian Government to those of England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 513.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 103.)
My Lord,

Bucharest, November 22, 1854.

I AM sorry to have to continue my reports of the conduct of the Austrian soldiery, both here and at Foxchani. At this latter place, my Agent gives me details I cannot repeat, but I inclose his whole letter in Italian.

I have seen the daily police reports presented to Omer Pasha, and nine offences out of ten are by Austrian soldiers, some of them of a very grave nature. The Préfet of Police has reported, that unless better discipline be maintained he cannot answer for the public peace; that the Wallachians, both soldiery and citizens, are so exasperated that on the first collision the consequences may be very serious.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure in No. 513.

Her Majesty's Consular Agent at Foxchani to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Eccellenza,

Foxian, li 3/15 Novembre, 1854.

DOPO li detagli che avrá inteso dal Capitano Vyner, corriere di Gabinetto, che ebbi il piacere di averlo in mia casa di quanto soffrono li abitanti di Foxian per la cattiva condutta delle truppe Austriache, mi fò un dovere di far gli altro rapporto di quanto è passato dopo la partenza del Capitano Vyner.

1. Una vecchia di anni 60 è stata violata per 7 soldati.

2. Una moglie de un prete Moldavano è stata violata in presenza del prete suo marito.

3. Un Boiar Comissi Selavo avendo una società di molti Boiar in son casa allasera, la moglie del detto Boiar si portò alla cucina per vedere se era pronto il tè, un soldato Austriacho che si trova in sua casa in alloggio, prese la signora Boiara nella cucina, e la voleva violare, ma cominciò a gridare, e fugita nella camera dove era il suo marito con una quantità dei Boiar. Allora il padrone Boiar andiede nella cucina a vedere come era l'affare, fù battuto come un cane dal soldato, e tirò la scibola per tagliare tutti quanti che si trovavano nella società, tutti come dei vili fuggirono alle loro case; il padrone si portò dal Comandante Austriacho per contarli il fatto, mandò una patroglia di 5 soldati per arrestarlo, il detto soldato non ha voluto sottomettersi agli ordini del Comandante, e restò nella medesima casa, la patroglia si ritirò, il soldato si trova sempre nel suo alloggio, e la Boiara fugita in un' altra casa.

4. Il Boiar Pachurgieu Simiolichi fù battuto dai officiali Austriachi che si

trovano alloggiatti in sua casa dopo che il medesimo Boïar li ha fatto tutte le onestà che non meritano questa gente, e restò battuto.

5. Il Presidente del Magistrato di Foxian in parte di Moldavia, ieri sera ha ricevuto li ordini di preparare dei ospitali per li Turchi che devono passare, come il Presidente Caminaro Bondisi ha una grande casa, ordinò alla polizia e al Commissario di fare sortire tre ò quattro malatti che si trovavano nella sua casa, e di metterli nelli altri ospitali, per fare questa sua grande casa l'ospitale per le truppe Turche. Furono eseguiti li suoi ordini dopo un' ora che erano partiti li ammalatti, e che dava li ordini convenuti per li letti che si dovevano fare per li Turchi, arrivò un ufficiale con 7 soldati, presero il padrone della casa Presidente del Magistrato, fù battuto e ferito in una mano; dove vengo in questo momento di vederlo nel letto, non posso dire di più.

Nella città nel mezzo hanno fatto delle scuderie [stables] di paglia per forza, una scuderia di paglia alle muraglie della Chiesa Cattolica, e tutti i giorni abbiano dei fuochi nella città messi espressamente, e con queste scuderie di paglia, non sò come finirà. Una deputazione di Foxian parte domane per Jassy, che il popolo si trova al momento di disperazione.

Con tutta, &c.
(Firmato) J. CALCAGNO.

No. 514.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 104.)
Bucharest, November 22, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Spathar Keresko having given in his resignation, it has been accepted, but no successor has been appointed. Colonel Pasnausky, chief of the Military Chancelry (a Russian by birth), has also been removed, and Colonel Vladoyano appointed his successor, to the scandal of the country. This Colonel commanded the Regiment of Wallachs at Buseo, in August last; when the rear-guard under D'Aurep left Buseo, he disarmed the Wallach regiment. This Colonel Vladoyano asked if any would volunteer to accompany the Russians. No answer being made to this appeal, he said, they were "un tas d'ingrats et qu'ils pouvaient aller au diable." Colonel Vladoyano is succeeded by a Russo-Greek, a Major Macedouski, as Colonel of the 3rd Regiment, who thus passes over several meritorious officers, his seniors. The Spathiarship is, it is said, reserved for the Prince George Stirbey, son of the Hospodar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

No. 515.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, December 9, 1854.

IN fulfilment of Article VI of the Treaty signed between England, Austria, and France on the 2nd December, you will, in conjunction with your Austrian and French colleagues, invite the Prussian Government to accede to it, but the Secret Article as well as the others must be adopted by Prussia, with a full understanding of the scope and bearing of the Treaty; no reservation or modification can be admitted. It is expected that Prussia will either accede to it without conditions, or decline it. Lord Westmorland has been directed to send you a copy of the Treaty when ratified.

No. 516.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 695.)
Therapia, November 21, 1854.

My Lord,

THE despatch from Colonel Neale, inclosed herewith in copy, corroborates the information previously received of the entire evacuation of the Dobrudscha by the Russian forces. It appears, moreover, that the positions of Isaktcha, Matchin, and Toultcha, had been entered by a detachment of Turkish Cavalry. Your Lordship will remark the uncertainty which is described as having prevailed of late in the movements of the Turkish army. The closing statement in Colonel Neale's despatch is at variance with Omer Pasha's intentions announced by himself to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 516.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, November 18, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Military Governor of Varna yesterday verbally communicated to me that the Dobrudscha was now entirely evacuated by the Russians, and Isaktcha, Matchin, and Toultcha, had been entered by a detachment of Turkish Cavalry. This intelligence is confirmed by an aide-de-camp of His Highness Omer Pasha, who arrived here this morning from Bucharest.

With respect to the movements of the Turkish army, the advance of the several divisions from Shumla, Ibraila, and Silistria, towards the Pruth, appears to have been ordered and counter-ordered once or twice within the last ten days. The aide-de-camp arrived this morning, however, informs me that the Turkish troops were again on their march across the Danube, and towards the Pruth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 517.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 699.)
Therapia, November 24, 1854.

My Lord,

A PARTIAL, but very sudden, change of administration has taken place at the Porte. Reshid Pasha was yesterday appointed by the Sultan to supersede the late Grand Vizier, Mehemet Pasha, and he is himself succeeded in the Department of Foreign Affairs by Aali Pasha, who, before he became Grand Vizier for a short time, filled the same office with some distinction.

I am assured that the change was wholly unexpected by the immediate objects of it, and that it emanated immediately from the Sultan's good pleasure. I do not apprehend that it will be attended with any change of policy.

The late Grand Vizier may be regretted on the score of integrity and firmness of character. In other important respects there is little reason to think that his loss, as head of the Government, will be severely felt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 518.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 700.)

Therapia, November 24, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith is a translation, in French, of the Imperial Rescript by which Reshid Pasha has been appointed once more to the office of Grand Vizier.

Further inquiries confirm my impression that there is no political signification in the change, which appears to have originated with the Sultan himself. Reshid Pasha assures me that he requested, in vain, the delay of a few days, and that, having to choose his successor in the Department for Foreign Affairs between Aali Pasha and Fuad Effendi, he gave his preference to the former, under a persuasion that the arrangement would be agreeable to Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have reason to believe that another important change is in immediate contemplation. The Minister of Finance will probably be dismissed, and, in the dearth of statesmen especially qualified for that department, I should not be surprised if Kiamil Pasha, the present Minister of Commerce, who is married to a relation of the Egyptian Viceroy, were to be appointed in his place. Whatever may be his merits or deficiencies, the State has everything to gain by the removal of the present incumbent.

By the new appointment of Aali Pasha, the Reform Commission loses its president. I have drawn Reshid Pasha's attention to the importance of making a good choice in the nomination of his successor.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 518.

Imperial Rescript.

(Traduction.)

Hatti-sherif publié à l'occasion de la nomination de Réchid Pacha au poste de Grand Vizier, et Aali Pacha à celui de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Mon illustre Vizier Mustapha Réchid Pacha,

EN conséquence de la retraite devenue nécessaire de Méhémed Pasha du poste de Grand Vizir, et attendu que nous avons en toi une pleine et parfaite confiance, et que tu es capable de remplir ce haut poste, nous te le conférons comme en étant digne.

Il est, par conséquent, devenu nécessaire de conférer à un autre personnage le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères; et comme Aali Pasha, Président du Conseil du Tanzimat, est propre à remplir cette place, nous le nommons Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Tu sais combien nous tenons à ce que toutes les affaires de notre Sublime Porte soient bien administrées et arrangées, à ce que notre Empire prospère, et à ce que le bonheur de toutes les classes de nos sujets soit assurée. Cela étant, nous voulons et nous attendons à ce que toi, aussi bien que tous les Ministres et les fonctionnaires, vous fassiez preuve de zèle et employiez tous vos efforts à réaliser nos vœux à ces égards.

Sur ce, nous prions le Très-Haut notre Seigneur d'accorder sa faveur divine et de facilité.

Le 2 Rebiul-evvel, 1271. (*November* 23, 1854.)

No. 519.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 704.)

Therapia, November 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of the instructions given to Osman Pasha of the Imperial Guard, who is to be sent in command of the Ottoman forces in the Crimea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 519.

Instructions given to Osman Pasha, of the Imperial Guard, sent in Command of the Ottoman Forces at Sebastopol.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial troops now at Sebastopol with the forces of the allies, and those to be sent hereafter, will amount to thirty battalions. His Imperial Majesty is very anxious that these troops should be firm in battle, and distinguish themselves by a proper spirit of religious zeal, patriotism, and military ardour: of which he has no doubt while under the able command of Osman Pasha.

The Pasha will, on his arrival, put himself in communication with the two allied Commanders-in-chief, and, after being informed by them of his duties, he will, in pursuance of his orders, employ his efforts for conducting himself as above laid down, the foundation of all military undertakings, and for fulfilling his duties properly on other more important matters. He will in this respect conform himself strictly with the instructions which he may receive from the Commanders-in-chief relative to the operations and administration of his forces, and carry them into immediate execution.

The Pasha will be careful to preserve discipline among his troops, and to inspire them with courage, &c. He will act towards the inhabitants of any places which may be taken, according to the injunctions of the Commanders-in-chief, and be careful in avoiding the commission of anything wrong, by express order of His Imperial Majesty. The Pasha will attend herein to the strict performance of justice.

The Pasha will make prompt and full reports to the Seraskier of any advantages gained over the enemy, or other military matters; and will be careful not to proceed beyond the limits of his present instructions. He will always be on terms of good fellowship with the allied troops with whom he is to act, and do nothing contrary to a spirit of good comradeship.

The Pasha will attend to the good administration and comfort of the troops. He will have to superintend himself the discipline and order of all the Ottoman troops, those already there and those to be sent out: but as the collective force at Sebastopol consists of the troops of the auxiliary and allied Powers, he must, under the circumstances, carry into immediate execution any instructions he may receive from the Commanders-in-chief relative to matters of war or military operations, and, in short, attend implicitly to their directions in all his military movements.

The Pasha will, therefore, act as above set forth in the execution of his duties and movements, in conformity with the exigencies of the times, and conduct himself bravely and uprightly.

No. 520.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 710.)

Constantinople, November 29, 1854.

My Lord,

THE further Ministerial changes which I gave your Lordship reason to expect, have already taken place.

Safeti Pasha has been removed from the Department of Finance to that of Commerce.

Kiamil Pasha, who preceded him in the latter office, is appointed President of the Reform Commission.

The new Minister of Finance is Shefiig Effendi, now raised to the dignity of Pasha. This Minister during several years was Chief Secretary to the Sultan, and subsequently Minister of the Mint. He is more remarkable for probity than for knowledge of finance.

I doubt whether the Ministry will remain long in its present cast of parts. There is much reason to question the efficiency of the Seraskier, and I have thought it my duty to call attention to his proceedings. There is unfortunately a dearth of men recommended at once by honesty and abilities for serving the State in its higher departments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 521.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 713.)

Constantinople, November 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE directed Mr. Pisani to inform Aali Pasha that Her Majesty's Government have taken steps to form a Mixed Commission at Vienna for the settlement of differences arising between the Ottoman and Austrian authorities, whether civil or military, in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The Porte, I have no doubt, will send corresponding instructions to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 522.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 714.)

Constantinople, November 29, 1854.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have demanded the trial and punishment of Mustapha Zarif Pasha, the late Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army at Kars. He arrived here a few days ago. I have suspended, meanwhile, the execution of a similar demand against the Generals of Division Kerim and Veli Pashas, on account of the altered manner in which Colonel Williams has spoken of the former in his latest despatches. It is desirable to know whether the appearance of amendment continues and extends. I have not, however, neglected the opportunity of remonstrating against the delays which have characterized the trial of Ahmet Pasha and Ali Ferik.

I thought it necessary to give my complaint a formal character by putting it into the shape of an official note. Copy of this note is inclosed herewith for

the information of Her Majesty's Government. The Ottoman Secretary of State, after having perused it, said that the two last-mentioned criminals laboured under such manifest proofs of guilt that they could not possibly escape.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 522.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Aali Pasha.

November 28, 1854.

IN obedience to special instructions from his Government, the Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, has the honour to call the attention of the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the frequent representations he has made on various occasions and in various forms respecting the corruption which has long prevailed and still unfortunately prevails in the administration of the Sultan's army at Kars, and the deplorable consequences which have resulted from it, in much unnecessary privation and suffering to the soldiers, in an immense loss of life, and in a diminution of numbers, strength, and spirit to a degree inconsistent with military success, and productive only of shame and defeat.

The Undersigned is more particularly directed to demand the punishment of those Commanders who are notorious for their participation in the infamous practices so often complained of, and, among the most prominent, to name the late Mushir, Mustapha Zarif Pasha, his predecessor Ahmed Pasha, and Ali Ferik, the two latter having been long since put on their trial, and, to all appearance, screened from the lawful result of their iniquity in a most inconceivable manner.

The Porte is earnestly requested to bear in mind that the Sultan's allies are making great sacrifices, incurring a heavy expense, and shedding profusely their best blood in His Majesty's cause; that they are in consequence entitled to require the correction of abuses subversive of all efficiency in the Ottoman armies, and to expect the condign punishment of officers or functionaries convicted of having wilfully persisted in corrupt practices ministering to their personal profit and fatal to the best interests of the Empire, or of having neglected their duty in presence of the enemy, and given an example of cowardice to the troops under their command.

The Undersigned requests that the present official note may be communicated to the Ottoman Council and also to His Majesty the Sultan. His Government will look with impatience for a reply conveying in clear terms the intention of the Porte as well with respect to punishing the above-mentioned criminals as to adopting immediate and efficient measures for preventing a repetition of abuses and restoring the army at Kars to that effective state which may render it capable of co-operating with the allied forces, according to the turn of events.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 523.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 719. Secret.)

Constantinople, November 30, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's information, is a translated copy of the Vizirial letter by which the Pasha of Egypt is invited to allow and facilitate the passage from Suez to Alexandria of any troops belonging to the British army in India, which Her Majesty's Government may think proper to send to the support of this Empire.

I propose to send the original to Her Majesty's Agent at Cairo by the earliest opportunity, and I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of my accompanying despatch to Mr. Bruce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 523.

The Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Egypt.

(Traduction.) *Le 8 Rebiul-evel*, 1271. (*November* 29, 1854.)

J'AI l'honneur de vous représenter ce qui suit :

On va faire venir à Constantinople, afin qu'ils se joignent aux forces auxiliaires qui se trouvent dans ces environs-ci, quelques régiments faisant partie de l'armée de l'Illustre Gouvernement Britannique qui est aux Indes. Seulement, comme le transport de ces régiments par une autre route serait difficile, le Gouvernement Britannique a fait savoir qu'on doit leur faire traverser l'Égypte par la voie de Suez.

Ces troupes doivent opérer leur jonction avec les forces employées contre les Russes.

D'après le Traité d'Alliance conclu entre la Sublime Porte et les Gouvernements Français et Anglais, le passage de troupes destinées à servir dans la question actuelle, par un endroit quelconque de l'Empire Ottoman, est permis aussi ; et puis votre Altesse fait preuve dans toutes les affaires d'un haut intérêt d'un zèle extraordinaire, c'est pourquoi Sa Majesté Impériale a ordonné de recommander à votre Altesse de permettre à ces troupes de venir du Suez à Alexandrie, et de là par mer ici, et de lui recommander aussi qu'elle prenne en même temps des mesures pour qu'un corps de troupes destiné à servir dans la cause de l'Empire Ottoman soit pourvu en route de tout ce qui peut contribuer à son repos et à ses aises.

Votre Altesse voudra donc bien ordonner à ceux de ses serviteurs qu'il faut de prendre toutes les mesures propres à procurer, et fournir complétement aux troupes susmentionnées, les moyens de traverser l'Égypte commodément, comme aussi tous les vivres et toutes les boissons nécessaires pendant leur séjour en Egypte.

(L.S.) MUSTAPHA RECHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 523.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Hon. Frederic Bruce.

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 30, 1854.

BEING informed by the Earl of Clarendon that a military force might be ordered from India in aid of the British army employed in this quarter, I have thought it desirable to obtain the removal of any obstacle which might by possibility retard its passage from Suez to Alexandria, that being the route by which the troops would find it most convenient to pass.

It must in fairness be presumed that Said Pasha would be little inclined to make any difficulty, but his Highness might think it proper to have the Sultan's sanction before he consented to the passage of a foreign force, however small in number, through a part of the Ottoman dominions.

In anticipation of this contingency, I have applied for letters to apprise the Viceroy of His Imperial Majesty's assent to the proposed passage of British troops, and I am happy to inform you that my request has been met with a ready and cordial compliance.

The Grand Vizier's letter to Said Pasha is inclosed herewith, and a translation accompanies it. You will observe that it is very considerately worded. You will, no doubt, find a convenient as well as an early opportunity for

presenting it to his Highness; and I cannot anticipate any but a favourable reply, which, I need not add, should be made known to Her Majesty's Government, and also to the Government of India, with the least practicable delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

No. 524.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 720.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 30, 1854.

IT is painful to observe that irritating differences continue to arise between the Commanders-in-chief of the Austrian and Ottoman armies in Wallachia. The correspondence, inclosed herewith in copy or translation, will show your Lordship on what points the disagreement more particularly turns.

It appears, moreover, that the conduct of the Austrian officers and soldiers, whenever they come into immediate contact with the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, is marked with circumstances of insolence and outrage tending to rouse a dangerous feeling of resentment and indignation among the inhabitants.

I derive my information on this subject principally from Mr. Colquhoun, who, no doubt, transmits to your Lordship the same information which he sends to me. The Internuncio, in conversation with me, refers the want of harmony which unfortunately prevails between Omer Pasha and Count Corronini, to military susceptibilities, and is unwilling to admit that any fundamental difference exists between his own opinions and those of Count Buol. He is now insisting on a demand of satisfaction from the Porte, on account of Sir Stephen Lakeman's proceedings at Bucharest, and on that plea he requires the withdrawal, if not from the whole of Wallachia, at least from its capital, of such refugees as are still employed in Omer Pasha's army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 524.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.) *Bucharest, le* 18 *Novembre*, 1854.

J'AI reçu la dépêche que votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 1 Novembre.

Votre Altesse m'a fait savoir que la question du mouvement de l'armée est tout-à-fait référée à moi, et elle m'a ordonné de prendre d'une telle manière l'acte qu'il s'agit de donner par suite des obstacles mis en avant par l'Autriche au mouvement des troupes. J'ai saisi le sens de vos ordres.

J'ai transmis il y a quelque temps au Seraskier Pacha la correspondance qui a eu lieu en conséquence de ce que les autorités Autrichiennes se sont mêlées de la question des mouvements de l'armée Turque, et des obstacles qu'elles y ont mis.

Le Général Coronini m'a envoyé une dépêche encore, par laquelle on voit qu'il y a toujours le même esprit d'opposition et que l'on veut tracer la ligne des mouvements de l'armée. Je m'empresse de vous en transmettre la copie. Votre Altesse se mettra en parcourant ces pièces au fait de tout.

Dernièrement nous avons voulu établir un corps de garde à Ibrail, mais le Général Autrichien à Galatz a protesté contre ce projet. Il s'en est suivi une correspondance qui a duré une dizaine de jours et dont copie est ci-inclose.

Lorsque ces pièces existent, et en présence de tous ces faits, c'est-à-dire lorsque les Autrichiens protestent non-seulement contre les mouvements de l'armée Impériale, mais même contre l'établissement d'un corps de garde, je crois, dans mon humble opinion, que ces faits et ces pièces sont en eux-mêmes un acte utile et valable, et que nous avons par là obtenu ce que nous voulions.

(Signé) OMER LUTFI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 524.

Omer Pasha to Count Coronini.

(Translation.)

Bucharest, November 18, 1854.

Excellency,

I HAVE received your two despatches, dated respectively the 5th and 9th of November, the first without inclosure, the second with the No. 421 of the despatches sent to me, both referring to the impending movements of the Imperial Ottoman army.

In the first of these despatches your Excellency does not point out any obstacles that lie in the way of these movements, but only expresses a wish to know the limits within which they will be confined, and states that the garrisoning of Monolopa, without your being previously informed of it, does not concur with your desires.

In the second, however, your Excellency confines the operations to a certain district. Now as these despatches mutually contradict each other entirely, I feel myself called upon to make the following remarks.

The garrisoning of Monolopa by a portion of the Imperial Ottoman troops took place on account of the establishment of outposts of observation. It is a measure which an army in the neighbourhood of an enemy finds itself forced to adopt, and the service details of which, falling on an inferior commander, who is forced to carry them out quickly, without losing any time in corresponding with his superiors, render any previous communication of the intention impossible. The institution of such outposts does not even require to be made known to the Commander of the army itself.

With regard to the second despatch of the 9th, the limits marked out appear, when the boggy nature of the right bank of the Pruth is taken into consideration, especially insufficient for an army 60,000 strong; and the more so as this little strip of land does not in itself permit of any tactical development, and you can, therefore, count upon no practical result.

Resting upon what I have just stated, and in consequence of advices which I have received from our Ambassador at Vienna, both by telegraph and courier, I feel myself under the necessity of informing your Excellency that I intend to carry out, without the least restriction, the already well-known operations, and which I communicated to you in my despatch No. 152 of the 6th November, nor do I doubt that your Excellency, knowing and appreciating that the operations of an army to be made available for any good must be unrestrained, will do due justice to my motives.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) OMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 524.

Omer Pasha to the Grand Vizier.

(Traduction.) *Bucharest*, 27 *Sefer*, 1271. (18 *Novembre*, 1854.)

J'AI pris la liberté d'écrire à votre Altesse pour lui demander la permission de me rendre à Constantinople pour peu de temps; mais j'ai parfaitement compris le sens de la réponse que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de la part de votre Altesse, en date du 9 courant. Voici ce que j'ai compris: comme il y a actuellement des troupes Russes du côté de Tultcha, de Isaktcha, et de Matchin, que les troupes Ottomanes se trouvant dans leurs quartiers d'hiver il n'existe pas une force considérable réunie quelque part, les Généraux Russes pourraient saisir l'occasion de votre éloignement de l'armée pour faire une diversion vers ce côté-ci; ce qui non-seulement dérangerait l'ordre des choses actuel, mais ferait une impression funeste sur l'esprit des Bulgares. C'est pourquoi je dois renoncer à mon idée de partir; et il faut que, sans perte de temps, je fasse ce qui sera nécessaire pour chasser les Russes qui sont de ce côté-là, et les pousser au-delà du Danube, et pour détruire la flotille Russe qui est sur le Danube—opérations qui seraient très utiles si l'on pourrait les mettre à exécution.

Votre Altesse a déjà appris par le rapport que j'ai envoyé dernièrement que les Russes ont abandonné complétement la position qu'ils avaient aux environs

de Tultcha, et qu'ils se sont tout-à-fait retirés, et que le Général de Brigade Ismail Pasha y était arrivé avec le corps de Cavalerie qu'il commande. Mais comme jusqu'alors on n'avait pas envoyé là un détachement de troupes, les habitants avaient quitté le pays—ce qui rendait le séjour du corps de troupes envoyé à Tultcha difficile et couteux. Il était d'ailleurs certain que si l'on envoyait un corps de troupes à Ibraila, les Russes craignant de voir leurs communications coupées se seraient retirés, comme en fait ils se sont retirés, de ces environs-là après l'arrivée du détachement. Ainsi l'objet qu'on avait en vue a été obtenu.

Il est certain que les Russes ne cessent d'exciter les habitants de la Bulgarie, et par conséquent rien de plus juste que les observations de votre Altesse à cet égard—observations qui m'empêcheront de partir. Je continuerai d'avoir les yeux ouverts sur ce qui se passe en Bulgarie, et d'avoir soin, sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, de cultiver sans cesse les esprits des Bulgares, et d'empêcher tout événement fâcheux en Bulgarie.

Venons maintenant à la question de la destruction de la flotille Russe sur le Danube. Il faut d'abord se rendre maîtres des fortifications que les Russes ont élevées à Rahui, à Vadolissaki, et à Formossi; et puis s'emparer des forteresses de Killi et d'Ismail. Or il est de fait, il est de superflu de le dire, que ces pays-là sont des pays ouverts, qui n'offrent aucun moyen de nous y mettre à l'abri des rigueurs de l'hiver. Si les troupes qu'on y enverrait étaient, Dieu les en préserve! Saisies par un chasse-neige, elles seraient tout-à-fait perdues. Il serait donc très mal-habile de les exposer à ce danger. Ajoutez à cela que les forteresses susmentionnées sont du premier ordre; qu'il est par conséquent difficile de les prendre, qu'il faut y établir des sièges en règle, et que celui-ci n'est pas le temps qu'il faut pour cela.

Quoiqu'il en soit ces sortes de choses n'ont du succès qu'en autant qu'il plaît à la Providence de les favoriser. On ne peut pas donc dire dès à présent ce qui se fera, ni ce qui ne se fera point.

Quant à notre mouvement actuel nous prions l'Etre Suprême de daigner le bénir.

(Signé) OMER LUTFI.

Inclosure 4 in No. 524.

Omer Pasha to the Seraskier.

(Traduction.) *Bucharest*, 27 *Sefer*, 1271. (18 *Novembre*, 1854.)

J'AI eu l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence par le rapport que je lui ai adressé tout récemment, que lorsque l'armée Impériale a commencé sa marche pour opposer un mouvement en avant, le Général Coronini a tracé une ligne qui ne nous convenait point; qu'à cause de cela j'ai arrêté pour le moment la marche des troupes; que j'ai fait connaître cet état de choses, par voie télégraphique, à Londres et à Paris; et que je demandais là dessus les ordres de votre Excellence.

Comme la réponse n'est pas arrivée, que j'ai compris qu'elle tarderait encore, et que d'ailleurs les troupes qui s'étaient mises en mouvement de leurs quartiers respectifs étaient déjà en route, qu'arrêter la marche d'une armée déjà en mouvement c'est faire naître des difficultés et faire souffrir l'armée Impériale des suites d'une mauvaise direction, j'ai pris par règle de ma conduite la communication faite déjà par l'Ambassadeur Ottoman à Vienne, et après avoir adressé au Comte Coronini une réponse, dont je transmet ci-joint copie à votre Excellence, j'ai, conformément au premier plan, fait continuer la marche des troupes.

Si votre Excellence ne trouve par ce mouvement des troupes à propos, elle a le temps de me le faire savoir jusqu'à ce que j'arrive à Fokschani, où j'attendrai.

(Signé) OMER LUTFI.

No. 525.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 462.)

Vienna, December 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a telegraphic despatch which I sent yesterday to Mr. Colquhoun, Her Majesty's Consul-General in Wallachia, relative to the differences which have arisen between the Austrian and Turkish Commanders in the Danubian Principalities respecting the movements of the Ottoman army.

I have likewise the honour to inclose a copy of the memorandum alluded to in my despatch to Mr. Colquhoun, which was signed by Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, and transmitted by the Turkish Ambassador to Omer Pasha and to his Government. The Turkish Ambassador had expected, at the latest, to have received yesterday the authorisation from his Government to take part in their conferences, but as it did not arrive by the post, he wished not to sign the memorandum, although he gave it his entire approbation and recommended the principles it established.

Your Lordship will perceive from this document that the Commission have endeavoured as far as possible to combine the double object of leaving entire liberty of action to the Turkish Commander-in-chief for any offensive operation he might contemplate against Bessarabia, without at the same time embarrassing the arrangements of the Austrian Commanders for the resistance they are engaged to offer to any attempt of the Russians to enter the Principalities, and considerable extension has been made in the ground left free for the movements of the Turkish army.

Both Count Buol and General Hess, as well as every member of the Commission, showed the greatest anxiety that no unnecessary impediment should be thrown in the way of these movements, and as your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 1st December, expressing the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that Omer Pasha should comply with the wishes of the English and French Generals, was immediately forwarded to Mr. Colquhoun, and as a despatch of a similar tenour was yesterday sent by Baron Bourqueney to the French Consul-General at Bucharest, I trust we may with confidence anticipate that no further difficulty will arise, and that the reinforcement of Omer Pasha's army, which Lord Raglan is looking for with anxiety, may immediately be forwarded to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—By telegraph from Bucharest, it is announced that Omer Pasha is satisfied by the communication of their opinions, and that he will await the receipt of the memorandum announced to him, and of the orders he may receive from his Government, before undertaking any further operations.

W.

Inclosure 1 in No. 525.

The Earl of Westmorland to Consul-General Colquhoun.

Vienna, December 5, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

UPON reports received from Bucharest of further discussions as to the movements of the allied Austrian and Turkish forces, the Commission of the four Powers, with General Hess, met on the invitation of Count Buol, and drew up a memorandum setting forth the principles upon which they consider that these movements should be regulated, which will be transmitted to you by post, and by the Turkish Ambassador to Omer Pasha. It is to be desired that no further action as to these discussions should take place till you have received this

document. It is the more desirable that these further discussions should be put an end to, as the Treaty of Alliance between England, France, and Austria was signed on the 2nd instant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 525.

Memorandum.

LES rapports les plus récents des Principautés ayant donné lieu de craindre que les chefs des différentes armées ne se fussent pas complétement entendus sur leurs positions respectives et sur les lignes de démarcation nécessaires aux opérations de chacune d'elles, la Commission composée des Représentants des quatre Puissances, et à laquelle avaient été invités à se rendre les Généraux De Hess et Létang, s'est rassemblée pour rechercher et établir les moyens les plus propres à prévenir tout espèce de conflit.

Après mûr examen la Commission est tombée d'accord sur les principes suivants pour régler l'occupation des Principautés Danubiennes, tant sous le rapport de la Convention conclue entre l'Autriche et la Turquie, que sous celui de l'opération offensive de l'armée alliée vers la Pruth:

1. L'emplacement et la position militaire de l'armée Autrichienne, comme force principalement destinée à la défense des Principautés en cas de besoin, doit être assuré de manière que, par une position de flanc, elle puisse remplir ce but aussi bien en Moldavie qu'en Valachie.

Les troupes Autrichiennes en Moldavie doivent donc occuper une ligne qui ne permette pas seulement leur communication libre et continuelle de l'une des Principautés à l'autre, mais couvre en même tems le dos de leurs propres provinces et ait la profondeur nécessaire pour ces positions et cantonnements.

2. L'armée Turque, de son côté, a besoin de l'espace nécessaire pour la marche et le développement d'une masse de 60,000 hommes entre le Sereth, la Byrlat, et le Pruth, pour se mouvoir avec aisance et pouvoir faire ses opérations pour le passage de ce fleuve.

Ces deux principes posés, une ligne allant de Fultschi sur le Pruth par Bolesh et Dokolemy jusqu'à la Byrlat, et de là le long de cette rivière jusqu'à Tekush, est la seule qui peut encore remplir ce double but ci-dessus indiqué, en laissant à l'armée Turque la libre action de presque quinze milles Allemands en longueur le long du Pruth et toute la largeur nécessaire pour ses opérations et pour leur base, tandis qu'elle est en même tems pour l'Autriche la seule et la plus reculée que ses troupes pourraient prendre pour ne pas abandonner tout-à-fait cette Principauté et retarder par cela, de leur côté, toute action à un terme incalculable.

En conséquence les Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et le Général de Létang, ont demandé à l'Ambassadeur Ottoman de vouloir bien transmettre à son Altesse le Généralissime Ottoman le présent memorandum comme contenant l'expression des vœux de la Commission siégeant à Vienne, tandis que le Général Baron de Hess s'est chargé de son côté de faire parvenir aux Commandants Autrichiens l'ordre d'occuper la ligne indiquée pour les troupes Autrichiennes.

Vienne, le 4 Décembre, 1854.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARIF.

No. 526.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1854.

YOU may confidentially give a copy of my despatch No. 388 to Count Buol, if his Excellency desires it.

No. 527.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1,488.) *Paris, December* 10, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to apprize your Lordship that the French ratifications of the Treaty of the 2nd instant were sent to Vienna yesterday.

The ratifications of the Treaty and of the Secret Article were separate, as desired by your Lordship, though against the rule generally observed in France.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 528.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 491.) *Berlin, December* 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a translation of the despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, dated the 15th of November, in reply to the Austrian despatch addressed to Count Esterhazy at Berlin on the 9th of November, conveying the assent of His Prussian Majesty to the Austrian proposals for a joint communication to the Diet at Frankfort, and inclosing the draft of a Federal Resolution to that effect, provided that this Agreement between the two Cabinets shall be recorded in the form of an Additional Article to the Convention of the 20th of April.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 528.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

(Translation.) *Berlin, November* 15, 1854.

YOUR Excellency has already been made acquainted, through the kindness of Count Buol, with the reply of the Imperial Cabinet to our communications of the 30th ultimo. Count Esterhazy has in the meantime likewise communicated to me the despatch addressed to him on the 9th instant, and I inclose a copy of it to complete the documents of the Mission.

It has afforded us great satisfaction to perceive that the Imperial Austrian Cabinet appreciate the sincere wish for an Agreement which dictated our proposals of the 30th of October, and our satisfaction has been the more lively, as we trust we are enabled to form, from the general impression which its remarks have made on us, the desired conviction that the two Courts are sufficiently agreed as to the means and objects of their common position with respect to the great questions connected with the Oriental complications to make in common further proposals to their other allies in the Diet. Actuated by the desire to

effect this in as short a time as possible, we have submitted to a most searching examination the reasons on which, on general and on particular grounds, the Austrian Cabinet deemed it necessary to oppose our previous form for an eventual Decree of the Diet. In doing so we have taken into account as much as possible the considerations which Austria owes to her European position, and her obligations arising therefrom. I believe I may pass over the details. One assumption, however, I must point out as resting generally on a misconception, namely, that we had intended to declare the four points, under all circumstances, as exclusively binding for us and our allies, and thus to fetter Austria to this extent. On the contrary, Article III of our Project had the case in view in which new demands would have to be made in the interests of the countries of Central Europe, and appointed for this case only a previous common resolution. We are of opinion that, if Austria were to agree to this in the form of a Decree of the Confederation, she would be only acting in the spirit of the Treaty of April 20. But we appreciate, as has been already said, the objections raised by the Cabinet of Vienna, and we have therefore taken care, as far as the adherence to our own opinions permitted, to expunge from the new Project which is herewith inclosed, and which His Majesty the King has specially sanctioned, everything which could be in contradiction to the Austrian view; and, on the other hand, to adopt nearly verbatim the three points as Austria herself has worded them in the draft of an instruction to the Imperial Minister at the Diet communicated to us, so that we may confidently count on Baron Prokesch being authorized to pronounce himself in the Committee for the adoption of this project.

His Majesty the King, in declaring his concurrence with such a Decree of the Diet, as has been already frequently remarked, is nevertheless penetrated with the conviction that, to avoid discussions and dissenting votes, it can only be taken, if an Additional Article has been previously agreed to, pronouncing the protection of Austria in the Danubian Principalities, which the Imperial Cabinet itself acknowledges as going beyond the original principle of the Treaty of April. His Majesty has also ordered everything to be avoided in the drawing up of this Additional Article which could possibly delay an understanding.

This is the leading consideration which has given rise to the inclosed Project, which has also been sanctioned by His Majesty, and your Excellency will communicate it to Count Buol, observing that, if it meets with the concurrence of His Majesty the Emperor, your Excellency is authorized to sign it with Count Buol without loss of time. Should they prefer in Vienna that the signature should take place here, Count Esterhazy can be easily authorized by telegraph to sign with me. The formalities of giving the full powers can be fulfilled afterwards. But when the Additional Article has been signed, it will be immediately communicated to our German allies, as well as to our Representatives in Frankfort, and its general adoption will not only not be attended with any difficulties, but it will also materially simplify the labours of the Committee connected with it; for the latter would only have to frame their propositions with reference to it, which, arising out of a Project agreed to by Prussia and Austria, will be certain of being unanimously adopted in the Committee as well as by the Diet.

Your Excellency will, without delay, communicate this despatch and its inclosures to the Imperial Cabinet. His Majesty attaches great value in bringing this matter—in which he has been guided by the most lively care for the interests of Prussia and Germany, and at the same time of those of Europe in general—to a speedy conclusion in the sense implied above, and confidently calculates on the cooperation of his august ally His Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

I look forward with the greatest interest to your Excellency's report on the result of the steps taken by you.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 529.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 494. Confidential.)

Berlin, December 8, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph on the 5th instant, that Count Esterhazy had received a copy of the Treaty signed last week at Vienna, and only waited for the French Minister and myself being similarly instructed by our Governments to communicate it to Baron Manteuffel, and invite Prussia to accede to it. The Austrian Minister has since informed me, that having been pressed by Baron Manteuffel to let him know the text of this Treaty—for all sorts of versions of it were circulated through the town—he had consented to do so confidentially, and left a copy with him for communication to the King, in the hope that His Majesty might perhaps be disposed to consider it with greater favour, than if he were kept any longer in ignorance on the subject. Count Esterhazy explained that the position of Austria in this matter was different from England and France, and that it was essential for Austria to endeavour to conciliate the goodwill of Prussia, on account of the influence she exercised in Germany, and that with this view he had resolved to make this confidential communication.

The Austrian Minister then said to me, that he had been instructed by telegraph to inquire of Baron Manteuffel the meaning of intelligence, which had reached Vienna, of M. de Bismarck's having made a declaration at Frankfort, that in consequence of the conclusion of the Treaty of the 2nd instant, between Austria, France, and England, the position of Austria in Germany was changed, and that he saw no necessity for pressing the Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th of April, through the Diet.

Baron Manteuffel answered that he was ignorant of any such proceedings on the part of M. de Bismarck, and that he would inquire. He has done so, as I understand, to-day, and endeavours to make out that there must have been some misunderstanding, and that the question will take its course; but there can be no doubt that M. de Bismarck's aversion to Austria prompted him to take a step in this matter which it appears has failed, through the vigorous representations of Austria.

I feel it my duty to bring this incident to your Lordship's knowledge, as it will show the total want of discipline in the diplomatic service of Prussia, and the difficulty which exists of carrying out any measure that is not in accordance with the views of the Court party.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 530.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 496. Confidential.)

Berlin, December 8, 1854.

My Lord,

THE greatest excitement and confusion has prevailed here since the arrival of the intelligence from Vienna of the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd instant, and Austria has been loudly accused by the Court party of treachery towards Germany for entering into such an alliance with the Western Powers.

I have reason to believe that at first it was suggested to the King that there was nothing left for him but to prepare to maintain his neutrality, and to put his army on the war footing for this purpose; but, after the first burst of anger and consternation, more prudent counsels have prevailed, and the usual policy of this Government of waiting to see whether fresh incidents may not arise that may allow them to follow a system of waiting on events, and coming to no decision until forced by circumstances to do so, is to be pursued.

The Liberal party lavishes every abuse on the policy of a Government which has brought the country into this disgraceful position, and I have reason to believe

that the King's feelings towards those persons by whom he is surrounded have been greatly modified. His Majesty never placed, I believe, much confidence in their opinion; and, if ever there was a favourable moment for shaking their hold on him, it has now arrived.

However, the vacillating character of the King, the influence of the Queen, and the difficulty attending the removal of the many persons about him, scarcely allow one to expect that a radical change is possible at the present moment. Nevertheless the Court party are, I am credibly informed, trembling for their places, and, if the Treaty is followed up by more vigorous acts on the part of the allies, we may be allowed to hope that a serious impression will be made on the influence which Russia at present exercises in this country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 531.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 497.)

Berlin, December 8, 1854.

My Lord,

IN the course of conversation to-day with Baron Manteuffel, he alluded to the question of the proposals for peace which had been made at Vienna. I asked his Excellency if he had received any further information on the subject from St. Petersburgh, when his Excellency replied that despatches had reached him this morning from Baron Werther, from which it certainly appeared that the Emperor of Russia was desirous for peace, and that His Imperial Majesty was disposed to make great concessions to obtain it; but he added that no new light had been thrown on the subject by Baron Werther, and that the only tangible points were to be found in the note which had been addressed to Count Buol by Prince Gortchakoff on the 28th ultimo, a copy of which, together with his Excellency's answer, had been forwarded for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, which he sincerely hoped would lead to negotiations. I replied that Her Majesty's Government would certainly not be disposed to take the simple acceptance of the four points by Russia as a "point de départ" for negotiations, and that we should require some guarantees from Russia of the sincerity of her intentions before we consented to meet in conference with a Russian Plenipotentiary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 532.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, December 11, 1854.

I HAVE communicated to my Austrian and French colleagues the substance of your Lordship's instructions of the 9th instant. The Austrian Minister has not been furnished with a copy of the Secret Article. The French ratification passed through Berlin to Vienna this day. The French Minister has received copy of the whole Treaty, and has been instructed to urge its acceptance on the Prussian Minister, but is directed only to communicate the Secret Article if he should find Prussia designed to accede.

I hasten to inform you of the apparent divergence of our instructions in case you should have any fresh orders for me. The King of Prussia has not yet taken any decision. It is said that the Treaty is not favourably viewed by His Majesty. He is annoyed that it has not been yet submitted by the Western Powers. The delay allows time for communication between Berlin and St. Petersburgh.

No. 533.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

Vienna, December 11, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I RECEIVED, late last night, the ratifications; I went immediately to Count Buol and the French Ambassador, in hopes of being able to exchange them to-day, so as to announce it to your Lordship before the meeting of Parliament; but the French ratifications are not arrived.

I will send the Treaty to Lord Stratford. I announced to him, a fortnight ago, that it would be signed, and, on Monday last, that it was signed, stating its general import.

I will send copy of Treaty, when ratified, to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin.

No. 534.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon—(Received December 12.)

Vienna, December 11, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French ratifications are not yet received. The Austrian are ready: the change you desired in the date of the Treaty signed the 12th is already made. As soon as the ratifications are exchanged, Count Buol will send the Treaty to Berlin, with directions, in concert with the British and French Ministers, to [?] it to the acceptance of the Prussian Government; if they adhere to it the Secret Article will be communicated. I shall at the same time send the Treaty to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin. By a telegraph to the Turkish Ambassador I learn that Omer Pasha left Bucharest yesterday for the Crimea.

No. 535.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 141.)

Frankfort, December 9, 1854.

My Lord,

AN extraordinary sitting of the Diet was convoked to-day for the purpose of receiving the report of the Commission on Oriental Affairs, relating to the Diet's adhesion to the Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th of April.

The report of the Commission was in favour of unreserved adhesion, and was adopted by the Diet with the single dissentient voice of Mecklenburgh; the Representative of those States referred to the previous dissent of those Governments from the Treaty itself, with the observation, however, that under the prospect of the Diet being united in opinion, the Mecklenburghs could not refuse to fulfil their federal obligations.

The report of the Military Commission will be the next step, and several preparatory measures already taken suffice to indicate that a portion at least of the federal contingents will be placed upon the war footing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 536.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 464.)

Vienna, December 9, 1854.

My Lord,

I BROUGHT before Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 389 of the 30th ultimo, which refers to the repeated impediments opposed by the Austrian Generals in the Principalities to the movements of the Turkish army for the

invasion of Bessarabia, which had been recommended by the Porte, by the English and French Governments and by the Commanders-in-chief of the allied armies. As your Lordship states in this despatch (and as it was reiterated upon the present occasion by Count Buol), the Austrian Government have given assurances that no intention ever existed to interfere with that movement, and that orders in conformity with these assurances have been transmitted to the Austrian Generals.

Not only have these orders been transmitted, but, as your Lordship has already been informed by my former despatches, Count Buol has invited the Commission established in Vienna, and composed of the Turkish Ambassador, the French Minister, Baron de Bourqueney, the French General, Letang, and myself, with whom General Du Plat was associated (but who was, unfortunately, prevented by illness from attending), to meet for the purpose of learning from himself (Count Buol) and from General Hess, the Austrian Commander-in-chief, what were the orders transmitted to the Generals in the Principalities, and what were the principles upon which these orders were issued, as well as the limitations which, consequent upon the duties respectively imposed upon the Austrian and Turkish armies, it had been judged right to establish.

According to the details given by General Hess, it appears that the first application of Omer Pasha for the passage of his troops for the purpose of invading Bessarabia contained the proposal that the Austrian garrisons of Ibraila and Galatz should retire from those positions, in order to allow his army to move forward upon the Pruth. My despatches to your Lordship of the 16th and 18th of October will explain what took place at that period, and in my despatch No. 399 of the 25th of the same month, I report that when Mr. Colquhoun and M. de Poujade informed Omer Pasha of the decision of the Austrian Government, "that he was entirely unfettered as to carrying into effect the movement he contemplated," his reply was, "that he considered any movement of importance upon the Pruth as now useless, and that the season was too far advanced to allow of a campaign in Bessarabia," &c.

In the postscript to my despatch No. 410 of the 1st of November, I state what General Hess reported to me of the transactions which took place between himself and Omer Pasha as to the occupation by the Turkish troops of Ibraila and Galatz at that period.

At the meeting of the Commission on the 4th instant, to which I have above referred, General Hess stated that since his arrangement with Omer Pasha in October, the Ottoman Commander-in-chief had again announced his intention of advancing to the Pruth in a different direction by Folkschani and to Jassy. This proposed operation I referred to in my despatches Nos. 441 of the 26th of November, and 462 of the 6th of December; and upon the same occasions I had likewise the honour to report General Hess's declaration made to the Commission, that upon having received this fresh application from Omer Pasha to allow him to pass through the districts occupied by the Austrian troops to Jassy, he, as Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, charged with the defence of the Principalities, had felt it his duty to refer to the Emperor for his orders upon the subject, and he then proceeded to detail the decision which the Emperor had come to. The Commission adopted the conclusions which were drawn up and consigned in the memorandum transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 462 of the 6th instant; and I hope the decisions therein taken, and the reasons for adopting those decisions, will be accepted by Omer Pasha, and will put an end to the unfortunate discussions which have taken place between the military Commanders of the strictly allied Austrian and Turkish armies. By the last intelligence received from Bucharest, it appears that Omer Pasha has decided upon immediately conforming himself to the wishes of the Commanders-in-chief in the Crimea, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, and of the English and French Governments, and that he has decided upon embarking the greater part of his army for Baluklava, and uniting himself with the allied troops engaged in operations against Sebastopol.

With respect to the letter addressed to Achmed Pasha by General Augustini, it appears that it was occasioned by a march of a part of the troops of this Pasha into the quarters occupied by the force under General Augustini's orders, without any previous communication, and before the latter had received the instruction from his superior officer to evacuate the position in charge of which he had been placed. General Augustini at that time had received only the first orders which

had been issued by General Hess for the passage of the Turkish troops to Formosa, and was, therefore, totally unprepared for their march into the cantonments he occupied; and he conceived that this was carried into effect by Achmed Pasha and his brigade upon his own responsibility, and without the courtesy and attention due to a general officer in command of troops belonging to a Sovereign allied to his own and fulfilling the important duty of defending the territory of the latter from attack. The language of this letter has been disapproved by Count Buol, and General Hess has taken measures to prevent a repetition of terms which are of a nature so contrary to the harmony and good feeling which it is his anxious object to maintain with the military authorities of the Porte, but he cannot but also find fault with the want of courtesy, and of established military regulation, which appears to him to have characterised the conduct of the Turkish Pasha, in entering the district occupied by a considerable corps of troops of a friendly Government, who by virtue of a Treaty were cantoned in the district which had been assigned to them by their superior officers.

Your Lordship is aware that I had already expressed myself with warmth upon this subject at the meeting of the Commission which took place on the 25th of November, and as I am convinced that it is as much the object of General Hess as of Count Buol that the most perfect harmony should exist between the Austrian and Ottoman armies, I hope this may be the last occasion upon which I may be called upon to make any observations upon this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 537.

Précis of a Despatch from Count Buol to Count Colloredo, dated Vienna, December 3, 1854, communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, December 13.

COUNT BUOL, after referring to the telegraphic despatch by which he had informed Count Colloredo that Count Nesselrode had declared to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh the acceptance by Russia of the four points indicated in the Notes of the 8th of April, and to conversations which he had had with Prince Gortchakoff, incloses for the information of Count Colloredo copy of a note which Prince Gortchakoff had addressed to him on this subject, together with copy of his own reply.

In submitting to the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government this overture of Russia, Count Buol remarks, that in the eyes of the Austrian Government the note of Prince Gortchakoff amounts to a complete adhesion to the four bases of peace; and he considers it capable of affording the ground for the commencement of serious negotiations.

This opinion is confirmed by the announcement made to him by Prince Gortchakoff, that the acceptance of these four bases by Russia implies the necessity of her renouncing the religious protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Sultan and the political protectorate of the Danubian Principalities, and of her recognizing the principle of the free navigation of the Danube, and the revision of the Treaty of 1841. Count Buol proceeds to examine possible objections to opening negotiations.

It may be said that Russia may not be sincere, and that she has accepted the four bases only for the purpose of detaching Austria from her adhesion with the Western Powers.

In answer to this, Count Buol points to the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd of December. Since Russia, he argues, must in face of this Treaty renounce the hope of detaching Austria from the alliance so long as the objects of that alliance are not completely attained, what interest can she have in commencing fictitious negotiations, or in delays which will be injurious rather than advantageous to her, since delay increases the chance of the number of her enemies being added to. Count Buol thinks the tone of Count Gortchakoff's conversations with him an argument in favour of the sincerity of the Russian Court.

Believing then that it is improbable that Russia wishes to open negotiations only to gain time, Count Buol thinks no time should be lost in taking her at her word, if only to test her sincerity.

The first interchange of ideas between the Plenipotentiaries would, Count Buol thinks, be enough to show whether Russia would agree to the practical application as well as to the definitive sanction of the guarantees which Europe has a right to require.

Either Russia will make the sacrifices required of her, or she will not. If she does, peace will follow; if she does not, the Western Powers will have the satisfaction of avoiding the reproach of having rejected an honourable opportunity of terminating the present contest, and Austria, having exhausted every attempt at conciliation, will be more than justified, from that time, in concerting with the allied Powers the most efficient means of restoring peace. What risk could the Western Powers have in opening negotiations? Russia does not demand the suspension of hostilities before the opening of negotiations, which, however, does not exclude the hope that if the negotiations should take a favourable turn, an armistice may be agreed to.

Inclosure 1 in No. 537.

Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol.

Vienne, le $\frac{16}{28}$ *Novembre*, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé en mission extraordinaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, est autorisé de déclarer à M. le Comte de Buol-Schauenstein, Ministre, &c., que Sa Majesté l'Empereur son auguste Maître accepte les quatre propositions du Cabinet de Vienne, pour servir de point de départ à des négociations de paix.

Le Soussigné, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 537.

Count Buol to Prince Gortchakoff.

Vienne, le 30 *Novembre*, 1854.

LE Soussigné, &c., s'est acquitté du devoir de placer sous les yeux de l'Empereur la note que M. le Prince de Gortchakoff lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du 28 du courant. Sa Majesté Impériale en a relevé avec une vive satisfaction que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies accepte les quatre propositions préliminaires que M. le Comte de Esterhazy avait été chargé de présenter dans le commencement du mois d'Août passé au Cabinet Impérial de Russie comme bases d'une entente générale.

Appréciant dans toute leur valeur les intentions qui ont inspiré cette importante résolution, l'Empereur François Joseph ne croit pouvoir mieux y répondre de son côté qu'en s'empressant d'en faire l'objet d'une communication auprès des Cours de Paris et de Londres, avec lesquelles il se trouve engagé pour l'atteinte d'une solution franche et équitable de ces quatre points jugés comme étant les préliminaires indispensables au rétablissement de la paix générale.

Le Soussigné, &c.

No. 538.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 413.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1854.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship copy of a despatch[a] from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest, reporting certain changes in the military

[a] No. 514.

commands in Wallachia, and I have to instruct you to communicate the same to Count Buol as a further proof of the consequences resulting from the reappointment of Prince Stirbey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 539.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 416.)
Foreign Office, December 14, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch in cypher of the 9th instant, desiring you to transmit a copy of the Treaty of the 2nd December to Lord Bloomfield, I have to inform you that I have instructed his Lordship, in conjunction with his Austrian and French colleagues, to invite the Prussian Government to accede to the Treaty; but the Secret Article, as well as the others, must be adopted by Prussia with a full understanding of the scope and bearing of the Treaty—no reservation or modification can be admitted. It is expected that Prussia will either accede to it without condition, or decline it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 540.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 14, 9 A.M.)

Vienna, December 13, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French ratifications are arrived. The exchange will take place to-morrow.

No. 541.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 15.)

Vienna, December 14, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

M. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest le 13, 2 P.M.:—

"No. 29. Your Excellency is requested to forward the inclosed, received this morning from the Crimea:"

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*Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle.**

December 7, 1854.

Nothing important had recently occurred here.

Enemy withdrew yesterday more troops from position they have occupied since 25th October in front of Balaklava to the other side of the Tchernaya; the precise object of this movement has not been ascertained.

Two Russian steamers came out of the harbour of Sebastopol yesterday, probably with a view to reconnoitre the Bays Nabrenetis and the position of the French army; they exchanged some shots with our steamers, and were then

* A portion of this towards the end was so confused in the cypher that nothing more can be made of it.

driven back by the and "Terrible" and a French steamer. The weather is fine to-day; if it continues so the roads will become better, and we shall have less difficulty in bringing up supplies, materials for siege.

The 90th and part of the 94th have arrived as well as a detachment of artillery.

According to the last accounts from Bucharest, troops continue to to the Crimea.

Some Turkish troops have arrived and will land at Eupatoria, and Omer has been again urged to come himself.

The above was brought from Crimea by Colonel Simon.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 542.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 415.)
Foreign Office, December 13, 1854.

My Lord,

AS Mr. Colquhoun's despatch No. 103 of the 22nd ultimo has passed through your Lordship's hands, I conclude you will have made known to Count Buol the atrocities committed by the Austrian soldiery in the Principalities; and I have to instruct your Lordship to report to me what may have been the result of such communication, and whether any measures have been taken for restaining the license of the soldiers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 543.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 1,498.)
Paris, December 13, 1854.

My Lord,

IT was only yesterday that I was made acquainted (whether from design or accident I cannot say—probably a mixture of both) with the text of the answer which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had proposed to Her Majesty's Government to join him in addressing to the Court of Vienna, in reply to the announcement made by Count Buol to the two Governments, that the Emperor of Russia consented to accept the four points as a basis of negotiation for peace. On reading it I could not help stating to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that on the strength of my previous conversations with him, I had led Her Majesty's Government to expect a very different document. I noticed particularly, that while I had been assuring Her Majesty's Government that in the French proposition to be submitted to them, a formal demand on the part of Russia to treat for peace formed a *sine qud non* to all negotiation, the note which M. Drouyn de Lhuys now proposed to authorize M. de Bourquency to address to the Austrian Government, took for granted that that demand had been or would be made, and that whereas I had led Her Majesty's Government to expect that the third point would be developed in a sense that would leave no doubt on the mind of Count Buol, as to the exact intentions of the Maritime Powers for diminishing the supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea, that point had been left more vague and undetermined than before.

Although M. Drouyn de Lhuys denied immediately that there was any change either in the sentiments of the Emperor, or of his own, in regard to the two points to which I had called his attention, it was not without much questioning, and I am compelled to add, through more than one contradiction on his part, that I arrived at an understanding of the practical course which he wished to pursue in conjunction with Her Majesty's Government, towards the Court of Vienna.

It may be summed up as follows:—

M. Drouyn de Lhuys having already, as he says, declared to M. de Bourquency that the note accepting the four points, addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol, and communicated by the latter to Paris and London, cannot be considered as an invitation to the belligerent Powers to open a negotiation for peace, proposes to recall that declaration to M. de Bourquency's recollection in a new despatch, and to add, that should the Russian Minister at Vienna authorise Count Buol, or any one else, to ask the Maritime Powers to treat for peace, that then, but not until then, M. de Bourquency is to state, that according to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 2nd instant, the three Powers who signed it are called upon to deliberate in common as to the terms in which peace can be made, and to invite Count Buol to carry out this stipulation by an exchange of notes, the draft of which has been submitted for the consideration of her Majesty's Government.

In the course of the conversation, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that your Lordship had also objected to the vagueness with which the objects of the third point had been described in the note: he added, that he thought that after explanation and upon further consideration, you would admit that vagueness was not only desirable, but necessary.

What did the French note state? That it was necessary to diminish the maritime preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. How? That must depend on the events of the war. Every measure remained open to the allies. But to declare now that they demanded, as was your Lordship's wish, that Sebastopol should be destroyed, and the Russian navy reduced within certain limits, would be to authorize Austria to suppose that more would not be required, while he must be permitted to say that the French Government looked to far greater results, and wished to leave the field for them open. Again, was there not something objectionable, not to say ridiculous, in stipulating for the destruction of a place before which the allied armies had now been above two months, without damaging a stone of it, and which was still open to a successful defence? If a reverse happened to our arms, in what a position would the two Governments be, after having declared in the face of Europe that they would be satisfied with nothing less than the destruction of Sebastopol? He was willing that this should be the understanding between the two Governments, but not that it should be their declaration to the world at the present moment. Thirdly, he observed that it would be the height of imprudence to give Austria, unnecessarily, a pretext for leaning towards Russia under the plea that the allies required too much.

For these reasons, while abiding in the fullest sense by all that they had ever said or written, respecting the measures to be taken for clipping the wings of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, the Emperor and himself adhered to the opinion that it was impossible at the present moment to give any definite description of the means which the allies proposed to employ to attain their ends.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought that these reasons were equally applicable against the presentation of a memorandum to the Austrian Government, with a view of developing the sense of the third point,—a suggestion which it appears that your Lordship had also thrown out to Count Walewski.

Before proceeding further with my despatch, I will state that I had had an opportunity of ascertaining the Emperor's views and sentiments on the previous day, and that they coincided completely with what M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated to me; but I must also add, that from the assurances given me by His Majesty, I cannot for a moment suppose that his policy in regard to the Black Sea is in reality at variance with ours, or that he is not prepared to go fully as far as Her Majesty's Government,—to strike such a blow in the East, as shall destroy all danger of Russian aggression for ever.

To return to my conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I observed to his Excellency that the position of Her Majesty's Government and of that of the Emperor was completely different. The latter, so to say, had no account to render to any one but to the Emperor, while the former were liable to the searching investigations of Parliament and of public opinion. Many things, therefore, that were easy to the latter were impossible to the former. Such appeared to me to be the case in the present instance. The explanation of the third point, as now desired by the French Government, was made less explicit

than it had been. How could Her Majesty's Government justify this retreat to Parliament?

Your Lordship is aware how anxious I have for some time been to obtain some Act from the French Government which should bind them more securely to us, and prevent, as far as possible, any unforeseen accident separating their policy in this war from ours. With this object in view, I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether, if Her Majesty's Government acceded to the programme recounted in the commencement of this despatch, he would enter into some more solemn engagement as to the minimum of the terms on which the allies would insist ere they laid down their arms. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, not only that he would enter into such an engagement with pleasure, but that if ever Her Majesty's Government were summoned to explain their conduct, they might publish it to the world.

I inquired further, whether, if Austria herself remarked on the vagueness of the definition of the third point, and required further explanations, the French Government would give them explicitly and without reserve in the sense understood between the allied Governments. His Excellency replied in the affirmative. Secondly, I asked whether, the case arising, the French Government would be equally explicit with a Russian Plenipotentiary. I received the same answer.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys at so late an hour yesterday that I was unable to send your Lordship this report. I called upon him again this morning, and found him in possession of the addition which your Lordship had proposed, through Count Walewski, to make to the definition of the third point. His Excellency said that he had received the Emperor's orders again to entreat your Lordship not to press it. He reverted to the suggestion which I had made yesterday of a declaration on the part of the two Governments, and he said that the Emperor adopted it completely; that your Lordship could not make it too comprehensive for the policy of the French Government; that there was no desire to make peace until the object of the war had been fully attained, and that he doubted whether, when they came to compare notes, the French Government would be as easily satisfied as Her Majesty's.

His Excellency added, that if your Lordship preferred the words "faire cesser la suprématie de la Russie" to "diminuer la prépotance de la Russie," he would adopt them. Still, he hoped that if the Austrian Government preferred the former term you would consent to its being retained.

It will be for Her Majesty's Government to determine whether the objections they entertain to the French proposal can be met or modified by such a declaration as that I have ventured to suggest.

Whatever may be the Emperor's reason for adhering so strongly to his (for it is his) definition of the third point, I feel convinced that he will be greatly annoyed if Her Majesty's Government persist in opposing it. My own persuasion is, that it is dictated by one feeling alone—that of drawing Austria further into the alliance. Whether it is the best course to take, and whether, if it succeeds, it is for our future interests, is another point, but I respectfully offer for your Lordship's consideration, whether it is not better to cede the contested point, and to take, at the same time, the best security we can for ourselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 544.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 14, 1854.*

I HAVE reason to believe that the King of Prussia will decline to accede to the Treaty of the 2nd of December. His Majesty considers that he has been duped by Austria; he is indisposed to act in conjunction with her, and in order to try and resume his place with the Great Powers intends proposing a Treaty to England and France of the same tenour as that of the 2nd December, but with stipulations for preventing revolutionary proceedings in Poland, and

insuring the Prussian territory from being traversed by French troops, in promotion of the war against Russia.

M. de Usedom will proceed on a special mission to London, with a letter to the Queen and communications to Her Majesty's Government.

No. 545.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, December 11, 1854.*

I FIND an expression of opinion, very nearly to the following effect, in several different organs of the German public press in relation to the effect likely to be produced by the working of the Tripartite Treaty of the 2nd of December: That the alliance of Austria with the Western Powers will prove that no third party or Power exists in Germany, and that all the efforts of M. Von der Pfordten and his associates to found a *tertium quid* of any weight, are fruitless.

The understanding now arrived at, compels all minor German Sovereigns to take a decision, and either to unite with Austria, or to remain floating at the mercy of eventualities, a prey to all the evils of internal impotence and external isolation.

The accession of Prussia to the Treaty is generally expected, but not without well-founded suspicions that in so doing that Power will still endeavour to hinder and thwart all action against Russia to the utmost of her ability.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 546.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,234.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 15, 1854.*

I INCLOSE the abstract of a despatch from Count Buol, which was read to me by Count Colloredo, who at the same time placed in my hands the copy of a note from Prince Gortchakoff announcing that the Emperor of Russia accepted the four propositions of the Cabinet of Vienna as the "point of departure" for negotiations for peace, and of Count Buol's note in answer to Prince Gortchakoff.

Count Buol, in his despatch to Count Colloredo, states his reasons for thinking that the Emperor of Russia is sincere in his offer to negotiate for peace, and strongly expresses his desire that this offer may not be rejected by Her Majesty's Government.

I told Count Colloredo that I did not share Count Buol's opinion as to the sincerity of Russia; that I did not consider the note of Prince Gortchakoff was an offer to treat for peace, and that a hollow and illusory negotiation would be alike repugnant to the Government and people of England; but that upon a matter of such importance I could give him no answer until I had obtained the Queen's sanction, after consulting with my colleagues, and having ascertained the views of the French Government.

On the 10th instant, Count Walewski communicated to me the draft of an identic note, copy of which I herewith inclose, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed should be delivered by the Ministers of England and France at Vienna to Count Buol, who, if he concurred in its terms, was to be invited to give an identic reply; that these notes should then be communicated to the Russian Minister, as containing the interpretation given by the three Powers to the bases, and it would then be for Prince Gortchakoff to say whether he was authorized to adopt that interpretation of the bases, and accept them so explained as the "point of departure for negotiations."

On the following day I informed Count Walewski that, in the opinion of

Her Majesty's Government, no further communication to the Austrian Government was necessary, as Count Buol was fully in possession of the views of the English and French Governments respecting the bases, which we had every reason to believe were in accordance with those of the Cabinet of Vienna, and that he had only to make them known to Prince Gortchakoff, and ascertain whether they would be adopted by Russia. The two Governments would thus be spared the necessity of entering upon a negotiation with the Russian Minister which was unlikely to lead to any useful result, and which might give rise to much misunderstanding, and be difficult to explain satisfactorily in the present excited state of the public mind. Her Majesty's Government, however, being desirous to meet the wishes of the Government of the Emperor, which were so earnestly pressed on them by Count Walewski, would not object to the course which M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed to pursue, and they were prepared to agree to the Ist, IInd, and IVth Articles in the project of note; but the IIIrd appeared to them open to serious objections, as it referred to the revision of the Treaty of 1841, which was by far the most important of the four bases, and the only one on which we could rely for effectually securing the objects of the war. It had hitherto not been defined with sufficient precision; but as the note of M. Drouyn de Lhuys left it more vague and uncertain than before, it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government that the conditions to be required of Russia, with reference to the Black Sea, should be distinctly stated.

Count Walewski said he would communicate this to his Government, and he yesterday placed in my hands a copy of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, copy of which is inclosed, stating at great length and with much ability the grounds on which his Excellency hopes that Her Majesty's Government will adopt the draft as originally proposed.

The views of Her Majesty's Government remain unchanged; they still think that no further notes are necessary; but your Excellency is instructed to inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government will adopt his project of note. They must, however, request that his Excellency will agree to substitute in the IIIrd Article, for "diminuer" the words "faire cesser," or "mettre fin," and to omit the word "maritime" after "prépotence."

It is obvious that the words "diminuer la prépotence maritime" imply a consent on the part of England and France to a maritime ascendancy of Russia in the Black Sea. From the moment such an admission is made it is of little consequence whether that maritime preponderance is maintained by ten line-of-battle ships or twenty. Ten line-of-battle ships escorting fifty transports would effectually overcome Turkish resistance at the Bosphorus and put an end to the Turkish Empire in Europe.

Nor would it be just and right to Austria to leave her in the belief that England and France would consent to a security so illusory.

Her Majesty's Government consider it quite indispensable that the expression of a desire to treat for peace should proceed from Russia, and be formally communicated to the Ministers of England and France at Vienna, and they trust that the Government of the Emperor will be of opinion that upon no other ground could the proposed course of proceeding be justified or defended.

Her Majesty's Government likewise consider it an object of extreme importance that their views and those of the Government of the Emperor respecting the revision of the Treaty of 1841, should be recorded in a formal document. The honour of the two Governments, the real issue of the war, and the future tranquillity and equilibrium of Europe, are all involved in the conditions that are to be imposed on Russia; and I accordingly inclose a note which embodies the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and your Excellency will address it to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who, Her Majesty's Government do not doubt, will address to you a similar note in answer.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 546.

Précis of a Despatch from Count Buol to Count Colloredo, dated December 3, 1854.

[See No. 537.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 546.

Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buól, November $\frac{16}{28}$, 1854.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 537.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 546.

Count Buol to Prince Gortchakoff, November 30, 1854.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 537.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 546.

Projet de Note.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français (de Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande), a l'honneur d'annoncer à son Excellence M. le Comte de Buol, &c., qu'informé de la démarche faite par M. l'Envoyé de Russie à Vienne, et de laquelle il résulte que l'acceptation par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg des quatre points spécifiés dans les Notes du 8 Août dernier a été suivie d'une demande (on doit être considérée comme une demande) d'entrer en négociation préliminaire sur les bases avec les Représentants des trois Puissances signataires du Traité du 2 Décembre, dans le but de préparer le rétablissement de la paix, son Gouvernement l'a autorisé à prendre part à une conférence à laquelle assisterait le dit Envoyé. Toutefois le Traité d'Alliance qui existe aujourd'hui entre leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Français, l'Empereur d'Autriche, et la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, imposent à leur Gouvernements l'obligation de n'entrer dans aucun arrangement avec la Cour Impériale de Russie avant d'en avoir délibéré en commun, il est essentiel, pour que leurs Plénipotentiaires tiennent le même langage, qu'ils se donnent réciproquement l'assurance qu'ils comprennent absolument de la même façon l'application des quatre principes proclamés en commun.

Le Soussigné a reçu, à cet effet, l'ordre de préciser le sens que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français attribue à chacun de ces principes, en se réservant d'ailleurs, comme il l'a déjà fait, le droit de modifier selon les circonstances, et notamment dans le cas où l'Article V du Traité du 2 Décembre viendrait à se réaliser, l'opinion qu'il exprime aujourd'hui, comme aussi de poser, conformément à l'Article I du même Traité, telles conditions particulières qui lui paraîtraient exigées, en sus des quatre garanties, par l'intérêt général de l'Europe à prévenir le retour des complications qui ont si malheureusement troublé son repos.

Le Soussigné déclare donc: 1. Que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, en jugeant avec ses alliés qu'il était nécessaire d'abolir le protectorat exclusif exercé par la Russie sur la Moldavie, la Valachie, et la Servie, et de placer dorénavant sous la garantie collective des Cinq Puissances les privilèges reconnus par les Sultans à ces Principautés dépendantes de leur Empire, a entendu et entend qu'aucune des stipulations des anciens Traités de la Russie avec la Porte concernant les dites Provinces ne saurait en aucun cas

être remise en vigueur à la paix, et que les arrangements à conclure à leur sujet seraient ultérieurement combinés de façon à donner une pleine et entière satisfaction aux droits de la Puissance Suzeraine, à ceux des trois Principautés, et aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

2. La liberté de la navigation du Danube ne sera assurée que lorsqu'elle se trouvera placée sous le contrôle d'une autorité Syndicale investie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour détruire les obstacles existant aux embouchures de ce fleuve ou qui s'y formeraient plus tard. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale croit en outre, si tel est aussi l'avis du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, qu'il importe, afin de donner à cette garantie spéciale tout son développement, d'examiner dans quelle mesure il conviendrait de laisser subsister la juridiction territoriale à laquelle, en vertu de l'Article III du Traité d'Andrinople, est soumis actuellement le cours du Bas Danube à partir du point où il devient commun aux deux États riverains.

3. La révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, doit avoir pour objet de rattacher plus complétement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à l'équilibre Européen, et de faire cesser la prépotence de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Quant aux arrangements à prendre à cet égard, ils dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour qu'on puisse dès à présent en arrêter les bases; il suffit d'en indiquer le principe.

4. La Russie, en renonçant à la prétention de couvrir d'un protectorat officiel les sujets Chrétiens du Sultan du rit Oriental, renonce également par voie de conséquence naturelle à faire revivre aucun des Articles de ses Traités antérieurs et notamment du Traité du Kutschuk-Kainardji, dont l'interprétation erronée a été la cause principale de la guerre actuelle. En se prêtant leur mutuel concours pour obtenir de l'initiative du Gouvernement Ottoman la consécration et l'observance des privilèges religieux des diverses communautés Chrétiens sans distinction de culte, et en mettant ensemble à profit, dans l'intérêt de dites communautés, les généreuses intentions manifestées à leur égard par Sa Majesté le Sultan, elles attacheront le plus grand soin à préserver de toute atteinte la dignité de Sa Hautesse et l'indépendance de sa Couronne.

Le Soussigné a le ferme espoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche partage les idées résumées dans la présente note, et aussitôt qu'il en aura reçu l'assurance, il sera prêt à faire usage de ses pleins pouvoirs. Il est du reste bien entendu que le résultat de la conférence préliminaire à laquelle le Soussigné est autorisé à assister serait communiqué immédiatement à la Sublime Porte, et que si ce résultat était satisfait le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman serait invité à prendre part aux conférences subséquentes, qui ne pourraient plus se tenir sans lui.

Le Soussigné, &c.

Inclosure 5 in No. 546

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.

Paris, le 12 Décembre, 1854.

M. le Comte,

J'AI reçu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire sous le No. 231 et que je me suis empressé de placer sous les yeux de l'Empereur. Ma dépêche No. n'avait fait que reproduire les instructions émanées de Sa Majesté elle-même, qui pense que le plan de conduite soumis en ce moment au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et dont vous avez parfaitement exposé les avantages à Lord Clarendon, est toujours celui qu'il convient le mieux de suivre. Je ne puis guère que retomber dans mon argumentation précédente; il est deux points cependant que je veux particulièrement mettre en relief.

Si la Russie demande à entrer en négociation sur les quatre garanties dont la note passée par son Envoyé à M. le Comte de Buol contient l'acceptation sans condition ni réserve, nous ne pourrions nous refuser, à moins de méconnaître nos engagements, à prendre part à la réunion préliminaire à laquelle nous serions invités. Interpellés officiellement à ce sujet par le Cabinet de Vienne, avant la conclusion du Traité du 2 Décembre, nous lui avons fait une réponse qui nous oblige aujourd'hui à accueillir ses ouvertures. Notre droit se borne à entourer notre assentiment à des pourparlers avec le Représentant du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg de précautions qui, en sauvegardant notre dignité, nous empêchent aussi

de tomber dans un piège. Or, M. le Comte, le meilleur moyen d'éviter ce danger, s'il existe, c'est assurément de faire nos affaires nous-mêmes et de n'autoriser personne, pas même un allié, à communiquer sans nous avec l'ennemi. Ce mode, je le répète, serait une dérogation au Traité du 2 Décembre. Nous créerions de notre fait à l'Autriche une situation mitoyenne et nous retarderions volontairement l'époque où elle doit unir ses forces aux nôtres. N'est-il pas à la fois plus simple et plus sage, en nous référant à des promesses données et reçues, de convenir avec le Cabinet de Vienne, dans des termes qui ne se prêtent à aucune équivoque, des questions à poser en commun au Plénipotentiaire de Russie? Je ne vois pas, pour ma part, du moment où il ne s'agit que de raisonner sur le sens des Notes du 8 Août, comment il serait possible de formuler d'une façon plus satisfaisante pour nous les garanties relatives: 1. Aux Provinces de Moldavie, de Valachie, et de Servie; 2. A la navigation de Danube; 3. Aux intérêts des populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie, combinés avec l'indépendance souveraine du Sultan. Je ne vois pas, d'un autre côté, quelle objection l'Autriche serait fondée à opposer à cette formule.

Reste le point spécial de la révision du Traité de 1841. Il y a là, à mon sens, deux choses qu'il ne faut pas confondre—la garantie Européenne, à laquelle le Cabinet de Vienne a souscrit comme nous, et les garanties plus complètes qui doivent dériver du succès de l'expédition Crimée. C'est de la garantie Européenne que nous avons seulement, dans la phase actuelle de la question, à nous entretenir avec l'Autriche. Cette garantie consiste dans l'adoption d'un système propre à relier plus intimement l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman à celle de l'équilibre général, c'est-à-dire, à rompre à tout jamais le tête-à-tête auquel le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg tenait d'autant plus qu'il en avait abusé davantage, et dans l'admission en principe d'une diminution de la prépotence de la Russie sur l'Euxine.

Voilà, M. le Comte, ce que l'Autriche, dans l'état des choses, s'est engagée à soutenir avec nous; il y aurait de l'imprudence à lui demander plus, et, je n'hésite pas à le dire, notre dignité elle-même y répugnerait. En effet, le Cabinet de Vienne, bien qu'il ait signé le Traité du 2 Décembre, n'a pas encore acquis envers nous des droits tels que nous ayons à le mettre dans nos confidences, et à lui faire part de ceux de nos projets qui se rattachent aux opérations de nos armées et de nos flottes. Restons avec lui dans les limites où ses propres obligations et la force des choses nous répondent de sa bonne volonté; il nous suffit d'avoir, en sus des quatre garanties, réservé sans cesse nos conditions particulières, et laissé entrevoir, dans mes dépêches comme dans celles de Lord Clarendon, l'ensemble de nos prétentions ultérieures. Notre loyauté se trouve ainsi à couvert, et les difficultés du siège de Sébastopol indiquent assez hautement ce que nous aurons à faire de cette place formidable, une fois qu'elle sera tombée sous les efforts de nos soldats.

Lorsqu'il sera démontré, et l'événement, j'en suis convaincu, donnera avant peu raison à mes prévisions, que les Notes du 8 Août ne sauraient servir de base même à de simples préliminaires de paix, la situation de l'Autriche aura totalement changé, et rien alors ne s'opposera plus, la Clause Secrète du Traité étant devenue exécutaire, à ce que cette Puissance connaisse nos plans et à ce que nous soyons mis au courant des siens. Si nous nous expliquions à fond avec elle avant que sa rupture ne soit consommée avec St. Pétersbourg, nous nous exposerions d'abord à ce que l'on omit des doutes sur les résultats de notre expédition, et à ce que l'on nous alléguât, leur incertitude pour taxer nos demandes d'exagération, et ensuite—considération non moins importante à mes yeux—à ce que plus tard, lorsque le succès aurait couronné nos armes, on essayât d'amoindrir les conséquences que nous voudrions tirer de notre victoire en nous opposant les déclarations que nous aurions spontanément faites.

Depuis longtemps, M. le Comte, nous avons exprimé des opinions absolument conformes au mémorandum du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique; je me contente de vous rappeler mes dépêches Nos. 176 et 178. Nous sommes en outre tombés d'accord à cette époque que nous ne devions pas laisser préjuger la destination définitive du territoire de la Crimée à l'expiration de la guerre, et encore moins sa rétrocession à la Russie; je verrais donc les plus graves inconvénients si, dans les circonstances présentes, nous remettions, même à titre confidentiel, à M. le Comte de Buol un document qui dominât d'une façon quelconque nos droits de belligérants. A mon avis, notre conversation avec le Cabinet de Vienne ne doit actuellement avoir pour objet que les

Notes du 8 Août. Nous ne l'étendrons utilement à d'autres matières que si la Russie entre largement dans la voie des concessions, ou, ce qui est plus probable, que si la lutte continue avec elle. Dans le premier cas, nous ne serons liés par aucune parole surabondante et nous resterons maîtres de régler soit en dehors des quatre garanties, soit en les interprétant, nos compensations d'après le calcul de nos sacrifices. Dans le second cas, nous n'aurons limité aucune des perspectives qui nous ouvrirait l'alliance armée de l'Autriche. J'ajouterai que cette marche ne compromet en rien les intérêts de la Porte, et qu'en établissant qu'une seconde conférence avec le Plénipotentiaire Russe ne pourrait se tenir en l'absence d'un Plénipotentiaire Ottoman, nous gagnons un temps précieux sans que la dignité de notre alliée reçoive aucune atteinte.

Je me plais à croire, M. le Comte, que Lord Clarendon appréciera ces considérations à toute leur valeur, et je vous autorise, s'il le désire, à lui remettre confidentiellement une copie de cette dépêche et de la précédente sur le même sujet.

Agréez, &c.
(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Inclosure 6 in No. 546.

Draft of Note to be presented by Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

HER MAJESTY'S Government, considering it of great importance that a clear understanding should exist with the Government of the Emperor of the French as to the interpretation of the third basis of negotiation, which provides for the revision of the Treaty of 1841, and the conditions to be required of Russia; the Undersigned has been directed to make known to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Sebastopol is the seat of danger to Turkey, as it is from thence that Russia is always able to menace the existence of the Ottoman Empire, which it is the policy and the determination of England and France to maintain. Russia, however strictly she may be bound by Treaties, may, at any moment when it suits her purpose, declare war against Turkey; and, being in possession of Sebastopol, with a powerful fleet and a numerous army, she may, in forty-eight hours, reach Constantinople, and seize upon the heart of the Ottoman Empire.

The Porte would be too weak, and the allies of the Sultan too distant, to oppose any effectual resistance to such a *coup de main*. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be in the possession of Russia, and, long before any hostile forces could be brought against her, she would be in a position to defy them.

Turkey, thus held firmly in her grasp, and the Black Sea then really a Russian lake, it is manifest that the countries bordering on that sea—Circassia, Georgia, Persia, and Asia Minor—must at once fall under her dominion, and it is equally clear that the power of Russia must extend over Greece, Thessaly, Albania, and the Danubian Principalities.

Russia would then be in a position to dictate the law to Europe; every evil that England and France hoped to avert by the war might occur; every object they mean to attain might be frustrated, and these calamities would be directly deducible from the retention of Sebastopol by Russia, and her great naval and military preponderance, that would be the natural and certain result of such an error on the part of England and France—an error that would render null all the sacrifices they have made, the treasure that has been expended, and the blood that has flowed.

England and France must, therefore, insist upon the demolition of Sebastopol, and, if possible, also of the other Russian fortresses on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Russia must be bound by Treaty not to reestablish them, nor at any other point in the Black Sea to establish a great naval arsenal. Russia must not have more than four ships of war to be employed hereafter in the Black Sea.

Other nations, including Turkey, must be limited to the same number, if the Porte consents to annul the Treaty of 1841; but no final decision can be taken on this point until the Porte has been consulted.

And, in order to superintend the faithful observance of Treaty engagements by Russia, England and France must have the right to appoint Consular Agents at such places in the Black Sea as may be agreed upon by Treaty.

No. 547.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 247.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BERNSTORFF has read to me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel urging upon the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government the request of the Cabinet of Vienna that England and France should consent to enter upon negotiations in consequence of the four bases having been accepted by Russia.

I asked Count Bernstorff whether his Government had adopted, or meant to adopt, the Treaty of December 2, as, otherwise, I must consider that Prussia still maintained the policy of isolation that, for some time past, she had prescribed to herself, and I did not, therefore, understand what title she had to advise the belligerent Powers as to the course they should pursue.

Count Bernstorff replied that, as Prussia was in strict alliance with Austria, he conceived his Government was entitled to support any proposal made by Austria which had for its object the restoration of peace.

I told Count Bernstorff that Her Majesty's Government were also desirous of peace, but that it must be a just and honourable peace, and one that would afford guarantees for the future tranquillity of Europe, and that, until the Emperor of Russia agreed to give such guarantee, the war would be prosecuted with the utmost vigour.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 548.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 1,502. Confidential.)

Paris, December 13, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Emperor stated to me the day before yesterday that he had received a further letter from the Emperor of Austria, in which that Sovereign, after alluding to the satisfaction which the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd instant had afforded him, expressed a hope that the deliberations of Austria and France, in conjunction with England, undertaken (if I rightly understood the Emperor) in consequence of the acceptance of the four points by Russia, might lead to the restoration of peace. Should he (the Emperor Francis Joseph) be deceived in his hopes, he should be ready to fulfil the other engagements which he had undertaken. His Majesty signed himself the good brother and ally of the Emperor of the French.

The conversation thus opened, and continued, at intervals, to some length, turned naturally on the answer which the Western Powers should return to the intimation made by Austria that the Russian Government was willing to accept the four points as a basis of negotiation for peace, and on the value of the alliance into which Great Britain and France had entered with Austria.

On the former of these questions the opinion of the Emperor did not differ much from that which I have reported to your Lordship, on former occasions, appeared to be that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys; only with respect to the third point, or that which relates to the Black Sea, His Majesty observed that he thought the definition of the intentions of England and France should be confined to a declaration of their determination to reduce the maritime power of Russia in the Black Sea. He did not think it would be prudent to say more at the present moment, and he added, with some emphasis, that he hoped that

the project of answer which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had sent to Count Walewski would be adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

As I had not then seen the text of this answer, and as it had been submitted for your Lordship's consideration, I did not feel it necessary to say more than that I had little doubt the two Governments would, as heretofore, easily agree in the line of conduct to be pursued; but that I hoped that His Majesty would not forget the position in which the two Governments stood: that all we knew at the present moment was, that the Emperor of Russia, out of deference to Germany, as he expressed himself, consented to accept the four points, but that he had not as yet sued the belligerent Powers for peace; and that it would be beneath the dignity of England and France to make propositions unless more specially required by Russia to do so.

On the question of the value of the Treaty with Austria, and of the advantages to be derived from it, I ventured to be more explicit. I said that His Majesty might think me too prone to suspicion; but that from various circumstances which had come to my knowledge I felt convinced that the object of Austria was not to join England and France in war, but to entangle them in negotiations for peace. Her Majesty's Government had followed the lead taken by France, in accomplishing this Treaty with Austria, not because they expected any very beneficial results from the Treaty, but because they saw that France desired its conclusion; nay, more, they understood and appreciated the motives which led France to desire it. But I hoped also, I said, that the Emperor would take care that no bad results arose from it. I could not help fearing that Austria might profit by the alliance to endeavour to detach France from her intimate alliance with England, and I trusted that the Emperor would be cautious in the reception which he gave to her advances, and not be led, by a desire to bind her more closely to France, to countenance propositions to which it would be impossible for Her Majesty's Government to accede.

Nothing could have been more satisfactory, more straightforward, or more fair, than the Emperor's reply to these observations. Maintaining his own belief in the sincerity of Austria, he said that, even if she was playing a doubtful game, the plan he proposed to follow must put her to the test. As she was now our ally it was our duty to be frank with her, and, above all, we ought not to have the appearance of avoiding all attempts to make peace before the end of the year. If His Majesty's definition of the third point was vague and unsatisfactory, it was because, under present circumstances, it was impossible to be more precise. It was far better to leave a margin that admitted of every restriction being imposed upon Russia, than mention a condition or two which might make it supposed the maritime Powers would ask no more. "For instance," said His Majesty, "if we succeed in limiting Russia for the future to a small squadron in the Black Sea, it signifies little whether the Dardanelles are closed or not; but, if she is to maintain such a fleet as she possesses now, it would become a question of grave consideration whether the advantage of opening the Black Sea to our fleets would not be more than counterbalanced by the mischief which might be worked by the continual presence of a Russian fleet of war in the Archipelago, the Adriatic, and the Mediterranean." I might be assured, His Majesty said, that there was no limit which he did not desire to see placed on the power and influence of Russia, whether in the Black Sea or elsewhere. The attempt at negotiation which was now made, His Majesty was convinced, would come to nothing. It was impossible that Russia should accept the conditions on which the maritime Powers, when called upon, must insist, and therefore he did not mind the attempt being fairly made.

On my reverting to the difficulty of negotiating, until Russia expressed to the belligerent Powers a wish to treat, the Emperor said that he was quite of that opinion.

The conclusion which I draw from this conversation is, that the Emperor, for reasons which I need not repeat here, is most anxious, by showing every deference and courtesy to Austria, to give her no reason for repenting the alliance which she has made, but that His Majesty's views and intentions as to what ought to be the results of the present war have undergone no change, and will not, I trust, at the present moment, be influenced by his new ally.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 549.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,246.)

Foreign Office, December 16, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,502, Confidential, of the 13th instant, reporting your conversation with the Emperor of the French on the subject of the Austrian alliance, and I have to state to you in reply that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your language on that occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 550.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

Vienna, December 17, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

MR. COLQUHOUN écrit de Bucharest, le 16 Décembre, 8 P.M.:

"Communicate home 156 groups [of figures].

"The 'Queen of the South' . . . . . Eupatoria on the 11th, after landing troops there; it was expected that the Russians would attack that place in force. Most active preparations [were] making for the defence of the place. The guns from the 'Henri IV' were being mounted on shore. The arrival of the Turkish contingent was very opportune; the remaining 6,000 would be expedited immediately. This news confirmed, by private letter to Her Majesty's Consul at Varna, secret intelligence from Lord George Paulet, of Her Majesty's ship of war 'Bellerophon,' which, with the 'Leander' and another small ship of war, was anchored off Eupatoria."

No. 551.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 797.)

Foreign Office, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of the Treaty of Alliance concluded on the 2nd instant between Her Majesty, and the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor of the French, the ratifications of which were exchanged at Vienna on the 14th instant; and I have to instruct you, in concert with the Internuncio and French Chargé d'Affaires, to communicate a copy of the Treaty officially to the Porte.

I also inclose a copy of a Secret Article* to that Treaty, signed and ratified on the same day with the Patent Treaty; but before making any formal communication to the Porte of that Article, you will ascertain from the Internuncio and the French Chargé d'Affaires what instructions they have received in that respect from their several Governments, and you will communicate to or withhold the Article from the Porte according to the course which those Ministers have been instructed to pursue in regard to it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 552.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 466.)

Vienna, December 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I WAITED upon Count Buol immediately after the receipt of Her Majesty's ratification of the Treaty and Secret Article signed by Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, on the 2nd instant, and in conjunction with him I

* Inclosure 2 in No. 494.

inquired whether Baron Bourqueney had received the ratification of the Emperor Napoleon.

Baron Bourqueney, although aware that the ratification had left Paris, was still only in expectation of its arrival. The interchange of the ratifications was, therefore, necessarily postponed.

I mentioned to Count Buol the error, which your Lordship had pointed out in the IInd Article of the Treaty, where the date of the 10th of April instead of the 12th of March had been inserted with reference to the Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Turkey, and your Lordship's request that the error might be corrected in the ratifications.

Count Buol immediately took a note of this correction, and gave the necessary orders that it should be attended to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 553.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 469.)

Vienna, December 13, 1854.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL requested Baron Bourqueney and myself to call upon him; when he stated that he had received a report from Bucharest, according to which it appeared that it was the intention of the Ottoman authorities in the Principalities to require the expulsion of several Moldavian and Wallachian subjects, and that it was understood that the property of some of the Boyards, designated in the list of those to be expelled, was to be confiscated.

Count Buol stated, he was most anxious that any harsh measure of that nature should not take place at this moment; that the privileges of the Danubian Provinces had been secured by the proclamation of the Government of the Sultan upon the entry of his troops into the Principalities, as well as by the assurances given, both by Omer Pasha and Dervish Pasha, of a general amnesty; and that the proclamations upon the entry of the Austrian troops into those Provinces were in conformity with those declarations.

Count Buol said that he in no way would wish to enter upon any discussion as to the sovereign rights of the Porte with reference to the privileges accorded to the Principalities; but what he was desirous of obtaining, was the postponement of any measures of severity, even if at a later period they should be considered necessary. He therefore requested M. de Bourqueney and myself to write in that sense to our respective Consular Agents in Bucharest.

Baron Bourqueney said he was convinced that such a proceeding was one which his Government would approve, and therefore that he would write to M. de Poujade in the sense which Count Buol desired, stating always that he was well aware that the feeling of the Austrian, as well as of the allied Governments, was distinctly in favour of upholding the sovereign rights of the Porte.

With the expression of the same sentiments, I consented to write to Mr. Colquhoun, and I herewith have the honour of forwarding to your Lordship a copy of the letter I addressed to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 553.

The Earl of Westmorland to Consul-General Colquhoun.

(Confidential.)

Vienna, December 11, 1854.

Sir,

FROM information recently received from Bucharest and Jassy by the Austrian Government, it appears that not only decrees of expulsion had been demanded by the Ottoman military authorities from the civil authorities against Wallachian and Moldavian subjects, but that firmans had been issued by the

Sublime Porte, which subjected twenty-three Boyards in Wallachia to the punishment of exile, and to the sequestration of their properties.

As I have not heard anything from you upon this subject, I am inclined to believe it may not have been correctly reported; but, as you are well aware, the paramount object of the Commission established in Vienna, of which I form a part, and which is recognized in the Treaty signed on the 2nd instant, is the upholding the sovereign rights of the Porte and, according to the public acts which have been previously entered into, the privileges of the Principalities, and this Commission, when it is officially constituted, will naturally desire the conciliation of the respective interests existing in the Principalities.

As the promises of amnesty made by the Porte when she marched her army into the Principalities will undoubtedly be maintained, and although exceptional cases may arise as mentioned in my last letter to you as to the arrest of persons by the different military authorities, yet I am sure you will agree with me that the more extensive measures which I have above alluded to, had better if possible be postponed, even if ultimately they might be found to be necessary.

Your French colleague, M. de Poujade, will receive a letter from M. de Bourqueney upon this subject, and upon this occasion, as upon all others, I conceive that you would desire to act in consultation, and in combination with him.

I am, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 554.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 470.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 13, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's confidential despatch No. 397 of the 5th instant, I have every reason to believe that the report therein mentioned is entirely without foundation, as it is in contradiction to the assurances given by Count Buol, as well as to the engagements taken by the Imperial Government to defend the Principalities from any aggression on the part of Russia, and which I have reported to your Lordship in my different despatches relating to that subject.

The Austrian Government will, however, retain in their own hands the actual order for the commencement of hostilities if it shall become necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 555.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 471.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 13, 1854.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt the signature of the Treaty between Austria, England, and France, and the hope they expressed that it might lead to the happy results which an intimate alliance between the three Powers was calculated to produce at this moment.

Count Buol stated in reply, that he reciprocated entirely the feelings which your Lordship had thus expressed.

The entire approval of my conduct by Her Majesty's Government in this matter which your Lordship has conveyed to me gives me great satisfaction, for which I beg to return my best acknowledgments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 556.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 472.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 13, 1854.

YOUR Lordship will already have learnt from Frankfort the unanimous adoption by the Diet of the Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th of April, which was signed on the 26th of November by Austria and Prussia.

The Austrian Government having been for a considerable time occupied in negotiations upon this subject, have learnt with much satisfaction the adoption by the Diet of the proposition made to it by them and by the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 557.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 473.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 13, 1854.

BARON BOURQUENEY waited upon Count Buol this day, to announce to him his having received the ratifications by the Emperor Napoleon of the Treaty signed on the 2nd instant. Count Buol has fixed to-morrow, at 12 o'clock, for the exchange of the ratifications between the three Powers, and I have received his invitation to attend at the Imperial Chancery for that purpose.

I have this day transmitted to Lord Bloomfield, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, a copy of this Treaty, and I will announce to him to-morrow by telegraph the exchange of ratifications as soon as it has taken place.

I shall also announce it in the same manner to your Lordship.

Count Buol will direct Count Esterhazy to consult with his two colleagues, Lord Bloomfield and M. de Moustier, as to the manner of bringing this Treaty before the Prussian Government, and of inviting their adhesion to it, and he will be instructed to adopt the mode of proceeding which may be decided upon between them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 558.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 477.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 14, 1854.

I HAVE the honour of reporting that in obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 403 of the 7th of December, I this day exchanged Her Majesty the Queen's ratifications, under the Great Seal, of the Treaty and Secret Article signed on the 2nd instant, with Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney, against similar instruments ratified by His Imperial and Royal Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French.

I transmit to your Lordship herewith the ratifications above mentioned, and also a *procès-verbal* of the exchange of these documents against the ratifications of Her Majesty the Queen, which has been signed by Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, and to which our seals have been affixed.

I have also the honour of inclosing a Protocol which has likewise been signed by Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, by which it is agreed that the full powers of the Plenipotentiaries, parties to the Treaty of the 2nd instant, should be joined to the copy of the said Treaty deposited in the archives of the Imperial Ministry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 559.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 478. Confidential.)

Vienna, December 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 477 of this day, the exchange of Her Majesty's ratifications with those of His Imperial and Royal Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French.

Before exchanging these documents I brought before Count Buol and Baron de Bourqueney, your Lordship's instructions contained in your despatch No. 403 of the 7th instant, by which I am directed to return to you certificates of the exchange of the ratifications (the forms of which you transmit to me), and which were to be signed by the Austrian and French Plenipotentiaries.

Upon my producing to Count Buol and to M. de Bourqueney these instructions, they both stated that the usual form which had been followed on such occasions was, that the Plenipotentiaries should sign a joint *procès-verbal*, by which they attested the exchange of the ratifications which had taken place, and that as the Treaty and the Secret Article could only be considered as forming one instrument, it was natural that the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty and of the Secret Article, should be recorded in the same document by the Plenipotentiaries who had signed both those instruments.

Upon my appeal to my two colleagues, to take into consideration the precision of the instructions I had received, they both replied that they would most willingly agree to any form which would be agreeable to the British Government, and which would answer the purpose required, but Count Buol appealed to the head of the Austrian Chancery, as to the usage established in transactions of this nature by the Imperial Government, and he stated distinctly, that it was in accordance with the *procès-verbal* which had now been drawn up and prepared. Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney immediately said, that under these circumstances, they could not but press me to adopt the form which appeared to be of so established a character, and which fulfilled entirely all the requirements of my Government; but to relieve me from all responsibility, they proposed to address me a letter, signed by them, which would give me the assurance that if I was directed by my Government to ask for an acknowledgment in a different form of the act just completed, they would be quite ready to accede to any wish I might express upon the subject.

In consequence of this declaration, and being unwilling to obstruct the exchange of the ratifications by an appeal to your Lordship, which must have taken several days, I consented to sign the *procès-verbal*, a copy of which is inclosed in my despatch No. 477 of this day. I have now the honour to forward to your Lordship a copy of the letter addressed to me by Count Buol and M. de Bourqueney, to which I have above referred.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 559.

Count Buol and Baron Bourqueney to the Earl of Westmorland.

Vienne, le 14 *Décembre*, 1854.

My Lord,

NOUS venons de nous conformer pour l'échange des ratifications aux usages constamment suivis par les chancelleries de Vienne; ils remplissent exactement le but qu'on se proposait à Londres en vous transmettant les pièces qu'il s'agissait d'échanger entre nous. Si toutefois vous étiez invité à réclamer une nouvelle constatation de l'Acte que nous venons d'accomplir, nous serions prêts à accéder au désir que vous nous en exprimeriez.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.
BOURQUENEY.

No. 560.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 421.)

Foreign Office, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 477 of the 14th instant, inclosing the Austrian and French ratifications of the Treaty and Secret Article of the 2nd of December, together with the *procès-verbal* of the exchange of the ratifications.

With reference to what your Lordship states in your despatch No. 478 of the same date, relative to the substitution of the form of *procès-verbal* in use at the Austrian Chancery for that which I transmitted to you with the ratifications of Her Majesty, I have to state to you that the form which I sent was that which is always used here, and which is generally signed abroad without difficulty. As, however, the object of the *procès-verbal* is simply to place upon record the fact of the exchange having duly taken place, the form of it is a matter of indifference, and I approve of your having signed that which was preferred by your Austrian and French colleagues.

With regard to full powers, the practice observed here in signing a Treaty, is to produce the original full power, and give a copy of it if desired. Your Lordship has been furnished with two full powers: one dated the 1st of February last, authorizing you to sign a Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, and Prussia, relative to efforts to be made for restoring peace between Russia and Turkey; the other dated the 31st of July last, authorizing you to carry on any negotiations within the Austrian dominions. I should wish to know which of the two your Lordship has consented to give up for the purpose of being annexed to the copy of the Treaty of the 2nd of December which is deposited in the Imperial archives at Vienna; because, as the full power of the 31st of July is not limited to the conclusion of that Treaty, your Lordship may have occasion to use it on a future occasion, and your parting with it might therefore be productive of inconvenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 561.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 422.)

Foreign Office, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HEREWITH transmit the copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

This despatch, with its several inclosures, will place your Lordship in possession of the communications that have passed between Count Colloredo

* No 546.

and myself, and between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, respecting the note of Prince Gortchakoff to Count Buol announcing that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh accepted the four bases as a point of departure for negotiations for peace.

Your Lordship will convey to Count Buol the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for making known to them Prince Gortchakoff's note. The communication took place subsequently to the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and Her Majesty's Government regard it therefore as a fulfilment of Article I of the Treaty, by which the Contracting Parties "engage mutually and reciprocally not to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia, without having first deliberated upon it in common."

Your Lordship will remind Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government were no party to the invitation to adopt the four bases, which his Excellency, in August last, addressed to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and they cannot therefore consider that the answer which Count Buol has received to that invitation, is addressed to the Governments of England and France; and if they were to regard it in that light, the Emperor of Russia would be fully entitled to say they were suing for peace. But as that would be at variance with the fact, England and France must guard themselves against an unfounded supposition.

It is possible, however, that the Emperor of Russia may think the time has arrived for entering upon serious and *bonâ fide* negotiations; and as Her Majesty's Government have no relations with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, it will rest with Count Buol to ascertain and to convey to your Lordship the desire of His Imperial Majesty to treat for peace with England and France upon the four bases of negotiation.

In the event of this desire being formally expressed to your Lordship, it will be necessary then to come to a clear understanding with the Austrian Government as to the interpretation to be given to the four bases. Her Majesty's Government have learned with satisfaction, by your Lordship's despatch No. 458 of the 6th instant, that their views upon this subject were, as they expected, in accordance with those of the Cabinet of Vienna; but in order to prevent all misunderstanding, now or hereafter, upon questions of such vital importance, it is expedient that the intentions of the three Governments should be recorded in identic notes; and I accordingly inclose the draft of a note which you will present to Count Buol, when you have received from his Excellency the assurance that he will return to it an identic answer. The Baron de Bourqueney will receive instructions to proceed in the same manner and at the same time as your Lordship.

Count Buol must be well aware of the wide difference that exists between the position of Austria and that of England and France. Austria is at peace; her diplomatic relations with Russia have not been interrupted, and she can communicate or negotiate with that Power as she thinks fit: but England and France have for many months been at war with Russia; they have already made great sacrifices in blood and treasure for the purpose of carrying on that war with vigour; and their national honour, their dignity, and their interests, forbid them to enter upon negotiations that would either be illusory or tend to an inglorious peace.

The question of negotiation cannot, therefore, be entertained unless it is clearly ascertained beforehand that Russia without reserve adopts our interpretation of the four bases; and your Lordship is instructed to concert with Count Buol and your French colleague as to the means of making known the identic notes to Prince Gortchakoff, who must not be left in doubt as to the true scope and meaning of the third basis, the vagueness of which is unavoidable, because the events of war must determine the mode in which it will be carried into effect.

Prince Gortchakoff must also understand that negotiations will not imply the suspension of hostilities.

If Prince Gortchakoff rejects these terms, Her Majesty's Government will consider that the Government of Russia will not consent to those guarantees which are absolutely indispensable for the future peace and equilibrium of Europe, and that her final answer is thus given to Austria. Her Majesty's Government will then, in accordance with the VIth Article of the Treaty of December 2, be prepared to "deliberate" with the Austrian Government "without delay upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance."

If Prince Gortchakoff, on the other hand, should not reject the terms, but express a wish to ask for instructions from his Government, the time should be fixed for his answer, and that time should be the shortest that is necessary for receiving a communication from St. Petersburgh.

But if Prince Gortchakoff should at once accept the terms, or be authorized by his Government to do so, he may be informed that as soon as the Turkish Plenipotentiary and those of England and France receive their full powers, negotiations may be commenced upon the bases of which the interpretation shall thus have been previously recorded in a formal document.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 561.

Draft of a Note to be presented by the Earl of Westmorland to the Austrian Government.

The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, has the honour to inform his Excellency Count Buol, &c., that Her Majesty's Government having been made acquainted with the step taken by the Envoy of Russia at Vienna, from which it results that the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the four points specified in the Note of the 8th of August last, has been followed by a proposal to enter into preliminary negotiations on those bases with the Representatives of the three Powers parties to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, with the view to pave the way for the re-establishment of peace, has authorized him to take part in a conference at which the said Envoy shall assist. As, however, the Treaty of Alliance at present in force between their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor of the French, imposes on their Governments the obligation not to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia without having first deliberated thereupon in common, it is essential, in order that the Plenipotentiaries of their said Majesties may hold the same language, that they should give each other the mutual assurance that they understand the application of the four principles which they have established in common entirely in the same sense.

With this view the Undersigned has received instructions to specify the meaning which the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland attaches to each of these principles, reserving to itself, however, as it has already done, the right to modify according to circumstances, and more particularly in case Article V of the Treaty of the 2nd of December should be carried into effect, the opinion which it now expresses, as well as to lay down, in conformity with the 1st Article of the same Treaty, such special condition over and above the four guarantees as may be required, in its opinion, by the general interests of Europe, in order to prevent the recurrence of complications which have so unfortunately disturbed her repose.

The Undersigned accordingly declares:

1. That the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in agreeing with its allies in the necessity of putting an end to the exclusive Protectorate exercised by Russia over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, and of placing henceforth under the collective guarantee of the Five Powers the privileges recognised by the Sultans in these dependencies of their Empire, has understood and does understand that none of the stipulations of the ancient Treaties of Russia with the Porte relative to the said provinces shall in any case be renewed at the peace, and that the arrangements to be concluded with respect to them shall ultimately be so framed as to satisfy fully and entirely the rights of the Suzerain Power, those of the Three Principalities, and the general interests of Europe.

2. The freedom of the navigation of the Danube can only be secured by placing it under the control of a corporate authority, invested with the necessary powers for removing the obstacles which already exist at the mouth of the river, or which may arise hereafter. The Government of Her Majesty considers,

moreover, if such is also the opinion of the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, that it is of importance, in order to give to this specia guarantee its full development, to inquire to what extent it may be fitting to allow the continuance of the territorial jurisdiction to which, in virtue of Article III of the Treaty of Adrianople, the course of the Lower Danube is at present subjected from the point at which it becomes common to the two States bordering on the river.

3. The revision of the Treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, ought to have for its object to attach more completely the existence of the Ottoman Empire to the European equilibrium, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. As regards the arrangements to be made for this purpose, they depend too directly upon the events of the war to allow of their bases being at once laid down. It is sufficient to indicate the principle on which they are to be framed.

4. Russia, in renouncing her pretension to an official Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan belonging to the Greek Church, equally renounces as a natural consequence all claim to revive any of the articles of her former Treaties, and especially of the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji, the erroneous interpretation of which has been the principal cause of the present war. The allied Powers, in affording to each other their mutual assistance to obtain, by the spontaneous act of the Ottoman Government itself, the recognition and observance of the religious privileges of various Christian communities, without distinction of rite, and in turning to account, in the interest of those communities, the generous intentions manifested with respect to them by His Majesty the Sultan, will take the greatest care to preserve intact the dignity of his Highness and the independence of his Crown.

The Undersigned entertains the confident hope that the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria shares in the views recapitulated in the present note, and as soon as he shall have received an assurance to that effect will be ready to act upon his full power. It is at the same time fully understood that the result of the preliminary conference in which the Undersigned is authorized to take part will immediately be communicated to the Sublime Porte, and that if the result should be satisfactory, the Ottoman Plenipotentiary shall be invited to join in the subsequent conferences, which could no longer take place without him.

No. 562.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 423.)

Foreign Office, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch[a] which I have addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, instructing him, in concert with the Internuncio and the French Chargé d'Affaires, to communicate officially to the Porte the patent Treaty of December 2; but to be guided, with reference to the formal communication of the Secret Article, by the instructions which those Ministers may receive from their respective Governments.

I have accordingly to instruct your Lordship to acquaint Count Buol with the nature of the instructions sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and you will apprise Lord Stratford of the course which Baron de Bruck may be instructed to pursue.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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[a] No. 551.

No. 563.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 1,519.)

Paris, December 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I WAITED upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon by appointment, and read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 1,234 of the 15th instant, giving a narrative of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government on the question of opening negotiations with Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys recognised the accuracy of your Lordship's statement, and he consented at once to make the alterations desired by your Lordship in the note which it is proposed by his Excellency the Governments of England and France should offer to exchange with that of Austria.

His Excellency agreed also that it was indispensable that the expression of a desire to treat for peace should proceed from Russia, and he formally communicated to the Ministers of England and France at Vienna. He assured me that all his instructions to M. de Bourqueney, the last of which were sent off on the 15th instant, and all of which he promised me should be communicated to your Lordship, insisted on this necessary preliminary to all further negotiation.

I then read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the text of the note which your Lordship instructs me to address to him. He said that it coincided perfectly with his own views, and was in fact but a repetition of what he had constantly stated himself.

I have since transmitted to his Excellency the document signed, with the addition of a paragraph inviting an answer of adherence to the principles which it sets forth. I have the honour to inclose a copy with this addition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 563.

Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Paris, December 17, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government considering it of great importance that a clear understanding should exist with the Government of the Emperor of the French as to the interpretation of the third basis of negotiation, which provides for the revision of the Treaty of 1841, and the conditions to be required of Russia, the Undersigned, Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of the French, has been directed to make known to his Excellency M. Drouyn de Lhuys, His Imperial Majesty's Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Sebastopol is the seat of danger to Turkey, as it is from thence that Russia is always able to menace the existence of the Ottoman Empire, which it is the policy and the determination of England and France to maintain. Russia, however strictly she may be bound by Treaties, may at any moment when it suits her purpose, declare war against Turkey, and being in possession of Sebastopol, with a powerful fleet and numerous army, she may in forty-eight hours reach Constantinople and seize upon the heart of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte would be too weak, and the allies of the Sultan too distant, to oppose any effectual resistance to such a *coup de main*; the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be in possession of Russia, and long before any hostile forces could be brought against her she would be in a position to defy them.

Turkey thus held firmly in her grasp, and the Black Sea then really a Russian lake, it is manifest that the countries bordering on that sea, Circassia, Georgia, Persia, and Asia Minor, must at once fall under her dominion; and it is equally clear that the power of Russia must extend over Greece, Thessaly, Albania, and the Danubian Principalities.

Russia would then be in a position to dictate the law to Europe; every evil that England and France hoped to avert by the war might occur; every object they mean to attain might be frustrated; and these calamities would be directly deducible from the retention of Sebastopol by Russia, and her great naval and military preponderance that would be the natural and certain result of such an error on the part of England and France; an error that would render null all the sacrifices they have made, the treasure that has been expended, and the blood that has flowed.

England and France must, therefore, insist upon the demolition of Sebastopol, and, if possible, also of the other Russian fortresses on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Russia must be bound by Treaty not to re-establish them, nor at any other point in the Black Sea to establish a great naval arsenal. Russia must not have more than four ships of war to be employed hereafter in the Black Sea. Other nations, including Turkey, must be limited to the same number, if the Porte consents to annul the Treaty of 1854; but no final decision can be taken on this point until the Porte has been consulted.

And, in order to superintend the faithful observance of Treaty engagements by Russia, England and France must have the right to appoint Consular Agents at such places in the Black Sea as may be agreed upon by Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French will participate in the views which the Undersigned has had the honour to declare in this note to be those entertained by Her Majesty's advisers, and it will give the Undersigned sincere satisfaction if he is authorised by his Excellency M. Drouyn de Lhuys to convey an assurance to this effect to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) COWLEY.

No. 564.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 505.)

Berlin, December 15, 1854.

My Lord,

A PAMPHLET lately in circulation, reproducing a memoir addressed by the late Field-Marshal Knesebeck to M. Stein during the Congress of Vienna, has produced considerable sensation here. I therefore beg leave to inclose to your Lordship two copies of it in original, with a translation of that portion more particularly deserving of notice.

Field-Marshal Knesebeck enjoyed to so high a degree the esteem and confidence both of the late Emperor Alexander and of the late King of Prussia, and was as deservedly esteemed by the Prussian nation, that his political views and the advice tendered by him commands, even at the present time, more than ordinary weight, notwithstanding that so many years have elapsed since these opinions were delivered by him.

Your Lordship will no doubt be struck by the marvellously prophetic advice which this distinguished General then offered: the rising power and ambition of Russia formed even then a subject of solicitude to him; and the necessity of maintaining a firm barrier to Russian encroachment, induced Field-Marshal Knesebeck to warn the Prussian Plenipotentiary at Vienna of the danger to which Europe would be later exposed, and to counsel that an efficient eastern frontier should be given to Prussia, as a protection against the growing power and ambition of her neighbour. On this subject I would beg to draw your Lordship's especial attention to the opinions expressed by Field-Marshal Knesebeck concerning Poland. In treating this subject he does not advocate a regeneration of Poland on any grounds of sympathy for a fallen and depressed people; his chief object is to prove that, in default of resuscitating an independent Poland, the frontiers of Prussia should be so ordered as are defined by nature, and capable of resisting any preponderating power on the part of Russia, and of securing the safety of Germany.

I am informed that this pamphlet, which has been reprinted from the Memoirs of Stein, has created a very great sensation here in all classes, and that it has awakened in the public mind a serious appreciation of the dangers to which Prussia and Germany are exposed by the menacing position of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 564.

Extracts from a Pamphlet by the late Field-Marshal Knesebeck.

(Translation.)

THE TURKS.—Yes! the Turks in Europe.

What then have the Turks done to you? They are a powerful, upright people. For centuries they have been quiet at home, if you only leave them unmolested; confidence may be placed in them; have they ever deceived you, are they not honest and frank in their policy? Brave and warlike it is true, but for more than one reason is this beneficial and good. They are the safest bulwark against the encroachment of the numerous Asiatic populations, and precisely because they have a footing in Europe they prevent that encroachment. If they were driven back, they would themselves become encroachers. Imagine them to be expelled. What would happen? Either Russia or Austria would get those countries, or a separate Greek State would be founded there. Do you wish then to make Russia still more powerful? from that side also to bring down the colossus on your shoulders? Are you not satisfied that it has gradually extended itself from the Volga to the Niemen, from the Niemen to the Vistula; and now in all likelihood will reach us far as the Wartha! And if this should not be the case, do you wish to extend Austrian influence in the direction of Asia, and thus make it weak or indifferent to the maintenance of the centre to the encroachment or pressure of the west? Call only to mind the situation of former times, those of John Sobiesky, of Eugene of Savoy, and of Montecuculy. How was it that France gained the field over Germany, but because Austria's strength was always wanted to ward off the encroachment from Asia? Will you again bring back and increase that state of things by approximating Austria to Asia?

You say, found a separate Greek State! Would that improve the situation of Europe? Would not Europe on the contrary, considering the state of enervation into which that nation has sunk, be constantly obliged to be under arms to protect it against the returning Turks? Would not Russia's influence over this State, by religion, commercial intercourse and interest, always make of Greece only a Russian colony.

Rather then leave the Turks where they are, and do not rouse the unquiet spirit when it reposes.

But, exclaims a well-meaning philanthropist, mankind are misused there! ancient Athens and Sparta, the fairest portion of the earth, are inhabited by barbarians!

It is true, my friend; mankind are at this moment staked and strangled there, but they are also elsewhere flogged, beaten, scourged and sold. Before you alter, consider well whether you can improve? Whether the knout, the corporal's cane and Greek duplicity will be lighter in their punishment than the bow-string and a firman?

Let your first care be to abolish such things, and likewise the Slave Trade from Europe, and make your mind easy as to the harshness of the Turk. His harshness has strength, his faith gives courage; and we need strength and courage if we are not passively to see the Muscovite push himself forward to the banks of the Warthe.

THE POLES.—The Turks then are to be upheld, but the Poles are to perish as a nation? Yes, it cannot be otherwise.

That which has strength to stand, that endures; where all is rotten, that wastes away. And so it is. Let any one ask himself what would happen if the Polish nation in its Polish essence were to be maintained as independent.

Drunkenness, debauchery, cringing and fawning, contempt for everything good and for every other nation, scolding, conceitedness and prejudice against all

order and morality, extravagance, dissipation, venality, deceit, duplicity, dissoluteness from the palace to the hut; that is the element in which the Pole exists. For this he sings his song, plays the violin and guitar, kisses his mistress and drinks out of her shoe, draws his sabre, strokes his mustachios, mounts his horse, gallops to the battle-field with Dumouriez and Bonaparte, and with all the adventurers of the earth intoxicates himself with brandy and punch, fights courageously with friend and foe, ill-treats his wife and his peasant, sells his property, goes abroad, sets half the world in a state of rebellion, and swears by Kosciusko and Poniatowsky, that this shall not perish so true as he is a Pole!

Here you have what you will preserve, when you say, Poland must be restored.

Is such a state of things worth preserving; is such a nation ripe for a constitution?

A constitution pre-supposes a sense for order, for a constitution does nothing but put in order and assign to every member of society the place to which he belongs. For this reason it defines the classes (Stände) of which the State is to consist, and the place, rank, order, rights and duties of each class, and it points out the course of the State machinery and the chief features of its administration.

Now, only try to introduce order, where no one will have order!

A Polish King (Stephen Bathory) once exclaimed: "Poles! it is not to order—you recognize none; it is not to government—you respect none: it is to chance alone that you are indebted for your preservation."

And so it is still. Disorder and dissoluteness form the element of the Pole. No, let this people undergo the lashes of the knout; Providence wills it so, and Heaven knows what is salutary for man.

For the present, therefore, let Poland no longer exist.

On the Boundaries of Austria and Prussia against Russia.

Poland.—If Poland is not to be again partitioned, according to the proportions of 1805, among the three adjacent Powers, then its future has only the following alternatives left:—

1st. Poland becomes a Russian province.
2nd. Poland becomes a self-existing, independent State.

In both cases, the neighbouring States must have security, that is, a military frontier, against it.

This is a duty which the self-preservation of every country requires; but it is the common interest of all, especially of those who fought together for the freedom of Europe.

For this it was that they went to war, and, in this respect, each protects the other. Security and independence, these were their objects. Europe, therefore, will not be at rest so long as this security is not firmly established, as well in the East as in the West. It cannot, and ought not, to be at rest, because its freedom would again be threatened. It matters not whence the pressure comes—whether it be the flat-sword or the knout: the freeman suffers neither; civilization abhors both.

It will be secure against both—against all preponderance. This is the demand the civilized world makes to their rulers; for this have mankind made such infinite sacrifices.

How, then, is this security to be attained in the East?

It is quite clear that, for this purpose, the conditions must be different: if Poland is to be a Russian province, or if Poland is to form an independent State of its own.

In the latter case, the strength of Austria, as well as of Prussia, balance this State, adjacent to theirs, and an invasion by it of their territories are not so dangerous for them as if this took place by a strength superior to theirs in strength.

One hundred thousand Polish soldiers, drawn up at Lenczyt, are balanced by 120,000 Prussians, stationed in Posen, Czentoekau or Bromberg; 500,000 Russians destroy the monarchy.

In the first case, a Polish invasion of Prussia is disagreeable, inconvenient; in the second, a Russian invasion threatens existence, destroys independence. The former may be tolerated; in the latter case, existence is precarious.

When, therefore, the mutual security of the States in the East is considered, the question, with respect to the above accepted alternatives, is to be answered very differently, and stands thus: that, if Poland is not to form an independent State, "there is no security for Prussia, whenever Russia invades the Prussian territory with a powerful army; for Austria there is none, when Russia crosses the Vistula."

Otherwise, Russia will be a mine against Prussia that can blow it to atoms.

By the curve in the Vistula, Russia gains, against Austria, a defence against the Carpathian Mountains, protected by which it can safely evade this natural bulwark, and can at once force a passage into the heart of the Austrian territory.

Russia, therefore, by such a position, threatens the security and independence of both States, and brings itself into the same situation, with respect to them and Germany, as Napoleon brought France into with respect to the above countries, when he fell upon them with his preponderating power; that is to say, Russia brings itself and them into a permanent state of war against each other. If Russia really withdraws her troops to the other side of the Düna, that does not make matters better. Napoleon, too, had not his armies constantly on the frontier. On the contrary, the dissimulation that lies hidden thereunder only makes the situation worse.

The night-mare remains, although it may not, for the moment, sit exactly on the breast. Its pressure continues, because it can press when it likes. No reasonable being can be deceived by this game.

Boundaries, if Poland is a Russian Province.—What, then, is the extreme boundary of Russia, if it is positively to acquire new conquests in Poland as an indemnification for this war, and if Finland, and all that she has gained on the Black Sea, and towards Persia, for the last ten years, do not satisfy it?

This limit is so clearly defined by nature, and so apparent to the eye, that policy can only intentionally, and never involuntarily, overlook it.

It is the Vistula to the Bug; the morasses, the wildernesses, and forests of the Narew, from the Bug to the Spirding Lake. There is no medium, no bargaining: here it is that the hand of Nature has also, between the Carpathians and the sea, provided with motherly care for the protection of her children, by pointing out to them one of the largest rivers as a boundary, and in such places where this river, on account of its inward curves, is no longer applicable as a boundary, because it would make that same Power the ruler over the others, and would give too great an offensive strength that would encroach upon the others as much as the Vistula does so here. There, also, has Nature written, in legible characters, as shown by the Narew, where the watercourse must be left abandoned, inasmuch as it created in a direct line still greater obstacles than even the Vistula presents in the morasses of the Narew and the lakes of Eastern Prussia, which are heaped together in the narrow space that extends from the Bug to the Cürischer Haff.

Let us recognise the hand of Nature, and follow her. She created the various Empires; she defined the boundaries of each—those which are necessary to the security of each. Where such a paramount interest makes its voice heard, the acquisition of a few square miles, or of a few thalers revenue, ought not to be considered. Only the great features of nature can here direct; in the above considerations they alone have been our guide.

The Vistula, therefore, as far as Modlin, and from thence to the Narew, are the only boundaries against Russia.

Boundary against Poland, if it is Independent.—This boundary might be otherwise if it happened that an independent, self-existing, self-governing State, without foreign influence, were to lie between Russia, Austria, and Prussia;—in short, if Poland were to be restored.

Then the pressure is less—or, rather, there is no longer any immediate pressure—on Austria or Prussia from that side. They have no aggression to fear from Poland. They need not then advance forwards in order to establish their defences beyond the heart of their own States. It is not necessary that they should have recourse to the obstacles raised by nature to make their defences possible.

This, then, lies in the balance of strength, and space protects them from aggression by Russia.

Austria, then, has only to take care to retain the road from Cracow to Lemberg, on the north side of the Carpathians, in order not to lose the power of free circulation.

Prussia must look out to maintain the communication between her territories on the Vistula and on the Oder, so that the belly be not cut out of her body politic.

Austria, then, requires for her security nothing more than what she possesses of Poland, and can rather do without Lemberg, and be bounded by the Vistula, the Sar, and the Dniester;—nay, if Russia gives back to Poland all that she has taken from her, Austria can even do more than the above: she can draw a boundary-line which, starting from the Carpathians, would join the Vistula after passing over Dukla and Tarnow, thus rendering the Carpathians her proper boundary.

Prussia, however, would gain her object if with the Drewenz she joins the Vistula; and from thence, over Sempolno, she meets the Wartha near Kolo, so following this river as far as Silesia.

Conclusion and Appendix.—These are the military boundaries, supposing that Poland becomes a Russian province, or that it becomes once more an independent State. And only in this way can the security of the States in the East be assured. Should, however, it become clear, from the course of the political negotiations followed up to this moment, that the above indicated boundaries against Russia cannot be obtained, but, at most, those indicated against Poland, it follows thence that the security of the States requires that in such case nothing should be neglected in order that Poland, with the exception of the necessary exceptions for her security indicated in the above views, may be completely restored; that is to say, sincerely and energetically to endeavour to make it a self-subsisting, independent, self-governed State, ruled by its own rulers, who do not sit upon foreign thrones. For I repeat it, the boundaries lastly indicated only afford security against Poland, not against Russia.

On the contrary, should Russia refuse the complete restoration of Poland, and yet extend herself as far as the Wartha, let it be under what pretext it may, her plans for the dominion of the world are then clear, the freedom of Europe is threatened from that quarter, and in a short time we may look forward to a fresh war to rescue the independence of the other States.

Nothing remains for us, then, but even now to devise means of meeting this impending war. These means are, that—

1. Austria and Prussia shall unite still more firmly together. For this purpose, however, Austria must assist more openly, more candidly, and more readily towards the consolidation of Prussia. She should further this matter as a claim in the interest of the world on which, in after time, the salvation of Europe will depend, and not as an act that she reluctantly performs, in which she shows distrust; that she accedes to only conditionally, and upon which she not even yet expresses herself openly and sincerely, notwithstanding the conditions she attaches thereto. Let her be convinced that, when she acts freely and openly towards Prussia, and meets her views in a friendly spirit, the infallible consequence of this must be to obtain what she now requires in advance as a condition, without even at the same time declaring herself clearly respecting the consolidation of Prussia. This, however, can only be a consequence of Austria's mode of acting; it cannot precede it, because Prussia would cast aside its sole support, and would stand completely isolated, without finding a new support in Austria.

What Austria requires lies certainly in the nature of things. Whereas she throws Prussia, by concessions ambiguously framed, conditional and reluctantly made, unavoidably into the arms of Russia, because no other support remains for Prussia on the continent. Generally, in politics, all declarations are reluctantly made, and betraying reserve, advance no cause and only produce in alliances, distrust, isolation, trouble, and disturbance, and are therefore not suited to great ideas, great plans, and great States.

Let any one ask himself, if Austria does not express herself clearly, openly, and freely with regard to Prussia, what else has the latter to do but to ally

herself with Russia? Does Austria wish this? No. She wishes to found a central Europe. To effect this, Prussia must be independent of Russia. But that it may be independent, it is requisite that her strength should be consolidated and increased. Does Austria do this? No. On the contrary, it participates with difficulty and reluctance in all that concerns Prussia's consolidation, or explains herself indefinitely upon what regards Prussia. Instead of drawing Prussia towards her, she makes her apprehensive, and forces her to ally herself with the East. Austria thus acts quite contrary to her proposed object, and forces Prussia to do that which Austria wishes to prevent, and which Prussia certainly does unwillingly. May she then, for the welfare of Europe, become sensible of the wrong course she is pursuing. If this happens, then it is—

2. Necessary that Germany be organized on a military footing, and ally herself with both Powers, both as a Power and as a Confederation.

3. That these Powers should themselves well organize their military forces and prepare everything for war; that Austria erect a fortress *à cheval* between Jablunken and Teschen. Prussia, a strong place in Posen.

4. That Austria, Prussia, and Germany, should ally themselves firmly with England.

5. That the policy of each of these Powers should be directed to prevent an alliance between Russia and France.

6. That the above-mentioned Powers should ally themselves with the Turks, and endeavour, in case of a war with Russia, to set the Turks and also the Persians in motion.

7. That this war should be avoided if possible, until the Turks, and if possible the Persians, take a part in it.

8. That in case of this war, the Poles should not be neglected, but that the above-named Powers should solemnly guarantee to them their deliverance from the Russian yoke, as well as their freedom and independence on the above-mentioned boundary improvement.

If no one of these points be neglected, but if they be all followed up with spirit and prudence, such as the importance of the case requires, then will the freedom of Europe be as secure against the East, as it is now happily secure against the West.

No. 565.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 506. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 15, 1854.*

I HAVE had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that I had reason to believe that the King of Prussia would not accede to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and that Baron Usedom was about to proceed to London on a special mission, charged to make a confidential communication to Her Majesty's Government on the intentions and wishes of His Prussian Majesty, with regard to an alliance which he is desirous to make with England and France.

Baron Usedom gave me this information last night; he said that he had been sent for from the country by the King, who had proposed to entrust this mission to him, and that His Majesty had already prepared a letter of which he was to be the bearer to Her Majesty the Queen. He told me that the King felt himself deeply aggrieved by the conduct of Austria; that at the very moment when he had signed an Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th of April, he did not expect that an alliance would have been almost completed by Austria with the Western Powers, to which he had not been invited to be a party until the negotiations were actually closed; that he could not submit to be dragged into a Treaty at the tail of Austria, and would not accede to it.

Baron Usedom said that the King had no intention whatever of attempting to escape from his engagements with Austria, and that he would now propose to us a Treaty which should contain similar stipulations. I replied that I was sure Her Majesty's Government would learn with deep regret the disinclination of the King of Prussia to join in the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and that I did not

think that the propositions which he had described to me would be well received in England; that the King must be aware how essential it was that Germany should be united at this moment; and that His Majesty ought to feel that it was not out of any disrespect to him that he had not been consulted during the negotiation of the Treaty; and that the secresy which was observed towards him was the natural consequence of His Majesty being surrounded by advisers who were our political enemies, and who would no sooner have learned the intentions of the three Powers than they would have used every exertion to prevent the success of the negotiation.

Baron Usedom then observed that this might be perfectly true, but that the King had resolved not to accede to this Treaty, though out of goodwill to England he was disposed to come to an arrangement which would, in his opinion, answer the same purpose. He then went on to state that there were some parts of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, relating to the Principalities, in which Prussia had not the same interest as the three Powers; that the king had certain feelings about Poland which he desired to explain to Her Majesty's Government; that he wished to guard against the possible demand of the passage of French troops through Prussia; and that he was prepared to mobilise part of his army, and place a considerable force on his eastern frontier, to watch which the Emperor of Russia would be obliged to place an army on his side.

Baron Usedom then said that he thought such propositions ought to meet with a good reception in England, for they proved that the intention of the King was to adapt himself to our policy. I answered that I did not think Her Majesty's Government would feel satisfied with any of these assurances unless His Prussian Majesty changed his Government, and removed from around him all those persons who were inimical to a Western alliance. That alone, I said, would inspire us with confidence; that it was not for us to say who His Majesty should select for his Ministers, but that we should have no faith in any assurances of a *rapprochement*, unless we saw His Majesty's present advisers removed.

Baron Usedom seems to feel all the difficulties of the mission with which he is charged, but he augurs that if it is in any way successful a change of Ministers is inevitable, and he appears to think that he may be himself called into office. If this should be the case he gave me to understand that he would never consent to associate himself with any of the Kreuz Zeitung party, and that if he were called to power, a radical change must be the consequence.

Baron Usedom is to see the King to-morrow, and will probably set out for London the day following. He is most desirous that His Majesty should also send a special mission to Paris, and will endeavour to persuade him to select some person for this purpose; but he fears that this will meet with serious and almost insurmountable objections, as His Majesty has hitherto refused to listen to anything of the sort; but as Baron Usedom feels the paramount necessity of it, he will do everything in his power to remove the King's present opposition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

No. 566.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 507. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 15, 1854.*

I HAVE had a few minutes' conversation this evening with Baron Manteuffel. I informed his Excellency that the Treaty of the 2nd of December had been ratified; that I had now received a copy of it; and that, after consulting with my Austrian and French colleagues, I should ask for an interview with his Excellency for the purpose of inviting the Prussian Government to accede to it. Having asked Baron Manteuffel if he thought the King were disposed to meet the wishes of the three Powers, his Excellency replied that His Majesty, he believed, would raise objections to some parts of this document, but that he was, up to the present moment, unacquainted with the Secret Article, and that, until the whole were communicated, he would say no more.

I then inquired if his Excellency could not give me some information on the subject of a rumoured mission of Baron Usedom to London. He replied, that the King had intended, for some time past, sending Baron Usedom to London; that His Majesty considered the present moment favourable for doing so; and that he was to be charged to communicate the objections which were entertained here to this Treaty of the 2nd of December, and explain the disposition in which His Majesty found himself to negotiate a separate Treaty with England and France, which he thought would equally meet the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency then said that the King was seriously occupied with the question of mobilizing a part of the army which he proposed placing on the eastern frontier of the kingdom; and he evidently wished me to understand that this measure indicated an adhesion, on the part of His Majesty, to the policy of the Western Powers, and the resolution to abide by and act up to all his treaties and engagements with Austria.

Baron Manteuffel did not speak with any satisfaction of the mission of Baron Usedom to London, and did not seem to have much confidence in the prospect of success which was likely to attend it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 567.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 508.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 15, 1854.*

A DISCUSSION took place to-day in the Second Chamber on the question of voting an address to the King, thanking His Majesty for his speech from the Throne. The Government wished to avoid a debate with respect to the foreign relations, and it was decided that no address should be voted.

The opposition parties, composed chiefly of the Liberal and Constitutional Conservatives, have, notwithstanding, moved addresses, which were submitted in the sitting of to-day, the one being proposed by M. de Vincke, the other by M. de Bethmann-Hollweg.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship an extract of that portion of the address moved by M. de Bethmann-Hollweg which refers to the present foreign relations of Prussia.

The principal object of these motions was to enable these members to express their disapprobation of the foreign policy of the Government. M. de Vincke, M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, and M. Reichensperger spoke at great length, and were answered with equal warmth by M. de Gerlach. On a division the address of M. de Vincke was rejected by a majority of about forty, and M. de Bethmann-Hollweg subsequently withdrew his motion.

I shall have the honour to forward to your Lordship a précis of this debate, which has not yet appeared in public print.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 567.

Translation of that portion of the Address intended to be moved in the Second Chamber by the party of Bethmann-Hollweg, in reply to the Speech of the King of Prussia, which refers to the position of Prussia with regard to the present complications.

THE gravest apprehensions fill the heart of every patriot with regard to the conflict which has broken out between the mightiest States of Europe, and which must affect the position of Prussia as a great Power, and her geographical situation, in proportion as it assumes greater dimensions. We acknowledge with the deepest gratitude the paternal solicitude of your Majesty to preserve to the country as long as possible the blessings of peace. But we feel bound, in conscience, most respectfully to state to your Majesty that in our

opinion, and in that of the great majority of the country, the moment is come when Prussia, in the maintenance of her peculiar and North German interests, may still avoid the dangerous position of complete isolation, by speedily and decisively returning to the European community to which the other great German Power and ally has steadfastly adhered, and to which it has now again given fresh confirmation; that if your Majesty will throw the full weight of your word, enforced by action, into the balance, the goal of a durable peace, based on right, and on its security against future danger, can alone be attained. Should the united voice of Europe meet with no attention, and should your Majesty be obliged to invoke the whole force of the country, then the nation will know that the heavy sacrifices of life and property are not imposed on them for the sake of foreign interests; but for the inestimable possession of rights, of independence, and of the honour of the fatherland, and in obeying the call of their King "will prove in a true Prussian spirit that we are strong in union."

No. 568.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 110.)

Bucharest, November 27, 1854.

My Lord,

AS a sequel to my despatch No. 97, I have now the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information copies of the remainder of the correspondence respecting the movement of Omer Pasha's forces. I have merely to remark that the line which both the Austrian Generals, Coronini and Augustini, trace for the passage of the Ottoman troops is now so well known to the enemy on the Pruth that, at the place where, if the forward movement were effected, the passage of the river must take place, is at this moment defended by a *tête de pont* mounting eighty-two guns.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 568.

Count Coronini to Omer Pasha.

Jassy, le 6 Novembre, 1854.

(Traduction.)

EN me rendant ici, j'ai appris avec plaisir qu'il existe une entente convenable et réciproque entre les Généraux Ottomans à Ibraila et les Généraux Autrichiens à Galatz.

Ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de la faire remarquer verbalement à votre Excellence, il ne sera apporté aucun empêchement de notre part aux opérations vers le Pruth de l'armée placée sous ses ordres, si ces opérations sont encore dans les vues de votre Excellence. Seulement je désire connaître l'espace dans lequel votre Excellence veut se mouvoir, afin de pouvoir en aviser mes Généraux pour empêcher tout croisement de colonnes eu égard aux positions que nous avons déjà prises, et aussi pour rester dans les termes de l'entente que votre Excellence a eue avec son Excellence M. le Baron de Hess. Notamment Nomolassa, qui a été occupé à notre insu par un détachement de troupes Ottomanes. Votre Excellence partage certainement avec moi la conviction qu'avec la dislocation actuelle de mes troupes, je dois être instruit des mouvements qui s'effectuent à un proximité. Je prie donc votre Excellence de me faire connaître la zone que vous désirez occuper avec les armées Ottomanes, pour pouvoir demander à M. le Baron de Hess les instructions qui me serviront de ligne de conduite.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) CORONINI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 568.

Omer Pasha to Count Coronini.

(Traduction.)

Bucharest, November 18, 1854.

M. le Comte,

VOS deux dépêches du 5 et du 9 Novembre courant, la première sans numéro, la seconde portant le No. 421, et concernant l'une et l'autre les mouvements prochains de l'armée Impériale Ottomane, me sont duement parvenues.

Dans la première de ces dépêches votre Excellence déclare ne vouloir opposer aucune difficulté à ces mouvements et y exprime le désir d'être instruite d'avance de la zone en dedans de laquelle ces mouvements viendraient à être opérés.

Votre Excellence fait également la déclaration que l'occupation de Nomolassa par un détachement de troupes Ottomanes, sans votre connaissance préalable, est incompatible avec vos désirs; mais dans la seconde dépêche votre Excellence limite ce mouvement à un espace précis.

Ces deux dépêches se trouvant en contradiction, je me vois forcé à faire les observations suivantes.

L'occupation du point de Nomolassa, par un détachement de troupes Ottomanes, eut lieu pour établir un poste d'observation, mesure qu'une armée qui se trouve à proximité de l'ennemi doit à sa sûreté et qui, étant du ressort du service de détail des commandants inférieurs, doit nécessairement être exécutée promptement par ces derniers, sans qu'ils perdent du temps par des correspondances de façon que "toute communication préalable" devient impossible et qu'il n'est pas même necessaire qu'ils donnent avis, à leur propre Commandant-en-chef, du placement de tels postes.

L'espace désigné dans la seconde dépêche (celle du 9), vû surtout la conformation marécageuse de la rive droite de Pruth, paraît d'autant plus insuffisant à une armée forte de plus de 60,000 hommes, que l'insignificance de cet espace, abstraction faite d'une base d'opération ou d'une position stratégique, ne lui permet pas même un déploiement tactique et que l'armée ne peut par conséquent compter sur aucun succès.

En me fondant sur ce qui précède et par suite des ordres qui m'ont été transmis par notre Ambassadeur à Vienne, tant par voie télégraphique que par courier, je me vois dans l'obligation de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que je ferai d'autant plus mettre à exécution, sans aucune restriction, les opérations dont je vous ai déjà donné connaissance antérieurement, par ma dépêche du 6 Novembre, No. 150, et qui se trouvent actuellement en voie d'exécution, que je ne doute nullement que votre Excellence voudra bien reconnaître et apprécier l'impossibilité de restreindre les opérations d'une armée, si elles doivent conduire à un résultat quelconque.

Je prie, &c.

Le Généralissime de l'Armée Impériale Ottomane.

(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 568.

General Augustini to Achmed Pasha.

(Traduction.)

Galatz, le 17 Novembre, 1854.

D'APRES ce qui a été convenu entre le Commandant-en-chef Baron de Hess et le Généralissime des troupes Ottomanes Omer Pacha, et ensuite d'après ce que m'a fait entendre formellement le Commandant de l'Avantgarde, Sadyk Pacha, à notre entrevue à Vödeni, l'armée Ottomane, dans le cas où elle s'avancerait sur le Pruth, ne pourra suivre que la route par Maximeni et Cornia à Formosa, c'est-à-dire, uniquement sur cette ligne.

Toute extension de l'armée Ottomane au delà de cette ligne sur le territoire Moldave a été et sera considéré comme inadmissible.

Au lieu de se conformer à la Convention arrêtée, votre Excellence n'a nullement suivi la ligne indiquée; elle a fait au contraire entrer son avant garde

par Vödeni en Moldavie et a occupé précisément la partie du territoire que la Convention lui avait défendu d'occuper.

J'ai reçu du Commandant des troupes Impériales Autrichiennes en Moldo-Valachie, M. le Comte Coronini, l'ordre le plus formel de protester contre cette marche, et de demander à votre Excellence en son nom et de la manière la plus énergique, de vider immédiatement les lieux qu'elle occupe illégalement, et de se retirer plus haut sur la ligne de Maximeni par Cornia à Formosa (Kagul); attendu que je ne saurait tolérer une occupation plus au sud, je dois attribuer à votre Excellence seule les suites qui pourraient en advenir, vû que le Commandant de mon corps d'armée est entré en négociations à ce sujet avec le Généralissime de l'armée Ottomane.

En outre, j'ai l'honneur de faire remarquer à votre Excellence que depuis que les troupes Ottomanes sont placées à proximité de Galatz, elles entrent librement de tous côtés dans la ville, sans aucun égard pour l'occupation de cette ville par les troupes Impériales Autrichiennes et pour le Général Autrichien qui en a le commandement; elles ont même comblé à un endroit le fossé de la douane pour entrer plus commodément.

Sans compter, ce que votre Excellence reconnaîtra sans doute, que cette conduite arbitraire pourrait amener des réclamations d'autre part, qui vous seraient certainement désagréables, je dois déclarer ici à votre Excellence que je ne puis plus, en aucun cas, souffrir qu'elle agisse ainsi de son propre chef en qu'elle mette de côté les égards qui me sont dûs dans le rayon que j'occupe. Je vous prie donc de donner des ordres pour faire cesser cet arbitraire, car quelque désagréable que cela me serait, à l'égard d'une Puissance amie de mon Empereur et Maître, je serais obligé, si les ordres de votre Excellence ne mettent fin à cette conduite, qui n'est pas militaire, d'user des mesures dont je dispose.

Dans l'attente certaine que votre Excellence fera, ainsi que moi, tout son possible pour maintenir la bonne intelligence entre nos armées amies, je vous prie de me répondre par le porteur de la présente.

(Signé) AUGUSTINI.

No. 569.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 19.)

Vienna, December 18, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Russian Minister at this Court has stated to Count Buol that he has received from his Government full power to treat. Count Buol told him he awaits the decision of the allies.

The Emperor sends this day the Prince Schonburg with the Order of St. Stephen to the Emperor of the French.

Count Buol, remarking upon Lord John Russell's speech, said that if he had stated that Austria might legally be released from her engagement, that he would have been right, but Count Buol considers that morally and in honour she is bound not to withdraw. Count Esterhazy informed Count Buol of Baron Usedom's mission.

No. 570.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 424.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 469 of the 13th instant, on the subject of the proposed expulsion by the Porte of certain Boyards from the Principalities, and the confiscation of their property, I have to inform your Lordship that I can give no opinion in the absence of information upon the several cases. If no formal trial has taken place, the expulsion of the Boyards and the confiscation of their property would appear to be a harsh measure; but

there are many notorious Russian agents in the Principalities who must be kept in check, and it is on every account necessary to uphold the Sultan's authority.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 571.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 426.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Colquhoun's despatch No. 110 of the 27th ultimo, inclosing copies of the correspondence which had passed between Omer Pasha and General Coronini as to the movements of the Ottoman troops, which despatch passed through your Lordship's hands under flying seal, I have to instruct your Lordship to report what steps you have taken upon it, and whether the Commission established at Vienna has come to any decision with respect to its contents.

If General Coronini protects the persons notoriously hostile to the Porte, and assumes the Protectorate over the Principalities, serious misunderstandings must constantly take place.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 572.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 19.)

(No. 1,523.)

Paris, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received in the course of last night a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated yesterday evening, stating that he could take upon himself to affirm that Count Buol would make no objection to the course proposed to be pursued by the Western Powers, namely, that Prince Gortchakoff should make a formal demand to treat with those Powers on the basis of the four points; that on his doing so, the explanation of the four points, as understood by those Powers and Austria (for M. de Bourqueney is convinced that Count Buol will make no objection to the exchange of notes), should be laid before him, and should he still express his intention of continuing the negotiations, that he should be informed that no further step can be taken before the arrival of a Turkish Plenipotentiary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 573.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 19.)

(No. 1,527.)

Paris, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from Berlin, in the sense of Lord Bloomfield's telegraphic despatch of the 14th instant, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 1,235 to me.

He is of opinion that the proposal of the Prussian Government of which M. Usedom is the bearer, should not be listened to; that he should be informed that the object of the allies is to preserve the unity of, and not, by following the course proposed by Prussia, to sow dissensions in Germany—an argument, he observes, which will make a favourable impression on Austria; and that England and France have given, and intend to give, no territorial guarantees.

It appears to be the opinion of the Representative of the smaller German Courts here, that Prussia must eventually adhere to the Treaty of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 574.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,262.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1854.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 1,519 of the 17th instant, stating that you had presented to the French Government the note transmitted in my despatch No. 1,234 of the 15th instant, on the subject of the four bases of negotiations for peace, and informing me that you had added another paragraph to the note; and I have to state to your Excellency in reply that I approve of your having done so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 575.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 800.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Wallachia, stating that he has traced the origin of the false report of the fall of Sebastopol to Islam Pasha, Commandant-de-place of Varna; and I have to instruct your Excellency to request the Porte to call upon that officer to explain his conduct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 576.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 1,533.)
My Lord, *Paris, December* 19, 1854.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just read me a telegraphic despatch from Vienna, in which it is stated that Count Buol has heard of the mission of M. Usedom to London with disdain, not having a doubt that the propositions of which he is the bearer will be at once refused by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 577.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 510. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, December* 17, 1854.

COUNT ESTERHAZY called upon me yesterday, and informed me that he had now received from Count Buol instructions to communicate officially to the Prussian Government a copy of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, together with the Secret Article, and that he proposed at once to call upon Baron

Manteuffel, read to his Excellency Count Buol's despatch, inviting the accession of Prussia to the Treaty, and leave it with him. This he appears to have done; and further to have stated to the Minister President that an accession to the Treaty would enable the King to resume his place at the Vienna Conference, and that the Austrian Government trusted this invitation would be well received.

Count Esterhazy in vain expected some answer from the Prussian Minister; his Excellency, however, said nothing in reply to this communication, and turned the conversation to another subject.

Last evening I saw Baron Manteuffel by appointment. I delivered to his Excellency the copy of the Treaty which I had received from Lord Westmorland, and told him that, in requesting his Excellency in the most earnest manner to recommend the King to accede to it, I might add that His Majesty by thus meeting the wishes of the allies, would no longer find himself isolated amongst the Great Powers, whilst his accession would increase the chances of the restoration of peace. I then added that I had been told that the King felt deeply annoyed that Austria had become a party to this Treaty without having made any previous communication to him, and that I begged His Majesty to consider the impossibility in which we found ourselves of making confidential communications to him, when we knew that every office at Court was filled by persons whose political opinions were hostile to us, and whose efforts were perpetually directed to advance the interests of Russia. Under these circumstances, I said, it was really impossible for us to propose the Treaty to Prussia until the three Powers had first agreed to it, more particularly as we felt certain that, if the Court party became aware of the negotiation, not only would they set all their engines at work to prevent its adoption here, but would endeavour to influence the opinion of the smaller States, seek to draw them away from Austria, and urge the establishment of a neutrality in Germany, adapted to call forth the entire approbation of the Imperial Court of Russia.

I then drew Baron Manteuffel's attention to the Secret Article, as one of the important parts of the document, and observed that it was my duty to inform him that we expected Prussia would either accede or decline our invitation, for that we could not admit of any half measures. I said further that, in a fortnight from this time we should, unless Russia agreed to preliminaries of peace, be in consultation with Austria as to an Offensive and Defensive Alliance, and that it was almost needless for me to say that the Treaty of the 2nd of December was only a first step, and that we looked forward, if Prussia were inclined to join us, to establishing a condition in Europe which might insure an early restoration of peace, and that if this failed, a general war might be the consequence.

Baron Manteuffel said he could not give me any definitive answer to this communication; that, however, he could assure me that, though the King was, for the moment, indisposed to accede to the Treaty, he was willing to agree to stipulations of the same purport in another form. I rejoined, if the King were so disposed, might we then expect that His Majesty would pass over this preliminary arrangement of the 2nd of December, and enter at once into an Offensive and Defensive Alliance with the Three Powers? To this Baron Manteuffel replied that he could say no more than that he thought such a negotiation would, at the present moment, be more likely to succeed than the Treaty to which we wanted his simple accession.

I then said, But if the King wishes his Envoy to attend the Conferences that may shortly be held at Vienna, he of course cannot do so unless he accedes to the Treaty, and enters into engagements with us which will prevent his holding any separate communication with St. Petersburgh.

Baron Manteuffel appeared aware of all the difficulties of the present position; but he nevertheless observed to me with some degree of surprise, that Count Nesselrode had complained that Count Buol had not made known to Prince Gortchakoff, the Austrian interpretation of the four points. I explained that Count Buol most naturally felt himself bound to communicate with London and Paris on the subject before offering any opinion, and that some little time might be consumed in doing this; but I said, all will be ready long before the end of this month, and then our positions will be more clearly defined.

Baron Manteuffel remarked that if our interpretation of the four points was as it had been represented to him, he did not believe Russia would subscribe to

them; and it appeared to me, that under these circumstances, he felt better inclined to be out of the Conference at Vienna, particularly as I gave him to understand that Prussia could only be admitted into it, if she adopted clearly and unreservedly the same views as the allies.

I cannot say that I see much chance of the King of Prussia joining the alliance at once, though he is better to do so than he was some weeks ago; but as he will naturally desire it to appear that he is not dragged into it, but comes of his own free will, the question then arises how far it may be advisable to meet his wishes, and to facilitate his joining us.

My French colleague found Baron Manteuffel better disposed than he expected; he first of all made a mere verbal communication like myself, inviting the accession of Prussia, but having subsequently to his first interview with Baron Manteuffel received from his Government a fresh instruction on the subject, he thought, under the change which is apparently coming round, that it might be useful to leave M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch with the Prussian Minister President, and the communication has been taken in good part.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 578.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 513. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 18, 1854.*

BARON USEDOM has set out for London, and will probably be there before this despatch can reach your Lordship.

I have not much to add on the subject of this mission to the intelligence already sent, but I have thought it right to report, without loss of time, all that I am able to collect respecting it, and I forward this despatch by an extra messenger to Ostend.

Baron Usedom has had two interviews with the King since I wrote to your Lordship on the 15th instant. His Majesty has on both occasions expressed his desire to draw nearer to England; and I believe that he begins, at last, to feel the impossibility of following up the policy which he has pursued for some time past. He is offended at the late conduct of Austria towards him, and sends Baron Usedom with a letter to the Queen, and with directions to make certain communications to your Lordship which he hopes will, at all events, lead to a better understanding between the two Courts, and perhaps to a closer alliance.

At first sight one is led to suppose that this Mission is nothing but a new vagary of the King, prompted by a spiteful feeling towards Austria and momentary ill-will towards Russia, by which His Majesty may hope to obtain concessions to his views from both parties; but I am inclined to think that something more is meant, and that the King is making a serious effort to shake off the trammels in which he is kept.

Neither Baron Usedom nor Baron Manteuffel have any hope that the proposed Separate Treaty between England, France, and Prussia will meet with favour in England, and both are prepared for the failure of the mission. So strong is this impression that the Prussian Government scarcely wish it to be known that the King is sending a letter to the Queen by Baron Usedom; they wish the mission to be kept as secret as possible, and it is said by some that he is going entirely on his own account.

If Baron Usedom should fail, he will remain in England for private reasons; and Baron Manteuffel would doubtless rejoice at anything that will keep him away from Berlin, and out of reach of the King's ear; for he well knows that there is, at the present moment, no person here who can approach the King and hold language to His Majesty in the sense advocated by Baron Usedom;—in fact, there is nobody to take his place, and he therefore thinks that in a few days perhaps the King may change his mind, and be brought back to his old train of thought.

However, His Majesty has made a good stand against the Court party.

General Gerlach had tendered his resignation, which was not accepted; and the General and Count Dohna have both declared to Baron Manteuffel that he will forfeit the confidence of their party if the mission succeeds.

It is difficult to believe that the King will continue long in his present mood, with such open opposition to his apparently altered views; but still I would venture to suggest that it may be advisable to give His Majesty some encouragement. The opinions of many adherents of the Court party will be shaken, and the waverers may come round—indeed, the change already effected is quite remarkable. Moreover, the negotiator selected is deserving of confidence; alliance with England is his political creed; and he has assured me that he will never take office, if asked to do so, under present circumstances, unless the King consents to a cordial union with the Western Powers, and to the adoption of warlike measures in support of this policy.

I understand that one of the reasons which has induced the King to take this sudden decision of sending Baron Usedom to England, is his continual apprehension that Protestantism is threatened, and that the union of England and Prussia is essential to the maintenance of the principles of the Reformation.

I have, &c
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 579.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 514.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 18, 1854.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 508 of the 15th instant, I have now the honour to inclose an extract, in translation, of the debate in the Prussian Chamber on the address.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 579.

Précis of Debate in Prussian Second Chamber, on Question of Voting an Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne.

THE Minister President, in remarking that the Government in no way admitted the grounds on which an address was proposed, stated that the advisers of the Crown, when consulted whether an address should be consequent upon the opening of the Chambers by the King in person, decided in the negative. The competency of the Chamber to vote an address was incontestable; and the explanations to be given in the debates are clearly in the hands of the Chamber.

In the state of suspension in which negotiations are now, it is impossible to give any detailed information concerning the political position. I must also abstain from the rectification of false statements, in case they should be advanced. I would also remind the members of this Chamber who take part in this debate, that we are at the present moment at peace with all States, and request that they will have due regard to this consideration.

M. Reichensperger spoke in favour of an address. The German Diet had always had an ancient right to assent to peace or war. The States-General (vereinigte Landtag) of 1847 affords a precedent of the participation of the Chambers in the foreign policy. From the writings of Professor Stahl, he (M. Reichensperger) proves that in Constitutional States the Representatives have the right to express their wishes on questions of foreign policy. He hoped and expected that the address would be voted.

M. de Vincke commences by explaining the motives for an address. He remarked that it was said that the address was of no political consequence; the form, however, was of importance, for it was the only direct connection of the Chamber with the Throne.

The joyful event in the Royal Family, not less than the formation of the First Chamber, gave cause for the voting of an address; but the state of the foreign policy required it still more. The Government ought to be informed of the opinions of the national representatives on the foreign policy, and no opportunity was more favourable than the voting of an address. To refrain from questioning as to the past, or interpellating as to the present, to be silent as to the future, was a request without any logical conclusion.

Last year, when money was asked of us, then we were justified in speaking on the foreign policy; but when the gentlemen got the money in their pockets, then the foreign policy re-entered into the exclusive domain of the Government. I said this last year: it is confirmed, unfortunately, this year.

It is said that the Government would be embarrassed by a difference of opinion, but if so, the Government would stand on weaker grounds than even the Republic of San Marino. If this was to apply to the majority, it would indeed be worse, for then the majority of the Chamber would not be, unfortunately, the majority of the country; for the small party which would form that majority would not have the majority of the country with them. M. de Vincke considered that an address was indispensable, for it was the only opportunity to prove to Europe the unanimity of the Government and the country. Something of the policy of the Government would then be known. Last year, after the Vienna Protocols, a cooperation with the Western Powers was inferred. The speech from the Throne in this respect alone mentions Austria. It is not suitable to the existence of a great Power to receive passively reproaches; and in the face of them, a disavowal by the Government is necessary. He could only hope for that almighty ally of Ziethen, by whom he hoped that Prussia and and the House of Hohenzollern would never be abandoned.

Vincke's motion for an address was rejected by 170 against 112 votes.

Bethmann-Hollweg then proposed his address; and after stating the grounds on which he deemed an address necessary, he entered at length into the march of the negotiations with respect to the position of Prussia on the Oriental question, and sought to prove how it was the office of Prussia to force Russia to a peace, and thus to put an end to the demands of the Western Powers, which will naturally go on increasing. It is the duty of the representatives of the country to express these opinions to the Crown.

M. de Gerlach passes over the poetic and sentimental, to express his fear with respect to the Parliamentary propriety which demands an address. He can only protest against the motion with the great party, which for seven years has been the support of the Government. He can pass over the contents of the proposition, as it is only intruded for a discussion on foreign affairs. Austria has been cited as an example, without being able to be justified. The wish for an entrance into cooperation with the European Powers has been expressed as if they were placed out of the European relations by a holding to Russia—Russia! whose Emperor is a Duke of Holstein!—whose Empress is the sister of His Majesty the King!—whose Prince-Royal is a grandson of Frederick-William III. In 1848, Paris, Berlin, or Vienna were very little European, and Russia at that time shewed herself to be European. The speaker then passed to the influence of the small and powerful party, and did not doubt that Prussia, numerically, as to population, was adverse to a breach with Russia.

The speech from the Throne itself counted upon unanimity of the country; therefore let them—as on the 8th of April the credit was valid—throw out, with a large majority, the present motion.

M. de Bethmann-Hollweg finally withdrew his motion.

No. 580.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 22, 1854.*

IT is possible that the Russian Minister may propose to adopt our interpretation of the first, second, and third bases, and to leave the fourth for consideration. You will refuse to agree to such a proposal.

No. 581.

Captain Conyers to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 18, 1854.*

ON the 24th of November, I had the honour to forward for your Lordship's information, a letter (No. 11) inclosing a further detail of the Russian forces in the Crimea.

This morning additional information has been sent, by the authorities here to Brigadier-General Du Plat, of which the accompanying lengthened statement is a faithful translation; and by which it would appear that, since the last report, reinforcements to the amount of 39,920 men, with 160 guns, have been sent to Prince Menchikoff. Of this force, 1,800 are Cossacks, 3,920 are Light Cavalry, accompanied by 16 light field-pieces.

Count Coronini has reported that Omer Pasha left Bucharest on the 11th instant, and proceeded with 20,000 men to Varna, *en route* to the Crimea; leaving as a garrison at Bucharest only two battalions of Infantry and one regiment of Cavalry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES E. CONYERS.

Inclosure in No. 581.

MEMORANDUM.

Enumeration of the Russian Forces in the Crimea, under the orders of Prince Menchikoff—with Head-quarters at Baktschiserai, the Right Wing at Belbek, the Centre at Inkermann, and the Left Wing at Tzaktyr.

In the middle of November, 1854 (after the battle of Inkermann), this army consisted of 95,870 men, 352 guns.

At Sebastopol.

	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
The 4th Infantry Corps d'Armée, under General Danneberg (since recalled), 31,400 men, 144 guns.				
The 10th Infantry Division (was under the command of General Soimonoff at Belbek)	10,000	48		
The 11th Infantry Division, General Toreloff, at Belbek	10,000	48		
12th Division, Liprandi, Tzaktyr	10,000	48		
The 4th Battalion of Chasseurs (600 men), and the 4th Battalion of Sappers (800)	1,400	0		
			31,400	144
The 6th Infantry Corps, under General Prince Gortchakoff (III), 27,920 men, 120 guns.				
16th Infantry Division, General Kwicinsky, at Inkermann	10,000	48		
17th, Kidjakow	10,000	48		
The 6th Battalion of Chasseurs (600), and the 6th Battalion of Sappers (600), ...	1,400	0		
The 6th Division of Light Cavalry under General Lanskoi (II) ..	3,920	16		
Also four Battalions of the 13th Brigade d'Infanterie de Réserve ..	2,600	8		
			27,920	120

	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
The Garrison of Sebastopol itself is composed of 21,000 men, 40 guns.				
1st Brigade of the 14th Infantry Division, under General Zalokritzky.	5,000	24		
8th Brigade, Infanterie de Réserve, under Colonel Wrasky	5,000	8		
Four Battalions of the 13th Brigade of the Infanterie de Réserve, under General Asiarowitch	2,400	0		
13th Brigade, Infanterie de Réserve, General Avelbäschew	5,000	8		
Six Naval Battalions	3,600	0		
And one Battalion of Greeks of Balaklava	600	0		
			21,600	40
At Baktschiserai, Tschorgun, and holding some other positions, 14,950 men, 48 guns.				
The Division of Lancers, of the Corps of Cuirassiers (called) General Korff (1)	4,240	16		
1st Brigade of the Division of Light Cavalerie de Réserve, Kyschow, (12 squadrons,) with the 1st Mounted Batterie de Réserve, at Tschorgun	1,640	8		
The Pulks of Cossacks of the Don, Nos. 34, 39, 40, 42, 53, 60, 61, 67 ..	4,800	0		
One Pulk of Cossacks of the Ural, and half-a-squadron of the Tartar Crimean Garde du Corps	670	0		
Two batteries—Light Mounted Battery of the Don, and the 3rd Batterie de Position, also of the Don	600	24		
			14,950	48
In the Peninsula of Kertch, under the orders of the Attaman of the Don, General Chountow, five Battalions of the line, men from the vicinity of the Black Sea			3,000	0
This makes up the total force of			95,870	352
Reinforcements on the way to the Crimea.				
The 3rd Corps of Infantry, under General Osten-Sacken, 39,920 men, 160 guns.				
The 6th Division of Infantry, Bellegarde	12,800	48		
8th Infantry Division, Paporo (1). (This Division arrived at Sebastopol on the 26th November)	10,000	48		
9th Infantry, Lissenska	10,000	48		
The 3rd Battalion of Chasseurs (600 men), and the 3rd Battalion of Sappers (600)	1,400	0		
The 4th Division of Light Cavalry, under General Comte de Nirol (1)	3,920	16		
The Pulks of Cossacks of the Don, Nos. 38, 43, 46	1,800	0		
			39,920	160
Therefore after the arrival of the 3rd Corps d'Armée, in the middle of December, the Russian force in the Crimea will amount to about			135,790	512

NOTE.—According to accounts received from the French Minister of War, the 4th Infantry Division has also received orders to proceed from the Province of Lublin to the Crimea.

No. 582.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 727.)

Constantinople, December 2, 1854.

My Lord,

IN answer to your inquiry respecting the expediency of advising the Porte to place the whole of Syria under the control of a Civil Governor-General, I have the honour to remark, that it may reasonably be doubted whether such an arrangement would secure the tranquillity of that province, or correct the abuses which compromise its welfare. The concentration of administrative power in single hands would have a beneficial tendency in so far as it might produce uniformity of action, and bring into one point of view for the consideration of Government the wants and resources of the various localities.

The frequent disorders which render Syria a hotbed of violence and crime, are traceable in part to natural causes, and, perhaps, in a greater degree to false principles of government and to the vices of those in authority. The broken and separative features of the country, the vicinity of the desert and its marauding tribes, the independence exercised, rather than enjoyed, in certain districts, the contrarieties of race, and feuds engendered by the passions of rival families, may be classed under the former head. To the latter belong those maxims of ruling

by division, of gaining by corruption, and of destroying by treachery, which characterize Eastern administration, those habits of impatient exaction which tear up the tree to get at its fruit, that system of arrogant self-appropriation according to which all productive industry is no better than a coal-field—to be worked, exhausted, and abandoned.

Such being the relations of society and the conditions of life in Syria, no wonder that they impart their colouring to those who are invested with office. Oppressive governors, venal magistrates, perjured witnesses, a brutal police, with all their train of falsehood, extortion, profligacy, baseness, and misery, are the natural and unavoidable results. These evils, which still unhappily abound throughout Turkey, are not less rife in Syria than elsewhere. In proportion to the degree of power is the temptation to those vices which render its exercise hateful and pernicious. Where the Aga pilfers, the Pasha plunders. The Mushir may oppress his victim, but the Sirdar ruins him.

It would seem to follow, that by concentrating authority without amending the system, you would be more likely to increase than to diminish the existing evil. Let the process be inverted by first removing the causes of abuse, and it is conceivable that the duties of a Civil Governor-General may be so discharged as to realise an extensive and durable improvement.

But the task even then would not be an easy one. Without having a sufficient regular force at his command this high functionary would be a cypher. He ought, moreover, to have the disposal of a considerable revenue. He ought to have a well-selected, well-paid police. He ought to have easy means of communication with every part of his Government. He ought to be strong enough to bring the best-supported native in his province to a summary trial.

But in order to wield these powers to good purpose, he must be placed under a real responsibility. It is also important that he should be at ease, as well on the score of appointments as in official position. He must not be recalled on light grounds. With few exceptions, he must be empowered to appoint and to dismiss. His first and principal duty should be to carry out the Sultan's administrative and judicial reforms.

But with all these elements of power in hand the Governor-General might still be puzzled to bring Aleppo, Damascus, Beyroot, Jerusalem, and Deir-el-Kamar, under the influence of a just and equable administration. Syria is a Babel of creeds, languages, races, and customs.

Another question presents itself here. Would the Porte be disposed to delegate so much of its power as would be required to bridge a chaos of that description? Her policy for some time back has been directed to the curtailment of provincial authority, and the restoration of the Sultan's prerogative in all its plenitude. Remissness in that respect during a long preceding period had led to the rebellion of Ali Pasha, to the separation of Egypt, and the loss for a while of Syria itself.

With the exception of Egypt, the precedents tell doubtfully in favour of the proposed measure. In the province of Bagdad, which offers the most obvious comparison, the experiment has not been attended with success. Nejib Pasha was an active, determined, intelligent governor. His powers were very extensive. His troops were not allowed to be idle; and, in point of revenue, wherever he reaped, little was left to glean. The results of his long administration were a general impoverishment of the province, an almost continual state of internal hostilities, and the display of an utter inability to do more than prevent any one set of mutineers, whether a rebellious town, a confederacy of tribes, or a disaffected family, from establishing their separate ascendancy.

When Mehemet Ali kept Syria in order, his more intelligent system of governing—though arbitrary and abusive enough—was supported by the presence of a numerous and disciplined army. The Sultan has no such advantage. The war has compelled him to distribute nearly the whole of his troops along the frontier; and Syria, left to itself, is more than ever exposed to the restless elements of misrule, which, however, after all, have proved less explosive than might have been expected.

Permit me now, my Lord, to assure you that I have not been inattentive to this palpable cause of disturbance and danger. Early in the spring I submitted to Reshid Pasha, and, through him, to the Council, a plan for organizing a combined force of militia and police, supported by small reserves of regulars in the chief provincial towns. The plan, after due deliberation, was

accepted, but I have no reason to suppose that it ever travelled an inch beyond the Seraskier's bureau.

At a still earlier period, two years before the commencement of the war, I submitted to the Sultan himself an idea which might, I conceive, have been carried into effect with advantage, and also without much difficulty. It was this: to form into certain groups the various Pashaliks of which the Empire is composed, and to place at the head of each group—without otherwise disturbing the present distribution—a Governor-General or High-Commissioner, selected from among the most experienced and best disposed of the Porte's servants, enjoying the full confidence of his Government, and charged with the special enforcement of the new administrative system by means of the regular subordinate authorities placed for the purpose under his superintendence. I also gave in a list of fifteen individuals qualified more or less, in my opinion, for the trust. The suggestion was graciously received, and I heard no objection from Reshid Pasha, who was Grand Vizier at the time; but nothing followed, and the plan has in all probability floated into that limbo which here, as elsewhere, is ever filling and never full.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have been reminded that when in two successive instances the government of all Syria was intrusted to a single Pasha, rebellion was the consequence. Abdullah Pasha rebelled, and so did the famous Dizzar Pasha.

S. DE R.

No. 583.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 730. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Pera, December* 3, 1854.

THE Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs communicated to-day in confidence to M. Pisani, for my information, a despatch just received from Veli Pasha at Paris.

The Ambassador reports that having had occasion to see M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the conversation fell upon the Crimea, when the French Minister said, We shall probably get possession of that country, and it is worth while for your Government to consider what is to be done with it. He then went on to say, as Veli Pasha asserts, that Omer Pasha might be installed there in the same manner as the Viceroy of Egypt now stands towards the Porte.

I do not understand that any distinct proposal was made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and Aali Pasha, when showing the despatch to M. Pisani, said that he merely thought it right to bring the statement to my knowledge in a confidential manner.

I can well conceive that the idea might be palatable to the Turkish Government apart from Omer Pasha, who is by no means in favour equal to his merits.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 584.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 734.)

My Lord, *Pera, December* 5, 1854.

IT appears from Mr. Colquhoun's correspondence, which has no doubt been submitted direct by himself to your Lordship, that Omer Pasha and the Commanders-in-chief of the allied armies have been rather at cross purposes respecting the operations to be forthwith undertaken by a considerable portion

of the Turkish army. I trust, however, that the twofold and simultaneous reference to London and Paris on the one side, and to the Crimea on the other, has by this time resolved the existing uncertainty into a complete acquiescence with Lord Raglan's proposal, as accepted and recommended by General Canrobert. Supposing the French Government to have taken this course, I anticipate no delay from the Porte in so far as the Imperial sanction is concerned, though I will not answer for the transports, provisions, and clothing, necessary as they are, being ready by the appointed time. So many transports are wanted for other services that it will be difficult, I fear, to meet the demand at Baljick with provisions, and other articles to be furnished by the Seraskier may easily be found deficient, notwithstanding the frequent representations made to him, and the assurances, quite as frequent, which he has given in reply.

Inclosed herewith, in copy, is a despatch from Colonel Neale, which, though not of a very recent date, may be read by your Lordship with interest as giving the real force of the eighteen battalions offered to Lord Raglan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 584.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, November* 22, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the number and distribution of Turkish contingent destined, if required, to proceed from Varna to the Crimea, is as follows:—

In Varna, 10 battalions at 650 men	6500
In Pravadi, 4 battalions at 650	2600
In Yasi Tepe (8 hours from Varna), 4 battalions at 650 . .	2600
Men . .	11,700

And two batteries of Field Artillery, one of which is at Varna, and the other at Pravadi.

I took occasion to converse with Tefik Bey, the brother-in-law of his Highness Omer Pasha, who is appointed to command a division, or one half of these troops (Mehmet Pasha having the command of the other division), respecting their numerical strength and condition as to equipments. He confirms my computation as to the number of effective men per battalion; and with respect to their equipments, he states that they are in much need of winter clothing, especially great-coats and trousers. He spoke of various arrangements which had been made to supply, as far as possible, this deficiency, by temporarily appropriating for the troops destined for the Crimea, some great-coats from the Artillerymen stationed in Varna, and of some clothing for other corps on the Danube. But he said, in reply to my inquiry as to what clothing it was absolutely necessary should be supplied from Constantinople, that 5,000 great-coats and 6,000 pairs of trousers were indispensible. I have, therefore, the honour to bring this fact to your Lordship's knowledge, and respectfully to suggest that the Turkish Government be urged to supply this deficiency as speedily as possible.

Tefik Bey said that there would be a sufficiency of tents, as it was purposed to take 300 belonging to the Egyptians, besides those that remained serviceable.

Shoes and other articles of clothing, he informed me, would be procured in Varna; and, he added, with respect to provisions, that these troops would take with them from Varna, if they went to the Crimea, a sufficient quantity for one month.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

No. 585.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 736.)

Therapia, December 5, 1854.

My Lord,

I AM informed on the best authority that the Austrian Internuncio is endeavouring, by means of his interpreter, to persuade the Turkish Government to give their assent to the four points, which are announced as having been accepted by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

It appears that Aali Pasha has declined to give any opinion upon the subject until the views of England and France are made known to the Porte.

Baron de Bruck received the above-mentioned intelligence from Vienna a few days ago, and communicated it to me in confidence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 586.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 737.)

Therapia, December 5, 1854.

My Lord,

M. PISANI, in his official report of this day's date, informs me that the Sultan has given his sanction to the proposal made by Lord Raglan and seconded by General Canrobert. Instructions in this sense will be forwarded to the Turkish Generalissimo to-morrow by an aide-de-camp.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 587.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 741.)

Therapia, December 9, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith is copy of the last despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna. A portion of the Turkish troops mentioned by Colonel Neale as embarking for the Crimea has reached Balaklava, and from thence has been sent round to Eupatoria. It appears that the officer charged with embarking them directed the troops, by mistake, to the former place instead of sending them to Eupatoria at once.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 587.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, December 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the British hired steamers "Simla," "Colombo," and "Queen of the South," and the sailing transport "Shooting Star," having arrived at Varna within the last three or four days for the purpose of conveying the first detachment of the Turkish contingent to the Crimea, the troops are in course of being actively embarked. One of the steamers, the "Queen of the South," has already left with 1,200 Infantry on board.

The exact number of troops of the several arms which will be embarked

is as follows: Infantry 10,800, Cavalry 1,000, Artillery 380; total, 12,180, with twelve guns.

Four steamers and four large sailing transports have been ordered by Vice-Admiral Dundas to proceed to Varna to embark these troops, and which they would have effected in two trips; but from some causes unexplained one of the steamers and three of the sailing transports have not arrived. It will, therefore, be necessary that those which are at present disposable perform four trips, in order to convey the whole of the troops.

Some clothing has arrived for these troops from Constantinople, but they consist chiefly of jackets; the great-coats and trousers so much wanted have not arrived. I understand, however, that Omer Pasha has communicated to the military authorities here that he has forwarded 6,000 pairs of trousers and as many pairs of shoes from Bucharest, and that they expected shortly to arrive here.

The troops in course of embarkation are the corps recently commanded by Hassan Pasha, and, I understand, are entirely composed of the Rediff, who do not, however, differ in any material degree from the troops of the regular Turkish army. These troops have also seen active service on the Danube, and some of the battalions were engaged in the defence of Silistria. They are commanded by Mehmet Pasha, who served at Giurgevo, and who is favourably spoken of, and the two brigades which form the division are respectively commanded by Behram Pasha (General Cannon) and Shefik Pasha, the nephew of Omer Pasha. General Cannon will embark to-morrow; he is accompanied by Colonels Ogilvy, Hinde, Morgan, and Ballard, and Lieutenant Cadell of the Madras Artillery, all attached to his Staff. The troops take with them one month's supply of provisions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. ST. JOHN NEALE.

P.S.—The latest intelligence received from the seat of war is up to the 2nd instant, but no event of importance had occurred.

No. 588.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 743.)

Therapia, December 10, 1854.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith in copy is a despatch, which I received this morning from Field-Marshal Lord Raglan. It relates to the Turkish troops detached, or proposed to be detached, from the army of Omer Pasha for service in the Crimea. Your Lordship will observe that the Commanders-in-chief of the allied armies agree in requiring more reinforcements from that quarter, and in desiring that Omer Pasha should take the command of the expedition in person.

The Porte's instructions, by order of the Sultan, directing the Generalissimo to take the command, were sent off by express four days ago.

I avail myself of this opportunity to bring under your Lordship's notice an official application for French and English steamers, to be employed in conveying provisions and ammunition from Bulgaria to the Crimea, on behalf of the Turkish army destined for Eupatoria.

I shall lose no time in recommending this demand to the attention of Rear-Admiral Boxer; but I question whether the means at his disposal will be found equal to the occasion, while reinforcements and supplies, principally under the British flag, are daily passing into the Black Sea, and absorbing a large proportion of the steam-power now in hand.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 588.

General Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Before Sebastopol, December* 8, 1854.

COLONEL SIMMONS arrived here the day before yesterday, and returned to Bucharest *viâ* Varna yesterday. He was the bearer of letters from Omer Pasha, and he was charged by General Canrobert and myself with despatches for his Highness, in which we again urged him to repair to the Crimea, and to bring with him as many of the troops belonging to his army as he may be able to withdraw from the Principalities.

It would appear that an advance towards the Pruth would be useless, the greater part of the Russian force having been withdrawn from Bessarabia, and put in march for the Crimea.

The first ships I sent to Varna for Turkish troops arrived here three days ago, and are now gone up to Eupatoria. They should have been directed there straight from Varna, but by an extraordinary oversight they were ordered here by the superintendent of the transport service, Captain Christie.

I find from General Canrobert that his intention of feeding the Turkish troops to be landed at Eupatoria was limited to the period at which arrangements for their supply by their own Government could be made.

I entreat your Excellency to impress this upon the Seraskier Pasha, and to urge him to make every exertion to send them provisions and warm clothing. If he fail to do this either as regards food or clothing, the Ottoman troops will be wholly inefficient, and be deprived of the power of creating a diversion that shall be useful, and which otherwise they may be able to effect, particularly if commanded by Omer Pasha in person.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RAGLAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 588.

Aali Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Traduction.) *Le 9 Décembre*, 1854.

LE nombre des troupes Turques en Crimée, comme votre Excellence le sait, augmente de plus en plus, et il faut leur envoyer en temps utile les munitions de guerre et de bouche dont ils ont besoin, afin d'assurer le succès qu'on espère, et de parvenir au but qu'on se propose.

Il est, par conséquent, indispensable que quelques bateaux-à-vapeur soient destinés à faire constamment ce service. Mais quelques-uns des bateaux de la Sublime Porte sont en réparation, et ceux qui sont en bon état ne sont pas en nombre suffisant. Il est donc nécessaire que trois grands bateaux-à-vapeur de chacune des flottes des deux illustres Gouvernements soient destinés dès à présent au transport en Crimée, comme il a été dit plus haut, des objets dont l'armée Impériale Turque a besoin. C'est pourquoi votre Excellence est priée de représenter cette nécessité à l'autorité compétente. La même demande est faite à l'Ambassade de France.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

No. 589.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 745.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 16, 1854.

COPIES of such correspondence as I have had the honour to hold with the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's fleet in the Black Sea, exclusive of

despatches relating to blockade or Slave Trade, are forwarded herewith; in sequel to the numerous transmissions of a similar kind which I have had to make from time to time for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 589.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Therapia, October* 23, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your despatch dated the 18th instant, and beg to offer my congratulations on the distinguished part which Her Majesty's fleet under your direction took in the attack on the sea-defences of Sebastopol.

I have applied to the Turkish Government for assistance in repairing the "Albion" and "Arethusa." There is every appearance of a cordial disposition to meet our wishes in that respect; but if the vessels require to be docked, there may be some unavoidable delay, owing to prior and urgent claims on the Turkish arsenal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 589.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Therapia, November* 24, 1854.

A MINISTERIAL change, which may give rise to conjecture, having taken place at the Porte, it may interest you to know that it has every appearance of being a mere personal arrangement, involving no political consequences.

Reshid Pasha has superseded the late Grand Vizier as head of the Administration, and he is himself succeeded by Aali Pasha in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 589.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Therapia, December* 6, 1854.

BEING informed by the Earl of Clarendon that instructions, concerted with the French Government, have been issued by the Admiralty, for the purpose of empowering you to establish, after a previous understanding with Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, frequent, fast, and regular communications, by British and French steamers, employed alternately three times a-week between the Crimea and Varna or Constantinople; I take the liberty to request that you will have the goodness to put me in possession of the terms of any such arrangement, as soon as you have leisure to make it, in execution of the instructions, to the end that I may concert with the French Chargé d'Affaires the most advisable mode of giving effect to the continuation, by land, of those communications, and regulate the expenses resulting from that part of the operation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 589.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Therapia, December 8, 1854.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch of the 30th ultimo, and availing myself of the readiness which you have obligingly expressed, to use any means in your power that I may suggest for giving effect to the late Imperial firmans abolishing the Traffic in Slaves from Georgia and Circassia, I have the honour to remark that, agreeing with you in the propriety of handing over to the Turkish authorities all persons found engaged in such traffic, I would submit that it might be advisable to consign them, in the first instance, to Her Majesty's Consul or Vice-Consul, at the port of delivery. I presume, moreover, that the slaves themselves, instead of being consigned to the questionable protection of any Turkish authority, would be at once restored to their own country, or landed at the port nearest to it with that view.

It strikes me, in conclusion, that an early and unreserved communication between our Vice-Consul at Trebizond and any officer whom you may think proper to select for the service in question would offer the most likely means of acting efficiently, and avoiding, at the same time, any unpleasant contingencies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 590.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 748.) *Therapia, December 10, 1854.*

My Lord,

NOTHING of importance appears to have occurred on the theatre of war since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship. Of the progress made by the French in carrying on their siege operations, your Lordship has ample accounts in the pages of General Rose's correspondence, and it is but fair to presume that the exertions of the British army are neither less active nor less encouraging.

There is reason to believe that the Russians are suffering severely from the difficulty of getting provisions, and to this circumstance may, perhaps, be attributed the retirement of General Liprandi's force from the position defended by redoubts captured from the Turks near Balaklava, to the other side of the Tchernaya river.

Letters from the Crimea mention the attempt of a Russian steamer to leave the harbour of Sebastopol, and its return under the fire of Her Majesty's steamship "Terrible," which, being within reach of the forts, received some shots, and sustained a loss of two men.

The 90th and 34th Regiments had joined Lord Raglan's army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 591.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 749. Confidential.) *Therapia, December 10, 1854.*

My Lord,

THE accompanying report, addressed to me by M. Pisani, is not unworthy of perusal. The person designated in it as Mehemet Pasha is the late Grand Vizier, who was the principal cause of the Porte's refusal of General Klapka, when I recommended that officer as a fit person to be entrusted with the command of the army at Kars.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 591.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Confidential.)

My Lord, *Pera, December 6, 1854.*

WITH reference to Mehemet Pasha's appointment as "Serdar Ekrem" of the army of Asia, I have the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that the Sultan, having directed the Grand Vizier to sound him, and ascertain, before issuing his Iradé, whether he would accept the command in question, his Highness, in obedience to His Majesty's pleasure, sent his musteshar to carry out Her Majesty's order; but the late Grand Vizier declined the honour, stating that the army at Kars is in such a deplorable condition that he cannot possibly put himself at the head of it without prejudicing himself, and requested that he might be exonerated from such a difficult task.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 592.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 750.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 10, 1854.*

I HAVE sounded the Grand Vizier as to the disposition of the Porte to place a division of Turkish troops under British pay, and to be commanded in part by British officers. It results from his Highness' answer that the Porte would object to no part of the proposal but that of allowing the troops to be paid by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 593.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1,541.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 21, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the note which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has addressed to me in answer to that which, under your Lordship's instructions, I wrote to his Excellency on the 17th instant, on the subject of the guarantees to be exacted by Great Britain and France from Russia, with reference to the annihilation of Russian supremacy in the Black Sea.

Your Lordship will observe that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in accepting in their fullest sense the measures which Her Majesty's Government consider to be necessary for the attainment of that object, refers to former communications made to your Lordship on the part of the Imperial Government, in which the said measures were put forward by himself. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, before sending me this note, stated that he had done so in order to establish the fact that the ideas entertained by the two Governments were not the result of an after-thought, but had been discussed between them prior to the late negotiations with the Austrian Cabinet. He thought that if some answer of the kind had not

been made, the Austrian Government might, on reading my note of the 17th instant, suppose that negotiations respecting peace had been entered into between Great Britain and France after the signature of the Treaty of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 593.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Lord Cowley.

Paris, le 19 Décembre, 1854.

LE Soussigné, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères, a reçu la note que son Excellence Lord Cowley, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande près Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser en date du 17 de ce mois, et dans laquelle il exprime le désir du Gouvernement de la Reine de s'entendre avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale sur l'interprétation à donner à l'une des quatres bases de négociation posées dans les Notes du 8 Août de cette année, et qui concerne la révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, dans le sens de l'équilibre Européen.

Le Soussigné, après avoir pris les ordres de l'Empereur son auguste Souverain, se félicite de pouvoir déclarer que pour établir l'identité qui existe entre les vues de son Gouvernement et celles qui lui ont été exposées par son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, il lui suffit de se référer aux instructions qu'il a été, à plusieurs reprises, dans le cas d'adresser à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale près Sa Majesté Britannique.

Le jour en effet où l'expedition de Crimée a été décidée, le Gouvernement Français s'est préoccupé de la nécessité de conjurer à tout jamais les dangers inhérents à l'existence de la forteresse de Sébastopol, et l'échange d'idées qui a eu lieu à cette époque entre les deux Cabinets de Paris et de Londres n'a pu laisser aucun doute au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur le but que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale assignait, dans son esprit, aux efforts communs des armées alliées. Quelques semaines plus tard, lorsque le Soussigné croyait le moment venu pour les deux Gouvernements de déterminer ensemble, autant que les circonstances le leur permettaient, les conditions particulières qu'ils mettraient au rétablissement de la paix, et sus des autres garanties déjà demandées à la Russie, le Soussigné écrivait à M. le Comte Walewski:

"Nous devons, avant toute chose, nous prémunir contre le rétablissement de la formidable place de guerre qui coûte à nos armées de si glorieux efforts. La Turquie serait en péril et le repos de l'Europe serait compromet, si la Russie pouvait de nouveau accumuler en Crimée une pareille masse de moyens de défense et d'attaque. Nous ne saurions plus admettre qu'à l'abri d'une forteresse de granit, une armée fût constamment prête, au premier signal, à monter sur une flotte pour ainsi dire à l'ancre en vue de Varna et du Bosphore. La guerre que nous avons entreprise manquerait son but, si elle ne nous servait pas à détruire à tout jamais les dangers dont l'évidence nous a mis les armes à la main."

Le 8 Décembre, discutant l'interprétation de la troisième garantie relative à la révision du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, le Soussigné disait à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impérinle à Londres dans une dépêche destinée à être communiquée au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique:

"Les quatre garanties ont été trop souvent l'objet de ma correspondance avée vous et de mes entretiens avec Lord Cowley, pour que je n'aie pas acquis la certitude de la complète entente du Gouvernement de l'Empereur et du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Il n'est qu'un seul point qui n'ait pas été entièrement élucidé: il a trait aux passages des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Je crois que la règle en vertu de laquelle le Sultan reste maître de ces eaux intérieures est aussi conforme aux principes du droit de gens qu'à l'intérêt de la Turquie; toutefois, nous ne saurions disconvenir que la conséquence de cette règle, c'est-à-dire la fermeture de la Mer Noire aux marines de guerre, n'ait été funeste à l'Empire Ottoman et n'ait permis à la Russie de développer dans un mystère presqu'impénétrable, des moyens de défense et d'attaque dont nous éprouvons

aujourd'hui la valeur. Evidemment, l'une des conditions que nous mettrons à la paix c'est la diminution, dans la Mer Noire, de cette puissance maritime qui rompt l'équilibre de l'Europe sur le point où il est le plus essentiel de le soutenir. Or, comment surveiller efficacement l'exécution des engagements de la Russie, comment nous rendre compte de tout ce que nous devrons savoir à l'avenir pour n'être plus jamais pris au dépourvu, si notre pavillon ne se promène pas sur l'Euxine? Ne devons-nous pas tenir à ce que nos bâtiments, par une fréquentation constante, se familiarisent avec une navigation dont le manque d'habitude a gêné si longtemps les efforts de notre marine? N'est-il pas nécessaire que l'influence morale et matérielle que portent avec eux des vaisseaux de guerre vienne contrebalancer aux yeux des populations l'influence de la Russie? N'a-t-on pas reconnu que partout, la protection des couleurs nationales facilitait et accroissait les rapports de commerce? Ne savons-nous pas, enfin, que la Turquie n'oppose aucun contrepoids dans la Mer Noire à l'autre Puissance riveraine?

"Pour tous ces motifs je crois que le Traité de 1841 devra, dans un intérêt général, subir une dérogation qui n'altère pas son principe, qui ne donne pas ombrage à la Porte, et qui, enfin, n'accorde pas à la Russie dans la Méditerranée l'équivalent des avantages que nous trouverons, nous, dans le vaste bassin où elle régnait sans contestation et sans concurrence."

Le 14 du même mois, enfin, le Soussigné revenait de nouveau sur les mêmes idées dans sa correspondance avec M. le Comte Walewski, et terminait par ces mots:

"La conviction du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale n'a pu que se fortifier encore avec les événements. Nous voulons énergiquement recouvrer à la paix le prix de nos sacrifices, le prix du sang de nos soldats; et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique peut être certain que nous nous montrerons aussi fermes, aussi exigeants que lui-même."

Le but du Soussigné, en rappelant la suite de ses déclarations constantes sur l'objet même de la communication à laquelle il a l'honneur de répondre, est d'établir, comme son Excellence Lord Cowley a bien voulu lui en faire, la demande que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impérinle partage complétement dans leur ensemble les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et que, sans arrêter dès aujourd'hui tous les détails de leur application, il n'admet, pas plus que son allié, que la guerre se termine avant que les conditions des forces respectives de la Russie et de la Turquie dans la Mer Noire ne soient réglées de façon à rendre désormais impossible la rupture d'un équilibre indispensable au repos de l'Europe.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 594.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 1,544.)
My Lord, *Paris, December* 21, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 797 to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, I have the honour to state that M. Benedetti has been instructed to communicate to the Porte the Secret Article attached to the Treaty of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 595.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1,545.) *Paris, December 21, 1854.*

My Lord,

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's instructions for the guidance of the Earl of Westmorland, in respect to the acceptance of the four points by the Russian Cabinet, inclosed in your despatch No. 1,259 of the 18th instant, and his Excellency signified his entire concurrence in the tenour of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 596.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1,554. Confidential.) *Paris, December 22, 1854.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 1,502 of the 14th instant, in which I apprized your Lordship that the Emperor had spoken to me of a further letter which he had received from the Emperor of Austria, I have now the honour to state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me this afternoon that the Emperor, in his answer which he transmitted two days ago to Vienna, after thanking His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty for the affectionate sentiments evinced in his letter, adds, that although he is convinced that negotiations will lead to no results, he will yet, if it is absolutely necessary, ("s'il le faut,") send full powers to M. de Bourqueney, as soon as ever it shall be notified that Prince Gortchakoff has accepted the interpretation given to the four bases by the three Powers. His Majesty adds, that instead of sending these full powers, he had much rather send two hundred thousand soldiers, which he holds ready to assist Austria in the common cause against Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me further, that the Emperor, during the audience which he had given M. de Hübner this morning, as mentioned in another despatch, had told him that the policy of Russia was very clear. She would accept of everything now in order to gain time, and to bring her reinforcements to the Crimea: that Austria therefore, for her own safety, should try and prevent this by early and vigorous measures, for she might be certain that, whether Russia succeeded in expelling the allies from the Crimea, or that she was obliged to abandon it herself, she would in the spring throw all her force upon Austria: His Majesty meaning thereby, that if Russia was victorious in the Crimea, she would be able to assume the defensive against Austria, and if beaten, that she would endeavour to retrieve her disasters by a diversion against that Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 597.

Memorandum as to the means of Improving the Condition of the Christian Subjects of the Porte.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Bernstorff, December 23, 1854.)

(Translation.)

HOWEVER vehemently opposed the Great Powers of Europe may be to each other in other respects, there are two points on which they agree: the desire to see the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire maintained; and secondly, to see the condition of the Christian population of the Empire improved.

If we look upon the claim advanced by Russia to exclusive advocacy on behalf of Christians of the Greek Church, as the origin of the present dissension among the Powers, as assuredly it is, it would, beyond a doubt, constitute an important groundwork for pacification were such an advocacy rendered unnecessary by general arrangements which should secure the condition of the Christian population of Turkey. The general guarantee of such arrangements and improvements would then devolve on those in whose endeavours they originated; namely, the Great Powers.

In carrying these arrangements into effect, it will, however, not be sufficient to take merely into consideration those bearing on the religious part of the question alone, as, for instance, on the relations of the patriarchs, bishops, and their rights; for it has been seen that the bishops of the Greek faith have not unfrequently assumed, in the Slavonic provinces, a position antagonistical to the population, more particularly as they were in the habit of purchasing their Sees at Constantinople. The Western Powers, indeed, acknowledging the necessity, have already brought forward a much more radical change; we mean arrangements for the improvement of the administration of justice. England has insisted that, for the future, the testimony of Christians shall be received in the Turkish Courts as readily as that of the Mussulman. But we should deceive ourselves were we to expect from an alteration of this kind, however well intentioned it undoubtedly is, any practical relief for the Christian. The decision of each case would always rest with the Turkish judge, from whose sense of justice little can be expected whenever dissension shall arise between the professors of the different creeds. The Turkish judges would, moreover, be satisfied with the issue of the hatti-sherifs, and of the decrees of the Sultan which have never, as yet, been properly carried into effect anywhere. The firmans are read, that is all: their execution is entrusted to those whose interest it not only is that they should remain a dead letter, but whose inclination, hallowed by their religious belief, has the same tendency. No Christian in Bosnia would have been able to appeal to the hatti-sherif of Gulhane: he would have risked his life; he would have been punished by death.

It is not by isolated abuses of power that the oppression of the Christian population is made manifest, but by the general preference in all things shown to the professors of Islam; or, rather, by the general dominion of the one race over the other. Not that all Mahomedans participate in the exercise of power; many there are who exist in a miserable condition, even in the European provinces, but Islamism is the condition of participation in affairs of war and state, and generally in that dominion which had its origin in the conquest and subjection of the Christian population, and which has since continued to constitute, as it were, a condition of permanent hostility between the races; for never, in the course of centuries, has this hostility changed into a peaceful and legal political condition, nor could it ever be so changed; for Islamism hallows oppression against infidels, and custom sanctions personal violence against them.

The Christian Powers, though jealous of, and in strife with, each other, are called upon by a divine decree to put an end to this discreditable state of things. It is manifest that it only requires on their part the expression of a firm will so to do; but, if this power be theirs, they are likewise bound by a sacred obligation.

In order to explain generally what is requisite, it may be expedient at once to adopt a distinction already made in the course of former negotiations; for

instance, in those of Akerman, in the year 1826; namely, the distinction between the terms "rayah" and "subject." Rayah is the Christian population in its subjection to the Osmanli—the unprivileged herd whose existence is only tolerated because the soil requires to be tilled. The use of this term was even at that time found inadmissible as soon as it became a question to secure the Christian a legal position, and in lieu of Rayah, the term Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte was used. This is one of the principal points to which attention must be directed if anything real is to be effected. The Christian population of Turkey must cease to be rayah, that is, subject to the believers in Islam, as constituting exclusively the body politic. They must become subjects of the Porte as well as the Osmanli.

It can hardly be intended to call into existence throughout the whole of the Turkish Empire, not even in its European provinces, a state of things such as that in Servia; for that state of things owes its existence to repeated success in arms, and represents a degree of national independence which the Porte can hardly be called upon to recognize in other portions of its dominions. It will consequently only be necessary to lay down certain conditions, without which a peaceful and secure, even if subordinate, personal existence for the Christian population cannot be secured.

As the first of these conditions we will specify the right to property; that is to say, to secure and legally guarantee possession of real property. In order fully to understand what is meant, we must recollect that within the last decade the removal of the Christian population from their possession has constantly been carried on, especially in Bosnia. It is a matter of course that the old feudal retainers of the Sultan, the Spahis, are considered as the proprietors in the villages, and draw their rents and emoluments from the lands of the Christian population. But as landed property, notwithstanding this charge upon it, still afforded a not inconsiderable surplus, a new class has in later times intruded into its possession. These were generally adventurers of Mahomedan creed, who under one form or another, or by open violence, took possession of the land, and have thus reduced the inhabitants to a condition devoid of law, such as renders a peaceable existence, as is required by men even in the lowest grade of society, almost an impossibility.

These intruders are called Tshiftlik or Tshiftlik-Seschris. They have not carried on their depredations by orders from the Porte, or to the advantage of the Porte, but solely to their own private profit in opposition to the Porte. These disorderly proceedings commenced at the time when the Janissaries endeavoured to throw off the yoke of the Sultan, and to convert lands and people to their own property. It was this which occasioned the insurrection in Servia, and was in connection with it. In several of the Bosnian districts, for instance in Jadar, it prevailed already at that time, and the inhabitants found themselves induced to resist. The more sensible portion of the Turks took part with them. A Turkish Chieftain at Swornick, Mehemet Capitän, appeared in the district and suppressed the Tshiftlik-Seschri. The Vizier of Bosnia, who had formerly encouraged these acts of violence—indeed, himself borne a part in them—was induced to sanction their suppression.

The example of Jadar sufficiently points out what sort of improvement is, before all, necessary. The Vizier conceded two points, namely: 1. That no Turk should enter the district, even the Spahi only once a year to receive his rents. 2. That the inhabitants should exercise jurisdiction over and among each other. He even went to the extent of conceding the right of life and death.

Without insisting on the adoption of each separate detail, it would be necessary to establish as a fixed basis of an improved condition that the Christians should be judged by persons of their own religion and nationality. For as long as the claim of the Turks, as founded on their religion, and as not to be contravened by any desire of the Sultan, to the exercise of violence and oppression, shall exist, no legal security would be possible unless the inhabitants are furnished with judges and authorities from their own ranks. It may be asked by what process, should such a concession actually be made, differences between Turks and Christians are to be judicially decided. An example exists which might be taken as a guide in cases such as this. In Belgrade it has been arranged that the Christian tribunal shall apply for the assistance of the Turkish whenever the accused was a Turk; the Turkish tribunal on the other hand to the Christian when a Christian was accused by a Turk; and there is nothing to

show that this has led to any denial of justice when the requisite reciprocity connected the claim of each party upon the other to the duty of rendering such justice. In this manner it might be arranged in all large towns, even in Constantinople itself. As regards the country it would be necessary to separate the two populations, as far as practicable, from each other, in order to avoid the constant recurrence of the national religious strife. When Servia in 1815 was first tranquillized, but had as yet not been definitively organized, as was the case at a later period, the Pasha Marashli Ali ordered that no Mussulman should, without the consent of the Knezes (princes, nobility), interfere in differences between Christians, even where Turks were concerned.

A third point intimately connected with the execution of the laws, which would have to be considered is, whether in order to put an end to abuses of power which so frequently accompany the collection of imposts, it might not be expedient to depute the Knezes or other authorities of the Christian communities to collect these imposts in the aggregate or in detail, as has been done at Jadar. For the Christian must remain liable to the Sultan's taxes and the legal rent due to the Spahi.

In accordance with the above, the proposition in a negotiation for peace might be worded as follows:

"The free exercise of their religion, as well as the enjoyment of their property, shall be guaranteed to the Christian inhabitants of Turkey for ever. They shall have judges and chiefs of their own creed and nations."

It remains, however, a question of some difficulty whether with such institutions the integrity and sovereignty of the Porte can be maintained.

We answer, the Porte will have full power and liberty to garrison its fortresses exclusively with Turks; for those fortresses which guard the frontiers of the province, will, without exception, as well as those provinces themselves, remain in its possession. It would, however, be of advantage as regards the desirable separation of the two nationalities, were the Turkish population to draw round the fortresses and settle there. There would be no danger of revolt on the part of the Christian population were they on their part to be collected, as far as the state of territorial possession may render such a scheme practicable, into separate districts, provided that population held all the lower administration and the exercise of justice in their own hands. Experience has shown that in proportion as the Christians in Turkey are allowed a tolerable existence under the rule of the Sultan, in the same proportion their desire to free themselves from such rule will diminish. Till now they have been subject to a foreign creed and a foreign nation. Their loyalty towards the Sultan would indefinitely augment were they only bound to obey him, and did they behold above them an executive ready equally to protect the professors of both creeds, as well as the members of both nationalities. In a financial point of view the Porte would beyond a doubt be a gainer. She could in such cases calculate with certainty upon her revenue, which she now only can while holding the sword above the head of the Pasha bound to provide it.

A greater difficulty will be found in devising the provisional arrangements by means of which the inhabitants are to be raised from the condition of Rayah, in which they were all dependent on the whole of the Turkish nation, to that of subjects of the Grand Vizier alone.

The outrages which incessantly take place on the part of the Turks upon the Christians, are for the most part to be traced to the circumstance that the Turks may, and the Christians may not bear arms, nor keep them in their habitations. The Porte has never been strong enough to deprive of their weapons those that prefer to live by plunder, instead of conforming to civil ordinances. Such persons make the total absence of subjection to their own Government, generally manifest by their conduct to the Christian population.

If it were now pretended that the Christians should likewise, in self-defence, have the right of being possessed of arms, at least in their houses, it might be objected, that this would be in contradiction to the principle which it is sought to establish, namely, a legal and peaceable state of things; and in fact, it would be unwarrantable if the Porte actually exercised complete authority over the Mahomedan portion of the population. But as long as this is not the case it will hardly be practicable to refuse arms to the Christian population. This would by no means be a cause of strife; on the contrary, it would tend to produce peace, by giving the means of defence to those who hitherto have been

overpowered. As soon as it shall become possible for the Turkish Government to disarm the Osmanli, and to bring him into entire subjection, the Christian would, on his part, be also obliged to deliver up his arms. For the only object is that both nations should become subjects of the Sultan, bound by the same obligations and enjoying the same rights.

It will probably be necessary to specify these arrangements in the text of the stipulation for peace. This would belong more properly to a Commission of the Great Powers, established to watch over the due execution of the stipulations of the Treaty. For, without the immediate supervision of the Great Powers, the provisions of such a Treaty will never be carried into effect. If this involves a limitation of the sovereignty of the Porte, such limitation is a necessity at a moment at which that Government only exists by the protection of the Great Powers, or rather by their mutual jealousy. Later, by means of this searching interference, it may be that this Empire shall again attain its full power and independence. The supervision and interference of the European Powers might be limited to a certain number of years,—say ten.

In the Protocol of the 9th of April the guarantee of the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte is promised, and it may be thought singular that so much greater stress is here laid on the former of these rights than on the latter; but the religious wrong practised against Christians in Turkey is principally manifest in the circumstance that the indispensable conditions for the civil existence of those Christians are denied to them on account of their religion. Their religious rights consist principally in a claim to be freed from civil disabilities and oppression, consequent solely on the difference of their creed.

No. 598.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 145.)
Frankfort, December 20, 1854.

My Lord,

THE impression produced here by the text of the Treaty of the 2nd of December is, that Austria has taken one step farther towards an open breach with Russia.

That such is the prevailing opinion is to be gathered not only from the language of those who desire to look forward to such a solution of the long hesitations of Germany, but still more from the unconcealed anger and vexation of the decided partizans of Russia.

Amongst these, certain Prussian members of a party calling itself national, are foremost in denouncing what they assert to be bad faith on the part of Austria, in not having sooner made the Cabinet of Berlin acquainted with the negotiation which was being carried on with Great Britain and France, and with discourtesy in hastening to sign the Treaty, when the Prussian Government, on receiving a partial intimation of its objects, signified a desire to participate in the negotiation.

If the opinions of this party should unfortunately prevail at Berlin, not only would that Government abstain from accession to the Treaty, but there would be considerable risk of their allying that country with Russia.

The policy of Austria is represented by its advocates as being perfectly sincere, but necessarily cautious, having to provide against great risks and dangers.

Austria sought in the first place, not to separate herself from Prussia and Germany, but to bind these to community of action, and this object has to some extent been effected by the Additional Article to the Treaty of the 20th of April.

In the next place, it was necessary to secure, or at least to fortify certain points on the Austrian frontier, which were wholly open to a Russian attack. This has now been in a great measure effected at Cracow, Przemisl, and one other important point in Gallicia, the name of which escapes me.

Thirdly. Austria desires to avoid a winter campaign.

By the course pursued she hopes to carry all Germany with her, and to be fully prepared to act on the offensive in the spring, in case the obstinacy of the Emperor Nicholas renders it necessary.

Your Lordship is of course better informed than I can be, of what is the animus of the Berlin Cabinet, but no one here seems to anticipate a frank and unconditional accession to the Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 599.

Colonel Williams to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 44.)
Erzeroom, November 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to announce my arrival in this garrison on the 15th instant, having left the camp at Kars on the 10th instant. Before quitting it, I addressed a letter to Kerim Pasha, the Ferik and Kaimakam of the forces cantoned in and around that city, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information. I have rendered a simple act of justice to that officer in thus recording my thanks for the assistance he has rendered the general cause since the late Mushir, Zarif Mustapha Pasha, quitted the army of Kars. His Excellency continues his good offices towards Lieutenant Teesdale, R.A., my aide-de-camp, as will appear by the inclosed paper of his first report which I received by Tatar last evening. In another communication Lieutenant Teesdale states that Kerim Pasha treats him with the utmost consideration, and as he is one of those Pashas recalled to Constantinople in consequence of the loss of the battle of Injéderreh, I beg respectfully to recommend him to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte. He is the only high military functionary who has expressed a word of consideration or thanks for the united efforts of myself and staff. I feel it incumbent on me further to state, with reference to the case of the two Armenians and the Judicial Council of Kars, as detailed in a former despatch, that Kerim Pasha took the affair into his own hands, and having satisfied himself that Zarif Mustapha Pasha's "chaush" (sergeant) had taken the money in question from the said Christian merchant, he caused the delinquent to be most severely beaten with rods before the whole camp; this being the second case of punishment inflicted by his Excellency for similar claims of Musselmans for immunity from justice in their dealings towards the oppressed Christians.

Lieutenant Teesdale further states that Shukri Pasha had arrived at Kars, and had received him with cold civility, but letting him plainly see that his presence was not desired. I also met that Ferik on the snowy mountains lying between Kars and Erzeroom; his reception of me was in all respects similar, and although such conduct was irritating, my thirteen years' knowledge of the Turks led me to consider it as a matter of course; I therefore saluted and passed on my way. On my arrival in Erzeroom I waited on the Governor-General, Ismail Pasha, to give him the detailed contents of the magazines of Kars on the 8th instant, estimating the force at 14,000 men, and 2,000 horses; viz.,

Wheat	-	-	37 days' consumption
Barley	-	-	84 „ „
Flour	-	-	4 „ „
Biscuit	-	-	23 „ „

I acknowledge having passed large convoys proceeding to Kars, and again received his promise not to relax in his efforts; but this interview plainly indicated the only course which was left for me in my future communications with Shukri Pasha, now at the head of this army, and Hussein Pasha, the Chief of the Staff; and I consequently wrote him a letter, the inclosed copy of which will explain to your Lordship the nature of the conduct of both, and against which I have protested in firm, and I trust your Lordship will think, appropriate terms. This letter will meet Shukri Pasha on the road on his return to Erzeroom; and as I learn from Lieutenant Teesdale that, after the arrival of this functionary at Kars,

he had not been able to get the account of the daily issue of provisions from the magazines of that garrison, the suspicions which my recent interview with the Governor-General and the military Pashas raised in my mind are fully borne out, and my resolution to take a stand against a concerted plan on the part of the Ferik, Shukri Pasha, and the chief of the staff, if possible, strengthened. Their object is obviously to deprive me of those sources of information which have thus far enabled me to put Her Majesty's Government in possession of the effective strength and intended movements of this army, as well as to lay bare the enormous frauds which characterize its administration, civil and military, which might have, and still may (if this clique be not crushed in the bud) lead an allied force into difficulty, and perhaps terminate in great disasters. I am anxious that these facts should be known at the earliest possible moment, as I hear that Ismail Pasha's* disposition towards me is by no means favourable. This, however, is but a rumour circulating amongst the higher grades of the army, and whilst I communicate it, I record a hope that it may prove incorrect.

The Governor-General and the Defterdar of the Province have just returned my visit. They are dispatching large supplies of every denomination to Kars, and they afford me all the intelligence I require. Ismail Pasha is, however, a man of extreme old age, and should be invested with a government better suited to his feeble body and impaired faculties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 599.

Colonel Williams to Kerim Pasha.

Camp, near Kars, November 9, 1854.

Excellency,

BEING about to quit this camp for the purpose of meeting, at Erzeroom, the newly appointed Commander-in-chief, Ismail Pasha, I feel it my duty to thank you for the manner in which you have, since the departure of Zarif Mustapha Pasha, seconded my efforts to procure comfortable and wholesome quarters for the troops composing the garrison, and to stop the pillage of the Sultan's magazines. Your Excellency has been kind enough to say that without my aid this could not have been accomplished; but it is only justice to tell you that, without your authority and active support, all my good intentions would have been frustrated.

As I am about to leave my "yaver," Lieutenant Teesdale, in Kars, during the winter, I recommend him to your Excellency's protection, and beg that two "chaousches" may be appointed to wait on him. I shall send a copy of this letter to Lords Stratford, Clarendon, and Raglan, and, wishing your Excellency good health, I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 599.

Lieutenant Teesdale to Colonel Williams.

Kars, November 14, 1854.

Sir,

ON the day following your departure, I received a visit from Kerim Pasha, although two messages had been sent to say that I was coming to visit him.

I then, agreeably to your wishes, called on Kaleel Pasha as the representative of the Vali, on Emin Pasha the Defterdar, and on Hussein Pasha the Chief of the Staff.

The works constructing in the camp consist of a square redoubt, and a work formed by throwing back two faces from the parapet of the central battery of the lines. They are considerably advanced, and appear to have been planned with great care and nicety.

* The newly appointed Mushir of this army.

Shukri Pasha arrived on the morning of the 12th instant, and having travelled by post, made his entry quite privately. He yesterday payed the troops one month's pay, and has this morning taken his departure. I called on him on the day of his arrival, and accompanied him this morning to the boundary of the camp.

The Russian camp at Ghumri is nearly broken up; forty guns still remain outside the town. There are about 400 cavalry and six guns at Bayindir. About 2,000 men have been sent to Ghumri, from Tiflis, without arms. It is said that the snow, having fallen near Schamyl, prevents further operations. Eight days ago a battalion of Russians went to Erivan. The Russian Irregulars, who occupied the villages on the Turkish frontier, have retired.

From Hussein Pasha I learn that the alarm posts have been arranged, the signal to be two guns fired from Hafiz Pasha, Fabia, and one from the Karadagh.

Three hundred and twenty arabas of wood (about 700 trees) had, up to yesterday, arrived from Sirry Pasha, and the arabas are to return immediately.

One troop of Arabistan Horse Artillery, two Regiments of Arabistan Cavalry, and the 1st and 5th Regiments of Anatolian Infantry, left this morning for Ardahan.

The town is tolerably clean, and the food of the soldiers good. A supply of rice has arrived from Erivan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. TEESDALE.

N.B.—Forty araba loads of rice have arrived from Erzeroom.

Inclosure 3 in No. 599.

Colonel Williams to Shukri Pasha.

Erzeroom, November 15, 1854.

Excellency,

I ARRIVED here yesterday, and this morning I visited the Vali, and saw the military authorities. I gave the Vali a list of the provisions in the magazines at Kars at my departure; and his Excellency told me that 1,000 loads of different sorts of supplies were now on the road towards that garrison.

The Vali also informed me that news had reached him from Toprak, Kalli, and Van, to the effect that the Russians were giving trouble in those quarters, and his Excellency asked me what troops could be sent there?

I answered that Hussein Pasha, the Chief of the Staff, told me in presence of Kerim Pasha and my staff, that he had received his orders, but he did not communicate them to me; and I have now to tell you that Hussein Pasha studiously avoided me, never once coming to my tent after he had dined with me; and when I asked him where he lived that I might go and see him, he answered, "I have no house, but live with the Colonel." Hussein Pasha never alluded to the fortifications which I saw rising before my tent two days before I left Kars, and had not even the politeness to ask me to visit them. I have therefore distinctly to state, that I advised him in presence of Kerim Pasha to wait your arrival before he moved troops, and I have had nothing to do with those movements, merely contenting myself to look into their pouches to be able to report if they marched with cartridges or not.

This is so completely setting me aside as the Queen of England's Commissioner, that I must acquaint your Excellency with it, and to state that I shall send a copy of this letter to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, to Lord Clarendon, and to Lord Raglan. I have worked at Kars, even when suffering from ill health, to get the Sultan's troops housed and fed, and might have expected different treatment; but I console myself with the thought of having done my duty, and leave the matter in the hands of my Government.

I wish I could finish here; but I have another duty to perform to my Sovereign, and that is frankly to tell your Excellency, that I have heard from good authority that you tried to prevent my getting intelligence from Erzeroom as to the state of the provision destined for the army of Kars, then in the greatest want of everything, saying before several functionaries "that my interference would not be allowed;" thus trying to prevent my transmitting to my

Government that intelligence which is so necessary to the cause for which England is shedding her best blood, and dispensing her treasure. I have never attempted to command the Kars army, but my happiness consists in having housed it, and saved it from robbery and starvation, for which truth I appeal to every honest officer of that force.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. WILLIAMS.

No. 600.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 24, 11 A.M.*)

Vienna, December 22, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL and the French Ambassador are to sign this evening the Convention relative to Italy, with the nature of which your Lordship is already acquainted.

No. 601.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 24, 5·15 P.M.*)

Vienna, December 23, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT BUOL objects to adopting the form of an identical note, while he entirely adheres to the spirit and letter of the terms and interpretations contained in the one sent by your Lordship. He writes to Count Colloredo and M. Hübner, to offer to declare his adherence in a responsive note, or he is ready to sign a Protocol with the French Ambassador and myself, recapitulating the words of the interpretation of the four Articles, as declared in the identical note, and stating the perfect agreement of the three Governments. He prefers this mode as more suited to the dignity of the Emperor of Austria, considering that the one proposal implies a want of confidence in good understanding no longer existent.

No. 602.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 24, 6·15 P.M.*)

Paris, December 24, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French Government has received intelligence that although Count Buol refuses the exchange of identic notes, he is willing to acknowledge the receipt of those which may be addressed to him, and accept their contents, or else to sign a Protocol in which the interpretation specified by England and France to the four points shall be textually reproduced. M. Drouyn de Lhuys thinks the latter plan preferable to any other, and entreats you to send an immediate order to Lord Westmorland to sign such a Protocol.

No. 603.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 806.)

Foreign Office, December 25, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency will doubtless have heard from Lord Cowley that M. Benedetti has been instructed to communicate to the Porte the Secret Article of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, which your Excellency was instructed by my despatch No. 797 of the 18th instant also to communicate, in case M. Benedetti and M. Bruck were authorized to do so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 604.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 808.)

Foreign Office, December 25, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have too much reason to fear that the desperate state of things in Syria, so vividly depicted by your Excellency in your despatch No. 727 of the 2nd instant, is equally true of most other parts of the Turkish dominions, where nothing can be relied on with certainty but the continuance of the foulest corruption and the most inveterate abuses.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 605.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 809.)

Foreign Office, December 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 730 of the 3rd instant, giving an account of a conversation said to have taken place between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, respecting the future destiny of the Crimea; and with reference to the account given by your Excellency in your despatch No. 727 of the previous day, of the deplorable state of the Turkish administration in Syria, I have to instruct you to report to me your opinion as to the prospect of the Crimea being held by the Porte against the vicinage and the influence of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 606.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 813.)

Foreign Office, December 25, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 736 of the 6th instant, that Her Majesty's Government consider that Aali Pasha did quite right in declining to give an opinion to the Internuncio respecting the four points, without previous communication with the British and French Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 607.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 25.*)

(No. 480.)

Vienna, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

UPON the receipt of Mr. Colquhoun's despatch No. 103, which reported several instances of excesses committed by the Austrian soldiers in the Principalities, I waited upon the Turkish Ambassador to learn whether he had received any complaints upon this subject, or any instructions to bring them before the Austrian Government. I felt that since the establishment, with your Lordship's approbation, of the Commission which had assembled in Vienna, and of which the Ambassador was a member, that if he brought forward the complaints in question, it would be more effectual, and would carry more weight

as coming from the Turkish authorities than any representation, such as the one I had received from Mr. Colquhoun.

The Turkish Ambassador stated that no communication had reached him as to the circumstances I mentioned, either from his Government or from the Ottoman Commissioner in the Principalities, Dervish Pasha, or from Omer Pasha; but he said that he had no doubt, if his Government was in the intention of instructing him to complain of these outrages, that he should shortly receive the orders to that effect, as he had written both to his Government and to the authorities in the Principalities, to announce to them that the Commission was established, and that it was the particular desire of the Austrian Government that every complaint of whatever nature from the provinces, should be transmitted to him, when they would be taken into the most anxious consideration.

Under these circumstances I determined to wait the instructions which the Ambassador expected, mentioning only to Count Buol that I had received a report of great excesses on the part of the Austrian soldiery in the Principalities; and receiving from him the assurance that he would mention the subject to General Hess, and when the details were officially brought before him, that he would submit them to the Commission, and take the measures with regard to them which they would recommend.

The Turkish Ambassador was disappointed in his expectations, and the different posts which have arrived since he spoke to me, having brought him no instructions as to the above-mentioned complaints, nor any as to the part he was to take in the Commission, I thought it was useless to wait any longer, and I read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 415; and he desired me to assure you that, whether with reference to Article VI of the Convention between Austria and the Porte, or under any circumstances whatever, you might rely upon it that the strictest orders would be given to repress and punish every license which might be attempted or perpetrated by the Austrian soldiery; and with this view he again expressed his anxiety that if such acts took place, they should immediately be brought to his knowledge by the Turkish Ambassador or by the Turkish Government, when the mode of obtaining redress had most distinctly been established.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 608.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 25.*)

(No. 481.)
My Lord,

Vienna, December 18, 1854.

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 413 of the 13th of December, in which you state that the appointment of certain persons to military commands in Wallachia, whose names are mentioned in Mr. Colquhoun's No. 104 of the 22nd November, were a further proof of the consequences resulting from the re-appointment of Prince Stirbey.

Count Buol replied, that he was unacquainted with the particulars of the appointments mentioned by Mr. Colquhoun; but if the Turkish Government were dissatisfied with them, they ought to represent it to the Hospodar; and the Turkish Commissioner, Dervish Pasha, appeared to him to have been appointed by the Porte for the express purpose of making such reclamations.

With respect to Prince Stirbey, Count Buol repeated that he had been recalled by the order of the Sultan; that he, Count Buol, had recommended his being replaced in his former situation, solely from the belief that the immediate establishment of the former government of the country would avoid many difficulties which must arise if a totally new administration was to be formed and to be placed in authority. Count Buol stated, that he had this day received despatches from Constantinople relating to Prince Stirbey, and he would communicate their substance through Count Colloredo to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 609.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 25.*)

(No. 487.)
My Lord,

Vienna, December 21, 1854.

BARON BOURQUENEY has received from his Government the answer which he is to present to Count Buol, to the communications made by the latter to the Governments of England and France, respecting the acceptance by the Emperor Nicholas of the four conditions of the 8th of August, as announced by Prince Gortchakoff. Baron Bourqueney called upon me to inquire whether I had received a similar document for communication to this Government, since it had been announced to him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that we were to present the notes together.

I replied to M. de Bourqueney, that I had a private notice from your Lordship that I should receive a note similar to that from the French Government, together with instructions with regard to it.

M. de Bourqueney and myself then agreed, that before taking any official steps in this matter, we must await the arrival of the communications I was expecting.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 610.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 23, 1854.

YOU are authorized to sign a Protocol, in which the terms of the proposed identic note shall be textually reproduced. You will take care that with respect to the third basis, no variation whatever is admitted.

No. 611.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 25.*)

(No. 1,557.)
My Lord,

Paris, December 22, 1854.

WITH reference to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch No. 730, marked Most Confidential, giving an account of a conversation which has passed between Vely Pasha and M. Drouyn de Lhûys, in which the latter had hinted that if the allies took possession of the Crimea, Omer Pasha might be installed there in the same manner as the Viceroy of Egypt now stands towards the Porte, I have the honour to state that, when intelligence reached the French Government a few days ago, that Omer Pasha intended to take the command of the Turkish troops destined to operate in the Crimea, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to me, with some appearance of self-complacency, that he had found the means of rousing Omer Pasha from his inactivity, for that he had had an opportunity of telling the Turkish Generalissimo that if he was instrumental in the conquest of the Crimea, he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) did not see why the Viceroyalty of that province, which might then be restored to Turkey, should not be his reward.

To tell your Lordship the plain truth, I paid but little attention to what I conceived to have been said rather as a means of rousing Omer Pasha from his inactivity than as a plan for the future, put forward by the French Government. I supposed the communication to have been addressed through M. Poujade to Omer Pasha, but now that I find that it has been made a subject of conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, it will be my duty to ask M. Drouyn de Lhuys in what sense he spoke to Vely Pasha, and to report thereon to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 612.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 1,564.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 24, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received, yesterday, a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney, in which the latter stated that Count Buol objected to the form proposed by England and France for placing on record the interpretation given by the three Powers to the four bases accepted by Russia, as a point of departure in negotiating for peace; but that he was willing, if the English and French Representatives addressed him the notes of which an exchange had been proposed, to acknowledge the receipt of those notes, and to state in general terms that he adhered to the interpretation of the four points given in them, or he would sign a Protocol with the Representatives of England and France, in which the substance of the notes should be textually introduced.

It was further understood, M. de Bourqueney said, that whenever Count Buol, Lord Westmorland, and himself met Prince Gortchakoff, they should hold identic language in the sense of the notes.

In giving me this information, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he had sent this despatch to Count Walewski yesterday evening, informing him at the same time that he was ready to agree to whichever of the proposals put forward by Count Buol might be preferred by your Lordship. On thinking over the matter since, however, he was of opinion that a Protocol was far preferable; and he engaged me, therefore, to urge your Lordship to send immediate directions to Lord Westmorland to sign a Protocol. I had the honour of addressing your Lordship a telegraphic despatch this afternoon, with this wish expressed in it.

In some of my late conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as also in one which I had the honour to hold with the Emperor yesterday, I could not refrain from calling the attention of His Majesty and of his Minister to the danger which the two Governments would incur of giving a more favourable position to Russia, whenever a meeting took place between Prince Gortchakoff and the Representatives of Austria, France, and Great Britain. Accounts, I said, agreed in stating that the Emperor of Russia was willing to make concessions in the largest sense desired by the allies upon the first, second, and fourth points; but that he was determined not to give way upon the third point. Let us, then, imagine this to happen; let us suppose His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiary declaring, after knowing our interpretation of the four points, "I accept, in the fullest sense which you can give to them, the first, second, and fourth, but I reject, with indignation, the third, as an insult to the Russian Government, and I break off further negotiations." Let us go a step further, and suppose the Russian Government to publish these proceedings, and to appeal not only to Prussia, but, say, to Germany, "I have ceded, in consideration for your wishes, every point in dispute respecting my influence in the Turkish Empire, for which war was made. I am required, in addition, to surrender my position in the Black Sea. I ask you whether the allies are in a position to require it."

It seemed to me, I said to the Emperor, not only that Prussia would respond to the appeal, but that the allies ran considerable risk of exciting a feeling in Germany that their demands were too exorbitant, and were fairly resisted by Russia.

I asked His Majesty whether he did not think that this dilemma might be averted by turning the tables, as it were, that is, by our Plenipotentiaries asking Prince Gortchakoff what propositions he had to make, instead of making propositions to him. The allies, I observed, had not asked to negotiate. It was Russia who had made the demand. We were entitled thereupon to say to the Russian Plenipotentiary, "You ask for peace; what are the conditions you propose?" If he replies, "It is for the allies to make propositions," we may rejoin, "We did not ask to treat,—we have none to make." If, on the contrary, he answers by bringing forward the original four points, we may ask for his interpretation of them. If he refuses to give an interpretation, or if he gives an interpretation which we cannot accept, we may say that that will not satisfy us, and that further negotiation is useless. He may press us for our interpretation,

but we must keep within our intrenchments, and refuse, since we do not ask for peace, to give explanations at the present moment.

There are, no doubt, objections and difficulties to proceeding in this way, but I humbly think that they are not so great as those which I have ventured to signalise at the beginning of this despatch as likely to attend any other course.

The Emperor having stated to me that he would be glad if this, or any other, expedient could be found to prevent a communication to the Russian Government of the intentions of the allies, I spoke in the same sense this afternoon to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at the same time giving his Excellency to understand that he must not consider me as making any proposition from your Lordship.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed great satisfaction at the plan I laid before him. He said, however, that it ought not to be brought forward until Austria was committed to our interpretation of the four points, for that if the two Governments showed misgivings previously they might shake her good intentions at the present moment. Nor, indeed, after the signature of a Protocol or other instrument could the two Governments act as I proposed without the concurrence of Austria; but he was quite of opinion, his Excellency said, that the proceeding which I advocated should be proposed to Austria as soon as the Protocol was signed, and that Count Buol should then be asked whether, in the present state of the war, it would not be advisable for Austria, as for the belligerent Powers, to avoid unnecessary explanations with Russia, and merely to meet Prince Gortchakoff for the purpose of refusing his propositions (which could never be acceptable to the allies), without needlessly exposing our own. He added that he should write on this subject to Count Walewski to-morrow, and that, in the meantime, if he received your Lordship's agreement to a Protocol, that he should direct M. de Bourqueney to sign it, and to abstain from all further proceedings until he received further instructions.

It is exceedingly difficult to explain as I would desire, within the limits of a despatch, a plan of this nature, but your Lordship will understand that the foundation of it is "yes" or "no" to what Prince Gortchakoff has to propose, and a simple statement that we have no propositions to make ourselves.

I have again to appeal to your Lordship's indulgence in travelling beyond the sphere of my duties, by offering suggestions when I ought only to be the channel of conveying those of Her Majesty's Government; but I have been so struck, unnecessarily perhaps, with the danger of aiding the cause of Russia by putting forward demands, however vague, which we must ourselves admit we have no right to expect Russia to concede at the present moment, that my anxiety makes me outstep my discretion.

That anxiety is not a little increased by a feeling which I may impart to your Lordship, though I could neither express it to the Emperor nor to his Minister, that if Russia could declare openly that peace had been prevented, after she had satisfied all the legitimate demands of the allies, by the requirement of conditions incompatible with her honour, and which the belligerent Powers were not in a condition to enforce, a sympathy for her would be aroused in France, as embarrassing for the Emperor as it would be perilous to the alliance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 613.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,287.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 25, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have received with much satisfaction, as an inclosure in your despatch No. 1,541 of the 21st instant, the note which M. Drouyn de Lhuys addressed to you on the

19th instant, in reply to your note of the 17th, on the subject of the guarantees to be exacted by Great Britain and France from Russia with reference to the annihilation of Russian supremacy in the Black Sea.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 614.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 518.)
Berlin, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 247 of the 14th instant reached me yesterday.

I have endeavoured, in the course of conversation with Baron Manteuffel, to discover in what sense Count Bernstoff had reported to his Excellency the conversation he had held with your Lordship, when urging on the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government the request of the Cabinet of Vienna, that England and France should consent to enter upon negotiations in consequence of the four bases having been accepted by Russia, but he was not inclined to be communicative on the subject. He seemed, in fact, to attach but little importance to the contents of Count Bernstoff's despatch, and to be for the moment completely absorbed with the reality of the difficulties of the present position of Prussia, without, however, suggesting any means of getting out of them; he appears to consider that, although the mission of Baron Usedom will fail in attaining the object that the King had in view, it may still lead to something of a more decided character; that time will at all events be gained; and that after having supported the Austrian communication on the four bases, and its having failed, he had no reproach to make to himself of not having done all in his power to reestablish peace in Europe.

His Excellency is under the impression that our interpretation of the four bases of negotiation with Russia will not be accepted, and that if even a Conference does take place at Vienna, there will be but one, and that Prussia would thus only compromise herself by joining in a Conference that is unlikely to have a peaceful result. A few weeks may then be gained before any further decision need be taken, and time will be allowed for the invention of schemes and projects for the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 615.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 519.)
Berlin, December 22, 1854.

My Lord,

I ENDEAVOURED to find out to-day from Baron Manteuffel the impressions that had been made at St. Petersburgh by the Treaty of the 2nd December.

His Excellency replied that it had been taken, according to his accounts, with great calmness, and that Count Nesselrode had insinuated that he was quite prepared for some act of this sort. This was all he knew, and he confirmed what had been said for some time past, that the Emperor is most desirous to make peace on the four bases, but that he does not think there is the least chance of his agreeing to the interpretations said to have been put upon these points by Her Majesty's and the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 616.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 520.)
Berlin, December 22, 1854.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL mentioned to me to-day that Baron Budberg had communicated to him a despatch lately received from St. Petersburgh, alluding, as I understand, to the relations of Austria and the Western Powers. He said that this despatch was drawn up in a manner which compromised the Cabinet of Berlin, and would lead to the belief that there was an intimate understanding between and Russia and Prussia which did not exist; and what was worse, he said, that this despatch was in lithograph, and that he believed it was intended to appear in the newspapers. He added that he should prepare an answer which would place matters in their true light; but he avoided entering into any details connected with this affair.

However, I took the opportunity of observing that if Prussia would but decide on the course she intended to follow, all these deplorable misunderstandings would be avoided, and that the moment was fast approaching when she must do so, and that I thought she could not too soon nor too publicly place matters in their true light, for her own advantage as well as for that of others.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 617.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 522. Confidential.)
Berlin, December 22, 1854.

My Lord,

COLONEL MANTEUFFEL, one of the King of Prussia's aides-de-camp who has been frequently employed to carry Royal letters and messages, was sent off last night to Vienna. He called on me a couple of hours before his departure, and told me that he was only charged with a letter from the King for the Emperor of Austria, and that he did not expect to be long absent.

The Minister President spoke to me also to-day on the subject, and said that although the letter was written in a colder shape than usual, the King felt very desirous to see the road opened for establishing a good understanding with Austria. On the other hand I have been given to understand from quarters which I believe to be well informed, that the King is endeavouring to urge the Emperor of Austria to consider well the position of Germany before His Imperial Majesty embarks further in an alliance with the Western Powers. I believe, in fact, that the main object of the King in this mission of Colonel Manteuffel, is to discover the final intentions of Austria with regard to the Treaty of the 2nd December, in order that he may try to bring himself to some decision as to his own policy in this matter.

I understand that answers have been received to inquiries addressed by this Government to the small German Courts as to their intentions in the event of an offensive and defensive alliance being concluded between Austria and the Western Powers, which are not satisfactory to His Prussian Majesty, inasmuch as they indicate a willingness to unite their policy with Austria, but at the same time I do not hear that there is any diminution in the feelings of the King with reference to the maintenance of Prussian neutrality under any circumstances.

At Court matters are unchanged, except that there appears to be less desire to separate from Austria than was pretended last week; and Count Esterhazy, in speaking to Baron Manteuffel on the subject of Baron Usedom's mission, has told him that his Government would certainly prefer the accession of Prussia to the Treaty of the 2nd of December to any other arrangement that might be suggested. Still his private opinion was, that an understanding with

England and France would be of advantage to the general cause, as it might become the means of hereafter leading the two German Powers into closer union in the Oriental question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 618.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 25.*)

(No. 523.)

Berlin, December 22, 1854.

My Lord,

AN article, of which I inclose herewith a copy in original and in translation, lately appeared in the "Kreuz Zeitung," giving the "analysis" of a despatch which was stated to have been addressed by the Prussian Government to the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna.

At a late interview with Baron Manteuffel, I took occasion to refer to this subject and to inquire whether he had written any such despatch.

His Excellency at once stated that this analysis was a pure invention and he promised that a reputation of its authenticity should be published. In conformity with which, an article to that intent was inserted in the ministerial organ, the "Preussische Correspondenz," of which I transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy and translation.

The original text, however, of this despatch to which the "analysis" referred, has been since published by the "Allgemeine Zeitung" and reproduced in the Berlin papers, and I have the honour to forward to your Lordship, herewith, a copy of it accompanied by a French translation.

Your Lordship may be enabled to judge by this transaction how sedulously the "Kreuz Zeitung" seeks to poison the public mind, without any regard to facts or truth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 618.

Extract from the "Kreuz Zeitung."

(Translation.)

WE have received from Paris the analysis of a Prussian circular despatch to the Prussian Minister at the Courts of London, Paris, and Vienna. We reproduce it here without being answerable for its authenticity, although our correspondent is generally well informed. The despatch is said to have stated something near the following:—

"In the difficult circumstances in which Europe is placed, the German Government have hitherto been solely guided by their love for peace. In the interest of all Europe and for the attainment of a great end, they have urged the Russian Cabinet to accept conditions which a year ago no one would have thought possible that Russia could accept. The Emperor of Russia yielding to the urgently expressed wishes and desire of his old ally, has given a proof of an extraordinary moderation. The concessions which he has made go to the furthest limit of what is compatible with his dignity. If the monstrous demands which are put forth in certain organs should be submitted at a Conference, the German Government would in no way support them, and the responsibility of an European conflict would recoil heavily on the authors of such pretensions."

Inclosure 2 in No. 618.

Extract from the "Preussische Correspondenz."

(Translation.)

THE "Preussische Correspondenz" states as follows:—"In several newspapers (not in the 'National Zeitung') has been inserted from the new Prussian Gazette, or 'Kreuz Zeitung,' a reported analysis of a Prussian circular despatch to their Ministers at the Courts of London, Paris, and Vienna. The 'Kreuz Zeitung' has with perfect reason added to this intelligence the cautious remarks that they did not guarantee the genuineness of it. On our part we can give the certain assurance that no document of the said nature exists."

Inclosure 3 in No. 618.

Prussian Circular to her Representatives at London and Paris.

M. le Comte,

VOTRE Excellence a eu dans le temps connaissance de la dépêche que, le 21 Octobre, j'ai adressée à l'Envoyé du Roi à St. Pétersbourg, pour engager une fois de plus le Cabinet Impérial de Russie à accepter, sans réserve, comme base de négociations, les quatre points qui lui avaient été proposés à cet effet par nous et par l'Autriche, et à se déclarer dans ce sens non seulement envers nous, mais directement à Vienne. Vous savez également, M. le Comte, que notre démarche a d'abord eu pour résultat une dépêche du Comte de Nesselrode au Baron de Budberg, par laquelle celui-ci fut autorisé à nous déclarer que l'Empereur Nicolas était disposé à prendre part à des négociations auxquelles les quatre points serviraient de point de départ. Or, dans cette déclaration les quatre points n'étaient pas formulés selon leur rédaction primitive. La dépêche Russe contenait en outre des appréciations tellement erronées sur la situation de l'Allemagne et ses rapports avec la Russie, que nous ne jugions point convenable d'y donner suite. Nous exprimions au contraire au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg nos regrets de ce qu'il n'avait pas suivi nos conseils, en déclarant à celui de Vienne son adhésion aux quatre points, et nous renouvelions nos instances pour qu'il suppléât et modifiât sous ce rapport les ouvertures qu'il nous avait faites. Nos essorts à cet effet ne restèrent pas infructueux, et l'Envoyé du Roi à St. Pétersbourg nous mandait, par le télégraphe, que le Prince Gortchakoff avait été autorisé, par le même voie, à déclarer au Comte de Buol l'adhésion de la Russie aux quatre points qui lui avaient été recommandés par l'Autriche. Le Représentant Russe à Vienne s'acquitta de cet ordre par la note ci-jointe en copie du 28 Novembre, et le Comte Buol y répondit le 30, comme votre Excellence le verra par la seconde annexe.

D'ordre du Roi, M. le Comte, je m'empresse de vous inviter à porter ces ouvertures pacifiques de la Russie à la connaissance du Cabinet de Paris (Londres). M. votre Collègue d'Autriche se trouvera chargé d'une communication analogue. Vous associerez donc votre langage au sien, afin de recommander avec instance la déclaration Russe à un accueil favorable de la part du Gouvernement Français (Britannique). Que celui-ci veuille bien peser l'ensemble de la situation générale, pour se convaincre qu'il n'y a pas lieu de laisser prédominer la méfiance, ni de supposer des arrière-pensées, où le désir d'arriver à une entente est général et sincère. Nous concevons parfaitement les exigences que l'état de guerre dans lequel les Puissances Occidentales se trouvent avec la Russie leur impose, mais nous avons de la peine à croire que, puisque la Russie admet sans réserve et sans détour une base de négociation que les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres (Londres et Paris) avaient formulée eux-mêmes, il y aura peu de temps, ceux-ci voudront ou devront se refuser à entrer dans une voie qui, sans préjuger nos chances des succès militaires, est pourtant de nature à offrir la possibilité d'abréger une guerre meurtrière, en lui opposant la barrière d'une volonté modérée, mais sérieuse et unie. En vous acquittant de la présente communication, vous pouvez vous prévaloir, M. le Comte, du haut prix que le Roi notre auguste Maître, attache

à marcher d'accord avec les Puissances Européennes, pour exprimer à M. Drouyn de Lhuys (Lord Clarendon) le vif intérêt avec lequel nous attendons vos rapports sur l'accueil qu'aura trouvé votre langage auprès du Cabinet de Paris (Londres).

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 619.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 351.)

My Lord, *Copenhagen, December* 19, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a note which I have received from M. de Scheel, communicating to me a report from Baron Plessen, respecting an inquiry which was instituted by the Russian authorities on his having represented to Count Nesselrode, that some English prisoners of war on proceeding to England to be exchanged, had complained of the manner in which they had been treated by their escort on their march from Rasan to St. Petersburgh.

From the statement of the prisoners themselves, it would appear that, whatever foundation may have existed for their previous complaint, they were satisfied with their treatment, and with the conduct of their escort, when overtaken on their journey to the frontier by an officer sent from St. Petersburgh to make inquiries on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 619.

M. Scheel to Mr. Buchanan.

Monsieur, *Copenhagen, le 18 Décembre,* 1854.

JE m'empresse d'avoir l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-près en copies, un rapport avec deux annexes que le Ministre du Roi à St. Pétersbourg vient de m'adresser pour l'information du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et par lequel le dit Ministre rend compte des démarches qu'il a faites auprès du Cabinet Impérial, après avoir été informé qu'un convoi de prisonniers de guerre Anglais envoyés dans leur patrie avaient formés des plaintes contre les soldats chargés de les garder.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) SCHEEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 619.

Baron Plessen to M. de Bluhme.

Monsieur, *St. Pétersbourg,* $\frac{\text{4 Décembre}}{\text{23 Novembre}}$ 1854.

IL y a environ trois semaines qu'un convoi de prisonniers de guerre Anglais a passé par St. Pétersbourg. C'étaient ceux des prisonniers qui étaient tombés au pouvoir des Russes en Finlande et qui, ayant été dirigés sur Rasan, étaient revenus sur leur pas par suite de l'acceptation de la proposition d'échange.

Durant les quarante-huit heures qu'ils ont passé à St. Pétersbourg, ils avaient été en relations avec quelques-uns de leurs compatriotes, et le Docteur Law, sur l'invitation qui lui en avait été faite, les avait visités.

Ces prisonniers avaient formé des plaintes contre les soldats chargés de les garder, et ces plaintes étaient parvenues à ma connaissance, sans cependant avoir été bien distinctement formulées.

La population des endroits par lesquels ces prisonniers avaient passé, avait été bonne et hospitalière pour eux, mais la garde préposée à leur surveillance

ne les avait pas toujours ménagés comme elle aurait dû le faire. C'est tout ce que j'ai pu apprendre à l'égard de leurs plaintes.

J'ai cru de mon devoir d'en parler à M. le Chancelier de l'Empire, et le Comte de Nesselrode a bien voulu porter mes observations à la connaissance du Ministre de la Guerre. Le Prince Dolgorouky a ordonné, à ce qu'on me dit, une enquête, et a envoyé un employé de confiance sur la route de Varsovie, où ces prisonniers ont été dirigés de St. Pétersbourg, pour s'enquérir de l'état dans lequel ils se trouvent.

Cet employé a rejoint les prisonniers entre Lougao et Pskof, et la notice du Ministre de la Guerre, ainsi que la déclaration, ci-jointes en copie, signée par ces prisonniers de guerre, rendent compte de leur situation, qui ne paraît pas être mauvaise.

Je ne saurais assez me louer de l'empressement que j'ai rencontré en cette circonstance de la part du Chancelier de l'Empire et du Prince Dolgorouky.

(Signé) PLESSEN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 619.

Report.

M. LE MINISTRE DE LA GUERRE ayant été informé que les prisonniers Anglais envoyés dans leur patrie avaient formés des plaintes contre les gardes qui les ont accompagnés de la Finlande à St. Pétersbourg, s'est empressé d'envoyer un employé de confiance chargé de s'assurer de la manière dont ils sont traités sur la route de Varsovie.

Cet employé, M. Louve, a atteint le convoi entre Lougo et Pskou. Il a vu les prisonniers et les a interrogés. Ils lui ont unanimement exprimé leur gratitude pour la douceur que les préposés à leur garde apportaient dans leurs relations avec eux. Ils ont déclarés avoir exactement reçu le 3 Novembre, à St. Pétersbourg, l'argent que le Gouvernement Anglais leur a envoyé.

En route il leur est payé tous les trois jours six roubles argent, ou comptant vingt kopecks par homme journellement. Ces paiemens, et les fonds dont ils disposent, les mettent dans la possibilité de procurer une nourriture abondante.

Les prisonniers sont pourvus de linge, d'habits, d'une pelisse de mouton et de bottes. Ils viennent de recevoir de galoches avec de la fourrure, et l'un d'eux des bottes chaudes. L'un des dix prisonniers est seul indisposé, ayant pris froid avant d'arriver à St. Pétersbourg, mais ne voulant pas se séparer de ses comrades est parti avec eux. Les autres marchent de bonne humeur, et paraissent fort satisfaits de leur position.

Sur la demande qui leur a été faite d'une déclaration attestant la réception de l'argent qui leur revient, ils ont tous signé l'écrit ci-joint en copie, qui atteste de plus qu'ils n'ont aucune plainte à former.

Inclosure 4 in No. 619.

Declaration.

November 24, 1854.

WE, the Undersigned, prisoners of war, certify that we have received the money sent by the British Government, and we likewise receive twenty copecks per day, and we are well pleased with the treatment we receive from the Russian Government. We are likewise very well treated by the soldiers in charge of us.

(Signed)

ALF. BOWLES.	THOS. EVANS.
GEORGE BIMMARET.	EDWD. TANDAY.
FRANCIS HAWTEN.	JOSEPH KINGSCOMBE.
GEORGE FERRIS.	W. GREENAWAY.
JOHN JAMES.	DAVID PICKARD.

No. 620.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 112.)

Bucharest, November 30, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship is aware that, after the occupation by the Russians of the Provinces in 1849, Russia exacted from the Principalities payment of the expenses of that occupation; the Turks declined making any such demand on the country.

To enable the provinces to meet this extraordinary and very onerous demand, a communication was made by the Imperial Chancelry at St. Petersburgh to the Russian Commissioner, and by him communicated to the Prince, who acknowledges its receipt in the note of which copy is inclosed, sanctioning the imposition of a tax on all the "contribuables" and possessors of land throughout the country. Appended to the above note will be found the office of the Prince Hospodar confirming the said proposal; consequently the matter passed into a law.

This tax, collected under the title of "Amortissement de la Dette envers la Russie," amounts to three piastres, a tenth of the capitation charged on all the peasants, of the six piastres which the proprietors pay for each family of peasants on their estates, and of five per cent. of the revenues of the uninhabited lands. This tax is collected half-yearly; it amounts to something near 3,000,000 piastres (46,000*l.*) annually: it has been regularly collected from 1849 to June 1852, and has been appropriated to the purpose for which it was destined. The proceeds of the last half-year of 1852, and the whole of that of 1853, amounting to about 4,140,000 piastres (68,000*l.*), were paid into the Chancelry of the Russian Consulate here, in terms of a note from Count Nesselrode.

For the last half-year this tax is now in course of collection, and is being deposited in a chest of the Treasury specially set apart for this purpose.

I was waited upon, a few days ago, by some large landed proprietors who told me that summonses have been issued to the administrators of the districts, to collect the tax for the identical purpose, in virtue of a princely ordinance. Many have refused to pay it.

I think it right to call your Lordship's especial attention to this fact,—that such a tax should be imposed and collected, at such a period, for such a purpose. I have set inquiries on foot to ascertain up to what period the tribute due by the provinces to the Sublime Porte has been paid, and what measures have been taken to pay up the arrears.

In 1849, Fuad Effendi, then Ottoman Commissioner, complained not only of General Duhamel, who did not even consult him on the subject of this war tax, but also of the Prince Stirbey, who adopted the measure without bringing it before the Turkish Commissioner; nay, further, when the Turkish forces were pressed for money about the same time, and Fuad proposed that a year's tribute to the Porte should be paid in advance, General Duhamel by note to the Wallachian Government refused to consent to the proposal, and formally protested against it. Five years have now contributed nearly 15,000,000 of piastres; the total required from the two provinces was about 30,000,000, of which Wallachia was to contribute 16,000,000, and Moldavia 14,000,000. Russia, during the last eighteen months, has largely drawn upon this exhausted Treasury, whose different chests are much dilapidated. It would now be an act of but common justice that the sum now in the Treasury should be sequestrated; that the sums taken from the peasantry should be restored to those particular districts which have most suffered during the late occupation, such as Vlasha (Giurgevo), Jalonitza (Calarash, opposite Silistria), Ibraila, and Fokschani; that part of the fund taken from the proprietors may be retained and applied to various useful purposes, such as forming roads, the increase of the militia, &c. But under the present ruler there is little chance of anything of the kind being done, except by the means of a firman from the Porte; and if this be obtained, a committee of proper upright people should be appointed to superintend the distribution of the returned fund to the hands of the peasantry, independent entirely of the Boyards or governors

of districts, who seldom or never disgorge any funds which once have reached their hands. I abstain from further comment, and leave the matter in your Lordship's hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure in No. 620.

Prince Stirbey to General Duhamel.

29 Novembre, 1849.

M. le Général,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 28 courant; et dont le contenu se rattache aux voies et moyens par lesquels la Valachie pourra le plus facilement se libérer des engagements pécuniaires qu'elle vient de contracter pour le remboursement successif des avances que le Gouvernement Impérial a faites jusqu'ici ou qu'il fera dans la suite afin de faciliter les revivements de la vestiarie pour subvenir aux frais d'approvisionnement des troupes Impériales Russes qui occupent le pays.

Votre Excellence veut bien me faire connaître qu'à cet effet le Ministère Impérial a autorisé le Gouvernement de la Principauté à prélever exceptionnellement et pour cette seule fois, en sus de l'impôt ordinaire, deux dixièmes additionnelles, dont une dixième serait reparti sur les contribuables et l'autre dixième exigible des propriétaires et seigneurs des terres ou villages, &c.

Office du Prince au Conseil Administratif Extraordinaire No. 285, le 7/8 Février, 1854:

Après délibération il a été décidé que les deux dixièmes du second terme seront prélevés.

Nous ordonnons au Département des Finances de prendre aussitôt les mesures nécessaires pour le recouvrement des sommes de cet impôt, lesquelles seront conservées dans une caisse séparée de la vestiarie pour servir au paiement de la dette du pays, &c.

No. 621.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 435.)

Foreign Office, December 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship a despatch in original from Her Majesty's Consul at Jassy, forwarding a correspondence which has taken place between the Ottoman and Austrian authorities on the subject of the arrest of certain individuals by orders of Sadyk Pasha; and I have to instruct your Lordship to call Count Buol's attention to the arbitrary proceedings of General Coronini, and his hostile language towards the Ottoman authorities, as well as his open protection of all persons who have taken part with the Russians, or are supposed to be friendly to them. It is painful to be constantly obliged to prefer complaints against Austrian Generals who are not acting in conformity with the instructions of their Government; but Count Buol will doubtless take effectual measures for putting a check upon such conduct at a moment when and in a locality where it is essential to uphold the Sultan's authority, and to mark the distinction between Russian and Austrian occupation of her territory.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 622.

Captain Conyers to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 13.)

Vienna, December 19, 1854.

My Lord,

ACCORDING to the latest Austrian official accounts, the force under Marshal Paskiewitch is mentioned at 194,100 men, with 604 pieces of artillery; showing (since the last report on this army made to your Lordship by Brigadier-General Du Plat) an increase of 13,886 men, with 32 pieces of artillery.

At the end of November there were, in Poland Proper, 132,490 men, with 392 guns.

36,100 men, with 112 guns, form the right wing, which is composed of the 1st Division of Infantry (12,000 men and 48 guns), under General Reitern, with head-quarters at Radom. The 3rd Division (12,800 and 48 guns), under General Dyken, is at Kielce. The 4th Brigade of Infanterie de Réserve (6,800 men with 8 guns), Major-General Zukowsky, is in the province of Radom. The 1st Battalion of Chasseurs (800), and the 1st Battalion of Sappers (600), are stationed at Skalmirz and Radom. The 3rd Pulk of the Regular Cossacks of the Don at Pilica; the 8th Pulk, with No. 8 Battery of the Don, at Michew; No. 24 Pulk at Olbrom; one Division of Caucasian Mountaineers at Kalish: in all, 2,300 men and 8 guns. The left wing, 39,440 men with 120 guns, between the Bug and the Pilica; head-quarters at Lublin. At Lublin, 4th Division of Infantry, under General Schepelew; Betreo, 4th Brigade Artillery (800 men, 48 guns)—12,000 men, 48 guns.

Krzesrow: 5th Division Infantry, General Labinzow; Chem and Krasmistaw: 2nd Brigade—12,800 men, 48 guns.

Zamosc: 9th Brigade Infanterie Réserve under General Pinc, 6,800 men, 8 guns.

Kramistaw and Chelm: 1st Regiment Hussars; 2nd Division Light Cavalry; Dubcenka: 2nd Brigade Mounted Artillery (400 men, 16 guns)—4,240 men, 16 guns

Opole: 1 Battalion of Chasseurs; Ivangorod: 2nd Battalion Sappers, and 1st Battalion Sapeurs de Réserve—2,200 men.

Tomaschow: 1 Pulk Cossacks (600).

The centre of this army, with head-quarters at Warsaw, is commanded by General Zerkow (aide-de-camp to the Emperor); it is formed of 56,950 men, and 160 guns.

Warsaw: 2nd Division Grenadiers, 13,700 men and 48 guns.

At Krylow: 3rd Division Grenadiers, 13,700 men, with 48 guns.

Of the latter force, the 1st Brigade is at Warsaw, the 2nd Brigade at Petrikau, Kowa, and Biala.

At Kutno, the 7th Division of Light Cavalry, General Pzittwitz, 4,240 men, with 16 guns.

Curulle: the 6th Brigade Infanterie de Réserve—6,800 men and 8 guns.

Brezeslitiwik: the 5th Brigade, 6,800 men, with 8 guns.

Ivangorod: 1st Battalion Sapeurs de Réserve, 800 men.

At Warsaw, the 1st Battalion of Grenadiers, the Garde du Corps Cosaques, and various other Cossack corps; also one Division of Transcaucasian Mahometans. In all amounting to 4,110 men and 24 guns.

In the Provinces of Curland and Kowno under General Sievers, 18,440 men, with 64 guns.

At the end of November, the 1st Division of Infantry, under General Dorobychow, marched into Poland. The 1st Division of Light Cavalry was also on the march to Poland, commanded by Brigadier-General Korff. This force amounted to 17,840 men, and 64 guns. The 44th Pulk of the Cossacks of the Don is dispersed over different points along the coast;—43,170 men, with 148 guns, form the grand reserve, with head-quarters at Vilna, and under the command of the Hereditary Grand Duke. It is composed of the following corps:—

At Vilna, the 1st Division of Infantry of the Guard, General Möller, 10,800 men and 36 guns.

At Grodno and Byrlystock, the 2nd Division of Infantry Guards, with the 5th Light Battery, and 3rd and 4th Battalions of Sappers, under the command of Aide-de-Camp General Brossimow, 10,800 men with 36 guns.

At Szcynezyn, the 3rd Division of Guards, with the 5th and 6th batteries de position (these are heavy foot artillery batteries), also the 5th and 6th Light Batteries. In all, 10,800 men and 36 guns: also, one battallion Sapeurs de la Garde, 800 men, and the Batallion Chasseurs de Finlande, 800 men.

At the end of November, 24 squadrons, 2,880 men of the Cuirassiers of the Guard under General Essen, marched to Warsaw; also, the 1st Battery of the Horse Artillery of the Guard, and No. 1 Light Battery also of Nova Artillery, and the Division of Mounted (Pioneers) Sappers and Miners, together, 8,930 men, and 16 guns. The 2nd Division of the Cavalry of the Guard, 18 squadrons at 180 horses, making 2,160 men, with No. 3 Battery of the Light Horse Artillery of the Guard, 2,680 men and 8 guns. At Keswick and Iconim, under General Tissolt, the 1st Division Light Cavalry of the Guard, 2,160 men, with the Light Horse Artillery Battery of the Guard. No. 2 Battery of the Garde du Corps du Don, and half-a-squadron of the Crimean Tartars of the Guard, making 2,660 men and 8 guns.

This makes up 194,100 men, with 604 field-pieces, which is stated to be the force for active operations at present under the command of Marshal Prince Paskiewitch.

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, that I have just heard the total available force of the Russian Empire, at the present moment, is placed at 829,204 men, and 2,372 pieces of field artillery.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES CONYERS.

No. 623.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1,572.)

Paris, December 26, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE been informed confidentially that Count Hatzfeldt had received instructions, under date the 19th instant, to explain to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Prussian Government, though admitting that the Treaty of the 2nd instant is based in terms which have received the sanction of the King of Prussia, cannot meet the wishes of the English, Austrian, and French Governments, that His Majesty should adhere to that Treaty. M. Manteuffel adds, that the King would have less objection to enter into some separate arrangement with the Western Powers, and he expresses a wish to be made acquainted with the interpretation which they give to the four points, on which the Treaty of Vienna is founded.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys being indisposed, I have been unable to see his Excellency to ascertain the answer which he returned to Count Hatzfeldt's communication, but I am informed that the substance of it is, that it will be impossible for the French Government to enter into any Treaty with the King of Prussia which contains less than the Treaty of Vienna, but that if the Prussian Government should do that which is most unlikely, viz., offer to enter into more stringent engagements against Russia, there could be no longer any objection on the part of the French Government to enumerate such engagements by Treaty.

I understand that Count Hatzfeldt observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that to ask Prussia to adhere to the Treaty of the 2nd instant, was to ask her to do that which had not common sense, for that in no way could the 2nd Article relating to the Principalities be made applicable to her, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted that if Prussia adhered to the sense of the political part of that Treaty, a new instrument to be signed by the four Powers would become necessary.

It may not be impossible that Prussia may have something of this kind in view, so as not to have the appearance of adhering to an Act which was already signed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 624.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul-General Colquhoun.

(No. 34.) *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1854.

Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No. 112 of the 30th of November, I have to convey to you the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the collection of a tax for Russia at this time reflects disgrace on the Hospodar of Wallachia; and I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of making Prince Stirbey aware that all his acts since he returned are known to Her Majesty's Government, who perceive with surprise and regret that his feelings in favour of Russia are as strong as they were before the late Russian invasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 625.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 819.) *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT for your Excellency's information a copy of a telegraphic despatch* which I have received to-day from the Earl of Westmorland, reporting what took place between himself, Baron de Bourqueney, Count Buol, and the Russian Minister at Vienna, on the occasion of their communicating to Prince Gortchakoff the interpretation put by the allies on the four bases for the negotiation of peace with Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 626.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 821.) *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration General Williams's despatch No. 44 of the 7th of November, and it is with regret, or it would be more appropriate to say with indignation, that they have again to complain of the conduct of the Turkish officers at Kars.

Her Majesty's Government have sent to the head-quarters of the unfortunate army at Kars a distinguished officer, whose knowledge and experience peculiarly fitted him for the service, and it is not too much to say that he has preserved the remnants of the army from the destruction that awaited it at the hands of its commanders.

He has already saved large sums to the Sultan by checking the most barefaced robberies, and yet it appears, that without respect for the character of General Williams as the Commissioner of the Queen of England, or regard for the Sultan's service, General Williams is exposed to affront from Shukri Pasha and the Chief of the Staff, who endeavour to prevent his acquiring the information that the Turkish Government are deeply interested that he should possess, in the vain hope that he may be disheartened and foiled, and that the system of plunder may recommence.

But General Williams must be upheld, and Her Majesty's Government must insist that his exertions to render the army at Kars fit to take the field in the spring should be aided by the Turkish Government.

Your Excellency will take the means you may think most expedient for bringing this despatch to the knowledge of the Turkish Government, but Her Majesty's Government desire that it should be by a written communication.

* No. 627.

Your Excellency will require that the most stringent instructions shall be sent to the Mushir to respect and support General Williams, and your Excellency will obtain a copy of those instructions and send it to General Williams.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 627.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 28, 1854.

WE signed the Protocol this day. The express meeting with the Russian Minister, as settled by Count Buol, took place shortly afterwards, the object being only to inform him of the interpretation put by our Governments on the four Articles. Each had a memorandum containing this interpretation, which was read out by the French Ambassador. The Russian Minister declared that he was unable to adhere to our interpretation, particularly of the third guarantee. Nevertheless, he attempted to separate the Austrian Plenipotentiary from the other two, but Count Buol remained firmly united to his colleagues. The Russian Minister asked if we could communicate to him the document we had read. The French Ambassador agreed to do so, stating expressly that no name was attached to it, and that it was intended only to aid his memory. He sends it by courier to St. Petersburgh, and conformably with your Lordship's instructions, in your despatch No. 422, we fixed a delay of fifteen days for a reply. We agreed to this, because the Russian Minister, whilst refusing to adhere to our interpretation, declared that he could not reject it without reference to his Court. The firmness of Count Buol appeared to produce a painful impression on the Russian Minister.

No. 628.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1854.

YOUR despatch of the 28th has been received, and has given much satisfaction. I hope Austria has announced to Russia that a rejection of the terms will be considered equivalent to a declaration of war.

No. 629.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 756.) *Therapia, December* 14, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch which I received this morning from Her Majesty's Consul at Varna.

It appears, from Colonel Neale's report, that 6,000 of the troops selected by Omer Pasha for an expedition to the Crimea had already embarked, and others were expected to arrive shortly on the coast for the same destination.

At the request of the Porte, I have applied to Admiral Boxer for steam-vessels to assist in conveying to the Crimea provisions and ammunition for the use of the Turkish troops.

Copies of my letter, and of Admiral Boxer's reply, are inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 629.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, December 11, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the embarkation of the Turkish troops proceeding to the Crimea continues with great activity, favoured by the fine weather which for the last ten days has prevailed since.

With the troops which will leave in the "Tynemouth," probably this evening, 6,000 Infantry, a battery of artillery, and Cavalry horses, will already have left Varna.

It is now expected that the same transports, and probably some additional ones, will return here from Eupatoria, where the troops are to be landed.

Your Lordship will be informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, that he returned here yesterday from the Crimea, and that he conveys to his Highness Omer Pasha, Lord Raglan's and General Canrobert's acceptance of his Highness' offer to send twenty-four additional battalions to the Crimea, and which it is generally believed his Highness will command in person. Some of these battalions, it is reported, are already on the march towards Varna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD ST. JNO. NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 629.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Rear-Admiral Boxer.

Therapia, December 11, 1854.

My Lord.

THE Turkish Government is particularly anxious to secure sufficient means of steam conveyance for the provisions and ammunition which they are called upon by the allies to send from Varna or Baltchik to the Crimea, and I am officially requested to bring the subject to your knowledge, in the earnest hope, which I most strenuously partake, that in concert with the French authorities you may be able to make arrangements for meeting their demands, and thereby enabling them to fulfil their engagements towards the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces in the Crimea.

It appears that the application has not been made by the Turkish Government until the inefficiency of their own means for the proposed object is, unfortunately, quite apparent.

I beg to recommend this important matter to your early and serious attention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 629.

Rear-Admiral Boxer to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Harpy," at Constantinople, December 13, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 11th instant, requesting me to afford steam conveyance to the Turkish Government for the provisions and ammunition which they are called upon by the allies to send from Varna or Baltchik to the Crimea.

I can assure your Excellency that I should have great pleasure in affording the assistance, but I have not steam-power at the present time to carry on the urgent services required by our army. I will, however, immediately forward a

copy of your Excellency's letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, who may be able to appropriate some of the steamers now at the Crimea for this service.

The number of steamers damaged by the gale of the 14th November has much crippled our resources.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD BOXER.

No. 630.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 763.)

Constantinople, December 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's instruction No. 768 of the 4th instant, yesterday evening.

At an early hour this morning I saw His Majesty the Sultan, and afterwards the Grand Vizier, on the subject of its contents. I am happy to say that both the Sovereign and his Minister received with favour the proposals which I was authorized by your Lordship to make. The Sultan, in particular, showed signs of satisfaction as I unfolded the plan, to which Her Majesty's Government attach so just an importance.

Reshid Pasha very naturally observed, that, however favourable his own sentiments were to the acceptance of my suggestions, it was desirable that he should take the opinion of his principal colleagues. I assented to this reservation, requesting only that the communication might be made to the Ministers in a confidential form, though calculated to draw out an official decision. I urged, moreover, the importance of dispatch. His Highness, in answer to an inquiry on my side, authorized me, in the meantime, to inform your Lordship that he anticipated no serious difficulty.

We deferred all question of particulars to a future occasion, and I hastened home, after a long and fatiguing ride, to address these few lines to your Lordship, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, before the departure, if possible, of the French mail-packet, having the messenger Ball on board.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 631.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 822.)

Foreign Office, December 30, 1854.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch* from Lord Westmorland, by which your Excellency will see that evil consequences have arisen from the delay of the Porte in sending instructions to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna, with respect to his proceedings as a member of the Commission established at Vienna to deal with questions arising out of the occupation of the Principalities by the Austrians.

It appears by Inclosure No. 1 in your Excellency's despatch No. 654 of the 10th of November, that the formation of the Commission and the approval of the English and French Governments were made known to the Porte through the Turkish Ambassador, by a despatch of the 30th of October, and your Excellency will inquire why no notice has been taken of the communication in question.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 607.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 632.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 445.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Bucharest, reporting the continued levy of a Russian war-tax by the Hospodar of Wallachia; and I have to observe that it is really disgraceful that the Hospodar should be collecting a tax for Russia from the exhausted and impoverished peasantry. A tax imposed in 1849 for the repayment of Russia ought certainly not to be collected in 1854, either for Russia or for Prince Stirbey. If any doubts existed before as to the unfitness of Prince Stirbey for the post he occupies, and of his faithlessness to the Suzerain Power, and of his understanding with Russia, they must now be removed. The allies of the Sultan must not permit the supreme authority in Wallachia to be entrusted to such hands.

You will communicate to Count Buol the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 620.